The failures of the first months of the Great Patriotic War for the USSR were due to many objective and subjective factors. Many works have been written on this topic, numerous studies have been carried out. An analysis of military operations and an assessment of the tactical and strategic decisions of the command of the Armed Forces and the political leadership of the Soviet Union are of interest even today.
1. Unpreparedness of the Red Army for war
Preparations for a major war that began in 1939, a sharp increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR, the production of a large amount of military equipment, combat experience gained in Spain, at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, in the Winter War - all this, it would seem, should have become tangible the advantages of the Red Army in battles with the Wehrmacht.
However, in general, the country was not yet ready for such a total war. Many divisions formed in 1939-1941 had an incomplete strength and were poorly provided with military equipment, moreover, they also had poor command of it. The repressions of the late 30s also had an effect, when a significant part of the experienced command personnel was destroyed, and less competent or inexperienced commanders took their place, in contrast to the German army, in which all generals and most of the officers had combat experience since the First World War , as well as the experience of all campaigns 1939-1941.
The transport capabilities of Germany were an order of magnitude higher than those of the Soviet Union. The Germans could move reinforcements much faster, regroup troops, organize their supply. The USSR had significant human resources, but these resources were much less mobile than the German ones. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht outnumbered the Red Army in terms of the number of trucks by about half, i.e. was more mobile. There are also samples that simply did not have an analogue in the Soviet armed forces. These are high-speed heavy artillery tractors and armored personnel carriers.
In general, the German army was much better prepared for war than the Red Army. If in the USSR this preparation lasted less than two years before the war, then Germany began to intensively develop the armed forces and the military industry immediately after Hitler came to power. For example, in Germany, universal military service was restored on March 16, 1935, and in the USSR only on September 1, 1939.
2. Strategic miscalculations of the command of the Red Army
But, if the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war became one of the reasons for the defeat of 1941, then in 1942 the Soviet troops were already experienced, they had behind them not only defeats and retreats, but also victories (the Battle of Moscow, the liberation of Rostov, the Kerch-Feodosia operation , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). But, nevertheless, it was in 1942 that the Wehrmacht reached its maximum advance on the territory of the Soviet Union. German troops reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, Mount Elbrus.
The reason for these defeats was the reassessment by the command (and primarily by Stalin) of the successes of the Soviet troops during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. German troops were driven back from Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also left the Kerch Peninsula and reduced pressure on Sevastopol. But they were not completely defeated, especially in a southerly direction. German active operations in 1942 were also logical in the southern direction - these Wehrmacht forces suffered the least.
The next failure of the Red Army in 1942 was the Kharkov operation, which cost the irretrievable loss of 171 thousand soldiers of the Red Army. Again, as in 1941, the generals - this time A.M. Vasilevsky - they asked for permission to withdraw troops, and again Stalin did not give such permission.
An important aspect of the failures of the Red Army during the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942. there was a lack of the required number of tank formations, which seriously affected the mobility of Soviet troops. The infantry and cavalry broke through the German defenses, but this often ended - there was almost no one and nothing to surround the enemy, since the superiority in manpower was minimal. As a result, both "cauldrons" (Demyansky and Kholmsky) were rescued by the Germans without any problems after the arrival of reinforcements. In addition, the encircled German troops in these pockets were supported by transport aircraft, which was difficult to fight due to the huge losses of Soviet aircraft in the first months of the war.
A common mistake was the incorrect determination of the directions of the main attacks of the enemy. Thus, in Ukraine, the command of the Southwestern Front, led by General Kirponos, was constantly afraid of turning the 1st Panzer Group to the south, to the rear of the Lvov salient. This led to unnecessary throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to large losses (in the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - more than 2.5 thousand tanks, during the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, near Uman - more than 200 tanks, under Kyiv - more than 400 tanks.)
3. Repressions in the pre-war period
According to various sources, during the repressions of 1937-1941. were shot, arrested or dismissed from the armed forces from 25 to 50 thousand officers. The highest commanding staff suffered the most significant losses - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. This greatly affected the actions of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war.
The fact is that old, experienced commanders who went through the school of the First World War, the Soviet-Polish, Civil Wars (Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Yegorov and many others) were subjected to repressions, and young officers came in their place, often had no experience in commanding large formations, and even in a war against the best army in the world.
Thus, by the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of commanders and political officers had been in their positions for no more than one year. By the summer of 1941, only 4.3% of the officers of the Red Army ground forces had a higher education, 36.5% had a specialized secondary education, 15.9% had no military education at all, and the remaining 43.3% completed only short-term courses junior lieutenants or were drafted into the army from the reserve.
But even solid military experience could not always help to win. For example, General D.T. Kozlov had been fighting since 1915, but could not oppose anything to the superiority of the Wehrmacht during the fighting in the Crimea in the spring of 1942. The same happened with V.N. Gordova - a long military experience, command of the front (Stalingrad), a series of failures that would have happened under any other commander, and, as a result, removal from office.
Thus, the already indicated reasons for the defeats of the Red Army were superimposed by the lack of a good experienced command, which together led to the horrific defeats of 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. And only by 1943, the Red Army commanders were able to adequately master the art of mechanized warfare, encirclement and destruction large enemy forces, powerful front-line offensives (similar to the German summer of 1941).
Synopsis on the history of Russia
June 22, 1941. Nazi Germany and its allies launched a carefully prepared blow against the Soviet Union. The peaceful work of the Soviet people was interrupted. A new period has begun in the life of the Soviet state - the period of the Great Patriotic War.
Goals and nature of the Great Patriotic War.
Germany in this war pursued the following goals:
Class - the destruction of the USSR as a state, and communism as an ideology;
Imperialist - the achievement of world domination;
Economic - robbery of the national wealth of the USSR;
Racist, misanthropic - the destruction of most of the Soviet people and the transformation of the remaining into slaves.
The goals of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR were:
Defense of the Fatherland, freedom and independence of the Motherland;
Assistance to the peoples of the world in liberation from the fascist yoke;
The elimination of fascism and the creation of conditions that exclude the possibility of aggression from German soil in the future.
Its nature followed naturally from the aims of the war. On the part of Germany, it was an unjust, predatory and criminal war. On the part of the USSR - liberation and fair.
Periodization of the Great Patriotic War.
June 1941 - November 1942 - the period of mobilization of all forces and means to repulse the enemy.
November 1942 - December 1943 - the period of a radical turning point in the war.
January 1944 - May 1945 - the period of the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe.
Causes of the defeats of the Red Army in the first period of the war:
Gross miscalculations of the country's leadership in assessing the real military situation;
Insufficient professional training of a significant part of the command personnel of the Red Army;
Weakening of the country's defense capability and the combat capability of the Red Army by unjustified repressions against the leading cadres of the country's armed forces;
miscalculations of a military-strategic nature;
The advantage of Germany over the USSR in economic potential;
Significant superiority of Germany in the actual military. Its army was fully mobilized and deployed, equipped with modern means of combat, and had two years of experience in combat operations. At the same time, the work on its technical equipment was not completed in the Soviet army. The balance of power on the eve of the war.
Germany and its allies: 190 divisions (153 + 37) = 5.5 million people, 4300 tanks, 4500 aircraft, 47 thousand guns and mortars and 192 ships of the main classes. Allies of Germany: Hungary, Romania, Finland, Italy, Slovakia. USSR: 179 divisions = 3 million people, 8800 tanks, 8700 aircraft, 38 thousand guns and mortars. The fleets of the Soviet armed forces consisted of 182 ships of the main classes and 1400 combat aircraft.
And although the Soviet troops had superiority in tanks and aviation, they were still inferior to the enemy in terms of quality.
German offensive strategy.
In accordance with the strategy of "blitzkrieg" it was envisaged the invasion of powerful groupings of tank formations and aviation, in cooperation with the ground forces, advancing in the direction of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, to surround and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops of the border districts, within 3-5 months to reach line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga - Astrakhan. To solve this problem, several army groups were created. Army Group "North" was advancing in the direction of the Baltic, Pskov and Leningrad. Commander - Field Marshal W. von Leeb. Army Group Center operated along the lines of Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow. Commander - Field Marshal F. von Bock. Army Group "South" strikes at Western Ukraine, captures Kyiv, then advances on Kharkov, Donbass, Crimea. Commander - Field Marshal G. von Runstedt. The German army of Norway acted in the direction of Murmansk. Two Romanian armies and a Hungarian army corps also joined the fighting.
mobilization activities.
A) Establishment of the supreme governing bodies of the country's defense.
June 23, 1941 - the Headquarters of the High Command was created, which on August 8 is transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command. It included People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov. General mobilization was declared in the country, and martial law was introduced throughout the European part.
June 30, 1941 - the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, endowed with full state, military and party power. It included Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, later Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Bulganin were introduced. Stalin became the chairman of the GKO. In addition, on July 19, he took the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and on August 8, he accepted the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and the Navy.
B) A directive letter from the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941. The letter prescribed the following order:
Ensuring the work of the rear for the front;
Organization of resistance in the occupied territory.
July 3, 1941 - Stalin's address to the people on the radio, where for the first time it was openly declared about the mortal threat hanging over the country, and contained an appeal to all citizens of the country to save the Fatherland.
1. Sudden attack of the enemy.
Early in the morning, exactly at half past three, on June 22, 1941, German aircraft attacked airfields, military camps, railway junctions, settlements in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. This took most of the divisions and regiments of the border military districts by surprise. The defensive lines were not occupied by the troops, who had already been withdrawn to summer camps in May. Artillery was located at the district training grounds far from the borders and their divisions. Aviation was not dispersed over field airfields. Only the ships and naval bases of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, were put on high alert in advance. Also in constant readiness were the border troops.
Taking advantage of the suddenness and weak anti-aircraft artillery cover of airfields, German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft of the border districts and seized complete air supremacy. Communication centers, bridges were captured, command and control of troops was disrupted, etc. As a result of the sudden strike, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, wounded, captured or disappeared.
G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs says: “The main reasons for the defeat of our troops at the beginning of the war were that the war found our armed forces at the stage of their reorganization and re-equipment with more advanced weapons; in the fact that our border troops were not promptly brought to wartime states, were not put on full combat readiness and were not deployed in accordance with all the rules of operational art for conducting active defense ... These shortcomings further increased the advantages of the enemy, who already surpassed ours troops in quantitative and qualitative terms, and since the enemy had the strategic initiative, all these factors played a decisive role in the beginning of the war.
2. Numerical superiority of the enemy .
The number of troops of Germany and its allies at the borders of the USSR amounted to 5.5 million people. This formidable invading army was opposed by the Soviet troops of the western districts with a total strength of 2.6 million people.
3. The Nazi army was mobilized, had two years of experience in modern warfare, while the professional level of the Soviet troops, especially the command staff, after mass repressions in the army decreased. By the beginning of the war, only 7% of the commanders of the Red Army had a higher military education, and 37% did not even complete the course of secondary military educational institutions.
As a result of mass repressions in 1937-1938. the country lost more than 40 thousand commanders, political workers, military engineers and specialists. “Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war in the forty-first year, an important role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military cadres that we had. There were a number of divisions commanded by captains, because everyone who was higher was arrested without exception, ”Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky says about this. At the end of the 30s, the following were repressed: M. N. Tukhachevsky (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World War and the Civil War, creator of works that had a significant impact on the development of Soviet military science), V. K. Blyukher (Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant of the First World and Civil War, head of the Special Far Eastern Army until 1937), A.I. Revolution and Civil War) and others.
Unlike the USSR, in Germany there were many commanders who went through the First World War: H. Guderian, W. Keitel, F. Paulus, E. Manstein, etc. Although some military leaders were not repressed, many of them did not show special abilities. Among them are Marshals of the USSR Voroshilov and Budyonny.
Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich, in February 1918, formed a cavalry detachment, with which he began military operations against the whites. Being a brilliant cavalry tactician, Budyonny did not have the talents of an outstanding commander, he could not think big, which affected during the Second World War. After mass purges in the army in 1926-35 and repressions in 1930-38, a situation developed in the army when people from the 1st Cavalry Army ended up in the highest positions, and Budyonny and K.E. Voroshilov was turned into almost the only heroes of the Civil War by Stalinist propaganda. Occupying high positions, Budyonny, being a convinced cavalryman and a fan of civil war tactics, is largely responsible for the fact that the country's leadership hampered the development of tank and motorized troops, and many new strategic developments were shelved. In all posts, B. showed a complete lack of talent as a commander and an inability to adapt to a new, changed war strategy. In 1942, he was finally removed from command posts and never received them again.
Voroshilov Kliment Efremovich during the fighting has always been distinguished by the "purity" of party views, but he did not achieve much success. Together with S.M. Budyonny was among the main organizers of the 1st Cavalry Army (November 1919) and became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army. After the death of M.V. Frunze Voroshilov, as a loyal and consistent supporter of Stalin, was appointed by him on November 6, 1925 as People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. Voroshilov became the most celebrated commander of the Civil War. In Aug. 1939 led the Soviet delegation in negotiations with France and Great Britain, proved to be a mediocre diplomat. On May 7, 1940, after the unsuccessful actions of the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish war, it became clear that Voroshilov absolutely could not lead the armed forces, Stalin removed him from the post of people's commissar and made him deputy. prev. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and before. Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (it was until May 1941). On June 10, 1941, Stalin appointed Voroshilov commander-in-chief of the troops of the North-Western direction, but already on August 31. he, having shown his complete inability to lead troops in a modern war, was removed from command. In Sept. 1941 Voroshilov was sent near Leningrad as a front commander, suffered a crushing defeat, while Stalin, having learned that Voroshilov personally tried to lead the troops on the attack, immediately recalled him and replaced G.K. Zhukov. In September - November 1942, Voroshilov held a purely formal post of commander in chief of the partisan movement.
In subsequent years, the damage inflicted on personnel was compensated numerically, but this did not happen in a qualitative sense. Many command and staff positions were occupied by insufficiently experienced and trained people. Finding themselves in the most difficult conditions of the initial period of the war, they naturally made many mistakes.
The professional skills of sappers and engineers were clearly insufficient. Air Force and Navy specialists were poorly trained, did not know either new or old military equipment. Communication facilities at the tactical level were almost completely absent, so the troops, even at the army-corps level, did not have stable communications. The air defense of troops and facilities did not meet the requirements of its time due to the lack of detection and communication equipment. The reasons could be listed endlessly.
4. Major miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in assessing the role of mechanized formations. The USSR did not have a developed auto industry. A significant part of the guns were moved on horses or old tractors. High degree of motorization
The German army allowed strike groups to rapidly develop the offensive, overcome water barriers on the move, outflank Soviet formations, and disrupt or weaken their counterattacks.
5. The ongoing modernization of military equipment and the reorganization of the main types of the Soviet Armed Forces were not completed, so a number of old weapons were discontinued, and there were still few new ones in the troops.
6. The old system of manning the army weakened the training of the army. In 1939, the Law “On General Military Duty” was adopted. He consolidated the personnel principle of the formation of the armed forces and abolished class restrictions on conscription.
7. One of the main reasons for the initial failures of the Red Army in the fight against fascist Germany was a miscalculation in the assessment of the military-strategic situation on the eve of the war.
German troops attacked suddenly, violating the non-aggression pact. Based on an erroneous assessment of the intentions of the fascist leadership, Stalin forbade the Soviet military command to carry out the necessary mobilization measures, to regroup troops in the border districts and put them on alert.
L.P. Beria rejected all information coming from intelligence agencies. In his memorandum to Stalin (06/21/41), he insists on the recall and punishment of the ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who assured the Soviet leadership that Hitler planned to launch an attack on the USSR on 06/22/41. Beria is also critical of the reports of the military attache in Germany, V. I. Tupikov, who claimed that the Wehrmacht groups would attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv.
“Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, back when he was Chief of the General Staff, based on an analysis of historical, geographical and operational strategic factors, concluded that in the event of a war with Germany, her command would strike the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction. Stalin declared that Germany needed bread to wage war. Therefore, the main blow can be dealt in Ukraine. “It is clear that Stalin's opinion has become a directive for our military command,” says N. G. Pavlenko.
Vasilevsky, in his work, partially justifies Stalin, saying that he did not dare to start regrouping the armed forces. The party wanted to delay the entry into the war, and Stalin was unable to correctly grasp the turning point when forced mobilization should have begun. Like Pavlenko, he argues that in the event of timely preparation of troops, heavy losses could be inflicted on the enemy, which would not allow him to advance so far across the territory of the USSR.
It was Stalin who made the biggest mistakes in the strategic command of the troops. He, according to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, both before the war and at the beginning of it had a very vague idea of \u200b\u200bmilitary affairs. Nevertheless, for over a year and a half (beginning in the spring of 1941) he took little account of the opinions of military experts, believing himself to be the only strategist. Only the harsh reality of the autumn of 1942 diminished his ambitions of the "commander".
The main feature of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense during the Civil War was that it did not replace and did not replace the organs of the party and government. The fundamental questions of the conduct of hostilities were then considered at the meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, and at the Politburo and plenums of the Central Committee, and at the congresses of the RCP (b). During the Great Patriotic War, no plenums, let alone party congresses, were held, all cardinal military issues were resolved in the State Defense Committee, or, to be more precise, personally by Stalin. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the assertion that the GKO, headed by Stalin, had as its prototype the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, which was under the leadership of V. I. Lenin.
Stalin actually discarded the experience of the civil war in the field of organizing the strategic leadership of the armed forces. Although the Headquarters had from six to eight members at different periods, in fact two or three people worked in it. According to Vasilevsky, Stalin attached little importance to the affiliation of certain military leaders to the Headquarters.
As you know, during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin held a number of important party and government posts. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. In addition, he was assigned other top management functions: to head the Transport Committee, deal almost daily with people's commissariats responsible for the production of weapons and ammunition, deal with people's commissars and designers on improving military equipment, etc. Naturally, such an overload of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief could not but affect negatively on the quality of his own military activity, prevented him from delving into the essence of the problems.
The offensive doctrine imposed by the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1939 raised almost no objections to the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army - and who could object if the commanders of the districts commanded for 1-2 years, the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko a little more. The leadership selected such cadres who would not dare to object to the general line of the party. Therefore, the order of the Central Committee to prepare offensive operations was carried out, despite the fact that from 1939 to 1941 the situation changed dramatically, and the General Staff stupidly carried out those directives that were developed two years before the war.
The General Staff closely observed the course of the two-year war in Europe, but the conclusions were made superficial. The achievements of the German command in concentrating the forces of tank formations in the direction of the main attacks, the use of operational and tactical landings, the rapid transfer of effort, the interaction of the forces of the ground forces, aviation, and navy were not noticed. The entry into battles with the beginning of one or another campaign at the same time by the main forces was denied. The adoption of the Politburo in June 1941 of the “Resolution on the deployment of troops of the second strategic echelon” (“second line”) was also belated, mainly along the river. Dnieper. The same Decree planned the construction of a state defense line on the outskirts of Moscow.
A series of replacements of people's commissars and chiefs of the General Staff led to the fact that the General Staff, two, one, six months before the start of the war, made miscalculations in the timing of its likely start, in the operational formation of the troops of the first strategic echelon, and most importantly - miscalculated in the direction of the main blows. Two years of the European war have shown that the Germans are planning operations in the directions of the maximum capacity of the railways, because. the organization of supply and 90% of the transfer of troops were carried out mainly through them. Yes, and as the post-war analysis showed, the presence of railways in the direction of the main strikes was taken as the basis for the Barbarossa plan. Despite the fact that the track in Europe is narrower, it was easier to use the existing railways. Therefore, the first direction to Leningrad was chosen, the second - Minsk-Moscow and the third - to Vinnitsa, since the terrain favored the use of tanks.
In the prewar years, in order to please Stalin's political ambitions, the People's Commissariat of Defense overestimated its own troops, and underestimated the enemy's troops. So, on December 28, 1940, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D. Pavlov, argued that our domestic tank corps was capable of solving the task of destroying 1-2 mechanized divisions or 4-5 infantry divisions, and on January 13, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff commander of 2- first rank K.A. Meretskov said: “When developing the field manual, we proceeded from the fact that our division is much stronger than the German division and in a meeting battle it will defeat the German one. In defense, one of our divisions will repel the blow of 2-3 enemy divisions.
8. A negative impact on military operations was the fact that Stalin tried to hide his guilt in the initial defeats of the Red Army in the Second World War, thereby punishing military leaders, generals, etc. for his misdeeds.
To divert blame from himself and his inner circle, Stalin organized a trial. On the basis of falsified sentences, a large group of generals were convicted and executed. Among them - the commander of the troops of the Western Front D. G. Pavlov, the chief of staff of the same front V. E. Klimovskikh, the commander of the troops of the 4th Army A. A. Korobkov and other military leaders.
In conditions of strict control over various kinds of "talks", those military leaders who tried to figure out the reasons for the defeats fell under suspicion and were subjected to repression. So, for confidential conversations with colleagues about possible mistakes in the command of strategic issues, a major military researcher, General V. A. Melikov, was accused of "defeatism" and imprisoned, where he died.
Along with repressions for attempts to analyze the causes of defeats, the version about the surprise attack of the enemy and other half-truths was intensively spread.
9. By June 1941, the troops of the border districts were scattered over too large spaces. Meanwhile, most of the Wehrmacht forces in advance and secretly concentrated directly at the Soviet borders.
10. The military-economic potential of Germany significantly exceeded the potential of the USSR at the initial stage of the war. In 1940, 18.3 million tons of steel were smelted in the USSR, 31 million tons of oil and 166 million tons of coal were mined. In Germany and the regions controlled by it, 32 million tons of steel were smelted a year, 400 million tons of coal and 6.5 million tons of oil were mined.
The USSR lagged behind Germany both in professional training (the army was mobilized and had two years of experience in waging war) and in armament (Germany transferred its economy to the production of the latest military equipment and, in addition, it used the resources of almost all of Western Europe, captured the weapons of more than 200 divisions defeated and surrendered armies: France - 4930 armored personnel carrier tanks, 3 thousand aircraft).
The Red Army also failed to turn into a modern army, despite the supply of new combat aircraft and tanks. The aircraft industry and tank building looked the most characteristic. A comparative analysis of the production of combat aircraft of the USSR and Germany shows that the non-belligerent USSR before the war, in 1939 and 1940, produced more combat aircraft than Germany (see Table 1). At the request of May 13, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov Politburo aviation industry was placed under martial law with simultaneous restructuring and expansion.
Table 1
| year | combat aircraft | Total aircraft | Aircraft losses | |
| the USSR | 6 460 2 | |||
| Germany | 1 645 | 2 518 3 | ||
| the USSR | 8 233 2 | |||
| Germany | 7 180 | 10 247 3 | 5 324 4 | |
| the USSR | 3 950 2 | 11 500 1 | 21 200 4 | |
| Germany | 8 703 | 12 401 3 | 2 160 | |
| the USSR | 19 772 2 | 25 400 1 | 14 700 4 | |
| Germany | 11 137 3 | 15 409 3 | 13 769 | |
| the USSR | 28 205 2 | 34 900 1 | 26 700 4 | |
| Germany | 18 813 3 | 24 807 3 | 17 495 | |
| the USSR | 40 200 1 | 30 500 4 | ||
| Germany | 2 287 3 | 40 593 3 | 32 280 | |
| the USSR | 10 100 1 | 13 300 4 | ||
| Germany | - | 7 540 3 | ||
| Total | the USSR | 106 400 4 | ||
| Germany | 71 065 |
9 new aircraft factories were built and 9 existing aircraft factories were reconstructed; 6 new motor-building plants were built and all existing plants were reconstructed. By the beginning of the war, the aviation fleet amounted to 15,990 combat aircraft, of which 9,917 were stationed in the western strategic direction. Germany by June 22 had 1820 and 770 Allied aircraft. Thus, the superiority in aircraft from the Soviet side is 4.5: 1. But only on the first day of fighting, 1811 aircraft were lost, of which 1489 were burned on the ground, and by July 10, 1941, 2516 aircraft remained in the Soviet Air Force, one third of the available ones. Almost the entire aircraft industry was lost in 1941. In addition, 22,150 aircraft were delivered under lend-lease from the USA and Great Britain.
The ratio between Soviet and German downed aircraft was 5:1 (for the first month of fighting), and for the entire war - 1.5:1. All pre-war efforts to develop aviation turned out to be pointless and ruinous due to poor personal training (the pilots had 4 hours of flights in the Kiev Special Military District, and the pilots of the Baltic Military District spent only 15 hours in the air), overcrowding at field airfields, lack of control and unpreparedness of the airfield network. The advantage in numbers was lost immediately, and in terms of air clashes we were inferior to the Germans until the end of the war.
Approximately the same situation was with the tanks. By the beginning of the war, the USSR had 22,600 tanks. During the war years, the industry produced 96,500 tanks, under Lend-Lease from the USA and Great Britain 38,100 tanks were received on the territory of the USSR, by May 9, 8,100 tanks remained at the front. At the same time, the USSR lost 96,500 tanks during the war years, and the Germans on all fronts lost 48,000 tanks. It turned out that the Germans, with one wrecked tank, destroyed two Soviet ones. There are many reasons for this. Before the war, more than half of all tanks were light. With an approximate equality in firepower, patency and armor protection of both light and medium tanks, Soviet tanks were not radio-equipped, in contrast to the total radio-fication of German tanks, self-propelled guns and armored vehicles. Until 1943, only the vehicles of company and battalion commanders were radio-equipped; one tank out of ten. Therefore, the Germans sought to knock out tanks with antennas in the first place, and the rest became deaf and uncontrollable. The optics were also inferior to the German ones, which, coupled with a small view, after the destruction of vehicles with walkie-talkies of company and battalion commanders, turned the tanks into blind boxes. The requirement to fire on the move was a waste of ammunition and rather a hope for the psychological instability of the enemy, but made the tanks unarmed after a while. Many tanks were put out of action due to inept operation. Drivers had only 1.5-2 hours of driving practice. Tankers were mainly cavalry and infantrymen, who had absolutely no skills in shooting, driving, or control.
11. The German army had strong weapons and rich combat experience. She was psychologically well prepared for war and aimed at victory.
Conclusion
Summing up, the main reason for the first defeats of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War becomes obvious. It is not a significant superiority in the size of the German army, not a surprise attack by the Nazis, not border troops that were not brought to wartime states in a timely manner. The main reason for the outrage is still the militarily illiterate government of the USSR.
The mediocre political and military leadership of the USSR was preparing the country for war, but not for defense, as many authors of the Soviet formation, defenders of everything Soviet, are trying to convince and prove; to an offensive, aggressive war, on foreign territory, and, knowing the actual combat readiness of the Red Army, not with little bloodshed. Having knocked out a completely professional backbone from the army in 1937-1939, the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKVD under the leadership of I.V. Stalin did so much to reduce the country's combat capability that even the Nazis did not. The professional training of the commanders of the districts, armies, divisions, battalions could not be compared with the German one. The frightened, downtrodden commanders blindly carried out the requirements of the field regulations, trying not to deviate in the slightest from the demands of the party, because retribution could follow immediately. Therefore, during the war years, patterns in operational art were noted, and at the tactical level, attacks were carried out straightforwardly, in crowds of 500-1000 people, through minefields, since there were barrage detachments and penal companies behind, because. those who doubted their urgent need were immediately shot.
Only the Politburo, the government of the USSR and the NKVD are to blame for the fact that the country's strategic reserves were transferred to the rear of the border districts. The stockpiled stocks were not only not sufficiently provided with rail transport, which was practically impossible, but their destruction was also not provided for - due to the lack of both specialists and means of undermining. Only the Airborne Commissariat is to blame for the fact that, despite the warnings of military experts, simultaneous reconstruction work began at all airfields to increase the length of the runways, and aircraft accumulated on a limited number of airfields that were moved to the border, which made them vulnerable to aviation the Nazis.
Bibliography
1. Dolutsky I.I. National history. XX century. textbook for grades 10-11. part II. M., 1996, p. 112
2. Russia in the XX century. Textbook for 10 - 11 grades. Levandovsky A.A., Shchetinov Yu.A. 2002. page 74
3. History of Russia, XX - beginning of the XXI century. Shestakov Vladimir Alekseevich Enlightenment, 2011 p. 215
4. Vasilevsky A. M. The work of a lifetime. M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. p. 86
5. Rzhevsky O. A. WWII, 1941 - 1945. Events, people, documents: A brief historical reference book. M.: Politizdat, 1990. p. 306
6. Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G. History of the XX century: A textbook for senior classes of general education schools and institutions. M.: Yakhont, 1998. p. 94.
7. History of Russia. 1917–2009 Barsenkov A.S., Vdovin A.I. 2010. p. 56
8. Zhukov G.K. . Memories and reflections. In 2 vols. T. 1. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. p. 281
9. History of Russia. Soviet era (1917-1993). Khutorskoy V.Ya. 2005 page 126
10. Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G.
11. There was a war. Military reflections. historian / [N. G. Pavlenko]. M. IK "Rodnik" 1994 p. 136
12. Kulakov E., Myatkov M., Rzheshevskiy O., War 1941-1945. Facts and documents M.: Olma-Press, 2001., P.46
13. Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M.: Politizdat, 1968. p. 78
14. Len Dayton. World War… Mistakes… Misses… Losses…., M.: Eksmo-Press, 2002, p. 490-496
Dolutsky I.I. National history. XX century. textbook for grades 10-11. part II. M., 1996, p. 112
Russia in the XX century. Textbook for 10 - 11 grades. Levandovsky A.A., Shchetinov Yu.A.
2002. page 74
History of Russia, XX - beginning of the XXI century. Shestakov Vladimir Alekseevich Enlightenment, 2011 p. 215
Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. p. 86
Rzhevsky O. A. WWII, 1941 - 1945. Events, people, documents: A Brief Historical Reference. M.: Politizdat, 1990. p. 306
Danilov A. A., Kosulina L. G. History of the XX century: Textbook for senior classes of general education schools and institutions. M.: Yakhont, 1998. p. 94
Russian history. 1917–2009 Barsenkov A.S., Vdovin A.I. 2010. p. 56
Zhukov G.K. . Memories and reflections. In 2 vols. T. 1. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.
Russian history. Soviet era (1917-1993). Khutorskoy V.Ya. 2005 page 126
Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. Russian history. XX century: Proc. book. For 9th grade. educational institutions. Page 131.
There was a war. Military reflections. historian / [N. G. Pavlenko]. M. IK "Rodnik" 1994
Kulakov E., Myatkov M., Rzheshevskiy O., War 1941-1945. Facts and documents M.: Olma-Press, 2001., P.46
Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M.: Politizdat, 1968. p. 78
Len Dayton. World War… Mistakes… Misses… Losses…., M.: Eksmo-Press, 2002, p. 490-496
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in their opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare, which the Red Army adhered to.
Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, laying the responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they "did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops."
An unexpected blitzkrieg
Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by the Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.
“The People’s Commissar for Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.
The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff expected that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the Nazis, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.
However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by the German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily due to the powerful strikes of the armored forces, supported by aircraft, which quickly cut through the enemy defenses.
The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defense capability of the invaded country.
The miscalculation of the command of the USSR led to the fact that German aviation on the very first day of the war destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft and actually secured air supremacy for itself. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The German command achieved its goal: the control of the Red Army troops was violated for some time.
Unfortunate disposition of troops
As many researchers note, the nature of the location of the Soviet troops was very convenient for striking at German territory, but detrimental to a defensive operation. The deployment that took shape at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the plan of the General Staff to deliver preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the Fundamentals of Deployment, such a deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.
At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with deployed rears, but were divided into three echelons out of operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy the Soviet troops in parts.
The situation was especially alarming on the "Bialystok ledge", which went for many kilometers towards the enemy. This arrangement of troops created a threat of deep coverage and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. Fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.
Reckless counteroffensives
On June 22, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin's directive was issued, which stated: "troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border."
Such an order testified to a misunderstanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when the German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts as well. Few could object to him. Despite the unpreparedness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire length of the front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.
Moreover, the troops were ordered to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction, could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov region, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the capabilities of the enemy and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a "boiler". About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.
Unavailability of inventories
The General Staff believed that in the conditions of the impending war, the material and technical means needed to be pulled closer to the troops. 340 out of 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in the border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. Only in the area of the Brest Fortress, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the frontline zone, but in training camps.
The course of hostilities showed the recklessness of such a decision. It was no longer possible to withdraw military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants in a short time. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was a large accumulation of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the forward units of the army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km., Then the front-line and long-range aviation units were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.
Main forces towards Moscow
In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into a gap in the Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, the Headquarters placed the main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the personnel of the Red Army, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center.
The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: to meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then go on the counteroffensive with all available forces. The main task - to keep Moscow at any cost - was completed, however, most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the "cauldrons" near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two "cauldrons" were 7 field directorates of the armies out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but most of the reserves were concentrated not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the southern direction.
How did the name of the USSR come about?
As early as 1913, Lenin dreamed of "an enormous historical step from medieval fragmentation to the future socialist unity of all countries." In the first years after the collapse of the empire, the question of such unity arose especially acutely.
Stalin proposed that the independent republics formed after the revolution be included in the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy, while Lenin, on the contrary, showing “national liberalism”, called for a federation of republics with equal rights. 
Delegates of the I Congress of Soviets in the meeting room. Moscow.
On December 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress of Soviets was held in Moscow, which, based on the Leninist version, adopted a declaration on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which included the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR and the Transcaucasian SFSR.
It is interesting that formally, according to the Constitution, each of the republics retained the right to secede from the USSR, they could also independently enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states.
Who financed industrialization?
The leadership of the USSR, having only restored the destroyed economy, set the task of catching up with the countries of the West that had gone ahead. This required accelerated industrialization, which required considerable funds.
In 1928, Stalin approved a forced approach, which proposed to eliminate the backlog in two five-year plans. The cost of the economic miracle was to be paid by the peasantry, but this was not enough. 
The country needed currency, which the party leadership obtained in various ways, for example, by selling paintings from the Hermitage. But there were other sources, economists say.
According to some researchers, the main source of industrialization was the loans of American bankers, who later counted on the creation of a Jewish republic in the Crimea.
Why did Stalin abandon Bolshevism?
Shortly after gaining sole power, Stalin departs from the revolutionary values of Bolshevism. Clear evidence of this is his struggle with the "Leninist Guard".
Many of the landmarks set by the October Revolution turned out to be unattainable, and the ideas turned out to be unviable. Thus, communism became a distant prospect that could not be realized without the establishment of socialism. 
The Bolshevik slogan "All power to the Soviets!" also underwent a change. Stalin came up with a new formula, where socialism is power concentrated in one hand.
The ideas of internationalism are now being replaced by state patriotism. Stalin promotes the rehabilitation of historical figures and prohibits the persecution of believers.
Historians are divided on the reasons for Stalin's departure from the Bolshevik slogans. According to some, this is due to the desire to unite the country, while others explain this by the need to change the political course.
Why did Stalin start the purges in 1937?
"Great Terror" 1937-1938 still raises many questions among historians and researchers. Today, few people doubt Stalin's involvement in the "mass purge", opinions differ only when counting the victims. According to some information, the number of those executed for political and criminal cases can reach up to 1 million people.
The opinions of researchers also do not agree on the causes of mass repressions. According to historian Yury Zhukov, the repressions were caused by the confrontation between Stalin and regional party bodies, which, fearing to lose their posts, prevented elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
But another Russian historian Alexei Teplyakov is sure that the Great Terror was an action planned and prepared by Stalin.
For the French historian Nicolas Werth, the repressions became the action of the “social engineering” mechanism, completing the policy of dispossession and deportations. And the German expert Karl Schloegel believes that "terror, initiated by the elite in the name of the great goal of getting rid of enemies, was readily picked up and used by many structures and citizens to solve their problems."
Why did the powerful Red Army suffer defeats in the first months of the war?
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War for the Red Army was catastrophic. By July 10, 1941, the Red Army, according to some sources, lost about 850 thousand people. Historians explain the reasons for the defeats by a complex of various factors that, when combined, led to a disaster.
A special place among such reasons is occupied by the deployment of Soviet troops, which, according to the September 1940 version of the "Fundamentals of Deployment", was designed not for border defense, but for preventive strikes against Germany. The formations of the Red Army, divided into echelons, favored the successful advance of the German troops. 
Recently, great emphasis has been placed on the miscalculations of the General Staff, which used the outdated doctrine of warfare. Some researchers, in particular, V. Solovyov and Yu. Kirshin, also find direct culprits - Stalin, Zhukov, Voroshilov, who "did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of the German troops ".
Why did Khrushchev condemn Stalin's personality cult?
On February 25, 1956, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev made a report "On the cult of personality and its consequences", in which he mercilessly criticized the former leader. Today, many historians on the whole see behind a correct, albeit biased assessment of Stalin's personality, not only a desire to restore historical justice, but to solve their own problems. 
In particular, by shifting all responsibility to Stalin, Khrushchev to some extent relieved himself of part of the blame for participating in mass repressions in Ukraine. “The accusations leveled against Stalin, coupled with the rehabilitation of the victims of unjustified executions, could soften the anger of the population,” writes the American historian Grover Furr.
But there are other hypotheses according to which criticism of Stalin was a weapon in the fight against members of the Presidium - Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, which could interfere with the implementation of Khrushchev's plans to reorganize the state apparatus.
Why was Crimea given to Ukraine?
The transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 was a resonant event that resonated many years later. Now the emphasis is not only on the legality. Opinions on this matter are different: some argue that in this way the USSR avoided the transfer of Crimea to the Jewish Republic on a “credit history” with American bankers, others suggest that it was a gift to Ukraine in honor of the celebration of the 300th anniversary Pereyaslav Rada.
Among the reasons mentioned are unfavorable conditions for farming in the steppe regions of the peninsula and the territorial proximity of Crimea to Ukraine. Many people support the version according to which the “Ukrainization” of Crimea was supposed to contribute to the restoration of the destroyed national economy.
Why sent troops to Afghanistan?
The question of the expediency of bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan began to be raised already in perestroika times. A moral assessment was also given to the decision of the Soviet leadership, which cost the lives of more than 15 thousand internationalist soldiers. 
Today it is already obvious that along with the declared justification for the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as assistance to the "friendly Afghan people", there was another, no less weighty reason.
Major General Yuri Drozdov, former head of the Illegal Intelligence Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, noted that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity, since US actions intensified in the country, in particular, technical observation posts were advanced to the southern borders of the USSR.
Why did the Politburo decide on perestroika?
By the mid-1980s, the USSR came close to an economic crisis. The devastation in agriculture, the chronic shortage of goods and the lack of industrial development required immediate measures.
It is known that the reforms were developed on behalf of Andropov, but Gorbachev initiated them. “Apparently, comrades, we all need to rebuild,” Gorbachev’s word was picked up by the media and quickly became the slogan of the new ideology. 
Today, the organizers of Perestroika are accused of the fact that, consciously or not, the transformations they initiated led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some researchers argue that the reforms were conceived for the sake of seizing property by the Soviet elite. But Sergei Kara-Murza sees in the victory of Perestroika the result of the activities of Western intelligence agencies.
The ideologists of Perestroika themselves have repeatedly stated that the reforms were exclusively of a socio-economic nature.
Who was behind the 1991 coup?
On August 20, 1991, Gorbachev scheduled the signing of the Union Treaty, which was to outline the new position of the Soviet republics. But the event was disrupted by the coup. The conspirators then called the main reason for the coup the need to preserve the USSR.
According to the State Emergency Committee, this was done "in order to overcome a deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy." 
But today, many researchers call the August coup a farce and consider the main directors to be those who benefited from the collapse of the country. For example, Mikhail Poltoranin, a former member of the Government of the Russian Federation, claims that "the putsch of 1991 was staged by Boris Yeltsin together with Mikhail Gorbachev."
However, some researchers still believe that the purpose of the GKChP was to seize power, for which they wanted to "overthrow Gorbachev" and "prevent Yeltsin from coming to power."
Taras Repin
