Doctor of History A.F. Noskova,

Doctor of History M.I. Meltyukhov

Warsaw Uprising of 1944: Intention and Results*

Numerous studies and journalistic works are devoted to the Warsaw Uprising, but scientific and public discussions continue. The same questions come up over and over again. For what purposes and against whom was the uprising raised? Was it possible for the rebels to succeed? Who is to blame for the defeat and, most importantly, who bears the historical and political responsibility for the death of people and the city?

Documents available today show that the uprising in Warsaw was not an unexpected patriotic impulse of the Poles. After the defeat of the Polish army in September 1939, the idea of ​​a general or local uprising as one of the ways to fight against Germany (enemy No. 1) and the Soviet Union (enemy No. 2) was contained in the geopolitical developments of the London-based Polish government. It was based on the assumption that Germany would be defeated by the armies of the Western allies with the participation of units of the Polish Army, which in 1939 went to the West. It was believed that the fighting in Europe would be accompanied by a general short-term (2-3 days) uprising of the Poles in support of military operations, which would lead to the expulsion of the invaders. Poland will thereby demonstrate to the world the ability to restore the state, to win freedom and independence. The "Eastern Creses" (Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Vilna Territory) will be returned to its composition. The western border will pass along the Oder (Odra) - Neisse (Nysa) line, Poland will receive the territory of East Prussia, the Baltic coast from Koenigsberg (Krulevets) to Stettin (Szczecin) inclusive and retain the territories of Czechoslovakia captured in 1938. The future of the eastern neighbor (enemy No. 2) in this Polish concept looked unenviable: if the USSR, together with Germany, did not tolerate a complete _______________

* - Preface to part I of volume 2 of the collection of documents "The Soviet Union and the Polish military-political underground", International Foundation "Democracy", Moscow, 2016

military defeat in a war in Europe, it will become weak to such an extent that it will lose international influence and its national interests will not be taken into account in the post-war reorganization of Europe. Thus, the Polish leadership believed that the external - western (Germany) and eastern (USSR) - threats to the independence and territorial integrity of Poland would disappear 1 .

In accordance with this concept, the activity of the military-political underground, which was created in Poland since the autumn of 1939, was determined to fight both against the Nazi occupation regime and against the Soviet power established on the territory of the former eastern Polish voivodeships that became part of the USSR in 1939 and 1940 d. Initially, the underground was required to gather strength, accumulate weapons, prepare for a general uprising, use weapons only for self-defense (“save blood”, “stand with a gun to your foot”), waiting for the liberation of the country and the destruction of the “last Bolshevik”. The activities of the underground were focused on sabotaging the orders of the German and Soviet authorities, sabotage and intelligence in favor of the Western ally - England. As one of the modern Polish historians admitted, until 1944 “armed struggle was not the main task of the Underground State. Its most important goal was to protect the Polish biological, cultural and economic substance...” 2 .

However, the course of hostilities and the situation in the international arena after the German attack on the USSR developed according to a different scenario. The USSR, like Poland, became a member of the Anti-Hitler Coalition 3 . A “Big Three” of leaders of countries (I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill) was formed, which actually made political decisions regarding the “small” allies. F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, under the pressure of events on the Soviet-German front, were forced to recognize the possibility of the Red Army to independently defeat the Wehrmacht in Europe, and behind Stalin - a key military-political place in the "Big Three". They could not but take into account the interests of the USSR, which he represented.

Such changes were reflected in the results of the conference of coalition leaders held in Tehran in November-December 1943. At that time, the close prospect of liberating the Soviet territories occupied by the Nazis and the possibility of the Red Army entering Poland became clear. Roosevelt and Churchill recognized that Poland would become a zone of military operations for the Red Army. This circumstance had a direct impact on the decisions taken on the Polish question. In Tehran, they agreed on the post-war territory of Poland in accordance with Soviet proposals (the Soviet-Polish border as of 1941, the Polish-German border along the Oder River, the addition of Polish territory at the expense of East Prussia) 4 .

All this foreshadowed the transition of Poland into the sphere of Soviet influence. Soon Churchill informed the head of the Polish government, St. Mikołajczyk, about the decisions taken, who, on the eve of his trip to Tehran, obtained from the British Prime Minister a promise not to discuss or make decisions about Poland "without Poland." However, this promise was not kept.

Changes on the Soviet-German front and in the policy of Poland's western allies entailed significant changes in the tactics of the Polish government. At the same time, the role of the internal factor - the military-political underground subordinated to the government - grew. The government and the command of the Craiova Army 5, whose partisan detachments began a “limited struggle” against the Nazis from mid-1943, developed action plans taking into account a fundamentally new military-political circumstance - the probable entry of Soviet troops (enemy No. 2) into the territory of pre-war Poland.

From the autumn of 1943, in accordance with the situation on the Soviet-German front, the tactics of specific military-political actions were refined. Through the joint efforts of the AK command in Warsaw and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander in London, several options for a plan for a large-scale armed operation called "Storm" ("Buzha") were developed. The political meaning of what was conceived was to turn underground civil and political structures into legal sovereign Polish power. To do this, before or during the offensive of the Soviet troops, the detachments of the Home Army, fighting the Nazis, had to get ahead of the Red Army, speaking to the "Soviets" as masters as cities and towns were liberated. A variant of an uprising against the Germans was envisaged, allowing to resolve the issue of power, and thereby prevent the Soviet "occupation" and exclude the possibility for the "councils", referring to the absence of the Polish administration, to recognize the power of "any figures in the service of the USSR". In addition, the AK command demanded "resolutely oppose" any attempts to include AK detachments in the Soviet units or Polish divisions fighting in the ranks of the Red Army 6 .

The AK command planned to carry out the “Storm” plan with AK detachments and divisions throughout the pre-war territory of the country, but primarily in Western Ukrainian, Western Belorussian lands and in the Vilna Territory, in order to prevent the restoration of Soviet orders here 7 . There was a calculation that from 52-57 thousand to 70-80 thousand people (excluding the rebels in Warsaw) would be able to take part in the "Storm" action.

The first attempt to start implementing the "Storm" plan was made on the Ukrainian sector of the Soviet-German front, where in early January 1944, units of the Red Army crossed the pre-war border with Poland. On January 15, the AK command ordered the implementation of the Storm plan to begin. The 27th Volyn division of the AK infantry, which numbered about 6.5 thousand fighters, began to execute the order in Volhynia. The division was supposed to, "as if ahead of the Soviet troops," take Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsky. The division came into contact with units of the Red Army 9 . The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, having received on March 23 a report from the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front on the joint actions of the Soviet troops and the AK division, considered the current situation and, by a directive on March 24, allowed military cooperation on the conditions of military-operational subordination of the Polish division to the Soviet command: “Dual power in the military fact cannot be. The division may have links with anyone, Sosnkovsky or anyone else, but in its actions it must obey the orders of the Red Army. But Polish "high politics" intervened. The AK command conditioned cooperation with the Red Army on the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the government in London on Polish terms, as well as the recognition of the independence of the AK detachments. Until the summer of 1944, there were no other serious attempts to implement the "Storm" plan 11 .

It is clear that the leadership of the USSR could not agree with the development of events according to the "Polish scenario" in the lands that they considered Soviet. On April 20, 1944, the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky was sent a directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220088 with an order to "sever all relations with the underground detachments of General Sosnkovsky." Polish partisans, and not only from the ranks of the AK, were offered to be at the disposal of the commander of the 1st Polish Army, "Comrade Berling", who fought as part of the Red Army, otherwise they were subject to disarmament and internment 12 .

In the spring of 1944, the Soviet leadership was faced with the question of the interaction of the Red Army with the Polish population when it entered the ethnic territory of Poland. The option of establishing a military administration here was not considered by the Soviet leadership, since the USSR did not conquer, but liberated the country from the Nazis. In parallel, two options were worked out for the emergence in Poland of a Polish government that was not hostile to the USSR. Firstly, the option of settling relations with the government of St. Mikolajczyk on the condition of changing its composition 13 and recognizing the Soviet-Polish border as of 1941 along the "Curzon Line" 14 . The leaders of Great Britain and the United States took this moment into account in their policies. Secondly, the possibility of creating an alternative government in Poland from leftist political forces, ready to accept the Soviet conditions for the settlement of interstate relations, was considered.

At the turn of 1943-1944. Polish communists and their few allies from the ranks of socialists and leaders of the peasant movement established a new body of representative power - the Craiova Rada Narodova (KRN). In May 1944, the KRN delegation arrived in Moscow, where, until mid-July 1944, it negotiated with leaders of the Union of Polish Patriots (SPP), a public organization of the Polish population in the USSR. JV Stalin held his first meeting with the KRN delegation on May 19, and then seven more conversations took place 15 . It was about creating an alternative center of executive power to the government underground, which could manage the Polish territories liberated by Soviet troops. At the same time, the Soviet ambassador to the governments of "small" countries in London, V.Z. Lebedev, repeatedly met with the head of the Rada Narodova (National Council) under the President of Poland S. Grabsky, but the conversations only confirmed the unwillingness of the London Poles to recognize Poland's eastern border along the "line Curzon" 16 .

Important for I.V. Stalin were reported by F. Roosevelt in a letter dated June 19 details of the visit of the Polish Prime Minister to the United States in June 1944. Roosevelt wrote that the Polish Prime Minister considers the coordination of the actions of the Soviet troops and the "organized Polish underground movement ... a military factor of the greatest importance" for the complete defeat of Germany and is ready to come to Moscow to discuss all difficult issues. On June 21, Stalin informed the president that "no later than a week later, the second round of the summer offensive of the Soviet troops will begin" and "130 divisions, including armored divisions, will take part in it." On June 24, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt: “If we have in mind the establishment of military cooperation between the Red Army and the forces of the Polish underground movement fighting against the Nazi invaders, then this, of course, is now an urgent matter for the final defeat of our common enemy” 17.

However, the Polish government in London did not accept the Soviet version of the settlement of political relations on the terms of a compromise agreed by the "Big Three" in Tehran on the territorial problems of post-war Poland, as well as the removal of a number of figures from the Mikolajczyk government, whose positions in Moscow were considered purely anti-Soviet 18. July 1944 became a decisive month for both the Soviet and Polish governments to make decisions on subsequent military-political actions.

The situation on the Soviet-German front, the positions of the Western allies, and the results of Mikolajczyk's visit to the United States were discussed at a meeting of the Polish government in London on 3 July. The Polish prime minister was not inclined to make radical concessions to Moscow, counting on the support of Polish interests by London and Washington. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General K. Sosnkovsky, recognized that Soviet troops would occupy the territory of Poland, and saw the need to concentrate the efforts of the AK on active sabotage operations against the Germans, insisted on refusing to prepare a general uprising: “... without honest and real cooperation with the Red Army, it was would be an act of desperation, from a military point of view" 19 .

On July 7, General K. Sosnkovsky brought his opinion to the commander of the AK, General T. Bur-Komorovsky: “Under the existing military-political conditions, an armed uprising of the people would not have been justified, not to mention the absence of physical chances for its success. However, theoretically it cannot be ruled out that conditions may still change, so one should keep in mind the beginning of the uprising. The general feared that the AK detachments, which ended up in the rear of the Soviet troops, would be disarmed and sent by force to the Berling army. Therefore, he suggested that the members of the Soviets "remain on the territory occupied by the Soviets and sit quietly until further orders are received" 20 .

On July 14, General Bur-Komorowski supported the Supreme Commander's assessment of the situation: "In the current state of German forces in Poland, a general uprising has no chance of success" and "will cost great sacrifices." The general admitted that "if the Soviet actions are not thwarted by the difficulties of providing the troops" with everything necessary, and the Germans do not organize counterattacks, then "the Soviets, I think, cannot be stopped." Further, the conclusion was made: "... depending on the situation, we [AK] are able to fight in one [the Storm plan] and in another [uprising] form separately, or in both forms at the same time, but in different territories" . This meant the still occupied by the Nazis and already liberated territories of pre-war Poland. Bur-Komorowski explained his conclusions by political expediency: although the uprising would be only an “armed demonstration”, “insignificant in terms of the results of an armed struggle” and would not lead to military successes, it was necessary to go for it: “By providing the Soviets with minimal military assistance, I will create for them, however , a political difficulty. AK emphasizes the will of the People for independence. This forces the Soviets to break our will and makes it difficult for them to destroy our aspirations. I am aware that our legalization may threaten to destroy the most ideological element in Poland, but the Soviets will not be able to carry out such destruction secretly and violence will occur, which may provoke protest from our friendly allies.

In other words, the AK command was preparing not to compromise with the USSR, but to oppose the Soviet intention to have a non-hostile Poland on its western border. It was ready for any sacrifice of the Polish people in the name of returning the government from exile and restoring the pre-war social order in the country, what Polish politicians called "the succession of power." The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which both the Soviet and Polish sides considered their own, as well as in the territory of the Lublin Voivodeship bordering the USSR, made the implementation of the Storm plan an urgent task for the AK command. In mid-July 1944, AK detachments tried to liberate first Vilna, then Lvov, and prevent the restoration of Soviet order there 22 .

These attempts by the AK to seize power by force in the territories that were de facto recognized by the allies as Soviet, forced the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to issue directive No. Immediately... disarm. ... In case of resistance ... to use armed force against them. It was ordered to send "selected" soldiers and officers of the AK to the army of General 3. Berling. Part of the officer corps of interest to the special services was transferred to the NKVD-NKGB and counterintelligence Smersh, respectively, and part was subject to internment in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR 23.

Approximately on the same days, St. Mikolajczyk informed British Prime Minister W. Churchill and Foreign Minister E. Eden about the order of the commander of the Home Army, which determined the final "readiness for an uprising for the period from July 17 to July 25 of this year." He asked to support the uprising with the actions of British combat aircraft, but he did not receive such a promise. At the same time (Doc. No. 38), the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General K. Sosnkovsky, repeatedly convinced the AK command of the senselessness of an armed uprising in the current military-political situation 24 .

The plan of the Polish ally of Great Britain alarmed W. Churchill, and he tried to organize negotiations between Mikolajczyk and the Soviet leadership. In a letter to Stalin dated July 20 to Stalin, Churchill hinted at the mass disarmament of the Akovites in the liberated territory of Soviet Belarus and Lithuania, stressed that he “avoided any statements” regarding Poland, and asked: “... if Mikolajczyk asks permission to come to you, I hope you will agree” (Doc. No. 5).

On July 21, General Bur-Komorovsky reported to Sosnkovsky's headquarters that the Germans had suffered a defeat on the Eastern Front and that the Soviet troops were rapidly moving forward. “I foresee that the movement of Soviet troops to the west in this sector without a large effective counteroffensive of the Germans will be quick, the troops will reach the Vistula, force it and move west ... The situation dictates us to be constantly and firmly ready for an uprising” and “when entering [ to Warsaw] Soviet troops must find it in Polish hands. On the same day, Bur-Komorovskii asked the "center" in London to transmit to the command of the regions and districts of the AK by radio an order and a "signal of readiness for a general uprising" from 00:01 on July 25, without stopping the execution of the "Storm" plan 25 ( document No. 10).

The political meaning and goals of the uprising Bur-Komorowski outlined in a dispatch in cipher on July 22 to the name of the Supreme High Command: eastern regions. It is necessary to understand this fact by all Polish political forces and, above all, by the leadership. Without a clear understanding of the current situation, it is impossible to achieve the mobilization of all Polish forces in a political campaign in which we have to fight Russia and emerge victorious from it ”with the support of the Anglo-Saxons. To achieve the set goals, the general urged: “Do not stop fighting Germany for a minute. Spiritually rally the whole society in the fight against Russia... In the event of an attempt to seize Poland, start an open struggle against the Soviets” 26 (Doc. No. 9).

The idea of ​​the uprising in Warsaw was discussed at a meeting between the commander of the AK, General Bur-Komorowski, his first deputy and the chief of the General Staff of the AK, General T. Pelczyński, as well as the first deputy chief of staff and the chief of the operational department of the Main Staff of the AK, General L. Okulicki 27 . The opinion of the three generals, whose formation was influenced by the fact that on July 20 the Bug was crossed by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, was unanimous: Warsaw must be liberated from the Nazi occupiers "by the combat effort of a Polish soldier" 28 . On July 22, the aforementioned decision of the AK commander to announce a signal of readiness for the start of the uprising was discussed by the “narrow” composition of the AK Main Staff. However, there was no unanimity of opinion here, various scenarios for the development of events were discussed, and it was decided whether to raise an uprising throughout the country or only in Warsaw. Boer-Komorowski argued that in the current military-operational situation it was impossible to stop the fight against Germany, but at the same time it was necessary to mobilize the spirit of the whole society for the fight against Russia. On the same day, he sent a directive to the commander of the Warsaw district of the AK to introduce from 00:01. On July 25, the state of readiness for an uprising in the capital (Doc. No. 10). The decision to uprising in Warsaw was taken by the AK command.

Between July 22 and 24, the commander of the AK received the consent of the Delegate (Commissioner) of the government J. Jankowski and the head of the underground parliament (REN) K. Puzhak for an uprising in Warsaw, about which the headquarters of the Supreme High Command in London was notified on July 25. At the same time, the government of Poland, although the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General K. Sosnkovsky (doc. No. 42) opposed such a decision, granted the command of the AK the right to determine the time of the start of the uprising against the Nazis in the capital. On July 26, in the AK command, "everyone was unanimous that the struggle for Warsaw was dictated by political considerations," but they recognized the extreme insufficiency of armament of the AK 29 detachments. The panic that prevailed among the Germans from 22 to 25 July, although it had already stopped by 27 July, also played a role in making this decision.

In those days when the decision on the uprising in Warsaw was being made at the General Headquarters of the AK Command, preparations were being completed in Moscow for the establishment, under the mandate of the Craiova Rada of the People (KRN), of an authority, an alternative to the Mikolajczyk government - the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKNO) 30 . On July 22, in the Polish city of Chelm, liberated by the Red Army, his Manifesto to the Polish people was distributed. On July 24, members of the PKNO arrived in Chelm and soon moved to the city of Lublin, which became the temporary capital of Poland.

In a letter sent to Churchill on July 23, Stalin said that the Soviet troops had liberated Lublin and “in this situation, we faced the practical question of administration on Polish territory. We do not want and will not create our own administration”, so as not to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. Announcing the establishment of contact with the Polish National Liberation Committee, "which was recently created by the National Council of Poland 32 in Warsaw", he agreed to receive Mikolajczyk, stipulating that "it would, however, be better if he turned to the Polish National Committee." On the same day, this message from Stalin to Churchill was sent to Roosevelt "for information" (Doc. No. 21). Thus, a new Polish political factor was introduced into the relations of the Big Three by Stalin. The latter meant that the Soviet interest in creating a coalition power in Poland by bringing Mikolajczyk and some people from his government into the PKNO had not yet disappeared.

On July 26, Mikolajczyk, whom Eden had convinced of the need for a trip to the USSR, from which the Polish Prime Minister did not expect the results he needed, flew out of London (Doc. No. 27). On the same day, Churchill sent a letter to Stalin, where he recognized the need to unite Poles friendly to Great Britain with Poles friendly to the USSR, and expressed regret over the emergence and recognition of various Polish authorities as allies (Doc. No. 30).

E.Osubka-Moravsky signed two Agreements with the USSR on the Soviet-Polish border along the "Curzon Line" and on relations between the Soviet command and the Polish administration, created by the PKNO. In accordance with the latest Agreement in the war zone in Poland, "all power and responsibility in all matters relating to the conduct of the war" was concentrated in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops. Thus began the "decoupling" of a deep territorial conflict in interstate relations between the USSR and Poland. The Soviet leadership could now deal with the friendly Polish authorities, and the command of the Red Army could avoid the establishment of the Soviet military administration on the liberated Polish territory, but at the same time ensure the security of the rear of the army on its own 33 .

On July 28, in response to Churchill's message, Stalin wrote about the "special importance" for the USSR of relations with "our neighbor" and expressed the hope that the creation of the PKNO would begin the unification of those different Poles whom Churchill had in mind. He expressed readiness to "mediate in reaching an agreement between them" (Doc. No. 39). Stalin made it clear that a further resolution of the Polish question was possible along the path he proposed, and was ready to make compromises.

Along with the political events around Poland, it is necessary to turn to the development of hostilities on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. The line of the Soviet-German front by June 1944 passed 240-600 km from Warsaw, and this city was not considered as a landmark for the actions of the Soviet troops. During Operation Bagration, Soviet troops were able to break through the defenses of the Wehrmacht in Belarus and defeat Army Group Center, defeating 48.6% of its formations. A 400-km gap was formed in the defense of the German troops, into which the Soviet troops rushed. The right-flank troops of the 1st Belorussian Front developed an offensive north of Polesye in the direction of Baranovichi, Brest.

Even during the preparation of Operation Bagration, it was assumed that the defeat of the German troops north of Pripyat would allow the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front to enter the flank and rear of the retreating enemy units and complete their defeat. Initially, according to the plan of operation approved on July 2, it was planned to defeat the Wehrmacht's Kovel grouping and capture Brest, after which the mobile formations were to develop an offensive either on Pruzhany, Slonim, or on Belsk, Bialystok, in order to encircle the remnants of Army Group Center in the western regions of Belarus . The combined arms armies were supposed to occupy and hold the front along the Siedlce-Lublin line.

However, the real situation required a change in the entire concept of the operation. On the night of July 5, the German command withdrew troops to the heights west of Kovel. Noticing this maneuver, the Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy and liberated Kovel on July 6. The Soviet command considered that if the enemy's withdrawal continued, a general offensive should be launched. During the pursuit, the Soviet command, not without the help of German intelligence, got the impression that the Wehrmacht was being withdrawn across the Western Bug River, but on July 8, units of the 11th Panzer Corps unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s prepared defenses and suffered heavy losses 34 . Therefore, the Soviet command decided to stop scattered attacks and prepare an operation to break through the front, which now passed along the line of the Pripyat, Ratno, Smidyn, Dolsk rivers, east of Verba.

Meanwhile, on July 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved a new version of the operation plan, which was brought to the troops on July 12 and 16 by orders of the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky. The troops of the left wing of the front were tasked with defeating the opposing enemy, forcing the Western Bug River on the 3-4th day of the operation and reaching the front of Ratno, Zalesye, Savin, Chelm, Dubenka. In the future, the troops should have developed the offensive in the northwestern and western directions, so that by the end of July the main forces would reach the Lukow-Lublin line. At the same time, it was planned to cover the enemy's Brest grouping from the south-west, preventing it from retreating to Warsaw. The troops of the right wing of the front were to strike from the southern regions of Western Belarus in the Warsaw direction, bypassing the Brest grouping from the north. In the future, formations of the 1st Belorussian Front were to advance to the rivers Narew and Vistula 35 .

The front concentrated its main efforts in the Lublin-Brest operation on the left wing, which included 36 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions (570,400 people, 9,954 guns and mortars, 1,748 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,465 aircraft). 9 infantry divisions and 3 assault gun brigades of the 8th Army and 56th Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army (about 111,600 people, 1,550 guns and mortars, 211 tanks and assault guns), the main forces of which were in the tactical defense zone (depth up to 15 km). The success of the upcoming offensive was facilitated by the fact that on the morning of July 13, formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which broke through the front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group, went on the offensive against Lviv.

The offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front began on the morning of July 18. Having broken through the enemy defenses, the troops of the 47th, 8th Guards 69th Armies on July 20-21 reached the Western Bug River on a wide front, crossed it on the move in three sectors and entered the territory of Poland, liberating the city of Chelm on July 22 . In the meantime, at 20:30 on July 21, with Directive No. 220149, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the commander of the front “no later than July 26-27 of this year. capture the city of Lublin” (document No. 7). Lublin was the center of the voivodship and a fairly large Polish city in the zone of action of the 1st Belorussian Front, where PKNO could be deployed. In addition, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the AK detachments in the Lublin region began to liberate small towns and villages, and it was necessary to prevent their seizure of power in the voivodship center 36 . Fulfilling the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 2nd Panzer Army, introduced into the breakthrough on July 22, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 8th Guards Army, liberated Lublin on July 23 and reached the river on July 25. Vistula near the cities of Deblin and Pulawy 37 .

Created on July 22, the Cavalry Mechanized Group of Lieutenant General V.V. Kryukova (2nd Guards Cavalry and 11th Tank Corps), developing an offensive to the northwest, on July 23 captured the cities of Parchev and Radzyn, on July 24 - the city of Lukow, and on the night of July 25 started a battle for the city of Siedlce. However, it turned out that the enemy, having received fresh reinforcements, was stubbornly holding the city. By the end of July 26, the armies of the right wing of the front fought out to the river. Western Bug, covering the Brest grouping of the enemy from the north and northwest. Troops of the 70th Army crossed the river south of Brest and bypassed the city from the southwest. Troops of the 61st Army approached him from the east.

The defeat of the Army Group Center, the successful Soviet offensive in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states, the Allied landing in Normandy and the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, created the hope of the Soviet command for an early defeat of the enemy. As early as July 19, the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K.

"one. The main strategic goal of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian fronts for the next stage should be: reaching the Vistula up to the Danzig Bay inclusive and capturing East Prussia or, in extreme cases, cutting off East Prussia from Central Germany simultaneously with reaching the Vistula.

East Prussia, in terms of the presence of fortified belts, engineering equipment and natural conditions, is a very serious obstacle. The approaches to Koenigsberg from the southeast and south are covered by five fortified bands, and from the east, in addition, to the west of Insterburg, a flood area has been prepared.

The most favorable directions for the offensive in East Prussia:

1st direction - from the Tilsit region along the coast in the general direction to Königsberg via Libots.

2nd direction - from the Kaunas - Alytus region through Gumbinen and Koenigsberg, bypassing the flood area and the Letzensky fortified region from the south.

In addition, a strong grouping must be thrown east of the Vistula in the general direction of Marienburg in order to cut off East Prussia from the Danzig region.

1st direction - a strike from the Tilsit region can be carried out only when Lithuania is cleared of the Germans.

The 2nd and 3rd directions can be used in the development of the offensive by the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts.

3. A strike through Gumbinen can be delivered by Chernyakhovsky, who, with part of his forces, should advance north of the Augustow forests through Suwalki to Goldap.

The blow from the Mlava area should be delivered by the 2nd Belorussian Front in the following directions:

a) one group per Allenstein;

b) one group to Marienburg for access to the Danzig Bay;

c) one group should go to the Vistula in the Grudzians - Neshava section, where they will gain a foothold.

To the left, to the border with the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 1st Belorussian Front should go out, while the front must definitely capture good bridgeheads on the western bank of the river. Wisla.

4. Enough troops will be enough for the 1st Belorussian Front to carry out the above tasks. He needs to add 300 tanks and 100 self-propelled guns.

The 2nd Belorussian Front will need one army of 9 divisions, one rifle corps - three divisions, two - three tank corps or a tank army, four heavy tank regiments, four regiments of self-propelled artillery - 152-mm and strengthen the front with aviation. In conclusion, Marshal Zhukov outlined proposals for dividing lines between the fronts.

Thus, the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that the formations of the defeated Army Group Center would not be able to offer serious resistance to the troops of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, which would soon be able to liberate Eastern and North-Eastern Poland. More complex and difficult seemed to him the operation against East Prussia, which, apparently, was to become the main one in the western direction in the autumn of 1944.

On July 27, a meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was held in Moscow to discuss the current strategic situation on the Soviet-German front. The successful offensive of the Red Army on the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians made it possible to assess the situation as a whole optimistically. It was assumed that soon it would be possible to liberate Central and Southern Poland, and in the future to cut off German troops in the Baltic from East Prussia, and East Prussia itself from Germany. As for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, although its right-flank formations lagged behind the left-flank ones by 200-250 km, and the rear fell behind, it was considered possible to continue the offensive into the central regions of Poland 39 .

An overestimation of the successes of the Soviet troops and an underestimation of the enemy’s combat capabilities led to the fact that at 24 hours on July 27, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by its directive No. 220162, set the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front the task of reaching the central regions of Poland (doc. No. 34). It was on July 27 that Warsaw first appeared in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command as a guide for the advancing troops of the Red Army. The main efforts of the troops were aimed at bypassing Warsaw from the north and south, since the presence of Wehrmacht fortifications on the outskirts of the city was assumed. On the eastern bank of the Vistula, Soviet troops were to occupy only Prague, but not try to storm the Polish capital. Actually, the Soviet leadership at that moment had no doubts about the feasibility of this plan. Of course, this was the result of an overly optimistic assessment of the situation at the front.

The German command tried with all its might to stop the offensive of the Red Army in Western Belarus, to maintain the front on the approaches to the eastern borders of Germany and, above all, to hold the lines of the Narew and Vistula rivers. For this, units from other fronts and from Germany were transferred to the central sector of the Soviet-German front. So, in the period from June 23 to July 16, 20 divisions (including 4 tank divisions), 4 brigades and 19 separate regiments were sent to Belarus. In the second half, another 16 divisions were sent there (including 4 tank divisions), 2 brigades and 3 separate regiments. On July 23, the new chief of the general staff of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, Colonel-General G. Guderian, ordered to keep the line pp. by all means. Vistula and San, because "otherwise you can gradually roll back to the Oder and the Elbe." An important role was assigned to the retention of Warsaw - this center of communications and a possible place for crossing the Vistula with large masses of troops in the event that the Red Army captured entire bridges in the city 41 . Therefore, on the same day, the command of Army Group Center decided to concentrate the main tank grouping on the outskirts of Warsaw. The German command regarded the offensive of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front as the most serious threat to holding the line of the river. The Vistula from Warsaw to Pulaw on July 24 was introduced by the 9th Army, to which all the troops arriving in this sector were subordinate.

Meanwhile, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front on July 26 ordered to speed up the advance of troops on the left flank. From the 1st Polish Army it was required “from the morning of 26.7.44 to continue moving in the general direction of Kuruw, Demblin with the task - on 28.7.44 to reach the line of the Vistula River in the area: Rytsice (1 km from [north] -z [west] Demblin), Vlastovice (2 km south of [her] Pulawy) ... Commander of the 8th Guards. A: with the release of the 1st PA on the river. Vistula 4th Guards. ck to withdraw into the strip of his army. To the commander of the 69th A: to continue the offensive in the general direction of Wojciechow, Karchlinska with the task of 26.7.44 to reach the line of the river. Vistula in the section: excluding Vlastovice, excluding Józefów” 43 . On July 27, on the left flank of the front, the 47th Army reached the line of Miedzyzhets, Lukow, the 8th Guards Army - west of Lukow, Demblin, the advanced units of the 69th Army approached the Vistula. Approached 27 rifle formations of the 8th Guards and 69th armies began crossing the river. Introduced into battle on July 28 at the junction of the 8th Guards and 69th Armies, the 1st Polish Army also approached the Vistula in the area of ​​​​Demblin, where it was supposed to take its sector from the 2nd Tank Army.

On the right wing of the front, during July 28, the troops of the 28th, 70th armies and the guards rifle corps of the 61st army occupied Brest and the next day in the forests to the west of it completed the defeat of up to 4 enemy divisions. After that, on July 30, the 61st and 70th armies were withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. By the end of July 28, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, having met stubborn resistance from the 2nd German Army reinforced with reserves at the turn south of Lositse, Siedlce, Garvolin, were forced to turn their front to the north. By this time, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front had reached the line of the Vistula River, Garvolin, Kolbel, Kalushin, Siedlce, Byala Podlyaska, r. Kshna, r. Western Bug, Bielsk-Podlaski.

On July 30, in pursuance of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220166 of July 29 on accelerating the crossing of the Vistula River 44 , Marshal Rokossovsky, commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, ordered to pull up the main crossing facilities to the river and ensure the crossing of the 69th, 1st Polish and 8th and Guards armies. It was necessary to work out plans for forcing the river and “bring to the attention of commanders of all degrees that the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in forcing the river. Vistula, will be presented for special awards with orders up to the awarding of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union" 45 . July 29 - August 2, the troops of the 69th Army managed to capture a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. The Vistula near Pulawy, and on August 1-4 the 8th Guards Army - near Magnushev, where fierce battles unfolded 46 .

Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Army, having gained the opportunity to maneuver, continued its offensive along the river. Vistula to the northwest, hoping to bypass Warsaw from the northeast and go to the river. Narew at Serock. By the evening of July 30, Soviet tank units occupied Otwotzk, Volomin and Radzymin, thereby cutting off the escape routes of the German troops defending in the Siedlce and Minsk-Mazowiecki areas. The advanced units of the 3rd Panzer Corps were 3-4 km from the bridge over the Narew River near Zagrob (doc. No. 44).

However, the general situation on the outskirts of Warsaw turned out to be quite difficult. Formations of the 2nd German Army organized a defensive line along the Siedlce-Biala-Poddyaska line, which the Soviet troops encountered on July 27. Taking advantage of the slowdown in the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, the enemy was able to launch a counterattack on the formations of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Siedlce area. All this led to the fact that the flanks of the 2nd Soviet tank army were open. Under these conditions, the German command, having received fresh formations and correctly assessed the intentions of the Soviet tankers to reach the lower reaches of the river. Narew, created an impressive grouping near Warsaw consisting of 5 tank and 2 infantry divisions with a total number of 51.5 thousand people, 1158 guns and mortars and 600 tanks and assault guns. The 2nd Panzer Army, weakened by a two-week offensive and experiencing interruptions in the supply of fuel and ammunition, totaled only 32 thousand people, 468 guns and mortars and 425 tanks and self-propelled guns 47 .

6th Air Army, interacting with the troops of the left wing

1st Belorussian Front, had not yet managed to relocate aircraft to new airfields closer to the front line and also experienced difficulties with the delivery of fuel. Thus, on July 29, in the presence of almost 1,400 aircraft, only 95 sorties were made, and on July 30, 232 sorties for operations on different sectors of the front 48 . Thus, the situation of the 2nd Soviet Tank Army, deprived of the support of infantry units and air cover, should be considered very serious. It is clear that under these conditions there could be no question of any further offensive.

On July 30, the command of the 2nd Panzer Army reported to the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front about the presence of the Warsaw fortified area, the situation on the army front, and plans for further operations. At the same time, a request was made to strengthen cooperation with aviation and accelerate the supply of fuel and lubricants, and it was reported: "I'm starting to run out of steam." This report contains Rokossovsky’s resolution: “The army should act according to the situation, avoid assaulting fortified areas and long-term defensive structures” (doc. No. 44).

However, the command of the 2nd Panzer Army found out that the situation had changed only on the morning of July 31, when an enemy counterattack hit the army formations from three sides. Parachute Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and the 19th Panzer Division from Prague, the 4th Panzer Division from the north, and the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Dead Head" attacked from the east Soviet troops, which were under the threat of encirclement. The importance of this operation for the German command is evidenced by the personal leadership of the counterattack by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal V. Modeli. In this situation, already at 4.10 am on August 1, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army will receive an order to go on the defensive (doc. No. 49).

The enemy increased the force of strikes against units of the 2nd Panzer Army (dock No. 46). It was the cannonade of these battles, which was heard in Warsaw, that prompted the AK command to decide to start the uprising at 5 p.m. on August 1, since it mistakenly believed that the Red Army could enter Prague any day and that it was necessary to liberate the Polish capital before approaching. In turn, the German command in Warsaw believed that the Wehrmacht formations concentrated on the outskirts of the city would be able to "detain the Russians for a long time" 49 .

By the end of August 2, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the line west of Surazh, Tsekhanovets, north of Kalushin, Radzymin, east of Prague, further south along the Vistula and continued fighting to expand the bridgehead on its western bank.

During the fighting on August 1, units of the 19th Panzer Division and the parachute-tank division "Hermann Goering" threw back the left-flank units of the 3rd Soviet Panzer Corps east to Radzymin, and at 19.15 of the same day, units of the 19th Panzer Division and the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" united in the Okunev area, closing the encirclement around the 3rd Soviet Panzer Corps. On August 2 and 3, Wehrmacht units continued to compress the encirclement front of the 3rd Panzer Corps and again occupied Radzymin and Volomin (see Diagram 50). On August 3, on the report of the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army about intense defensive battles, the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front imposed a resolution according to which the army should have "the main task is not to allow the enemy to the south and southeast" (doc. No. 57). Thus, at that moment the front commander saw the main danger in the breakthrough of the enemy troops to the rear of the Soviet troops deployed along the Vistula and fighting for bridgeheads on its western bank.

At that moment, the situation was so unclear to the highest Soviet headquarters that, for example, in the morning operational report No. 215 of the General Staff of the Red Army of August 2, the 2nd Tank Army was not mentioned at all. On August 4, Wehrmacht formations completed the defeat of the encircled Soviet units in the area southeast of Volomin and continued to attack the front of the 2nd Panzer Army. The intensity of these battles is clearly visible from the report of the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army dated August 5 (Doc. No. 70). The operational reports of the General Staff for August 3-7 show that the troops of the 2nd Tank Army fought stubborn battles with the attacking enemy units, at first slowly retreating to the southeast, and then holding on to their lines (doc. No. 46).

During these battles, units of the 2nd Panzer Army lost 409 people killed, 390 missing and 1271 wounded, which amounted to 48.3% of losses for the entire period from July 20 to August 8. On August 8, the tank army handed over the front line to the formations of the 47th Army and was withdrawn from the battle. At that moment, it had only 27 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns out of 810 available by 18 July. That is, the total losses in armored vehicles amounted to 779 units (92.7%), and 394 tanks and self-propelled guns (50.6%), of which 244 were irretrievably lost (61.9%), were lost in the battles of July 31 - August 853. As a result, the enemy eliminated the threat of Soviet troops entering the rear of the Wehrmacht formations fighting east of Warsaw along the Siedlce, Minsk-Mazowiecki line, which, in turn, created the danger of a Wehrmacht counterattack south to the rear of the Soviet troops that had reached the Vistula. This was the moment when the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front simply did not have the reserves to repel this blow. Nevertheless, the troops of the 2nd Panzer and 47th Armies managed to hold the front.

The Soviet command did not immediately appreciate the gravity of the situation. Only on August 6, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, First Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, reported to Moscow: “1. A strong enemy grouping is operating in the Sokolów-Podlaski sector, Ogrudek (10 km north of Kalushyn), Stanislavow, Volomin, Prague. 2. We did not have enough forces to defeat this enemy grouping. They asked for permission to bring into battle the 70th Army, which had previously been withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and to give three days to prepare the operation. "Earlier than August 10, it is not possible to go on the offensive due to the fact that before that time we do not have time to deliver the minimum required amount of ammunition" 54 . However, this did not help either. Then the Soviet command proposed to prepare a new operation to occupy Warsaw. Already on August 8, Zhukov and Rokossovsky reported to I.V. Stalin their thoughts on her plan (doc. No. 82).

However, under the circumstances, it was impossible to carry out this plan. Firstly, at this time, German troops attacked the Soviet units on the bridgeheads west of the Vistula. In the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front on August 14, the Wehrmacht attacked the Pulawski and Magnushevsky bridgeheads. Only after repelling the enemy's blows did the Soviet troops themselves launch a series of attacks in the second half of August, seeking to expand their bridgeheads. Meanwhile, on July 29-31, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula in the Sandomierz area. On the morning of August 2, German troops launched a counterattack on the eastern bank of the Vistula in order to cut off the bridgehead from the main forces. Having repulsed these attacks, on August 14, Soviet troops launched an offensive to expand the bridgehead and surrounded the 42nd Army Corps of the Wehrmacht near Sandomierz, but on August 19-21 the enemy managed to release it. On August 23-24 and 26-28, the Wehrmacht launched new attacks against the bridgehead. As a result, the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the direction of Radom did not take place 55 .

Secondly, the increased density of the defense of the Wehrmacht on the outskirts of Prague and the middle course of the Narew River did not allow the Soviet troops to complete their tasks. Only on August 26 and 27 did the Red Army cross the lower reaches of the river. Western Bug and began to move towards the Narew. However, these battles showed that the offensive capabilities of the 1st Belorussian Front had dried up. In this situation, the Soviet command refused to conduct the Warsaw operation. At 2 am on August 29, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, with its directive No. 220196, demanded that the command of the l-th Belorussian Front go over to a tough defense at the turn of the Vistula River and hold all bridgeheads on its western bank. “The right wing to continue the offensive with the task of reaching the river by 4-5.9. Narew to the mouth and capture bridgeheads on the western coast in the area of ​​Pultusk, Serotsk, and then also move on to a tough defense ”(doc. No. 177). Directives on the transition to defense were also received by the troops of the 1st, 4th Ukrainian, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

The change in the military-operational situation near Warsaw in the last days of July 1944 caused alarm at the headquarters of the AK command. On July 31, at a morning meeting of the AK headquarters, taking into account intelligence information, Bur-Komorovsky postponed an armed uprising in the city. But already at about 18:00 on July 31, after receiving turned out to be unreliable information about Soviet tanks in Prague, almost a day and a half after the start of a powerful German counterattack on the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, and under pressure from Generals Okulitzky and Pelchinsky, the main headquarters was guided by "political considerations", appointed the beginning of the restoration at 17.00 on August 1. With fleeting (2-3 days) military operations, the headquarters hoped to oust the Germans from Warsaw and thereby resolve the issue of Poland's power 56 .

On the morning of August 1, a part of the generals and officers of the General Staff 57 gathered in the Wola district of Warsaw. On the night of August 1-2, Government Delegate Ya. Jankowski and General T. Bur-Komorowski sent a short dispatch to St. Mikolajczyk and General K. Sosnkovsky in London: “The time for the start of the struggle for capturing the capital was set for August 1, 17.00. The fighting began”, on August 2, the commander of the AK informed the commanders of the districts of the AK about the uprising in Warsaw and ordered: “The rest are performing the “Storm”” 58 . However, the AK leadership in Warsaw misjudged the intentions of the Soviet troops. It was assumed that it was the Polish capital that was the main goal of the offensive of the Red Army. As shown above, this was not the case at all. The leaders of the uprising made the whole bet on the quick success of the Soviet troops and the relatively quick retreat of the Wehrmacht from the city.

However, on the eve of the uprising, the situation on the Soviet-German front in the Warsaw region changed in favor of the German troops. The troops of the 2nd Panzer Army of the Red Army, advancing to the lower reaches of the river. Narew northeast of Warsaw five hours before the uprising were forced to go on the defensive. Later, under the blows of the enemy, the Soviet troops had to retreat to the south-east 59 (Doc. No. 49). The AK command did not foresee such a development of events.

In addition to the decisive, but not taken into account, military-operational circumstances unfavorable for the success of the insurgents, foreign policy circumstances also turned out to be difficult. Recall that in mid-July 1944, the British allied to the Polish government did not approve of the intentions of the Poles to raise an uprising in Warsaw without coordinating actions with the Soviet side. On July 28, the British government refused to help the rebels with the supply of weapons, raids on airfields near the city, and the landing of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade from the western front into Warsaw.

The AK command was unable to ensure the suddenness of the uprising, since the Germans, having agents in the Polish underground, monitored the situation in the city. For several days they received secret reports about the preparation of the uprising: “27 / VII - the uprising will begin. 30/VII - no, nothing will be done. 31/VII - alarm level 3, will start within 40 hours. 1/VIII - approximately at 15.30 - will start today" (Doc. No. 407). Based on these data at 16:30. an alarm was announced in the German garrison in Warsaw.

In addition, the AK command failed to mobilize all the forces at its disposal for the fight. A significant part of the detachments remained in the Soviet rear, where by August 1, many of them were disarmed by the Soviet military authorities. Part of the AK units operated in the German rear. In total, on the western bank of the Vistula, in combat detachments of the AK, according to various sources, there were from 16 to 22 thousand people. There were more than 4,000 fighters of a number of military organizations in the district who were not subordinate to the command of the AK, including armed groups created by communists and left socialists. According to Polish historians, the numerical ratio of Polish and German forces in Warsaw on the eve of the uprising was approximately equal. The commander of the German garrison, General R. Stagel, had 16 thousand soldiers on the western and 4 thousand on the eastern banks of the Vistula and up to 50 thousand soldiers in reserve. Shortly after the uprising began, a police corps formation led by General E. von dem Bach-Zelevsky was concentrated in the city, and a number of national collaborationist units created from former Soviet prisoners of war were introduced.

It was essential for the development of the situation in the city that the Wehrmacht had a plan for the defense of Warsaw both in the event of an attack by the Soviet troops and in the event of an uprising of the Poles. The German command had no intention of surrendering the Warsaw Fortified Region, because in the event the Germans lost a strategically key city, the path to central Europe, Berlin and East Prussia became open for the Red Army.

Fundamental was the difference in the provision of weapons of the German and Polish sides. The Nazis did not suffer from the lack of weapons, the garrison was completed, armed and soon reinforced with artillery, tanks and air support. Armament was the weakest side of the rebels. Before the uprising began, no more than 10-12% of its participants had weapons, and there was an acute shortage of ammunition, which could be enough for 2-3 days of fighting 64 .

The uprising was led by the commander of the AK, General T. Bur-Komorovsky, and the commander of the Warsaw District, Colonel A. Khrushchel, who soon received the rank of general. The uprising was started, according to various sources, from 1.5 to 3.5 thousand people, they were joined by members of other armed organizations and groups, including the communist Army of the People (AL) and detachments of the Polish Army of the People (PAL) of the left socialists. The rebels were enthusiastically supported by part of the population of the city. The ranks of those who fought grew to 15 thousand people, however, poorly armed.

Nevertheless, the performance in Warsaw took on a nationwide character. The first days turned out to be successful for the rebels, the uprising covered a significant part of the city. However, they failed to capture the bridges across the Vistula and block the Germans from delivering weapons and replenishing personnel.

Already on the second day of the struggle, the rebels met with strong resistance from the enemy, who on August 5 went on the offensive, cutting the territory of the city occupied by them into separate sections, using tanks, artillery and aircraft. In the first days of August, an uprising was crushed on the right bank of the Vistula - in Prague. On August 11, the centers of the uprising fell in large areas of the capital - Volya and Okhota, by August 12, the invaders controlled almost 3/4 of the city's territory. On August 17, the Germans broke the resistance of the rebels in the Stare Miasto region. The rebels found themselves in a difficult situation due to the lack of weapons, medicines, water and food. The fighting of the Nazis was accompanied by massive punitive operations against the civilian population and the methodical destruction of the city. However, the defenders of Śródmieście (the center of the city), Mokotov, Zoliborz and Kampinoska Puscha, where the Allied planes dropped grout for the insurgents, continued to fight 66 .

How realistic were the calculations of Polish politicians for the success of the uprising, bearing in mind the state of Polish "affairs" in the leadership of the Anti-Hitler coalition? As early as mid-August 1944, the leadership of the uprising in Warsaw and "Polish" London realized that the military success of the uprising was problematic, which means that the main goal - the political victory of its organizers 67 - would not be achieved, and rather quickly decided on the "main culprit" of the upcoming defeat. Dispatches were sent to the government and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief from Warsaw informing about "silence" on the Soviet front, about the "conscious stop" of the Soviet offensive, and the "demonstrative" cessation of all hostilities by the Soviet command. Such information was supposed to explain the failure of the rebels by the "insidious" actions of the Soviet troops near Warsaw, the political malice of the "Soviets" to destroy the uprising and destroy the AK, and at the same time gloss over the question of the erroneous decision on the place and time of the uprising and the military-political failure of the plan to prevent political influence USSR in Poland 68 (Doc. No. 197).

As shown above, the assessments of the leadership of the uprising of the state of affairs on the Soviet-German front near Warsaw were either a conscientious error or a malicious distortion of the truth. Actually, the uprising did not correlate with the immediate military-operational plans of the Soviet command, whose main attention in August-October 1944 was turned to the then strategically priority northwestern (Baltic) and southwestern (Balkans) operational areas. Soviet troops entered Romania and Bulgaria, which broke the alliance with Germany and went over to the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition. The Red Army advanced towards the Yugoslav and Hungarian borders.

At the turn of July-August 1944, relations between the USSR and the PKN were taking shape and the Soviet leadership was “working through” the possibility of creating a full-fledged coalition government of Poland on its basis in such a way as to minimize difficulties in relations with Roosevelt and Churchill. Therefore, Stalin agreed to receive the Prime Minister of the Government of Poland, St. Mikolajczyk, who arrived in Moscow on July 30, was received by V.M. Molotov on July 31, and twice, on August 3 and 9, talked with I.V. Stalin.

Uncertain information about the plan for an armed uprising in the capital was first reported by the Prime Minister at a meeting with Molotov, saying that "the Polish government was considering a plan for a general uprising in Warsaw and wanted to ask the Soviet government to bombard airfields near Warsaw." Molotov did not attach any importance to these words, stating in response that “only about ten kilometers remained to Warsaw” (doc. No. 47). In Moscow, agreeing to Mikolajczyk's visit, they planned to discuss with him the central issue - the creation of a coalition government based on the PKNO with the participation of individual politicians from the Polish government. On August 2, Stalin, on the eve of his meeting with Mikolajczyk, wrote to Roosevelt that everything depended "on the ability of certain persons from the Polish government in exile to cooperate with the PKNO, already operating in Poland." The leader of the USSR made it clear to the President of the United States that further resolution of the Polish question was possible along the path proposed by the Soviet side, which was ready to make compromises, "providing all Poles possible assistance in this matter" 69 . True, Stalin kept silent about the fact that on August 1 he de facto recognized the PKNO.

As for the position of the Western allies regarding the uprising in Warsaw, then, as noted earlier, the British did not support the plan of the Poles, fearing complications in relations with the USSR. Moscow, on the other hand, was not warned about the uprising in advance. According to Molotov, information “about the risky venture of August 1” arrived in the Soviet capital from the Reuters agency on August 2, and at the same time the British sent a request from Warsaw “for the Russians to help us with an immediate attack from outside” 70 . This was the first and only, until the last days of September 1944, the Polish request for the storming of the city by Soviet troops, which alone could save the rebels.

On August 3, Mikolajczyk, for whom the question of a new coalition government in Poland was not the main point of the trip to Moscow, actually outlined to the Soviet leader the political plan of the organizers of the uprising. Mikołajczyk admitted, firstly, that "I would like to ask Marshal Stalin to instruct the Soviet troops to assist the internal Polish army so that it can continue its struggle against the Germans." Secondly, reacting to the fact of the creation of the PKNO, the prime minister “would like to say in this connection that when the Soviet troops enter Warsaw, the deputy prime minister of the Polish government and the commandant of the underground army, who deal with administration issues in Poland, will come to them,” and expressed confidence that "the Soviet authorities will not cause any harm to these persons" 71 . Thirdly, Mikołajczyk firmly stated that “he wants to be in Warsaw”, and to Stalin’s remark “that the Germans have Warsaw”, he replied: “as he thinks, Warsaw will soon be liberated, and he will be able to create a new government there, based against all the forces of Poland” (Doc. No. 54). This statement was fundamentally important for Stalin, because it concerned Polish intentions to resolve the issue of power in the country, preventing the participation of the USSR and representatives of the PKNO in this.

Therefore, the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the unexpected uprising in Warsaw from the very beginning turned out to be wary. In a letter to Churchill on August 5, Stalin expressed confidence that "the information of the Poles [about the successes of the rebels] is greatly exaggerated and does not inspire confidence", expressed doubts about the ability of the AK to drive the Germans out of the city and "take Warsaw, for the defense of which the Germans put up four tank divisions, in including the division “Hermann Goering” ”(doc. No. 67). But, in response to Mikolajczyk's request for arms assistance during the second meeting on August 9, Stalin promised to do "everything possible" and send a Soviet liaison officer to Warsaw (Doc. No. 88).

Starting from the first days of the uprising, the Polish leadership demanded help from the Western allies. So, on August 3, Polish President V. Rachkevich addressed a letter to W. Churchill, in which he said: “Warsaw has been fighting for two days already. An indispensable condition for saving the city is the dropping of a large amount of weapons and ammunition tonight at the indicated points. Weapons and ammunition are prepared at bases in Italy. Without this immediate assistance, our forces fighting in Warsaw will face defeat and the population will face the threat of mass destruction even before the Soviet troops are able to reach Warsaw.”

Assistance from the government of Poland was demanded by the command of the AK and the political leadership of the uprising in Warsaw (Doc. No. 62). On August 5, the President of Poland asked Churchill for help (doc. No. 68), and the ministers of the Polish government petitioned the British Foreign Office for the same. However, there has been no significant help so far. On August 7 in Warsaw, “the complete isolation of our uprising in the Anglo-Saxon camp” was stated (doc. No. 78).

The British Prime Minister was compelled to promise support, but increasingly refused to demand regular drops of weapons, referring to the fact that the Polish and British (South African) Allied aircraft crews were facing long and dangerous expeditions from bases in Italy. The pilots could not guarantee the accuracy of the cargo hit, since they could be dropped from a height of 4.5-5 km. Flights were often delayed due to adverse weather conditions. The British leadership agreed to send its military mission to the fighting Warsaw and grant the AK and its soldiers the international status of combatants in the fight against Germany.

Irregularly performed flights caused misunderstanding in the Polish military command in London and irritation in the military-political leadership of the uprising in Warsaw. On August 8, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General K. Sosnkovsky, wrote to Bur-Komorovsky that he "applies his will and energy to break the passivity of the allies." Noting the "great resistance" of the allies, the general expressed the hope "although in part to convince them, especially on the issue of dropping weapons." August 9 The government delegate in Warsaw J. Jankowski and the head of the underground parliament (REN) K. Puzhak in a letter to President V. Rachkevich continued to categorically demand "immediate, significant and quick" drops of weapons, bombing and landing in the city of the Polish parachute brigade. On August 10, Yankovsky wrote to the President of the country: “We only once received a small drop [of weapons] from you. There has been silence on the Soviet-German front since the 3rd. We do not have any material or moral assistance... from you we have not even received proper recognition of our actions... [the rebels] feel deceived, they start to grumble." On that day, Sosnkowski wrote to Warsaw: “We are tirelessly making efforts to organize assistance for you,” but he warned that “we have no right to reassure you, we cannot vouch for anything” (Doc. No. 113). On August 11, they reported from the city: “There are no discharges, no promises of them, no help. We are dealing with a mockery of our people unheard of in history.” On the territory of the Old Town surrounded by the Nazis, its "non-defenders received not a single drop due to the actions of the German air defense" 72 . On August 12, the military-political leadership of the uprising in Warsaw appealed to Roosevelt and Churchill for help (Doc. No. 110).

In this difficult situation, the Western allies of Poland tried to enlist Stalin to help the rebellious city. On August 3, the British military mission forwarded an appeal on this issue to the Poles from Warsaw, who asked to storm the city by Soviet troops (Doc. No. 53). On August 4, Churchill wrote that the Poles were "asking for Russian help, which seems very close." The British Ambassador to the USSR, A. Clark Kerr, addressed Molotov with the same request that day (Doc. No. 59). On August 8, answering Churchill, Stalin pointed out that Mikolajczyk "has unsatisfactory information about affairs in Poland." He reported on Mikolajczyk's meetings with the leaders of the KRN and the PKNO, detailed the disagreements that hinder agreements between the "London" and "Lublin" Poles, and admitted that the meetings "have not yet led to the desired results", but "still had a positive effect ... Let's hope that things will go better in the future” 73 .

By August 9, the military-operational situation of the rebels had noticeably deteriorated. Therefore, in another conversation with Stalin, Mikolajczyk petitioned for assistance to Warsaw by dropping weapons. "The Poles need arms in order to hold out." Stalin defined “starting with an uprising ... an unrealistic thing,” since “the Germans only in the Prague region have three tank divisions, not counting the infantry. I just feel sorry for these Poles.” At the same time, he promised to help with weapons and noted: “Soviet troops, of course, will overcome the resistance of the Germans and take Warsaw, but this will take time” (doc. No. 88). Mikołajczyk did not ask for an assault on the city, which fully corresponded to the tactics of the AK command - to hold out at any cost until the moment when it becomes possible to expel the Nazis from the city on their own 74 . The storming of the city by Soviet troops did not guarantee the AK the main thing - the return of the government from exile and a geopolitical victory in the "fight" with the "Soviets".

The main political issues of discussion in the Kremlin on August 9 were the issue of the border and the creation of a new government. Mikolajczyk did not accept the Soviet proposal (Poland's renunciation of possession of the eastern kreses to be compensated by territorial increments at the expense of Germany) in terms of the loss of kreses. The second proposal of Stalin on the creation of a new coalition government of Poland, which the prime minister discussed on August 6 and 7 with the leaders of the KRN (B. Bierut), PKNO (E. Osubka-Moravsky) who arrived in Moscow, and on August 8 in the same composition with V. M. Molotov , was also not accepted 75 . Mikolajczyk refused to accept the post of Prime Minister of the new government in Lublin offered to him. Probably, counting on the allies, he still had hope for the military-political success of the uprising and for the PKWN to be ousted from the political process in Poland 76 .

Taking into account Stalin's promise of help to Mikolajczyk during the conversation on August 9, the British hastily, on August 10, provided the coordinates for the reception of the Soviet officer in Warsaw 77 . On August 11-12, the British ambassador in Moscow conveyed to the Soviet side those calls for help that came from Warsaw to London. On the same day, Churchill informed Stalin that the Poles “begged for machine guns and ammunition. Can you give them some more help, since the distance from Italy is very great” (Doc. No. 116). On August 13, Mikolajczyk turned to Stalin with a request for help in the uprising in Warsaw (Doc. No. 117).

For US President F.D. Roosevelt, the Polish problems of the summer-autumn of 1944 were not a priority. American politicians, referring to the fact that "Warsaw is in the sphere of military-tactical actions of Russia and without its consent they cannot do anything", made their position towards Poland dependent on the agreements between the Polish government and the USSR on the issue of the border and the restoration of diplomatic relations. relations 78 .

In turn, for Stalin, American participation in resolving the Polish "question" was extremely important, but not so much in relation to the Warsaw Uprising, but in giving legitimacy to the PKNO. In Moscow, they tried to acquire at least an indirect American consent to its existence. For this purpose, the option of using the figure of O. Lange, a Polish socialist, a well-known professor of economics at the University of Chicago, who visited the USSR and repeatedly talked with Stalin in the spring of 1944, was worked out. Lange accepted the Soviet version of the settlement of Soviet-Polish contradictions and in June 1944 acted as an intermediary in organization of contact between Moscow and Mikolajczyk 79 .

On August 8, the leadership of the PKNO, hardly on its own initiative, turned to the American president with a request to allow the American citizen O. Lange to travel to Poland so that he could join the PKNO and head the Department of Foreign Affairs, if necessary, cancel the status of a US citizen 80 .

On August 9, in a message to Roosevelt, Stalin informed the American president about meetings with the Polish prime minister in Moscow, dwelling in detail on the latter’s conversations with representatives of the PKNO, and concluded that “both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk express a desire to work together and look for practical solutions in this direction. opportunities” (Doc. No. 89). The political meaning of the information contained in the message was concluded in its last paragraph, where Stalin supported the request of the PCWL for Lang and expressed the hope that the President would not refuse "the necessary support in this matter, which is of such great importance for the cause of the Allies" 81 .

Roosevelt's reply was received in Moscow on August 12. He was sharp enough. After stipulating that “You understand, I am sure that it is difficult for the United States Government at this stage [a reference to the upcoming US presidential election] to take formal action against Lange. As a private person, he, of course, has, according to the law, every right to do what he considers right,” Roosevelt actually denied Stalin his request: “... in the present situation, and especially until the end of negotiations between Premier Mikolajczyk, the Government whom we still continue to officially recognize, and the Polish Committee, the Government of the United States does not wish to be involved in the matter of the Polish Committee's request that Professor Lange join it as head of the foreign affairs department, to express any opinion in regard to this request." 82 The Soviet side probably regarded such a refusal as a violation of Soviet-American cooperation. But just recently, the US President assured that "he does not intend to impose his opinion in any way on issues that are of special importance for Stalin and his country" 83 .

Moscow's reaction was the TASS Statement published on August 13, which formulated the USSR's harsh opinion about the uprising in Warsaw: the latter did not provide them with adequate assistance. TASS is authorized to declare that these statements and allusions in the foreign press are either the fruit of a misunderstanding or a manifestation of slander against the Soviet command. TASS knows that the Polish London circles responsible for what is happening in Warsaw made no previous attempts to notify and coordinate with the Soviet military command any demonstrations in Warsaw. In view of this, the responsibility for what is happening in Warsaw falls exclusively on the Polish émigré circles in London” (Doc. No. 118).

After the publication of this statement, Moscow considered the issue of Soviet assistance to Warsaw removed from the agenda. The assessments of the uprising in Stalin's messages to Churchill and Mikolajczyk, and in the ensuing correspondence between the USSR Foreign Ministry and the ambassadors of Great Britain and the United States in Moscow, became more and more harsh.

In the new situation, the Western allies tried to soften the position of the Soviet side. On August 13, the General Staff of the Red Army received information from the British military mission about the preparation of an American operation to deliver German captured weapons to Warsaw "from bases in Russia" (Doc. No. 122). On August 14, V.M. Molotov received a message from US Ambassador A. Harriman that "there is an intention to send American bombers to Warsaw." At the same time, the British ambassador reported on the Polish appeal to the allies to recognize the AK as an army fighting Germany, and thereby ensure its soldiers the status of a prisoner of war in the event of a defeat of the uprising, and inquired about Molotov's attitude to this idea (doc. No. 123).

The People's Commissar evaded a direct answer, referring to the fact that the AK detachments are fighting on two fronts - against Germany and against the USSR. On the same day, Molotov received a request from Harriman about the possibility of landing on Soviet territory by American planes making shuttle flights from Great Britain to drop supplies to the Warsaw insurgents. The ambassador believed that "we can provide the most effective assistance by daytime shuttle flights of American bombers to Soviet bases" (Doc. No. 124).

The refusal was sent to Harriman by Deputy People's Commissar A. Ya. Vyshinsky on the morning of August 15 and repeated on the same day to two ambassadors who visited him with a request to reconsider this decision. The refusal was motivated by the fact that the acceptance of American or British aircraft on Soviet territory would mean the participation of the USSR in the "adventure in Warsaw", from which the Soviet leadership dissociated itself. “It is not at all a question,” Vyshinsky said, “to prevent the Americans or anyone else in such attempts, that we are talking about an assessment of the Warsaw events, which are adventurous, which determines our attitude to the question of dropping weapons in Warsaw” (Doc No. 129). On August 16, Vyshinsky, receiving Harriman, repeated this statement (Doc. No. 136).

On August 16, in a message to Churchill, Stalin wrote that “the Warsaw action is a reckless terrible adventure, costing the population great sacrifices ... In the situation that has arisen, the Soviet command has come to the conclusion that it must dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, since it cannot bear any direct, no indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action.” Giving a harsh assessment of the events in Warsaw, Stalin argued that “this would not have happened if the Soviet command had been informed before the start of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with the latter” (Doc. No. 132). On the same day, in a letter to Mikołajczyk, Stalin defined the uprising plan as “a frivolous adventure causing pointless casualties of the population” and drew the Polish Prime Minister’s attention to “a slanderous campaign of the Polish press with hints that the Soviet command had failed the Warsaw people” (Doc. No. 133 ).

On August 17, the ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain were again received by Molotov. A long conversation took place, beginning with a request to be received by Stalin and ending with the People's Commissar's statement that "the Soviet government will not change its position," including on the issue of the use of Soviet airfields by American planes flying to Warsaw. A warning followed about the intention of the Soviet government to refuse to use the airfields provided by the US aviation for shuttle operations against Germany (doc. No. 141).

The Soviet leadership repeatedly gave a negative answer to the one given, starting from mid-August 1944, by the ambassadors of Great Britain and the USA to the USSR A. Clark Kerr and A. Harriman, as well as St. Mikolajczyk, the question of Soviet involvement in the beginning of the uprising, which was allegedly raised “under the influence of repeated Soviet calls to act more actively” (documents No. 136, No. 137, No. 133, No. 141,
No. 143, No. 146, No. 164). Answering letters from the British side dated August 18 and 20, A.Ya. Vyshinsky categorically denied information from Warsaw that one of the reasons for the Poles' action in Warsaw was the Soviet calls for an uprising in Warsaw: “This statement, Vyshinsky declared, is clearly based on a misunderstanding, since neither the Soviet government, nor the Soviet command, nor any or other Soviet organs never called on the Poles to revolt in Warsaw 84 . The Soviet government has no doubt that this order was given by the Polish government in exile...” (Doc. No. 164).

By mid-August 1944, the United States developed an air operation to help Warsaw. It could take place on the condition that Soviet airfields were used for landing American bombers and attack aircraft after raids were carried out on German airfields around Warsaw and cargo drops for the rebels. However, by refusing Stalin's request to send O. Lange to Lublin, Roosevelt found himself in a situation where he could not, without the consent of Moscow, provide American assistance to the Polish government he recognized.

Those dissatisfied with Moscow's position in Washington regarded the situation between the main allies as alarming. A. Harriman admitted that the Soviet refusal to the Americans "was dictated by tough political motives" 85 . The US leadership concluded that the shuttle operations of US aircraft "should not be disrupted" due to insufficient assistance to the uprising in Warsaw. This opinion was also shared in London. The result of pondering the answer to Moscow was, according to the definition of Russian researchers, the "sluggish joint message" of Roosevelt and Churchill on August 20, which "had no effect on Stalin" 86 .

On August 22, answering the question asked by the allies: “... would you agree to help our planes” drop cargo to Warsaw, Stalin introduced a military motive into his argument: the strengthening of the German group near Warsaw in connection with the uprising “is very unprofitable for both the Red Army , and for the Poles", and the Soviet troops "are doing everything possible to break these counterattacks of the Nazis and go on to a new broad offensive near Warsaw ... and free Warsaw for the Poles. This will be the best and real help to the anti-Nazi Poles” (Doc. No. 159).

The allies refrained from responding to this message from Stalin. Further pressure on Moscow on the Polish issue was recognized in London and Washington as not useful "from the point of view, according to Roosevelt, of the long-term prospects for the war as a whole" 87 . The active correspondence of the leaders of the "Big Three" on the Polish question was temporarily suspended.

Thus, in response to Roosevelt's refusal regarding O. Lange and the PKNO, Moscow refused to help the planned Anglo-American air operation over Warsaw, which could not decide the fate of the city and ensure the victory of the rebels. The Soviet leadership made it clear to the allies that Warsaw and Poland were a zone of military operations of the Red Army and, according to the agreements in Tehran, a sphere of national interests of the USSR. Confirmation can be considered the order of the chief of staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel-General M.S. Malinin dated August 23 to the command of the armies and troops of the rear of the front: “Take decisive measures to prevent even the smallest groups of the Home Army from crossing the Vistula River. Intercept and disarm groups of Kraevites [AK members] in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander” of July 14. This was a reaction to the order of the AK command to their detachments “by any means to break through the river. Vistula and exit in the vicinity of Warsaw” (Doc. No. 167).

The reaction of the allies to the actions of the Soviet leadership still followed. On August 29, the Home Army, strictly speaking consisting of partisan detachments of various sizes and armed with hand weapons, was recognized by the governments of Great Britain and the United States as an army that "constitutes a military force that forms an integral part of the Polish armed forces." The Home Army "in accordance with the laws and customs of war" was recognized as the international status of combatants in the fight against Germany 88 (Doc. No. 174). This decision of the Western allies had a purely selective political meaning. It should be noted that soon the allies refused to recognize the status of combatants to the regular armies of Romania and Bulgaria, who had gone over to the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition. The text of the statements of London and Washington was sent to the Soviet leadership, which decided "not to respond" to the notifications received (Doc. No. 181).

At the end of August 1944, the situation of the rebels and the inhabitants of the city became critical: there were not enough weapons, ammunition, medicines, food, there was no water and light in the city. More and more, the rebels and the population of the capital realized the inevitable defeat of the uprising, “hope for a successful end to the uprising was slowly weakening”, judgments were made about the senselessness of the uprising and the sacrifices made in vain, accusations were made against the Western allies of inaction, demands for the resignation of the government in London (doc. No. 161, 162, 171).

The hopelessness of the Poles' resistance was also taken into account by the German command, which sought to get rid of this hotbed of hostilities as quickly as possible. According to a message from Warsaw to “Polish” London on August 22, proposals for capitulation and unity in the fight against the Soviets were received repeatedly: “In case of refusal, they threaten to raze the city to the ground. For the last time, the parliamentarians brought a letter from the commander of the Warsaw Front with a proposal to capitulate and a promise that the Craiova Army would be released with honors and weapons, and the population would be deported to the west ”(doc No. 161). On August 25, the German command turned to the population, offering to leave the city (doc. No. 172).

But the AK command at the beginning of September was not ready to recognize the military-political defeat and capitulation. On the contrary, on September 2, Bur-Komorowski reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the decision to “defend Warsaw to the limit of possibilities” and admitted that “the ability to hold out does not depend solely on our endurance, but also on material [material] assistance from you or on quick successes Soviet troops in our sector” (document No. 188). On September 3, Mikołajczyk notified Bur-Komorowski that the Polish "proposal to send a large-scale expedition of the Royal Air Force was once again considered" by the Allies, but "after considering all possibilities, this was considered impossible" (Doc. No. 189).

Unclear for the fate of the uprising in Warsaw regarded the situation on the Soviet-German front and the Polish ambassador to the United States J. Chekhanovsky.
On September 4, he had a lengthy conversation with the Chief of Staff of the US Supreme Command under President Roosevelt, Admiral D. Legi. The ambassador looked into the possibility of American assistance to the rebels, but received a virtual refusal. The admiral doubted that it was technically possible to conduct a large operation "without Soviet participation and assistance, or at least without the support of the Soviet side", but promised to "consider the issue in the most favorable way" and "report to the president tomorrow." According to Chekhanovsky, the Soviet strategy boiled down to the fact that “today it is more important for Stalin to act as quickly as possible through Romania in the Balkans in order to get ahead of the actions of the allies in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and also to bring his forces into Hungary as early as possible, along the only road consecrated tradition, namely through the “iron gates” 89 , thereby avoiding heavy and protracted battles on the Carpathian ridge. Political motives for Stalin on the Balkan Peninsula may be much more important than the immediate entry of troops into Germany through Poland ”(doc. No. 192).

However, Ambassador Chekhanovsky, in his assumptions, did not keep up with the development of events. In September 1944, the events around Warsaw developed against the background of the serious successes of the Red Army in the Balkans and Finland.
On September 5, the USSR declared war on Bulgaria. On September 8, Soviet troops entered its territory. On September 9, hostilities ceased here. On September 12, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed an armistice with Romania, and on September 19 the USSR and Great Britain signed an armistice with Finland. Thus, the process of formation of a government that was not hostile to the Soviet Union began in the countries located along the Soviet borders in the northwest and southwest of the continent, which corresponded to the interests of ensuring the security of the western borders of the USSR.

At the end of August 1944, the Soviet command went on the defensive in most of the central sector of the Soviet-German front, but the fighting on the outskirts of Warsaw and in the direction of the lower reaches of the river. Narew continued. On August 30, Soviet troops occupied Radzymin again, and
September 5 - Volomin. On the same day, bridgeheads on the Narev River near Ruzhany and Serotsk were captured by Soviet troops 90 . On September 4, the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky ordered the commander of the 1st Polish Army, General Z.
The 1st Polish Infantry Division into operational subordination to the commander of the 47th Army for an attack on the right-bank suburb of Warsaw - Prague (dock No. 193).

After some Allied silence on Polish affairs, British Ambassador Clark Kerr handed Molotov a message on 5 September stating that in Warsaw "the Poles fighting there against the Germans are in desperate distress" and calling on the Soviet government to "provide all possible assistance, which may be in his power, and, among other things, to enable aircraft of the United States to land for this purpose at your airfields. The document contains Molotov's resolution: "Our answer is urgent[ly]" (document No. 191).

The Soviet People's Commissar responded to the British on September 9, stating at the outset that: "The Soviet government would like an impartial commission to be organized to find out exactly on whose order the uprising in Warsaw was started and who is to blame for the fact that the Soviet military command was not aware of this notified in advance." Molotov insisted that “no command in the world, either English or American, can put up with the fact that in front of the front of his troops an uprising was organized in a big city without the knowledge of this command and contrary to its operational plans. It is clear that the Soviet command should not be an exception. However, he announced the Soviet agreement to help the rebels (Doc. No. 199).

Then, on September 9, another German proposal followed to the AK command in Warsaw to lay down their arms on the terms of recognizing the international status of combatants for the rebels. The AK commander considered surrender inevitable due to the lack of Soviet assistance, and on the same day a dispatch went from Warsaw to the government: “Secret negotiations on surrender have begun with the Germans” (Doc. No. 200).

On September 10, Bur-Komorowski presented the terms of surrender to the commander of the German troops in the Warsaw-South region, Major General G. Popy. It was about "ensuring the full rights of combatants in relation to all those fighting, without any investigation into their anti-German activities, including those carried out in the period up to 1.8.44." The AK commander expected information from the German side about the fate of the civilian population in the city, about the attitude of the German command to the civil authorities created during the uprising, and to their activities ”(doc. No. 204). The Polish demands were fully accepted by the Germans, but were conditioned by the warning: “I hereby demand for the last time surrender until 16.00 10.9.1944. At this time, I am waiting for your representatives to accept your surrender in writing” (Doc. No. 205).

The AK command, however, delayed the surrender. As early as September 8, the insurgent commander in the Zoliborz region reported to the chief of staff of the AK command in Warsaw, General T. Pelczyński, about the arrival from K.K. Rokossovsky two Soviet paratroopers with a walkie-talkie. On September 10, the British notified Mikolajczyk of Moscow's consent to "carrying out a large daytime American expedition", who immediately sent the information to Warsaw (Doc. No. 203). On the same day, the Soviet side handed over to the AK command in Warsaw the ciphers and a method of communication with the command of the 1st Belorussian Front 91 via London. On September 10 and 11, the first cargo was dropped, and Soviet aviation 92 (Doc. No. 208) began to actively operate over Prague. On September 11, Warsaw received news from Mikolajczyk about the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet side.
"on the question of aid to the fighting Warsaw" 93 . This Soviet decision was influenced by the successes of the troops entrenched on the left bank of the Vistula in the area of ​​​​Magnuszew, and the fighting on the nearest approaches to the city. The AK command associated with this event the hope for an early assault on Warsaw by Soviet troops and decided to continue the fight in the city.

On September 10–14, Soviet and Polish units were able to occupy Prague. Now in Moscow they considered that the conditions for the provision of effective and regular assistance to Warsaw were created by the fighting of the Red Army. On the night of September 13-14, 85 Soviet aircraft dropped 29 tons of food, ammunition, and weapons at designated destinations. From this sortie until the end of the month, every night the Soviet command provided all kinds of assistance to the rebels. Soviet aircraft operated in the sky above the city, destroying German aircraft, suppressing enemy firing points, finding out the situation and the location of the rebel battle groups, transmitting to them the necessary Soviet intelligence data on the location and capabilities of the Germans (doc. No. 220). We emphasize that every third flight was made by Polish pilots of the regiment of night bombers of the 1st Polish Army.

On September 15, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, through the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General A.I. Antonov satisfied the request of Bur-Komorovsky, which came to Moscow through the British, to exchange radio signals. But on the same day, another decision of the front command followed: “There is no radio communication with the rebels and we will not restore it; Telephone communication between the commanders was not established either (Doc. No. 222, 243, 244).

The question of organizing systematic Soviet aid for liberated Prague was being discussed in Moscow these days. On September 15, information was received from a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin, immediately sent to I.V. Stalin. The information received was probably considered important, and Telegin was ordered to provide detailed information about the situation in Warsaw twice a day. This channel for receiving information on Warsaw operated on a daily basis until the first days of October 1944. Periodically, Telegin's information was received by Stalin, providing the Soviet leadership with knowledge of the military-political situation, the actions of the rebel command on the ground and the mood of the population in the city
(Doc. No. 229, 236).

To establish contacts and obtain information about the situation in the city from ordinary participants in the uprising and individual officers of the AK and AL
On September 18, two Soviet servicemen were abandoned in Warsaw - a communications officer and a radio operator with a walkie-talkie (Doc. No. 247, 248, 255, 257, 258).
From September 21, the Soviet intelligence officer captain I. Kolos (pseudo-Oleg) was in the city, who from September 24 established radio communications between the headquarters of the l-th Belorussian Front with some remaining centers of the uprising, which made it possible to receive information about the situation in the city and the needs of the rebels and the civilian population (Doc No. 353, 363).

Meanwhile, on September 16-23, units of the 1st Polish Army undertook an operation to force the Vistula within the city and connect with the rebels (Doc. No. 234, 236, 243, 247, 248, 255, 257, 258, 259, 262, etc. .). However, the fierce resistance of the enemy, the weak activity of the rebels, the slow buildup of forces on the captured bridgeheads and the shortcomings in the combat command and control of the landing forces led to the fact that, having lost
87.1% of the personnel of the landing detachments, units of the 1st Polish Army were forced to return to the eastern bank of the river 94 (doc. No. 291, 292). North of Prague, Soviet troops tried to eliminate the German bridgehead in the interfluve of the Nareva and Vistula. As early as September 16, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts reached the line of the Narev River and entrenched themselves in bridgeheads on its western bank. After repulsing a number of attempts by the Wehrmacht to liquidate these bridgeheads, the front finally stabilized on October 30, 1944 95 . The price of "standing" of the Soviet and Polish troops near Warsaw was high. Judging by the documents published in the collection, the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front for August-September amounted to 171,665 people, and the losses of the 1st Polish Army - 7371 people (doc. No. 187, 352) 96 .

The public mood of the inhabitants of Warsaw and the insurgents gradually changed. On September 17, Bur-Komorowski sent a disturbing message to the Supreme Commander Sosnkovsky that “the lack of visible help and support from our Western allies, along with the increasingly popular Soviet propaganda about the insolvency and inactivity of the political and military authorities on the ground, as well as the Polish government in London” set up public opinion in favor of the USSR and the PKNO (Doc. No. 238, 247).

In Warsaw, they were convinced that it was possible to rectify this situation, subject to great help from the Western allies, who were preparing and coordinating with Moscow a major expedition to Warsaw (Doc. No. 216, 246). On September 18, 110 "flying fortresses" of the 3rd American Bomber Division took off in three groups from British territory. Each bomber carried from 6 to 12 containers with weapons, grenades, explosives, food and medicine. Around 14:00 in the afternoon, 1,170 containers were dropped into the city in three waves from a height of 4-5 km. However, only 288 of them, or about 25% (about 50 tons), went to the rebels, the rest fell into the territory controlled either by Soviet or (mostly) German troops 97 .

The operation had a positive effect on the mood in the city: "People were jumping for joy." However, the accuracy of dropping cargo to the designated targets was not high: “part [of the cargo] fell into German hands, part to the Prague region - to the Soviets” (doc. No. 246). The last time the Western allies dropped cargo for Warsaw was on September 21, when 3 containers were dropped on the territory of Kampinoska Puszcz, of which only 198 were received by the rebels. Then, according to General A. Khrushchel, the situation in the city was “very difficult, there was nothing to eat and nothing to shoot with” (doc. No. 338). Only the Soviet command continued to help Warsaw with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine. Converted Po-2 planes dropped cargo without parachutes from heights of 100-150 m, mainly at the coordinates and on the "order" of the rebels. During the period from September 13 to October 1, 1944, Soviet pilots and pilots of the 1st Polish Army dropped over 150 tons of weapons and ammunition, 131 tons of food and 515 kg of medicines to the Warsaw insurgents (Doc. No. 358). During the two months of fighting, Poland's western allies gave the insurgents 82.3 tons of arms and ammunition and 21.7 tons of food and medicine 99 .

The help of the Soviet side and the Western allies to the uprising was essential. It undoubtedly alleviated the tragic situation of the insurgents and the population, but could not radically change the military-operational situation in Warsaw. The military defeat of the uprising was inevitably approaching. However, the question of possible actions to support the insurgents and liberate Warsaw was still considered in Moscow. While units of the 1st Polish Army were fighting on bridgeheads in the city, the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command suggested that Marshals G.K. Zhukov and K.K. Rokossovsky consider possible options for assistance. Already on September 20, a memorandum was sent to Moscow on the need to cover the city from the north, which required the defeat of the enemy in the interfluve pp. Narew and Vistula. It was proposed to prepare the operation for October 4-5, 100 (Doc. No. 272). On September 21, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front reported to Stalin about the situation in Warsaw and the combat capabilities of the rebels. The authors of the report are Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky and Colonel General M.S. Malinin wrote that more than 4,000 insurgents with weak weapons, in the absence of a unified leadership and political unity, “do not represent any real force in the struggle for Warsaw, and one cannot count on their any significant help. In the city and in the areas occupied by the insurgents, there is still a significant number of the population that can, to one degree or another, take part in the fight against the Germans, but they are not organized and armed, they are suffering from an acute shortage of food, which makes it possible to count on their involvement in active struggle is not possible at this time” (Doc. No. 281). The next day, September 22, 1944, the representative of the General Staff at the 1st Polish Army, N.M. Molotkov, reported to the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal G.K. Warsaw (Doc. No. 290). With such a military-operational situation in the capital and on the outskirts of it, the assault on the city became meaningless.

The serious successes of the Red Army in the Baltics and the Balkans did not allow Great Britain to impose on the Soviet leadership the solution of the "Polish question" that it needed. The British could only try to find out the intentions of I.V. Stalin. On September 23, the US and British ambassadors visited the Kremlin with information about the bilateral meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec, where the problems of ending the war in Europe and the Far East were discussed. Each ambassador inquired about the situation in the Warsaw area. Stalin called the situation unsatisfactory, since it was "very difficult" to take Warsaw by a frontal attack. Speaking about the insurgents, he clarified: “The insurgents in Warsaw are scattered over four districts”, with about 2.5 thousand weapons, “weapons dropped from American aircraft often do not fall into the hands of the insurgents, as they are dropped from very high altitudes,. ..the population of Warsaw is starving” (document no. 297).

The Polish story did not develop further during this conversation, but the information about Warsaw received from Stalin made it clear that the Soviet troops would not be able to liberate the city in the near future. This was important, first of all, for Churchill - the main intercessor for Mikolajczyk and the search for a compromise in resolving the "Polish question" as a whole. A few days later, the problem "Mikolajczyk - PKNO" was continued.

Meanwhile, on September 25, the commander of the German police corps in Warsaw, von dem Bach, sent two AK officers who were in German captivity to the Polish command with a proposal to the AK command to surrender on favorable terms for the insurgents: they would be considered combatants. At the same time, the hope was expressed that "in the future, the German army, together with the Polish [army], would fight against the Bolsheviks" 101 . The German side was well aware of the anti-Soviet goals of the organizers of the uprising.

The Polish side did not accept the proposals of the German command. Among the participants in the uprising and some of their commanders, the attitude towards the surrender of weapons was negative. So, on September 27, the defenders of the Zholibozh region rejected the ultimatum of the German command and "during the night they were subjected to terrible shelling" (Doc. No. 326, 327, 329). However, the mood in the highest circles of the AK was different. The commander of the AK in Warsaw, General A. Khrushchel, the commander of the AK units in the Sredmiescie-South region, Lieutenant Colonel J. Szczurek-Tsergovsky, and Lieutenant Colonel Zygmund 102, held a meeting on September 28 on the upcoming surrender with representatives of von dem Bach. The Poles were asked to lay down their arms on the condition that the rebels were recognized as prisoners of war. On this day, orders for a ceasefire from the Polish side began to come to the AK detachments (Doc. No. 326, 327, 328, 363). There followed another discussion of the situation in the city of the AK command with the government delegate Y. Yankovsky, an active supporter of ending the struggle. He argued that “the uprising did not set itself the goal of starting a general war with the Germans and could not have the goal of defeating the Germans. The uprising has already achieved its political and moral goals. At the same time, T. Bur-Komorovsky reported to K. Sosnkovsky: “Further struggle in two isolated boilers may become impossible. Hunger. If we do not receive effective assistance with the offensive of the Red Army before October 1, then we will be forced to stop the fight ”(doc. No. 336).

In London, it was known about the negotiations of the Warsaw insurgents with German representatives. This caused the British government to be concerned about the fate of the Polish ally after the capitulation of the uprising in Warsaw. First of all, anxiety was caused by the future of the government headed by Mikolajczyk, whom Churchill stubbornly urged from the beginning of 1944 to accept the Soviet conditions for settling relations with the USSR. New circumstances could not but "push" the British Prime Minister to work out options for action after the defeat of the uprising.

On September 27, Stalin received a message from Churchill expressing his desire to "come to Moscow in October." On September 30 Stalin gave a positive reply: “I very much welcome your desire to come to Moscow in October. We should have discussed military and other matters of great importance.

On September 29, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Eden, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain F.T. Gusev, convinced him of Mikolajczyk's desire to "reach an agreement with the Soviet government" (Doc. No. 334). On the same day, Churchill received Mikołajczyk, who could not help but report to him on September 27 the refusal of the political leaders of the underground, who were in Warsaw, "to take over the negotiation [on the settlement of relations with the USSR]." They suggested that Mikolajczyk "come to Warsaw immediately after the entry of the Soviet troops" (Doc. No. 310). Such information should have alarmed Churchill, who recommended that the Polish prime minister immediately write an appeal to Stalin, which arrived at the British Embassy in Moscow on September 30 and was handed over to V.M. on October 1. Molotov.

Mikolajczyk first asked Stalin about the storming of Warsaw by Soviet troops (Doc No. 332). Most likely, the prime minister counted on the fact that the storming of the city by Soviet troops was possible and would allow him to avoid capitulation, and, therefore, to save the leading military-political staff of the underground in case the Soviet troops entered the capital. This is confirmed by the letter of the British Ambassador V.M. Molotov dated September 29: “... The Polish government in London asked my government to urgently bring to the attention of the Soviet government the following information about the names of the leaders of the Polish underground movement, as well as the Polish internal army 105, who acted under pseudonyms” (doc No. 333) . What followed was a list of names of individuals.

For Churchill, Mikolajczyk's appeal to Stalin was necessary to prepare his participation in future negotiations in Moscow. The British side sought to convince Stalin of Mikolajczyk's inclination to compromise with the USSR, so that when discussing the Polish question at the level of the "Big Three", they would not allow the exclusion of the Polish government recognized by Great Britain from the process of reshaping power in Poland. At that time, Stalin also showed interest in the Polish premier as a participant in future negotiations with the PKNO, otherwise Mikolajczyk would not have arrived in Moscow in two weeks.

Meanwhile, according to a Soviet intelligence officer in Warsaw, “on September 30, the first exit of the civilian population began” from the city. Panic began among the soldiers and officers of the AK; they changed into civilian clothes and left together with the civilian population (doc. no. 363). On October 1, when Zoliborz fell, the AK command made the final decision to negotiate with the Germans on the conditions for the surrender of the rebels and the evacuation of the civilian population from the besieged areas of the city: “Warsaw,” Bur-Komorowski wrote to the government, “no longer has any chance to defend himself ... Negotiations tomorrow” (doc. No. 347).

On the evening of October 2, Colonel K. Iranek-Osmetsky and Lieutenant Colonel Z. Dobrovolsky from the Polish side, and General E. von dem Bach from the German side signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities from 20.00. During the negotiations, the command of the Home Army refused to satisfy the demand of the Germans and give an order to the Home Army throughout the country to stop the fight against Germany. The variant of the "secret agreement" on this score proposed during the personal conversation of Bur-Komorowski with von dem Bach on October 4 (Doc. No. 404, 408, 411) was not accepted either. However, the AK commander expressed his "personal conviction that the German top leadership would not have any particular difficulties from the AK, since the Warsaw Uprising was the culmination of the AK's activities, the crown of its efforts" 107 .

The treatment of the Germans with the surrendered Warsaw insurgents was fundamentally different from the system of mass terror and repressions characteristic of the occupation regime in Poland, starting from the autumn of 1939. Following the Western Allies, the German command recognized the status of prisoners of war both for members of the Home Army, and for all others, tactically it subordinate military units. The German side agreed not to prosecute the Poles “neither for military or political activities, both during the uprising in Warsaw and in the previous period”, not to punish “for violation of German orders” and hinted to the AK command of the need to reorient armed activities against the “Soviets” 108 .

Thus, after 63 days of the heroic struggle of the rebels, accompanied by the death of tens of thousands of inhabitants and the destruction of the country's capital, the AK command capitulated. Modern Polish historians believe that from 15 to 18 thousand Poles died on the barricades,
25 thousand were wounded. 17,000 Akovites laid down their arms 109 . Among them were generals T. Bur-Komorovsky, T. Pelchinsky, A. Khrushchel, as well as the heads of departments of the High Command of the Army Corps - Colonels K. Iranek-Osmetsky, Yu. Shostak, Ya. Zhepetsky, A. Sanoytsa and others (doc. No. 406).

The most numerous victims - from 120 to 130-165 thousand lives - during the uprising were suffered by the inhabitants of Warsaw, who, on the orders of the Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, were destroyed by "tens of thousands" 110 . Varshavians who survived the bombings and fires were sent by the Nazis to concentration camps in Pruszkow and Ursus, located near Warsaw. According to German data, by October 14, 1944, "a total of 350,617 refugees had been passed through these camps." The Nazis "placed" most of the disabled and sick in the Warsaw, Krakow and Radom regions, about 1 thousand people were sent to work in Germany (doc. No. 404). Together with the civilian population, part of the AK command left the city, including the new commander of the AK, General L. Okulitsky.

The capital of Poland itself became a victim of the plan of the AK command for an uprising. On October 9, von dem Bach received "an order from Hitler from the Reichsführer [Himmler] to completely destroy Warsaw" (Doc. No. 387). The order was carried out. The Nazis blew up and burned the city methodically, block by block, house by house. Almost all monuments of Polish history and Warsaw architecture were turned into ruins. Such was the material price of the defeat of the uprising.

The political goal of the uprising, which the Polish government and the AK command sought to realize, remained unfulfilled. Destined to become the apogee of the Buzha action throughout pre-war Poland, the uprising was supposed to create conditions for returning from emigration to the capital of the Polish government and demonstrate the ability of the Poles to independently, by force of their weapons, resolve the issue of power, territory, place and role of Poland in post-war Europe . However, the calculations of the Polish pre-war political class turned out to be incommensurable with its real military and foreign policy capabilities.

Weakly supported by Great Britain and the USA, the uprising, politically directed against the USSR, could not fail to suffer a military defeat, since the German command was not going to surrender Warsaw. In turn, the uprising became a harbinger of the collapse of the geopolitical project created by the socio-political forces that dominated pre-war Poland. The goal of this project was to become the leader of the "small" states of the Eastern European region, to turn Poland into an important geopolitical factor for the Western allies, to acquire a key role in Eastern Europe to resist the Soviet Union. The erroneousness of the geopolitical concept of the Polish government, built on anti-Sovietism, gave rise to the conviction that the USSR could be defeated, if not military, then geopolitically. The largest application of the Polish government and the AK command for the implementation of this project was the uprising in Warsaw, which ended in a tragic defeat. The main winner of the war in Europe was the USSR, which made such a plan insignificant.

Notes

1. Duraczyński E. Polska. 1939-1945. Warszawa, 1999. S. 136-137; Komorowski K. Armia Krajowa - siły zbrojne Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego // Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Warszawa, 2002. S. 30.
2. Salmanowicz St., NeyKrwawicz M., Górski A. Polskie Państwo Podziemne. Warszawa, 1999. S. 11 (from the preface by E. Shlyasky).
3. Relations between the governments of the two countries were interrupted by the Soviet side on April 25, 1943. The decision was caused by the reaction of the Polish government to the German statement about the executions by the Soviet side of Polish officers in the autumn of 1940 near Smolensk (Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War: In 3 volumes. Vol. 1: June 22
4. 1941 - December 31, 1943 M., 1944. S. 301-303).
5. See also: Rzheshevsky O.A. Stalin and Churchill. Meetings. Conversations. Discussions. M., 2004. S. 384-411.
6. The AK was considered part of the Polish Armed Forces stationed in Great Britain and on the Western Front, the commander of the AK, General T. Bur-Komorowski, was subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General K. Sosnkovsky. All those who joined the AK were enrolled in active military service with the preservation of military ranks and receiving a salary. The payroll of the AK in the spring of 1944 included about 390 thousand people. The officer corps, including junior ranks, numbered about 9 thousand people. The command was in the hands of generals and senior officers, supporters of J. Pilsudski, a dictator who was not controlled by the constitutional bodies of state power, the creator of the "sanation" regime, the main support of which was the army. This environment was dominated by right-wing nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments (Poland in the XX century. Essays on political history. M., 2012. P. 169, 212, 227; Kirchmayer E. Powstanie Warszawskie. Warszawa, 1959. S. 50).
7. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. 1939-1945. T. III. Wroclaw-Warszawa-Krakow, 1991. S. 182-185, 209-213; Salmanowicz St., NeyKrwawicz M., Gorski A. Op. cit. S. 82-84.
8. Moscow had information about these plans. In 1943, information came through various channels. Thus, in August and October 1943, Stalin was reported that the Polish General Staff “with the consent of the government and the president gave instructions to the representative of the Polish government in Poland to prepare to resist the Red Army”, that “the Polish armed forces must, by virtue of these instructions, conduct a merciless fight against the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and prepare a general uprising when the Red Army enters there "in order to show the whole world the unwillingness of the population to accept the Soviet regime" (Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. T. 4. M., 1999. pp. 463-464, 609).
9. NeyKrwawicz M. Koncepcje powstania powszechnego na ziemiach
   polskich // Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Warszawa, 2002. S. 93; Duraczyński E. Op. cit. S. 478; Żenczykowski T. Polska Lubelska. Warszawa, 1990. S. 69.
10. See also: Motyka G. Na białych Polaków obława. Wojska NKWD w walce z polskim podziemiem. 1944-1953 Warszawa, 2014. S. 81, 85-86; Ciechanowski J. Powstanie Warszawskie. 1944. Pułtusk, 2004. S. 235, 242-243.
11. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 16 (5-4): Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Documents and materials. 1944-1945. M., 1999. S. 61-62; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-2): The Red Army in the countries of Central and Northern Europe and the Balkans: Documents and materials. M., 2000. S. 403; Poland in the 20th century. Essays on political history. M., 2012. S. 386-387.
12. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-2): The Red Army in the countries of Central and Northern Europe and the Balkans: Documents and materials. M., 2000. S. 403; Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. III. S. 411-412.
13. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 105. L. 52; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 16 (5-4): Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Documents and materials. 1944-1945. M., 1999. S. 80; Teczka specjalna J.W. Stalina. Reporty NKWD z Polski. 1944-1946. Warszawa, 1998. S. 210-211.
14. See also: Poland in the 20th century. Essays on political history. Moscow, 2012, pp. 321-322, 425-426; Wasilewska W. Wspomnienia // Archiwum ruchu robotniczego. T. VII. Warszawa, 1982. S. 40.
15. The "Curzon Line" was proposed at the end of 1919 by the Entente as a temporary Polish eastern border, drawn on an ethnographic basis.
16. At the request of the KRN delegation, she was received by the US Ambassador to Moscow A. Harriman (June 11) and the British Ambassador to Moscow A. Clark Kerr (June 26, 27 and 29, 1944), the delegation visited the Embassy of Czechoslovakia and the military mission of Yugoslavia (Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations, Vol. VIII: January 1944 - December
    1945 M., 1974. S. 162-174).
17. Poland in the 20th century. pp. 391-393; Tebinka J. Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej. 1939-1945. Warszawa, 1998. S. 347.
18. Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945: In 2 vols. T. 2. M., 1989. S. 152-155.
19. On June 20, 22 and 23, 1944, the Soviet ambassador to the governments of the "small" countries in London, VZ Lebedev, discussed with Mikolajczyk questions about the border and about changing the composition of the Polish government. The Soviet side conditioned the restoration of diplomatic relations with the exclusion from the Polish cabinet of a number of politicians, whose positions it considered purely anti-Soviet, as well as the reconstruction of the cabinet and the admission of Polish politicians located in Poland, the USSR and the USA, including communists. The ambassador firmly insisted on the recognition by the Polish side of the border along the "Curzon Line". No agreement followed, and, according to the contemporary Polish historian J. Tebinka, this was the last chance for the Polish government to avoid the emergence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Buhler R. Polska droga do wolności. 1939-1995. Warszawa 1999. S. 66; Tebinka J. Op. cit. S. 349).
20. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. III. S. 498-504.
21. Ibid. S. 504-506.
22. Ibid. S. 546-550.
23. Under Vilna and Novogrudok, according to Polish data, 5.5-6 thousand AK fighters were concentrated, according to Soviet data - up to 25 thousand Akovites; near
    Lviv - about 3 thousand and in the south-east of Poland, mainly in the Lublin Voivodeship, about 12 thousand people i (Friszke F. Polska. Losy Państwa i Narodu. 1939-1989. Warszawa, 2003. S. 89; Warsaw, Moscow, Comrade Beria... "Documents of the NKVD of the USSR on the Polish underground. I 1944-1945. M., 2001. P. 36).
24. Near Vilna in July 1944, according to various sources, from 6 to 9 thousand 1 Akovites were disarmed. "From Warsaw. Moscow, Comrade Beria...” Documents of the NKVD of the USSR on the Polish underground. 1944-1945 M., 2001. S. 42; Teczka specjalna J.W. Stalina. Reporty i NKWD z Polski. 1944-1946. Warszawa, 1998. S. 40; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 16 (5-4): Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Documents and materials. 1944-1945. M., 1999. S. 111.
25. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. V. S. 9; T. VI. S. 17-18, 27, 29.
26. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 1-2.
27. There. S. 3-5.
28. The command staff of the AK was made up of career officers and generals of the pre-war Polish Army, as a rule, participants in the First World War or the war with Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1944, the composition of the General Staff was as follows: commander - General T. Bur-Komorovsky; Deputy Commander and Chief of the General Staff - Gen. T.Pelchinsky; First Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations - Gen. L. Okulitsky (was in Poland since May 22, 1944); second deputy chief of staff for commissary service, head of the IV department, colonel Z.Milkovsky; Colonel A. Sanoytsa, Deputy Chief of Staff for Organizational Issues; Deputy Chief of Staff for Control and Communications, Head of the V Division Regiment. K. Plyuta-Chakhovsky; head of the 1st organizational department, Colonel F. Kaminsky (simultaneously commander of the Khlopsky Battalions); chief of Kediv (team of sabotage) regiment. Y. Mazurkevich; Head of the 2nd Reconnaissance Division K.Iranek-Osmensky; Chief of the III operational department, Col. Y. Shostak; Head of the VI Department (Bureau of Information and Propaganda) Col. Ya.Zhepetsky; Head of the VII Department (Bureau of Finance and Control), Col. St. Thun; head of the military bureau L. Muzychka. In the summer of 1944, new district commanders were appointed: Novogrudok - Regiment. A. Shidlovsky (pseudonym Poleshuk), then Major M. Kalenkevich (pseudo-Kotvich); Polissya - Major G. Kraevsky (psev. Tzhaska, Leshchny); Tarnopol - Major B. Zavadsky (pseudonym Soroka, Yurand); Volyn - K. Bombinsky, then the regiment. Y.Kiversky, Major T. Shtumberk-Rykhter (pseudonym Zhegota), Colonel Y.Kotovich (pseudo Tvardy); Poznan - acted as a lieutenant. Ya. Kolodzei (pseudonym Drval, Blyady); Pomorye - from July 1944, Major F. Troyanovsky (pseudonym Falia, Ryngraf, Torunchyk); Vilna - Regiment. Yu. Kulikovsky (pseud. Vitold, Ryngraf, Drogomir); district of Lublin - Regiment F. Jacques; Krakow - Col. E. Godlevsky (pseud. Garda). (Duraczyński E. Op. cit. S. 433). The Lvov obshar of the AK was commanded by a regiment. Filipkovsky (pseudonym Janka) (Mazur G. Obszar Lwów // Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Warszawa, 2002. S. 190).
29. Duraczyński E. Op. cit. S. 485-486.
30. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 11-12, 15-17, 24; The Warsaw uprising of 1944 in the documents of the secret services. Moscow-Warsaw, 2007. S. 586, 742, 788, 924, 1022; Poland in the 20th century. pp. 399-400.
31. The PKNO was created from representatives of the KRN and SPP. Its coalition composition, headed by the left socialist E. Osubka-Moravsky, was agreed and approved on the night of July 21-22 in Stalin's office (Historical archive. 1996. No. 4. P. 82; At a reception at Stalin. Notebooks (magazines) of records persons accepted by IV Stalin (1924-1953), M., 2008, pp. 437-438).
32. Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations.
    T. 8. S. 129-131; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1): USSR and Poland. 1941 - 1945. On the history of the military union: Documents and materials. M., 1994. S. 316-317.
33. I mean KRN.
34. On August 1, 1944, the PKNO was recognized by the Soviet side as a coalition representation of Poland (Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. Vol. 14 (3–1). P. 198, 316-317; Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. T VIII, pp. 153-157).
35. Parts of the corps irretrievably lost 75 tanks (Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. Vol. 16 (5-4), p. 112).
36. Shtemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years: In 2 books. Book. 2. M., 1981. S. 59-63; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945: In 12 vols. T. 9. M., 1978. S. 55-56; Military encyclopedia. In 8 vols. T. 4. M., 1999. S. 494-495.
37. See also: Noskova A.F. Stalin and the creation of the Polish National Liberation Committee: a forced step in the right direction // Central Europe. Problems of international and interethnic relations. XII-XX centuries M., 2009. S. 365-393.
38. Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War: Documents and materials. M., 1985. S. 284-287; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-2). pp. 408-409.
39. Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 3 vols. T. 3. M., 1990. S. 152-153.
40. Shtemenko S.I. Decree. op. pp. 71-75; Antipenko N. Issues of logistic support of the Belarusian operation // Military History Journal. 1964.
    No. 6. S. 36-51.
41. Belarusian operation in numbers // Military Historical Journal. 1964. No. 6. S. 82.
42. Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. Per. with him. M., 1956. S. 451.
43. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. bd. 8. Miinchen, 2007. S. 571. Along with the Hermann Goering parachute-tank division arriving from Italy, the 19th Panzer Division from Bialystok, as well as the 4th Panzer Division and the 5th SS Panzer Division were transferred to Warsaw near Warsaw "Viking" from the Kleschel area.
44. Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 14(3-1). pp. 200-201.
45. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 16 (5-4). pp. 120-121.
46. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1). pp. 202-203.
47. There. pp. 212, 213; T. 14 (3-2). pp. 418-419.
48. Nazarevich R. Warsaw Uprising. 1944 Per. from Polish. M., 1989. S. 89. According to modern German researchers, on August 2, 1944, after two days of fighting, there were 70 tanks and tank destroyers in the 19th Panzer Division, and 63 tanks in the Hermann Goering Parachute Tank Division and tank destroyers, in the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" - 66 tanks and assault guns, and in the 4th Panzer Division - 78 tanks (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd. 8. S. 581).
49. Antipenko H. Decree. op. S. 48.
50. The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 in documents from the archives of the secret services.
    pp. 584-596.
51. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. bd. 8. S. 646.
52. Operation Bagration. Liberation of Belarus. M., 2004. S. 327-328; The Great Patriotic War - day after day: based on declassified operational reports of the General Staff of the Red Army: In 10 volumes. T. 8: Liberation. June 1 - December 31, 1944. M., 2010. S. 152-153.
53. For a description of the tank battle near Warsaw from the German side, see: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. bd. 8. S. 570-587.
54. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1). S. 215, approx. 2 on p. 216, approx. 4 on p. 216-217.
55. Shtemenko S.M. Decree. op. S. 86.
56. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1). pp. 237, 238-239. Reports of the General Staff of the Red Army on the battles of the 1st Belorussian Front from 9 to
    August 30, 1944 see: Operation Bagration. Liberation of Belarus. pp. 361-467; The Great Patriotic War - day after day. T. 8. S. 184-268.
57. Komorowski K. Bitwa about stolicę Polskiego Państwa Polskiego // Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Warszawa, 2002. S. 552.
58. Ney-Krwawicz M. Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej. 1939-1945. Warszawa, 1990. S. 313, 320-321.
59. Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 552; Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 31, 32.
60. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14(3-1). pp. 204, 209-210, 212; Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 100.
61. The Polish historian K. Komorowski notes that although the concentration of German forces against the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army “relieved the load” from the territory covered by the uprising, “German counterattacks deepened the backlog of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, slowed down the movement of Rokossovsky’s troops and postponed his attack on the city. But the fate of the Uprising depended on this ”(Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 551).
62. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. V. S. 9-13, T. IV. S. 18-21; Die Zeit. 07/29/1994; Poland in the 20th century. S. 401.
63. Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 548.
64. Warsaw was the largest city in pre-war Poland. In the summer of 1944, its population, including Prague, was up to 1 million people. During the war, the city was the most important strategic and transport, railway and aviation (large airfields Okecze and Bielany and small ones Bornerovo, Sluzhev, Gotslav, Zelenka), a hub, and also had powerful fortifications in the Warsaw-Modlin-Zegrze triangle. A serious obstacle in the offensive from the east was the wide and deep river. The Vistula, which could only be crossed by boats (Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 544-545).
65. Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 529-534, 542, 551.
66. It is possible that the AK command did not set such a goal for the rebels. The rebels seized, first of all, government buildings, administrative offices, banks.
67. Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 555-557.
68. A well-known English historian, a former participant in the uprising, defined its goal as follows: “The Craiova Army, having captured Warsaw, had to pave the way for a general and final battle with Stalin, which would decide who would govern post-war Poland - the London camp or the PPR and its supporters. The authors of the uprising acted in the belief that a turning point was coming for Poland, that it was at a historical crossroads and its fate was being decided again” (Ciechanowski J.M. Op. cit. S. 15). The uprising was the apogee of the entire Storm plan, but it could not decide the fate of the country in any of its outcomes.
69. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 35, 47, 59-63, 72-73, 77-79, 80, 82, etc.
70. Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2: Correspondence with F. Roosevelt and G. Truman (August 1941 - December 1945). M., 1986 S. 100.
71. Soviet-American relations during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945 Documents and materials in 2 vols. T. 2. M., 1984. S. 174; Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1). pp. 210-211.
72. This refers to the Craiova Rada of Ministers headed by the Deputy Prime Minister
    Ya. Yankovsky and his deputies in the rank of ministers A. Benem, A. Paidak and St. Yasyukovich.
73. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 41-42, 53-54, 57-58, 70-71, 74-76, 85-86, 93, 99, 100, 112-113, etc.
74. Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Second World War 1941-1945. Vol. 1: Correspondence with W. Churchill and K. Atlee (July 1941 - November 1945). M., 1986. S. 291-292.
75. The position and calculations of the organizers of the uprising contained, according to prof. Duraczyński, a paradox that initially ruled out his military-political success (Duraczyński E. Stalin. Twyrca i dyktator supermocarstwa. Pułtusk - Warszawa, 2012. S. 495). Indeed, Polish politicians envisaged the expulsion of the Nazis from Warsaw by the forces of the Red Army, and at the same time they also expected to take power in the city to counter the geopolitical plans of the Soviet leadership regarding Poland.
76. The compilers do not have records of conversations on August 6 and 7, 1944. Soviet recording of a conversation on August 8 with V.M. Molotov published: The Soviet factor in Eastern Europe. 1944-1953. T. 1: 1944-1948. M., 1999. S. 76-83.
77. Soviet factor in Eastern Europe 1944-1953. T. 1. 1944-1948. Documentation. M., 1999. S. 67-76, 84-87, 76-83; Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. T. VIII. Doc. No. 91, note 1. S. 27.
78. The Soviet officer was dropped into Warsaw, but was killed, about which the Soviet side notified the US and British ambassadors in Moscow on August 14 and 15. See doc. No. 123 and 129.
79. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 65-67; Cytowska-Siegrist E. Stany Zjednoczone a Polska. 1939-1945. Warszawa, 2013. S. 269, 281, 283.
80. Sierocki T. Oskar Lange. Biography. Warszawa, 1989, pp. 138-156; Noskova A.F. Towards the Creation of PKNO (Russian Archives on the Role of Moscow) // Slavic Studies. 2008. No. 3. S. 3-21.; Record of Stalin's conversation with Lange on May 17, 1944, see: Stalin and Poland. 1943-1944 years. From declassified documents of Russian archives // New and recent history. 2008. No. 3. S. 124-137.
81. Pechatnov V.O., Magadeev I.E. Correspondence I.V. Stalin with F. Roosevelt W. Churchill during the Great Patriotic War: Documentary research: In 2 vols. T. 2. M., 2015. S. 236.
82. Correspondence... T. 2. S. 161 - 162.
83. There. P. 162. For Roosevelt, who was preparing for the next presidential election, it was important to avoid participation, together with Stalin, in solving the PKNO problem and not allow support for Soviet intentions, so as not to lose 6-7 million votes of "American" Poles, who were highly anti-Soviet .
84. Cit. Quoted from: Cytowska Siegrist E. Op. cit. S. 297.
85. By order of I.V. Stalin, all Soviet radio broadcasts were checked on the eve of the uprising, including those SPP broadcasts that were conducted through the Radio Committee. The test results were negative. July 29, 1944 radio station. Kosciuszko, who was at the disposal of the SPP, transmitted various information to Warsaw, including an appeal to the Poles in connection with the fighting of Soviet troops near Warsaw (see note No. 81).
86. Cit. by: Pechatnov O.V., Magadeev I.E. Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill during the Great Patriotic War: Documentary research: In 2 vols. T. 2. M., 2015. P. 244.
87. There. pp. 247-248.
88. Pechatnov O.V., Magadeev I.E. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 250-251; Сutowska-Siegrist E. Op. cit. S. 290-293.
89. Soviet prisoners of war did not have such international legal protection against German repressions.
90. See note. No. 92.
91. Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II. pp. 292-293.
92. Nazarevich R. Decree. op. S. 170.
93. The compilers do not have any supporting Soviet documents.
94. Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. T. IV. S. 307-308.
95. Russian archive: Great Patriotic. T. 14 (3-1). pp. 242-243, 246, 249-251, 271-272, 274-275, 277-279; T. 14 (3-2). pp. 435-439, 440-441.
96. Tippelskirch K. Decree. op. S. 453; Shtemenko S.M. Decree. op. pp. 90-108.
97. See also: Classified removed: Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, combat operations and military conflicts. M., 1993. S. 203; The Great Patriotic War. T. 14 (3-1). S. 193, approx. 1 on p. 244, approx. 1 on p. 291; Nazarevich R. Decree. op. S.167, 179-180.
98. Komorowski K. Op. cit. S. 559-560.
99. Same place; Kirchmayer J. Op. cit. S. 503.
100. Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War. T. 14 (3-1). pp. 267-268, 270; Komorowski K. Bitwa about stolice Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego // Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie. Warszawa, 2004. S. 560 Nazarewicz R. Z problematyki politycznej , powstania Warszawskiego (1944). Warszawa, 1980. S. 221; Kirchmayer J. Op. cit. S. 503-504.
101. But the operation to cover the city from the north could not be carried out either, since on October 4-10 the German troops attacked and pressed the Soviet units on the bridgehead north of Serotsk. Only on October 14-24, the troops of the 65th and 70th armies were able to expand 1 bridgehead to 25 km along the front and 4-5 km in depth, occupying Serotsk on October 19 (IIItemenko S.M. General Staff during the war years. Book 2 pp. 101 - 108).
102. Cit. by: Nazarevich R. Decree. op. pp. 201-202; Madajczyk Cz. Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce. T. I. Warszawa, 1970. S. 200-201.
103. Probably, the lawyer, Lieutenant Colonel Ya. Dobrovolsky (pseudo-Zyngram) is meant.
104. Nazarevich R. Decree. op. S. 202.
105. Correspondence ... T. 1. S. 299-300, 301. On September 30, Mikolajczyk sent a letter to Rokossovsky through the same "channel", containing information about the fortifications of German troops near Warsaw.
106. I mean Home Army.
107. See also: Noskova A.F. The problem of international recognition and borders of Poland (August 1944 - August 1945) // Great Patriotic War. 1945 M., 2015. S. 26-29.
108. Cit. by: Nazarevich R. Decree. op. pp. 209-210.
109. The text of the agreement in Polish was sent to the headquarters of the High Command on October 3, 1944 (Armia Krajowa w dokumentach. Vol. IV. S. 428-432).
110. Polska. 1939-1945. Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami. Warszawa, 2009, pp. 183-184.

Currently, Polish historians have recognized as unreliable the data on 200-250 thousand dead residents of the city, which existed in the scientific literature and the national memory of the Poles for many decades (Polska. 1939-1945. S. 184).

Prepared by Dmitry ZHVANIA

August 1, 1944 is one of the most tragic dates in the history of Poland and World War II. On August 1, 1944, the Warsaw Uprising began against the German occupation. Coincidentally, on the same day, the Main Operations Directorate of the SS issued an order to create on the basis of the collaborationist Russian Liberation People's Army (RONA) the 29th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS / Russian No. . one). Russian SS men were immediately thrown by the Germans to suppress the Polish uprising.

"Brutal error" or "heroic impulse"

“Precisely at 5 o’clock, shooting began from thousands of wide-open windows. From all sides, a hail of bullets fell on the passing Germans, on the buildings occupied by them and on the marching formations. In the blink of an eye, the remaining civilians in the city disappeared from the streets. Our people rushed out of their houses and attacked. In 15 minutes, the entire city with a million inhabitants was engulfed in struggle. All transport has stopped. Warsaw ceased to be a major center of communications in the immediate rear of the German front, where the paths from the north, south, east and west crossed. The battle for the city began, ”recalled the leader of the uprising, the commander of the Home Army Tadeusz Komarovsky.

Much has been written about the Warsaw Uprising. The Poles revolted in the hope that they would be supported by the Red Army, which successfully developed the offensive. But the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front froze at the walls of the Polish capital. Why? Some historians believe that Stalin did not want the representatives of the Polish government in exile to win. Others point out that the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having passed over 300 kilometers before that through the Belarusian and Polish lands, simply ran out of steam. They did not have the strength to storm such a large city as Warsaw.

August 9, 1944 Stalin in a conversation with members of the Polish government delegation headed by the Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile Stanislav Mikolajczyk stated that he considers the uprising of the Polish underground army in Warsaw to be an "unrealistic thing", but did not refuse to establish contact with the rebels and drop weapons to them. Nevertheless, until September 13, 1944, Soviet aviation did not drop weapons and ammunition to the insurgent Poles. Later, on November 15, 1944, in a conversation with one of the creators of the Ludova Army Marian Spychalski Stalin listed the reasons why the 1st Belorussian Front could not support the Warsaw Uprising with an offensive: the high left bank of the Vistula and the need for a successful assault to pull up at least 40 divisions, weapons and food. “If we were asked, we would not give advice to rebel,” said the leader of the USSR.

BUT Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, a Pole by nationality, whose sister was in Warsaw during the uprising, speaking on August 26, 1944 in Lublin, called a "gross mistake" an uprising launched without coordination with the leadership of the Red Army. “Bur-Komorovsky, together with his henchmen, stumbled here like a redhead in a circus - like that clown that appears on the arena at the most inopportune moment and turns out to be wrapped in a carpet ... If here it was just about clowning, it would not have any values, but we are talking about a political adventure, and this adventure will cost Poland hundreds of thousands of lives. This is a terrible tragedy, and now they are trying to shift all the blame for it onto us. It pains me to think of the thousands and thousands of people who died in our struggle for the liberation of Poland. Do you really think that we would not have taken Warsaw if we had been in a position to do so? The very idea that we are in some sense afraid of the Home Army is absurd to the point of idiocy, ”he argued, when active battles were still going on in Warsaw between the Home Army and SS units.

But all this time there were Russians in Warsaw. Only not in order to help the Poles, but vice versa - in order to help the Germans suppress their uprising. It's about the RONA fighters. With the easy suggestion of the Kremlin's propagandists and they sang along from the "patriotic" camp, now any deviation from Putin's "general line" is called "Vlasovism." "Vlasovshchina" in the public mind is a sort of collective image of betrayal.

Without analyzing in this text the causes and meanings of Russian collaborationism during the Second World War, we only note that until the end of 1944, the former Major General of the Red Army Andrey Vlasov did not play the role of the first violin in the Russian collaborationist ensemble. As the researchers note, he, having gone to cooperate with the Nazis, at first was engaged in more propaganda work than combat.

"Russian Republic" in the German rear

Konstantin Voskoboynik - the first burgomaster of the Lokot self-government

Combat work, primarily anti-partisan operations, since 1941, was engaged in Bronislav Kaminsky- RON commander. For help, let's turn to the book "Russian SS" by Dmitry Zhukov and Ivan Kovtun:

“Bronislav Vladislavovich Kaminsky was born on June 16, 1899 in the village of Dobrzhin, Polotsk district, Vitebsk province. His father was a Pole, and his mother was a Russified German. In 1917 he entered the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute. In the autumn of 1918, Kaminsky volunteered to join the Red Army, where he served as an ordinary Red Army soldier in the 27th Omsk Red Banner Division named after the Italian Proletariat.

In 1921, he was demobilized and continued his studies at the Petrograd Institute of Chemical Technology, which he graduated from only after 1930, since he worked at the Respublika chemical plant in parallel.

Shortly after demobilization from the Red Army, he married and subsequently became the father of four children in this marriage. Until 1937, he worked at the Leningrad Chemical Plant as an engineer-technologist of chemical production. During these years, Kaminsky joined the ranks of the CPSU (b), however, he soon joined the "right opposition" and began to openly criticize Stalin's course towards the collectivization of agriculture and the authoritarian tendencies in the policy of the party leadership. In 1935 he was expelled from the party, and in 1937 he was arrested on charges of involvement in "the case of Chayanov's counter-revolutionary group - the Labor Peasant Party." Kaminsky was sentenced to 10 years in the camps. He served his term in Shadrinsk, Kurgan Region. In early 1941, he moved to the village of Lokot, Brasovsky District, Oryol Region, where he got a job as an engineer at a local distillery. After the area was occupied by German troops, he became deputy K.P. (Konstantin Pavlovich - approx. SN) Voskoboinika - heads of the local collaborationist administration.

In the Lokotsky district, Voskoboinik and Kaminsky created something like a collaborationist republic - "Russian state formation - Lokotsky district self-government" (RGO-LOS). Lokot self-government was officially recognized by the German authorities on November 15, 1941. This "republic" included the districts of the Bryansk, Kursk and Oryol regions and lasted until 1943. In tsarist times, these lands were part of the Komaritskaya volost and belonged to the imperial family, and in the inconspicuous village of Lokot there was an estate Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich Romanov.

According to historian Sergei Drobyazko, with minimal control from the German administration, the Lokot self-government achieved major successes in the socio-economic life of the district. Collective farms were abolished on the territory of the Lokot self-government, private property was returned, and considerable freedom of entrepreneurship was allowed. During the existence of the self-government, industrial enterprises for the processing of agricultural products were restored and launched on its territory, churches were opened, nine hospitals and 37 outpatient medical centers operated, 345 secondary schools and three orphanages operated, and in the town of Lokot an art and drama theater was even opened. Theater named after K. P. Voskoboinik, and ballet numbers were staged in the program of the Dmitrov City Theater.

The German authorities preferred not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Lokot self-government, which was responsible for collecting taxes, securing German cargo on its territory, and providing food for German troops. At the same time, only the Soviet ruble was used as a means of payment in the Lokot Republic.

However, the main task of the Lokot self-government was not the organization of peaceful life, but the fight against the partisan movement, which, as you know, was very active in those areas (we all know about the partisans of the Bryansk forest from school). At first, a local self-defense detachment was engaged in this, and after the death of Konstantin Voskoboinik on January 7, 1942, Bronislav Kaminsky set about creating the Russian Liberation People's Army. Its ranks were formed from former Red Army soldiers, defectors from partisan detachments, as well as the mobilized local population (Kaminsky conducted three mobilizations of guys aged 17 to 20).

At the end of December 1942, the RONA included 14 rifle battalions, an armored division and a motorized fighter company with a total number of 10 thousand people, it was equipped with guns, mortars and machine guns, mostly Soviet. At the beginning of 1943, the RONA consisted of 15 battalions, its total number was 12-15 thousand fighters, and by the middle of 1943 - 20 thousand, by that time the RONA included a tank battalion, an artillery division, five infantry regiments, a sapper battalion and a security battalion.

“The units of the Russian Liberation People’s Army, alas, quite effectively fought against the people’s avengers,” researchers Zhukov and Kovtun note. The "Kamintsy" not only fought against the partisans, but also terrorized the local population, suspected of being in connection with the people's avengers. “These methods used by them (the partisans - SN) on an unlimited scale force us to respond to their executions and terror with merciless terror of our entire people, thirsting for tranquility, peace and free labor,” Kaminsky said in the text of his order dated May 8, 1942.

The wave of terror resulted, according to archival data, in a large number of victims. “In order to fight against the same partisans, the villages of Krasnaya Sloboda, Terebushka, Chern, Gavrilova Guta, Kokorevka, Kokushkino, Chukhrai, Smiliz, Igritskoye, Dobrovolsky, Altukhovo, Shushuyevo were completely burned, and their inhabitants were forcibly evicted to other areas. According to the State Extraordinary Commission, which conducted investigations into the activities of the RONA, its punishers executed 10,000 people during the existence of the republic, and more than two hundred were burned alive, ”says Pavel Sutulin, responding to the apology of the "Lokot Republic" performed by a journalist Sergei Veryovkin. From the Brasovsky district of the Bryansk region alone, 7,000 people were driven to Germany for forced labor.

Desertion from the RONA was punishable by imprisonment for a period of three years, with a mandatory complete confiscation of property. And for gross violations of discipline, for example, murders motivated by drunkenness, they were shot in the Lokot Republic. The executioner of the Lokotsky District Antonina Makarova ("Tonka the Machine Gunner") carried out the death sentences. She shot about 1,500 people, including partisans, their families, women and teenagers (she was exposed by the KGB only in the late 70s and sentenced to death, shot in 1978).

“The RONA soldiers had to participate directly in the battles with the Red Army. The first combat clashes between the “Kaminians” and the latter took place during the so-called “Sevsky raid”, or the Dmitriev-Sevskaya offensive operation, which took place in late February - March 1943. On the orders of the German command, some parts of the RONA were platoon and company merged into the German and Hungarian units, and German officers were sent to each battalion of the “Kaminians”, ”say Zhukov and Kovtun.

After the failure of the German operation "Citadel", RONA left the Lokotsky district. “On August 5, 1943, Kaminsky issued Order No. 233 on the evacuation of the military and civilian structures of the Lokotsky District, as well as the local population, which “does not want to live in Bolshevik hell,” to Belarus. At the cost of enormous efforts, this task was completed, and on August 26, 1943, units of the RONA (up to 7,000 people) with equipment, the civil administration, members of their families, as well as anti-Soviet civilians (about 30 thousand people) were loaded and evacuated by rail to district of the Belarusian city of Lepel, ”we read in the study of Zhukov and Kovtun. In Belarus, the "Kamins" did the same as in the Bryansk, Oryol and Kursk regions, and the ranks of the RONA were replenished, including by Belarusian policemen. In Lepel, the Kaminsky unit changed its name and became known as the Kaminsky People's Army Brigade (Volksheer-Brigade Kaminski).

For successful actions in the fight against the "forest bandits" Kaminsky by January 1944 received several medals for the "Eastern peoples", and on January 27 the Germans awarded him the Iron Cross of the 2nd class, and then, after the defeat of the partisan "1st Anti-Fascist Brigade" (which consisted of "double defectors" - from former soldiers of the 1st Russian national SS brigade "Druzhina"), and the Iron Cross 1st class.

July 30, 1944 Kaminsky arrived in Rastenburg to meet with Heinrich Himmler. The head of the "Black Order" thanked Kaminsky for the successful actions of the brigade and personally awarded him the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, and also awarded him the rank of Waffen Brigadeführer. On August 1, the Main Operational Directorate of the SS issued an order to create the 29th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division / Russian No. 1 / (29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS / Russische Nr. 1) based on the RONA. Soon the Germans attracted the "Kaminians" to suppress the Warsaw Uprising.

Russians in Warsaw

SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach - executioner of Warsaw

In journalistic literature there is an assertion that Russian collaborators became almost the main force of this Nazi operation. However, it is not. Zhukov and Kovtun tell in detail about the participation of RONA in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising:

“The fact that the RONA soldiers were involved in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising, Kaminsky learned while in Berlin. He, writes the historian Konstantin Semyonov, received Himmler's telegram with the following content: "I am waiting for your help in this matter."

Upon arrival at the formation, Kaminsky held a meeting, which was attended by the chief of staff of the division I.N. th, 2nd and 5th regiments I.F. Frolov, Golyakov and Romanov, commander of a separate guards battalion Burygin. Kaminsky said that the unit was renamed the division of the German SS troops and assigned to it No. 29; he was promoted to the rank of major general and ordered to send part of the division to Warsaw. Each regiment commander must allocate 400 people (“according to the battalion of reliable people”). It was necessary to form a combined regiment under the command of the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer SS I. D. Frolov (Chief of Staff of the Waffen-Hauptsturmführer SS Nochevkin) and prepare for the transfer to the former Polish capital.

The consolidated regiment was formed from both family and unmarried servicemen, and consisted of four rifle battalions, four T-34, Su-76 tanks and two 122-mm howitzers. The number of the regiment, according to German documents, was 1,700 people, according to the testimony of division officers I. D. Frolov and P. R. Mayorov - from 1,500 to 1,600 people.

In the early morning of August 3, the personnel boarded vehicles and moved to the designated area. On August 8, the regiment arrived in the village of Rakov, located four kilometers southwest of Warsaw. The next day, Kaminsky arrived at the unit with an order from the German command to advance.

Frolov's regiment was included in the battle group of the SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops and the police, Heinz Reinefarth - it was he who von dem Bach instructed to suppress the uprising. The Reinefart combat group was divided into several operational formations that carried out the cleansing of Warsaw - these were the Rek, Rohr, Dirlewanger, Schmidt combat groups, the Sarnov cover group, etc. Each group was assigned a site, divided into sectors.

On August 9, the subordinates of Frolov and Nochevkin became part of the battle group of Major General Günther Rohr. Parts of the latter operated in the “South” sector, sector “D”. In addition to the “Kamins”, the Ror group (total number of 6161 people, according to R. Michaelis - 12,700 people) included the 627th engineer battalion, engineer company No. 500, the 80th anti-aircraft regiment, the III division of the artillery regiment 5- of the SS Panzer Division “Viking”, security police units of Colonel V. Rodewald and the Birknet SD team. The unit was tasked with clearing the quarters from the rebels in the areas of Volya, Okhota, Oketsie and Mokotov.

"Kamintsy" fought against the rebels, entrenched in the Okhota region. The firing points of the Poles were suppressed with the help of artillery. Participants in those battles recalled how Frolov personally fired from a 122-mm howitzer at houses, from where AK fighters offered resistance.

The battles for residential quarters were distinguished by great cruelty, both sides did not take prisoners. Already on the first day, when the offensive from Rakov to Okhota was carried out, the “Kaminians” had to go on the defensive, since the losses from the insurgents’ fire were sensitive (50 people were killed and wounded). But, having got used to it, the RONA soldiers began to push the Poles, clearing street after street.

On August 11, the Kaminians tried to take over a factory in the suburbs of Warsaw. After some time, one of the battalion commanders arrived at the headquarters of the regiment and reported to Frolov that it was impossible to take the factory by force of the infantry. Frolov reported this to Kaminsky. Then Kaminsky personally took control of the battle. On August 12, after a two-hour battle, the factory was taken. The regiment lost about 70 men. For this battle, Kaminsky and Shavykin were presented by the German command for awards, which they received on August 18.

On August 16, RONA soldiers continued to fight in the streets. After clearing several blocks, the assault groups stopped. Three German tanks that supported the SS with fire were burned. In this battle, the Kaminians lost another 40 people killed and wounded. Subsequently, the regiment lost daily from 5 to 20 people.

By August 19, the Okhota region was more than half cleared of the rebels, but the “Kamins” in 10 days could not complete the task to the end - to reach the Vistula River in their area. Having accepted Kaminsky's proposal, the German command decided to change the regiment. Frolov received an order to advance to an area located 25–30 km northwest of Warsaw and comb the forests where Polish partisans had become more active.

Historians sometimes explain the withdrawal of the regiment from Warsaw by the fact that discipline among the “Kaminians” seriously fell, they killed several Germans and robbed the population. Some facts of this kind actually took place. But it should be remembered that the Germans themselves gave carte blanche to marauding actions. RONA fighters seized the things of the civilian population, but not in such numbers as other parts of the SS and the Wehrmacht. In the first ten days of the uprising alone, the Germans took out about 7,000 railway wagons with various property. The SS men of Dirlewanger were the absolute leaders in this matter.

It is impossible to talk about the decisive role of the Kaminians in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, even just based on numbers. Hitler sent 16,696 SS fighters to suppress the Warsaw Uprising, of which only 1,700 were Kaminians. This, of course, does not whitewash the "Kaminians" at all. They behaved in Warsaw like real occupiers. However, statements about the decisive role of Russian collaborators in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising do not simplify the already difficult relations between the Polish and Russian peoples.

Warsaw Uprising of the Polish people against the Nazi invaders broke out in the Polish capital on August 1, 1944 and ended on October 2 of the same year with the defeat of the rebels and their signing of the act of surrender. This tragic date has been celebrated annually in Poland for 70 years. To this day, it is precisely around the history of this event that fierce political and scientific discussions are being conducted. Controversial issues, for example, include allegations that the Soviet leadership, when the uprising began, did not want to help it, deliberately suspended the offensive of the Soviet troops, waiting for the Nazis to crack down on the Warsaw people and eliminate the leadership of the uprising, which was undesirable for the USSR, representing the interests of the Polish government. in exile.

The key factors to be taken into account when considering the position of the USSR regarding the events in Warsaw are the following two circumstances. Firstly, with none of the countries that were to be liberated by the Red Army during the hostilities in 1944-1945. and being allies within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition, the USSR did not have such difficult relations as with Poland. The main "pain point" in relations between the two states was the problem of the Soviet-Polish border. The issue of borders was closely linked to the problem of maintaining in power in Poland those political forces that uncompromisingly defended the inviolability of the pre-war borders of 1939, the entry of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine into Poland, and, accordingly, the preservation of the former pre-war political regime with its foreign policy concepts. After the defeat of Poland by Germany in September 1939, a Polish government in exile was formed in France (later in London), headed by General V. Sikorsky. Until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it took a hostile position towards the USSR, based on the concept of "two historical enemies of Poland": Germany and Russia. On July 30, 1941, an agreement was signed between the government of the USSR and the government of Poland in exile on the restoration of diplomatic relations and the creation of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR. The question of the Soviet-Polish border between the two countries remained open.

Secondly, the internal political situation in Poland was characterized by a lack of unity in the ranks of the Polish resistance movement, represented mainly by two political currents: one - led by the government in exile in London and its representatives in the country, the other - based on anti-fascist and underground organizations left-wing led by the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), formed in January 1942. The Armed Forces, the Craiova Army (AK), created on the territory of Poland occupied by the Germans in February 1942 on the basis of the Union of Armed Struggle, were subordinate to the London government, which united a significant number of groups and organizations in its ranks. Under the conditions of occupation, an extensive administrative and political structure was created on Polish territory, subordinate to the Polish emigrant government and called the "underground state". The goal of the Polish government in exile and the AK command on Polish territory was to recreate the Polish state within the pre-1939 borders.

At the end of 1943, when the imminent entry of Soviet troops into Poland became obvious, the AK command, in accordance with the directives of the government in exile, developed a plan under the conspiratorial name "Buzha" ("Storm"). It provided for the occupation by the Home Army of the cities left by the Nazis and the establishment of the authority of the émigré government in them before the Soviet troops approached them. The implementation of the plan was supposed to involve 70-80 thousand soldiers and officers of the AK, stationed mainly in the eastern and southeastern regions of Poland, as well as in the territories of Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Under certain conditions (for example, during the rapid retreat of the enemy from Poland), an armed uprising was not ruled out.

On April 25, 1943, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with the government of Sikorsky (after his death in July 1943, the cabinet was headed by S. Mikolajczyk). The reason for the rupture of relations was the support by the émigré government of the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign launched by the Nazis about the "Katyn case". I.V. Stalin laid the blame for the rupture of relations on the Polish government, accusing it of complicity with the Nazi fascists.

With the approach of Soviet troops to the borders of Poland, the military goal of the AK became the implementation of the aforementioned “Storm” plan, so that the advancing Soviet and allied Polish troops created on the territory of the USSR would already find the formed power apparatus subordinate to the emigre government in the liberated territory. In addition, the AK had to be ready for action against those Polish political forces that were in opposition to the government in exile and were military-politically oriented towards the USSR. The main calculation was made on the fact that, regardless of the success of Operation Storm, the Polish question would become the subject of discussion in England, the USA and the USSR, which would force Moscow to make concessions.

Historians have not yet been able to accurately determine the size of the Home Army. Be that as it may, in the spring of 1944, according to various estimates, there were from 300 thousand to 380 thousand members of the army in its ranks. , the accumulation of weapons, reconnaissance, etc. Having proclaimed the tactics of waiting, the London émigré government through its press organ "Information Bulletin" constantly opposed the partisan struggle in Poland, declaring calls to fight the invaders "harmful agitation of the Comintern", "Soviet sabotage". Nevertheless, many ordinary commanders and soldiers of the AK sought to contribute to the liberation of Poland from fascism. Together with sabotage groups, they attacked transport, communications, and railroads. objects. In 1944, more than 60 bridges and 5,000 vehicles were destroyed, 130 large warehouses and military installations were burned, and a large number of acts of sabotage were carried out.

To consolidate the left forces and unite the Polish people, on the basis of the political platform of the Polish Workers' Party and on its initiative, on January 1, 1944, the Craiova Rada Narodova (KRN) was formed - the supreme body of the national democratic front. At the same time, it was decided to unite all partisan groups, armed detachments and military formations of the left forces into the People's Army (AL). However, by the summer of 1944, the AL numbered only up to 60 thousand people in its ranks and did not represent a real military force. Soviet support for the KRN strengthened the new system of power created by the Polish communists. In May 1944, the KRN was actually recognized by the USSR.

After the suspension of Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations, the USSR showed a willingness to compromise and resume dialogue with the leaders of the Polish government in exile. The political conditions for the start of negotiations, put forward by the Soviet side, were the rejection of the anti-Soviet policy by the émigré government, the settlement of its relations with the Polish democratic camp, and the recognition of the Polish-Soviet border along the so-called Curzon Line. These conditions were set out in the Statement of the Soviet government of January 11, 1944. The London government rejected these proposals, in turn putting forward the demand for the establishment of a demarcation line east of Vilnius and Lvov and the transfer of control in the east of it to the Soviet administration under the control of the Western Allies.

Thus, the London government and the politicians who led the "Underground State" and the Home Army on Polish territory continued to stubbornly adhere to the orientation towards the assistance of the Western Allies in keeping Poland within the pre-war borders. Such an ideological attitude inevitably led to conflict with the Soviet side. Thus, the Craiova Army and that part of the population that supported it became hostages of this concept, far from political realism and taking into account the specific historical circumstances associated with the inevitability of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army.

W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt were realists in assessing the military-political situation and did not see any real force that could prevent the USSR from taking advantage of the results of the offensive actions of the Red Army in Poland. Most importantly, the Western allies clearly understood that the USSR would inevitably achieve a solution to the issue of Poland's eastern borders by military means. Churchill's attempts to persuade Prime Minister S. Mikolajczyk to recognize the "Curzon Line" are well known. When discussing the Polish problem in Quebec (September 1944), Churchill, in a conversation with Roosevelt, tried to dissociate himself from the ill-considered, limited and selfish policy of the Polish government in exile, to show his non-participation in it. On February 22, 1944, Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, declared that "only the Russian armies, which have lost millions of people destroying the German military machine, can liberate Poland at the present time."

As the Red Army troops advanced through the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Lithuania, the AK command forbade the fighters to join the Polish units of the Polish Army formed in the USSR. All this laid the foundation for distrust between the AK and the Soviet troops, as well as between various Polish political forces and military formations. Already during the battles for Kovel in March 1944, it became clear that the political directives of the AK command ran counter not only to the situation at the front, but also to the interests of the liberation of Poland. The Soviet leadership decided to stop any combat interaction with the forces of the Home Army. On July 7, 1944, AK detachments made an attempt to capture Vilnius before the Red Army troops entered it, losing about 500 soldiers in the process. In the end, Vilnius was liberated on July 13 by the waxes of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Trying to establish its administrative authority on this territory and refusing to obey the command of the 1st Polish Army, the AK command put its units in a conflict situation with the troops of the Red Army, which led to individual cases of armed clashes and, as a result, to the disarmament of the Polish units. On July 23, AK fighters made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Lvov on their own. Lviv was liberated on July 27 by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Attempts by the local AK command to establish their own administration only exacerbated the situation. On July 14, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the USSR issued a directive to the commanders of the troops of the three Belorussian Fronts and the 1st Ukrainian Front on the disarmament of the Polish armed detachments subordinate to the Polish government in exile.

It is quite obvious that there could be no question of the liberation of Poland without the liquidation of powerful Wehrmacht groupings, which by the summer of 1944 had more than 170 divisions in the central direction. It was on the Polish territory that ran in 1944-1945. the main strategic direction in which the outcome of the war was largely decided. More than half of the Soviet active army - five fronts - participated in battles on Polish soil, although the length of the front line in Poland amounted to no more than 25% of the entire Soviet-German front.

The Warsaw Uprising was preceded by a series of interconnected events of a military, political and diplomatic nature.

On July 6, 1944, a delegation of the Craiova Rada Narodova arrived in Moscow from Warsaw across the front line. The delegation assumed the authority to regulate interstate relations between the two countries. According to the memoirs of the marshal, it was at this time, on July 8, 1944, at a dacha near Moscow, questions were discussed about the possibility of an exit of Soviet troops to the Vistula. These goals were envisaged by the plan of the Kovel offensive operation. After breaking through the enemy defenses, the main blow was to be delivered in the general direction to Deblin and further along the eastern bank of the river. The Vistula to Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), and the 47th Army with one tank and one cavalry corps - through Parchev, Lukov - to Sedlec. The plan of operation was approved at the same time. At the same time, together with representatives of the Craiova Rada Narodova B. Bierut, E. Osubka-Moravsky, M. Rola-Zhymersky, it was decided that the first city where the KRN would deploy its activities would be Lublin.

In the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of July 21, 1944, it was ordered to seize the city of Lublin no later than July 26-27. At the same time, it was emphasized that "this is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of an independent democratic Poland." On June 22, 1944, at a meeting with the Polish delegation of the KRN in the Kremlin, I.V. Stalin emphasized that the crossing of the Bug line by the Red Army was a matter of the near future, and it was in Poland's interests to prepare to take control of the liberated territory into their own hands. The delegation of representatives of the KRN, which repeatedly met with the Soviet leadership, was preparing to create the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKNO), which was proclaimed in the liberated Polish city of Chelm on July 21, 1944.

In the period from July 17 to 20, Soviet troops, together with units of the 1st Polish Army, created in the USSR, entered the territory of Poland. On July 24, 1944, Lublin was liberated.

After the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory, as well as the conclusion on July 26 and 27, 1944, of an agreement with the PKNO on the Soviet-Polish border along the Curzon Line and on the relationship between the Soviet commander-in-chief and the Polish administration, the PKNO was de facto recognized as the only authority in the liberated territory, and the Polish Army is the only military force in Poland recognized by the USSR. “No other authorities, including those of the Polish emigrant “government” in London, except for the Polish Committee of National Liberation, should be recognized,” the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of July 31, 1944 stated.

The command of the 1st Belorussian Front immediately before the uprising, in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of July 27, 1944, planned to go to the Vistula and seize bridgeheads, and not later than August 5-8, capture the suburbs of Warsaw - Prague. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of 29.7.44 stated that "fighters and commanders who distinguished themselves in forcing the Vistula will receive special awards with orders up to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

At the same time, as archival documents testify, this task was unrealistic. The troops traveled hundreds of kilometers in combat, suffered heavy losses, had extended communications, which made it difficult to supply the fronts with logistics. On the night of 31.7 to 1.8, units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Vistula immediately, without appropriate preparation.

Almost at the moment the Soviet troops entered Polish territory, the commander of the Home Army, General T. Bur-Komorowski, on July 21, 1944, issued an order on the state of readiness to wait for a signal for an uprising from one in the morning on July 25. This decision was approved on July 23-24 by the Main Commission of the Rada of Unity Narodova (an underground body of the Polish state, created by representatives of supporters of the Polish government in exile). The issue of the uprising in Warsaw was discussed at a meeting of the government in exile in London on July 25, 1944, then it was decided to give the highest political representative of the Polish government in occupied Poland the right to start an uprising at any moment he chose. The purpose of the uprising was to capture Warsaw before it was occupied by units of the Red Army and to place an émigré government headed by S. Mikolajczyk there.

The uprising plan developed by the AK headquarters proceeded from the fact that in the near future the German army itself would leave the Polish capital. The concept of the uprising was based on the possibility of a short (maximum 2-3 days) and relatively bloodless struggle against the retreating German troops. Moreover, in order not to delay their retreat to the west, it was not planned to seize the most important transport communications, including the strategically important bridges across the Vistula.

The order to start the uprising was given by Bur-Komorovsky on 31 July. The basis for this decision was unverified information about the approach of Soviet tanks to the right-bank part of Warsaw - Prague.

The Polish government in exile and the command of the Home Army prepared plans for an uprising in secret from the Soviet leadership, without its consent, clearly not counting on its help and not planning joint actions with the Soviet troops to liberate Warsaw. On the contrary, these plans provided only for the help of the Western allies. On July 27, on the eve of the uprising, representatives of the London government turned to the British side with requests for active assistance in connection with the uprising plan and received the answer that the British government could not satisfy any of these requests. A few days later, the Chief of Staff of the British Ministry of Defense, General G. Ismay, said that help was impossible, whether it be bombing or the transfer of Polish aviation and a parachute brigade to Poland. At the same time, it was explicitly stated that the territory of Poland was included in the zone of operations of the Soviet troops: “The Allies cannot take such actions if they are not coordinated with the Russian offensive, since they should be considered actions carried out in the zone of Russian tactical interests.” Despite this, the leadership of the Home Army decided to revolt.

It is noteworthy that when the order was given to start the uprising in Warsaw, the head of the Polish government in exile, S. Mikolajczyk, was in Moscow.

Recordings of I.V. Stalin and S. Mikołajczyk of August 3 and 9, 1944 testify that the Polish Prime Minister of the government in exile did not turn to Stalin with a request to provide the Red Army with assistance to the rebels by delivering strikes from outside or to coordinate military operations between the rebels and the Soviet troops. Mikolajczyk raised the question only of providing assistance by dropping weapons and food from aircraft. Stalin promised to provide assistance with weapons and send a Soviet liaison officer. At the same time, on August 3, he harshly declared the Soviet political position, in particular that “The Soviet government does not recognize the London Polish government, that it broke off relations with it. At the same time, the Soviet government has actual relations and agreements with the PKNO. Stalin spoke in favor of the fact that before negotiating with Mikolajczyk, as the head of the Polish government, it was necessary to reach an agreement with the PKNO on joining forces and creating a provisional government.

Negotiations that took place on August 8 between Mikolajczyk and the leaders of the PKNO ended inconclusively. And then the Polish Prime Minister of the government in exile did not use the chance to try to really help the rebels in Warsaw. On August 8, Stalin wrote to Churchill: "The conversation with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has unsatisfactory information about the affairs in Poland".

The British side, knowing about the preparations for the uprising, only on August 2, 1944, through a military mission in Moscow, informed the Soviet command that the Polish government in exile in London had received telegrams about the beginning of an armed uprising in Warsaw and with a request "that the Russians help with an immediate attack from outside." On August 5, Stalin sent a rather harsh message to W. Churchill, in which he pointed out that “it is impossible to imagine how several Polish detachments of the so-called Home Army, which has neither artillery, nor aviation, nor tanks, can take Warsaw, while The Germans put up four tank divisions for the defense of Warsaw. The same position of the Soviet government was stated on August 13, 1944 in the TASS Statement, which stated that the Polish government in exile did not make any attempts to notify the Soviet military command in advance and coordinate with them any offensive in Warsaw.

From the very beginning, Stalin reacted negatively to the uprising in Warsaw, which was not coordinated with the Soviet leadership and military command, which he regarded as a political demonstration addressed to Moscow. This is confirmed by the correspondence of the Soviet leader with W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt in August 1944, and especially Stalin's letter to Churchill dated August 16. In particular, he wrote: “After a conversation with Mr. Mikolajczyk, I ordered that the Command of the Red Army intensively drop weapons in the Warsaw area. A liaison paratrooper was also dropped, who, as the command reports, did not achieve his goal, as he was killed by the Germans. Later, having become more familiar with the Warsaw affair, I became convinced that the Warsaw action was a reckless, terrible adventure that would cost the Warsaw people great and unnecessary sacrifices. This would not have happened if the Soviet command had been informed before the start of the uprising and if the Poles had maintained contact with the latter. In the situation that had arisen, the Soviet command came to the conclusion that it should dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, since it could not bear either direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action..

For the German command, the plans of the leadership of the AK regarding the uprising and the time of its beginning were not a secret. The German police received reliable information through their agents who were in the ranks of various units of the Polish Resistance, including AK. This is once again evidenced by the testimony of the commandant of Warsaw, Lieutenant General of the Luftwaffe R. Stagel, who had information that the uprising would begin on August 1, at about 15:30. Thus, the important moment of suddenness of the beginning of the uprising was lost.

By that time, Hitler had thrown additional forces into the defense of Warsaw. Already on July 26, German divisions from Romania, Holland and Italy began to arrive in the city area. The panic in Warsaw among the personnel of the Nazi administration was mistaken for the readiness of the Germans to evacuate the Polish capital. The rebellious Varsovians, armed only with small arms, did not represent a serious military force and were under the threat of imminent destruction. At the beginning of the uprising, the rebels outnumbered the German garrison by up to 35 thousand people - about 20 thousand, but they had only up to 3,500 small arms and ammunition for two or three days of fighting. Only a few of the rebels had any combat experience.

G. Himmler, in an order dated August 1, 1944, following Hitler's instructions, forbade the taking of prisoners and ordered Warsaw to be razed to the ground. Starting on August 4, the Germans began the systematic suppression of the uprising by the forces of the SS, the police, Ukrainian nationalists and the so-called RONA, or "Kaminsky's brigade", which consisted of Vlasovites and other traitors. At the same time, the Nazi command, using the disunity of the rebels, methodically, in turn, destroyed pockets of resistance, using heavy guns, armored trains, tanks and flamethrowers.

The main point around which there are disputes concerning the actions of the troops of the Red Army in the direction of Warsaw is the question of whether or not the Soviet troops deliberately stopped their offensive. It would be more correct, in our opinion, to raise the question of whether the Soviet command in July 1944 planned the liberation of Warsaw at all and whether the slowdown in the advance of the Soviet troops in August 1944 was intentional? We emphasize that the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front No. 220162 dated July 27, 1944 did not provide for the liberation of Warsaw, but set the task, after capturing the settlements of Brest and Sedlec, by August 5-8, to capture Prague and seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narew River in the area of ​​Pultusk and Serock. The left wing of the front was supposed to capture a bridgehead on the Vistula in the area of ​​Deblin, Zvolen, Solets.

The German command tried with all its might to stop the offensive of the Red Army, to maintain the front on the approaches to the eastern borders of Germany and, above all, to hold the lines of the Nareva and Vistula rivers. As early as July 23, the new chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Colonel-General G. Guderian, ordered that the line of the Vistula and Sana rivers be held by all means. An important role was assigned to the retention of Warsaw - the center of communications and a possible place for crossing the Vistula with large masses of troops in the event that the Red Army captured bridges in the city. Therefore, the main tank grouping of Army Group Center was created on the outskirts of the city.

It should be pointed out that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops, as a result of which they moved forward by 500-600 km, slowed down in mid-July 1944. If from July 5 to July 17, Soviet troops advanced 120-200 km at an average rate of 10-16.6 km per day, then in the second half of July the advance of troops amounted to 60-120 km with an average rate of 4-12.6 km per day. The fatigue of the troops and their separation from the supply bases affected. Thus, the 6th Air Army, which interacted with the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, had not yet had time to relocate aircraft to new airfields closer to the front line and experienced difficulties in transporting fuel. On July 29, in the presence of almost 1400 aircraft, only 95 were made, and on July 30 - 232 sorties for operations on different sectors of the front.

By August 1, i.e. By the beginning of the Warsaw Uprising, the enemy managed to concentrate significant forces, which included five tank divisions, in the direction of the offensive of the Soviet 2nd Panzer Army. These forces, relying on the Warsaw fortified region, offered stubborn resistance to the Soviet troops, and on August 3 went on the offensive from the Radzymin region in the direction of Volomin. Thus, the situation of the 2nd Soviet Tank Army, deprived of the support of rifle units and air cover, became very serious.

The fact that the situation had changed, the command of the 2nd Panzer Army found out only on the morning of July 31, when an enemy counterattack hit the army formations from three sides. Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and the 19th Panzer Division from Prague, the 4th Panzer Division from the north, and the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" from the east, attacked Soviet troops, which were under the threat of encirclement.

In this situation, already at 4:10 am on August 1, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army received an order to go on the defensive. The Soviet troops of the 2nd Panzer Army suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment. After a lost battle in the Volomin area, the 2nd Panzer Army was withdrawn from the battle. By this time, 27 tanks and self-propelled guns remained in it; 689 tanks and 146 self-propelled guns of various systems were missing. So there is no need to talk about any deliberate nature of slowing down the pace of the offensive in this case.

During August 1944, the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front fought protracted and stubborn battles in order to capture the Prague region. However, due to the resistance of the German tank divisions, lack of ammunition and fuel, the task of capturing Prague, set by the directive of the Headquarters of July 27, was not completed. For the same reasons, the struggle for the expansion of bridgeheads on the Vistula developed extremely slowly. The commander of the 8th Guards Army reported on the difficulties in forcing this river, pointing out that the offensive was slowed down by enemy aircraft, which "acted with impunity" (440 aircraft). There was also a lack of transportation facilities. By August 7, the 8th Guards Army, having captured the bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula, went on the defensive.

It should be noted that the Soviet command did not remain indifferent to the fate of the rebels. It is important that as early as August 8, 1944, when Mikolaichik was actively negotiating in Moscow, Marshals G.K. Zhukov and were presented "considerations on the further actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the outline of a plan for conducting the Warsaw operation." This project provided for the possibility of starting the Warsaw operation after the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the line of the river. Narew and capturing a bridgehead on its western bank in the Pultusk, Serock section. To assist the 69th, 8th Guards armies and other formations of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, it was necessary to transfer the 1st Panzer Army of Katukov from the 1st Ukrainian Front to the 1st Belorussian Front. Under the most favorable conditions, the operation could only begin on August 25, 1944.

German defense on the outskirts of the river. Narew turned out to be unexpectedly strong, so only in early September, Soviet troops managed to capture bridgeheads on the Narew River. The general strategic situation in the direction of action of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts also developed unfavorably. It is between the river Neman and Warsaw, the Nazi command managed to organize stubborn resistance on the outskirts of East Prussia. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front only at the end of August reached the Augustow, Ostrow-Mazowiecki line, and in September they threw the enemy back to the river. Narew. To these facts, one can add the fact that the transfer of the 1st Tank Army from the 1st Ukrainian Front to the 1st Belorussian Front, proposed by the draft plan for the Warsaw operation, was also not carried out, since in the period from August 5 to 22, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian front fought fierce battles to repel the counteroffensive of large enemy forces (8 tank, 14 infantry divisions), seeking to push the Soviet troops to the eastern bank of the Vistula.

From what has been said, it follows that the start of the operation to liberate Warsaw on August 25 in accordance with the plan of August 8 was out of the question. Moreover, during this period there was a constant strengthening of the enemy grouping and the accumulation of reserves. The number of divisions in the reserve of the enemy's Warsaw grouping increased from 5 to 12 divisions. At the same time, on the central sector of the front, the Nazi troops fought to eliminate the protrusion of Soviet troops in the area northeast of Warsaw and the bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula in the area southeast of the city. It was noted that a large number of reinforcements arrived in the enemy tank divisions operating in the Warsaw and Radom directions.

Of course, it can be assumed that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command could find strategic reserves to support the actions of the 1st Belorussian Front. But then the general strategic plans would have to be changed. Indeed, just at the end of August 1944, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts launched an offensive in the Balkan direction. By the end of the month, Marshal Zhukov left for the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to prepare an operation in Bulgaria. On August 29, the Slovak National Uprising began, the provision of assistance to which was also included in the plans of the Soviet leadership.

On August 15, the Soviet leadership refused to provide Soviet airfields for the landing of Western Allied aircraft flying to Warsaw, explaining that the uprising in Warsaw "is a purely adventurous matter" and "The Soviet Government does not want to associate itself either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw ".

The unfavorable development of the military situation in the Warsaw direction did not change Stalin's assessment of the uprising as an "adventure", and during this period he only used the situation to confirm this in the face of public opinion in the West.

Churchill ordered over 100 bombers to be sent to Warsaw during the three nights of August 13-16 in order to parachute weapons, ammunition and food for the Polish insurgents. At the same time, a categorical order was given to drop the cargo from a height of 150-200 m. No signals and frequencies for communication with the Russians and the coordinates of the location of the Soviet units were given. The British pilots courageously carried out this order, at the same time calling it "suicidal and senseless", since, according to the pilots themselves, the aviation suffered significant losses, and could not provide serious assistance to the rebels.

According to eyewitnesses, only an insignificant part of the dropped cargo fell to the rebels. For example, in the report of a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin dated September 22, 1944 noted: “British and American aviation, dropping cargo, does not actually help the rebels, but supplies the Germans ... . Dropping was carried out from a height of 4000 meters ... From this height, it is almost impossible to count on dropping into areas occupied by the rebels ". After September 18, no cargo drops were made by the Western Allies.

A fairly eloquent assessment of the "assistance" of the Western allies was given by the governor of the Warsaw district, Gruppenführer L. Fischer. In his report after the suppression of the uprising in the autumn of 1944, he wrote: “In the hope of this help from Great Britain, the Poles began to fight. And they were again deeply disappointed, because for 63 days to help the Warsaw Poles, Great Britain and America used only a small part of the aircraft that they had abandoned at that time for the almost daily bombing of German cities. This behavior is fully consistent with the style of the UK. Britain's claim to provide guarantees to the Polish Republic was trampled as early as 1939. During the uprising, Poland was all the more betrayed ... ".

The command of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Army of the Polish Army did not stand aside from helping the rebels, both with artillery and air strikes, and in logistical terms. Only in the period from September 13 to October 1, 1944, 4821 sorties were made, including 1361 for bombing and attacking the enemy in Warsaw and 2435 for dropping various military cargoes.

During August, repelling the attacks of the rebels on the bridges, the Germans ensured that Warsaw was cut off from its suburbs of Prague and the uprising was suppressed on the right, eastern bank of the Vistula, the division of the uprising areas along the main transport arteries, and later, after blowing up the bridges on September 13, the rebels were cut off from the Soviet and Polish troops. In addition to the central section, which included Wola, Śródmieście, Powiśle and Staroe Miasto, the rebels fought separately on Zholiborz, Mokotuv, Chernyakuw and Selcy.

In late August - early September, Warsaw, which was fighting, found itself in a critical situation. Having captured the urban areas of Volya and Okhota, the Nazis finally occupied Staro Miasto on September 2. The defenders of the Old Town numbered about 7,200 fighters, thanks to the courage and stamina of which the attacks of the von dem Bach corps, almost twice as numerous, were repulsed. Underground sewer passages managed to bring 1,500 armed and about 3,000 unarmed soldiers of the AK and AL to the area of ​​Sredmiestie. In an unequal battle, about 3 thousand rebels died. In total, as a result of hostilities and barbaric bombardments, as well as mass executions, about 40 thousand inhabitants of the Old Town were killed.

By September 6, the Nazis captured the Powisle area up to the line of Novy Svyat Street, and thus almost completed the plan to cut off the rebels from the Vistula. The military operations of the German forces were accompanied by attempts by the German command to persuade the rebels to surrender with the help of promises of "good treatment." However, despite these promises, the Nazi formations treated the civilian population and captured rebels brutally. After taking the Old Town, they dealt with the wounded rebels left in the hospital basements, as well as with sick old people and other civilians. The civilian population, which heroically helped the insurgents in the first weeks of the uprising, saw no end to the torment, lost faith in the expediency of the action, and cases of desertion became more frequent. On September 7, the Rada of Unity of the People decided to start negotiations with the Germans. On the same day, a delegation of the Polish Red Cross set off for negotiations on the withdrawal of part of the civilian population from the battlefields. At one of its meetings, the Craiova Rada of Ministers decided to lay responsibility for the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising mainly on the USSR and use it in propaganda work. capitulation with the delegation of the Polish Red Cross. At the same time, the German side expressed its readiness to come to an agreement with the AK command.

In turn, the Warsaw leadership of the PPR and AL at that time made attempts to persuade the command of the AK to establish contacts with the Soviet command, however, the commander of the Warsaw district of the AK, Colonel A. Khruszel ("Monter") stated that he was personally against surrender, but did not have powers to establish cooperation with the Red Army.

On September 7, the leadership of the PPR decided to send its representatives across the front line to Lublin. The delegation of the PPR, headed by H. Yavorskaya, crossed the Vistula on the night of September 12-13, and then, with the help of the soldiers of the 47th Army, reached Lublin. In parallel, the AL command on Zoliborz also made efforts to establish contact with the command of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, sending its delegation of three people across the Vistula. Arriving at the headquarters of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, the Polish representatives informed the Soviet command and headquarters of the 1st Army of the Polish Army about the situation in Warsaw. From them, the Soviet military command for the first time learned details about the uprising, the location and state of the rebel forces.

The further position of the AK command on the issue of surrender was influenced by the successful actions of the Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Vistula, as well as a radiogram from S. Mikolajczyk with a message about the decision of the Soviet government to give England's consent to joint actions to help Warsaw, to shuttle flights of American aircraft to airfields in THE USSR. In the new situation, General Bur-Komorovsky on September 11, at a meeting of the Craiova Rada of Ministers, opposed the surrender. The Germans, in turn, appointed the deadline for surrender - September 11 at 1.00. When the deadline passed, they scattered leaflets signed by General von dem Bach, announcing that since "German assurances unprecedented in world history" had been rejected, they would strive to end this struggle. The announcement was accompanied by heavy bombardments and intensified attacks by German troops, directed primarily at the areas along the Vistula.

Only on September 14, 1944, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front managed to liberate the suburb of Warsaw - Prague. From September 13, a regular massive transfer of goods to the rebels was organized. Until October 1, 1944, in order to assist the Warsaw insurgents, Soviet aviation carried out 4821 sorties, including 2435 to drop cargo, 100 to suppress enemy air defense systems in the city of Warsaw in the cargo drop area, to bombard and attack enemy troops in the city of Warsaw at the request of the insurgents - 1361, to cover the areas occupied by the insurgents, and for reconnaissance - 925.

From the memoirs of S. M. Shtemenko, it is known that on September 13, Stalin ordered Marshal Zhukov to go to the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front and “deal with Warsaw” on the spot. "Can't Stalin asked. - there to conduct a private operation to force the Vistula precisely by the troops of Berling[Z. Berling - Commander of the 1st Army of the Polish Army]".

After the liberation of the Warsaw suburbs of Prague, the possibilities for providing assistance to the insurgents and the population of Warsaw improved. The Soviet government transmitted through London to the AK command in Warsaw the ciphers and communication method necessary to establish contacts with the radio station of Marshal Rokossovsky, and on September 15 the headquarters of the Polish commander in London handed over to the Soviet mission the call signs and ciphers of communication with the AK radio station. At the same time, General Komorowski decided to send signal officers to the suburbs of Prague, who arrived there on the night of September 19-20. On the night of September 21, Captain Ivan Kolos, a liaison officer of the 1st Belorussian Front, landed in the area of ​​​​Srodmiescie in Warsaw to establish contacts with AK and AL. However, coordination of operational actions between the leadership of the uprising and the Soviet command was not carried out, although direct radio communication was established on September 24.

On September 17, G.K. Zhukov reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command: “The main forces of the 1st Polish Army in the near future will have the task of capturing the southern part of Warsaw, approximately from May 3 Alley, Jerusalem Alley to the Henrykow area, and, having gained a foothold, lead in the future operation to the north, presumably covering the city from the southwest. The plan also called for establishing contact with the rebel group occupying the northern part of the city, and organizing an attack from the north to meet the southern attack. At the same time, the 47th and 70th armies of the 1st Belorussian Front continued their operations north of Prague.

Starting from September 16, units of the 1st Polish Army began to cross the right bank of the Vistula, which fought along with the rebels. However, the operation ended in failure. The losses of the 1st Army of the Polish Army from 2614 people who crossed to the western bank of the Vistula amounted to 1987 people killed and missing, and the total losses for September were 4857 people. By September 23, the bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula had to be abandoned. The failure of the operation was caused by the significant numerical and fire superiority of the enemy in the landing area of ​​the Polish troops.

After the decision of the Soviet command on September 22 to withdraw all units of the 1st Polish Army from the western bank of the Vistula to the eastern bank, they made an attempt to prepare and launch an offensive around Warsaw and create a bridgehead for this between the Narew and the Bug. The operation was scheduled to begin on October 4-5. But by this time Warsaw had already capitulated. In addition, on October 4, the enemy launched an offensive against the troops of the 65th Army on the Serotsky bridgehead. Only on October 19 did the Soviet troops manage to restore their former position. At the end of October 1944, Stalin gave up hope for a quick liberation of the capital of Poland. On November 12, 1944, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the defensive.

The testimonies of the Soviet intelligence officer Ivan Kolos and the Poles who crossed the front line after the defeat of the uprising speak not only of the heroic resistance of the Varsovians, but also of the actions of the leadership of the Home Army, who were preparing to surrender when it was still possible to fight, and did not want to make efforts to organize joint actions with soldiers of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. According to the rebels, the authority of the London government in exile and General Komorowski fell sharply, the participants in the uprising became more and more convinced of their treacherous role. In Warsaw, they said about General Komorowski: "The best punishment for him would be to give him into the hands of women who have to hide in cellars." Since the main insurgent forces were concentrated in the central part of Warsaw, the Germans were able to create a defense front on the western bank of the Vistula, cut off the insurgents from the 47th Army, create powerful fire barriers on the river itself, and make it extremely difficult to force the Vistula from Prague, which made it extremely difficult to provide Soviet and Polish troops to help the insurgents. The passivity of the AK command in relation to the support of the landed units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army caused great damage to the uprising.

On September 25, von dem Bach sent two captured AK officers with a new offer of surrender, with the assurance that the AK soldiers would be treated as combatants. At the same time, he expressed the hope that "in the future, the German army, together with the Polish one, would fight against the Bolsheviks."

On September 27, after the liquidation of bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula, the Nazis directed the main attack on Mokotow. On the same day, the remaining defenders of the area ceased resistance.

On the night of October 1, 1944, the chief delegate of the Polish London government in Poland, J. Jankowski, and the commander of the AK, General T. Bur-Komorowski, recognizing the situation of the uprising participants as hopeless, decided to capitulate on the terms proposed by the Germans. Under the terms of the surrender, the commander of the AK himself, the composition of the main headquarters, all the officers and soldiers of the Home Army who were in Warsaw were to surrender to the Germans, and the population of Warsaw was evacuated. On October 2, 1944, General Komorowski signed the act of surrender. On the same day, resistance in the city, with the exception of its individual centers, ceased. It should be emphasized that the Soviet command proposed to the leadership of the AK that its troops, under the cover of Soviet artillery and aviation, break through to the right bank of the Vistula. However, the commander of the AK, General Bur-Komorovsky, preferred to surrender to the Germans, giving an order to do so to his subordinate troops.

It is known that the vast majority of the soldiers of the People's Army did not surrender, but left Warsaw together with the population. Some reached the partisan detachments in Poland. The evacuation operation prepared by the 2nd Division of the 1st Army of the Polish Army was supposed to transport the entire two thousandth grouping of the Home Army to Zholibozh beyond the Vistula, but its commander refused this when he received the order from General Komorowski to surrender to the Germans. Most of the Home Army soldiers surrendered.

According to the commandant of Warsaw R. Stagel, the course of the battles of the German forces “East of the Vistula, the uprising hardly had any effect. The front is strong. Everything that was needed from allowances, the front found on the east coast. Only at first it was sometimes necessary to make a detour through Maudlin. Communication with the west through the city was interrupted only for a short time".

On October 9, the commander of the 9th German Army, General von Foremann, announced that he had received A. Hitler's order for the complete destruction of Warsaw. During the uprising, about 200 thousand Varsovians died, 40 percent of them were rebels, the rest were civilians. The Nazis who survived were evicted from the city, while 68,707 people were sent to concentration camps, contrary to the terms of the surrender agreement. 87,250 people sent to forced labor in Germany. The Nazis continued to methodically destroy the city for several months. As a result, the capital of Poland was almost completely destroyed and burned.

According to a report from a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, K.F. Telegin, on October 8, crowded rallies were held in the suburbs of Warsaw - Prague, dedicated to the memory of the rebels who died in Warsaw. Funeral services were held in all churches. The Poles who spoke at the rallies condemned the London government, which prematurely provoked the population to an uprising. “The people speak with hatred and contempt about Bur-Komorowski and other traitors, expressing their desire to avenge the victims of Warsaw.”

Without pretending to a comprehensive assessment of the uprising, it should be noted that, despite the geopolitical and other goals of its leaders, far from reality, the uprising acquired an anti-fascist patriotic character. For 63 days, detachments of the Warsaw AK district, with the support of the Hallerovo subdistrict, the Stolpetskaya AK group from the Novogrudek district, as well as the civilian population, fought against the German military and police units. The Warsaw Uprising lasted twice as long as the September 1939 campaign, and the Germans lost about the same number of dead in this battle.

Warsaw was liberated by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front during the Vistula-Oder offensive operation on January 17, 1945. The honor to be the first to enter the Polish capital was given to the 1st Army of the Polish Army under the command of Lieutenant General S. Poplavsky.

In military terms, the actions of the Soviet troops in the Warsaw direction were subject to military expediency and the general military-strategic plans of the Soviet command in the summer-autumn of 1944. The Red Army did not violate any allied obligations in the anti-Hitler coalition and the Soviet soldiers fulfilled their military duty. Only units and formations of the 1st Belorussian Front lost 166,808 people in August and the first half of September (of which 19.2% - in the battles for Prague), and the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front only in August - 122,578 people. These losses increased even more in the second half of September and in October 1944 during the stubborn fighting north of Warsaw to establish and hold the starting positions for the offensive in January 1945.

November 15, 1944 at a meeting with the Polish delegation headed by General S. Spychalsky I.V. Stalin explained why the absence of preliminary agreements and interaction between the rebels and the Red Army led to such tragic consequences. He stated in particular: “We were not asked… we were not consulted. If we were asked, we would not give advice to rebel. The Red Army, which captured more than one large city during the offensive, never took large cities like Warsaw with a frontal attack ... Warsaw could not be taken head-on, because. it is located on the high left bank of the Vistula. Taking Warsaw head-on means destroying the city with artillery and incurring unnecessary sacrifices in the process. A situation similar to Kyiv has been created here ... We did not take Kyiv head-on. We took it bypass. We also wanted to take Warsaw by a detour, but we needed serious preparations for such an operation. It was necessary to bring up at least 40 divisions, a lot of ammunition and food ... It took time. That is why the Red Army temporarily lingered at the walls of Warsaw..

The fighting for the liberation of Poland continued from the middle of summer 1944 until the spring of 1945. The irretrievable losses of the Red Army on Polish territory (within modern borders) amounted to 600,212 people; total losses during strategic operations exceeded 2 million people.

At the Crimean Conference of the leaders of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA in February 1945, an agreement was reached that the Curzon line should be the basis of the Soviet-Polish border.

After the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising, the Soviet leadership finally took the Polish Committee of National Liberation as the basis for all military-political relations with Poland and carried out military-political cooperation with it during the final operations to liberate the country.

In general, despite the existence of various assessments on the issues raised, one cannot ignore the fact that the vital interests of the Polish people during the Second World War required the preservation of a military alliance with the USSR, on which the survival of the Polish people and the fate of the liberation of Poland from Nazi occupation depended.

The Warsaw uprising lasted 63 days, more than 150 thousand civilians and over 15 thousand soldiers of the Home Army were killed, 200 thousand Warsaw residents were sent to forced labor in the Reich, about 70 thousand were deported to concentration camps. Losses on the German side are contradictory - according to various sources, from 2 to 10 thousand people were killed. After the capitulation on October 2, Warsaw was physically destroyed, 85 percent of the city was completely destroyed. The rebels who surrendered were sent to a POW camp. The Polish Journal written in German tells about this.

After the defeat of Poland in 1939, about 85,000 Polish soldiers and many political figures left the country. Initially, they went to France, where already on September 30 the Polish government in exile was formed under the leadership of Vladislav Sikorsky.

After the defeat of France in 1940, most of the military and the government fled to Britain. The Polish resistance was formed in London and submitted to the Sikorsky government, which in turn relied on the army in exile. The first Polish corps fought under British command, and later a Polish squadron was formed. The government in exile also coordinated from London the actions of the Home Army, which during its heyday 1943-1944 numbered about 350,000 armed fighters.

The resistance movement resulted not only in guerrilla actions, many schools, universities, newspapers conducted underground work. After the death of Sikorsky in a plane crash in 1943, the circumstances of which are not fully clarified, the government in exile was headed by Stanislav Mikolajczyk, at which time the government became more and more worried about the borders of the future Poland. The Soviet Union caused general outrage by the execution of Polish officers near Katyn. Two Polish armies were organized in the USSR. Founded in 1943, the Polish Infantry Division. Tadeusz Kosciuszko, under the leadership of Sigmund Bering, fought on the eastern front. The second army was led, it was formed mainly from deported Poles. Her path from the Soviet Union lay through Orenburg to the Middle East, then to North Africa. Eventually Anders' army formed the Second Polish Corps of the British Eighth Army. These 400,000 Polish soldiers fought bravely near Monte Cassino.

In Poland itself, the center of resistance was Warsaw. The Jewish resistance movement Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa - ZOB (Jewish Fighting Organization) started an uprising in the Jewish ghetto, which began on April 19, 1943 - the task of dissolving the ghetto was urgent, because it had long since become clear where people were transported from the ghetto and what happened to them afterwards . The rebels from the ghetto held out until May 16, but were broken by German troops under the leadership of SS General Jurgen Stroop, who ordered the entire area to be burned.

In the summer of 1944, the Home Army could see and hear that the Red Army began a non-stop advance across Poland, seemingly freeing the country piece by piece from Nazi domination. The head of the AK in Poland, Count Bur-Komarovsky, was convinced in July that the planned uprising would begin very soon - if it still makes sense - after all, in the summer of 1944, events such as the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20 and the landing of the Allies in Normandy and their advance in the Western front. In addition, on July 21, 1944, the Communist Polish Committee of People's Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) was founded in Lublin, whose members performed the tasks of a provisional government loyal to the Soviet line.

When the Red Army reached the Eastern Bank of the Vistula, the Home Army - despite the lack of weapons and ammunition - launched the Warsaw Uprising on August 1, 1944, which had the goal, among other things, to liberate the Polish capital to the Red Army, and thus demonstrate the strength and independence of the future Poland . They wanted to welcome the Red Army to a free Warsaw.

But these plans did not materialize. The Red Army stopped all operations on the Vistula and seemed to be watching with interest what was happening on the other side. For Allied aircraft, Stalin closed his airfields, so the British could not help.

Hitler ordered Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, to put down the uprising. Himmler immediately gave the order to kill all the inhabitants of Warsaw - regardless of whether they were rebels, children, women, old people - and the city itself to be razed to the ground. This task was entrusted to SS Gruppenführer Reinefart, under whose leadership were a squad of combat-ready members of the Warsaw garrison, the 20th SS-RONA Grenadier Division, the SS Dirlewanger assault brigade, the Bergman special unit, the SS police unit, and the combined parachute-tank division "Hermann Goering ". Already in the first days of the uprising, German troops killed from 20 to 50 thousand Polish civilians. In order to carry out their task as soon as possible, they evaded direct battles with the Home Army and its subordinate formations as far as possible. The division "Hermann Goering" drove the inhabitants of Warsaw (including children and women), using them as human shields for tanks and forcing them to dismantle the barricades.

About 40 thousand rebels under the leadership of General Count Tadeusz Bur-Komarovsky (1895-1966) took control of a significant part of the city in the first days after the hardest street fighting, before on August 6 German units under the command of SS General Erich von dem Bach-Zelensky ( 1899-1972) changed tactics and gradually gained the upper hand. Special Einsatzgruppen were now tasked with carrying out mass executions. Under Bach's leadership, German forces placed particular emphasis on railroad bridges to control the supply routes to the Ninth Army on the eastern front. For this, tanks, artillery, and aviation were involved, which, however, could not resist the partisan actions of the rebels, who fought bloody battles with an enemy superior to them. On August 21, the Germans managed to push the Polish fighters back to the territory of a small area of ​​1 sq. km. At that time, from 24 to 35 thousand inhabitants lived in this area, all of them were deported for forced labor. By August 1, the Old Town was completely occupied by the Germans. As before during the fighting, the still alive wounded - soldiers and civilians - were shot by the German troops.

Only a few shreds of Warsaw remained for the Polish troops - three city blocks: Zolibozh, Mokotov and part of the center along the western bank of the Vistula, which was first occupied by the Germans in order to contain a possible attack by the Red Army. Bur-Komarovsky, the situation seemed hopeless, and on September 8 he asked the Polish government in exile for permission to surrender. But suddenly, on September 9, the Soviet air force intervened in the battle. On this day, the commander-in-chief of the Third Belorussian Front, General Mikhail Rokossovsky, took possession of the urban area of ​​​​Prague east of the Vistula, and a few days later, by September 14, the districts of Warsaw lying east of the Vistula were under his control. On September 18, the Red Army finally allowed the landing of American aircraft carrying supplies for the Polish troops. Again there was hope to defend Warsaw. Even earlier, on September 15, the Red Army allowed the Polish division Berlinger to cross the Vistula in the south of the capital, but the combat units of the Red Army itself remained in place. On September 23, the Berlinger division was forced to turn east again ... The next day, the Germans conquered Zholibozh, and four days later - Mokotov. On October 1, a truce was declared.

The uprising lasted 63 days, more than 150 thousand civilians and over 15 thousand soldiers of the Home Army were killed, 200 thousand residents of Warsaw were sent to forced labor in the Reich, about 70 thousand were deported to concentration camps. Losses on the German side are contradictory - according to various sources, from 2 to 10 thousand people were killed. After the capitulation on October 2, Warsaw was physically destroyed, 85 percent of the city was completely destroyed.

The rebels who surrendered were not killed (as was the case with the partisans), but received the status of participants in military battles and were sent to a prisoner of war camp. After the Red Army, after a period of reorganization at the end of the summer of 1944, gathered its forces for the final blow, it released in Warsaw about 5,000 people hiding in the ruins of the city.

Translation by Natalia Kolyagina

Warsaw Uprising - an anti-fascist armed uprising that took place from August 1 to October 2, 1944 during the Second World War.

The uprising began on August 1, 1944 in the Polish capital occupied by Nazi troops under the leadership of the Home Army (AK) as part of the Buzha (Storm) plan developed by the Polish exile government in London.

The "Storm" plan provided that during the retreat of the German troops defeated by the Red Army and the advance of the front along Polish soil to the west, the detachments conspired by the AK would be used to attack the rearguards of the enemy and liberate individual settlements before the Soviet units entered them. Local power in this case would have passed to the organs of the delegation of the émigré government. The "Storm" plan also provided for the participation of AK in battles together with units of the Red Army on the basis of temporary cooperation.

The decision to insurrection was taken by the command of the AK, and the order to start it was given by the commander of the AK, General Tadeusz Komorowski, on July 31 without the consent of the command of the Red Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army.

On August 1, at 17:00, the rebels (about 40 thousand AK people, who had only 3.5 thousand small arms) launched battles in Warsaw. The well-armed German garrison numbered about 15 thousand people. Soon it was reinforced by SS and police units and brought up to 50 thousand people. The leadership of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) tried to prevent a premature and unprepared uprising. When it began, the Central Committee of the PPR called on all members of the party and detachments of the People's Army (an underground military organization that operated during the Second World War in order to conduct an armed struggle against the Nazi invaders in Poland) to take part in the uprising. The rebels seized a number of German objects, captured a significant part of the city, depriving the invaders of the opportunity to use the city's east-west transit arteries. However, the forces were unequal. The lack of weapons and ammunition limited the possibility of offensive operations of the rebels and allowed the German troops to localize the centers of fighting in certain areas of the city (Staro Miasto, Srudmesce, Zoliborz, Mokotow).

On August 19, the Nazis stormed Staro Miasto and at the end of the month, after fierce fighting, captured it. Subsequently, they took possession of Srudmesce and a number of other areas. After September 5, Czerniakow turned out to be the only insurgent region.

The Soviet leadership, despite the very difficult situation for the Soviet troops in the Warsaw area (August 2, 1944, the Nazi troops launched a counterattack on the 2nd Panzer Army of the 1st Belorussian Front), in order to help the rebels, set the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front the task repel the counterattack of the Nazis and go on a broad offensive, and the 1st Army of the Polish Army - to strike from the Magnushevsky bridgehead on Warsaw along the left bank of the Vistula. However, the German Goering tank division and two more infantry divisions brought into battle by the German command did not allow expanding the bridgehead and developing the offensive.

On August 29, by decision of the Headquarters, the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, with the exception of the troops of the right wing, was stopped. Soon the troops of the front, including the 1st Army of the Polish Army, were given the task of reaching Prague, a suburb of Warsaw, crossing the Vistula and joining up with the rebels. This task failed. Six Polish battalions that crossed to the bridgehead in the Chernyakuva region suffered heavy losses in the battles (3764 killed and wounded), on September 21, by order of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, they were withdrawn beyond the Vistula.

Since September 14, the 16th Air Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and the regiment of Krakow night bombers of the Polish Army were involved in assisting the rebels.

Despite the help, the position of the rebels became more difficult. The loss of bridgeheads on the Vistula, the fall of Mokotow, the lack of ammunition and food forced the AK command to begin negotiations on September 28 with the Nazi command for surrender. On October 2, the AK command capitulated. The uprising, which lasted 63 days, was defeated. During the fighting, 18,000 rebels were killed, 25,000 were wounded, and the loss of the civilian population amounted to over 200,000 killed. German troops lost about 17 thousand killed and missing and about 9 thousand wounded. Left-bank Warsaw was almost 90% destroyed.

Warsaw was liberated by Soviet troops together with the 1st Army of the Polish Army on January 17, 1945.

On July 29, 2009, Polish President Lech Kaczynski proposed establishing a new public holiday in the country to commemorate the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. The Polish leader proposed to consider August 1