What year was the Polish uprising. The attack of the Polish rebels on the palace of the Governor of the Kingdom of Poland, Vel

February 12th, 2018

The impetus for the next activation of the Polish national movement was the war that began in 1859 between France and Austria. Napoleon III liberated Italy, and the Polish revolutionaries hoped that he would help Catholic Poland regain its independence. The main generator and conductor of nationalist sentiments in the Kingdom of Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire, was the Polish nobility. The gentry were disadvantaged by the lack of privileges and the opportunity to participate in real state administration, they considered the subordination of Russia as a humiliation and dreamed of the revival of the Commonwealth. In 1830-1831. in the Kingdom of Poland, a powerful uprising was already breaking out, suppressed by Russian troops.

Thirty-three years later, the "Reds", as the unequivocal supporters of Poland's independence were called, began to prepare a new performance.

In October 1861, the Central National Committee was founded, which later played the role of the headquarters of the rebels. In addition, there was a Committee of Russian Officers in Poland, founded in 1861 and maintaining close ties with both Polish nationalists and Russian revolutionary democrats. After the arrest of the founder of the circle, Vasily Kaplinsky, who served in the Russian army with the rank of lieutenant, the Committee was headed by another officer - Lieutenant of the Shlisselburg Infantry Regiment Andrey Potebnya. Yaroslav Dombrovsky, who also served in the Russian army as a junior officer and even took part in the Crimean War, was also a member of the Committee.

Yaroslav Dombrovsky

By the end of 1862, the underground groups that were going to take part in the upcoming uprising numbered at least 20 thousand people. The social base of the rebels were petty Polish gentry, junior officers - Poles and Litvins who served in the Russian army, students and pupils of Polish educational institutions, representatives of the raznochintsy intelligentsia. The priests of the Catholic Church played a special role. The Vatican unconditionally supported all plans to start an uprising, counting on the liberation of Catholic Poland from the rule of Orthodox Russia.

In 1860-1862. the situation became more and more tense. For example, a pogrom was staged at an Orthodox cemetery, the Russian inhabitants of Warsaw began to receive threatening letters, on February 15 (27), 1861, soldiers shot down a demonstration, as a result of which five of its participants died. In turn, Polish radicals have repeatedly made attempts on the lives of Russian governor-generals. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich did not escape the assassination attempt, escaping with minor injuries. The formal reason for the uprising was the decision of Alexander II to start recruiting in Poland. So the emperor wanted to isolate most of the protest youth.

On the night of January 10-11, 1863, bells began to ring in many cities of Poland. It was a prearranged signal that told the revolutionaries about the beginning of the speech. It was the young people who evaded recruiting into the Russian army that became the backbone of the first insurgent detachments. The radicals formed a "Provisional National Government" (Jond Narodovy), headed by a 22-year-old former philosophy student, Stefan Bobrovsky. On the first day of the uprising, 25 attacks on Russian garrisons took place throughout the territory of the Kingdom of Poland. However, since the rebels were poorly organized and poorly armed, these attacks were repelled by Russian soldiers quite easily.

In early February 1863, 49-year-old Ludwik Mieroslavsky arrived in Poland from France - the godson of Napoleonic General Davout, a participant in the uprising of 1830-1831. and professional Polish revolutionary. He was proclaimed the dictator of the uprising. But Mieroslavsky's "dictatorship" did not last long. On February 7 (19), 1863, at the edge of the Krzhivosondzsky forest, a detachment commanded by the "dictator" himself, entered into battle with a detachment of Colonel Yuri Schilder - Shundler, which included 3.5 companies of the Olonets infantry regiment, 60 Cossacks and 50 border guards. Even such modest forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels, after which on February 9 (21), 1863, Ludwik Mieroslavsky left the leadership of the uprising and fled back to France.

Mieroslawski Ludwik

After the flight of Mieroslavsky, the rebels were led by Colonel Marian Langevich (1827-1887), promoted to general, who had previously commanded the Sandomierz Voivodeship. Like Mieroslavsky, Langiewicz, a former officer in the Prussian army, was a professional Polish revolutionary and lived in France and Italy, where he was engaged in military training for Polish youth. Nevertheless, Meroslavsky was formally considered a dictator for some time, and only on February 26 (March 10) was Langevich proclaimed the new dictator of the uprising. But luck didn't smile on him either. Already on March 19, 1863, being utterly defeated in two battles with Russian troops, Langevich fled to the territory of neighboring Austrian Galicia.

In addition to the centralized forces of the rebels, numerous partisan detachments led by local "field commanders" also operated in Poland. These were the detachments of Leon Frankovsky, Apolinar Kurovsky, Zygmunt Podalevsky, Karol Fruche, Ignatius Mystkovsky and many others. Most of the detachments operated for a month - two, at most three months. Then they suffered crushing defeats from the Russian troops. One of the few exceptions was the detachment of Colonel General Mikhail Heidenreich, who managed to hold out from July to December 1863. This was not surprising, given that Mikhail Jan Heidenreich himself was a career officer in the Russian army in the past and graduated from the Academy of the General Staff.

Marian Langevich

In addition to Poland, the uprising also spread to a number of provinces that were once part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Grodno, Vilna, Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev lands - everywhere their rebel formations appeared, created by Polish and Lithuanian gentry. It is worth noting that the uprising was supported from the very beginning by the Polish emigration and revolutionary circles in Europe. Sympathized with the Polish rebels and many Russian revolutionaries. A number of Russian and European radicals went to the Polish lands as volunteers. Several volunteer formations were formed, staffed by French, Italian, Hungarian revolutionaries. For example, a "battalion of zouaves of death" was created, commanded by the Frenchman Francois de Roshenbrune. A distinctive feature of this formation was the "oath of death" - to commit suicide in case of defeat. Such Polish "suicide bombers".

In the European press, the Polish uprising was romanticized, presented exclusively as a national liberation movement of the proud European people against Russian autocracy and national oppression. A similar attitude was inherited from the revolutionary movement of that time by the official Soviet historical science. Meanwhile, the rebels were not "soft and fluffy" romantic idealists who fought solely for freedom. The rebels, among whom the Polish gentry prevailed, defended their class interests, namely, they advocated the return of that form of social and political structure in which the gentry felt most at ease. Religious differences played a role in motivating the rebels. It is known about the reprisals against Orthodox clergy, the desecration of Orthodox churches and cemeteries.

Alexander II in March 1863 adopted a number of radical measures as part of the ongoing agrarian reform. So, in the Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, and then Vitebsk, Kyiv, Mogilev, Podolsk and Volyn provinces, the obligations of the peasants towards the landowners were terminated. Since the bulk of the landlords were Polish gentry, such a measure could not please them. But the far-sighted Russian policy deprived the Polish lords of the support of the bulk of the peasantry. The majority of peasants both in the Kingdom of Poland and in the western provinces remained indifferent to the insurgents. There are many cases and actions of peasants against the rebels, who annoyed the rural population with their requisitions, and even outright robberies.

The Polish lords were distinguished by their particular cruelty towards the peasant population, especially towards the Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants who professed Orthodoxy. Therefore, there was nothing surprising in the fact that the peasant population hated their exploiters and, at any opportunity, took any action against them. For example, peasants repeatedly gathered detachments and captured their lords, who sympathized with the rebels, in order to hand them over to the authorities. Moreover, the command of the Russian army even tried to somewhat cool the ardor of the peasantry, which, during the suppression of the uprising, tried to recoup for centuries of atrocities of the gentry. In turn, the rebels launched a real terror against the peaceful peasant population, trying to intimidate the peasants and force them to support the rebels, or at least not to cooperate with the tsarist troops. The lack of support from the peasantry was one of the main reasons for the rapid defeat of the Polish uprising of 1863-1864.

In the period from 1863 to 1865, in the fighting on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland and the western provinces, the Russian army lost 1221 soldiers and officers who died and died from wounds, 2810 died from diseases and domestic injuries, 3416 were wounded, 438 were missing and deserted , another 254 people were captured by the rebels. There were cases when individual soldiers and junior officers went over to the side of the insurgents, and officers of Polish and Lithuanian origin usually went over to the insurgents. In the process of suppressing the uprising, the authorities severely punished the leaders and the most active rebels. On March 22, 1864, Konstantin Kalinovsky was hanged in Vilna. The total number of death sentences carried out during the period 1863-1865 amounted to. about 400. At least 12 thousand people were deported to Siberia and other regions of the Russian Empire. About 7 thousand more participants in the uprising and sympathizers left the Kingdom of Poland and the western provinces and emigrated to the countries of Central and Western Europe. However, the actions of the tsarist government against the rebels can hardly be called excessively harsh. Already on December 31, 1866, Alexander II replaced the indefinite hard labor for the rebels sentenced to it with a ten-year one. In total, only about 15% of the rebels were punished for participating in the uprising, and most of the participants in the hostilities from the side of the rebels remained at large.

After the suppression of the uprising, the tsarist government took care of the prevention of nationalism among the Polish gentry. In 1864, the Latin alphabet was banned, Mikhail Muravyov ordered to stop publishing any books in the Lithuanian language. In 1866, the governor-general of the Vilna province, Konstantin Kaufman, banned the use of the Polish language in public places and in official documents, and also introduced a ban on the use of any Polish national symbols. The positions of the Polish gentry were dealt a serious blow. But as a result of the uprising, the peasantry won. The authorities, seeking to create a counterbalance to the Polish gentry, reduced the amount of redemption payments for peasants by 20% (in Lithuanian and Belarusian lands - by 30%). In addition, a centralized opening of primary schools for the children of Belarusian and Lithuanian peasants began, which had a completely understandable meaning - to educate the younger generations of peasants in loyalty to the Russian authorities, in the Orthodox cultural tradition.

Although European public opinion idealized the insurgents, viewing them solely as idealistic heroes, in reality, no European power seriously helped the Polish uprising. It was the hope for help from France and Great Britain that "warmed the soul" of the Polish gentry, who were counting on the outbreak of war between the Western powers and Russia. Even the British newspapers admitted that if the rebel leaders had not counted on Western military assistance, the uprising would have ended by itself, if not started at all.

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Author: Ilya Polonsky

Political situation ¦ Forces of the parties ¦ Plans of military operations

In 1807 Napoleon founded the Duchy of Warsaw. It did not satisfy the expectations of the majority of Poles, who dreamed of Poland "from sea to sea" with the inclusion of Lithuania and Western Russia. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I formalized the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia under the name of the Kingdom of Poland and granted it a constitution. Poland received the right to have its own army of 30,000. Moreover, the money for armaments, uniforms and food for this army was not issued from the treasury of the Kingdom, but from the sums of the empire.

Alexander's measures regarding Poland did not meet with sympathy among the Russians. The historian Karamzin even spoke harshly. “The tsar,” he wrote, “corrects the division of Poland by the division of Russia; with this he will cause applause, but plunge the Russians into despair; the restoration of Poland will either be the destruction of Russia, or the Russians will water Poland with their blood and once again take Prague by storm.”

“At one of the reviews,” Paskevich, who was then passing through Warsaw, says in his notes, “I go up to Count. Miloradovich and gr. Osterman-Tolstoy and I ask: “What will happen from this?” Osterman answered: “But what will happen - in 10 years you will storm Warsaw with your division.” The prediction came true.

Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish army, and the old veteran of the Polish army, General Zaionchek, who acted in complete accord with the Grand Duke, was appointed viceroy of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the post of vicegerent harbored the hope of taking Adam Czartoryski in such an influential post to achieve the cherished Polish goals. Struck by failure, Czartoryski took the position of trustee of the Vilna educational district and curator of Vilna University and, with his mother, Isabella, became the secret center of all Polish intrigue.

Then there was the time of Freemasonry, the Decembrist movement in Russia, the Carbonari in Italy, etc. The Kingdom of Poland and the Western Territory quickly became covered with a network of secret societies. The anarchy that reigned in the government of Poland for centuries, the right of confederations, which, as it were, gave the appearance of legality to every rebellion, gave a certain political education to the nation. The Poles were imbued with an indelible passion for conspiracies - this explains their constant readiness for reckless uprisings.

The center of revolutionary ideas in Lithuania was Vilna University and churches, and in Ukraine, Volhynia and Podolia - the Kremenets Lyceum, founded by Count Chatsky. The chief propagandist in Vilna was the talented history professor Lelewel.

Of course, all this was known to the Russian government, but it either did not take any measures, or these measures were extremely unsuccessful. Since the annexation of Lithuania to Russia, nothing has been done to unite it with other parts of the empire. When it was reported that at Vilna University a professor of philosophy was lecturing in a revolutionary direction, the police captain was ordered to attend the lectures. In 1823, Czartoryski was replaced by Novosiltsev, and Lelewel was transferred to Warsaw, where he indulged in propaganda with even greater convenience.

The political mood of Poland was so clear to everyone that Nicholas I, leaving Warsaw in 1829 after being crowned Tsar of Poland, told the Empress that they were on a volcano that had been threatening to erupt for ten years. It is clear after that that the explosion of 1830 was not a surprise, and it is completely naive to assert that the revolution was made by lieutenants Vysotsky, Zalivsky and Urbanasy and the school of ensigns, “snots” (brats), as they were called by the Polish Minister of War Gauke.

The July Revolution of 1830 in Paris and the August Revolution in Brussels added fuel to the Polish fire. The last impetus for the uprising was the expulsion of Polish troops along with the Russians to suppress the revolution in Belgium. With the removal of the national troops, all hope for the success of the revolution disappeared, and therefore the Poles decided to act. Thus, for the sake of political dreams, unrealizable just because their implementation affected the interests of three powerful states (Russia, Austria and Prussia), which concluded the former Polish provinces, the institutions already granted and the material well-being of the country achieved under Russian rule were sacrificed, made such remarkable progress in 15 years that in the treasury, instead of the previous constant deficit, there was now free cash in the amount of 66 million zlotys (15 k.).

On the evening of November 17, the conspirators attacked the residence of the Tsarevich Belvedere. The Grand Duke, thanks to the valet Friese, escaped, and the Russian troops and part of the Polish gradually joined him and left the city on November 18 in the evening.

According to the Poles themselves, the uprising was easy to suppress at the very beginning, but the Tsarevich was confused. He kept saying that “every drop of blood spilled will only spoil the matter”, and released the Polish troops that remained loyal (these excellent regiments joined the rebels), retreated with the Russian detachment through Pulawy to Vlodava within the empire and surrendered the Lublin fortress to the Poles, which had of great strategic importance, and large artillery reserves, and Zamostye. The uprising spread throughout the region.

General Khlopitsky, a well-known veteran of the Napoleonic troops, a man with great military talents, a favorite of the troops and people, was declared the commander-in-chief of the Polish troops. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm declared the Romanov dynasty deprived of the Polish throne. Czartoryski, who openly became the head of a revolutionary government, entered into negotiations with foreign powers to provide assistance to the Poles. The calculations turned out to be wrong. For Austria and Prussia, the restoration of Poland was dangerous, the sovereign rejected the petitions of England and France, declaring that he considered the Polish question to be internal; other states could not exercise any influence.

The Poles responded to Nicholas's calls for obedience by demanding that the western provinces be annexed to the kingdom. The fight became inevitable.

Side forces. Poles. The Polish army consisted of 35 thousand (28 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry) with 106 guns. The revolutionary government: firstly, called up old-time soldiers and retired officers - 20 thousand; secondly, announced the recruitment of 100 thousand, of which 10 thousand for the cavalry; thirdly, they took draft horses for the cavalry, and then they had to take peasant horses as well; fourthly, to form five 8-gun batteries, they took howitzers from Modlin, Prussian cannons left over from the time of the Prussian domination, Turkish cannons and cast 20 cannons from bells; fifthly, from the school of ensigns and from the Kalisz cadet corps, they made an increased release of officers, and in addition, nobles who had never served in the army were appointed to officer positions - an unsuccessful measure, because the servicemen were bad, but as revolutionaries they introduced a corrupting principle into the army.

By the beginning of hostilities, there were up to 140 thousand in total, but 55 thousand could be put in the field. The active army was divided into 4 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, in addition, there were troops in fortresses and in detachments that had a separate purpose. Infantry regiments consisted of 4 battalions, cavalry regiments - from 6 squadrons; the battalions were strong, much stronger than the Russian battalions.

The old troops were excellently trained thanks to the vigilant care of the Tsarevich. The new ones were significantly inferior to the old ones in terms of training, discipline and endurance. The mistake was that from the old units they did not single out strong enough personnel who would give strength and stamina to the new troops. The armament was good thanks to the stock of guns accumulated in the arsenal: the Tsarevich handed over all the slightly damaged guns to the Russian arsenal, and in return demanded new ones from the empire.

After Khlopitsky's refusal, Prince Radziwill was appointed commander-in-chief, who had neither military talents nor the corresponding character, so he was entirely under the influence of Khlopitsky, who was assigned to him as an adviser. However, the power of the commander-in-chief does not tolerate any division, and therefore the position of the seemingly all-powerful Khlopitsky was nevertheless false and led to harm in the battle of Grokhov. In addition, Khlopytsky, although he had all the data to lead the army, did not sympathize with the uprising - he abandoned offensive actions and believed that only an honorable grave could be prepared for the Polish army under the walls of Warsaw.

The chief of staff was Khrzhanovsky, an excellent officer of the General Staff. Quartermaster General Prondzinsky, in addition to his extensive education as an officer of the General Staff, was distinguished by the brilliance and courage of shrewd strategic considerations.

Although among the Polish officers many served in the Napoleonic troops, the French usually commanded the Polish divisions there, and therefore there were not enough experienced generals among them during the revolution.

The Poles were distinguished by the ardor of their attacks, as well as their steadfastness in defense. The Pole is agile, ardent, brave, enterprising, but he has no moral stamina. He considers his impulse irresistible, but if he fails, then cowardice sets in, he loses heart. In addition, party membership brought a lot of harm. Love for the fatherland has turned over the centuries into devotion to one's party. The triumph of the latter became the main goal - for him they were ready to sacrifice the interests of the state. All this led to disagreement among the highest, destroyed the unity that was so necessary in the war.

Russians. Infantry corps (as the norm) consisted of 3 infantry divisions, 3 two-regiment brigades each, regiments of 3 four-company battalions, but the third battalions (reserve) were left in the rear to occupy more important places of the border country.

Cavalry: 5 reserve cavalry corps of 2 divisions and 10 light cavalry divisions, one each for an infantry corps. Cavalry regiments - 6 squadrons. For each infantry division - 3 companies of artillery with 12 guns; with the cavalry - 2 cavalry companies. Engineer troops - 11 sapper battalions, and with the guards corps and the first reserve cavalry - one cavalry pioneer division each. The guns were partly bad, spoiled by stupid cleaning, with bent barrels and faulty locks.

In no way inferior to the Poles in maneuvering in masses, the Russians turned out to be less prepared in single actions, in skirmishing, etc. Frequent battle fire in a deployed formation was considered panache. Arakcheev's system had a detrimental effect on the development of enterprise and the ability for independent action in superiors.

The following were appointed to the active army: 6th Infantry Corps (Lithuanian) Rosen; the guards detachment of the Tsarevich is also included in it; 1st Infantry Corps Palen 1st; Witt's 3rd Reserve Caucasian Corps and Kreutz's 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps; grenadier corps of Shakhovsky; Guards Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich; 2nd Infantry Corps Palen 2nd. Only 183 thousand (of which 41 thousand cavalry) and, in addition, 13 Cossack regiments.

The spirit of the troops, however, was the same; in this war the usual virtues were manifested. In all clashes with the enemy, the regiments maintained their old glory and showed their characteristic courage and steadfastness. The Prussian General Brandt, who was then with the Russian army and knew it well, writes that Russian soldiers are the first in the world. The grenadier corps and the famous 13th and 14th chasseur regiments were especially distinguished for their exploits. This was not the spirit of Rosen's 6th (Lithuanian) Corps. Many Poles officers who participated in secret societies served in it, and therefore sympathy for the Poles was noticed in the corps, "the entire Lithuanian corps is looking at Warsaw."

Before the start of hostilities, the troops were given "Rules for observation during the march, in bivouacs, in cramped apartments and in the battle itself." This field charter was compiled on the basis of the combat experience of that era by people who knew the war, and therefore is of great value even for the present. Unfortunately, the tactical training of the Russian army, under the influence of parade ground masters who did not know the war, was far from up to par and did not meet the basic requirements of the Rules.

When the troops had provisions for only 15 days and fodder for the cavalry for 12 days. Replenishment of these stocks was extremely difficult, because there was a crop failure in the country, and the inhabitants were either hostile or indifferent. They resorted to requisitions - and the tariff was set low - and the inhabitants avoided the concession of products. The only way to extinguish the patriotism of the regiments was with money. In addition, the requisitions were not without abuse and violence. The best way to provide food would be a reliable arrangement of the transport part of the army, but the Russians expected to finish off the Poles immediately and then spread out in wide apartments with allowances from the inhabitants, and therefore neglected this part. Shortcomings in the organization of food had a detrimental effect on military operations.

Field Marshal Count Dibich-Zabalkansky, 45 years old, with great military ability, extensive combat experience and recognized authority, was appointed commander in chief. However, in 1831 he did not fully justify the hopes placed on him. He did not always show sufficient decisiveness and asked himself too complex combinations. After the death of his beloved wife, Dibich began to notice a decline in spirit and an addiction to alcoholic beverages. To top Dibich's misfortune, at a time when the Russian army had survived all the crises, when the most important part of the campaign was over and the enemy was weakened, so that it remained to strike the last blow and reap the fruits of his labors, the commander-in-chief died suddenly of cholera - all the glory went to his successor Paskevich.

The chief of staff, Count Tol, was talented, educated, determined, energetic, went through the military school of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and was on excellent terms with Dibich.

War plans. Poles. Around December 20, 1830, the Poles could muster about 55,000 ready troops. Meanwhile, on the part of the Russians, only the 6th (Lithuanian) corps (38 thousand, and with the detachment of the Tsarevich 45 thousand) was ready, which Baron Rosen concentrated in two places (Brest and Bialystok), remote from one another by 120 miles. It is clear that it was more profitable for the Poles to advance in order to break the Russians in parts and capture as much territory as possible (Lithuania) in order to expand the sources of manning the army and materiel.

Khlopitsky, for his own political reasons, did not want to take any offensive actions and decided: the Polish army would deploy in echelons in two directions leading to Warsaw from Kovna and from Brest-Litovsk; when the Russians advance, retreat to the position at Grokhov and take the fight there. It was believed that it was risky to move far ahead to cover Warsaw, for fear of being outflanked and cut off from the bridges in Prague and Molina. On the Grochowska position, one cannot be surrounded, the Russians, according to the conditions of the terrain, could not deploy all their forces and take advantage of superiority, and finally, the Poles relied on the extensive sources of Warsaw and on the Prague tete-de-pon. However, it should be noted that the position of the Poles did not correspond in size to the number of their troops, they managed from the left flank, and in the rear there was a large river with one bridge.

According to this plan, the 1st infantry division of Krukovetsky stood on the Kovno highway to Serock, and the cavalry division of Jankowski advanced to Rozhan. Zhimirsky's 2nd Infantry Division is on the Brest Highway, with advanced regiments on the Livets River, and Sukhorzhevsky's Lancers Division ahead on the Veprzh River. Skrzynetsky's 3rd Infantry Division stood between these two lines at Stanislavov and Dobre. General Reserve (Schembek's 4th Infantry Division and three Caucasian divisions) - ahead of Warsaw. Separate detachments of Serovsky, Dvernitsky, Dzekonsky, Kazakovsky were assigned to guard the upper Vistula.

Russians. All the forces intended against the Poles could not be immediately opposed to the enemy. The Lithuanian corps could only assemble at the end of December; The 3rd reserve cavalry corps (from Podolia) needed a month to join the Lithuanian; by the beginning of January, the 1st Corps could approach Brest; in early February - grenadier; in early March - guards; at the end of March - the 2nd Corps, that is, the entire army - in 3-4 months.

By January 20, in fact, 126 thousand were collected (of which 28 thousand were cavalry); leaving 12 thousand in the rear, there were 114 thousand for the offensive - quite significant forces.

Dibich's goal is to defeat the enemy army and capture Warsaw. To do this, he intended to concentrate between the Narew and the Bug, between Lomzha and Nur, and act depending on the circumstances, trying to cut off the enemy from Warsaw. If this fails, then cross the upper Vistula, surround Warsaw and force it to capitulate by starvation or storm.

The plan corresponded to the situation and pursued important goals (the army, the capital), but it did not take into account the possibility of a change in the weather, that is, that during the thaw the Bug and Narew would present an obstacle to the crossing. In addition, if a crossing over the upper Vistula was already envisaged, then some advised choosing Brest-Litovsk as the center of operations and from there to proceed, according to circumstances, either to Warsaw or to the upper Vistula. But the execution of this plan was fraught with various inconveniences, and most importantly, with the loss of time, meanwhile, the field marshal hoped to soon put an end to the uprising and, moreover, with one blow.

Then Tol suggested a compromise: to move through Drogichin to Siedlce and from there to Warsaw, or to the upper Vistula; at the same time, the troops would move further near the border, and therefore food would be easier; but the path lengthened, and the army moved away from the grenadier and guards corps, following from the north of Kovna. Dibich did not agree and began to act according to the original version.

Diebitsch offensive towards Warsaw

Crossing the Polish border by Russians ¦ Change of line of action ¦ Advance of the Russian army to Wavre ¦ Battle of Wavre on February 7 ¦ Battle of Bialolenka on February 12 ¦ Battle of Grochow on February 13 ¦ Location of Russians in apartments

On January 24 and 25, the Russian army crossed the Polish border in 11 columns over a vast area from Kovna through Grodna, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk to Ustilug. Despite the apparent dispersion, the entire movement and distribution of troops was so calculated that in the main forces in any place it was possible to concentrate 80 thousand in 20 hours, while the Poles could not oppose more than 55 thousand.

On January 27, the main forces reached the line Lomzha, Zambrov (1st Corps of Palen), Chizhev (6th Corps of Rosen), that is, in three days they passed only 60 miles, and meanwhile the transitions were forced. As a result of the thaw, the roads turned into swamps; walked no more than two miles per hour; the wagon trains, put on the sledge track, stopped. Give the troops a rest. On January 27, the rain drove all the snow from the fields; On the 29th the thaw intensified; small rivers opened up, on the Bug the ice melted in places. It was impossible to be drawn into the wooded and swampy space between the Bug and the Narew.

After a discussion at the military council, the field marshal decided to cross to the left bank of the Bug near Brok and Nur, draw troops from Vengrov and Siedlce, then use the Brest highway and continue moving towards Warsaw. The road to Drogichin could have been used for messages.

Change of line of action. Thus, it was necessary to make a flank march and change the line of action. On January 30, the crossing began. The difficulty of crossing was great. If the Poles showed proper activity, they could greatly interfere with Dibich. After the crossing, the army moved to the Livets River, where it established itself almost without resistance from the Poles - there were small avant-garde skirmishes. By February 2, the army stood in two masses at Vengrov and Siedlce, putting forward the vanguards.

The march of 100 versts along disgusting roads was accomplished extremely quickly, but with great effort. Rest was given on February 2, 3 and 4 - it was also necessary to tighten the carts.

On February 2, the head of the cavalry division, Baron Geismar, from the 5th reserve cavalry corps advancing from Kyiv to Pulawy, allowed himself to be defeated in parts near the village of Stochek by the Polish general Dvernitsky (3 battalions, 17 squadrons and 6 guns).

Tall horse rangers on massive horses could not act quickly against the evasive Polish lancers on light horses. Taking advantage of the superiority of forces, Dvernitsky defeated both Russian regiments in turn, which were panicked. The Poles did not pursue them. The Russians lost 280 men and 8 guns, the Poles 87 men.

Geismar went to Siedlce. Dvernitsky, having formed a battery of cannons taken and taking advantage of the horses captured from the Russians, went back behind the Vistula. This matter, unimportant in itself, had a very great moral significance for the Poles: it gave the people confidence in their troops, reinforced their conviction that it was possible to fight against Russia. Dvernitsky immediately became a folk hero, volunteers began to flock to him. In general, the significance of Stochek's case is determined by the fact that it was the first in the forthcoming campaign.

The offensive of the Russian army to Wavre. On February 5, the 6th Corps moved on Dobra; 1st Corps - from Liva to Kalushin; for communication between them, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade (Muravyova) - along the old Warsaw road to Zimnovody (then the road goes to Stanislavov, Okunev); reserves, under the command of Tolya, from Siedlce along the Brest highway. In the rear of the army Nur, Vengerov and Siedlce were occupied by garrisons. With such a direction of movement, collisions between Skrzynetsky and Rosen at Dobre and Zhimirsky with Tol and Palen at Kalushin were inevitable.

Battle at Kalushin. Tol before Palena went to Kalushina and bypassed the position of Zhimirsky from both flanks. Zhimirsky managed to retreat to Minsk without great losses.

Fight at Dobre. Skrzhinetsky took a strong position in a forest clearing, relying on the village of Dobre. He stubbornly held out against the avant-garde of Rosen and even went on the offensive with the 4th regiment (who were famous as "chvartaki"), but with the arrival of the main forces of the 6th corps, after a hot 4-hour battle, they were overturned; however, he retreated in order to Okunev. Russian losses 750 people, Poles 600 people.

Skrzynetsky had 12 battalions, 12 guns, 4 squadrons; Rosen - 19 battalions, 56 guns, 2 uhlan regiments and a Cossack, but sent troops into battle in parts and still did not bring all of them. In addition, the Poles had an advantageous position, and the Russians could not deploy their numerous artillery.

On February 6, pressed by the Russians, Skrzhinetsky withdrew to the Grokhovsky position near the Alder Grove, and Zhimirsky settled down, not reaching Wavre. Rosen advanced to Okunev (avant-garde), Palen - to Milosna (vanguard); the left flank of the army was guarded by Geismar at Schennitsa.

Battle of Wavre on February 7th. The battle was random for both sides. On February 7, the field marshal did not count on a battle. He ordered the 1st and 6th corps to set out at 7 o'clock in the morning and take control of the exits from the forest gorges to the Grochow Plain. The 1st corps had to go 8 versts along the highway, and the 6th 12 versts to the tavern Benefit along the bad old Warsaw road. It is clear that the movement of the columns was not uniform.

Khlopitsky also did not think of accepting battles, but since Palen strongly pressed Zhimirsky, the Shembek division was sent to replace and support; they had only 18 battalions.

Battle of Wavre in 1831

In the main forces of the vanguard of Palen, between the infantry, there was a brigade of horse rangers, in addition, in the tail - another 22 squadrons and 16 K. Or.

Khlopytsky ordered to attack Palen, leaning forward mainly on the left flank, Krukovetsky ordered to take Vygoda, Skrzhinetsky stood behind Krukovetsky. Thus, almost the entire Polish army was on the battlefield. Polish artillery opened frequent fire.

The head of the vanguard, Palen Lopukhin, was quickly overthrown. The Black Sea Cossack regiment barely rescued Ataman Vlasov, who had already fallen under sabers. Palen immediately pushed the 1st cavalry artillery company to the left of the highway, ordered the cavalry to clear a place for infantry and move to the left in order to hold the pressure of the right flank of the Poles. The regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division, which had come running, were hastily deployed on the highway and to the right; they delayed the enemy a little, but still, Zhimirsky, who was moving forward, pressed the right flank of the 1st corps and threatened to cut it off from the 6th. Palen advances the Novoingermanlandsky regiment to the right flank. Tol, who arrived, moved the Staroingermanlandsky regiment and other infantry units to the right, and placed the artillery of the 3rd division in a ledge behind the horse.

About 11 o'clock Dibich arrived. He ordered the horse rangers to let the infantry through. But while the cavalry cleared the highway, the Poles made a new offensive on the right flank. The cavalry company suddenly doused them with buckshot; the Poles retreated, but the skirmishers rushed to the battery. Dibich sent his convoy against them (half-squadron of the Lubensky hussars) and supported him with a sapper battalion, that is, in extreme cases, even these units that were at hand, regardless of their special purpose, were put into action. The skirmishers were driven back and disappeared into the forest.

It was already 12 o'clock. Dibich sent Rosen to rush, who managed to turn around only by 3 o'clock in the afternoon. It was necessary, of necessity, to send Palen's troops into battle in parts, as they approached: Lopukhin's haste put the Russian army in a critical situation.

Meanwhile, the head of the vanguard of the 6th Corps, Vladek, having passed the Gribov will, heard shots from the side of Palen and immediately advanced towards him into the forest 3 battalions of rangers, who attacked the enemy along with the right flank of Palen. The field marshal, having heard the cannonade at Rosen, no longer fearing for his right flank, ordered a general offensive to be launched, and Saken was sent to the extreme left flank to lead the numerous cavalry. The Poles are thrown back everywhere; Lubensky, overturned by Saken, tries to find protection behind the infantry, but Zhimirsky and Shembek are also pressed. Then Khlopitsky himself directs the Guards Grenadier Regiment.

Dibich orders the horse rangers to attack right along the highway. They are glad in front of the field marshal to make amends for their failure at Stochek. The Württemberg Horse Chasseur Regiment overturned the 3rd Polish Horse Chasseur Regiment, then cut into the square of the Guards Grenadiers, threw them into the swamps, scattering and chopping some of the people. Gradually pushing the enemy, the Russians occupied Wavre.

Khlopytsky also had a division of Skrzynetsky, which he did not use. If he did not have in mind a decisive attack and intended to give the final battle on the Grochov position, then it is not clear for what purpose he fought the battle at Wavre on such a large scale. Krukovetsky tried to keep Rosen, but, attacked by significant forces and seeing the retreat of the rest of the troops, he retreated to Alder Grove, occupied by Skrzhinetsky. Rosen also occupied Kavenchin, driving out a small Polish detachment from there. At 4 o'clock, Dibich had already taken possession of the exits from the forest, which he considered the goal of the battle to be achieved.

The damage of the Russians is 3700 people, the Poles lost no less, counting the 600 people taken by the Russians as prisoners.

On February 8, a firefight broke out at the forward posts near the Alder Grove. Rosen sent Reibniz's 25th division to drive out the Poles. Reibnitz was repulsed with the loss of 1,620 men.

Dibich, having learned about this useless bloodshed, confirmed the order to refrain from any clashes with the enemy.

Battle of Bialolenk February 12. Prince Shakhovskoy with the grenadier corps went from Kovna (starting from January 24) to Mariampol, Kalvaria, Suwalki, Raigrod, Shchuchin, Lomzha and reached Ostrolenka on February 8. Here he crossed the Narew and went further to Pultusk, Serock and Zegrzh. Having crossed here on February 11 through the Bugo-Narev, Shakhovskoy at Neporent joined with Saken (1 battalion, regiment of lancers, company of sappers, 2 guns), sent by the field marshal to facilitate the movement of Shakhovsky. At this time, Khlopitsky sent a detachment of Jankowski to the north of Warsaw to collect food. Yankovsky attacked Shakhovsky early in the morning of February 12 and was repulsed. Then Shakhovskoy went to Byalolenka, intending to cut off Jankowski.

Dibich, meanwhile, created a plan for the Grokhovsky battle, and intended to advance, as suddenly and covertly as possible, Shakhovsky with part of other troops against the left flank and rear of the Polish army and deliver the main blow to it in this direction.

Field Marshal Shakhovsky did not explain his plan, but simply sent an order (in fact, this is not an order, but a command) to stop in Neporent or where the sent one finds. The Cossack with a note came across Yankovsky, was late and arrived at Shakhovsky when he was already approaching Byalolenka, which was heavily occupied by Malakhovsky and Yankovsky. Shakhovskoy attacked; the Poles withdrew to Brudno, where Krukovetsky connected his division and 18 guns, that is, forces equal to those of Shakhovsky. Losses on both sides of 650 people.

The battle at Bialolenk showed the field marshal that his plans for surprise had been violated. Fearing that the Poles would not attack Shakhovsky in superior forces, he sent an order to him that same night, again without explaining the goal, to remain and not start a fight again, and if the Poles attack him, then our main forces will attack the enemy from front. The adjutant who brought the order reported that Dibich was extremely dissatisfied with the occupation of Bialolenka. This greatly agitated the old man Shakhovsky, he began to consult what should be done, but nothing was decided.

On the morning of February 13, Shakhovskoy, imagining that the entire Polish army could rush at him, decided to retreat through Grodzisk and Marki to connect with Dibich. Krukovetsky, seeing the retreat of the Russians, opened artillery fire and went on the attack. Shakhovskoy left safely, having lost only one gun, bogged down in a swamp. The battle ended at 11 am.

Dibich, having heard the cannonade of Shakhovsky, decided to attack the Poles with the main forces for his rescue. As a result, the Grochov battle broke out a day earlier than expected - on the 13th instead of the 14th, and not at all according to the previously worked out plan.

Battle of Grochow 13 February. Grochow's position was on a vast low-lying plain intersected by swamps and drainage ditches. From M. Grokhov past Kavenchin and Zombka to Byalolenka stretches a swampy strip 1–2 versts wide.

To the south of B. Grokhov, the division of Shembek was located, notches were arranged in the grove. Zhimirsky's division occupied Alder Grove, north of M. Grokhov (about 1 verst along the front and? verst in depth, cut through by a sazhen ditch). The swampy ground froze and allowed movement. Roland's brigade scattered a dense line of skirmishers along the edge of the forest with strong reserves behind. The main mass of the brigade stood behind the moat in an expanded formation with intervals between units so that the overturned front troops could go back and settle under the cover of battle fire and the bayonets of the deployed units. Chizhevsky's other brigade stood behind, in reserve. Nearby behind the grove, epolements for batteries were dug up, penetrating the entire grove. 2 batteries fired at the territory to the left from the grove to Kavenchin. Behind the Zhymirsky division was Skrzynetsky, who was also intended to defend the grove.

Battle of Grochow in 1831

Lubensky's cavalry stood between the highway and the village of Targuvek. Cavalry Corps Uminsky (2 divisions with 2 horse batteries) - at the count. Elsner. Krukovetsky acted against Shakhovsky near Brudno; near Prague - militias with braids (cosigners) and parks. There was no general reserve, because it is impossible to consider cosigners for it.

Position benefits: Russian troops did not have enough space for deployment and had to perform it when leaving the forest under artillery and even rifle fire. Disadvantages: the left flank hung in the air, which gave Dibich the basis for his bypass of this flank by Shakhovsky's corps, but failed - in the rear there is a large river with one bridge, so the retreat is dangerous.

The forces of the Poles - 56 thousand; of them 12 thousand cavalrymen; without Krukovetsky - 44 thousand; Russians - 73 thousand, of which 17 thousand cavalrymen; without Shakhovsky - 60 thousand.

AT 9? hours the Russians began a cannonade, and then their right flank began to move to the right to attack the Alder Grove. The attacks were carried out incorrectly: the troops were brought into battle in parts, there was no artillery preparation and by means of encirclement. First, 5 battalions broke into the forest, but ran into reserves behind the ditch and were driven out of the grove by Roland's battalions. Reinforced with 6 battalions. Again the Russians broke in, but Chizhevsky, together with Roland (12 battalions), again forced them to retreat. The Russians bring in 7 more battalions. A long line (18 battalions) of Russians swiftly rushes at the Poles and knocks out the entire division from the grove at about 11 o'clock in the morning. Zhimirsky himself was mortally wounded. But, not supported by sufficient artillery, the Russians suffered greatly from the Polish buckshot. Khlopitsky introduces Skrizhenetsky's division into action. 23 Polish battalions take possession of the grove.

At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Dibich strengthens the attack with another 10 battalions, begins to surround the grove on the right and left, where new batteries are put up on the flanks. Having successfully forced out from the edge, the Russians on the right could only reach a large ditch; but on the left, the fresh regiments of the 3rd division circled the grove and went far ahead, but came under the closest fire from the batteries.

Prondzinsky, pointing to the Russian battery, shouts: "Children, another 100 steps - and these guns are yours." Two of them were taken and directed to the height where Dibich stood.

This was the last desperate effort of the Poles. The field marshal directs everything possible from the infantry (2nd Grenadier Division) to the grove; reinforces artillery: more than 90 guns acted on the sides of the grove and, moving forward from the right side (from the north), heavily hit the Polish batteries behind the grove; to bypass the grove on the right, the 3rd cuirassier division was moved with the Life Guards Lancers of His Highness and 32 guns to help seize the groves, and at the same time break the front of the retreating Poles and try to push back to the swamps near the Brest highway at least their right flank. Even to the right, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade of Muravyov with the Lancers division occupied the colonies of Metsenas and Elsner, advancing forward, contacting the cuirassiers on the left flank.

Excited, Dibich gave the spurs to his horse and, jumping up to the retreating troops, shouted loudly: “Where are you guys, because the enemy is there! Forward! Forward!" - and, standing in front of the regiments of the 3rd division, led them to attack. A huge avalanche hit the grove from all sides. The grenadiers, not responding to the fire of the Poles and bowing their bayonets, burst into the grove; they were followed by the 3rd division, then the 6th corps of Rosen. In vain Khlopitsky, already wounded in the leg, personally bypasses the front line and tries to inspire the Poles. On piles of bodies, the Russians cross the ditch and finally take possession of the grove.

Khlopitsky orders Krukovetsky to go to the grove, and Lubensky with the cavalry to support the upcoming attack. Lubensky replied that the terrain was inconvenient for cavalry operations, that Khlopitsky was an infantry general and did not understand cavalry business, and that he would execute the order only after receiving it from the official commander-in-chief Radziwill. It was at this critical moment that Khlopitsky's position was incorrect. He went to Radziwill. On the way, the grenade hit Khlopitsky's horse, exploded inside and injured his legs. His activity has ceased. The whole cause of the Poles fell into disarray, the general administration disappeared. Radziwill was completely at a loss, whispered prayers and answered questions with texts from the Holy Scriptures. Cowardly Shembek wept. Uminsky quarreled with Krukovetsky. Only Skrzynetsky kept his presence of mind and showed diligence.

Dibich entrusted the leadership of the actions of the cavalry mass to Tolya, who became carried away by particulars and scattered his cavalry across the field, only one cuirassier regiment of Prince Albert, led by a division of Lieutenant Colonel von Zon, rushed to pursue the randomly retreating Poles. The regiment went through the entire battle formation of the enemy, and only at Prague itself did 5 Polish lancer squadrons take the Zone on the flank. But he deftly led his cuirassiers onto the highway and escaped from infantry and missile battery fire. The attack lasted 20 minutes over 2? miles. Although the losses of the cuirassiers reached half of the composition (Zon was mortally wounded and taken prisoner), however, the moral effect of the attack is enormous. Radzwill with his retinue rode off to Warsaw.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky finally appeared, who showed complete inactivity that day. The delighted Dibich made no reproach, only announced that the honor of completing the victory belonged to them, and he himself became the head of the grenadiers. But when they approached the enemy position, it was 5 o'clock, the day was drawing to a close. The field marshal thought about it and after some hesitation ordered to stop the battle.

The loss of the Poles - 12 thousand, Russian 9400 people.

Meanwhile, a terrible disorder prevailed among the Poles. Troops and convoys crowded near the bridge, only by midnight the crossing ended, under the cover of Skrzynetsky.

Under such conditions, it would not be difficult for the Russians to cope with Skrzynetsky, and then storm the Prague tete-de-pon. It is completely incomprehensible why Dibich did not do this. His plan was to put an end to the uprising with one blow and, moreover, as soon as possible. The opportunity just presented itself, and the field marshal did not take advantage of it. The obscure question of causes has not yet been clarified by history.

The location of the Russians in the apartments. The next day, the Poles occupied and heavily armed the Prague fortifications. It was possible to attack only with the help of siege weapons, and their delivery required 4 months. Crossing the upper Vistula, in order to then attack Warsaw from the west, also required time. Therefore, Dibich stationed the army in wide apartments (Okunev, Kolbel, Zhelekhov, Radzyn, Siedlce), about 40 versts along the front and 40 in depth, in order to facilitate food through requisition.

Meanwhile, by March 10, the Vistula was cleared of ice and it was possible to start crossing. To do this, they chose Tyrchin (outside the sphere of influence of the Polish army, the width is only 400 steps, the fairway is closer to the right bank, the Veprzh flows not far, which can be used for harvesting and alloying materials). Although the thaw had reached its extreme limit, Dibich was in a hurry and on March 15 ordered the army to move to the crossing.

Polish offensives

Expedition of Dvernitsky ¦ Offensive of Skrzynetsky

The Poles took advantage of the suspension of the actions of the Russian main army for private enterprises. Since the Lublin Voivodeship was weakly occupied by the Russians, and kr. Zamostye could serve as a support for a partisan detachment, then at the insistence of Lelevel, a detachment of Dvernitsky (2 battalions, 22 squadrons, 12 guns - 6500 people) was assigned to move to Volhynia with the aim of inciting an uprising there. On February 19, Dvernitsky crossed the Vistula and at Kurov attacked the cavalry detachment of General Kaver, overturned the Finnish dragoons and captured 4 guns. On February 21, Dibich moved significant forces from different directions, and Tolya entrusted the leadership of the whole business. Then Dvernitsky took refuge in Zamostye on March 4.

At the end of March, Dvernitsky decided to continue the expedition to Volyn: he quickly moved to Krylov and there on March 29 he crossed the Bug. Ridiger's troops were against the Poles in Volyn - 11 thousand with 36 guns.

Dvernitsky, moving along the Austrian border, became convinced that in this side with the dominant Russian population there was nothing to think about a general uprising, and therefore decided to make his way to Podolia. At Styr near Boremli (Mikhailovka), Ridiger blocked his path.

Dvernitsky secretly withdrew from the position at night: he walked along the border, and Ridiger pursued in parallel. On April 15, Dvernitsky took up a strong position at the Lyulinsky tavern, with his rear to the Austrian border. Ridiger attacked, but at the last minute Dvernitsky did not accept the attack, crossed the border and was disarmed by Austrian troops.

The advance of Skrzynetsky. To provide for the army moving towards the crossing, the 6th Corps of Rosen was temporarily left on the Brest highway, which was ordered to observe Prague, cover the rear of the movement, secure the edge, and especially protect Siedlce and communication with Brest. In the event of an offensive by the Poles in superior forces, retreat to Kalushin and even to Siedlce.

Adjutant General Count Karl Fedorovich Tol

On March 17, the army set off from the apartments. The march was very difficult: people were exhausted from fatigue, artillery was dragged by infantry, carts lagged behind, pontoons got stuck in the mud. But still, on March 19, the army approached the crossing. It took another 2-3 days to lift the convoy. The field marshal was already ready to start the crossing, when the Poles went on the offensive and delivered a blow to Rosen, which upset the whole plan of Dibich.

On March 19, Rosen's corps consisted of 18,000, of which 6,000 were in the vanguard of Geismar at Wavre. Despite the instructions of the field marshal, Rosen did not pull back the vanguard. The Poles, aware of all the difficulties of the direct defense of the Vistula, decided, among 40 thousand, to suddenly attack Rosen and thereby divert Dibich from the crossing. All secrecy measures were taken. At 3 am on March 10, in the midst of thick fog, the Poles began debushing from Prague.

Although Geismar acted energetically, the attack was somewhat sudden, and the Poles pressed Geismar, who retreated to Dembe-Velka, for 8 hours in a row.

Rosen managed to withdraw his troops from the apartments, but in three places: at Dembe-Velke (10 thousand together with Geismar), at Ryshe (3 miles to the right) and at Mistov (in the rear). The terrain in front of the position is swampy, hard to reach for the enemy, but the swamps stretched at an angle to the retreat route (highway), which ran along the left flank. Meanwhile, Rosen did not even break the bridge here.

The battle went very well for the Russians, numerous attempts by the Poles were repelled. However, a brilliant attack by the cavalry division led by Skarzhinsky, carried out in the evening, forced Rosen to retreat. The corps retreated to Minsk. Losses: Russians - 5500 people and 10 guns, Poles - 500 people.

On March 20, the retreat continued towards Siedlce, the rearguard stopped at Yagodnia. Skrzhinetsky settled down near Latovich.

Movement of the main Russian army. On March 23, Dibich convened a military council, at which it was decided, at the suggestion of Toll, to temporarily abandon the crossing and move against the Polish main army and its messages. The disposition was already given for the movement of the army on March 28 to Garvolin, as quartermaster general d.s. with. Abakumov reported to Dibich that the allowance for the troops was completely unsecured, since, due to impassability, the waiting transports were far behind; the military reserve was already for the most part used up, and it was impossible to replenish it with requisitions due to the exhaustion of the country. On March 28, Dibich decided on a flank march to Lukov to get close to the supplies in Siedlce and Mendzirzhets and with transports from Brest and Drogichin. On March 31, the field marshal entered Siedlce.

Prondzinsky convinced Skrzynetsky to finish off Rosen near Siedlce, advance to Brest and cut off Dibich from communications with the north. Plan: from the front, from Boime, Skrzynetsky himself; on the left, through Sukha, Lubensky and on the right, through Vodyne, Prondzinsky, who is entrusted with the main role (12 thousand). This led to the battle on March 29 near Igane, where the 13th and 14th chasseur regiments were badly damaged and Prondzinsky managed to disperse the 2 regiments of the rearguard of General Fezi.

Losses: Russians - 3 thousand, Poles - much less. Only late in the evening did Polish troops appear from Suha, and then Skrzynetsky himself. He arrived at the troops on the morning of March 29, who were waiting for him under arms. Without leaving the carriage, he began to complain of fatigue, had breakfast in the nearest village and lay down to rest; dare not wake him up. The commander-in-chief overslept the battle. The troops from Sukha received no instructions.

Stay of Dibić near Siedlce. During the forced inactivity, the field marshal took steps to provide food for the army in order to meet current needs and form another two weeks' supply for 120,000 people. For this, by the way, 450 regimental trucks and 7 mobile artillery parks were sent from the army to Brest for food, which were ordered in Brest to lay down ammunition and bring grain fodder. Transports from Volhynia began to approach Kotsk.

To ensure the rear, Brest-Litovsk was fortified, equipped with a significant garrison of 12 battalions, 10 squadrons and 60 guns under the command of Rosen. This was supposed to calm Lithuania, which was already worried.

Diebitsch's first offensive. Finally, it was decided to move with the army through Vodyna and Yeruzal to Kuflev in order to outflank the Polish vanguard from the south, suddenly attack the main enemy forces and overturn them from the highway to the north.

The preparations were quite lengthy, secrecy measures were not taken during the march on April 12, and, by the way, the Poles had previously been aware of the Russian enterprise. As a result, Skrzyniecki managed to slip away and retreated to Dembe-Velka, where the position was well fortified. The whole enterprise was expressed in a rearguard battle near Minsk, where the Poles lost 365 people.

After a day's rest between Minsk and Dembe-Velke, the Russian army (60 thousand) retreated.

New war plan

Diebitsch's Second Offensive ¦ Cholera

Emperor Nicholas himself indicated the plan of military operations. Dibich's difficulties consisted in providing the rear of the army in the field and in supplying it with food. The provision of the rear was entrusted to the newly formed reserve army of Count Tolstoy and to the 1st Army, which had existed before. Thus, Dibich's hands were untied. His army was ordered to move to the lower Vistula, providing a supply of food, initially by purchase in Prussia, and subsequently by delivery by water from Russia through Danzig and further along the Vistula.

Thus, it was necessary to completely change the line of action, that is, it was necessary to clear the Brest highway of hospitals and warehouses and arrange everything again on the line from the Narew to the lower Vistula.

Soon the Poles learned about these new proposals.

Dibić's second offensive. The movement of Khrzhanovsky in Zamosc disturbed the field marshal, who received false information that Skrzhinetsky on May 1 intended to move against the left flank of the Russian army and attack Siedlce. Then, at dawn on May 1, Dibich himself moved along the highway. The first Polish troops retreated non-stop. At Yanov, the Russians stopped for the night, and the next day they retreated. We learned from the prisoners that the troops belonged to the Uminsky detachment. Diebitsch concluded that Skrzyniecki had slipped away again. In fact, the Polish commander-in-chief went against the guards, which remained unknown to Dibich.

Cholera. If the monthly stop at Siedlce helped the Russian army to settle down, then the Poles completed their troops, completed the formation of new regiments, believed in their strength and in the significance of their private successes. Now at the disposal of Skrzynetsky there were 5 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, very comfortable.

At the same time, cholera was rapidly developing in the Russian army. It appeared on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea as early as 1830, and the following year it spread throughout Russia and even into Western Europe. She entered the army through Brest, where transports and staffing converged from everywhere. It appeared on March 6, but at first weakly, so that in March there were only 233 patients, in April, due to crowded and motionless parking, there were 5 thousand of them. In early April, cholera also penetrated the Polish army, which suffered from it no less than the Russian one.

Skrzynetsky's campaign against the guard

The guards corps under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich stood apart from the main army between the Bug and Narew and was not completely subordinate to Dibich. This situation was detrimental. If, during the offensive to the crossings on the upper Vistula, Dibich could have disposed of the guards, then, perhaps, there would not have been a catastrophe with Rosen's corps.

Now the Poles planned to break the guard before Dibich came to her aid, and then join the connection with the Lithuanian insurgents through the Augustow Voivodeship. Stopped on the Brest highway to defend Warsaw, Uminsky (11 thousand), uniting with the detachment of Dzekonsky, who was on the upper Vistula, and Khozhanovsky from Zamosc, could collect 25 thousand and operate Dibich in the rear or join Skrzhinetsky for a general attack, if Dibich will go to the aid of the guards.

In total, Skrzhinetsky had 46 thousand, and the Russian guard with the Saken detachment that reinforced it had only 27 thousand. It is clear that the chances of success were significant, but Skrzynecki hesitated. First, on April 30, the Poles left their location near Kalushyn to Serotsk, from where they divided into three columns: 1) Dembinsky (4200 people) - along the highway along the right bank of the Nareva to Ostrolenka against Saken; 2) Lubensky (12 thousand) - up the Bug to Nur to destroy bridges and interrupt Dibich's communications with the guard; 3) Skrzhinetsky (30 thousand) - in the middle between the two previous ones on Lomza.

The guards concentrated at Zambrow, the vanguard of Bistrom at Vonsev, the advance detachment of General Poleshka at Przhetyche.

On May 4, the Polish avant-garde of Jankowski pushed back the Cossacks, but at Przhetyche he met stubborn resistance from the guards chasseurs. Poleshko, all right, went step by step to Sokolov. The Grand Duke at that time concentrated the main forces at Snyadov.

On May 5, the Russian avant-garde withdrew to Yakots. Lubensky occupied Nur. To help the Lithuanians, Skrzynetsky sent in the intervals between Dibich and the guards of General Chlapovsky with a lancer regiment, 100 infantrymen and 2 guns, in the form of personnel for future Polish troops.

Prondzinsky insisted on attacking the guards (23 thousand), taking advantage of the superiority of the Polish forces (30 thousand). Skrzhinetsky did not agree, but went with Gelgud's division to Ostroleka. Saken managed to retreat to Lomzha; Gelgud pursued him and occupied Miastkovo, that is, almost in the rear of the guard. On May 7, the Grand Duke reached out to Bialystok.

So, Skrzynetsky's blow fell in the air; not only that, by going so far, he put the army in a perilous position. Moving to connect with the guards, on May 10, Dibich defeated Lubensky at Nur.

The field marshal continued to move towards the connection with the guard, on May 12 he reached Vysoko-Mazowiecka, and the guard was already in Menzhenin. Skrzyniecki hastily retreated to Ostrołęka.

On May 13, Diebitsch made an extraordinary forced march. Palen's troops passed 50 versts, Shakhovsky's - 40 versts, and yet, after a short night's halt, the field marshal continued to move.

Battle of Ostroleka on May 14th. The city of Ostroleka lies on the left bank of the Narew and is connected to the right bank by two bridges, about 120 sazhens long: permanent on piles and floating. About 700 sazhens from the shore stretch sandy hills covered with small and rare shrubs. The whole area is somewhat swampy. The battlefield offered many passive defense benefits, especially if bridges were destroyed. But this could not be done, since there were still many Polish troops on the other side of the river: Gelgud's division in Lomza and Lubensky's rearguard. Prondzinsky planned, hiding the troops in the bushes, to smash those who crossed over with artillery fire, and then, with a joint attack from several sides, throw them back to Narew, and because of the tightness, the Russians would not be able to turn around or use significant forces, especially cavalry. Skrzhinetsky, counting on the usual slowness of the Russians, did not expect a fight the next day and, completely reassured, allowed Prondzinsky to make the necessary orders; he himself went to m. Kruki and spent the night at the inn, enjoying champagne.

The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions stood on the sand hills. In front of the left flank on a hill - 10 Tursky guns; Bielitsky with 12 guns advanced to the bridge itself; the cavalry initially became to the right, beyond the river. Omulev.

Already at 6 o'clock in the morning on May 14, Bistrom appeared in view of Lubensky, who, after some resistance, began to retreat towards Ostrolenko. At about 11 o'clock in the morning the head of the Russian army approached the city, making 70 versts in 32 hours, and the troops retained excellent order and good spirits. Complete carelessness reigned in the Polish main camp: the horses in the cavalry were unsaddled, the infantry dispersed for firewood, water and for bathing.

Opening artillery fire, the grenadiers swiftly attacked Lubensky. Despite the deep sands, they quickly broke into the city and went through it, overturning or cutting off the enemy. Even the famous 4th regiment (“chvartaki”) was pushed back and completely upset by the guards horse rangers and lancers. In total, 1200 people were taken prisoner.

Although the army was greatly stretched out, Dibich ordered to continue the battle and take control of the bridges. Immediately, 3 guns were put up along the street against the bridge, 4 guns to the right of the city and 2 to the left. Then these batteries, which were of great importance, increased to 28 and 34 guns, respectively.

The Poles tried to destroy the bridge, but Russian buckshot forced them to retreat. The Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment, led by the Cavaliers of St. George, rushes, despite the buckshot of two guns from Bielitsky, along the beams and captures the guns. Patz with the remnants of the rearguard falls on the Astrakhans, but General Martynov with a battalion of the Suvorov (Fanagoriysky) regiment ran across the floating bridge; another battalion is sent along the pile bridge, and by common efforts the enemy is driven back. Arriving on the battlefield, Skrzynetsky was completely puzzled by what had happened and began to throw his troops in parts to attack the Russians, who had crossed to the left bank.

Meanwhile, the Suvorov and Astrakhan troops broke into the battery and took possession of several guns, but they were unable to take them away, because Polish horse rangers appeared on the left. Suvorovites without rank lined up in a heap and met the enemy with fire. The horse rangers were not embarrassed by the fire, they galloped from the battalion and, trying to break into the square, cut down the Russians with their sabers. Then the battalion commander ordered to sound the alarm and shout "Hurrah"; the frightened horses rushed back.

The Hungarian brigade, thrown forward by Skrzhinetsky, grappled hand-to-hand with the Russians near the highway. The Suvorov battalion, which crossed the bridge, hit the Poles on the flank - they were driven back. Artillery from the left bank provides the Russians with the strongest support.

The Hungarian brought his brigade into order and again led the attack. But Martynov also received help: two more regiments crossed the bridge. They hit the Hungarian from the flank, threw back and captured one gun. The Hungarian lost half of his men and went into the bushes. Then Skrzynetsky ordered the Langerman brigade not only to push the Russians back across the river, but also to capture the city. The attack was unsuccessful.

In indescribable excitement, the Polish commander-in-chief galloped along the front and shouted: “Malakhovsky, forward! Rybinsky, go ahead! All forward!” He continued to consistently break the brigades against the Russian grenadiers. Finally, he took Krasitsky's brigade, reinforced it with an infantry regiment and several squadrons, and led the attack himself. Encouraged by the presence of the commander-in-chief, the Poles sang "Polish has not yet perished" and rushed at the Russians. Proud of the feats already accomplished, the grenadiers overturned this attack, and inflicted severe damage, for they had 4 guns. Krasitsky, who was knocked down by a rifle butt from a horse, was taken prisoner.

At 4 o'clock, 17 battalions had already gathered on the right bank. They moved forward and pushed the enemy back. The 2nd Polish Lancers, famous for its bravery, tried to attack, but all of its attacks were repulsed.

Skrzyniecki retained his unshakable firmness; For 8 hours he was exposed to fire, seeking death. “Here we must conquer or perish all,” he said. “The fate of Poland is being decided here.” He planned to make a general attack with the remnants of all divisions. The decision is belated - the Russians have already established themselves on the right bank, and the Poles are greatly weakened. Skrzhinetsky himself became the leader, and yet he had to withdraw with the loss of 250 prisoners.

Private attacks were repeated several more times, and in the end half the troops were out of action. Now Skrzynetsky is only trying to prolong the fight until nightfall. He ordered to collect all the scattered units and individuals, to bring them into battalions, at the head of which to put all available officers. A long line of battalion columns without a reserve moved forward, and the battery galloped to the nearest distance to the troops of the 3rd division, who had just crossed the bridge, and doused them with grapeshot. The stunned Old and New Ingermanland regiments ran back to the bridge. But the commanders managed to restore order, and the same regiments bravely attacked the Poles and pursued them.

At 7 o'clock in the afternoon the battle ceased. At 8 o'clock, due to a misunderstanding, artillery fire resumed, but immediately subsided. The Polish army was in complete disarray; the transition of the Russians to a decisive offensive could lead to complete extermination. But the field marshal, under the influence of some secondary thoughts, or about the unknown where Gelgud's division was located, did not dare to pursue with all his might and sent 3 regiments of Cossacks at night. Already on the 15th in the afternoon, 7,000 were sent under the command of Witt, and even he moved with such slowness that in 5 days he covered 56 miles.

The retreat of the Poles looked like the most disorderly flight; to take away the guns, they demanded cabs from Warsaw. Dibich himself, with the main forces, left Ostroleka only on May 20 and went over to Pultusk. Losses of Russians - up to 5 thousand, Poles - up to 9500 people.

Death of Dibich. The field marshal energetically prepared to cross the lower Vistula. Significant stocks of food, transportation means, artillery and hospital allowances, materials for the crossing were procured. Finally, reconnaissance of places for the crossing and ways to them was made. Thus, when all the difficulties had been experienced, everything was prepared for a decisive blow to the weakened enemy, when the victory was to crown the whole cause of the field marshal and his glory would shine with a new brilliance, at this time, on May 29, Count Dibich died of cholera within a few hours. On the basis of the law, the chief of staff, Count Tol, took command of the army, but only until the arrival of the newly appointed commander-in-chief, Count Paskevich-Erivansky.

Partisan actions in Lithuania and Podolia

The uprising in Lithuania spread everywhere, and only the cities of Vilna, Kovna and Vizdy were in the hands of the Russians. The organization of the insurgent troops advanced especially far in Samogitia, in Rossien and Telshi. For the Russian detachments, the fight against the insurgents, despite the constant successes in the battles, was painful, because the enemy was directly elusive.

Khlapovsky, who skillfully made his way between the Russian troops, gathered a detachment of up to 5 thousand people and organized it into several infantry and cavalry regiments.

After the battle of Ostroleka, a detachment of General Gelgud was sent to Lithuania, with a force of up to 12 thousand with 26 guns. Gelgud was a brave, but spineless and incapable man. General Saken acted against him with a detachment, with a force of up to 6 thousand. On May 21, he reached Kovna, passing 150 miles in 4 days, and on the night of May 31, Saken came to the Vistula with 7 thousand and took up a position 7 miles to the west on the Ponar Heights .

Gelgud's forces increased to 24,000. Under the influence of Khlapovsky, Gelgud decided to attack the Russians on the Ponar Heights, but hesitated to carry out this plan. Meanwhile, detachments of Sulima, Prince Khilkov, and others were converging on Vilna. Finally, on June 4, Kuruta approached. In total, 24 thousand gathered with 76 guns.

On June 7, a battle took place on the Ponar Heights, in which Saken ordered, although General Kuruta was the eldest. The Poles acted ineptly and piecemeal, the Russians acted decisively (the Life Guards Volyn and Orenburg Lancers especially distinguished themselves). The Poles were utterly defeated and began to hastily retreat.

There were signs of panic among the retreating Poles. Saken was preparing to inflict a decisive defeat with an energetic pursuit, but ... at this time, Kuruta declared his seniority and resolutely told Saken: "No, you will not pursue." Damage of Russians - 364 people, Poles - together with 2 thousand who fled.

With the approach of Tolstoy's reserve army to Vilna, Gelgud made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Shavli, where Lieutenant Colonel Kryukov was with 5 battalions and 5 guns, after which his detachment dispersed: Khlapovsky, pursued by the Russians, crossed the Russian border at Gudaun on June 30, and Roland - 3 July at Deguce.

During the turmoil at the Prussian border on June 30, Gelgud sat on horseback; officers showered him with reproaches and curses. Adjutant of the 7th Regiment, Lieutenant Skulsky, killed Gelgud on the spot with a pistol shot in the chest and calmly joined his regiment.

Dembinsky's campaign is an excellent example of partisan action. In total there were up to 4 thousand. Dembinsky avoided open spaces and significant cities; he made his way through the forests between the Russian detachments, breaking the small ones and bypassing the stronger ones. On June 28, he set out towards Belovezhskaya Pushcha and reached it on July 15. Acting successfully and happily slipping past the detachment of Generals Savoini and Rosen, Dembinsky through Rudnya, on July 22, Sterdyn arrived at the Marks near Warsaw.

The uprising in Podolia flared up mainly among the gentry, because it was not possible to revolt the mass of the Russian peasant population. The banner of the uprising was raised by the Sabansky brothers, landowners near Olgopol. By the end of April, the number of rebels reached 5 thousand under the command of the retired General Kolyshko. The commander of the 5th corps Roth from Bessarabia arrived in forced marches and defeated them utterly near Dashev (loss of 1,600 Poles). The remnants were once again defeated by General Sheremetyev at Maidanek (near Derazhnya). The remnants of 700 people on May 14 crossed the Austrian border at Satanov.

Pacification of the rebellion by Paskevich

Toll was going to make a flank march from Pultusk past the Polish army, which was based on Lublin, along convenient roads that had already been explored earlier. But Paskevich, who arrived in Pultusk on June 13, sent the army further north, ostensibly for safety. On June 22, the movement began in four columns. The march on bad roads was very difficult, everything was drowned in the impenetrable mud. There were no roads between the columns for communication, and therefore, in case of need, one could not give help to the other.

Osek, near the Prussian border, was chosen for the crossing. The construction of bridges by Palen 1st began on July 1, as well as the construction of tete-de-pons on both banks. On July 8, the crossing of the entire army, which was located in the vicinity of Neshava, was completed.

Actions on the Brest highway. Paskevich ordered Rosen to put forward the vanguard under the command of General Golovin in order to: 1) disturb the enemy, 2) distract the Poles from the crossing of the main army, but at the same time avoid a decisive clash with the strongest enemy, 3) demonstrate to Prague and Lublin. All this was given less than 7 thousand. Golovin advanced to Kalushin and on July 2 decided to attack the enemy with several small columns, capturing the tracks adjacent to the highway. On the same day, Khrzhanovsky, having concentrated 22 thousand under his command, also decided to attack. Of course, the Poles overthrew the Russians, but only with such audacity could Golovin achieve the goal of reconnaissance and distracting the enemy.

Paskevich's movement towards Warsaw. The plan of the cautious field marshal, who was afraid to risk his newly acquired laurels, was to bring the army to Warsaw without a fight if possible, and then force it to surrender by blockade.

Having provided himself with excess food delivered from Prussia, the field marshal on July 15 moved through Brest-Kuyavsky, Gostynin, Gombin (July 18). The Poles occupied a well-known position near Sokhachev across the river. Baura; you can get around it through Lovich. The Poles did not appreciate the importance of Lovich, and therefore the advanced units of the Russian army occupied Lovich on July 20, and on the 21st the whole army concentrated there. Pushing the Poles across the river. Ravka, the Russians stopped, and so both armies remained until the first days of August.

At this time, a great excitement arose in Warsaw. Instead of Skrzhinetsky, Dembinsky was appointed commander-in-chief, crowned with the glory of the recent skillful movement from Lithuania. On the night of 3 August, he withdrew the army towards Warsaw and took up position behind Wola. On August 3, indignation of the street mob broke out in Warsaw; they searched for traitors and killed many suspects and innocent people. The old intriguer Krukovetsky was elected president of the board, and the old man Malakhovsky was elected commander-in-chief. On August 6, the taxation of Warsaw began; the army moved to Nadarzhin and its environs.

Riediger's actions. He occupied the Lublin Voivodeship. Paskevich suggested that he also cross the Vistula. Field Marshal Sacken, commander of the 1st Army, to whom Ridiger was subordinate, agreed, and Ridiger (12,400 men and 42 guns) crossed the Vistula and Józefow on 26 July. The Polish general Rozhitsky, who had no more than 5 thousand people in several detachments, acted against Ridiger. On July 31, Ridiger occupied Radom.

In early August, Rozhitsky increased to 8 thousand and began to act offensively. On August 10, Ridiger destroyed the Gedroits detachment, and captured him himself. Then Rozhitsky calmed down, but Ridiger, who sent a division to him at the invitation of Paskevich and left the protection of the bridge, himself remained with 4 battalions and could not do anything.

Actions on the Brest highway. On the night of August 10, Romarino set out from Prague with 20 thousand and went to Garvolin and Zhelekhov with the aim of defeating Golovin and Rosen separately. Romarino managed to win small private successes and even reach Terespol (near Brest), but failed to defeat Golovin and Rosen. On August 24, Romarino stopped in Miedzirzec, as he learned about the negotiations between Krukovetsky and Paskevich.

Storming of Warsaw on 25 and 26 August. Paskevich managed to concentrate 70 thousand and 362 guns at Nadorzhin. There were 35,000 Poles in Warsaw with 92 guns. If you count Romarino 20 thousand, then the largest will be - 55 thousand. True, Rozhitsky still had 8,000, Lubensky had 4,000 in the Plock Voivodeship, 10,000 in the garrisons of Lublin and Zamostye, which in total would give 77,000 and 151 guns. But all these troops did not take part in the defense of the capital, as well as Romarino.

To strengthen Warsaw, Khrzhanovsky proposed to build several strong forts at intervals to go on the offensive. To occupy them, he considered it necessary to assign 15 thousand, and 10 thousand to the reserve, a total of 25 thousand would be enough. The engineering committee rejected this project and sketched a whole hundred small fortifications, which they did not even have time to finish by the day of the assault. It would take at least 60 thousand to occupy all the fortifications. The troops, scattered in small units behind weak parapets, which did not cover the numerous Russian artillery from fire, could not offer staunch resistance, especially in the absence of an external reserve.

The fortifications formed three circles. The strongest fortification in the 1st line was the Volya redoubt (No. 56) with semi-bastions at the corners, with a reduit in the southwestern corner and with a flank defense of the ditches. The internal fortifications were divided into two parts by a retransaction: the larger of them had a garden, and the smaller one had a stone church with a stone fence, adapted for defense. The approaches to Wola were defended by lunette No. 57. The second line was especially strong near the Kalisz highway, fortifications No. 22 and 23. The third line was the city rampart, 10 feet high and thick, built opposite the smuggling, without any consideration for the conditions of defense; only later it was reinforced with lunettes and flushes. The Jerusalem outpost is the strongest place in the third line, fortifications No. 15, 16, 18. In service, in addition to field guns, there were 130 serfs, but very scattered.

Uminsky's corps (20 thousand) defended the territory from Chernyakovskaya Zastava up to No. 54, and Dembinsky (13 thousand) - everything else.

The Russians decided to attack Wola. With the fall of this strongest fortification, the assault on the rest seemed easy. In addition, when fighting inside the city in this direction, it was more likely to get to the Prague Bridge.

1st day of the assault, August 25th. According to the will of the sovereign, Paskevich offered the Poles to submit on the condition of a general amnesty. Krukovetsky answered about the desire to restore the fatherland within the ancient limits. On the evening of August 24, the troops occupied the following places: 1) Palen (11 thousand) near the Kalisz highway at the height of Khrzhanov; the target is an attack of Will. 2) Kreutz (12 thousand) about with. Vlohi; attack the fortifications to the right of Will. 3) Ants (3 thousand) at Rakov; distract the attention of the enemy along the Krakow highway. 4) Strandman (2 thousand) at Sluzhevets; for a false attack along the Lublin highway. 5) Khilkov (2800 cavalry) near Khrzhanov, to the left of Palen, to guard the left flank. 6) Nostitz (2100 light guards cavalry) behind Zbarzh, to communicate between Shtrandman and Muravyov and to repel attacks. 7) Guards and grenadiers (2700) reserve, behind Palen and Kreutz. 8) cut artillery (198 guns) and Witt's reserve cavalry (8 thousand) at Solibsa, not far from Kreutz. 9) The Cossacks are distributed over different points. At 5 o'clock in the morning the artillery opened fire, and an hour later two troops rushed to the assault. Kreutz took control of fortifications No. 54 and 55 on the fly. Palen No. 57 got more difficult. The stuck bayonets served as steps for climbing the parapet of the brave. Despite desperate resistance, the lunette was taken, most of the garrison was put on the spot, 80 people were taken prisoner.

There was an assault on Wola, which was occupied by the elderly General Sovinsky with 5 battalions and 12 guns. The Russians put forward 76 guns, and then selected infantry went from three sides. She broke through the rampart, but was stopped here by desperate resistance. Finally, the Poles were driven out of the garden, but the reduit remained in their hands, it was impossible to shoot them with artillery fire, so as not to shoot at their own. Paskevich sent several more regiments, with the grenadiers led by Tol. Under heavy enemy fire, the Russians overcame a number of obstacles, but the proximity of the target inflamed everyone. After climbing over the fence of the church, the soldiers approached the palisades that protected the entrance to the church. Having made a breach, they found themselves in front of the littered doors of the church, which had to be knocked out. Finally, at 11 o'clock, they managed to break into the inside of the church, where, after a fierce battle, the enemy was exterminated or captured. Sovinsky fell under the bayonets of the grenadier at the altar. 30 officers and 1200 lower ranks were captured, among the prisoners one of the instigators of the rebellion - Vysotsky.

Ants took Rakovets, Shtrandman - Shops. Meanwhile, Uminsky made a demonstration against them. Then Paskevich sent support to Muravyov, and at the same time ordered, despite Tol's ideas, to suspend all offensive actions for the time being. This was completely wrong: the more troops Uminsky would send against Muravyov and Shtrandman, the easier it would be to attack in the main direction. The Poles took advantage of the suspension to correct errors in the distribution of their troops, which caused unnecessary effort and sacrifice on the part of the Russians the next day. Finally, the Poles mistook the suspension for the exhaustion of the Russian forces and immediately went over to the offensive against Wola, and approached it with a half-gun shot. Then two carabinieri regiments, without any order, with desperate swiftness, rushed forward with bayonets and overturned the Poles. But the battle did not end there - they had to go with hostility 3 times, made their way behind the second line of fortifications and even into the Volsky suburb, but, by order of the field marshal, they were recalled back. It was one of the bloodiest episodes of the day.

Uminsky took Shops from Strandman, but Muravyov kept Rakovets. It was still only 3 p.m., but the field marshal did not want to continue the assault that day. The troops spent the night without overcoats and warm food, many without even a piece of bread, since there was only one day's supply.

2nd day of the assault, August 26th. The next day, Paskevich had a meeting with Krukovetsky, but it did not lead to anything. Polish troops were concentrated mainly to the center between the Volskaya and Jerusalem outposts. At about 2 p.m., the Russians began a cannonade. At the very beginning of the case, Paskevich was shell-shocked in the hand and, pale, with a distorted face, he fell to the ground. He handed over unlimited command of the army to Tolya.

A 120-gun battery was immediately concentrated, which began to fight the Polish battery of 112 field and fortress guns. Muravyov was ordered to attack vigorously. Muravyov, reinforced by a guards brigade, led the attack in two columns. After a stubborn battle, he captured fortification No. 81, and the other rushed to No. 78. Uminsky sent infantry and cavalry regiments against her. Then Nostitz sent to the aid of the guards dragoons, who covered themselves here and arrived in time to help them with unfading glory in the fight against the enemy, four times as strong.

At about 5 o’clock, Kreutz went in two columns to fortifications No. 21 and 22: the 4th cavalry company of Colonel Zhitov jumped to redoubt No. 21 for 200 steps and showered the enemy with such cruel buckshot that he fled without waiting for the attack, and horse-artillery hunters rushed on horseback into redoubt and captured the gun. Thus, Zhitov showed an extremely rare example of an independent attack with artillery without the help of other branches of the military.

No. 22 with two battalions was occupied by the troops of Kreutz after a stubborn battle, and the garrison was almost completely exterminated.

Palen took possession of No. 23 and 24, and then, after a fierce battle, the Evangelical cemetery. It was already about 6 pm, dusk was approaching. Some generals suggested that Tolya postpone the assault until the morning. “Now or never,” Tol answered and ordered the troops to be put in order, reinforced with reserves, send artillery and storm the city rampart. After a 3-hour struggle, the Jerusalem outpost was taken, and at about 10 pm - Volskaya. At night, half of the troops rested, while the other was under arms, pushing forward posts only 50 paces ahead of the rampart. The sappers cut through the gun embrasures for tomorrow. However, there was no need to fight: at night, Commander-in-Chief Malazovsky sent a letter addressed to Paskevich that Warsaw would be cleared by 5 o'clock in the morning.

Having cleared Warsaw, the Poles moved towards Modlin. On August 27, the Russian army entered the enemy capital. Russian losses amounted to 10? thousand, Poles - 11 thousand and 132 guns.

It seemed that the struggle with the Poles was over and the defeated Polish army should surrender to the mercy of the winner. However, as soon as the Poles escaped the death that threatened them, the members of the board who gathered in Zakrochim (near Modlin) declared their unwillingness to obey unconditionally. Paskevich had 60 thousand, but 12 thousand had to be allocated to the Warsaw garrison, and a detachment to secure the Brest highway, that is, 45 thousand would remain, which he did not want to risk and go against 30 thousand Poles, although defeated and disorganized. He wanted to wait until Rosen and Ridiger had dealt with Romarino and Rozhitsky.

Malakhovsky ordered Romarino to arrive in Modlin, but the latter, pursuing his personal goals and obeying the desire of the magnates who were with his detachment, did not comply with the orders of the commander-in-chief under the pretext of the danger of moving to Modlin. He decided to retreat to the Upper Vistula, cross at Zavikhost and join Rozhitsky. Romarino took up a strong position at Opole, but on September 3 was overturned by Rosen, who finally pinned him to the Austrian border. On September 5, Romarino, with 14 thousand and 42 guns, crossed the border at Borov and surrendered to the Austrians.

In early September, Ridiger, reinforced from Rosen's detachment, had 9 thousand with 24 guns. Rozhitsky also had 9 thousand, but retreated to Pinchov and, assuming to hold on to the river here. Nida, separated Kamensky to Stopnitsa with most of the cavalry, 3 battalions and 2 guns. On September 11, Ridiger sent against Kamensky Krasovsky with 2 thousand, and he himself went to Pinchov. On September 12, Krasovsky overtook and defeated Kamensky at Shkalmberg (there were 2,000 prisoners alone), and General Plakhovo, with the vanguard of Ridiger, inflicted a severe defeat on Rozhitsky, who was retreating to Mekhov. On September 14, Rozhitsky decided to move to Krakow possessions. Ridiger followed him and drove him into Galicia, where the Austrians disarmed the Poles; however, only 1,400 of them remained.

The death of Colonel Kozlinikov in the vicinity of Plock

Seeing successes against Romarino and Rozhitsky, Paskevich decided to act by force of arms against the main Polish army. It was impossible for the Poles to continue the war in the north, it remained to move the war south to the wooded, mountainous and rugged terrain, where it was possible to rely on Krakow and Galicia, which sympathized with the Poles. However, moving an army south past the Russians required speed, energy, and stealth.

The new Polish commander-in-chief Rybinsky, leaving the garrison in Lublin, arrived on September 11 to Plock. The crossing began successfully, but Rybinsky returned the troops back, the conditions of obedience, accepted by the majority at the military council, were returned from Paskevich. But such a decision caused indignation, especially among young officers, and therefore the proposal was rejected. Paskevich sent most of his forces after the Poles along both banks of the Vistula.

On September 16, the crossing of the Poles began safely at Vlotslavsk, but Rybinsky, having learned about the fate of Rozhitsky (it was no longer possible to count on connecting with him), again refused the crossing. Immediately, Mülberg, who was negotiating with Paskevich, brought his new proposal, more severe, the words “constitutional” and “fatherland” were excluded from the oath. The proposal was rejected and decided to go to Prussia.

On September 20, the Polish army (21,000, 95 guns and 9,000 horses) crossed the Prussian border at Soberzyn, Shutov and Gurzno (east of Thorn). Ragged, in linen trousers, without overcoats, and many even without shoes, the Poles inspired compassion for the Prussian troops who were preparing to receive them. While the troops had weapons in their hands, they still seemed calm, but when they had to give up their guns, dismount from their horses, unfasten and lay down their sabers, some began to cry. A few days later, however, the Poles indulged in a carefree and scattered life. Their restless behavior, constant desire for intrigues and gossip, hatred of everything that bore a sign of order, finally, their boasting and vanity - all this was the reason that those who crossed the border fell even more in general opinion.

During the uprising, the Kingdom of Poland lost 326,000 people, of which 25,000 were Warsaw alone, and more than 600 million zlotys, not counting private losses. But most importantly, the Poles lost those significant privileges that they enjoyed before the uprising.

Notes:

Before the invasion of Napoleon, there were 9257 monasteries, churches, government and private buildings in Moscow; 6496 of them burned down; all others were more or less plundered. The losses of individuals amounted to 83,372,000 rubles. real estate and 16,585,000 rubles. movable property. This did not include losses of the palace, spiritual, military and other state and public departments.

These facts, set forth in the work of Count Yorck von Wartenburg, are incomprehensible; Napoleon, undoubtedly, had already decided to retreat to Smolensk and, in relation to this, echeloned his troops; under such conditions it was impossible to even think of a battle.

Deciding to retreat is very difficult, especially for someone who fancied himself a superman and before whom almost the whole world trembled.

On the same day, October 16, in the rear of Napoleon, Admiral Chichagov moved from the vicinity of Pruzhany to Minsk and the river. Berezina, leaving Saken against Schwarzenberg and Rainier, pushed back beyond the river. Bug.

The Sejm is a class representative institution; a representative assembly in the former Poland and later in Finland. - Note. ed.

Formerly, oddly enough, Czartoryski had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia.

Ensign - the rank in which the lower ranks were promoted, who passed the ensign examination after completing the course at the ensign school and remained in long-term service. - Note. ed.

Shlyakhtich is a Polish small estate nobleman. - Note. ed.

The skirmisher is a soldier in the forward line. - Note. ed.

Tete de pont (French tete de pont< tete голова + pont мост) - предмостное укрепление. - Note. ed.

Here: “four” (from Polish cwiartka - four, quarter. - Note. ed.

Notch - a barrier of fallen trees. - Note. ed.

Epolements are parapets of a special device that serve to cover troops where the terrain does not have convenient natural covers. - Note. ed.

Cosigners - during the uprising, the Polish army, armed with scythes, which were attached to poles. - Note. ed.

It is this attack of the Poles that is depicted in the painting by Kossak, where the patriotic artist completely depicted the triumphant Poles and only in the right corner of one Russian staff officer, cast down to dust. Khlopitsky - in a civilian gray coat and top hat, on horseback, followed by Prondzinsky in the uniform of the General Staff. In general, a lot of portraits. The Piontek battery is visible on the highway. He used up the shells, but did not want to leave the position, sat on the gun, lit a pipe and decided to wait until the shells were fed. Warsaw is visible in the distance.

Having entered Poland as a "liberator" in 1807, Napoleon turned it into the Duchy of Warsaw, dependent on France. But after its defeat in 1815, a new partition of Poland was carried out at the Congress of Vienna - the fourth in a row, in which four-fifths of the Duchy of Poland was transferred to Russian citizenship. Russia created the Kingdom of Poland on this territory with its own constitution and Sejm. The rest of Poland was divided between Austria and Prussia.

The Russian emperor Alexander I forgave the Poles for their action against Russia: in 1812, Poland fielded its 80,000-strong army as part of the Napoleonic army. Order and tranquility were restored in the country, the material well-being of the people began to develop rapidly, which gave impetus to the rapid growth of the population. Russia also did not forget about the public education and cultural growth of the Kingdom of Poland - a university was founded in Warsaw, "two military academies, a women's institute, a school of agriculture and agriculture and other educational institutions." The brother of Emperor Alexander I, Konstantin Pavlovich, loved Poland, knew its language perfectly, and, since 1814, being the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, strengthened it in every possible way. Later, after the first governor - General Zayonchek, becoming the governor of the Kingdom of Poland himself, he married the Polish countess I. Grudzinskaya and even stood for the complete independence of Poland. Konstantin was quite pleased with his fate and, perhaps, therefore, in 1823 he abdicated the Russian throne in favor of his younger brother Nikolai Pavlovich.

Documents on this case were prepared in advance by Alexander I and secretly kept one copy in the Synod, the Senate, in the State Council and in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the sealed envelopes had the royal signature in their own hand: “... keep until my demand, and in the event of my death to reveal, before any action, in an emergency assembly. So Constantine finally broke with the succession to the throne and devoted himself to Poland. The Poles themselves spoke of their well-being with great satisfaction: “... Poland has never been as happy as in the time of Alexander I, and if it continued to follow this path, it would soon forget 200 years of its anarchy and would become along with the most educated states of Europe ".

Even after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Alexander I granted the Poles a constitution. The manifestation of the opposition began with the fact that Poland, having, thanks to the efforts of Constantine, its own national army, began to seek separation from Russia and even intended to annex to itself a huge part of the territory of the Russian lands that made up Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Such a statement at the Seimas outraged the Russian emperor, and he began to limit his activities, stretch out the terms between his meetings, and then the publicity of the Seimas meeting was canceled, and basically its meetings began to be held behind closed doors. Such a violation of the constitution led to the organization of a network of secret societies, which took up the special education of the younger youth and preparation for a future uprising.

Over time, two main parties were formed: the aristocratic one, led by Prince Adam Chertoryisky, and the democratic one, led by Lelewel, professor of history at Vilna University. They were separated by plans for the future reorganization of Poland, but united by the current ones - to prepare as soon as possible for an uprising to fight for the national independence of Poland. They even tried to contact the Decembrists in Russia, but the negotiations did not lead to the desired results.

By this time, the flames of revolution had begun to flare up in the West. In France, the Bourbon dynasty was swept away, Belgium was indignant, a breeze of unrest of the Russian peasantry blew from the east. Preparations for the uprising in Poland began to overripe - denunciations and arrests began. It was impossible to postpone the performance any longer. The last, decisive impetus for the uprising was the inclusion of Polish troops in the Russian army for a campaign in Belgium to suppress the revolutionary movement.

On a cold autumn night on November 17, a group of conspirators from young officers and pupils of military schools, led by Nabelyak, Trzhaskovsky and Goshchinsky, broke into the Belvedere country palace shouting: "Death to a tyrant!" Sleepy Konstantin was pushed aside by the valet, and he managed to escape, and then go to the Russian army. But many Russian generals, officers, close associates of Constantine and servants, along with Poles loyal to Russia, were killed.

The conspirators broke the doors of the arsenal and began to arm the rebel army, who were kindled with anger with provocative cries, "... that the Russians are cutting the Poles and burning the city." At this time, another group tried to capture the barracks, but the skirmish dragged on, and the case fell through. The military forces for the coup were clearly not enough, since a small number of units were involved. Then the organizers rushed to the workers' quarters with an appeal, and the entire population of the city was raised. Crowds of people rushed to the arsenal. In a short time, the uprising engulfed the whole of Warsaw. Constantine at this time, having released the Polish detachments loyal to him, withdrew with his Russian troops from the city, giving the Poles the opportunity to understand that the Russians were peacefully disposed. He considered the moment the uprising began to be a small flash and waited for it to go out by itself. But as a result of such inaction, the uprising engulfed all of Poland. Rapidly developing events frightened the top of the Polish aristocracy. An interim government was urgently created, headed by the former minister and friend of Emperor Alexander I, Adam Chertoryisky. He persuaded General Khlopitsky, who had once served in the Napoleonic army, to take over the leadership of the uprising in order to prevent it from developing spontaneously. And then the new government and the Sejm sent to St. Petersburg their demands for the observance of the constitution and the restoration of Poland within the borders before its first partition, that is, with the annexation of "Western Russian regions" to it. In response to the “daring” statement, Nicholas I did not negotiate, but stated: “... that he promises an amnesty to the Poles if they immediately submit; but if they dare to take up arms against Russia and their legitimate sovereign, then they themselves and their cannon shots will overthrow Poland.

But the rebels did not lay down their arms. Then the Russian emperor sent his troops to tame the "rebels" under the command of Field Marshal Johann Dibich-Zabalkansky. But since the uprising in Poland was unexpected for Russia, it took about 3.5 months to prepare the army for hostilities. In the meantime, only one corps of Baron Rosen was operating there, which, under the pressure of the Poles, was gradually losing its positions.

The new year 1831 has come. The Russian emperor was declared deposed in Poland, the people took to the streets and demanded the complete separation of Poland from Russia. As a sign of solidarity with the Russian revolutionaries of 1825, they defiantly served a memorial service for the executed Decembrists and "... put forward a slogan addressed to the Russian people -" For our and your freedom "".

Russian punitive troops were on their way. Poland was intensively preparing for hostilities. Its initial army of 35 thousand grew to 130, but hardly half was suitable for real action. In Warsaw itself, up to four thousand national guardsmen were under arms. Having extensive experience, General Khlopitsky already foresaw the outcome of the uprising. From the very beginning, he did not want to take on leadership and refused the role of dictator. He led a wait-and-see policy in order to get out of the game if necessary. Khlopitsky did not even take advantage of the absence of the main forces of the Russian army to defeat the 6th Lithuanian Corps of General Rosen. In the end, he was replaced by Prince Mikhail Radziwill.

The Russian army numbering 125.5 thousand entered Poland. On January 24, Dibich wedged it in several columns between the Narew and the Bug in order to cut the Polish army and break it piece by piece with one decisive blow. But the mudslide interfered with his plans. In order not to get stuck in the swamps of the interfluve, he went to the Brest highway. On February 13, Dibich defeated the army of the Poles near Grochow, but did not finish them off when crossing the Vistula and made it possible to leave for Prague. The next day, approaching the fortress, which Suvorov once took, he was convinced that it was impossible to take it without special siege weapons.

Having secured the base and strengthened the rear, on April 12, Dibich launched a decisive offensive. Upon learning of this, the commander-in-chief of the Polish forces, Skrzynetsky, began to leave with his troops from the blow, but on May 14 he was overtaken and defeated at Ostroleka. After the defeat, the Polish army concentrated at Prague. Dibich moved towards it, but on the way he died of cholera, which raged not only in Poland, but also in the central regions of Russia.

On June 13, General I.F. Paskevich-Erivansky took command of the Russian troops. General N. N. Muravyov moved with his army to the Brest highway. The Poles pulled an army of 40 thousand people to Warsaw, in addition, a general conscription into the militia was announced. But it was all in vain. By August 1, Skrzynetsky left the post of commander in chief. He was replaced by Dembinsky - the fourth leader of the Polish army. All three previous commanders-in-chief - Khlopnitsky, Radziwill and Skrzhinetsky were accused of treason and imprisoned. The Poles demanded their execution, but the government remained silent. Then a crowd of angry citizens broke into the prison by force and executed the arrested generals by lynching. Popular uprisings began against the government, which, in turn, was confused. Adam Chertoryisky left the post of chief ruler and fled from Warsaw to Paris. The Sejm urgently appointed General Krukovetsky instead of him, and the massacre of popular protests began. Some participants in demonstrations against the Polish government and the most ardent participants in the massacre of former commanders in prison were executed. There were attempts to start new negotiations with Paskevich, but he did not accept any conditions, categorically stating that the rebels lay down their arms and cease resistance. The statement of the Russian commander was rejected. The Poles decided to fight to the end.

On September 25, Paskevich, with decisive actions of the army, struck at the western suburbs of Warsaw and captured its suburban part - Wola, and the whole of Warsaw was surrendered the next day. Part of the Polish troops under the command of Rybinsky, who did not want to lay down their arms, retreated to the north of Poland. Pursued by Paskevich's army, the Polish detachments crossed the border of Prussia on September 20 and were disarmed there. Soon the military garrison of Medlin surrendered, followed on October 9 by Zamosc. The instigators and active participants were exiled to Siberia, the Polish Sejm was dispersed, the constitution was abolished. It was replaced by the "Organic Statute", according to which from now on and forever Poland was to be an integral part of the Russian Empire. The name of the Kingdom of Poland was retained, but it ceased to exist as an independent state. General Paskevich, who received the title of Prince of Warsaw, was appointed governor of this Russian province. Under him, a council was established of the chief officials of the region, who replaced the former ministers. Instead of the Sejm, the State Council of the Kingdom of Poland was approved from dignitaries appointed by Emperor Nicholas I himself. In all official areas of activity, the Russian language was introduced without fail.

Three years later, the Russian emperor himself showed up in Warsaw and, at the reception of a delegation from the population, bluntly stated: “... By my order, a citadel was erected here (the Aleksandrovskaya fortress for the Russian garrison), and I announce to you that at the slightest indignation I will order to destroy your city ... " .

In order to prevent the further organization of Polish secret societies and the ideological influence of the Poles on the western regions of Russia, the universities in Warsaw, Vilna, as well as the Krmenets Lyceum were closed, and instead of them, the University of St. Vladimir.

With great sympathy, the Russian Synod accepted the petition of the Uniate Bishop Joseph Semashko to reunite with the Russian Orthodox Church the Uniate churches of the Russian population of the western regions, under the influence of Polish Catholicism. A significant role in this matter was played by the highest hierarch and an outstanding theologian of that time, Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow.

Such an event as the defeat of the Polish uprising did not go unnoticed in the history of awards. All participants in the hostilities against the Polish rebels were awarded a special award - a special cross minted in the manner of the Polish military order "Virtuti Militari". This Russian sign - "werewolf" - of the Polish Order of Distinction for Military Merit was specially introduced by Emperor Nicholas I to insult the national dignity of the Polish people. It, like the Polish order, has broadened ends and an image in the rosette of the front side of the Polish single-headed eagle, around which a continuous wreath of laurel leaves is placed around the circumference. On the ends of the cross there are inscriptions: on the left "VIR", on the right "TUTI", on the top - "MILI", on the bottom - "TARI". On the reverse side, in exactly the same rosette with a wreath, a three-line inscription: "REX - ET - PATRIA" (Ruler and Fatherland); below, under the spherical bar, the date is "1831". At the ends of the cross - the image of the monograms of the initial letters - SAPR ( Stanislav August Rex Polonia), but the order of their arrangement is unusual: on the top - "S", on the left - "A", on the right - "R" and on the bottom - "P". This inscription reminds of the last Polish king, Stanislaw August Poniatowski, who once reigned with the support of the Russian Empress Catherine II and was oriented towards Russia in Polish politics. He died in St. Petersburg in 1798 after renouncing the Polish crown.

The cross of Russian coinage was divided into five classes:

badge of the 1st class - gold, with enamel, issued with a shoulder ribbon and a star to the army commander and corps commanders;

badge of the 2nd class - gold, with enamel, on a neck ribbon - for generals with a rank below the corps;

badge of the 3rd class - gold, with enamel, to be worn on a chest ribbon - for staff officers;

badge of the 4th class - gold, but without enamel - like a soldier, 28x28 mm in size - for chief officers;

badge of the 5th class - silver, size 28x28, intended for rewarding the lower ranks.

Establishing this cross in 1831, Emperor Nicholas I "... commanded to consider it as a medal ...". The ribbon for all crosses was adopted the same (colors of the Polish national order) - blue with black stripes along the edges. After the appearance of the Russian sign, resembling the Polish order in form, it actually ceased to exist. And only a few decades later it was again revived by the Polish bourgeois government.

In addition to these signs, a special silver medal was also established on December 31, 1831, with a diameter of 26 mm. On its front side, in the entire field, there is an image of the Russian State Emblem (double-headed eagle), in the center of which, under the royal crown, is a porphyry with an image of the Polish coat of arms (one-headed Lithuanian eagle); on top, along the side of the medal, a small inscription: "BENEFITS OF HONOR AND GLORY."

On the reverse side, inside a wreath of two laurel branches tied at the bottom with a ribbon, there is a four-line inscription: "FOR THE CAPTURE - ATTACK - WARSAW - August 25 and 26"; below, at the sling, the year is "1831". At the very top, between the ends of the branches (above the inscription), a radiant six-pointed cross is placed.

The medal was awarded to the lower ranks who participated in the assault on the Polish capital, as well as priests and medical personnel who performed their duties in a combat situation.

Such medals were also smaller in diameter - 22 mm. They were intended to reward cavalrymen. This is the last - the fifth - in a series of similar cavalry awards. They were worn on the same ribbon as the Polish signs - blue with black stripes along the edges.

There is a minting of the medal "For the Capture of Warsaw" made of white metal, 26 mm in diameter, somewhat different in image. This is one of the first medals made of white metal.

Polish uprising of 1830-1831. Part I

The uprising of 1830, the November uprising, the Russian-Polish war of 1830-1831 (Polish Powstanie listopadowe) - "national liberation" (the term of Polish and Soviet historiography) or "anti-Russian uprising" (the term of Russian pre-revolutionary historiography) against the power of the Russian Empire on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, partly Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine - that is, all the lands formerly part of the Commonwealth. It happened simultaneously with the so-called "cholera riots" in central Russia.

It began on November 29, 1830 and continued until October 21, 1831. It was carried out under the slogan of restoring the “historical Commonwealth” within the borders of 1772, that is, not just the secession of territories with a predominantly Polish population, but the complete secession of all territories inhabited by Belarusians and Ukrainians, as well as Lithuanians.

Poland under the rule of the Russian Empire

After the Napoleonic Wars, by decision of the Congress of Vienna, the Kingdom of Poland was created (incorrectly translated into Russian as "Kingdom of Poland" - a term that became widespread after the suppression of the uprising. (Polish: Królestwo Polskie) - a state that was in a personal union with Russia.

Congress of Vienna 1815

The state was a constitutional monarchy, ruled by a two-year Sejm and a king, who was represented by a governor in Warsaw. The Kingdom had its own army, staffed mainly from "legionnaires" - veterans of the Polish legions who fought during the Napoleonic wars against Russia, Austria and Prussia. The post of viceroy was taken by Kosciuszko's colleague, divisional general of the French imperial army, Zayonchek, at the same time, the brother of the Russian emperor, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, became the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, after the death of Zayonchek (1826) he also became the governor.

Konstantin Pavlovich Romanov

Alexander I, who was very sympathetic to the Polish national movement, gave Poland a liberal constitution, but on the other hand, he himself began to violate it when the Poles, exercising their rights, began to resist his measures. Thus, the second Sejm in 1820 rejected a bill that abolished jury trials (introduced in Poland by Napoleon); to which Alexander declared that he, as the author of the constitution, had the right to be its sole interpreter.

Alexander I

In 1819, preliminary censorship was introduced, which until now Poland did not know. The convocation of the Third Diet was delayed for a long time: elected in 1822, it was convened only at the beginning of 1825. After the Kalisz Voivodeship elected the oppositionist Vincent Nemoevsky, the elections there were cashed and new ones were appointed; when Kalisz again elected Nemoevsky, he was deprived of the right to elect at all, and Nemoevsky, who had come to take his seat in the Sejm, was arrested at the Warsaw outpost. The royal decree abolished the publicity of the meetings of the Seimas (except for the first). In such a situation, the third diet unquestioningly adopted all the laws submitted to it by the emperor. The subsequent appointment of the Russian governor, Konstantin Pavlovich, alarmed the Poles, who feared a tightening of the regime.

On the other hand, violations of the constitution were not the only and not even the main reason for the dissatisfaction of the Poles, especially since the Poles in other areas of the former Commonwealth, that is, Lithuania and Russia (the so-called "eight voivodeships"), did not have any constitutional rights and guarantees ( while retaining full land and economic supremacy). Violations of the constitution were superimposed on patriotic feelings that protested against foreign power over Poland and looked forward to the revival of an independent Polish state; in addition, the so-called "Congress Poland", the brainchild of Alexander I at the Congress of Vienna, the former "Duchy of Warsaw", created by Napoleon, occupied only a small part of the historical lands of the Commonwealth, which are ethnic Poland. The Poles (plus the "Litvins": the Polish gentry of Western Russia, that is, Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania), for their part, continued to perceive their homeland within the borders of 1772 (before the partitions) and dreamed in reality of driving the Russians out, hoping for help from Europe.

patriotic movement

In 1819, Major Valerian Lukasinsky, Prince Yablonovsky, Colonels Krzhizhanovsky and Prondzinsky founded the National Masonic Society, whose members were about 200 people, mostly officers; after the prohibition of Masonic lodges in 1820, it was transformed into a deeply conspiratorial Patriotic Society. At the same time, secret societies also existed outside congressional Poland: patriots, friends, promenists (in Vilna), Templars (in Volhynia), and others. The movement among officers had especially wide support. The Catholic clergy also contributed to the movement; only the peasantry remained aloof from him. The movement was heterogeneous in its social goals and was divided into hostile parties: aristocratic (headed by Prince Czartoryski) and democratic, headed by Professor Lelewel, the leader and idol of university youth;

Adam Adamovich Czartoryski Joachim Lelewel

its military wing was subsequently headed by Lieutenant of the Guards Grenadiers Vysotsky, an instructor at the School of Corpsmen (military school), who created a conspiratorial military organization already within the national movement itself. However, they were separated only by plans for the future structure of Poland, but not about the uprising and not about its borders. Twice (during the Kyiv contracts) representatives of the Patriotic Society tried to enter into relations with the Decembrists, but the negotiations did not lead to anything. When the Decembrists' conspiracy was discovered and some Poles connected with them, the case of the latter was transferred to the Administrative Council (government), which, after two months of deliberations, decided to release the accused. The hopes of the Poles revived a lot after Russia declared war on Turkey (1828). Plans for a performance were discussed, in view of the fact that the main forces of Russia were involved in the Balkans; the objection was that such an action might hinder the liberation of Greece. Vysotsky, who just then created his own society, entered into relations with members of other parties and set the end of March 1829 as the time for the uprising, when, according to rumors, the coronation of Emperor Nicholas I with the crown of Poland was to take place. It was decided to kill Nikolai, and Vysotsky volunteered to personally carry out the action.

The coronation, however, took place safely (in May 1829); the plan was not carried out.

Preparation of the uprising

The July Revolution of 1830 in France brought the Polish nationalists into extreme excitement. On August 12, a meeting was held at which the question of immediate action was discussed; however, it was decided to postpone the speech, since it was necessary to win over one of the high-ranking military men. In the end, the conspirators managed to win over the generals Khlopitsky, Stanislav Potocki, Krukovetsky and Schembek to their side.

Josef Grzegorz Chłopicki Jan Stefan Krukowiecki

Stanislav Iosifovich Pototsky

The movement embraced almost all army officers, the gentry, women, craft workshops, and students. Vysotsky's plan was adopted, according to which the signal for the uprising was to be the assassination of Konstantin Pavlovich and the capture of the barracks of Russian troops. The performance was scheduled for October 26th.

In the first days of October, proclamations were posted in the streets; an announcement appeared that the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw (the seat of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, the former governor of Poland) was rented from the new year.

Belvedere Palace

But the Grand Duke was warned of the danger by his Polish wife (Princess Lovich) and did not leave the Belvedere.

The last straw for the Poles was Nicholas's manifesto on the Belgian revolution, after which the Poles saw that their army was destined to be the vanguard in the campaign against the rebellious Belgians. The uprising was finally scheduled for 29 November. The conspirators had 10,000 soldiers against about 7,000 Russians, of whom, however, many were natives of the former Polish regions.

"November Night"

With the onset of the evening of November 29, armed students gathered in the Lazenkovsky forest, and regiments were armed in the barracks. At 6 pm, Pyotr Vysotsky entered the barracks of the cadets and said: “Brothers, the hour of freedom has struck!”, He was answered with shouts: “Long live Poland!” Vysotsky, at the head of 150 cadets, attacked the barracks of the guards lancers, while 14 conspirators moved to the Belvedere. However, at the moment when they broke into the palace, Chief of Police Lyubovitsky raised the alarm and Konstantin Pavlovich managed to escape in one dressing gown and hide. However, this failure did not affect the further course of events, since Constantine, instead of organizing an energetic rebuff to the rebels with the help of available forces, showed complete passivity.

Vysotsky's attack on the uhlan barracks also failed, but soon 2,000 students and a crowd of workers came to his aid. The rebels killed six Polish generals who remained loyal to the tsar (including Minister of War Gauka). The arsenal was taken. The Russian regiments were surrounded in their barracks and, without receiving orders from anywhere, were demoralized. Most of the Polish regiments hesitated, held back by their commanders (the commander of the Guards Horse Rangers Zhymirsky even managed to force his regiment to fight against the rebels in the Krakow suburb, and then with the regiment joined Konstantin, who left Warsaw at night). Konstantin summoned the Russian regiments to him, and by 2 o'clock in the morning Warsaw was cleared of Russian troops. After that, the uprising at once swept all of Poland.

Konstantin, explaining his passivity, said: “I don’t want to participate in this Polish fight,” meaning that what is happening is a conflict exclusively between the Poles and their king Nicholas. Subsequently, during the war, he even defiantly showed pro-Polish sympathies. Representatives of the Polish government (Administrative Council) began negotiations with him, as a result of which Konstantin undertook to release the Polish troops who were with him, not to call on the troops of the Lithuanian Corps (Russian troops of Lithuania and Russia subordinate to him) and leave for the Vistula. The Poles, for their part, promised not to disturb him and supply him with supplies. Konstantin not only went beyond the Vistula, but completely left the Kingdom of Poland - the fortresses of Modlin and Zamostye were surrendered to the Poles, and the entire territory of the Kingdom of Poland was liberated from Russian rule.

Government organization. Deposition of Nicholas I

Nicholas I informs the guards about the uprising in Poland

The next day after the start of the uprising, on November 30, the Administrative Council met, which was at a loss: in its appeal, it defined the coup as an event "as unfortunate as it was unexpected", and tried to pretend that it was governing on behalf of Nicholas. “Nicholas, the King of Poland, is waging war with Nicholas, the Emperor of All Russia,” the Minister of Finance Lyubetsky described the situation in this way.

Nicholas I

On the same day, the Patriot Club was formed, demanding a purge of the council. As a result, a number of ministers were expelled and replaced by new ones: Vladislav Ostrovsky, General K. Malakhovskiy and Professor Lelevel. General Khlopitsky was appointed commander in chief.

Sharp disagreements immediately emerged between the right and left wing of the movement. The left tended to view the Polish movement as part of a pan-European liberation movement and were associated with the democratic circles in France that brought about the July Revolution; they dreamed of a nationwide uprising and war against all three monarchies that had divided Poland, in alliance with revolutionary France. The right tended to seek a compromise with Nicholas on the basis of the 1815 constitution. At the same time, however, they also did not doubt the need to return the "eight provinces" (Lithuania and Russia). The coup was organized by the left, but as the elite joined it, influence passed to the side of the right. General Khlopitsky, who was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, was also on the right. However, he also enjoyed influence among the left, as an ally of Kosciuszko and Dombrowski.

On December 4, a Provisional Government of 7 members was formed, including Lelevel and Yulian Nemtsevich. The council was headed by Prince Adam Czartoryski - thus, power passed to the right. The most active left-wing leaders, Zalivsky and Vysotsky, Khlopitsky removed from Warsaw, the first - to organize an uprising in Lithuania, the second - as a captain in the army. He even tried to prosecute the coroners. On December 5, Khlopitsky accused the government of empty rhetoric and condoning club violence, and proclaimed himself a dictator. At the same time, he expressed his intention to “govern in the name of the constitutional king”, who just then (December 17) issued a manifesto to the Poles, stigmatizing the rebels and their “heinous betrayal”, and announced the mobilization of the army. The Sejm, which consisted mostly of leftists, took away the dictatorship from Khlopytsky, but then, under the pressure of public opinion (Khlopytsky was extremely popular, and they saw him as the savior of Poland), he returned it, after which Khlopytsky achieved the suspension of the sessions of the Seym.

session of the Seimas

Delegates (Lyubitsky and Yezersky) were sent to Petersburg to negotiate with the Russian government. Polish conditions boiled down to the following: the return of "eight provinces"; observance of the constitution; voting of taxes by chambers; observance of guarantees of freedom and publicity; publicity of Seimas sittings; protection of the kingdom exclusively by its own troops. With the exception of the first, these requirements were within the framework of the Vienna Convention of 1815, which guaranteed the constitutional rights of Poland. Nicholas, however, promised nothing more than an amnesty. When on January 25, 1831, the returned Yezersky informed the Sejm about this, the latter immediately adopted an act deposing Nicholas and banning representatives of the Romanov dynasty from occupying the Polish throne. Even earlier, under the impression of the first news of Russia's military preparations, the Sejm again took the dictatorship from Khlopitsky (who, knowing full well that Europe would not support Poland and the uprising was doomed, categorically insisted on a compromise with Nicholas). The Sejm was ready to leave him command, but Khlopitsky refused him, saying that he intended to serve only as a simple soldier. On January 20, the command was entrusted to Prince Radziwill, who was completely devoid of military experience.

Mikhail Gedeon Radziwill

From that moment on, the outcome of the Polish uprising was to be decided by the single combat of Russian and Polish weapons.

Start of hostilities. Grokhov

By November 1830, the Polish army consisted of 23,800 infantry, 6,800 cavalry, with 108 guns. As a result of active government measures (recruitment, enrollment of volunteers, creation of detachments of cosigners armed with scythes erected on a pole) in March 1831, the army had 57,924 infantry, 18,272 cavalry and 3,000 volunteers - a total of 79,000 people with 158 guns. In September, by the end of the uprising, the army numbered 80,821 people.

guard Jan Zygmund Skrzynecki

This was almost equal to the Russian army put up against Poland. Nevertheless, the quality of the composition of the army was much inferior to the Russian one: they were mostly newly drafted and inexperienced soldiers, in the mass of which veterans were dissolved. The Polish army was especially inferior to the Russian in cavalry and artillery.

Emilia Plater (commander of the cosigner detachment)

For the Russian government, the Polish uprising was a surprise: the Russian army was located partly in the western, partly in the interior provinces and had a peaceful organization. The number of all troops that were supposed to be used against the Poles reached 183 thousand (not counting 13 Cossack regiments), but it took 3-4 months to concentrate them. Count Dibich-Zabalkansky was appointed commander-in-chief, and Count Tol was appointed head of the field headquarters.

Ivan Ivanovich Dibich-Zabalkansky

By the beginning of 1831, the Poles had about 55,000 completely ready; on the Russian side, only Baron Rosen, commander of the 6th (Lithuanian) Corps, could concentrate about 45 thousand in Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. For political reasons, Khlopitsky did not take advantage of the favorable moment for offensive actions, but deployed his main forces of troops in echelons along the roads from Kovna and Brest-Litovsk to Warsaw. Separate detachments of Seravsky and Dvernitsky stood between the rivers Vistula and Pilica; Kozakovsky's detachment observed the Upper Vistula; Dzekonsky formed new regiments in Radom; in Warsaw itself, up to 4,000 national guards were under arms. Khlopitsky's place at the head of the army was taken by Prince Radziwill.

By February 1831, the strength of the Russian army had grown to 125,500. Hoping to end the war immediately, inflicting a decisive blow on the enemy, Dibich did not pay due attention to providing the troops with food, especially to the reliable arrangement of the transportation unit, and this soon resulted in major difficulties for the Russians.

On February 5-6 (January 24-25, old style), the main forces of the Russian army (I, VI infantry and III reserve cavalry corps) entered the Kingdom of Poland in several columns, heading for the space between the Bug and Narew. The 5th reserve cavalry corps of Kreutz was supposed to occupy the Lublin Voivodeship, cross the Vistula, stop the weapons that had begun there and divert the attention of the enemy. The movement of some Russian columns to Augustow and Lomzha forced the Poles to push two divisions to Pultusk and Serock, which was in full accordance with Dibich's plans - to cut the enemy army and break it in parts. The sudden onslaught of mud changed the situation. The movement of the Russian army (which reached the Chizhev-Zambrov-Lomzha line on February 8) in the accepted direction was recognized as impossible, since it would have to be drawn into the wooded and swampy strip between the Bug and the Narew. As a result, Dibich crossed the Bug at Nur (February 11) and moved to the Brest highway, against the right wing of the Poles. Since, with this change, the extreme right column, Prince Shakhovsky, moving towards Lomzha from Avgustov, was too distant from the main forces, she was given complete freedom of action. On February 14, the Battle of Stochek took place, where General Geismar with a brigade of horsemen was defeated by a detachment of Dvernitsky.

Józef Dvernicki

battle of Stochek

This first battle of the war, which turned out to be successful for the Poles, greatly lifted their spirits. The Polish army took up a position at Grochow, covering the approaches to Warsaw. On February 19, the first battle began - the battle of Grochow.

Battle of Grochow 13 February. Grochow's position was on a vast low-lying plain intersected by swamps and drainage ditches. From M. Grokhov past Kavenchin and Zombka to Byalolenka stretches a swampy strip 1-2 versts wide.
To the south of B. Grokhov, the division of Shembek was located, notches were arranged in the grove. Zhimirsky's division occupied the Alder Grove, north of M. Grokhov (about 1 verst along the front and 3/4 verst in depth, cut through by a sazhen ditch). The swampy ground froze and allowed movement. Roland's brigade scattered a dense line of skirmishers along the edge of the forest with strong reserves behind. The main mass of the brigade stood behind the moat in an expanded formation with intervals between units so that the overturned front troops could go back and settle under the cover of battle fire and the bayonets of the deployed units. Chizhevsky's other brigade stood behind, in reserve. Nearby behind the grove, epolements for batteries were dug up, penetrating the entire grove. 2 batteries fired at the territory to the left from the grove to Kavenchin. Behind the Zhymirsky division was Skrzynetsky, who was also intended to defend the grove.
Lubensky's cavalry stood between the highway and the village of Targuvek. Cavalry Corps Uminsky (2 divisions with 2 horse batteries) - at the count. Elsner. Krukovetsky acted against Shakhovsky near Brudno; near Prague - militias with braids (cosigners) and parks. There was no general reserve, because cosigners cannot be considered for it.
Advantages of the position: the Russian troops did not have enough space for deployment and had to perform it when leaving the forest under artillery and even rifle fire. Disadvantages: the left flank hung in the air, which gave Dibich the basis for his bypass of this flank by Shakhovsky's corps, but failed - in the rear there is a large river with one bridge, so the retreat is dangerous.
The forces of the Poles - 56 thousand; of them 12 thousand cavalrymen; without Krukovetsky - 44 thousand; Russians - 73 thousand, of which 17 thousand cavalrymen; without Shakhovsky - 60 thousand.

At 9 1/2 hours, the Russians began a cannonade, and then their right flank began to move to the right to attack the Alder Grove. The attacks were carried out incorrectly: the troops were brought into battle in parts, there was no artillery preparation and by means of encirclement. First, 5 battalions broke into the forest, but ran into reserves behind the ditch and were driven out of the grove by Roland's battalions. Reinforced with 6 battalions. Again the Russians broke in, but Chizhevsky, together with Roland (12 battalions), again forced them to retreat. The Russians bring in 7 more battalions. A long line (18 battalions) of Russians swiftly rushes at the Poles and knocks out the entire division from the grove at about 11 o'clock in the morning. Zhimirsky himself was mortally wounded. But, not supported by sufficient artillery, the Russians suffered greatly from the Polish buckshot. Khlopitsky introduces Skrizhenetsky's division into action. 23 Polish battalions take possession of the grove.
At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Dibich strengthens the attack with another 10 battalions, begins to surround the grove on the right and left, where new batteries are put up on the flanks. Having successfully forced out from the edge, the Russians on the right could only reach a large ditch; but on the left, the fresh regiments of the 3rd division circled the grove and went far ahead, but came under the closest fire from the batteries.

Khlopitsky, wanting to take advantage of this moment, introduces both divisions (Zhymirsky and Skrzhinetsky) and 4 fresh battalions of guards grenadiers, whom he personally leads into the attack. Seeing in their midst their beloved leader, calm, with a pipe in his teeth, the Poles, singing "Polish has not yet perished," with irresistible force, attack the Russian tired, upset regiments. The latter are starting to retreat. The Poles gradually capture the entire grove, their columns approach the very edge of the forest, the skirmishers run forward.
Prondzinsky, pointing to the Russian battery, shouts: "Children, another 100 steps - and these guns are yours." Two of them were taken and directed to the height where Dibich stood.
This was the last desperate effort of the Poles. The field marshal directs everything possible from the infantry (2nd Grenadier Division) to the grove; reinforces artillery: more than 90 guns acted on the sides of the grove and, moving forward from the right side (from the north), heavily hit the Polish batteries behind the grove; to bypass the grove on the right, the 3rd cuirassier division was moved with the Life Guards Lancers of His Highness and 32 guns to help seize the groves, and at the same time break the front of the retreating Poles and try to push back to the swamps near the Brest highway at least their right flank. Even to the right, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade of Muravyov with the Lancers division occupied the colonies of Metsenas and Elsner, advancing forward, contacting the cuirassiers on the left flank.
Excited, Dibich gave the spurs to his horse and, jumping up to the retreating troops, shouted loudly: “Where are you guys, because the enemy is there! Forward! Forward!" - and, standing in front of the regiments of the 3rd division, he led them to the attack. A huge avalanche hit the grove from all sides. The grenadiers, not responding to the fire of the Poles and bowing their bayonets, burst into the grove; they were followed by the 3rd division, then the 6th corps of Rosen. In vain Khlopitsky, already wounded in the leg, personally bypasses the front line and tries to inspire the Poles. On piles of bodies, the Russians cross the ditch and finally take possession of the grove.

Dibich entrusted the leadership of the actions of the cavalry mass to Tolya, who became carried away by particulars and scattered his cavalry across the field, only one cuirassier regiment of Prince Albert, led by a division of Lieutenant Colonel von Zon, rushed to pursue the randomly retreating Poles. The regiment went through the entire battle formation of the enemy, and only at Prague itself did 5 Polish lancer squadrons take the Zone on the flank. But he deftly led his cuirassiers onto the highway and escaped from infantry and missile battery fire. The attack lasted 20 minutes over 2 1/2 versts. Although the losses of the cuirassiers reached half of the composition (Zon was mortally wounded and taken prisoner), however, the moral effect of the attack is enormous. Radzwill with his retinue rode off to Warsaw.

The Olviopol hussars famously attacked Shembek, pinned two regiments to the Vistula and scattered them. The Poles were pushed back everywhere. Skrzyniecki gathered and arranged the remnants behind in position on the sandy hills.
At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky finally appeared, who showed complete inactivity that day. The delighted Dibich made no reproach, only announced that the honor of completing the victory belonged to them, and he himself became the head of the grenadiers. But when they approached the enemy position, it was 5 o'clock, the day was drawing to a close. The field marshal thought about it and after some hesitation ordered to stop the battle.
The loss of the Poles - 12 thousand, Russian 9400 people.
Meanwhile, a terrible disorder prevailed among the Poles. Troops and convoys crowded near the bridge, only by midnight did the crossing end, under the cover of Skrzynetsky
Under such conditions, it would not be difficult for the Russians to cope with Skrzynetsky, and then storm the Prague tete-de-pon. It is completely incomprehensible why Dibich did not do this. His plan was to put an end to the uprising with one blow and, moreover, as soon as possible. The opportunity just presented itself, and the field marshal did not take advantage of it. The dark question of causes is still not clarified by history

The first Russian attacks were repulsed by the Poles, but on February 25, the Poles, who had lost their commander by that time (Khlopitsky was wounded), left their position and retreated to Warsaw. The Poles suffered serious losses, but they themselves inflicted those on the Russians (they lost 10,000 people against 8,000 Russians, according to other sources, 12,000 against 9,400).

Polish uprising of 1830-1831. they call the rebellion organized by the nobility and the Catholic clergy in the Kingdom of Poland and the neighboring provinces of the Russian Empire.

The rebellion was aimed at separating the Kingdom of Poland from Russia and tearing away from Russia its original western lands, which were part of the 16th-18th centuries. part of the former Commonwealth. The constitution granted by Emperor Alexander I to the Kingdom (Kingdom) of Poland in 1815 granted Poland broad sovereign rights. The Kingdom of Poland was a sovereign state that was part of the Russian Empire and associated with it by a personal union. The All-Russian Emperor was at the same time the Tsar (King) of Poland. The Kingdom of Poland had its own bicameral parliament - the Sejm, as well as its own army. The Sejm of the Kingdom of Poland was solemnly opened in 1818 by Emperor Alexander I, who hoped to receive in his person proof of the possibility of the peaceful development of the Polish nation within the framework of the Empire as a link connecting Russia with Western Europe. But in subsequent years, the implacable anti-government opposition intensified in the Seimas.

In the 1820s in the Kingdom of Poland, in Lithuania and on the Right-Bank Ukraine, secret conspiratorial, Masonic societies arose, which began to prepare an armed rebellion. Guards Lieutenant P. Vysotsky in 1828 founded a union of officers and students of military schools and entered into an agreement with other secret societies. The uprising was scheduled for the end of March 1829 and timed to coincide with the proposed coronation of Nicholas I as the king of Poland. But the coronation took place safely in May 1829.

The July Revolution of 1830 in France gave rise to new hopes for the Polish "patriots". The immediate cause for the uprising was the news of the imminent dispatch of Russian and Polish troops to suppress the Belgian revolution. The viceroy in the Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was warned by the Polish ensign about the conspiracy existing in Warsaw, but did not attach any importance to this.

On November 17, 1830, a crowd of conspirators led by L. Nabelyak and S. Goszczyński broke into the Belvedere Palace, the Warsaw residence of the governor, and committed a pogrom there, injuring several people from among the Grand Duke's close associates and servants. Konstantin Pavlovich managed to escape. On the same day, an uprising began in Warsaw, led by the secret gentry officer society of P. Vysotsky. The rebels seized the arsenal. Many Russian generals and officers who were in Warsaw were killed.

In the context of the outbreak of the rebellion, the behavior of the governor looked extremely strange. Konstantin Pavlovich considered the uprising a mere outburst of anger and did not allow the troops to come out to suppress it, saying that "the Russians have nothing to do in a fight." Then he sent home that part of the Polish troops, which at the beginning of the uprising still remained loyal to the authorities.

November 18, 1830 Warsaw passed into the hands of the rebels. With a small Russian detachment, the governor left Warsaw and left Poland. The powerful military fortresses of Modlin and Zamostye were surrendered to the rebels without a fight. A few days after the flight of the governor, the Kingdom of Poland was left by all Russian troops.

The Administrative Council of the Kingdom of Poland was transformed into the Provisional Government. The Sejm elected General Yu. Khlopitsky as commander-in-chief of the Polish troops and proclaimed him a "dictator", but the general refused dictatorial powers and, not believing in the success of the war with Russia, sent a delegation to Emperor Nicholas I. The Russian tsar refused to negotiate with the rebellious government and on January 5 1831 Khlopitsky resigned.

Prince Radziwill became the new Polish commander-in-chief. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm announced the deposition of Nicholas I - depriving him of the Polish crown. The National Government headed by Prince A. Czartoryski came to power. At the same time, the "revolutionary" Seimas refused to consider even the most moderate projects of agrarian reform and improving the situation of the peasants.

The national government was preparing to fight with Russia. The Polish army grew from 35 to 130 thousand people, although only 60 thousand of them could participate in hostilities with combat experience. But the Russian troops stationed in the western provinces were not ready for war. Here, the vast majority of military garrisons were the so-called. disabled teams. The number of Russian troops here reached 183 thousand people, but it took 3-4 months for their concentration. Field Marshal Count I.I. was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Dibich-Zabalkansky, and the chief of staff, General Count K.F. Tol.

Dibich hurried the troops. Without waiting for the concentration of all forces, without providing the army with food and without having time to equip the rear, on January 24-25, 1831, the commander-in-chief, together with the main forces, began an invasion of the Kingdom of Poland between the Bug and Narew rivers. A separate left column of General Kreutz was to occupy the Lublin Voivodeship in the south of the Kingdom and divert enemy forces. The spring thaw that began soon buried the original plan of the military campaign. On February 2, 1831, in the battle at Stochek, the Russian brigade of horse rangers under the command of General Geismar was defeated by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky. The battle between the main forces of the Russian and Polish troops took place on February 13, 1831 near Grokhov and ended with the defeat of the Polish army. But Dibich did not dare to continue the offensive, expecting a serious rebuff.

Soon Radziwill was replaced as commander-in-chief by General J. Skshinetsky, who managed to raise the morale of his troops after the defeat at Grokhov. The Russian detachment of Baron Kreutz crossed the Vistula, but was stopped by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky and retreated to Lublin, which was hastily abandoned by the Russian troops. The Polish command took advantage of the inaction of the main forces of the Russian troops and, trying to gain time, began peace negotiations with Dibich. Meanwhile, on February 19, 1831, Dvernitsky's detachment crossed the Vistula at Puławy, overthrew small Russian detachments and tried to invade Volhynia. The reinforcements that arrived there under the command of General Tol forced Dvernitsky to take refuge in Zamosc. A few days later, the Vistula cleared of ice and Dibich began to prepare a crossing to the left bank near Tyrchin. But the Polish detachments attacked the rear of the main forces of the Russian troops and thwarted their offensive.

In the areas adjacent to the Kingdom of Poland - Volhynia and Podolia, unrest broke out, an open rebellion broke out in Lithuania. Lithuania was guarded only by a weak Russian division (3200 people), stationed in Vilna. Dibić sent military reinforcements to Lithuania. In March, the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky set out from Zamosc and invaded Volhynia, but was stopped by the Russian detachment of F.A. Rediger and thrown back to the Austrian border, and then went to Austria, where he was disarmed. The Polish detachment of Hrshanovsky, who moved to help Dvernitsky, was met by a detachment of Baron Kreutz at Lyubartov and retreated to Zamosc.

However, successful attacks by small Polish units exhausted the main forces of Dibich. The actions of the Russian troops, moreover, were complicated by the cholera epidemic that broke out in April, there were about 5 thousand patients in the army.

In early May, the 45,000-strong Polish army of Skshinetsky launched an offensive against the 27,000-strong Russian Guards Corps, commanded by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, and threw it back to Bialystok - outside the Kingdom of Poland. Dibich did not immediately believe in the success of the Polish offensive against the guards, and only 10 days after it began, he threw the main forces against the rebels. On May 14, 1831, a new major battle took place at Ostroleka. The Polish army was defeated. The military council, assembled by Skshinetsky, decided to retreat to Warsaw. But a large detachment of the Polish general Gelgud (12 thousand people) was sent to the rear of the Russian army, to Lithuania. There he united with Khlapovsky's detachment and local bands of rebels, his numbers doubled. Russian and Polish forces in Lithuania were approximately equal.

On May 29, 1831, Dibich fell ill with cholera and died the same day. Command was temporarily taken over by General Tol. June 7, 1831 Gelgud attacked the Russian positions near Vilna, but was defeated and fled to the Prussian borders. Of the troops under his command, only the detachment of Dembinsky (3800 people) was able to break through from Lithuania to Warsaw. A few days later, the Russian troops of General Roth defeated the Polish gang of Pegs near Dashev and at the village. Maidanek, which led to the suppression of the rebellion in Volhynia. New attempts by Skshinetsky to move behind the lines of the Russian army failed.

On June 13, 1831, the new commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Field Marshal Count I.F., arrived in Poland. Paskevich-Erivansky. Near Warsaw was the 50,000th Russian army, it was opposed by 40,000 rebels. The Polish authorities declared a total militia, but the common people refused to shed blood for the power of the greedy gentry and fanatic priests.

Paskevich chose Osek near Torun, near the Prussian border, as the place of crossing to the left bank of the Vistula. From July 1, 1831, the Russians built bridges near Osek, along which the army safely crossed to the enemy coast. Skshinetsky did not dare to interfere with the crossing, but the dissatisfaction of the Warsaw society forced him to move towards the main Russian forces. Under their onslaught, the Polish troops rolled back to the capital. At the end of July, Skshinetsky was removed and Dembinsky became the new commander-in-chief of the Polish army, who wanted to give the Russians a decisive battle right at the walls of Warsaw.

On August 3, 1831, unrest broke out in Warsaw. The Seimas dissolved the old government, appointed General J. Krukovetsky as head of government (president) and endowed him with emergency rights. On August 6, Russian troops began to besiege Warsaw, and commander-in-chief Dembinsky was replaced by Malakhovych. Malakhovych again tried to attack the Russian rear in the north and east of the Kingdom of Poland. The Polish detachment of Romarino attacked the Russian troops of Baron Rosen, stationed on the Brest highway - east of Warsaw, and on August 19, 1831 pushed them back to Brest-Litovsk, but then hastily retreated to protect the capital.

Paskevich's troops, having received all the necessary reinforcements, numbered 86 thousand people, and the Polish troops near Warsaw - 35 thousand. In response to the proposal to surrender Warsaw, Krukovetsky stated that the Poles had raised an uprising in order to restore their fatherland within its ancient borders, i.e. . to Smolensk and Kyiv. On August 25, 1831, Russian troops stormed Wola, a suburb of Warsaw. On the night of August 26-27, 1831, Krukowiecki and the Polish troops in Warsaw capitulated.

The Polish army, leaving the capital, was supposed to arrive in the Plock Voivodeship in the north of the Kingdom in order to wait for the subsequent orders of the Russian emperor. But the members of the Polish government, who left Warsaw with their troops, refused to comply with Krukowiecki's decision to surrender. In September and October 1831, the remnants of the Polish army, which continued to resist, were expelled by Russian troops from the Kingdom to Prussia and Austria, where they were disarmed. The last to surrender to the Russians were the fortresses of Modlin (September 20, 1831) and Zamostye (October 9, 1831). The uprising was pacified, and the sovereign statehood of the Kingdom of Poland was liquidated. Count I.F. was appointed viceroy. Paskevich-Erivansky, who received the new title of Prince of Warsaw.

Bibliography

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://www.bestreferat.ru were used.

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