Even before the start of World War II, the leadership of the Third Reich thought about what should be done in the first place in the occupied territories. The Germans also had a plan for the development of the Soviet Union.
Disputes on the topic
There is still no (and cannot be) consensus among historians about what would have happened to the Soviet Union if Germany had won World War II.
This topic is by definition speculative. However, the documented plans of the Nazis for the development of the conquered territories do exist, and their study continues, revealing more and more new details.
The plans of the Third Reich regarding the development of the conquered territories of the USSR are usually associated with the "General Plan Ost". It must be understood that this is not one document, but rather a project, because historians do not have the complete text of the document officially approved by Hitler.
The very concept of Plan Ost was developed on the basis of Nazi racial doctrine under the patronage of the Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of German Statehood (RKF), headed by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. The concept of the General Plan Ost was supposed to serve as a theoretical foundation for the colonization and Germanization of the occupied territories after the victory over the USSR.
Busy work...
The Nazis began to think about how to "arrange life" in the conquered territories back in 1940. In February of this year, Professor Konrad Mayer and the planning department of the RKF he headed presented the first plan for the settlement of the western regions of Poland annexed to the Reich. The Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of German Statehood itself was created less than six months earlier - in October 1939. Mayer oversaw the creation of five of the six documents listed above.
The execution of the "General Plan Ost" was divided into two parts: the near plan - for the already occupied territories, and the far one - for the eastern territories of the USSR, which had yet to be captured. The Germans began to fulfill the “foreground plan” already at the beginning of the war, in 1941.
Ostland and Reichskommissariat Ukraine
Already on July 17, 1941, on the basis of Adolf Hitler’s order “On Civil Administration in the Occupied Eastern Regions”, under the leadership of Alfred Rosenberg, the “Imperial Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories” was created, subordinating two administrative units: the Reichskommissariat Ostland with a center in Riga and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine with the center in Rivne.
The plans of the Nazis also included the creation of the Reichskommissariat Muscovy, which would include the entire European part of Russia. It was also planned to create the Reyskomissariat Don-Volga, the Caucasus and Turkestan.
"Germanization"
One of the main points of the Ost plan was the so-called Germanization of the population of the occupied territories. The racist concept of the Third Reich considered the Russians and Slavs to be Untermensch, that is, "subhuman." The Russians were recognized as the most non-Germanized people, moreover, they were "poisoned with the poison of Judeo-Bolshevism."
Therefore, they either had to be destroyed or evicted. to Western Siberia. The European part of the USSR, according to the plan, was to be completely Germanized.
Himmler has repeatedly said that the goal of the Barbarossa plan is to destroy the Slavic population of 30 million, Wetzel wrote in his memoirs about the need to take measures to limit the birth rate (agitation of abortions, popularization of contraception, refusal to fight infant mortality).
Hitler himself frankly wrote about the program for the extermination of the local population of the USSR:
“Locals? We will have to deal with their filtering. We will remove destructive Jews altogether. My impression of the Belarusian territory is better than that of the Ukrainian one. We will not go to Russian cities, they must completely die out. There is only one task: to carry out Germanization through the importation of Germans, and the former inhabitants must be considered as Indians.
Plans
The occupied territories of the USSR, first of all, were supposed to serve as the raw material and food base of the Third Reich, and their population - as cheap labor. Therefore, Hitler, if possible, demanded that agriculture and industry be preserved here, which were of great interest to the German war economy.
Ost Mayer allotted 25 years for the implementation of the plan. During this time, most of the population of the occupied territories had to be "Germanized" in accordance with nationality quotas. The indigenous population was deprived of the right to private property in the cities in order to force it "on the ground."
According to the Ost plan, margraviates were introduced to control those territories where the percentage of the German population was initially low. As, for example, Ingermanlandia (Leningrad region), Gotengau (Crimea, Kherson), and Memel-Narev (Lithuania - Bialystok).
In Ingermanland, it was planned to reduce the urban population from 3 million to 200 thousand. Mayer planned the creation of 36 strongholds in Poland, Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine, which would ensure effective communication between the margraviates and with each other and with the metropolis.
In 25–30 years, margraviates were to be Germanized by 50%, strongholds by 25–30%. Himmler allocated only 20 years for these tasks and proposed to consider the complete Germanization of Latvia and Estonia, as well as a more active Germanization of Poland.
All these plans, on which scientists and managers, economists and business executives worked, on the development of which 510 thousand Reichsmarks were spent, were all postponed. The Third Reich was not up to fantasy.
"The hour has struck. This week the moment has come for Hitler's decisive attempt to break Russia.
Hitler cannot spend another year conquering Russia. He has a maximum of four, or even three months to defeat it - otherwise Germany will lose the war. According to his calculations, Russia must be withdrawn from the war before the United States throws its real power into the scales. Hitler must win quickly - so that the German war machine has time to turn around and face the enemy in the West.
When the Nazi high command planned the 1942 campaign, it proceeded from three fundamental facts. These axioms were firmly embedded in the minds of Hitler's number one strategist, Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces.
He and his staff officers - those unknown squires of the German army who leave glory to the generals in command on the battlefield, but take the main responsibility - understood well the problem they faced.
This time, in order to defeat the Russian army, they must tie it down with battles - after all, even today the Russians, having retreated 1000 miles, will not even be at the borders of the Ural industrial region. To do this, the Germans need to be able to advance along the entire front line 2,000 miles long. For such an opportunity to appear, the Germans had to wait for the most favorable time of the year. In the north, in the region of Leningrad, the soil dries out sufficiently only by mid-July (a month later than in Ukraine).
Given these seasonal restrictions and the need to finish the job before winter, General Halder and his staff needed to develop a plan to defeat Russia in a matter of months - a plan of attack as crushing as the Polish or French campaigns of 1939-1940, and more thoughtful than the unsuccessful "blitzkrieg" against Russia in 1941. This should be a blow that has no equal in strength, and delivered just in time.
Failure will almost certainly result in defeat in the war. But the reward for success would be the opportunity to throw all the forces of the Wehrmacht against Britain and the United States - and hence the chance to capture all of Asia, most of Africa, and even the British Isles.
Hitler and Halder over the map of the USSR.
First year of the war
This week marks exactly one year since the German attack on Russia, and General Halder could learn from the early failures in planning a new campaign.
During the twelve months of the war, the Germans occupied about 7% of the territory of Russia (about 580,000 square miles), but they could not defeat it. They destroyed or captured more than 4,500,000 Red Army soldiers, 15,000 tanks, 9,000 aircraft. But they did not destroy the Red Army. German artillerymen photographed Leningrad through the eyepieces of their stereo tubes. But the Germans could not take Leningrad - the key to dominance in the Baltic, a barrier on the way to Murmansk and supply routes through Murmansk. The swastika flag flew only 115 miles from Moscow. But the Germans failed to capture the heart of Russia and its capital, the center of a gigantic railway network that radiates from Moscow and covers most of the country.
The German armies stopped at the approaches to the industrial Donbass. But Germany did not get its mines, power plants and factories, and an advantageous springboard for a rush to Caucasian oil. The Germans forced Russia to evacuate a large part of the industry behind the Urals, but they did not come close to this rear forge of military power, which could partially provide the Russian armies with everything they needed, even if most of European Russia fell into the hands of the enemy. The Germans occupied the Crimea, they occupied the Black Sea port of Kerch. But by the first anniversary of the start of the war, they had not yet completely captured Sevastopol, the fortress that controlled the Black Sea.
But most importantly, they did not capture the Caucasus and its oil. We often hear about how badly Hitler needs oil, how the gigantic fields of Maikop and Baku beckon him. However, another reason also attracts him to the south, to the Caucasus: the Russians themselves cannot do without Caucasian oil.
Considering how little time they had to achieve all these goals, the Germans had to complete all preparations for a general offensive in advance. And along the entire gigantic front, from Murmansk to the Sea of Azov, the rough work of the war began to boil. Echoes of these preliminary clashes reached the whole world in May - in messages from the Kharkov front, last week - in news of skirmishes and battles of local significance south of Leningrad, on the Moscow front, in the region of Kalinin and Smolensk west of the capital, and near Kharkov, where the Nazis developed the offensive. The largest of these battles was the battle for Sevastopol, the capture of which was the necessary conclusion of the campaign in the Crimea and the most important prelude to a further offensive in the south.
Price Paid
"" So, you saw the defenders of Sevastopol: The main, gratifying conviction that you made is the conviction that it is impossible to take Sevastopol, and not only to take Sevastopol, but to shake the strength of the Russian people anywhere - and you did not see this impossibility in this multitude of traverses, parapets, intricately woven trenches, mines and guns, one on top of the other, of which you did not understand anything, but saw it in the eyes, speeches, techniques, in what is called the spirit of the defenders of Sevastopol. What they do, they do so simply: that, you are convinced, they can still do a hundred times more ... "
Such lines were written by one young officer - a participant in the defense of Sevastopol. His name was Leo Tolstoy, and the events he experienced took place during the Crimean War.
German soldiers near Sevastopol.
In Tolstoy's time, dying enemies - and victors (when 127,000 Russians fell, the city was abandoned) - wore English and French uniforms. Last week, the powerful fortifications around the city, regardless of the losses, were stormed over and over again by an even more formidable enemy, armed with much more terrible weapons. Alexei, a distant relative of Leo Tolstoy, wrote in Krasnaya Zvezda: "Today it is impossible to breathe in Sevastopol because of the decaying corpses of Germans and Romanians." The troops of Hitler's Colonel-General Fritz-Erich von Manstein stubbornly advanced closer and closer to the city over the piles of their own dead. One American correspondent reported: "The question that is being decided in Sevastopol is not whether the Germans are able to take it, but what price they are willing to pay for it."
The Germans paid their bills. They wanted Sevastopol for reasons of grand strategy, but they wanted to take it this very week for political reasons: June 22 marked the one year anniversary of the German armies invading Russia, and the German people never received the promised victory. And by this date, Adolf Hitler was in dire need of success in order to strengthen the spirit of the Germans on the eve of a new gigantic campaign.
armies ready to attack
However, the bacchanalia of death in Sevastopol is only an overture to what lies ahead. In spirit, in readiness to win or die, no one will surpass the Red Army. What its number and armament is, only the Soviet High Command knows. However, we also know two indisputable facts: 1) Russia persistently urges the United States to increase the volume of deliveries; and 2) since May of this year, whenever the German and Russian armies faced each other, the victory remained with the Germans. However, London and Washington have approximate data on the number and deployment of German troops:*
On the northern sector of the front, from Murmansk to Staraya Russa south of Leningrad, there are almost 1,000,000 soldiers (35 German divisions, including three tank divisions, 12 Finnish divisions, and 2 Italian divisions).
On the central sector of the front (Moscow, Kalinin, Rzhev, Vyazma, Bryansk) - more than 850,000 (40 German divisions, including 4 tank divisions), 2 Italian and one Spanish division).
On the southern sector of the front, from Kharkov to the Crimea, about 1,300,000 (50 German divisions, including 8 tank, 14 Romanian and 2 Italian divisions).
In the reserve (in the occupied territory of Ukraine, in Belarus, the Baltic states, Poland and East Prussia) - more than 1,500,000 people (70 German divisions, including at least 4 tank, 6 Romanian and 4 Italian divisions).
The forces of the Luftwaffe, now concentrated mainly in the south, are about 6,000 first-line aircraft, divided into three air fleets of 2,000 aircraft each.
The opponents of Nazism wanted to believe that the German army was a colossus with feet of clay, that the stalemate at the front and the horrors of the Russian winter had broken its morale and given rise to apathy. The Germans themselves admit that their losses reached 1,500,000 soldiers. Well, the Russians can probably discount the Spaniards and Italians, and no doubt some of those Germans who bore the brunt of the past winter are physically and spiritually broken. But you can't say about the soldiers who stormed Sevastopol that they lost heart; even the Romanians who had been forced to march forward and died by the thousands side by side with their German masters.
Last week correspondent Leland Stowe spoke to Germans recently captured in Russia. Here is what he writes: “Psychologically, they are no closer to a knockout than Joe Lewis in the third round We, the Americans and the British, and especially our military, should take into account this fact. Any illusions that the Nazi army will fall apart from within in the near future will only lead to disaster: The spirit of the Germans will not broken, their will and tenacity firm: They will fight desperately, knowing that in case of defeat, Germany, or at least their generation, will lose everything.
The plan is ready too.
Today in Russia, Hitler faces colossal problems: across the gigantic front line, his armies are confronted not only by relentless and well-armed enemy troops (possibly outnumbering the Nazis), but by defense lines in depth blocking every mile of the main attack ( Moscow and south), and a secondary direction (north).
Against such a defense, the typical blitzkrieg tactic—a surprise strike, a breakthrough, the development of the offensive by tank wedges supported by aircraft and self-propelled artillery clearing the way for infantry—will not work with the same effectiveness as in Poland, Belgium, and Russia itself in the first months after the attack. Today, in depth and thoughtfulness, the Russian defense surpasses that which, last fall, slowed down the Nazi offensive, and then, with the onset of paralyzing winter cold, stopped it completely. However, if Stalin and his staff learned to resist the blitzkrieg tactics of the 1940 model, then the Nazi generals had enough time to study the Soviet defense. In its calculations, the Moscow command can only proceed from the assumption that the Germans have some kind of plan, that everything is ready for its implementation, and that its scale corresponds to the tasks facing the Germans.
During the "preparatory" offensives this spring, the German troops have already demonstrated some "novelties". The essence of this updated tactic is to select a very small section of the front for attack, "process" it with the most massive air strikes (according to the Russians, up to 1,000 aircraft operated on a fifteen-mile stretch south of Kharkov), and then launch closely interacting infantry formations into the offensive , tanks and artillery. Now the Germans are no longer trying to break through the Russian defenses with entire tank divisions, in order to then sow chaos in the rear. Instead, the German tanks appear to be operating in small groups, keeping close to the infantry and artillery. As a result, although the Germans advance more slowly, they ensure the solidity of the advancing columns, and at any moment have enough forces to repel Russian encirclement attempts. Near Kharkov, this tactic worked so successfully that Moscow was forced to admit that it was not yet possible to stop the Nazi offensive. In Sevastopol, the rough pressure of a mass of people and metal in 16 days brought this fortress to the brink of collapse.
Massed air strikes on cities are a favorite technique of German strategists.
Perhaps the latest variation in German tactics meant a simple change of pace, perhaps partly due to the desire to spare tanks. Given the size of the theater of operations and the size of the Russian armies—and General Halder's propensity for grandiose designs in all previous campaigns of World War II—the Nazi plan for 1942 may well involve breakthroughs and encirclements of enormous proportions.
There are many possibilities for such operations. If the main blow is delivered in the center, it can be aimed at taking Moscow, and then reaching the flank of the Russian southern front. A major offensive in the south may involve a direct strike in the direction of the Caucasus, or a turn to the north to reach the rear of the central front. An offensive in the far north makes it possible to cut communications through which allied aid is delivered from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. A major offensive through Turkey or bypassing its territory could cut off Russian supply routes through Persia or continue south towards the Suez Canal.
Variations on the aforementioned themes cannot be ruled out. For example, offensives in several of these directions simultaneously are possible - some of them will really be the main blows, while others will be diverting. Any two offensives in parallel directions can turn into pincers. In general, whatever the German plan, it will amaze with its scope.
Adolf Hitler decides where the German army, air force and navy wage war. Sometimes he specifies when exactly this or that operation should begin. But how they wage war is determined by General Halder and a small group of his highly professional assistants.
Colonel-General Halder belongs to that group of dexterous officers that joined the Nazis immediately after Hitler came to power. If the army aristocracy - the Prussian junkers - kept aloof from them, middle-class opportunists tried to make friends with the Brown House (the name of the NSDAP headquarters in Munich - approx. Transl.), safely turning a blind eye to Nazi atrocities, and became favorites of the new authorities for a long time before the Prussian top of the Reichswehr "surrendered" to them. Today, people from this group are among Hitler's confidants: among them are the Führer's chief military adviser Jodl, the commander of German troops in the Far North, Dietl, and List, who is now probably in charge of the central front.
Many Germans believe that Colonel General Halder is directly related to the curious documents circulated last year called "Explanations to the official communiqués." Their carefully veiled meaning can be reduced to the following: "God, we should beware: Hitler thinks he is Napoleon." However, when Hitler removed the commander of the ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, Halder was even closer to the Fuhrer.
The only thing that Halder did not take into account was the strength of Russian weapons.
So far, Franz Halder's plans have invariably resulted in a devastating lightning strike - Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium and France collapsed under its power, and last year Russia barely resisted. But the lightning strike must be delivered at the right moment. For Hitler in Russia, the right moment—and the only moment—is now. The world has a right to expect a terrifying confrontation. If the blow does not follow, or it is not crushing, this will also change the course of history. Indeed, in this case, the Nazi war machine will be in a difficult situation, and the days of its glory will be numbered.
Undoubtedly, the most important holiday for a Russian person in the 21st century is Victory Day. A victory at a monstrously high price, a victory to which each family contributed. On this holiday, the whole country - from a middle-aged president to young schoolchildren - takes to the streets of cities with portraits of their ancestors, thanks to which a peaceful sky is above their heads today. Thousands of processions pay tribute to the merits of the heroes.
Not only Soviet soldiers made their contribution to the great victory. Together with them, the Nazis were opposed by the British and Americans, who fought on other fronts, who helped with weapons and various products, which was so necessary on the battlefields and in the rear. I would like to tell in detail about such a significant episode of the Great Patriotic War as Lend-Lease. As sources on such an important topic, we will use the materials of the authoritative channel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Zvezda", which has long been famous for its objective presentation of information about everything related to the Russian army and Russian victories.
First of all, war is a weapon. These are tanks and planes, without which by the beginning of the Second World War there was nothing to do on the battlefields. Before the Great Patriotic War, the USSR had entire tank armadas. Most of the tanks were classified as light, but there were quite a few modern vehicles among the light ones. And in addition to the lungs, there were under a thousand of the latest and unparalleled T-34s and hundreds of heavy KV-1 tanks. But by autumn, there is an acute shortage of armored vehicles at the front. The US leadership at that time was not sure that the USSR would be able to resist Hitler, and was in no hurry with the supply of tanks, fearing that the Germans would get them. Not the last role in the doubts of the Americans was played by the unpredictability of Stalin, who entered the Second World War, helping Nazi Germany.
"Distrust is a good basis for cooperation."I.V. Stalin
In this difficult time for the USSR, the British came to the rescue. On October 11, 1941, British tanks "Matilda" arrived in Arkhangelsk. The Soviet soldiers had only 15 days to run in and master the model. The tank was a forced compromise. It was created for the war in the deserts, and not in winter Russia. There were problems with the chassis, with the engine. There were no high-explosive fragmentation shells for the tank. In the fall of 1941, another British tank, the Mk.III "Valentine", began to be delivered. A total of 350 Matildas and Valentines were delivered. But at that time it was a significant help. By December 1941, only 1,700 tanks remained in the Soviet army. Of these, 20% are English.
The turning point in the Battle of Moscow changed the US opinion that the USSR was in for an imminent defeat. And already in January 1942, the first American tanks M3 "Stuart" began to arrive at the front, and from February - medium tanks M3 "Lee". They were also a forced measure and did not meet the requirements of the front. But the real combat vehicle of the Second World War was the M4 Sherman. Its production in the USA began in February 1942. Compared to Soviet vehicles, the Emcha (as the Soviet tankers called the M4) was easier to drive and more enduring on long marches. The engine did not require frequent adjustment. A valuable feature was the fact that the M4 was quieter and clanged less tracks, which made it possible to sneak up on the enemy unnoticed. One of the main advantages of the M4 was that they were all equipped with walkie-talkies.
Moreover, compared to the Soviet ones, these were walkie-talkies of a different level. One worked on ultrashort waves and provided communication in combat at distances up to 2 km. The second allowed to communicate with the command at distances of tens of kilometers. "Shermans" proved to be very good in the Soviet army and were supplied until the end of the war. One of the military "memes" was the gifts of American workers, which they left in M4 tanks sent to the USSR. Alcohol and clothes were a pleasant and useful surprise for the fighters. And the coffee makers that were part of the tank equipment made a great impression on Soviet mechanics. About 4,000 Shermans were delivered to the USSR.
“Another big plus of the Sherman was recharging the batteries. On our thirty-four, to charge the battery, it was necessary to drive the engine at full power, all 500 horses. The Sherman had a charging gasoline walk-behind tractor in the fighting compartment, small, like a motorcycle. - and he charged the battery for you. It was a great thing for us!"D.F. Vine
Thanks to Lend-Lease deliveries, Soviet designers gained access to the latest American and British armored vehicles. A detailed study of components and assemblies made it possible to improve their own armored vehicles. 10% of the total number of Soviet tanks that participated in the battles were Lend-Lease vehicles.
An even more significant contribution to the cause of victory was the supply of aviation equipment. The USSR received dozens of different types of aircraft - transport, fighters, bombers and even amphibians. As well as repair shops, spare parts and fuel.
On June 22, 1941, 1200 aircraft were lost. Two-thirds were destroyed at airfields. Luftwaffe losses on the first day of World War II amounted to 240 aircraft of all types. The new Soviet MiG-3, Yak-1, LaG-3 were inferior to the "Messers" in many respects. One of the significant advantages of the Luftwaffe was the availability of radios on all German fighters. There was practically no radio communication on Soviet aircraft. Even on new types of equipment, a transmitting and receiving radio station was installed on one of the ten aircraft. The front armored glass also gave confidence to the German pilots.
After such significant losses in the first weeks of the war and the evacuation of 3/4 of the aviation industry to the rear, the Soviet army experienced a catastrophic shortage of aircraft. Already on August 28, 1941, 24 Hurricane fighters with British identification marks landed at the Vaenga airfield near Murmansk. Another 15 aircraft arrived in boxes in Arkhangelsk. All of them went to the Northern Fleet.
On October 12, 1941, P-40 Tomahawks appeared in the Soviet sky. The aircraft had the same shortcomings in speed as the Hurricanes. But the basic armament was powerful - 6 machine guns of the fiftieth caliber. "Tomahawks" had good armor, all-metal body and at the same time were economical. One of the important points was that all Lend-Lease aircraft were equipped with radio stations.
Until the end of 1941, the Allies provided the USSR with 730 fighters. The planes were inferior to the Messerschmitts, but were better than the old Soviet models. And they just were. These types of aircraft were also delivered in 1942, but their value was already less. However, in April 1943, out of 5,500 aircraft in the active Soviet army, a quarter was imported.
At the end of 1942, Soviet pilots began to master the famous Airacobra. The most productive Soviet aces flew on this unusual rear-engine aircraft: Alexander Pokryshkin, Grigory Rechkalov, Nikolai Gulyaev, the Glinka brothers, Alexander Klubov. 5,000 Airacobras were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. The aircraft had powerful armament and excellent maneuverability at low and medium altitudes, which were used by Soviet pilots. The main disadvantage was the difficulty in piloting. The fighter required highly qualified pilots. The supplied aircraft were modified for Soviet needs. For example, the tail section was reinforced for vigorous maneuvering. Soviet pilots exceeded the permissible overloads by the manufacturer, squeezing all its huge potential out of the car.
I liked the Airacobra for its shape and, mainly, for its powerful weapons. There was something to shoot down enemy planes - a 37 mm cannon, two large-caliber rapid-fire machine guns and four normal-caliber machine guns of a thousand rounds per minute each. My mood did not deteriorate even after the warning of the pilots about the dangerous feature of the aircraft to break into a tailspin due to the rear centering.A. I. Pokryshkin
Another famous machine supplied to the USSR was the B-25. In the USSR, its excellent navigational equipment was greatly appreciated and used as a long-range night bomber. Deliveries began as early as 1942. On the night of December 30, 1942, several Mitchell squadrons bombed the Vitebsk railway station without loss.
From May 1942, front-line bombers began to arrive - Douglas A-20 Boston. Did the pilots consider it more reliable and efficient? than the famous Pe-2. The American was very tenacious, could continue flying on one engine, had excellent visibility, a decent bomb load and very good navigation equipment. There was only one drawback - weak defensive weapons. In naval aviation, the A-20 proved capable of carrying two torpedoes.
The priorities of the aircraft industry of the USSR during the war years were combat aircraft - fighters, attack aircraft, bombers. Transporters did the last. Their disadvantage was compensated by the American "Douglas" DC-3. Back in the late 30s, the USSR bought a license to produce this aircraft. During the war years, the USSR produced more than 2000 of these aircraft under the name Li-2. Another 700 cars came from the USA. American machines usually performed the most important tasks.
During the war years, the USSR produced 112,000 aircraft. About 18,000 aircraft were delivered under Lend-Lease - 16% of the total. Deliveries were especially important at the beginning of the war. Even more important was the ability to improve their own design solutions, which gave impetus to the aviation industry.
Industry produces not only tanks, aircraft and rifles. Already in the first weeks of the war, Soviet units were faced with an acute shortage of anti-tank weapons. Before the war, the main chemical plants that produced gunpowder, shells and cartridges were located in the west of the USSR. The very first attacks by German bombers destroyed many enterprises. But already in 1941, the British authorities agreed to transfer to the USSR one and a half thousand tons of incendiary mixtures. The cargo was very explosive and therefore went through the Atlantic Ocean, the USA, the Pacific Ocean, Vladivostok and the entire USSR. British aid was delivered just in time for the Battle of Moscow. By this time, the Soviet army had used up almost all the stocks of gunpowder and explosives. In early 1942, gunpowder began to enter the USSR from Canada and the USA. Every fourth cartridge in Soviet rifles was loaded with American gunpowder.
Already in 1941, the USSR lost about 40% of fertile land. Vehicles, including those employed in agriculture, were mobilized to the front. Agriculture fell into decline. At the same time, there was an oversupply of food in the US. US wheat alone offered 200,000 tons monthly. On October 1, 1941, the Moscow Protocol was signed. In the first two months after the signing, 28 ships departed from the United States, carrying about 130,000 tons of cargo for the USSR. At first, aid came in smaller quantities due to Washington's aforementioned fear that the USSR would lose the war and the Germans would get supplies. In the spring of 1942, seeds were supplied from the USA, which were needed in the USSR, where there was not enough seed. By the fall of 1942, the USSR had lost territories that provided up to 60% of agricultural products. The harvest was a quarter of the pre-war level. On September 8, 1942, a wheat agreement was concluded between the USSR and Canada, where, as in the United States, there was a crisis of overproduction in agriculture.
In the summer of 1942, the Soviet army began to receive canned meat. At first, American canned food was received by pilots, submariners, scouts and other elite units. A simple soldier fell occasionally. But the volume of deliveries increased, and in 1944, not only the entire army, but also the rear workers began to have enough meat. During the war years, the Americans produced 12 billion cans of canned pork - 3 billion went to the USSR.
The US aid to the Soviet Union was so huge that already in 1942 in the States themselves there was a shortage of food, gasoline, and tires. Tires and gasoline came to the USSR in large volumes: every third wheel of Soviet cars was received under Lend-Lease. But the help of the Americans was not limited to the supply of finished products. For example, in 1943, American specialists, using their technologies and equipment, launched oil refineries in Kuibyshev, Orsk, Krasnovodsk and other cities of the USSR.
Assistance to the Soviet aircraft industry also became an important contribution of the United States. By 1943, the production of new efficient aircraft was put on stream. The realities of the war required the use of new technologies in aircraft construction using non-ferrous alloys. In 1941-42, the USSR used wooden frames, plywood, percale (fabric) in the production of aircraft. Such fighters could not resist the all-metal "Messers". The USSR needed supplies of duralumin from abroad: the production of duralumin fell 430 times due to the loss of factories in the western part of the USSR.
The famous Il-2 attack aircraft was made from imported aluminum. During the entire war, more than 300,000 tons of aluminum and duralumin were supplied to the USSR - a little more than was produced at Soviet enterprises. Even more - about 400,000 tons - was supplied under Lend-Lease copper. And about 470,000 tons of cobalt, which was comparable to Soviet wartime production. The United States supplied 13,000 tons of tin, but this is twice as much as was produced in the USSR. Molybdenum - 9000 tons, but it was very important in the production of alloy steel for artillery and tank factories. Steel was also missing. The USSR produced 18 million tons per year before the war. In 1940, more than 60 million tons of steel were smelted in the United States. In total, during the years of the war, 2.3 million tons of steel were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. This amount is enough to produce 70,000 T-34 tanks. Finished steel products were also supplied - springs, cables, ropes.
Speaking of American aid, it is worth mentioning uniforms and footwear. From the beginning of 1942, many recruits received American boots. In total, 15 million pairs of shoes were delivered to the USSR during the war years. Cotton fabrics and cloth were supplied in large quantities from the USA. To understand the scale of supplies, we can recall that more than 250 million pieces were delivered from the USA under Lend-Lease alone.
But the figures for the supplied materials and weapons do not give a complete picture of the significance of Lend-Lease. More important were the achievements of technology, which made it possible to transfer military operations to new conditions. Deliveries of machine tools and equipment were of great importance. Thanks to them, new workshops and entire enterprises in the rear were quickly put into operation, which made it possible to turn the tide of the war. Some of these machines are still in operation today.
Lend-lease gave the belligerent USSR the opportunity to free up resources. All free resources then went to the front. And the main ones were human. Over time, the role of Lend-Lease in the USSR began to be hushed up. In the US, on the contrary, exaggerate. An ideological confrontation began, which today has entered a new round. Remembering the death of our ancestors on the fronts of the war, one should not forget those whose help helped reduce these losses and bring the Victory so honored today closer.
“Now it’s easy to say that Lend-Lease meant nothing. But in the fall of 1941, we lost everything. And if it weren’t for Lend-Lease, weapons, food, it remains to be seen how things would have turned out.”Anastas Mikoyan
Text: Alex Kulmanov
A lot of evidence suggests that Hitler was only interested in triumph in the World War. He didn't think about the consequences. Most likely, after the signing of the peace treaty, he planned to retire. He was not a man with a stranglehold on his position. He was only interested in the triumph of ideas.
Most likely, after his retirement, he would play the role of an adviser. Approximately like the role that Lee Kuan Yew played in Singapore. He resigned after thirty years of rule, but at the request of the party and ministers remained in the government. A kind of mentor who is not actively involved in the work.
According to the same evidence, it was assumed that in the event of Hitler's resignation, Goering would become the head of state and government, who held a dozen posts under Hitler and successfully coped with them, including the position of vice-chancellor and, in fact, the "successor of the Fuhrer."
But given what happened between Hitler and Goering on April 23, 1945, I believe that, having received the position of Fuhrer and Chancellor, the former loyal ally of the leader of Nazism would hardly have unquestioningly followed his instructions, even if he had remained as a mentor in the government. After all, we all have our own minds.
Most likely, Goering in the history of alternative Germany would have played a role similar to that later played in the People's Republic of China by Deng Xiaoping, who went on to significantly liberalize Chinese politics and the economy, but did not weaken the grip of the party apparatus.
But at the same time, given how Goering, even after the break with Hitler, spoke about him at the Nuremberg trials, I doubt that he would have gone to the point of condemning the Fuhrer’s personality cult, which Khrushchev once did in relation to Stalin, if only in justify itself to a certain extent in the face of the Soviet public.
In fact, in China, to this day, the Communist Party claims that, despite Mao's excesses, his course and methods were largely correct. "Mao was 70% right." Most likely, the Nazi propaganda machine would have launched a similar slogan among the Germans.
How long would the Third Reich have lasted? Well, if things went the way I think, then on the whole German party politics would be able to hold on tight long enough, only occasionally being tested periodically in the form of student riots, which are inevitable in any society.
But here it is much more important not the historical, but the ideological aspect. If everything is clear with Hitler's followers, then, as it seems to me, nothing is clear at all about the ideas of German National Socialism. Actually, what is Nazism?
If we take Soviet communism, then it had quite intelligible and voluminous ideological material, containing Marxism, Leninism, Trotskyism, Stalinism and the works of other communist and socialist theorists. That is, the communist program was almost traditionally incorporated into society.
What is the Nazi program? The so-called "25 points"? So they don't talk about anything. Their significance is no greater than that of the United Russia manifesto of 2002. The ideas of German National Socialism were in many ways a continuation of the ideas of Italian fascism, only with the condition of the German political agenda of that time.
What I mean is that Nazism, in many ways, is an empty idea. But a dummy necessary. As a consequence of the reactionary process against the backdrop of the situation that developed in the twenties. Weak European economy, further tested during the Great Depression, with the red threat looming over all going to the east.
It is worth saying here that Russia, in the period between the February Revolution and the Great Terror, was itself often in danger of falling into the abyss of Russian fascism. All this is a right-wing radical form of a left-radical threat. And so it is with everyone - the Germans, Italians, and even almost with us.
But the absence of a strong ideology would hardly have prevented the Third Reich, having achieved victory in the war, from developing successfully. Still, economic growth is largely due to scientific and technological progress and a strong financial system, and not some kind of party guidelines. Therefore, today China is a country with an advanced economy, despite the party nomenclature and the fading communist ideals.
Of course, Nazism in Germany would have died out, but in return for this, the Third Reich would have been a world power, whose economy would be far ahead of everyone else. And it would hardly have had any aggressively Nazi connotation. Most likely, it would be much more reminiscent of the modern European Union, but without all these problems of the Arab crisis.
A kind of conservative European Union with an advanced economy, much more reminiscent of a mixture of European (primarily French and German) and Japanese, rather than American or Chinese. Perhaps today, in the struggle between the two superpowers, it seems that just one more is not enough for balance.
Current page: 1 (total book has 34 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 23 pages]
Alexander Petrovich Simakov
Demyansk battle. "Stalin's missed triumph" or "Hitler's Pyrrhic victory"?
Fights to the death in forests and swamps
Wounded Northwestern Front,
The thinned companies are on the attack,
But the sun, like the Banner of Victory, rises.
A. Bulavkin
Chapter 1
THE WAR BEGINS
balance of power
The events of the spring and summer of 1941 indicated that Germany would launch a military attack on the USSR. In the strip of the Baltic Special Military District in May - June, cases of violation of the state border by German aircraft became more frequent, some of them penetrated as far as Riga, Siauliai, Vilna. The fifth column in the Baltic began to rise and expand its activities.
Our agents and defectors indicated that an armed action by Germany against us would take place in the near future. The dates were almost exactly indicated - June 20–22, 1941.
The command of the Baltic District had the opportunity to immediately redeploy a number of units closer to the border. However, the pace of concentration and deployment was slow. The capacity of the railways of the Baltic States was small, the troops were deployed over a large area and at a distance from the state border.
At the same time, there was a real opportunity, under the guise of withdrawing units to the camps, to conduct a covert concentration of the main forces near the state border, to occupy and improve field defenses. But this was possible under the condition of a correct assessment and foresight of impending events. Only the 90th, 188th and 5th rifle divisions were withdrawn in time, but they were mainly engaged in camp equipment rather than combat training.
Thus, directly at the state border from the Baltic coast to Augstogallen were: 10th Rifle Corps - 10th, 90th and 125th Rifle Divisions of the 11th Rifle Corps; from the Neman River to Koptsiovo - 5th, 33rd, 188th and 128th rifle divisions of the 16th rifle corps.
These units were mainly located in camps, having cover from a company to a battalion directly at the state border, essentially only strengthening the border service.
The 11th, 16th, 23rd, 126th, and 183rd Rifle Divisions made transfers or marches from camp areas or winter quarters to the border.
The 179th, 180th, 181st, 182nd, 184th, 185th Rifle Divisions continued to remain in camps or in winter quarters.
The 3rd and 12th mechanized corps occupied the concentration areas according to the plan 1
The concentration of troops was late for 5-7 days. There was no pronounced grouping, moreover, a strike force - mechanized corps were pulled apart by divisions in a number of directions.
By the end of June 21, only parts of the cover (six rifle divisions) and the mechanized corps were put on alert.
Army Group North under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, which included the 16th and 18th armies and the 4th tank group, was concentrated in the zone of the Baltic Special Military District.
Our troops opposing them consisted of the 8th, 11th, 27th armies led by Major General P.P. Sobennikov, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov and Major General N.E. Berzarin, as well as the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps under the command of Major General of the Tank Forces A.V. Kurkin and brigade commander N.M. Shestopalov.
In total there were 25 divisions (19 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized rifle), 1 rifle and 3 airborne brigades. On the basis of the Baltic Special Military District, on the first day of the war, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsova. According to intelligence and agents, our command incorrectly assessed the balance of forces of the parties. In the combat log of the front on June 21 it is written:
“The troops of the NWF had equal strength, and superiority in individual elements of weapons. Machine guns: Germans - 13,500, we - 18,760; mortars: the Germans - 1400, we - 3517; artillery: the Germans - 2256 guns, we - 2884, of which 60% are heavy systems; in terms of tanks, the superiority of the Germans by 900 tanks; PTartillery - for 560 guns; clear superiority in machine guns and aircraft.
The enemy involved the 3rd Panzer Group and two left-flank corps of the 9th Army from the Army Group Center to strike in this direction. The entire group consisted of 42 divisions, including 7 tank and 6 motorized. The group's offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, which had 760 aircraft.
The enemy outnumbered Soviet troops in divisions by 1.7 times (the actual superiority in people was more significant), in tanks - 1.3 times, in guns and mortars - 2 times, in aviation - 1.2 times 2
South of Lake Ilmen. Sat. memories. - L .: Lenizdat, 1980. S. 5.
Our deep reserves could not influence the course of the battle, since they were late with their arrival by 3–5 days, and the enemy’s reserves were brought in for 1–2 days. The Germans had every opportunity to beat our troops in parts, that is, first of all, 7-8 infantry divisions of cover, then motorized units and then reserves, which approached on the fifth - seventh day.
The German command planned deep rapid breakthroughs of tank-motorized formations in order to prevent the withdrawal of border units to the lines prepared for defense. Therefore, Leeb put forward the best parts of the breakthrough into the first echelon - the 41st and 56th motorized corps of Generals Reinhardt and Manstein.
A few words about aviation. Most of the Soviet aviation at the border airfields was destroyed on the ground by an air strike, before it could take to the air.
Connection. By June 22, in our rear there was an incredible number of saboteurs who cut telephone wires and killed messengers. All! Without telephone communications, there were no armies, corps, divisions and regiments in our western districts. There were several thousand companies and battalions left, which acted without a single plan and orders. And the headquarters radio stations of armies, corps and divisions were mounted in buses - easily recognizable targets for German aviation. A few days later, these radio stations were gone.
Thus, on the morning of June 22, the troops of the Baltic District entered the war under obviously unfavorable conditions. In the very first hours, communication between headquarters at all levels and military units was disrupted and control over them was lost. At the border airfields, most of the available aircraft were destroyed or damaged. Therefore, throughout the first day of the war, German aircraft continuously "walked over the heads" of our troops, bombing and storming the positions they occupied.
In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, Leeb's troops were to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils (Dvinsk) and Leningrad, destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states and, having captured ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, deprive the Red Banner Baltic Fleet of its bases 3
History of the Second World War 1939–1945: In 12 vols. M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. V.3. S. 238.
The right-flank 4th Panzer Group and the 16th Army, advancing in the Daugavpils direction, were to advance as quickly as possible to the area northeast of Opochka, block the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states, defeat them and create prerequisites for advancing to Leningrad. The main blow of the 18th army was directed at Riga - the Soviet troops southwest of the city were to be cut off and destroyed. In the future, developing an offensive on Ostrov, Pskov, the 18th Army was to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the east and capture Estonia.
In the early days
Coverage of the course of hostilities in the initial period of the war is not within the scope of this book. Therefore, we confine ourselves to a few remarks. On the very first day of the war, the enemy advanced 30–50 km. Two intact bridges over the Dubyssa River were captured. Enemy tanks on the shoulders of the retreating Soviet units captured the bridges and crossed the Neman. In the Siauliai direction, Reinhardt's corps broke through farthest of all German units. The front commander decided to "cut off" the enemy tank wedge with flank attacks by the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps. In addition, he gave the order to deploy the 9th mobile artillery and anti-tank brigade of Colonel N.I. Polyansky. It consisted of 250 guns with a caliber of 76 and 85 mm. The 202nd mechanized division of Colonel V.K. was attached as support. Gorbachev.
There was no proper communication and interaction between the advancing mechanized corps. The divisions entered the battle separately, without mutual support. Introduced into battle "on a first come first serve basis", cut off from the rear and having no air cover, the tank divisions of both corps were defeated by the enemy by the end of June 26. The artillerymen of Colonel Polyansky and Gorbachev's division successfully repelled enemy attacks. The defeat of the mechanized corps allowed Reinhardt to release the main forces and carry out a detour maneuver. Therefore, the 202nd motorized rifle division and the 9th artillery brigade, being under the threat of encirclement, left Siauliai.
By this time, the situation in the zone of the 11th Army had deteriorated sharply. After heavy fighting for Vilnius, the army, having suffered heavy losses and cut into pieces, began to retreat to the northeast. The direction Kaunas - Daugavpils turned out to be practically without cover, and Manstein began to quickly move towards the Western Dvina.
Having lost almost all the tanks, the front commander, General Kuznetsov, ordered the troops to withdraw beyond the Dvina and, behind a strong natural line, organize a strong defense. At the same time, in order to eliminate the gap that had formed between the 8th and 11th armies, it was decided to move the not yet mobilized and technically poorly equipped 5th airborne and 21st mechanized corps from the front reserve to the Daugavpils region. Their leadership was entrusted to the commander of the 27th Army, General N.E. Berzarin. This was the right decision, but it turned out to be too late. The enemy was not going to give up the initiative. The Germans were the first to approach the Western Dvina. On June 26, Manstein's advanced units broke into Daugavpils and captured a strategically important object - a bridge. As a result, the front was cut in two. The 27th Army was late with the advance, and Manstein had already captured bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dvina, aiming at Pskov and Leningrad.
Commander of the 21st Mechanized Corps, General D.D. Lelyushenko received an order from the Headquarters of the High Command to advance from the Opochka-Idritsa region to the Daugavpils region and prevent the enemy from forcing the Western Dvina. However, this task was completely impossible, and on June 26 the enemy crossed the river with large forces and captured Daugavpils. Manstein was ordered to stop, as his 56th motorized corps broke out 130 km ahead, leaving the other troops of the North group far behind. The command was afraid that the corps might fall into the "bag".
The 5th Airborne Corps of Colonel I.S. was thrown into the German bridgeheads. Bezuglov and the 21st mechanized corps of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko. But, unfortunately, interaction, communications, command and control of troops were not properly organized. As a result of three days of fierce fighting, our troops suffered heavy losses, and the bridgeheads remained in the hands of Manstein. And yet, until July 20, the enemy, rushing to Leningrad, was stopped.
Meanwhile, Reinhardt's corps crossed the Dvina, parts of the German 18th Army entered Riga. Early on the morning of July 2, Reinhardt's corps delivered a powerful blow to the junction of the weakened 8th and 27th armies. The front was immediately broken. The Germans developed an offensive on the Island and cut the 8th Army in two. Both our armies again retreated in divergent directions. The front headquarters was surrounded.
Enemy on Russian soil
On July 4, the Headquarters of the High Command appointed Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who previously commanded the 8th Army. On this day, the 1st Panzer Division of the Germans broke into Ostrov. Among the trophies, she got whole and unharmed bridges across the Velikaya River. The 1st Mechanized, 22nd, and 41st Rifle Corps, which were moving forward from the Stavka reserve, were forced to fight for the Island on the move and were therefore overturned by the enemy. Only on the right flank did Lelyushenko's corps repulse Manstein's attacks at the Sebezh-Opochka line. As noted in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov: “Because of the delay in the exit of our reserves to the Velikaya River, the enemy captured the city of Pskov on the move. The 8th Army of the North-Western Front, having lost contact with other troops, retreated to the north.4
Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - M .: Publishing house of the Novosti Press Agency, 1975. S. 273.
On the evening of July 8, the 118th, 111th, and 235th rifle divisions of the 41st rifle corps left the Pskov fortified area and the city of Pskov itself and began a disorderly retreat to Luga and Soltsy. The enemy discovered this withdrawal, and on July 9-11 pursued our troops with small forward detachments, followed by powerful motorized columns.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command was well aware of the danger looming over Leningrad. The construction of the Luga line of defense proceeded at a rapid pace. In an extremely short time, a fortified area was created, consisting of two strips with a length of about 175 and a depth of 12 km.
On July 9, Reinhardt's corps began an offensive on Luga. On July 12, he started fighting in the foreground of the Luga UR. Faced with a well-organized defense in depth, the enemy's 41st motorized corps immediately got bogged down in fierce positional battles. The commander of the fortified area, General P.M. Pyadyshev, leading a stubborn and active defense, finally stopped the enemy by the end of the third day. Manstein, convinced of the strength of the Russian positions in front of him, brought his tanks into the previously made gap in the Ostrov area. The 56th motorized corps bypassed the Sebezh fortified area and developed an offensive against Porkhov, Shimsk and Novgorod. Porkhov was taken the next day. The motorized SS division “Dead Head” included in the Manstein corps remained in it, and the 3rd motorized and 8th tank divisions launched an offensive against Soltsy and Novgorod.
The 41st Rifle Corps under the command of Major General I. Kosobutsky could not oppose anything to the advancing enemy - in the very first hours of the battle, contact with the army headquarters was lost. Parts in disorder began to retreat in the east and northeast directions.
It is good that formations occupying the Luga defensive line were deployed in the withdrawal area of the 41st Rifle Corps. Otherwise, a front-line disaster could happen. The corps commander was removed from command and put on trial. He had to endure a lot, but he nevertheless ended the war as commander of the 34th Rifle Corps with the rank of lieutenant general. But the commander of the 118th rifle division, Major General N. Glovatsky, was shot on August 3 by the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.
The 22nd Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General A.S. was in a difficult situation. Ksenofontov. It was national, formed in 1940 from units of the Estonian army, headed by Russian commanders. After the announcement of mobilization, not a single Estonian arrived in the corps. The legacy was an Estonian-style military uniform and outdated weapons.
The units loaded into echelons were sent to the Ostrovsky fortified area, which was already occupied by the enemy. Therefore, the new task of the corps was to take positions southwest of Porkhov. There were numerous cases of Estonian servicemen going over to the side of the Germans. Only by mid-July, the combat effectiveness of the units was increased, when personnel from the interior of the country began to arrive.
The first encounter with the enemy occurred on July 7. For two days, the 180th and 182nd rifle divisions successfully repelled enemy attacks. Then communication between the divisions and with the headquarters of the corps ceased. Particularly fierce battles were waged by the 180th Infantry Division of Colonel I.I. Missana for Khilovo resort. Under the pressure of tanks, parts of the corps retreated to the east.
The 12th mechanized corps, withdrawn to the front reserve, from the morning of July 9 concentrated for staffing in the Soltsov area. The corps included the 23rd Rifle, 28th Tank, 202nd Motorized Divisions and the 10th Motorcycle Regiment.
To reinforce the army of General Morozov on July 11, the 1st mechanized corps was transferred from the front-line reserve, consisting of two tank divisions - the 3rd and 21st. The corps was commanded by Major General M.L. Chernyavsky. Both divisions were deployed northwest of the Dno in the area of the village of Borovichi, fifteen kilometers north of Porkhov.
KV-1 in a village captured by the Germans
On July 8, the defensive operation of the 8th Army began in Estonia (from July 3 it was commanded by Major General F.S. Ivanov) against the 18th army of the enemy. Having consolidated on July 10 at the 250-kilometer line Pärnu - Tartu - Lake Peipsi, the army detained the enemy until July 22 (on July 14 the army became part of the Northern Front).
On the left flank, formations of the 27th Army fought fierce, with the transition to counterattacks, defensive battles at the turn of the Opochkinsky fortified area. Although the 27th Army was reinforced by the 5th, 126th, and 188th Rifle Divisions and separate units, its strength was still small and extremely battle-weary.
On July 9, the 27th Army fought stubborn defensive battles on the Velikaya River during the day; by the end of the day, the enemy managed to capture Opochka, Pushkinskiye Gory, Vybor 5
TsAMO. F. 221. Op. 1351. D. 200.
On July 11, the 24th Rifle Corps captured Pushkinskiye Gory with a night attack. The 46th Panzer Division of the 21st Mechanized Corps broke into Opochka and fought in the encirclement. The troops of the army did not have enough weapons and ammunition. Under the influence of the 126th, 30th, and 122nd infantry divisions of the enemy, the 27th Army was forced to leave the Opochkinsky fortified area and begin a retreat in the direction of the city of Kholm.
Counterattack near Soltsov
Due to the fact that the 16th German army was advancing on Kholm and Staraya Russa, a 100-kilometer gap formed between its formations and Manstein's 56th motorized corps. The command of the front decided to use this gap in order to disrupt the enemy's offensive on Novgorod and defeat the units of the 56th Corps that were breaking through to Shimsk.
The battles for Soltsy were fought by the troops of the 11th Army. Parts of the 1st mechanized corps became a barrier on the enemy's path to the city near the village of Borovichi. The crew of Senior Lieutenant V.V. Platitsina of the 3rd Panzer Division entered the battle with 13 enemy tanks. In six hours, skillfully changing positions, the brave tankers set fire to 10 vehicles, and forced the rest to turn back.
The defense of the city was mainly assigned to the 202nd motorized rifle division. Its commander, Colonel B.K. Gorbachev was removed from command on July 13 for poor leadership of the battle. His deputy colonel S.G. Shtykov managed to stop the panic and skillfully led the battle. Choosing a convenient position, correctly placing artillery and maneuvering rifle units, Shtykov managed to hold the city and all the crossings for a day. From July 14 to July 16, the fighting reached hand-to-hand combat. The head of the department of the 1st Mechanized Corps, Colonel Marchenko, reported to the headquarters of the 11th Army on July 17, 1941: “... during 15–16.07.41 in parts of 202 m.s.d. on the north bank of the river. Shelon destroyed more than 100 transport vehicles, about 50 tanks, one headquarters on the western outskirts of Soltsy, a large number of enemy manpower.
By 18.00 on July 14, the enemy captured Soltsy. The commander of the Northwestern Front ordered a counterattack and the restoration of the situation. The following were transferred from the Northern Front to the 11th Army: the 21st Panzer Division of Colonel L.V. Bunin, 70th Rifle Division, Major General A.G. Fedyunin and the 237th Rifle Division, Major General D.A. Popov (from July 15 he will be replaced by Colonel V.Ya. Tishinsky).
Two groupings were created to carry out a counterattack: the northern one, consisting of the 70th and 237th rifle divisions and the 21st tank division deployed here (a total of 148 tanks) and the southern one, as part of the 183rd rifle division.
The idea of the commander of the 11th army was to surround the 8th tank and part of the forces of the 3rd motorized division of the Germans with a blow in converging directions, cut and destroy them. In order to prevent the enemy from retreating beyond the Shelon, the 202nd motorized rifle division was deployed on its right bank. The 182nd Rifle Division was to go on the offensive and capture the city of Porkhov.
The counterattack began at 18:00 on 14 July. A few hours earlier, the aviation of the North-Western Front, the 1st long-range bomber air corps and the 2nd mixed air division of the Northern Front attacked concentrations of personnel, equipment and batteries of the Manstein corps, as well as reserves in the area of Soltsov, Sitni, Porkhova, Dno . Our aviation managed to seize local dominance in the air for the duration of the counterattack. After a 16-hour battle, the 70th Rifle Division, in cooperation with the 237th Rifle Division, on July 15 cut off the enemy's retreat to the west. On July 17, parts of the division captured the city of Soltsy.
The 180th Rifle Division attacked in a northerly direction from the Dno area to Sitnya. The 183rd and 182nd Rifle Divisions held back the onslaught of the enemy from the west.
In four days of fighting, the 8th Panzer Division and the enemy engineering regiment were defeated. Although the remnants managed to break out of the encirclement, it took a whole month to restore the combat readiness of the 8th Panzer Division. Parts of the 56th motorized corps were thrown back 40 km to the west.
The 11th Army's counterattack temporarily eliminated the threat of a German breakthrough to Novgorod and thwarted the enemy's first attempt to take Leningrad on the move. A threat was created to the communications of the 4th German Panzer Group. This forced the enemy to suspend the offensive in the Kingisepp and Luga directions until the main forces of the 18th Army approached Luga and the 16th Army approached the Staraya Russa-Kholm line. The front on Luga stabilized until 10 August. The defenders of Leningrad received additional time to strengthen the defense.
During these days, the enemy offensive developed successfully on the Soviet-German front. F. Halder's diary contains the following entry: “July 23rd. So far everything is going according to plan. Current issues requiring immediate resolution: …3. Troops are moving fast. Brothels do not keep up with the parts. Heads of rear units to supply brothels with trophy vehicles.
In the second half of July 1940, an order was issued in Berlin, which spoke of the creation of brothels for the Wehrmacht. The selection of candidates for “priestesses of love” for field brothels was at first quite strict. First of all, their appearance must meet the criteria of the Aryan model. All German women entering such work were listed as employees of the military department and received a salary, insurance, and also had benefits. 6
Hans Killian. In the shadow of victory German surgeon on the Eastern Front. – M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. S. 173.
But the time is not far off when F. Halder will be concerned about completely different problems. In a German newspaper there was an "explanation" of the giant of demagoguery and the paradox of Reich Minister Goebbels, Hitler's closest associate. German soldiers leaving for the Eastern Front asked him: “How is it that we are at war with the Russians, but the Russians are Slavs, and the Slavs came, like the Germans, from the Aryans?” Goebbels, without batting an eye, replied as follows: “The Russians were Slavs, but they mixed with the Tatars and became Bolsheviks!”
German soldiers took the oath: “I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich, loyalty and courage! I promise you and your appointed leaders to obey until death. God help me!"
Official notice of the death of a German soldier in the First World War: "He died for God, the Emperor and the Fatherland"; in World War II: "He died for the Fuhrer and the people."
Already in the summer months of 1941, the Germans began to understand that everything was not so simple and beautiful. Here are the memoirs of a German doctor: “... Wehrmacht news bulletins are full of optimistic forecasts. But the losses are mounting, the hospitals of the panzer division fighting on the front line right in front of us are overcrowded. The medical service units, which the Wehrmacht never reports on, are in a critical situation. Hospitals of Daugavpils do not cope with work. Planes are not able to transport the wounded...
In the middle of the month, on July 15, 1941, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch arrives in our army ... He hurries to announce to the assembled officers that the campaign against Russia has almost been won.
When this rapidly spreading phrase of the Field Marshal reaches us, advisers, we are speechless with horror.7
Hans Killian. In the shadow of victory German surgeon on the Eastern Front. S. 38.
The German command took urgent measures to save their troops. Divisions of the 22nd Rifle Corps were subjected to fierce attacks. On July 17, the enemy made the strongest attacks with the support of tanks in the Peski area, as a result of which the right flank of the 183rd Infantry Division was pushed back to the Petrovo-Sukharevo line, and then was driven back to the southern coast of Shelon. By the end of the day, the 182nd Infantry Division, under pressure from the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division of the Germans, was slowly retreating east from the Porkhov direction.
On this day, our aviation was active. Reconnaissance was carried out in small groups of 2-3 aircraft and single vehicles, a blow was struck on a column of motorized enemy units on the Vysotskoye-Dubrovo road. As a result of the bombing of the Pskov airfield, 8–10 aircraft caught fire, one Focke-Wulf aircraft was shot down over the Pskov airfield 8
Rybalko Ya.N. Old Russians. Zovnishtorgvidav Ukraine, 1994, p. 225.
On July 18, in the zone of the 183rd Infantry Division in the Bolshie Luki area, the enemy transported a group of tanks and an infantry company with motorcycles to the eastern bank of the Shelon. The 182nd Rifle Division, after withdrawing from the Porkhov direction, restored its position by 0500, but then, attacked by units of the 21st Infantry Division, withdrew to the Poddubie-Dubrovo line.
The 202nd motorized rifle division was sent to the Dno area, but it was too late. The enemy had already occupied the Dno with the forces of an infantry division and was advancing in an easterly direction.
On July 19, the 16th Rifle Corps suspended the offensive due to the withdrawal of parts of the 22nd Rifle Corps, which, in connection with the breakthrough of the front of the 182nd Division, began to withdraw to a line 10 km east of Dno. The wire communication with the command of the 11th Army by enemy bombers was put out of action, which created great difficulties in commanding divisions.
22 s.k. - the front of which had been broken through by a strike of 21 p.d. at the junction of 182 and 180 s.d., from the morning of 20.8 continued to withdraw to the east, and by 14.00 these divisions, together with units of 21 s.d. and thrown to the aid of 202 m.d. fought at the turn of Kamenka - Volotovo - Ditches. The remnants of the 5th motorized regiment were transferred to the same line. The position of this corps at the indicated line was still unstable (it was not possible to determine the exact position of the units due to the lack of communication by the end of 20.7) 9
TsAMO. F. 221. Op. 1351. D. 200.
On the same day, the front commander demanded in his directive: without his permission, the line that had developed by July 20 should not be left. This directive required the armies to take measures to strengthen defensive work and develop them in depth.
The directive noted that the troops still did not conduct reconnaissance. The commander demanded, under the personal responsibility of the chiefs of staff of the armies, the elimination of these shortcomings and the obligatory conduct of reconnaissance both day and night.
July 20 is considered the official date for the completion of the counterattack of the troops of the North-Western Front near Soltsy.
After July 20, the enemy, having pulled up fresh 11th and 21st infantry divisions and tanks to the Soltsy-Shimsk area, began to push parts of the 16th corps, intending to encircle it. The fact that the enemy failed to do this is the special merit of the gunners. On July 22, the enemy brought the SS division "Dead Head" into battle. It consisted of only two regiments. One regiment was destroyed by units of the 237th division shortly before. Manstein confirms this in his memoirs: "The division suffered colossal losses ... three regiments of the division had to be reduced to two."
After this fight, then they counted “more than thirty wrecked tanks, over two dozen armored vehicles, about two hundred burned trucks with shells, gasoline, food ... and the number of killed and wounded German soldiers was in the thousands. Among the dead, the chief of staff of the division and the commanders of two regiments were found, but the corpse of the division commander was not found.10
Military history collection. Great national catastrophe. The tragedy of 1941. – M.: Eksmo, 2007. S. 89.
