Many contemporaries are convinced that in the past historians paid little attention to such an event as the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Briefly, but as accessible as possible, we will discuss this episode in the history of Russia. After all, he, like any war, in any case, the history of the state.
Let's try to analyze such an event as the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, briefly, but as clearly as possible. First of all, for ordinary readers.
Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 (briefly)
The main opponents of this armed conflict were the Russian and Ottoman empires.
Many important events took place during it. The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (briefly described in this article) left a mark on the history of almost all participating countries.
On the side of the Porte (an acceptable name for the history of the Ottoman Empire) were the Abkhaz, Dagestan and Chechen rebels, as well as the Polish Legion.
Russia, in turn, was supported by the Balkans.
Causes of the Russo-Turkish War
First of all, we will analyze the main causes of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (briefly).
The main reason for starting the war was a significant increase in national consciousness in some Balkan countries.
This kind of public sentiment was associated with the April uprising in Bulgaria. The cruelty and ruthlessness with which the Bulgarian rebellion was suppressed forced some European countries (especially the Russian Empire) to show sympathy for the Christians in Turkey.
Another reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the defeat of Serbia in the Serbian-Montenegrin-Turkish war, as well as the failed Constantinople Conference.
The course of the war
On April 24, 1877, the Russian Empire officially declared war on the Porte. After the solemn parade in Chisinau, Archbishop Pavel read out the manifesto of Emperor Alexander II at a prayer service, which spoke of the beginning of hostilities against the Ottoman Empire.
In order to avoid the intervention of European states, the war had to be carried out "quickly" - in one company.
In May of the same year, the troops of the Russian Empire were introduced into the territory of the Romanian state.
Romanian troops, in turn, began to take an active part in the conflict on the side of Russia and its allies only three months after this event.
The organization and readiness of the Russian army was noticeably affected by the military reform carried out at that time by Emperor Alexander II.
The Russian troops included about 700 thousand people. The Ottoman Empire had about 281 thousand people. Despite the significant numerical superiority of the Russians, a significant advantage of the Turks was the possession and equipping of the army with modern weapons.
It is worth noting that the Russian Empire intended to spend the entire war on land. The fact is that the Black Sea was completely under the control of the Turks, and Russia was allowed to build its ships in this sea only in 1871. Naturally, in such a short time it was impossible to build a strong flotilla.
This armed conflict was fought in two directions: in Asia and Europe.
European theater of operations
As we mentioned above, with the outbreak of the war, Russian troops were brought into Romania. This was done to eliminate the Danubian fleet of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the Danube crossings.
The Turkish river flotilla was unable to resist the actions of enemy sailors, and soon the Dnieper was forced by Russian troops. This was the first significant step towards Constantinople.
Despite the fact that the Turks were able to briefly delay the Russian troops and get time to fortify Istanbul and Edirne, they could not change the course of the war. Due to the inept actions of the military command of the Ottoman Empire, Plevna capitulated on December 10.
After this event, the active Russian army, which at that time numbered about 314 thousand soldiers, was preparing to go on the offensive again.
At the same time, Serbia resumes hostilities against the Porte.
On December 23, 1877, a raid through the Balkans was carried out by a Russian detachment, which at that moment was under the command of General Romeiko-Gurko, thanks to whom Sofia was occupied.
On December 27-28, a battle took place at Sheinovo, in which the troops of the Southern Detachment participated. The result of this battle was the encirclement and defeat of the 30 thousandth
On January 8, the troops of the Russian Empire, without any resistance, took one of the key points of the Turkish army - the city of Edirne.
Asian theater of operations
The main tasks of the Asian direction of the war were to ensure the security of their own borders, as well as the desire of the leadership of the Russian Empire to break the focus of the Turks exclusively on the European theater of operations.
The origin of the Caucasian company is considered to be the Abkhazian rebellion, which took place in May 1877.
Around the same time, Russian troops leave the city of Sukhum. It was only in August that he was brought back.
During operations in Transcaucasia, Russian troops captured many citadels, garrisons and fortresses: Bayazit, Ardagan, etc.
In the second half of the summer of 1877, the fighting was temporarily "frozen" for the reason that both sides were waiting for reinforcements to arrive.
Beginning in September, the Russians adopted siege tactics. So, for example, the city of Kars was taken, which opened the victorious path to Erzurum. However, his capture did not take place due to the conclusion of the San Stefano peace treaty.
The terms of this truce, in addition to Austria and England, were also dissatisfied with Serbia and Romania. It was believed that their merits in the war were not appreciated. This was the beginning of the birth of a new - Berlin - Congress.
The results of the Russian-Turkish war
The final stage will sum up the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (briefly).
There was an expansion of the borders of the Russian Empire: more specifically, Bessarabia, which was lost during
In exchange for helping the Ottoman Empire to defend itself against the Russians in the Caucasus, England stationed its troops on the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean.
Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 (briefly reviewed by us in this article) played a big role in international relations.
It gave rise to a gradual retreat from the confrontation between the Russian Empire and Great Britain for the reason that the countries began to focus more on their own interests (for example, Russia was interested in the Black Sea, and England was interested in Egypt).
Historians and the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878. Briefly describe the event
Despite the fact that this war is not considered as a particularly significant event in the history of the Russian state, a considerable number of historians have been studying it. The most famous researchers, whose contribution was noted as the most significant, are L.I. Rovnyakova, O.V. Orlik, F.T. Konstantinova, E.P. Lvov, etc.
They studied the biographies of the participating commanders and military leaders, significant events, summed up the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, briefly described in the presented publication. Naturally, all this was not in vain.
Economist A.P. Pogrebinsky believed that the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which briefly and quickly ended with the victory of the Russian Empire and its allies, had a huge impact primarily on the economy. An important role in this was played by the annexation of Bessarabia.
According to the Soviet politician Nikolai Belyaev, this military conflict was unfair, bearing an aggressive character. This statement, according to its author, is relevant both in relation to the Russian Empire and in relation to the Port.
It can also be said that the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, briefly described in this article, first of all showed the success of the military reform of Alexander II, both organizationally and technically.
Speaking briefly about the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, about the reasons that provoked its beginning, then, first of all, it is worth mentioning the brutal oppression of the Christian population of the Balkan territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire and included in its composition. This happened with the connivance and implementation by France and England of the "Turkophile" policy, which "turned a blind eye" to the killings of the civilian population and, in particular, to the wild atrocities of the Bashi-Bazouks.
background
The relationship of the two empires, the Russian and the Ottoman, has undergone a number of significant disagreements since their foundation, which led to frequent violent wars. In addition to territorial disputes, in particular, over the territory of the Crimean peninsula, the prerequisites for the emergence of conflicts were religious differences based on the fact that Russia was the successor of Byzantium, captured and plundered by Muslim Turks, who turned Christian shrines into Muslim ones. Raids on Russian settlements, the capture of inhabitants into slavery often led to military clashes. In short, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. was provoked precisely by the cruelty and intolerance of the Turks towards the Orthodox population.
Contributed to the development of Russian-Turkish disagreements and the position of European states, in particular Britain, who did not want the strengthening of Russia, which led to the Ottoman Empire's policy of toughening and oppressing enslaved Christians, mostly Orthodox: Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and other Balkan Slavs.
Conflict, its preconditions
The events that predetermined the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 can be briefly described as the struggle for the independence of the Balkan peoples, mainly Slavic and Orthodox. After the end of the Crimean War, the Treaty of Paris was signed, its Article 9 directly obliged the government of the Ottoman Empire to provide Christians living on its territory with equal rights with Muslims. But things did not go beyond the Sultan's decree.
The Ottoman Empire, in its essence, could not provide all residents with equality, as evidenced by the events of 1860 in Lebanon and the events of 1866-1869. on the island of Crete. The Balkan Slavs continued to be subjected to cruel oppression.
By that time in Russia there had been a change in domestic political sentiment towards the Turkish question in society, the strengthening of the power of the Russian army. The prerequisites for conducting preparations for the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 can be summarized in two paragraphs. The first is the successful reform in the Russian army carried out by Alexander II. The second is the policy of rapprochement and alliance with Prussia, which was emphasized by the new chancellor, the outstanding Russian politician Prince A. M. Gorchakov.
The main reasons for the start of the war
Briefly, the causes of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 can be characterized by two points. As the struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish enslavers and the strengthening of Russia, which wants to help the Slav brothers in their just struggle and seeks to take revenge for the lost war of 1853-1856.
The beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (briefly) was the summer rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prerequisites for which were an unjustified and exorbitant increase in taxes imposed by the Turkish government, which at that time was financially insolvent.
In the spring of 1876, for the same reason, there was an uprising in Bulgaria. More than 30,000 Bulgarians were killed during its suppression. Irregular units of bashi-bazouks distinguished themselves with special atrocities. All this became the property of the European public, which created an atmosphere of sympathy for the Balkan peoples and criticism of their government, which, thanks to tacit consent, contributed to this.
A similar wave of protests swept across Russia. The public of the country, concerned about the growth of violence against the Slavic peoples of the Balkans, expressed their dissatisfaction. Thousands of volunteers expressed their desire to help Serbia and Montenegro, which declared war on Turkey in 1876. Having suffered a defeat from the troops of the Porte, Serbia asked for help from European states, including Russia. The Turks declared a month-long truce. Let's say briefly: the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. was predetermined.
Russia's entry into the war
In October, the truce ended, the situation for Serbia became threatening, only the lightning entry of Russia into the war and the opportunity to end it in one company could deter England and France from invading. These countries, under the pressure of anti-Turkish public sentiment, decide to send their expeditionary forces to the Balkans. Russia, in turn, having held meetings with a number of European powers, such as Austria-Hungary, and having secured their neutrality, decides to send troops to the territory of Turkey.
Russia declares war on Turkey 04/12/1877 Russian troops enter the territory of Romania. The army of this country decides to act on its side, but implements the decision only in August.
The course of the war
Let's try to describe the course of the Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878) briefly. In June, Russian troops, with 185 thousand soldiers, concentrated on the left bank of the Danube, in the Zimnitsa region. The command of the Russian army was led by Grand Duke Nikolai.
In the Turkish army opposing Russia, there were more than 200 thousand people, most of whom were garrisons of fortresses. It was commanded by Marshal Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha.
To advance the Russian army, it was necessary to cross the Danube, on which the Turks had a military flotilla. Light boats were delivered by rail, which, with the help of minefields, prevented its action. The troops successfully crossed and went on the offensive, moving inland. The Russian army advanced in two directions: in the Caucasus and the Balkans. The Balkans were paramount, since, having captured Constantinople, one could talk about Turkey's withdrawal from the war.
The main battle took place during the passage of the Shipka Pass. In this battle, the Russians won and continued to move towards Constantinople, where in the area of the fortress of Plevna they met with serious resistance from the Turks who had settled in it. And only in November the situation changed in favor of the Russians. Winning the battles, Russia in January 1878 took the city of Andrianopol.
Conclusion of a peace treaty
As a result of the war, on March 16, 1878, an agreement was signed in San Stefano. He did not suit a number of leading European countries led by England. In addition, Britain held secret negotiations with Turkey, as a result of which it occupied the island of Cyprus in exchange for protecting the Turks from the Russians.
As a result of behind-the-scenes intrigues, for which England was a master, the Berlin Treaty of 07/01/1878 was signed. As a result of its signing, most of the points of the San Stefano Treaty were annulled.
The results of the war
Let us briefly summarize the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. As a result of the war, Russia returned the previously lost southern part of Bessarabia and the Kars region, populated mainly by Armenians. The territory of the island of Cyprus was occupied by England.
In 1885, a single principality of Bulgaria was formed, after the Balkan wars the Kingdom of Bulgaria became sovereign. Serbia, Romania and Montenegro gained independence.
Start of hostilities. The Russian army in the Balkans, led by the tsar's brother Nikolai Nikolaevich, numbered 185 thousand people. The king was also at the headquarters of the army. The number of the Turkish army in Northern Bulgaria was 160 thousand people.
On June 15, 1877, Russian troops crossed the Danube and launched an offensive. The Bulgarians enthusiastically welcomed the Russian army. Bulgarian voluntary squads joined its composition, showing high morale. They were told that they went into battle as "for a happy holiday".
Russian troops quickly moved south, in a hurry to take possession of the mountain passes through the Balkans and go to southern Bulgaria. It was especially important to take the Shipka Pass, from where the shortest road to Adrianople went. After two days of fierce fighting, the pass was taken. Turkish troops retreated in disarray. It seemed that a direct path to Constantinople was opening up.
Turkish counteroffensive. Battles on Shipka and near Plevna. However, the course of events suddenly changed dramatically. On July 7, a large Turkish detachment under the command of Osman Pasha, having made a forced march from the Serbian border and ahead of the Russians, occupied the fortress of Plevna in Northern Bulgaria. There was a threat of a flank attack. Two attempts by the Russian troops to capture Plevna were unsuccessful. The Turkish troops, who could not withstand the onslaught of the Russians in open battles, held out well in the fortresses. The offensive of the Russian troops was suspended.
Having seized the initiative, the Turkish troops ousted the Russians from southern Bulgaria. In August, bloody battles for Shipka began. The five thousandth Russian detachment, which included Bulgarian squads, was led by General N. G. Stoletov. The enemy had a fivefold superiority. The defenders of Shipka had to fight off up to 14 attacks a day. The unbearable heat increased the thirst, and the stream was under fire. At the end of the third day of fighting, when the situation became desperate, reinforcements arrived. The environmental threat has been eliminated. After a few days, the fighting subsided. The Shipka passage remained in the hands of the Russians, its southern slopes were held by the Turks.
Reinforcements from Russia were drawn to Plevna. Its third assault began on 30 August. Under the cover of dense fog, a detachment of General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev (1843-1882) secretly approached the enemy and broke through the fortifications with a swift attack. But in other sectors, the attacks of the Russian troops were repulsed. Having received no support, Skobelev withdrew his detachment the next day. In three assaults on Plevna, the Russians lost 32 thousand, the Romanians - 3 thousand people. The hero of Sevastopol, General E. I. Totleben, arrived from St. Petersburg. He examined the positions, he advised to completely block the fortress. Without heavy artillery, a new assault could only increase the number of needless victims.
The fall of Plevna and a turning point in the course of the war. Winter has begun. The Turks held Plevna, the Russians - Shipka. “Everything is calm on Shipka,” the command reported. Meanwhile, the number of frostbite reached 400 per day. In a snowstorm, the supply of ammunition and food was stopped. From September to December 1877, the Russians and Bulgarians lost 9,500 frostbitten, sick and frozen people on Shipka. Nowadays, there is a monument-tomb on Shipka with the image of two warriors bowing their heads - a Russian and a Bulgarian.
At the end of November, food ran out in Plevna. Osman Pasha made a desperate attempt to break through, but was thrown back into the fortress. November 28 Plevna surrendered. In Russian captivity were 43 thousand people, led by the most talented Turkish commander. During the war there was a turning point. Serbia resumed hostilities In order not to lose the initiative, the Russian command decided to go through the Balkans without waiting for spring.
On December 13, the main forces of the Russian army, led by General Iosif Vladimirovich Gurko (1828-1901), began their journey to Sofia through the most difficult Churyak Pass. The troops moved day and night along the steep and slippery mountain slopes. The rain that had begun turned into snow, a blizzard swirled, and then frost hit. On December 23, 1877, in icy overcoats, the Russians entered Sofia.
Meanwhile, the troops under the command of Skobelev were supposed to withdraw from the fight the group that blocked the Shipka Pass. Skobelev crossed the Balkans west of Shipka, along an icy and sloping cornice over an abyss, and went to the rear of the fortified Sheinovo camp. Skobelev, who was nicknamed the "white general" (he had a habit of appearing in dangerous places on a white horse and in all white), valued and took care of a soldier's life. His soldiers went into battle not in dense columns, as was customary then, but in chains and quick dashes. As a result of the battles at Shipka-Sheinovo on December 27-28, the 20,000-strong Turkish group capitulated.
A three-day battle south of Plovdiv ended the military campaign. January 8, 1878 Russian troops entered Adrianople. Pursuing the hastily retreating Turks, the Russian cavalry reached the shores of the Sea of Marmara. A detachment under the command of Skobelev took the place of San Stefano, a few kilometers from Constantinople. It was not difficult to enter the Turkish capital, but, fearing international complications, the Russian command did not dare to take such a step.
A few years after the war, Skobelev died suddenly in the prime of life and talent at the age of 38. Many streets and squares in Bulgaria are named after him.
Military operations in Transcaucasia. Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, the youngest son of Nicholas I, was formally considered the commander of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia. In fact, the command was carried out by General M.T. Loris-Melikov. In April-May 1877, the Russian army took the fortresses of Bayazet and Ardagan and blockaded Kare. But then there were a series of setbacks, and the siege of Kars had to be lifted.
The decisive battle took place in autumn in the area of the Aladzhin Heights, not far from Kars. On October 3, Russian troops stormed the fortified mountain Avliyar, a key point of the Turkish defense. In the battle of Aladzhin, the Russian command for the first time used the telegraph to control troops. On the night of November 6, 1877, Kare was taken. After that, the Russian army went to Erzurum.
Treaty of San Stefano. On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was signed in San Stefano. Under its terms, Bulgaria received the status of an autonomous principality, independent in its internal affairs. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained full independence and significantly expanded their territory. South Bessarabia, torn away under the Treaty of Paris, was returned to Russia and transferred to Kara.
The provisional Russian administration that ruled Bulgaria developed a draft constitution. Bulgaria proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. Individual and property rights were guaranteed. The Russian project formed the basis of the Bulgarian constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in Tarnovo in April 1879.
Berlin Congress. England and Austria-Hungary did not recognize the Treaty of San Stefano. At their insistence, the Berlin Congress was held in the summer of 1878 with the participation of England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey. Russia found itself isolated and forced to make concessions. The Western powers categorically objected to the creation of a unified Bulgarian state. As a result, Southern Bulgaria remained under Turkish rule. Russian diplomats managed to achieve only that Sofia and Varna were included in the autonomous Bulgarian principality. The territory of Serbia and Montenegro was significantly reduced. Congress confirmed the right of Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. England negotiated for itself the right to send troops to Cyprus. In a report to the tsar, the head of the Russian delegation, A. M. Gorchakov, wrote: “ The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my official career.". The king noted: "And mine too".
All the more shocked was the Russian public, who did not know about the secret Budapest agreement. The failure in Berlin was entirely attributed to the failures of Russian diplomacy. The indignant speech of Ivan Aksakov in the Moscow Slavic Committee thundered throughout the country. The government, which did not tolerate criticism, expelled this honored public figure from Moscow.
The Congress of Berlin undoubtedly did not embellish the diplomatic history of not only Russia, but also the Western powers. Driven by petty momentary calculations and envy of the brilliant victory of Russian arms, the governments of these countries extended Turkish rule over several million Slavs.
And yet the fruits of the Russian victory were only partly destroyed. Having laid the foundations for the freedom of the Bulgarian people, Russia has written a glorious page in its history. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 entered the general context of the era of Liberation and became its worthy completion.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev From the memoirs of the artist V. V. Vereshchagin
On the field of the Russian-Turkish war, Skobelev appeared as a major general, already with George around his neck (meaning the Order of St. George the Victorious, which was awarded to generals and officers for bravery. Soldiers could also receive the insignia of the Military Order. He was called "soldier George) , and although at first they laughed at his Turkestan glory, they said that he still had to earn these crosses, that, perhaps, it was dangerous to trust this boy with a company of soldiers, he took his own and ended the war with the reputation of the first military officer, the bravest of the brave, people warrior hero!
During the second attack on Plevna, Skobelev decided to entrust, in addition to the Cossacks, another infantry battalion, and with this battalion he positively saved our repulsed, defeated troops ... With a handful of people, he reached Plevna itself and firmly pressed the Turks, who did not believe in any way, that they are only dealing with a few hundred people, supported by no one...
Here, by the way, to cite the chivalrous character trait of Skobelev: he called on my late brother Sergei, to whom he usually entrusted the most dangerous assignments, and said:
“Remove all the wounded: I will not retreat until I receive notification from you that everyone has been picked up.
It was already late when my brother ... and the centurion Sh. came to Skobelev and reported that "not a single wounded man was left on the battlefield."
“I believe you,” said Skobelev, and only then ordered to retreat ...
The Battle of Lovchaya was the first in which Mikhail Skobelev, a 34-year-old general, independently commanded a detachment of 20,000 people. He was under the command of Prince Imeretinsky, a prudent general who did not constrain Skobelev in his orders and completely entrusted him with all his strength.
When the forts, which, perhaps, none of the other Russian generals would have mastered, were nevertheless taken, after the most bloody battle, Prince Imeretinsky, in his report to the commander-in-chief, called Skobelev "hero of the day" ...
What I happened to hear from Skobelev in friendly conversations, now, of course, I don’t have to tell. Suffice it to say that he was a supporter of the development of Russia and its movement forward, not backward ... I repeat that it is inconvenient to talk about this.
Skobelev studied a lot, read a lot, wrote even more ... The notes submitted by Mikhail Dmitrievich during this war to the commander-in-chief about the situation of officers and soldiers and the probable cause of our temporary failures are full of observation, correct, well-aimed remarks. Living together with Skobelev in Plevna, I read some of these notes, which, according to him, were very disliked...
Skobelev was fluent in French, German and English and knew the literature of these countries, especially the military one, very well ... He especially appreciated the military talent of Napoleon I, and of the modern ones, Moltke, who, for his part, apparently was not indifferent to a young, stormy, multi-talented brother in arms; at least when I spoke to Moltke about Skobelev, after the latter's death, there was a tender, fatherly note in the voice of the "great silent man" that I did not expect from the Prussian general-fighter.
During the Turkish war, Skobelev spoke unimportantly about most of our leaders - at least ...
It must be said that Skobelev positively improved his moral character. Here, for example, is an example of military decency from his activities in recent years: on the second day after the Sheinov battle, I found him writing a letter.
— What are you writing?
- An apology message: I scolded poor X. at the front, as I see it, completely in vain, therefore I want my apology to be as public and public as the reprimand ...
Anyone who has not been on fire with Skobelev cannot positively comprehend his calmness and composure among bullets and grenades - composure all the more remarkable because, as he confessed to me, he had no indifference to death; on the contrary, he was always, in every case, afraid that he would be slammed and, consequently, every minute he was waiting for death. What strength of will must have been, what incessant tension of nerves, in order to overcome fear and not show it!
Prudent people reproached Skobelev for his reckless courage; they said that “he behaves like a boy”, that “he rushes forward like an ensign”, that, finally, risking “necessarily”, he exposes the soldiers to the danger of being left without high command, etc. It must be said that these are all the speeches of people who care primarily about saving their precious lives - and then what God will give ... Not for the same reason did a person rise to the epaulettes of a general, to sacrifice his life for cowards.
- Why not! Skobelev argued. - The concept of cowardice and courage is relative; the same soldier, in most cases, can be both a coward and a brave one, depending on the hands in which he is. One thing is certain, that a soldier is usually not a fool: it is possible to captivate him, but it is difficult to force him to go without setting an example.
This is an example for both soldiers and officers, Skobelev considered himself obliged to show.
Kuban scouts in the Caucasian army in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
BALKAN KNOT
More than 130 years ago, the battles of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 died down, which arose as a result of the rise of the liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in the Middle East. Russia supported the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, and also sought to restore its prestige and influence, undermined by the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
By the beginning of the war, Russia deployed two armies: the Danubian (185 thousand people, 810 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich and the Caucasian (75 thousand people, 276 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich.
Both armies included cavalry Cossack regiments of the Kuban Cossack Army (KKV) and battalions of Kuban scouts, which, as in previous years, made a worthy contribution to the Russian victories. The sabotage and reconnaissance parties of the scouts courageously and skillfully acted in both theaters of military operations. However, if much is known about the military exploits of the Cossacks in the Balkans, then, according to the author, not enough has been said about the combat work of the scouts in the Caucasus.
The mobilization of the Caucasian army was preceded by a preparatory period (September 1 - November 11, 1876) and the actual mobilization period (November 11, 1876 - April 12, 1877). Simultaneously with the mobilization of infantry, artillery and cavalry units of the Russian army, by order of the Minister of War, the following units of the Kuban Cossack army were subject to mobilization: 10 cavalry regiments, a squadron of His Own Imperial Majesty's convoy and 20 plastun hundreds. In November, five four-hundred battalions (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th battalions) were formed from the scout hundreds, the regiments were given the name of the second.
The formation of the Cossack units was complicated by the fact that by the beginning of the mobilization of firearms for arming the Cossacks was not enough. Alas, the insufficient preparedness of the army for war was characteristic of both the Russian-Japanese and the First World War. As of September 1876, there were 6454 rifles of the Berdan system in the KKV, 2086 were missing. At the end of October, a transport with 10,387 rifles arrived from St. Tanner. Some plastun battalions were armed with Carley guns. At the subsequent stages of mobilization, the foot battalions of the Scouts were armed with the dragoon guns of the Krnka system. In general, the Cossack units were armed with firearms of different systems, which created difficulties in providing ammunition.
Soon, the aggravation of the political situation, the military preparations of the Turks and the mood of the highlanders required additional mobilization in early April 1877, including the call for the third stage of the KKV. Additionally, five prefabricated cavalry Cossack regiments and five foot battalions of the KKV (8, 9, 10, 11 and 12th) were formed. In total, the KKV fielded 21,600 Cossacks, who took part in the defense of the Bayazet fortress, the capture of Kars and Erzerum, in the battles on Shipka and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
WAR
In the Caucasus-Asia Minor theater, after the declaration of war on April 12, 1877, the troops of the Active Corps and its detachments under the command of Adjutant General Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (the future Minister of Internal Affairs) crossed the border and deepened into enemy territory as part of several columns. Information has been preserved about the successful actions during this period of the scouts of the 2nd foot scout battalion and two hundred of the Poltava cavalry regiment of the KKV, who were instructed to remove the Turkish border posts and ensure the unimpeded passage of the main forces of the detachment of Colonel Komarov in the area of the village of Vale. Scouts and mounted Cossack hundreds were actively involved in the flying and reconnaissance detachments to collect data on the enemy's fortifications, the strength of the garrisons, the nature of the terrain, damage to telegraph communication lines. Information was collected both through personal observation and by interviewing local residents, capturing prisoners.
So, for example, in May 1877, a hunting team consisting of 11 scouts and Cossacks of the Poltava cavalry regiment was tasked with reconnaissance of the heights of Gelaverda (near Ardagan), determining the paths for the approach of the main forces and getting the language. To scatter the attention of the Turks, distracting actions of other plastun groups were simultaneously carried out. The hunting team, led by the centurion Kamensky, successfully passed three enemy chains, reconnoitered the fortifications and "captured a sentry with a gun, whom they delivered to the camp as proof of their feat." In July, during the reconnaissance of Turkish forces near Dagor, a detachment of 20 Cossack scouts and 20 Chechens from the Chechen irregular cavalry regiment under the command of the General Staff of Colonel Malama crossed the Arpachay River at night, conducted a successful reconnaissance of the area and safely returned to its territory.
Scouts were actively used in the coastal direction, where the actions of the Cossack cavalry regiments were hampered by mountainous and wooded areas. So, for example, in the summary of the military operations of the Sochi detachment from July 28 to August 28, 1877, it is said about the successful reconnaissance operation of hundreds of scouts under the command of the cornet Nikitin: “... a party of scouts in Sandripsha found enemy pickets, and near Gagra they noticed the movement of a significant mass of people, moreover, the passage was guarded by two Turkish battleships. The detachment commander reported that the enemy had taken all measures to prevent our troops from advancing to the Gagra fortification. The scouts were instructed to conduct reconnaissance of bypass mountain paths. In the future, the scouts were given the task of taking control of the largest possible area near Gagra, so that the enemy would not have time to occupy hard-to-reach approaches, which would then have to be taken from him with great sacrifices. Subsequently, together with the shooters, three hundred scouts also participated in the successful assault on the Gagra fortification.
Scouts-scouts sometimes obtained information that allowed some negligent officers to be brought to light. For example, on May 31, 1877, Lieutenant-General Geiman reported on command about the following fact, refuting the officer’s report about the incident at the Cossack picket: “Information was received from scouts that not 300 bashi-bazouks attacked our picket at Ardost, but only 30-40 people; there was a complete oversight at the post: half of the Cossacks were sleeping, while others ate sour milk, which is why they did not have time to collect the horses, which the enemies took all of them. This information was given by scouts, and it is completely different from the officer's report. It would be supposed to conduct an investigation and give the officer to the court, otherwise, with the carelessness of our Cossacks, such cases may be repeated.
The command of the Russian troops skillfully used the outstanding fighting qualities of the scouts in the pursuit of the retreating enemy. For example, by skillful maneuvers of our forces, detachments of the retreating Turkish troops were led out to the scouts in ambush and fell under their well-aimed gunfire. The effective actions of the scouts suggested to the command of the Russian troops the idea of forming prefabricated battalions of hunters, which, along with the scouts that formed their basis, included the most quick-witted and physically trained volunteers from the infantry regiments of the Russian army.
The Kuban scouts as part of the 7th scout battalion under the command of Yesaul Bashtannik, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, were involved in the Danube army. From the coastal Sistov Heights, which the battalion captured from the enemy with extraordinary courage and courage, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Russian army across the Danube, under the leadership of General Gurko, the Kuban scouts began their glorious military path to the legendary Shipka. For the exploits shown on the battlefields in Bulgaria, many scouts were awarded the St. George Crosses, many lower ranks were awarded non-commissioned officers and officer ranks.
Interesting memories of the actions of scouts during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 were left by the famous journalist and writer Vladimir Gilyarovsky. During that war, he volunteered to serve in the army and, thanks to his restless and adventurous nature, found himself among the Kuban scout hunters who operated on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
LOST WORLD
One way or another, the war was won. However, the subsequent development of events makes us think about the questions of how justified the sacrifices made by Russia turned out to be and who is to blame for the lost results of the victories of Russian weapons.
Russia's successes in the war with Turkey alarmed the ruling circles of England and Austria-Hungary. The British government sent a squadron to the Sea of Marmara, which forced Russia to abandon the capture of Istanbul. In February, thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, the San Stefano Treaty, which was beneficial for Russia, was signed, which, it would seem, changed the entire political picture of the Balkans (and not only) in favor of Russia's interests.
Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, previously vassal to Turkey, gained independence, Bulgaria acquired the status of a de facto independent principality, Turkey pledged to pay Russia an indemnity of 1,410 million rubles, and on account of this amount lost Kapc, Ardagan, Bayazet and Batum in the Caucasus and even Southern Bessarabia, torn away from Russia after the Crimean War. Russian weapons triumphed. How did Russian diplomacy use the victorious results of the war?
The Scouts still continued skirmishes with bashi-bazouks, when the Berlin Congress began to review the results of the war on June 3, 1878, where the "big five" dominated: Germany, Russia, England, France and Austria-Hungary. Its final act was signed on July 1 (13), 1878. The 80-year-old Prince Gorchakov was formally considered the head of the Russian delegation, but he was already old and sick. In fact, the delegation was led by the former chief of the gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, who, judging by the results, turned out to be a diplomat, much worse than a gendarme.
During the congress, it became clear that Germany, worried about the excessive strengthening of Russia, did not want to support it. France, which had not yet recovered from the defeat of 1871, gravitated toward Russia, but was afraid of Germany and did not dare to actively support Russian demands. The current situation was skillfully used by England and Austria-Hungary, who imposed on the Congress the well-known decisions that changed the San Stefano Treaty to the detriment of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.
So, the territory of the Bulgarian principality was limited only to the northern half, and southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire called Eastern Rumelia. Serbia was given part of Bulgaria, which for a long time quarreled the two Slavic peoples. Russia returned Bayazet to Turkey, and collected not 1410 million, but only 300 million rubles as an indemnity. Finally, Austria-Hungary negotiated for itself the "right" to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As a result, the Russian-Turkish war turned out to be for Russia, although won, but unsuccessful. Chancellor Gorchakov, in a note to the tsar on the results of the Congress, admitted: "The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my official career." Emperor Alexander II added: "And in mine, too."
Shortly after the end of the Russo-Turkish War, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Obruchev, wrote in a memo to the emperor: “If Russia is poor and weak, if it is far behind Europe, then this is primarily because very often it incorrectly solved the most fundamental political issues : where it should and where it should not sacrifice its property. If you go the same way, you can completely perish and quickly complete your cycle of a great Power ... "
Even taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation that have occurred over the past more than 100 years, the words of General Obruchev have not lost their relevance today.
When we talk about the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the conversation rarely turns to the Turkish army. It is perceived as a background. It is characteristic that in terms of war N.N. Obruchev, the Danube, Turkish fortresses and the Balkan years appear as obstacles, but not the Turkish army. She was considered (and is considered) weak. In many ways, this is exactly the case. The Turkish army had several serious problems that did not allow it to operate effectively. But this does not mean that she was completely incapable of anything. We will analyze the main characteristics of the Turkish army.
1) Organization
Generally speaking, we can say that the Turkish army is an army of brave people, good soldiers, almost devoid of organization. The lack of proper organization was a key weakness.
In 1869, that is, earlier than Russia and many European powers, the Ottoman Empire began the transition to universal military service. But the transition came with big problems. The active army was small - about 280,000 people (of which 200,000 were in the Balkan theater). Behind them was a multi-storey system of reserves: ikhtiyat - redif - mustahfiz. The reserve, in fact, was only on paper. Those who were supposed to go from under the banners to the Ikhtiyat after 4 years of service were usually simply detained in the troops for another 2 years. Parts of the redif either in practice also represented active troops (and then they were combat-ready), or were created improvisationally (and were useless). Mustahfiz existed more on paper. Back in the Crimean War, the reserve troops showed themselves to be weak: they had almost no training, a clear structure, and the officers were very bad. The situation changed little in 1877.
Theoretically, the army had a normal structure with armies, corps, divisions and regiments. In practice, permanent formations above the battalion (tabor) almost never existed. The army was constantly involved in the suppression of insurrections and police functions, and it was easier to organize it in the form of small temporary detachments (mufrese). The battalions spent more time in such mufrez than in their regiments, and the commanders had no experience in managing large units.
The rear services were organized very poorly, and the Turks had constant supply problems. If the troops stood still, then the supply was at the level, but if the troops had to advance and, especially, retreat, then the supply situation quickly became catastrophic. This was an important reason why the Turks preferred defense over offensive actions.
The medical service was a separate issue. As a system, it was missing. There were no professional doctors among the Muslim population, and all doctors in the army were foreigners. They had to be looked for literally by the advertisements in the newspapers. The result of the lack of organization in this part was a high incidence and deplorable condition of the wounded and sick.
2) Command
In general, the command was incompetent and existed in conditions of strong distrust that existed on the part of the authorities and between the generals.
One of the key problems of the Ottoman Empire was the low level of education among the bulk of the population. The literary language in the Ottoman Empire was outdated and filled with Arabic and Persian lexemes. The distance between spoken and written language was very great, so getting an education was associated with additional difficulties.
The Ottoman Empire had a system of military education. There was a Military Academy (Kharbiye, founded in 1845), a Military Engineering School (Mukhendishane) and a system of military schools in large cities. The military education had a strong engineering bias, so the officers who completed the school were well versed in construction and fortification, but did not know tactics and strategy brilliantly. In addition, 20% of educated officers served in the artillery. This is quite logical: the lack of educated officers made it necessary to send a few sensible officers precisely to the field of engineering and artillery, where they were most needed.
Osman Pasha, Mehmed Ali Pasha and Suleiman Pasha
School graduates were called mekteblis. There were not enough of them: out of 20,000 officers, only 1,600 graduated from the academy, and out of 70 generals who took part in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, only 45 were mekteblis. There were only 132 officers of the General Staff. The lack of educated officers led to the fact that the mekteblis were overloaded with work and performed functions unusual for them: they carried reports, monitored their implementation, chose artillery positions, carried out reconnaissance, and sometimes even aimed guns themselves.
In addition to the mektebli, there were alaili officers. These are soldiers who have received the rank of officer. In the Turkish army, it was more the rule than the exception. The Alayle were experienced warriors, had a great influence on the soldiers, but were illiterate, underdeveloped and very conservative. There was a strong antagonism between Alayli and Mektebli.
The weak general level of education of commanding officials was one of the reasons why the Turkish army preferred defense to attack. Defense did not require much from the commanders.
However, education was not the key to career advancement. The presence of patrons among the sultan's entourage and political reliability meant much more. The Turkish army actively participated in politics. Mektebli more often supported progressive and reformist aspirations, supported the doctrine of Ottomanism (the loyalty of the Ottoman Empire is higher than national and religious considerations). The Alayle more often supported conservatives. On May 30, 1876, Sultan Abdulaziz was overthrown, and the army actively participated in this. After a short reign of the mentally unbalanced Murad V, Abdul-Hamid II came to power. He was naturally suspicious of the military.
It was partly the consequence of suspicion that the extremely confusing system of command in 1877 became. Seraskir (commander-in-chief) was appointed close to the sultan alaili Redif Pasha. Redif Pasha sat in Constantinople at the head of a military council composed of old generals. Then another additional military council was drawn up. Finally, many decisions were made by Abdul-Hamid himself, who used the advice of random people. Thus, the decision-making center was the many-headed synclite in Constantinople.
In addition, the Danube and the Caucasus had their own commanders-in-chief (serdars) - the old and incompetent Abdul-Kerim and the young and talented Ahmed-Mukhtar, respectively. In their headquarters were representatives of the Sultan, something like the Bolshevik commissars. As soon as the war on the Danube began to take an unfavorable turn, the Sultan began to indiscriminately dismiss and prosecute the commanders, which paralyzed their will. In 1877, three commanders changed in the Balkans - Abdul-Kerim, Mehmed-Ali and Suleiman.
The generals were reluctant to recognize each other's authority and sought to get out of submission. Suleiman was one of the main participants in the conspiracy against Abdul-Aziz, and he was not trusted. He was an ardent nationalist and hated Mehmed-Ali, by birth a German, and Mehmed-Ali answered him the same. Osman Pasha also did not recognize the authority of Mehmed Ali, who was younger than him. This led to the fact that in 1877 the Turks acted in three disparate groups (Plevna, Shipka and Shumla), little coordinated with each other. They never united, not least because the connection meant the loss of independence.
Despite everything, the Turks had good generals - Ahmed-Mukhtar, Osman, Suleiman, Mehmed-Ali and Ahmed-Eyub, above all. But their talents were paralyzed by the squabbles and incompetence of their subordinates.
3) Soldiers
Turkish soldiers have had a very good reputation since ancient times. It was believed that they are brave, hardy, undemanding and fight well, especially when defending fortresses. The Turkish soldier is a strong feature of the Turkish army.
This is due to the contingent that was recruited into the army and in many ways resembled the contingent of the Russian army. The army was also peasant, and the Turkish peasants, like the Russians, were accustomed to difficult living and working conditions, were religious, collectivist, strong and hardy, walked a lot, etc.
The downside was that only Muslims could serve in the Turkish army. Muslim norms forbade "infidels" to carry weapons and there was distrust towards them. Even the Gulhane Hatti Sheriff (1839) proclaimed the equality of all subjects of the Sultan, including in military service, but this declaration remained on paper, as well as subsequent confirmations that Christians would be called up. As a result, neither conservatives nor Christians were eager to change the status quo. This limited the available contingent.
Another problem was associated with high social mobility within the army structure. Good soldiers filled the ranks of the alaili officers, but did not stay in non-commissioned officer positions. Therefore, the non-commissioned officers were weak, and the officers had to fulfill their duties.
The strong point was the armament of the infantry. The Ottoman Empire, despite its backwardness and deplorable financial condition, was not stingy in purchasing good Peabody-Martini rifles for the army abroad, which were among the best in their time and greatly surpassed the Russian Krnka in firing range.
4) Cavalry and artillery
In ancient times, the Ottomans had very good artillery and cavalry, but much has changed since then.
It was never possible to organize a normal regular cavalry and the Turkish army relied mainly on unruly bashi-bouzuks and nomadic contingents. Both those and others robbed better than fought. The absence of cavalry led to the fact that the Turkish army, even if it won, could not defeat the enemy by organizing the pursuit. Intelligence was also a problem.
Artillery remained at a very good level. There were a disproportionate number of mekteblis in it, and the guns were steel, Krupp, superior to the bronze guns of the Russians. Artillery was the best branch of the military.
