The role of the guard during the era of palace coups. The role of the guard in the palace coups of the XVIII

In the first quarter of the 18th century, the orders and customs of the pre-Petrine time, the era of the Muscovite state (XVI-XVII centuries), were still preserved, but Peter the Great literally opened the “gates” to Russia in front of the West, and the country began to quickly become Europeanized.
Peter I created a powerful and extensive administrative apparatus. Since then, a weak monarch, even a baby, could sit on the Russian throne and rule the empire, relying on the coordinated actions of a huge state machine.

Introduction 2
§one. Changes on the Russian throne 3
§2. The social essence of palace coups 3
§3. Power and Guards in Russia XVIII 9
§four. Guards in the era of palace coups 17
Conclusion 22
List of used literature 23

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Table of contents

Introduction

In the first quarter of the 18th century, the orders and customs of the pre-Petrine time, the era of the Muscovite state (XVI-XVII centuries), were still preserved, but Peter the Great literally opened the “gates” to Russia in front of the West, and the country began to quickly become Europeanized.

Peter I created a powerful and extensive administrative apparatus. Since then, a weak monarch, even a baby, could sit on the Russian throne and rule the empire, relying on the coordinated actions of a huge state machine. However, it was easy to stay on the throne, it was easy to lose it. But if a strong sovereign, whose name and family are consecrated by ancient tradition, is not needed to manage a huge empire, then why not replace the ruling monarch with a candidate who meets the interests of any court group? The emperor, with all his enormous power, turned out to be a toy of powerful political forces. Therefore, almost the entire XVIII century. - the time of constant palace conspiracies, endless intrigues, struggle for power, successful and unsuccessful attempts to seize the imperial crown. The privileged guards, who held the country of one or another court party, were able to decide the fate of Russia in one night for years and decades to come. In addition, the personality of the monarch and the struggle of various cliques and groups at court determined the entire style of government, and the slightest whim of the sovereign or his favorite could become an occasion for serious changes in the life of the country.

§one. Changes on the Russian throne

The 37-year period of political instability (1725-1762) that followed the death of Peter I was called the "era of palace coups". During this period, the policy of the state was determined by separate groups of the palace nobility, which actively intervened in resolving the issue of the heir to the throne, fought among themselves for power, and carried out palace coups. The reason for such intervention was the Statute on the succession to the throne issued by Peter I on February 5, 1722, which canceled "both orders of succession to the throne that were in force before, both the testament and the conciliar election, replacing both with a personal appointment, the discretion of the reigning sovereign." Peter himself did not use this charter, he died on January 28, 1725, without appointing a successor for himself. Therefore, immediately after his death, a struggle for power began between representatives of the ruling elite.

The decisive force in the palace coups was the guards, a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter (these are the famous Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, in the 30s two new ones, Izmailovsky and Horse Guards, were added to them). Her participation decided the outcome of the case: on whose side the guard, that group won. The guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, it was a representative of the whole class (nobles), from whose midst it was almost exclusively formed and whose interests it represented. one

§2. The social essence of palace coups

A.L. Yanov, describing the orgy of palace coups after the death of Anna Ioannovna, notes: “In all this madness, however, there was a system. For ... the St. Petersburg grenadiers or life guards, like the entire Peter the Great service elite who stood behind them, set themselves the goal not at all of the accession of another "colonel", but the abolition of compulsory service (while maintaining all privileges and property). In other words, the return of once again lost aristocratic status (for the "Peter's elite", probably, the point after all was not at all in the return of this status, but only in its acquisition). They didn't rest until they got their way. And as soon as she thought of the true reason for all this extraordinary political confusion, the only politically literate woman among the galaxy of Russian empresses, Sophia Anhalt-Zerbstskaya, better known under the name of Catherine the Great, as passions immediately subsided and yesterday's arbitrariness was replaced by orderliness. 2
Unfortunately, Yanov himself interprets this completely international process as specifically Russian, as “original Russian examples of the formation of the elite” (and as evidence of Russia’s alleged attraction to Europe with its nobleness and independence of the position of the aristocracy from the will of the center). However, this process proceeded everywhere, in all bureaucratic societies, although in different forms, already determined by the civilizational characteristics of these societies and other, mainly political, circumstances.

Palace coups did not entail changes in the political, and even more so the social system of society and boiled down to the struggle for power of various noble groups pursuing their own, most often selfish interests. At the same time, the specific policy of each of the six monarchs had its own characteristics, sometimes important for the country. In general, socio-economic stabilization and foreign policy successes achieved during the reign of Elizabeth created the conditions for more accelerated development and new breakthroughs in foreign policy that would occur under Catherine II.

According to Klyuchevsky, the St. Petersburg guards barracks was a rival of the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council, the successor of the Moscow Zemsky Sobor. This participation of the Guards regiments in deciding the question of the throne had very important political consequences; above all, it had a strong effect on the political mood of the guards themselves. At first, an obedient tool in the hands of her leaders, Menshikov, Buturlin, she then wanted to be an independent mover of events, intervening in politics on her own initiative; palace coups became for her a preparatory political school. But the then guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, cut off from society: it had an influential social significance, was a representative of an entire class, from whose midst it was almost exclusively recruited. The color of the estate served in the guard, the layers of which, previously divided, under Peter I united under the common name of the nobility or gentry, and according to the laws of Peter, it was a compulsory military school for this estate. The political tastes and pretensions acquired by the guard through participation in palace affairs did not remain within the walls of the St. Petersburg barracks, but spread from there to all corners of the nobility, urban and rural. This political connection between the guards and the class at the head of Russian society, and the dangerous consequences that could result from this, were vividly felt by the powerful Petersburg businessmen of that time.

Therefore, simultaneously with the palace coups and under their obvious influence and in the mood of the nobility, two important changes are revealed: 1) thanks to the political role that the course of court affairs imposed on the guard and so willingly learned by it, such a pretentious view of its significance in the state was established among the nobility, which he had not seen before; 2) with the assistance of this view and the circumstances that established it, both the position of the nobility in the state and its relations with other classes of society changed. 3

The main point is that the nobility longed for these coups. In the rank and file of the nobility, mercilessly expelled from provincial estates to regiments and schools, thought was refined by inventing ways to retire from science and service, while in the upper strata, especially in the government environment, the minds worked hard on more lofty subjects. Here, the remnants of the old boyar nobility still survived, forming a fairly close circle of a few surnames. Out of the general political excitement, a kind of political program was developed here, a rather definite view was formed of the order that should be established in the state.
In the conditions of political, legal and economic lack of freedom of the entire Russian society, including its highest circles (it should be remembered that the famous decree on the freedom of the nobility was adopted only in 1761), the problem of limiting the power of the monarch, that is, the creation of a constitutional monarchy, acquires , it would seem, their supporters in all spheres of Russian society. It seems that Peter I was the first of the autocrats to realize this well. The creation of the Senate by him is nothing but the beginning of work on creating the foundations of the constitutional order. Paradoxical as it may sound, Russia should be considered the only state where this process did not take place under revolutionary pressure, but was a very deliberate and necessary step for the state and society on the part of and at the initiative of the monarch himself.
This process outlived its initiator. With the creation of the Supreme Privy Council and the limitation of the competence of the Senate only to issues of the highest judicial jurisdiction in Russia, the contours of the separation of powers are quite clearly outlined, which, in our opinion, is undeniably one of the most important signs of constitutionalism. This process would also be accompanied by the alleged divisions of the highest state power between the monarch and the Supreme Privy Council.

A contemporary and participant in those events, F. Prokopovich, in his memoirs describes the events and political moods of those years: “Many said that the scepter should not belong to anyone other than Her Majesty the Empress, as well as the most prophetic and she is, according to Her Majesty’s recent coronation . The Germans began to argue whether such a coronation gives the right, when in other nations queens are crowned, but for that they are not heirs? four

These arguments about the succession to the throne were heard at spontaneous meetings of the highest circles of Russian society. Their participants were not competent to decide on the issue of succession to the throne. The Senate was competent to decide this issue. V.O. Klyuchevsky wrote well about its historic meeting: “While the senators were conferring in the palace on the issue of succession to the throne, officers of the guard somehow appeared in the corner of the conference hall, called here by no one knows who. They did not take a direct part in the debates of the senators, but, like a choir in an ancient drama, they expressed their judgment about them with sharp frankness, threatening to break the heads of the old boyars who would oppose the accession of Catherine. 5

The guards, and this is clear from subsequent events, were attracted by Menshikov and Buturlin. Her appearance both within the walls of the Senate and beyond its walls was a weighty argument in resolving the issue of succession to the throne. It is possible that the threat of the use of military force, which, figuratively speaking, was in the air, also influenced the opinion of the representatives of the former boyar families in the Senate. Nevertheless, the main argument, in our opinion, was the new legal image of the monarchy that had formed in the public mind, according to which the practice of electing a tsar at the Zemsky Sobor was actually stopped. According to the adopted legislation, the emperor himself was free to announce the heir to the throne. Naturally, in his choice he was limited by the ruling house, an unspoken preference for male heirs still existed.

The Supreme Privy Council actually ruled the country during the reign of Elizabeth I and after the accession of Peter II. It was the first collegiate governing body, although in general it was devoid of internal regulations. He was in some kind of intermediate state, either copying the autocratic tsar, or the Boyar Duma. But, in any case, it was a new authority. Many procedural issues of its activities, like those of other similar authorities, crystallized over the years, and even decades, when a certain tradition was formed in their activities. Naturally, one dominant personality placed great importance on the activities of the Supreme Privy Council.

It is generally accepted that in the first two years it was His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Menshikov (1673-1729, Generalissimo. In 1718-1724 and 1726-1727 - President of the Military Collegium), in the remaining three years - Prince Dmitry Golitsyn ( 1665-1737, drafter of "conditions" In 1736 he was accused and convicted of participating in a conspiracy).

The “Verkhovniki” rejected the candidacy of the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, as illegitimate on the sole ground that she was born before the official marriage of her parents, and decided to invite Anna Ioannovna, rightly believing that it would be easier to negotiate with her on the subject of delimitation of powers. This fact has been overlooked by many historians. Meanwhile, this is a very important detail. In fact, the "conditions" were the embodiment in practice of contractual principles in the arrangement of the highest body of state power. V. Kobrin was absolutely right, who believed that the election of the monarch is “a kind of agreement between the subjects and the sovereign, which means a step towards the rule of law”. 6 It seems that it does not matter where the tsar was elected - at the Boyar Duma, the Zemsky Sobor or at the Supreme Privy Council. Another thing is that from today's position, spontaneous elections, which are not clearly regulated by a special law on the procedure for holding them, of course, testify only to the very rudimentary state of the rule of law. Nevertheless, they were and, in our opinion, are a strong confirmation of the existence of the legal traditions of Russian statehood.

The Supreme Privy Council, in the event of the success of the plans of the "supreme leaders", closed the supreme power in the country, turning the empress into a bearer of purely representative functions. From a legal point of view, this suggests an analogy with the state principles of the British monarchy. However, it remains unclear whether these innovations could take root on Russian state soil and whether the political and legal life in Russia turned into something similar to the Polish one, where the omnipotence of the magnates, including the election of the king, significantly weakened the vertical of power. Did the higher circles of Russian society understand this? Obviously, they understood, and, in our opinion, a good reason for this is the project of Prince A. Cherkassky on the state structure of Russia, developed in early February 1730. It was based on the concept of an associate of Peter I, Russian historian V. Tatishchev. At its core, it was an alternative to the plans of the "supreme leaders".

Be that as it may, the result of the Petrine reforms, which took place in the conditions of the liquidation of the remnants and rudiments of class-representative democracy, the suppression of the democracy of the Cossack circle and the squeezing of juice from the people, was a great military power, which smelted more steel of excellent quality than advanced England.
But over time, the ruling class, which the Asian mode of production also makes to work in the sweat of its brow, gets tired of climbing out of the skin, and when the main tasks were completed, and the whip fell out of the hands of the reformer, the "top" took up the organization of their own affairs. The time of stagnation has come, despite the outward dynamism of the "epoch of palace coups". By inertia, factories worked, expeditions were sent, regiments marched, but little by little everything fell into decay. However, the inertia was so great that it gave Koenigsberg into the hands of Russia, and the great Kant himself took an oath of allegiance to the Russian crown.

The crisis is being resolved by Peter III, an agent of Prussia and a faithful "brother" of his leader in the Masonic lodge, Frederick II. This figure combines both Boris Godunov and Grishka Otrepyev in one person. Russia, despite the "stagnation", is too strong for anyone to decide to intervene, but, acting through its agents, the West achieves a lot - the army is weakened, the results of the conquests of the Elizabethan regiments are handed over. Russian soldiers go obediently to shed blood for German interests, against their recent ally - Denmark. The national feeling of the Russian people is humiliated and insulted. 7

This cannot continue for a long time and Peter is eliminated as a result of a palace coup. However, with the hands of this insignificant person, history has done a great deed - a decree “On the Liberties of the Nobles” was adopted. It would seem that this is a step back, towards the restoration of feudalism. The nobleman is freed from subordination to the state, from the obligation to serve and becomes a free master, master of his estate. But let's not take form for content. The Russian landowner is not a feudal lord at all, and his estate is not a feudal possession, but a normal full-blooded private property. He is not a steward of the land, but an owner operating under the conditions of the capitalist market, just as the slave-owning planters of America acted under the conditions of the market. Well, the truth is, they had fewer restrictions on the market.

What was the role of the guard in the palace coups of 1725-1762? and got the best answer

Answer from And you don't know... how?)[guru]
The role of the guards in palace coups (Klyuchevsky V.O.) was great, because it consisted mainly of the chicks of Peter's nest - the serving nobility, who considered it an honorary duty to serve the sovereign. The active position of the guard, which Peter brought up as a privileged support of autocracy, is explained by the fact that she took upon herself the right to control the correspondence of the personality and policy of the monarch to the legacy that her beloved emperor left. Also, an important role in the activity of the guard during this period of time is played by its intra-estate interests - the desire to retain priority in the state (the fight against the old aristocratic families) and the provision of new privileges, which was received:
Anna Ioannovna went to satisfy the most pressing demands of the Russian nobility:
1) Their service life was limited to 25 years;
2) that part of the Decree on Single Inheritance, which limited the right of the nobles to dispose of the estate when it was inherited, was canceled;
3) making it easier to get an officer's rank. For these purposes, a cadet noble corps was created, at the end of which an officer rank was awarded;
4) it is allowed to enlist the nobles for service from infancy, which gave them the opportunity, upon reaching the age of majority, to receive an officer's rank by length of service.
The social policy of Elizaveta Petrovna was aimed at transforming the nobility from a service class into a privileged class and strengthening serfdom, which was expressed in the landlords obtaining the right to sell their peasants as recruits (1747), and also to exile them without trial to Siberia (1760).
In 1762, Peter III signed a manifesto on granting liberties and freedom to all Russian nobility, freeing the nobles from compulsory service, abolishing corporal punishment for them and turning them into a truly privileged class.

Answer from Onona[guru]
The decisive force in the palace coups was the guard, a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter (these are the famous Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, in the 30s two new ones, Izmailovsky and Horse Guards, were added to them). Her participation decided the outcome of the case: on whose side the guard,
that group was victorious. The guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, it was a representative of the whole estate (noble), from which almost exclusively formed and
whose interests she represented. Palace coups testified to the weakness of absolute power under
successors of Peter I, who were unable to continue the reforms with energy and in the spirit of the initiator and who could manage the state only relying on their close associates. Favoritism flourished during this period. Favorites-temporary workers received unlimited influence on the policy of the state. The only heir of Peter I in the male line was his grandson - the son of the executed Tsarevich Alexei Peter. But the wife of Peter I, Catherine, claimed the throne. The two daughters of Peter, Anna (married to
Holstein Prince) and Elizabeth - by that time still a minor. The issue of a successor was resolved by the quick actions of A. Menshikov, who, relying on the guards, carried out the first palace coup in favor of Catherine I (1725-1727). and became with her an all-powerful temporary worker. In 1727 Catherine I died. The throne, according to her will, passed to the 12-year-old Peter II (1727-1730). Affairs in the state continued to administer
Supreme Privy Council. However, there were rearrangements in it: Menshikov was removed and exiled with his family to the distant West Siberian city of Berezov, and the tutor of Tsarevich Osterman and two princes Dolgoruky and Golitsyn entered the Council. The favorite of Peter II was Ivan Dolgoruky, who had a huge influence on the young emperor.
In January 1730, Peter II dies of smallpox, and the question of a candidate for the throne again arises. The Supreme Privy Council, at the suggestion of D. Golitsyn, opted for the niece of Peter I, the daughter of his brother Ivan, the Dowager Duchess of Courland Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740). became a powerless puppet.
The guards, protesting against the conditions, demanded that Anna Ioannovna remain the same autocrat as her ancestors. Upon arrival in Moscow, Anna was already aware of the mood of wide circles of the nobility and guards.
Therefore, on February 25, 1730, she broke the conditions and "became sovereign." Having become an autocrat, Anna Ioannovna hastened to find support for herself, mainly among foreigners who occupied the highest posts at the court, in the army and in the highest government. Mittava's favorite of Anna Biron became the de facto ruler of the country. In that
the system of power that developed under Anna Ioannovna without Biron, her confidant, a rude and vengeful temporary worker, not a single important decision was made at all. According to the will of Anna Ioannovna, her great-nephew, Ivan Antonovich of Braunschweig, was appointed her heir. Biron was appointed regent under him.
Against the hated Biron, a palace coup was carried out just a few weeks later. The ruler under the minor Ivan Antonovich was proclaimed his mother Anna Leopoldovna. However, there were no changes in policy, all positions continued to remain in the hands of the Germans. On the night of November 25, 1741, the grenadier company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment made a palace coup in favor of Elizabeth. -daughters of Peter I - (1741-1761) .. The striking force of the coup on November 25 was not just the guards, but the guards' lower classes - people from tax-paying estates, expressing the patriotic moods of wide sections of the capital's population.


Answer from Vladimir non-Rasian[guru]
Life Guards regiments - personal guard of the emperor (from the English security units). While at war (not as often as other units), the best of the best. The guards were given tasks that were considered impossible or extremely risky. Why did the guards suffer quite serious losses in the war. True, they were not launched into the usual meat grinder of the war, that is. e. positional. In normal times, in St. Petersburg, problems of conspiracy quite often arose, and the guards, being representatives of high society, were also saturated with this musty spirit of an inactive state. In the dark history of the guardsmen, a much longer list of coups-Paul in the 19th century was strangled with a silver officer's scarf (the one that was worn on the belt) ... Money played an important role. Look like a "million dollar" and get a penny... The officer of the Russian army was obliged to support himself, at least from the state. By the way, everything is very similar to the modern history of Russia. Only now the paratroopers of the 106th Tula Airborne Forces in August 1991 did not participate in the coup. On August 20, they completely left Moscow, not claiming the role of people's liberators from the oppression of the CPSU, nor the role of a firing squad, the only ones participating in the Moscow events who fulfilled the Oath!


Answer from Daria Bespyatkina[guru]
in fact, the results of the coup depended on the predisposition of the guards, since the Supreme Secret Council, although it had power (unofficial and official), the guards, in fact the army, had real power. they were looking for someone to put on the throne, and by searching through all the royal and imperial relatives, they found a certain Anna Ivanovna Romanova, who was pure Romanova by blood. ideal in principle option for the top. secrets. owls. since she lived all this time in Courland (present-day Latvia) and, accordingly, had no connections at court and was an excellent puppet. they offered her to become empress by signing conditions (conditions) which essentially stated that the council would really rule, simply on her behalf. but on the way to St. Petersburg, Anna is intercepted by the guards, who offer her their conditions, which are more forgiving and leave autocratic power. Anna, in front of everyone, breaks the conditions proposed by the council and, under the protection of the guards, follows to the royal palace. result 1730-1740 rules Anna.


Answer from Lieutenant Brusentsov[guru]
key


Answer from Yotas[guru]
Palace
coups (1725 - 1762)
latest
the words of Peter I were: "Give everything ...". After that he died. name
Peter I did not have time to succeed his successor.
Thereafter
Russia enters a period of political instability, called the era
palace coups. During 1725 - 1741. on the Russian throne
there have been five monarchs.
Governing body
Catherine I (1725 - 1727). After the death of the emperor, his closest associate
A. D. Menshikov, with the support of the guard, achieved the enthronement of the wife of Peter I
Catherine I.
empress
she was not engaged in management affairs, but led a wild life. Actual
AD Menshikov became the ruler. Influential noble families for
concentration of power in their hands achieved the creation of the Supreme Secret
advice. The Council became the highest state institution of the country, standing above
Senate and College. At the beginning, A.D. was at the head of the Supreme Privy Council.
Menshikov, then Golitsyn and Dolgoruky. Formally, the Supreme Privy Council was
advisory body under the monarch, but actually decided all the most important issues
domestic and foreign policy. In 1725, the Academy was opened in St. Petersburg
Sciences. Already under Catherine I, an open struggle of noble groups for
power. Contempt for the reforming activities of Peter was revealed. In 1727
the leaders canceled a number of decrees of Peter I. Under Catherine, there was
V. Bering's sea expedition to the Far East was organized. All winter 1726 -
1727 Catherine I was sick. Feeling the approach of death, she signed
testament on the transfer of the throne to 12-year-old Peter Alekseevich - the grandson of Peter I from
eldest son Alexei.
Peter's reign
II Alekseevich (1727 - 1730). Peter II was tall, very handsome,
well educated.
His mother died
shortly after his birth, at the age of three, he also lost his father. The drama of young Peter
Alekseevich was that too early the heir to the throne was surrounded by experienced
intriguers, and there was no near him a close and loving person who would
guided him firmly through life. Immediately after the death of Peter I to him from the monastery
rushed grandmother E. F. Lopukhin, the first wife of Peter I and the mother of the deceased
Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich. But there was no mutual understanding between her and her grandson.
around the throne
a sharp struggle unfolded noble groups for influence on the emperor.
AD Menshikov tried to stay in power. He settled Peter II in his palace
and betrothed the emperor to his 16-year-old daughter Maria. But during illness
A. D. Menshikov, his opponents A. G. and I. A. Dolgoruky managed to win
position of the king. Peter II abandoned science, began to indulge in fun. Under
the influence of A. G. and I. A. Dolgoruky, Peter II arrested A. D. Menshikov, deprived everyone
ranks, awards, and together with his family sent to Siberia. In January 1730 during
winter walk Peter II caught a cold and soon died. With his death interrupted
male line of the Romanovs. The grandson of Peter I entered Russian history under the name
"young emperor"
"Bironovshchina"
(1730 - 1740). The Supreme Privy Council invited Peter's niece to the throne
I Anna Ioannovna (daughter of the elder brother of Peter I Ivan Alekseevich). Anna
Ioannovna in 1710 (at the age of 17), by the will of Peter I, was given in marriage to an 18-year-old
Duke of Courland Friedrich - Wilhelm, who is on his way from Germany to
Russia died from excessive drinking. The widowed duchess did not return to
Russia, and lived for 19 years in Mitava, where she became close to Duke E. I. Biron,
became her favourite. After the death of young Peter II, the direct heirs to the throne
remained: the unmarried daughter of Peter I, Elizaveta Petrovna, and the young grandson of Peter
I, the son of the eldest daughter of Peter I - Anna Petrovna, who had already died by this time. But
The Supreme Privy Council decided to invite the niece of Peter I Anna to the throne
Ioannovna.
At that moment
an attempt was made to replace the power of the autocracy with the oligarchy of the aristocracy.
The Supreme Privy Council invited Anna Ioannovna to the throne, subject to her
"conditions" (conditions). "Co

S. M. Solovyov, one of our leading historians, was perhaps the first to draw attention to the peculiarity of the Russian guard: “We must not forget that the guard included the best people who cared for the interests of the country and the people, and the proof is that all these coups were aimed at the good of the country, were carried out according to national motives ”Soloviev S.M. History of Russia since ancient times. T. 21 .. Under the "national motives" Solovyov did not mean the nationality of the persons on the throne, but precisely the interests of the country. The guards wanted to see in power in 1740 instead of the German Biron the half-German Anna Leopoldovna and the German Anton of Brunswick, not to mention the three-quarters German Ioann Antonovich. In 1725, the guards preferred the pure German Catherine the First to the half-German Peter the Second. Looking ahead, let's say that the next action of the guards instead of the half-German Anna Leopoldovna carried the half-German Elizaveta upstairs. And in 1762, the half-German Peter the Third, the grandson of Peter the Great, was overthrown and killed by the guards for the sake of the purebred German Catherine II. The ideology of the guard with each coup became more and more definite. When on November 25, 1741, 308 guardsmen enthroned Elizabeth, for the first time the performance was held under a clearly formulated slogan: “Let's go and let's just think about how to make our fatherland happy, no matter what!” The coup of November 25, 1741 also buried the idea of ​​the guard as a representative of exclusively noble interests. Of the 308 participants in the coup, as the historian E. V. Anisimov found out, only 54 people were from the nobility. The rest represented the entire section of Russian society, including peasants.

Various political groups intrigued in favor of Elizabeth. But, like a year ago, it was the guards who took the decisive initiative, who were not satisfied with the stagnant slowness of the Brunswick rule and the lack of reformist dynamics. The Guard over and over again chose the candidate who, in her opinion, could more effectively rule the country.

The Guardsmen rapidly matured politically. And the coup of 1762, which elevated Catherine II to the Russian throne, who did not have the slightest right to it, was ideologically deeply prepared. The dashing guardsmen, led by the Orlov brothers, no longer acted on their own, but in alliance with the ideologists Nikita Panin, Princess Dashkova. This was no longer a palace coup, but a capital revolution that anticipated the Decembrist rebellion.

The logic of the historical process placed the Russian guard in the place that had remained vacant after the abolition of the Zemstvo sobors and any kind of representative institutions by the first emperor. In their place stood the “guards parliament”, which itself makes decisions and implements them for the good of the country, as it understood this good.

The political role of the Russian guard ended with the defeat of its avant-garde on Senate Square on December 14, 1825 - near the monument to its creator. And that was the prologue to the collapse of the empire.

On the role of the guard in history. Independent political force

In the history of Russia in the 18th century there is a phenomenon that has no analogues in the life of European countries of the same period. This phenomenon is the special political role of the Russian guard. It is impossible to fully understand the period of Russian history from Peter I to Paul I, and even to Nicholas II, without examining the political history of the Guards. Meanwhile, this work has not yet been done. The social composition of the guard, the nature and dynamics of its change have not been studied with sufficient accuracy. And this lack of knowledge gives rise to historical myths.

We are talking specifically about political history, because after the Poltava victory and the Prut defeat for many decades of the 18th century, the guard did not take any active part in hostilities. The sphere of activity of the guards regiments was politics.

The decisive force in the palace coups turned out to be the guards, a privileged part of the regular army created by Peter (these are the famous Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, in the 30s two new ones, Izmailovsky and Horse Guards, were added to them). Her participation decided the outcome of the case: on whose side the guard was, that group won. The guard was not only a privileged part of the Russian army, it was a representative of the whole class (nobles), from whose midst it was almost exclusively formed and whose interests it represented.

Creating the guard in 1692, Peter wanted to oppose it to the archers - the privileged infantry regiments of the Moscow tsars, who by the end of the 17th century began to interfere in politics. "Janissaries!" Peter called them so contemptuously. He had reasons for hatred - forever he, a ten-year-old boy, remembered the terrible archery riot of 1682, when his closest relatives died on the spears of the archers. The guard is the first and, perhaps, the most perfect creation of Peter. These two regiments - six thousand bayonets - could compete with the best regiments of Europe in combat training and military spirit. Guards for Peter was a support in the struggle for power and in the retention of power. According to contemporaries, Peter often said that among the guards there was not a single one to whom he would not dare to entrust his life. The guard for Peter was a "forge of personnel." Guards officers and sergeants carried out any orders of the king - from the organization of the mining industry to control over the actions of the highest generals. The Guard has always known its duty - it was brought up that way. It seemed to Peter that ideal model, focusing on which he dreamed of creating his own "regular" state - a clear, obedient, strong militarily, working smoothly and conscientiously. And the guards idolized their creator. And for good reason. It was not only about honors and privileges. Peter managed to inspire the Semenovites and Preobrazhenians with a sense of participation in the construction of a new state. The guardsman not only was, but also realized himself as a statesman. And this self-awareness, completely new for an ordinary Russian person, gave the Petrine guardsman extraordinary strength.

Sagittarius Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was also a patriot. But he stood for tradition, for the inviolability or slow evolution of the state life, merging for him with the life of the home, his ideal was the preservation of the life around him, its reference values. The Petrovsky Guardsman felt like a creator of something new and unprecedented. Unlike the archer, he was much less connected with everyday life. He was committed to the future. He lived with a feeling of constant impulse, movement, improvement. He was a man of reform as a life principle. It was this attitude and self-awareness, and not a shaved chin and a European uniform, that fundamentally distinguished the Peter's guardsman from the pre-Petrine soldier.

But before the founder and first colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment closed his eyes, his favorites in green uniforms turned into new Janissaries.

Perfectly equipped, exemplarily armed and trained guardsmen have always been the pride and support of the Russian throne. Their courage, steadfastness, selflessness many times decided the fate of battles, campaigns, entire wars in favor of Russian weapons.

But there is another, less heroic page in the annals of the imperial guard. The guardsmen, these handsome men, duelists, red tape, spoiled by the attention of metropolitan and provincial ladies, constituted a special privileged military unit of the Russian army with their own traditions, customs, and psychology. The main duty of the guard was to protect the peace and security of the autocrat, the royal family and the court. Standing on the clock outside and inside the royal palace, they saw the wrong side of court life. Favorites sneaked past them into the royal bedrooms, they heard gossip and saw ugly quarrels, without which the court could not live. The guardsmen did not experience reverent awe of the courtiers sparkling with gold and diamonds, they missed the magnificent ceremonies - for them all this was familiar, and they had their own, often impartial, opinion about everything.

It is also important that the guardsmen had an exaggerated idea of ​​their role in the life of the court, the capital, and Russia. Peter I created a force that throughout the 18th century acted as the main arbiter of the destinies of monarchs and pretenders to the throne. Guards regiments, noble in composition, were the closest support to the throne. They represented that real armed force at the court, which could contribute to both the enthronement and the deposition of kings. Therefore, the rulers tried in every possible way to enlist the support of the guard, showered her with signs of attention and favors. A special relationship was established between the guards and the monarch: the guards barracks and the royal palace were closely connected with each other. Service in the guard was not profitable - it required a lot of money, but it opened up good career prospects, the road to political ambition and adventurism, so typical of the 18th century with its dizzying ups and downs of "random" people.

Nevertheless, it often turned out that the "fierce Russian Janissaries" could be successfully controlled. With flattery, promises, money, clever court businessmen were able to direct the red-hot stream of the Guards in the right direction, so that the mustachioed handsome men did not even suspect their miserable role as puppets in the hands of intriguers and adventurers. However, like a double-edged sword, the guard was also dangerous for those who used its services. Emperors and the first nobles often became hostages of an unbridled and capricious armed crowd of guardsmen. And this ominous role in Russian history of the guard was shrewdly understood by the French envoy in St. Petersburg, Jean Campredon, who wrote to his master Louis XV immediately after the accession to the throne of Catherine I: "The decision of the guard is the law here." And it was true, the 18th century went down in Russian history as the “age of palace coups”. And all these coups were made by the hands of the guards.

On January 28, 1725, the guardsmen played their political role for the first time in the drama of Russian history, immediately after the death of the first emperor, they brought the widow of Peter the Great to the throne, bypassing other heirs. This was the first independent performance of the guard as a political force.

When Catherine I fell dangerously ill in May 1727, officials of the highest government institutions gathered to resolve the issue of a successor: the Supreme Privy Council, the Senate, the Synod, and the presidents of the collegiums. Majors of the guards appeared among them, as if the officers of the guards constituted a special political corporation, without whose assistance such an important issue could not be resolved. Unlike other guard corporations - Roman Praetorians, Turkish Janissaries - the Russian Guard turned into political corporation.

The historian Klyuchevsky, who did not specifically deal with this issue, sensed the essence of the phenomenon. Having given in a few sentences a cursory overview of the “epoch of palace coups”, he further formulates the fundamental provisions: “This participation of the guard in state affairs was of the utmost importance, having a powerful influence on its political mood. Initially an obedient tool in the hands of its leaders, it then becomes an independent mover of events, intervening in politics on its own initiative. The palace coups were a preparatory political school for her, they developed certain political tastes in her, instilled in her a certain political way of thinking, created a mood. The Guards barracks is a counterbalance and sometimes an open opponent of the Senate and the Supreme Privy Council.

This is a wise passage. However, there is something to object to here. Firstly, the guards went through a certain political school under Peter. By the era of palace coups, she came already as a "political corporation." Her claims to resolve issues within the competence of government institutions - the Senate and the Supreme Council, were based on memories of the role that Peter assigned to her in the last decade of his reign, the role of a controlling and regulating force, accountable only to the king.

Secondly, it is unlikely that in 1725 and 1727 the guard was an “obedient instrument” in the hands of Menshikov and Buturlin. She was an "obedient instrument" - an ideal instrument - in the hands of her creator, and with his death immediately became a force in her own right. The guards followed Menshikov and Buturlin because their program at that moment was really organically close to the guards: Catherine seemed to the Preobrazhenians and Semenovites a guarantor of literally following the plans of the first emperor.

The guard chose not just a reigning person, she chose a principle. Moreover, the guard did not choose between Peter the Great and pre-Petrine Russia, but it made its choice in January 1725 between two trends in the political reform of the country - a moderate but undeniable movement towards limiting the autocracy and the inevitable increase in freedom in the country, on the one hand, and further development and strengthening of the military-bureaucratic state based on total slavery, on the other hand.

Guards in 1725 chose the second option.

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The role of the guard in palace coups
After Peter I, his wife Catherine I ruled for two years, and after her death, the grandson of Peter I, Peter II.
Peter I did not have time to decide who would be his heir. Most of all the rights to the throne had his grandson (the son of the executed Alexei), the young Peter. But among the nobles, parties were formed that tried to put on the throne a king that was beneficial to them. Menshikov, Yaguzhinsky and others contributed to the coming to power of Catherine I. The troops gathered around the palace were especially convinced by the Senate, the Synod and the generals. Catherine was an intelligent, but uneducated woman, according to one foreign ambassador, when she ascended the throne, she could neither read nor write. But three months later she learned to sign government papers. In fact, Menshikov was the ruler under her, while the empress herself spent time in magnificent feasts and festivities. An important event of her reign was the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council to decide the most important state affairs.
Catherine died in 1727 and appointed Peter II Alekseevich as his successor. Passions boiled around the 11-year-old Emperor Peter II. Initially, he was greatly influenced by Menshikov, who wanted to marry him to his daughter. Then he annoyed the boy with his strictness and, on the advice of his enemies, was exiled to distant Berezovo. The huge fortune of Prince and Generalissimo Alexander Danilovich was taken away. The princes Dolgoruky now had a strong influence on the tsar, who agreed on the wedding of Peter II and Catherine Dolgoruky. But suddenly the monarch fell ill with smallpox. In January 1730, on the day of the planned wedding, Peter II died.
Among the candidates for the throne was the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, but she was born before the official marriage to Catherine and was considered illegitimate. Therefore, they settled on the daughter of Ivan V, brother of Peter I, Anna. In addition, court groups sought to establish on the throne a ruler that was beneficial to them in order to receive some benefits, privileges, strengthen their position, etc. Among the members of the Supreme Privy Council (“supreme leaders”), an idea arose to limit the power of the king, “to make yourself feel better”, “ give yourself the will." They offered the throne to Anna, but with the condition that they sign an agreement - not to decide the most important matters without the consent of the "supreme leaders". On the one hand, theoretically, the limitation of autocracy could be positive. But a very narrow, oligarchic circle of advisers was appointed. The danger would be too great to use the Council as an instrument for narrowly selfish purposes. This body had very little support among the nobles. And Anna soon abandoned the obligation.
After the death of Peter II in 1730, the niece of Peter I, Anna Ivanovna, who lived in the Baltics, ascended the throne. The guards began to play an increasing role in the appointment (and then overthrow) of emperors and empresses, as well as influential dignitaries. These privileged troops consisted of nobles, even the rank and file here were nobles. To a certain extent, they reflected the mood of the upper class of the whole country, but, mainly, they began to turn into a force supporting this or that party, a person capable of carrying out a palace coup.
From the Baltics, Anna brought her entourage, among which her favorite (favorite) Biron was the main one. Anna's reign is inextricably linked with the growing influence of foreigners ("Germans"), many of whom were distinguished by rudeness, arrogance, greed, and disregard for everything Russian. Arbitrariness increased, political arrests and executions increased. This whole regime caused great discontent among the Russians, both the aristocracy and the common people. However, Anna happily reigned for ten years. After her death, palace coups began again. Formally, the baby Ivan Antonovich (Ivan VI), the great-grandson of Ivan V (brother of Peter I), was the tsar for almost a year. Then he was deposed, and the daughter of Peter I, Elizabeth, ascended the throne.
Anna, dying, left herself a successor: the infant son of her niece Anna Leopoldovna, who was married to the German prince Anton-Ulrich of Brunswick. But the regent, i.e. the actual ruler until the king came of age, should have been the same hated Biron. For the nobles, who were looking forward to the departure of the temporary worker, it was unbearable. It didn’t even help that Biron began his reign by favors: he canceled a number of death sentences, reduced taxes, etc. A conspiracy arose, the soul of which was another “German”, Field Marshal Minich. Biron was arrested and in April 1741 exiled forever to Pelym. His young mother Anna became the regent under the tsar. But she didn't have long to rule. At the end of November 1741, the guards again made a coup and elevated their beloved Elizabeth to the throne (Ivan VI Antonovich was imprisoned in a fortress). Unlike her mother, Elizabeth received an education, but she herself understood that she was not prepared to govern the state. She was not a particularly distant woman, sometimes rude and using a strong word. The queen was very fond of fun and balls. After her death, 15 thousand (!) Dresses that belonged to her remained. However, she was also distinguished by great piety, very strictly observing fasts. During the conspiracy, she gave her word not to execute anyone by death and kept it. It is believed that she was married in secret to Alexei Razumovsky.
The reign of Elizabeth lasted a long time, 20 years. She did a lot for the development of Russian industry and culture, greatly reduced the influence of foreigners at court. She was succeeded by her nephew, the grandson of Peter I from his daughter Anna and the German Duke of Holstein, Peter III. This was a stupid person. He turned down the opportunity to gain benefits for Russia as a result of victories in a difficult war with Prussia. German influence again increased. As a result, the guards again made a coup and in 1762 put his wife Catherine II on the throne. Unlike previous coups, for the first time a conspiracy arose not after the death of the king, but with a living adult emperor. For the first time, the emperor was also killed.
Peter III considered the Prussian king Frederick II a model for himself, did not recognize anything Russian. He put the benefits of his tiny state in Germany above the interests of huge Russia. His development is evidenced by the fact that one of his favorite pastimes was playing with soldiers. One day, Catherine, entering his room, saw with horror that he had hung a rat, which, according to him, committed a criminal offense: it ate the heads of two soldiers. Peter tyrannized his wife and humiliated in every possible way. The latter, although she was also German, from an early age was imbued with the life of Russia, was much more intelligent and educated. The guards loved her. Having managed to wean themselves from the dominance of foreigners, many officers could not restrain their indignation at the new order. The Orlov brothers became the center of the conspiracy. Peter III was overthrown and later killed.555