With the unification of Germany, a line was drawn under almost half a century of presence in Europe of the most powerful grouping of the Armed Forces of our country - the Western Group of Forces. The withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces to their homeland became an operation unprecedented in military practice, surpassing in scale the transfer of troops to the Far East during the Second World War or to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm.
Meanwhile, for thousands of officers and members of their families, this hasty, more reminiscent of flight, outcome turned into a real tragedy. Domestic politicians, trying to please the West, and often just following the lead of "sworn friends", forgot about their army, in fact, left it to its fate. The last Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces, retired Colonel-General Matvey BURLAKOV, tells about how the Western Group of Forces was taken out and met, about the ups and downs of that strange period of time.

Matvey Prokofievich, having learned about the appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces, did you realize that it was you who would bear the burden of withdrawing a military group of many thousands?
I began the withdrawal of our troops from Europe even before I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces - in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Group. There were no special complaints against me in this regard, and the Minister of Defense of the USSR Yazov even decided to conduct practical exercises for the commands of the Western, Northern and Central groups using the example of a group of troops subordinate to me. First Deputy Minister General of the Army Lushev was appointed to lead the classes in Hungary. For two days, we showed the procedure for preparing for the withdrawal, the process of collecting and loading equipment. Especially for this, a collection point was set up in Transcarpathia. Everything went well. “I will report to the minister, and get ready, Matvey Prokofievich: you will most likely have to withdraw the Western Group as well. You have a good experience, ”Lushev said then. That was June 1989. And in October 1990, in Moscow, I was at the report of the minister. Yazov listened, was silent for a while: “You know, Matvey, next year, most likely by May, the commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces will be dismissed. The age is still 65 years. Get ready to take the job." May means May.
But then chance intervened: an emergency occurs in the Western Group of Forces. The commander of one of the regiments, leaving his family and taking with him a secret rocket at that time, fled to the West. The Germans, of course, refused to extradite the defector to the Soviet side. A loud scandal erupted. The country's leadership makes decisions: to remove from their positions the commander-in-chief and a member of the military council of a group of troops. Thus, I took the ZGV instead of May in December. I was told about this at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow, giving only three days to hand over the affairs to the first deputy, say goodbye to the Hungarian leadership and subordinates. On December 14, 1990, I flew from Budapest to Berlin.

Was the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces more difficult than the previous withdrawal from Hungary?
Incomparably more difficult. Firstly, the Southern Group of Forces went out back in the days of the Soviet Union - they crossed the Hungarian border, and already at home, in their native Ukraine. Another thing is Germany, where the grouping was dozens of times larger, and in order to withdraw it, it was necessary to overcome several borders of sovereign states - Poland, Czechoslovakia, and since 1992 - also Belarus, Ukraine. Moreover, the attitude towards us was far from friendly. The Poles and Czechs, former brothers in the socialist camp, decided to improve their shaky financial situation at the expense of the Western Group of Forces. The leaderships of these countries put forward a number of conditions: to repair all routes, to build bridges, to lay, in fact, new bypass roads around cities. And for the passage of each axle of a railway car across the country, they demanded an astronomical amount - from 4.5 to 5 thousand marks!
Naturally, the group did not have such money, which means that there was only one way left - by sea. From the German ports of Rostock and Mukran to Kaliningrad, Vyborg and Klaipeda. In order to study the situation, the technical readiness for the withdrawal of troops by sea, I was on the coast with the main part of the headquarters for six months. Otherwise, it was impossible: after all, there were not enough warships, and no one knew how civilian cargo ships not intended for transporting equipment would behave. Then three ferries "Mukran - Klaipeda" were launched, each of which was loaded with a hundred pieces of equipment. The first six months were spent precisely on studying the possibility of withdrawing troops by sea, therefore, they entered the established schedule only in the second half of 1991.

Did the Germans really see off our soldiers and officers with tears in their eyes and bouquets of flowers? Or did the majority still grin maliciously at the back of the troops leaving Germany?
It was different. East Germans, especially those who served in the People's National Army of the GDR, were offended that we were leaving them. After the unification of Germany, the army of the GDR was simply disbanded. The generals and senior officers were fired, while all the rest who wished to stay were lowered in rank by two steps. But there really were rallies, flowers, tears, they saw us off well, kindly. The Western Germans were surprisingly calm and even about our departure.
There were, however, negative moments. Neo-Nazis threw a torch on one of the wagons of a train carrying ammunition passing under the bridge. The sentry, knowing full well that if the tarpaulin catches fire, then disaster cannot be avoided, climbs up. The guy managed to drop the torch and put out the flames, but he himself died.

Now, twenty years later, it is absolutely obvious that the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces in such a short time was an absolutely ill-conceived, I would even say adventurous operation. Did you, as commander-in-chief, somehow try to influence the situation?
A man in uniform cannot discuss orders, criticize the incumbent President - the Supreme Commander. And we prompted and advised him constantly. Personally, I kept telling both our and the German leadership that the rate of withdrawal should be equal to the rate of equipping the troops at home. A town was built in Russia - we are withdrawing a regiment, a division - we are liberating the German garrison. The formula is simple and not invented by us! This is how the French withdrew their troops. And in our country, elite units and formations were sent to an open field, everything was so ill-conceived.
The Germans, of course, wanted to push us out as soon as possible, and this can be understood. Another thing is incomprehensible: why the leaders of our country, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin, who came to replace him, absolutely did not think about their own army. On the contrary, they were constantly rushing, urging. And Yeltsin, plus everything, reduced the already disastrous time for the withdrawal of the group by another four months.
If the ZGV had been given eight to ten years, then for sure everything would have turned out quite differently. During this time, it was possible to create infrastructure, equip training grounds, build housing for military personnel. Indeed, there were practically no military camps in post-Soviet Russia, all of them remained along the western borders of the former Union: in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and Moldova. The authorities turned out to be aloof from the problems of people in uniform, in fact, leaving them to the mercy of fate.
Take, for example, a tank division thrown under the village of Boguchary in the Voronezh region. The mud is impassable, the nearest railway line is 50 km off-road. No one even thought about how to drive the tanks to their destination through the black soil! When making such a wild decision, they were guided by other principles: at that time, the Voronezh region was afraid of Chechnya, located not so far away, and Boguchary on the southern outskirts should have become a kind of barrier, an outpost. And they did not think at all about where to live for the officers and their families.

Matvey Prokofievich, don't you think that it was during these years that a time bomb was laid under the prestige of officer service?
The image of the officer corps and the prestige of military service as a whole have suffered, that's no doubt. And how many broken families! Judge for yourself: the officers left in trains with the soldiers, and the wives and children who had such an opportunity were sent to their parents, close relatives, and acquaintances. The forced separation sometimes lasted for several years: where to bring the family if you feed mosquitoes in the tent yourself, and there is no chance to change anything? Many never reunited. And this is also a tragedy, one of many.
And how many sensible, professional commanders we lost in those years! Even the young officers serving in the Western Group of Forces had a wealth of experience: after all, the troops in Germany did not engage in side activities that were not characteristic of the army, but devoted all their time to planned combat training. No annual "battles for the potato harvest", only the improvement of military skills! Arriving home, these people faced insurmountable difficulties of a domestic nature, and, accordingly, the service faded into the background, prospects and meaning were lost. 56,900 officers were withdrawn from Germany. Thousands of them - some immediately, others a few years later - left the Armed Forces.

Previously, it was believed that only the so-called "thieves" officers who won the "contest of dads" get to serve in the Western Group of Forces...
Of course, there were some, but I can confidently say that they did not make up the majority. You don’t have to go far for an example: I, a native of a working-class family, after graduating with honors from a school, were sent to Germany, where I served as a young officer from 1956 to 1963. Graduates with honors during distribution were then given the right to choose a place of service. And you know, these seven years have given me a lot as a commander, it was impossible to come up with a better school.

The talk of the town was the sale of the property of the Western Group of Forces ...
According to an agreement between the heads of our states, the German Ministry of Finance was supposed to deal with the sale of real estate owned by the ZGV. Now think, why should the Ministry of Finance sell our barracks, when it is already clear to everyone that no one will take it with them anyway, and in the end they will get it for free? Therefore, there was actually no sale of real estate.
Under these conditions, I made a decision: to dismantle everything that was possible and take it to Russia. And these are thousands of various hangars, storages, boxes - in general, those structures that can be assembled in a new place. More than 37,000 concrete airfield slabs were removed from runways and parking lots alone! The Germans, of course, began to resent. And I tried to calmly explain: in the weapons room, the machine guns are in the pyramids, which we take along with the weapons, and the combat aircraft is based on the concrete parking lot of the airfield, and this, figuratively speaking, is its pyramid. Why should we leave our possessions when we leave? At home, these plates were very useful. Today, almost all the tanks withdrawn at one time from the Western Group of Forces, and this is neither more nor less than four thousand units of armored vehicles, are standing on these plates in the places where divisions are deployed.

And then…
- ... and then the “fourth estate” was lowered on me, or rather watchdogs from the journalistic workshop, which I deeply respect. He reacted painfully to all these attacks, blood, as they say, spoiled. When he came to Moscow, and this happened infrequently, he tried to speak on television, to tell the truth about the state of affairs in the Western Group of Forces. But lies poured from screens and newspaper pages every day! The people wanted fried facts, and they got them in huge quantities. Reading fables was also hard for my family, relatives, people who knew me well.

Tell us in more detail what kind of explosive compromising material was contained in the famous report of Yuri Boldyrev, which dealt with abuses in the Western Group of Forces? After all, as far as I know, his entire text was never made public.
But I don’t know who Boldyrev is, I have never met him personally. Yes, at the end of 1991, a fairly large group came from him, fifteen people, led by his deputy Vyacheslav Vasyagin. The commission worked in the group of troops for almost a month. At the summing up, Vasyagin said: “After all the publications in the press, we came to you with bad intentions, and we leave with a good feeling. Everything is going well, and you will eliminate the minor shortcomings that exist on your own. ” The analysis by the head of the commission was carried out orally, no written conclusions were left to us. True, the entire meeting, including these words of Vasyagin, was recorded by my chief of staff on a dictaphone. This film, by the way, mysteriously disappeared after a month ...
And then it started from Moscow: remove, demote, imprison! The positive conclusion of the Vasyagin Commission after some 30 days turned into the famous, "revealing" report of Boldyrev. This lie was also needed in order to divert public opinion from the glaring internal problems of Russia. After all, it was the beginning of the 90s, a difficult time. And here, by the way, “the fattening, plundering the army generals and officers” came in handy! But think about it: after all, 36,095 people visited the Western Group of Forces with various checks at that time! Couldn't they all at once, as if by agreement, fail to notice gross violations bordering on crimes?

You once said that the time to name those who wanted to compromise you, to make you a whipping boy, has not yet come. Has it already arrived today?
Not yet. These people are still in power.

What can you say about the three-part documentary film "Red Star over Germany" filmed in 2001 by German filmmakers?
I, along with several former commanders-in-chief, acted as a consultant on this project. The film is not bad, although the Germans still broke in places on the negative.

And how did the infamous August coup come back to haunt Wünsdorf, far from Moscow?
On the morning of the 19th (by the way, I was on another vacation then), the operational duty officer calls me: “Order of the Minister of Defense, at 6 o’clock all commanders should be watching TVs in their offices.” I, as befits a vacationer, go to the office in a tracksuit. I sit down, turn on the TV, watch the appeal of the State Emergency Committee. After that come the deputies. I then said that this does not concern us - no one will drive tanks from Berlin to Moscow, this is at least stupid. After an hour and a half of unsuccessful attempts to get through to the minister, I still heard Yazov's voice in the receiver: “Matvey, you are an experienced person, and you know what to do. Mind your own business". At that time, I had one thing to do - the withdrawal of troops.
Ironically, August 19th is my birthday. In the evening we celebrated a little in the family circle, with colleagues. A little later, Chief of Staff Kuznetsov calls: “Comrade Commander-in-Chief, the Prime Minister of Brandenburg, Mr. Manfred Stolbert, wants to meet with you.” I put on my uniform and went to my office. It turned out that Stolbert arrived on behalf of the President of Germany himself, in order to find out how a group of troops would behave in the light of the current situation? My answer that no adjustments would be made to the withdrawal schedule reassured him.
On August 25, when I safely returned from vacation, the commission of the group of troops, headed by the chief of staff, worked according to plan in the formations of the 2nd Panzer Army. And I flew to the coast, to control the process of the withdrawal of troops by sea. No sooner had he arrived in Mukran than the Chief of the General Staff got in touch: “Matvey Prokofievich, urgently return to Wünsdorf. The Germans are panicking: Burlakov is raising the 2nd Panzer Army, he is almost going to attack Germany. At least play preference, but don’t get out of control! The situation was such that journalists, police, and special services were on duty almost around the clock near each of our military camps. And I, as commander in chief, was the number one figure for spies of all stripes.
Thanks for the candid conversation!

Interviewed by Roman SHKURLATOV

PRIVATE BUSSINESS BURLAKOV Matvey Prokopevich Born on August 19, 1935 in Ulan-Ude. In 1957 he graduated from the Omsk Military School. M. V. Frunze. In 1968, after graduating from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze was appointed deputy commander of the regiment. Since 1969 - regiment commander, since 1973 - division commander. In 1977, after graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff, he was appointed commander of an army corps. Since 1979 - Army Commander, since 1983 - Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. Since 1988 - Commander of the Southern Group of Forces. Since December 1990 - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. Since 1994 - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Reserved since 1995. President of the public association "Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces / GSVG".

- Matvey Prokopyevich, before moving on to the main topic of the conversation, perhaps remember how your appointment as commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces took place?

For the uninitiated, it turned out to be, frankly, unexpected. The decision on my appointment was made by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and personally by Mikhail Gorbachev. Back in October 1990, I had a conversation with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov. It was he who offered me in the spring of 1991 to head the Western Group of Forces. In Moscow, they noticed and, apparently, appreciated the successful withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces, which I led.

But man proposes, but fate disposes... A month later I was urgently summoned to Moscow and ordered to take the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces. But that was only the beginning. At that time, the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held in the capital. Suddenly there was a telephone call from the General Staff: "The General Secretary is calling you!"

And how was the meeting with the first and last president of the USSR and the general secretary of the Central Committee? Worried?

Not that word. After all, far from many, even considering the then democratization, had a chance to communicate with the leader of perestroika. The audience took place on the same day. During a break between sessions of the plenum of the Central Committee, Yazov and I approached Gorbachev. A little later, Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov joined us.

The General Secretary began with a question: "Have we already met?" I answered in the affirmative. In his recommendations, Gorbachev touched upon the economic and political problems associated with the withdrawal of troops from Germany. He advised to establish ties with the local and federal leadership of the FRG and paid special attention to the sale of real estate owned by the USSR.

The press often mentioned fantastic figures for the value of Soviet property in Germany. How much was everything really valued?

In a conversation with me, Gorbachev suggested that our real estate was valued at 30 billion West German marks. A colossal number! However, there is nothing surprising in that. The group of troops was located in 777 military camps. They numbered 36290 buildings and structures. More than twenty-one thousand objects were built at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, during the sale of all the property of the Western Group, conflicts and sometimes deadlocks often arose. Under a servile agreement between the USSR and the FRG, the implementation was entrusted to the German Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the current value of real estate, which is the property of the USSR, at prices in 1990 was determined by a much smaller amount - about ten and a half billion marks. It is quite natural that the Germans were not interested in a profitable sale. Moscow, in the person of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, did not show the will of the state in this matter.

For the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the Germans were ready to pay tens of billions of marks. But Gorbachev was content with a small amount.

According to interstate agreements dated December 16, 1992, all our real estate in the Western Group of Companies became the property of Germany. It was practically given to the Germans. This decision of some leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia is akin to a betrayal of the interests of their own people, tens of thousands of homeless families of officers and ensigns. This conclusion was made even by some Western media.

God be with them, with the Western media. Russian newspapers and magazines wrote that the withdrawal of the ZGV resembled a swift flight. The Americans carried out the redeployment of only one division from Europe to the United States for five to seven years. Who is to blame for the fact that dozens of our formations and units ended up in an open field?

The top leadership of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's inner circle, who pursued an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible policy. Mikhail Sergeevich himself achieved world popularity, became the "best German" due to the fact that, for the sake of foreign policy dividends, he forgot about the country's internal problems. For the sake of the friendly smiles of a Western man in the street and the nickname "Gorby", he waved his hand at many things.

Boris Yeltsin continued his anti-army policy with no less cynicism. To please his friend, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he reduced the already unthinkable period for the withdrawal of our troops by four months. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the military infrastructure of the Soviet Union was concentrated in the border areas - in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. So the Russian divisions and regiments had to be deployed in completely undeveloped places.

The same Americans withdrew their troops only after military camps were built for them in the States and appropriate living conditions were created. In 1992, the 7th Corps left Germany for their homeland, for the USA. The Yankees returned home without any problems, in good spirits, happy and contented.

During the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany, Western intelligence allegedly successfully carried out an operation code-named "Giraffe", the purpose of which was to acquire ultra-modern weapons. Is it a bluff?

Yes and no. They most likely carried out the operation, but I would not be so categorical about success.

The group of Soviet troops in Germany, later renamed the Western Group of Forces, has always been a testing ground for the capabilities of the latest military equipment, the level of training of command personnel and personnel. The most modern samples of weapons and military equipment first came here.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan, conclusions on the characteristics of weapons and military equipment, the possibilities of their use in extreme conditions were made in the Armed Forces of the USSR mainly on the basis of exercises and maneuvers of formations and formations stationed in Germany.

In 1990-1994, "sensational" information regularly appeared in the German media that the Russians were selling weapons and ammunition left and right. One of the Germans pecked at this "duck", who offered our soldier two thousand marks for a Kalashnikov assault rifle. This "merchant" was caught red-handed. And there were more than fifty such attempts to buy weapons from our servicemen in 1992 alone. None of them succeeded. Therefore, once again I allow myself to doubt the success of Operation Giraffe. Accounting for ammunition, weapons and military equipment in the Western Group of Forces was properly organized.

Especially for skeptics, I will give the following argument. For almost half a century of existence of the GSVG-ZGV, only 68 small arms were wanted. One hundred percent of weapons and military equipment were taken to Russia.

Our military echelons were heading home through the territory of neighboring states, recent allies under the Warsaw Pact. Were there any problems?

I don't want to indiscriminately blame entire peoples and label them, but the new "democratic" leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to improve their financial affairs at the expense of the troops withdrawn from Germany. The leadership of the Polish "Solidarity", for example, demanded to repair the bridges on which our echelons were supposed to move. The "lords" presented us with truly enslaving, clearly unfeasible demands for payment. The passage of each axle of a railway car through the country was estimated as much as four thousand West German marks. It was about tens of millions.

These conditions were unacceptable for us. Apparently, even then, recent colleagues in the Warsaw Pact were trying to earn indulgences, foreseeing the imminent expansion of NATO to the east.

Of course, we did not have such money to pay for transportation. The German side allocated only 1 billion marks to cover our transportation costs. There was only one way - by sea. But it was impossible to solve such a complex task without the consent of the German state authorities.

To be honest, at first I had little faith in the reality of the idea of ​​transferring a huge group by sea. And there were objective reasons for that. Within two or three months, the entire withdrawal scheme and plan had to be revised, which in itself is quite problematic.

But the German side kept these promises and provided full political and financial support in sending our troops across the Baltic Sea.

Then, in your native Fatherland, you were not commemorated with a "quiet kind word" unless you were lazy. They were not accused of anything: use of official position, corruption, personal enrichment. Now it is clear that "puppeteers" were behind all this. Did you hurt someone?

Many! I think the time has not yet come when you can talk about everything in plain text. Although, there are no others, and those are far away.

First, it was necessary to distract the Russian people from internal problems. Remember, there was not enough food, wages were not paid for months, plus rampant crime and all the "charms" of nascent capitalism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union buried the hopes of hundreds of millions of people for a stable and normal life. And here, the notorious piano in the bushes turned out to be very useful - the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany. A topical, so to speak, socio-political topic, when one could talk about the mediocrity of the command, about theft and corruption, about deserters and monster officers. At the same time, it was transparently hinted that all these loafers were sitting on the neck of the common people. In my opinion, an excellent valve for bleeding off excess pressure in the country.

Secondly, I did everything in my power to prevent unscrupulous businessmen from getting their hands on the withdrawal of troops. The Western group was surrounded by hundreds of different firms and firms, the owners of which were located in Moscow, Bonn and Berlin and occupied by no means the last positions. What we just did not offer. For example, to purchase food, coal, and other necessary material resources at astronomical prices.

In February 1991, we learned that we would not receive money from the 2.5 billion interest-free loan provided by Germany. I had to save on literally everything. Meanwhile, complaints about the objectionable and stubborn Burlakov were going to all instances. No one knows what it took to endure this pressure, except for me and the command of the Western Group of Forces. Naturally, I was not forgiven for such "willfulness". But I don't regret anything.

Many high-ranking military leaders at the end of their careers smoothly move to well-paid positions of consultants, advisers, heads of various firms and foundations. What is pensioner Burlakov doing today?

As befits a pensioner, I am raising children and grandchildren, but rather they are me. I do housework. I don’t get into politics and dubious commercial transactions.

On a voluntary basis, I lead the Union of Veterans of the Western Group of Forces - the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Anticipating malicious questions, I will say that we do not use customs privileges and, unlike some, did not flood the country with imported alcohol and cigarettes. We provide all possible legal and medical assistance to veterans of military service and their families, we meet with the younger generation.

I look people straight in the eye. If someone considers such work a "warm place" - I will not dissuade. Time will judge.

Is it true that the Germans attempted unauthorized entry into our nuclear arsenals?

Yes, it was. In 1992, in Altengrabow, three officers of the Bundeswehr tried to penetrate the territory of the missile base. Ignoring the warning shouts of the sentry and even a shot in the air, one of them overcame the fence. Our soldier opened fire to kill. As a result, a German major was seriously wounded, and the violators were detained. The Minister of Defense of Germany then officially apologized to us for the actions of his subordinates.

They say that our Western partners were shocked when they finally found themselves in ... empty storage facilities for nuclear weapons? They were so hoping to get acquainted with their contents!

I will not brag, but they have not been able to calculate the time and place of the evacuation of nuclear weapons. Together with the special services, we planned and successfully implemented a multi-way combination. At the same time, purposeful misinformation was carried out and a number of distracting actions were carried out ...

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Western media have not tired of shouting about the so-called "Russian mafia". She did not cause problems to her compatriots in uniform?

In July 1992, the robbery of the century could have taken place. The publicity would be colossal, and the consequences would be unpredictable. On the way of transport with fifteen million German marks, Chechen criminal elements, already settled in Europe, ambushed. They calculated everything: traffic routes, departure time, security forces and much more. They did not take into account one thing - the professionalism of the Russian military and specialists from the special detachment of the Brandenburg criminal police. Thanks to coordinated and prompt actions, the robbery failed.

But this did not stop the mafia. The ZGV safe was a painfully tasty morsel. The gang was sent reinforcements from Chechnya. High-class "specialists" in robbery and robbery have come to Germany. In January 1993, the criminals repeated the robbery attempt. But the command and counterintelligence received the necessary information in time ... By the way, more than a dozen ethnic bandit groups were operating on the territory of the former GDR at that time. We realized that it is simply impossible to foresee everything. And the money was delivered by plane.

Alas, today experts' forecasts that with the collapse of the Soviet Union organized crime will rush to Western Europe have been confirmed.

Ten years since the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces is more of a sad date than a happy holiday. Who were we in Europe - occupiers, as some people sometimes say, or liberators?

For 49 years of our troops being in Germany, we have never frightened anyone, but we have not been afraid of anyone either. Being the most powerful grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces, the GSVG-ZGV faithfully carried out its historic mission to ensure peace and stability in Europe. It is still unknown how the post-war structure of the world would have developed if there were no Soviet troops in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

One of the military journalists, touching on this topic, aptly remarked:
In the ZGV were all for selection
And the orders of the fathers were honored sacredly,
If we were still there
It is not known where NATO would be!

I think there is a lot of truth in these words. Russian soldiers and officers who served in the Western Group of Forces deserve only the respect and gratitude of their descendants. I am sure that after a short time, Mrs. History will put everything in its place and reward everyone according to their deserts.

On the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria and its consequences.
....Here it would be very appropriate to mention one more act of Khrushchev, which is already little known today. Nikita Sergeevich himself said this about it: “But I have the conviction that it is no longer possible to confine ourselves to talking and pulling on this issue, that the abnormality should be eliminated by urgently signing a peace treaty with Austria, withdrawing our troops from there. Thus, to untie their hands in order to carry out propaganda in full voice against the US military bases, which scattered their troops across different continents and countries and pursued an aggressive, gendarmerie policy against countries that were in their sphere of influence, keeping on their territory and military bases. In order to speak in a loud voice, to organize the public of the whole world to fight against such orders, we ourselves had to withdraw our troops from foreign territories. The first question arose about Austria. It will be about how Khrushchev, without any need, unexpectedly withdrew our troops from Austria. As you can see, the pretext was far-fetched: the Soviet Union needed to withdraw its troops from Austria so that it would be easier to launch propaganda against the presence of American bases in many parts of the world. Here, they say, we do not have military bases on foreign territory, which means that the Americans should also withdraw their military bases.
More than half a century has passed, it's time to take stock. How many American bases were liquidated by the Americans after our criticism? None. So the reasons for Khrushchev's actions are completely different - the systematic, gradual surrender of the geopolitical positions of Russia - the USSR. What is Austria from a geopolitical point of view? At that moment it was a country with a population of about 7 million people and with a very important location in Central Europe. It borders on Germany, Switzerland, Italy and other countries. In 1938, as a result of the Anschluss, Austria was annexed to the Third Reich and became its eastern land Ostmark. Tens of thousands of Austrian soldiers fought on the German Eastern Front against the Soviet Union and committed atrocities on our territory no less than the Germans. In the spring of 1945, more than 26 thousand Soviet soldiers died during the battles for the liberation of Austria. But this was not the entire payment for the right of Russia - the USSR to have military bases and for its presence in the very center of Europe. In the Austrian

1 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power: Memoirs. In 4 books. - M.: Moscow news, 1999.Kn. 4.C. 281.
the ashes of more than 60 thousand Soviet prisoners of war and forcibly driven away civilians who died in concentration camps on the territory of Austria rest on earth.
After the surrender, the territory of Austria within the borders of 1938 was divided among the four victorious powers into occupation zones, just like the territory of Germany. At first, only the Soviet troops that liberated it were in Vienna, but at the Potsdam Conference, the allies agreed on the division of the capital of Austria into four occupation zones. All laws adopted by the Austrian parliament, before they were officially published by the federal government, had to receive approval from the Allied Commission created by the victorious countries. This situation continued for ten years. And suddenly, in March 1955, at the direction of N. S. Khrushchev, an Austrian government delegation was unexpectedly invited to Moscow to prepare a state treaty, which was supposed to restore the independence and full sovereignty of Austria. The USSR did not gain anything from this step, but already on May 15, 1955, this document was signed in Vienna and entered into force on July 27, 1955. According to the agreements reached, the troops of all the victorious countries had to leave Austria within only 90 days. On October 19, 1955, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria was completed1.
Behind the beautiful words about the withdrawal of “all troops”, the essence was hidden: it was incomparably more important for the Soviet Union to remain in the center of Europe than for anyone else. It was our army that came to Europe, chasing the Nazis from our homeland, and created a barrier against new aggression in the form of a bloc of socialist states. Being in Austria, we had a powerful lever of influence on European politics. And most importantly, giving up your positions in any game is a sign of weakness or

1 “In total, the Soviet troops stationed in Austria are staffed by 38,803 military personnel and 2,671 workers and employees” (G.K. Zhukov’s note to the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria dated June 6, 1955, AP RF.F. 3. Inv. 64. D. 21. Ll. 11–14).
nonsense. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, carried out in 1955 at the direction of N. S. Khrushchev, caused great damage to the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union and significantly changed the balance of power in Central Europe not in favor of our country. The Austro-Hungarian border that became transparent allowed the former fascists of Miklós Horthy to return to Hungary, who now began working for the US and British intelligence services. The result was an armed rebellion in Hungary in the autumn of 1956, to suppress which the USSR had to use troops1. Pay attention to the dates: in 1955 we left Austria, and in 1956 we were almost “left” from Hungary its head

1 These were not peaceful demonstrators, but armed fighters who fought in World War II just 11 years ago. Reprisals against communists and members of the Hungarian special services. Actual lynchings on the streets of Budapest. The scope of the "peaceful demonstrations" in Hungary in 1956 and their scenario will be understandable in comparison with the events in Syria. Demonstrations also began there, and then out of nowhere, the “demonstrators” had sniper rifles, grenade launchers and machine guns.
Some units of the regular army of Hungary went over to the side of the rebels. The scope of the battles in which Russian soldiers defended its geopolitical interests and gave their lives will emphasize the following fact: “...Thousands (the exact number is unknown to this day) of Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 26 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union Yuza, 14 of them - posthumously. By a separate but open Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 1, 1956, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (four times) was awarded to Marshal Zhukov. During 12 days of active hostilities, our army lost as a result of the actions of "peaceful and unarmed demonstrators": 705 people, including 22 - missing; 26 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 10 armored personnel carriers, 4 Katyushas, ​​38 vehicles, 9 anti-aircraft guns (76 mm and 85 mm), four 85 mm D-44 divisional cannons, nine 122 mm howitzers (see photo). : Smolyannikov S. Hungary 1956. The bloody autumn of Budapest, on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the events that received the official name "Liquidation of the Hungarian rebellion" //).
2 But Austria-Hungary until 1918 was called a common country of several peoples in the center of Europe.
idiot (traitor) Khrushchev - you need to put pressure on all fronts1. That is why under Stalin, who did not do stupid things in foreign policy, there were no uprisings anywhere. Surrendering Hungary at that time also meant receiving similar speeches by “driven to despair” agents of the CIA and MI-6, former Nazis who received promises and money, as well as people simply deceived by propaganda in all other countries that entered the zone of influence of the USSR. Don't forget: the colossal war ended just a little over ten years ago, everyone who fought against Russia was alive and full of strength...
And one more important fact. Our army did not leave Austria, but almost ran away from there. The three-month period for the withdrawal of troops was not determined by any circumstances, there was nowhere to rush, moreover, there was no need to withdraw troops.

1 It is necessary to understand that geopolitical competitors always use ANY reason to rock the situation. And the death of Stalin, his demonization by Khrushchev, insulting the memory of the leader - this is also a REASON for pumping up tensions within the USSR. Only not against, but for Stalin. A good example is the unrest and unrest that happened in the same 1956 in Tbilisi. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, and on February 25, 1956, at the morning meeting, N. S. Khrushchev delivered a closed report "On the cult of personality and its consequences." You can easily find this report on the Internet and you can see for yourself how false it is. Pay attention: the report is SECRET and CLOSED. And in a week in the capital of Georgia, the demonstrators will know its contents and be indignant. At first, people took to the streets without seeing any mention of the anniversary of Stalin's death in the newspapers. Spontaneous mourning events began. Then, from March 6, indignation will begin to be pumped up with Khrushchev's lies, which were voiced in the report. Stalin is a Georgian, Khrushchev's slander touches the pride of the Georgians. The result was demonstrations in the capital of Georgia with portraits of Stalin and a demand that March 9, the day of Stalin's funeral, be given the status of a day of mourning. And then provocateurs in the crowd, whipping up passions, seizing transport and trying to seize the House of Communications and newspaper editorial offices. First, warning volleys of troops, then aimed fire, which stopped the onslaught. At least one person with a gun was detained in the crowd. According to official data, a total of 21 people were killed, and another 54 were injured of varying severity. Let me remind you: under Stalin there was not a single similar story.
So the withdrawal of troops to the detriment of the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union, and also accelerated, was not invented by Gorbachev (Afghanistan) and not Yeltsin (Germany), but by Khrushchev.
And finally, for all those who like to call on Russia to repent. There are no emotions in geopolitics and there is no place for evaluations based on them. Only one thing is valued here - strength. The word "gratitude" in geopolitics is simply absent. The most seemingly moral actions in the field of geopolitics will not lead to anything good if they are one-sided surrender of positions. Here is one example of how Austria later thanked its liberators, who gave it the opportunity in 1955 to restore independence and full sovereignty. Twenty-four years after the withdrawal of our troops, in 1979, State Hermitage researcher Sergei Androsov accidentally saw an elegant bronze statue of the Flying Mercury at an exhibition in Vienna. It was stolen by German troops from Pavlovsk Park near St. Petersburg during the Great Patriotic War and is the only bronze copy of the world-famous sculpture of Mercury, the god of trade and patron of the arts, by the outstanding Italian Renaissance master Giovanni Bologna1. kick the statue. The "grateful" Austrian side, under various pretexts, did not want to return it. Negotiations about the obvious fact have been going on for 25 (!) years. Finally, only on May 5, 2005, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 50th anniversary of the restoration of the independence and sovereignty of Austria, its ambassador to Moscow, Martin Vukovich, at a solemn ceremony at the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts handed over to Russia sculpture "Flying Mercury".

It was an excerpt from the book by N. Starikov "Geopolitics: How it's done"

About 25 years ago, without a single shot, East Germany either ceased to exist. The group of Soviet troops in Germany (GSVG) located in the GDR was prepared for any situation, even taking into account the enemy’s nuclear attack. But the USSR lost the Cold War, which led to the humiliating withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany.

post-war period

Approximately one month after the victory of the USSR over Germany in World War II, the high command of the USSR decided to create a contingent of occupation troops in Germany, the commander of which was the hero of the war, Marshal Georgy Zhukov. This happened on July 9, 1945. The number of Soviet soldiers stationed at first was 1.5 million.

The mission in Germany of the Soviet troops, whose main headquarters was in the city of Potsdam, neighboring Berlin, was to ensure the administration of the German occupation zone, as well as the restoration of a peaceful life for citizens in it. At the same time, the command of the USSR did not believe that these troops would be in Germany for a long time. In addition, the policy of the USSR in the post-war period was focused on the unification of Germany, since after the destruction of the ruling fascist party in this country, the communists and socialists became the main political forces. Thus, the Soviet Union viewed Germany as a potential strong ally in the center of Europe.

The GSVG was established on March 26, 1954, this date is considered the end of the occupation of Germany by Soviet troops. Between 1957 and 1958, about 70,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed on the territory of the GDR.

This group of troops was created to ensure the implementation of the decisions taken at the Potsdam Conference, as well as to ensure the security of the western border. Further, on September 20, 1955, the GDR signed an agreement with the USSR and became one of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. In 1957, a new pact was signed between and the GDR, according to which the number and location of Soviet troops in Germany were established. According to this agreement, Soviet troops did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the GDR.

In 1963, the GSVG had about 386,000 soldiers, of which 46,000 belonged to the air force. The armament of the GSVG included:

• 7500 tanks;
• 100 tactical missiles;
• 484 self-propelled military installations;
• 146 bombers;
• 101 reconnaissance aircraft;
• 80 helicopters.

In 1968, German Soviet troops took part in the suppression of the uprising in Prague. In the late 70s and early 80s, the Soviet military contingent in Germany was reduced. Thus, 1,000 tanks and other military vehicles and about 20,000 soldiers were withdrawn from the territory of the GDR. During perestroika in the USSR, the GSVG had a defensive character in accordance with its structure and armament. In 1989, the number of armored Soviet vehicles on the territory of the GDR was significantly reduced.

In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev (general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee) was at the head of the USSR. In 1989, he decided on the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. The military power of the GSVG was greatly weakened, since 8 battalions of soldiers and 4 tank divisions were immediately disbanded. It should be noted that the number of GSVG has been constantly decreasing since the year of their formation in the GDR, however, a major withdrawal of troops began in 1989. Therefore, answering the question of when the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany began, it should be called 1989.

On September 2, 1990, the foreign ministers of the FRG, Great Britain, the GDR, the USA, the USSR and France signed an agreement concerning the fate of Germany, which in practice meant that the borders of the FRG would expand, absorbing the GDR completely.

It is interesting to note that the United States did not plan to withdraw its troops from the territory of the FRG, while the USSR agreed to carry out a complete withdrawal of Soviet and Russian troops from East Germany before 1994. this name replaced the previous GSVG) at the time of withdrawal included:

• 546,200 soldiers;
• 115,000 units of military equipment;
• 667,000 tons of ammunition;
• 36,290 buildings and structures in 777 military camps.

The withdrawal of such a huge number of troops meant for the USSR a shameful retreat to nowhere.

Troop withdrawal

In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal from Germany of 4 divisions of armored vehicles attacking the air force, as well as short-range nuclear missiles. Starting from that date, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany became the most full-scale transfer of military forces in the history of mankind. Despite the enormous difficulties in transferring such a quantity of military and military equipment from the GDR to the USSR, the withdrawal deadlines were not violated, and the plan was completed by August 1994. The German government pledged to allocate DM 15 million to cover the costs required by the withdrawal of troops.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was carried out mainly by sea, in particular, through the ports of the German city of Rostock and the island of Rügen, as well as by rail through Poland.

Problems during the withdrawal of troops

One of the main problems during the years of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was the issue of housing. It was originally planned to withdraw troops as housing was built for them at home. However, according to the last commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces, Matvey Burlakov, "the country's government did not think about its own army." Moreover, the president of Russia at that time, Boris Yeltsin, in order to meet the requirements of the Western authorities, spoke in favor of reducing the withdrawal period by 4 months.

Of the promised 15 million marks for the construction of housing for soldiers, Germany paid only 8 million. As a result, only 45,000 houses were built for Soviet soldiers in Ukraine and Belarus. More than 170,000 Soviet officers and 160,000 soldiers were left homeless.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was also a personal disaster for many thousands of soldiers. Their wives and children were sent to their parents' houses, many soldiers remained to live in tents and tents. Most of the families were never able to reunite again.

Another important issue was the compensation of the USSR for the property they left on German territory. The total value of this property at that time was estimated at $28 billion. Only $385 million was paid to Russia as compensation.

Most of the Soviet military units were disbanded after their withdrawal from Germany. Many Germans sympathized with the Soviet soldiers, because they understood that there was not even housing for them in their homeland. The famous historian Werner Borchert said that Soviet soldiers were friends for many Germans.

Many East Germans were on good terms with the Soviet soldiers, as they had been in German territory for several decades. During the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the German people saw off the soldiers with rallies and flowers.

Completion of the withdrawal of troops

The Russian ground forces left German soil on June 25, 1994. Withdrawal celebrations were held on June 11, 1994 in the city of Wünsdorf and in Treptow Park on August 31, 1994. The last date is considered the official date when the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany was completed. The festive ceremony in Treptow Park was attended by (German chancellor) and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Matvey Burlakov - Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces left Germany by plane on September 1, 1994.

February 15, 1989 at 1000 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border separating the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on a bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who closed the last column of the 40th Army, thus symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.

Having crossed the invisible line - the state border, the army commander stopped and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered a few phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told reporters: “There was not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me” . Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of over 14,000 and maimed over 53,000 Soviet citizens and over a million Afghans.

On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held, where the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D. F. Ustinov said: “I think it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L. I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after it happens that it will be possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure the complete security of Afghanistan.”

At the end of February 1980, again at the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was being worked out. It was believed that by overthrowing H. Amin and securing the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had fulfilled their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do this. Probably, the decision was influenced by a sharp aggravation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was fired upon, several of our citizens were killed. Then the government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.

In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA F. A. Tabeev, at a meeting of military advisers, stated the official point of view on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in a short time, no more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in fighting, we will create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, until world public opinion has time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the leadership of Afghanistan does not have its own military support to protect the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army, combat-ready, devoted to the government.”

At the beginning of 1982, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordoves and others joined in the active participation in the settlement of the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations were organized, 41 discussions with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were answered positively.
On May 19, 1982, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Cardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.

After K. U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military raised the question of the withdrawal of troops more and more insistently.

The process of negotiations resumed only in 1985 after the election of MS Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In October 1985, the Politburo was given the task of speeding up the decision on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were informed of our firm intention to withdraw our troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”

In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, MS Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been worked out and would be implemented immediately after the political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal, Najibullah (Najib) was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. B. Karmal went to "rest and treatment" in the USSR.
At a meeting of the Politburo on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: within two years to carry out the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan (withdraw half of the troops in 1987, and the remaining 50% in 1988).

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, in accordance with which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US had to stop all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D.T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).

Carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide significant military assistance to Afghanistan. Training of Afghan specialists was carried out at an accelerated pace, stockpiles of materiel were created in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to take part in the battles with the Mujahideen, attacking the bases of militants with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The closer the deadline for the start of the second stage of the withdrawal of troops approached, the more worried the Afghan leadership showed. In September 1988, the President of Afghanistan, Najibullah, in a conversation with Generals V. I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B. V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, made an attempt to detain Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command unambiguously spoke out against this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans found understanding among some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the schedule for the withdrawal of troops was changed. The second stage of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, and in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it began only on January 15, 1989.

But this was not the end of the matter. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V. A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave volunteers from the 40th Army in the amount of 12 thousand people in Afghanistan to protect the international airport in Kabul and the strategic Kabul-Khairatan highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze instructed to prepare proposals to the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Afghanistan.
General V. I. Varennikov transmitted his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish monetary payments to volunteers - officers at 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers at 1 thousand rubles a month. At the same time, the military emphasized that if the decision is nevertheless made, then it is necessary to leave the grouping of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V. I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the objects left behind would have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. Yet common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave the troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal on time.

On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In addition to the Soviet embassy, ​​only small security forces remained in the capital, the leadership of the Task Force of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of a limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Until now, there is a discussion about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the expediency of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers went through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and made tens of thousands disabled, in addition, countless Afghan rebels and civilians died.

Winners or losers?

Disputes do not subside about the status in which the Soviet military contingent left Afghanistan in 1989 - as a winner or a defeated one. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners in the Afghan war, opinions are divided on whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they have never officially been given the task of complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The task was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government and prevent possible external intervention. With these tasks, according to the supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.

Opponents say that in fact the task of complete military victory and control over the Afghan territory was, but it could not be fulfilled - the tactics of guerrilla warfare were used, in which the final victory is almost unattainable, and the main part of the territory was always controlled by the Mujahideen. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which, as a result, three years after the withdrawal of troops, was overthrown. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a large role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war, the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of the Soviet troops are 14427 people killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded, who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.

Nevertheless, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory to the heroes!