V.l. Israeli diplomacy during the war years (1941–1945)

Soviet diplomacy during the war years solved three main tasks: the creation of an anti-fascist coalition, the opening of a second front, and the solution of the question of the post-war order of the world.

The process of folding the coalition dragged on for a year - from June 1941 to June 1942. The first step towards a coalition was the Soviet-British agreement concluded on July 12, 1941 in Moscow on joint actions in the war against Germany. A new step was the Moscow Conference of representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (September-October 1941). The USA and Britain undertook to supply the USSR with arms and military materials, the Soviet Union undertook to supply the allies with the necessary raw materials.

Movement towards a coalition was accelerated after the Japanese defeated the largest US naval base in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, and the United States of America entered the war. On January 1, 1942, at the initiative of the United States in Washington, representatives of 26 countries, including the Soviet Union, signed the Declaration of the United Nations. It stated that the governments of these countries pledged to use all their resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and the states that acceded to it, with which these governments are at war.

On May 26, 1942, a Soviet-British treaty was signed in London on an alliance in the war and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war. On June 11, 1942, a Soviet-American agreement on the principles of mutual assistance in war was concluded in Washington. The alliance treaty with Great Britain and the agreement with the United States finally formalized the anti-Hitler coalition, which included more than 40 states during the war years.

The question of opening a second front

The problem of the second front was solved for a long time and with difficulty. The Soviet leadership understood the second front as the landing of Allied troops on the territory of continental Europe, namely in Northern France. For the first time this question was raised by the Soviet government in July 1941 before the government of Great Britain. However, the British government then evaded a definite answer, referring to the limited resources and geographical position of their country.

The question of a second front was at the center of the negotiations in May-June 1942 in London and Washington. During the negotiations, the Allies stubbornly avoided specific commitments regarding the timing and number of military forces that could be allocated for the invasion. Nevertheless, they were given an obligation to land troops on the continent "in August or September 1942." However, during his visit to Washington, British Prime Minister Churchill agreed with US President Roosevelt not to carry out an invasion of Europe across the English Channel in 1942, but to occupy French North-West Africa. At the end of 1942, such an operation was carried out.

At the beginning of 1943, Anglo-American conferences were held in Casablanca and Washington, which approved the "Balkan version" of the second front, which Churchill insisted on. The meaning of this option was that the Anglo-American troops would enter the countries of South-Eastern Europe before the Soviet ones, and then cut off the Red Army's path to the West. The operation in the Mediterranean area was scheduled for 1943. The opening of the second front on the Atlantic coast (Northern France) was postponed until May 1944.

The problem of the second front became the most important at the Tehran conference of the heads of government of the USSR, USA, Great Britain - I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill, which took place on November 28 - December 1, 1943. This was the first of three conferences of the "Big Three" . Despite another attempt by Churchill to replace the landing of US and British troops in France with the "Balkan" option, an agreement was reached at the conference on the landing of Anglo-American troops in France in May 1944. Soviet diplomacy regarded this decision as a significant victory. In turn, at the conference, Stalin promised that the USSR would declare war on Japan after the defeat of Germany.

The second front was opened in June 1944. On June 6, in the north-west of France, in Normandy, the landing of the Anglo-American troops began (Operation Overlord). General D. Eisenhower commanded the united forces. It was the largest landing operation of the Second World War, in which up to 1 million people participated. Allied losses amounted to several tens of thousands of soldiers. On August 15, the Allied troops landed in southern France (auxiliary operation Envil), by mid-September 1944, the Allied troops reached the western border of Germany. The opening of a second front shortened the duration of the Second World War and brought the collapse of Nazi Germany closer.

The problem of the post-war structure of the world

For the first time, the tasks of the post-war order of the world were widely discussed at the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three great powers in October 1943. Questions of the post-war order took an important place on the agenda of the Tehran Conference. In the adopted declaration, the heads of government of the three states expressed their determination to work together both during the war and in the subsequent peacetime. Since the Soviet delegation insisted on decisive measures to prevent German revanchism and militarism in the future, Roosevelt proposed a plan for dividing Germany into five independent states. Churchill supported him. In turn, Stalin obtained from the Allies a principled consent to the transfer to the Soviet Union of Koenigsberg with the territories adjacent to it.

The tasks of the post-war peace system were brought to the fore at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the Big Three. The Yalta (Crimean) conference of the heads of government of the three great powers took place on February 4-11, 1945 in the Livadia Palace. It agreed on plans for the final defeat of Germany, the terms of its surrender, the procedure for its occupation, the mechanism of allied control. The goal of occupation and control was declared to be "the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantees that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the whole world." The "three D" plan (demilitarization, denazification and democratization of Germany) united the interests of the three great powers. At the insistence of the Soviet delegation, France was also involved in the occupation of Germany on an equal footing with other great powers. The conference adopted the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe", which stated the need to destroy the traces of Nazism and fascism in the liberated countries of Europe and create democratic institutions of the peoples' own choice. Polish and Yugoslav issues were highlighted, as well as a complex of Far Eastern issues, including the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the USSR and the return of South Sakhalin, captured by Japan in 1904, to it. At the conference in Crimea, the issue of creating the United Nations to ensure international security was finally resolved in the postwar years.

The Potsdam (Berlin) conference of the "Big Three" (July 17 - August 1, 1945) became the arena of sharp confrontation on the problems of the post-war peace settlement. At this conference there was no longer a supporter of active cooperation with the USSR F. Roosevelt. He died shortly after returning home from the Yalta Conference. The American side was represented by the new US President G. Truman. The British delegation at the conference was led at first by British Prime Minister W. Churchill, and from July 28, the leader of the Labor Party, C. Attlee, who won the election. As before, I.V. Stalin was at the head of the Soviet delegation. The leaders of the three powers came to mutually acceptable decisions on the German question*,

* The dissolution of all the armed forces of Germany, the liquidation of its military industry, the prohibition of the National Socialist Party. Any militaristic activity, including military propaganda, was prohibited.

on the question of reparations, on the new borders of Poland, on the problems of Central and South-Eastern Europe. In addition, on July 26, 1945, the leaders of the United States, Britain, and China published a declaration on Japan on behalf of the Potsdam Conference, in which they called on the Japanese government to immediately proclaim unconditional surrender. Despite the fact that the preparation and publication of the declaration took place without the participation of the USSR, the Soviet government joined it on August 8. Potsdam secured a new balance of power in Europe and throughout the world.

In April-June 1945, the founding conference of the United Nations was held in San Francisco. The conference discussed the draft UN Charter, which entered into force on October 26, 1945. This day became the day of the official creation of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining and strengthening peace, security and developing cooperation between peoples and states.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich MOLOTOV / SKRYABIN / (03/09/1890 - 11/08/1986), statesman and party leader

Born in the settlement of Kukarka, Vyatka province. Father - Mikhail Prokhorovich Skryabin, clerk. Mother - Anna Yakovlevna Nebogatikova from a very wealthy merchant family. He graduated from a real school in Kazan and two years of economics at the Polytechnic Institute in Petrograd. Member of the October Revolution. In 1930-1940. - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. At the same time (since 1939) People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1941-1957. - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Molotov “was part of Stalin's closest political circle; one of the most active organizers of the mass repressions of the 1930s and early 1950s.” On his responsibility - in the first place the repression of workers of the central Soviet apparatus. Many of them were arrested and physically destroyed on his personal initiative. In 1949, Molotov authorized the arrest of many Soviet and foreign citizens accused of espionage and anti-Soviet activities. Most of them have now been rehabilitated due to the lack of corpus delicti (Central Committee of the CPSU. On the anti-constitutional practice of the 30s-40s and early 50s ” // APRF. Top secret. Special folder. Package No. 59 (90). Original / / Bulletin of the APRF, 1995, No. 1, p. 125).

Molotov became the head of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on May 4, 1939. His appointment was connected with the reorientation of the foreign policy of the USSR towards rapprochement with Nazi Germany, since it was obvious that Hitler would not negotiate with the former head of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov, a Jew by nationality.

“Only with the advent of a new leadership headed by Comrade Molotov,” says the resolution of the NKID meeting of July 23, 1939, “the Bolshevik order began to be established in the People's Commissariat. In this short period of time, a huge amount of work has been done to cleanse the NKID of worthless, dubious elements ”(Roshchin A. In the People’s Commissariat on the Eve of the War // International Life. 1988. No. 4. P. 126).

“In April-August, employees of the German Foreign Ministry had ten contacts with Soviet officials in Berlin and Moscow in order to convince the latter of the need to conclude a political agreement between both countries” (Fleischhauer I. Pakt. Hitler, Stalin and the initiative of German diplomacy 1938-1939 Moscow, 1991, pp. 211-214). As early as August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed in Moscow, which received the unofficial name of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.2 To this treaty, Molotov and Ribbentrop also signed secret protocols on the division of spheres of influence in Europe.

The Soviet leadership denied the existence of secret protocols for more than fifty years. Moreover, as it turned out later, the documents were seized from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the USSR and placed first in a special archive of the Central Committee, and then in the Archive of the President of the USSR. All documents relating to Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941 were hushed up. Molotov until the end of his days did not recognize their existence, answering direct questions from F. Chuev (Chuev F. Molotov. M 1999. S. 28-29).

Historian M. Semiryaga writes: “Contrary to the assertions of some researchers, the Soviet-German agreements did not create an effective barrier to Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, if before 1939-1940. From the Barents to the Black Sea, there were a number of states that served as a kind of buffer between Germany and the USSR, then on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, a direct confrontation of the armed forces arose.

From August 1939 to June 1941 our affairs went from bad to worse. The prestige of the Soviet leadership in the eyes of the world democratic community especially fell during Molotov's negotiations with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin in the autumn of 1940. During these negotiations, the Soviet leadership even agreed, under certain conditions, to join the aggressive Tripartite Pact. Based on the same Soviet-German agreements and with the diplomatic and military assistance of Nazi Germany, the Soviet leadership annexed a number of neighboring countries and territories to the USSR. Moreover, the opinion of the people was ignored. From the point of view of international law, only the return of Bessarabia, illegally occupied by Romanian troops in 1918, can be justified...

Concluding reflections on the events of the pre-war period, especially on such a pivotal act as the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the author cannot but come to the conclusion: if there had not been a fateful August 23, 1939, there would probably not have been a fateful day June 22, 1941 G." (Semiryaga M. Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. M., 1992. S. 290-293).

“Significantly inferior to the Red Army in terms of numbers and comparable to it in terms of technical equipment, the Wehrmacht overcame the territories in just a few days, because of the acquisition of which such complex diplomatic games were played before the war, costing the country moral prestige, which turned into a final split in the anti-fascist forces” (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn. 1990. No. 10. S. 57-58).

On October 31, 1939, Molotov made a report at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, convened specifically for the ratification of this treaty. The report, in particular, literally said the following: “The ideology of Hitlerism, like any other ideological system, can be recognized or denied, this is a matter of political views. But any person will understand that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, it cannot be ended by war. Therefore, it is not only senseless, but also criminal to wage such a war as a war to destroy Hitlerism ... (Extraordinary fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. October 31 - November 2, 1939. Verbatim report. M., 1939. P. 9). On this basis, Molotov mocked England and France, who declared that the goal of the war they declared was "the destruction of Hitlerism." In another part of the report, Molotov said: “The ruling circles of Poland boasted a lot about the “strength” of their state and the “power” of their army.

However, a short blow to Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red Army, turned out to be enough to leave nothing of this ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles, which lived off the oppression of non-Polish nationalities. Until recently, this statement by Molotov poisoned the atmosphere of friendship between Poland and the USSR.

Molotov's last official appointments were ambassador to Mongolia, then to Austria. In February 1962 he was expelled from the party.

He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

Molotov was married (since 1921) to PS Zhemchuzhina. They had an only daughter, named, like Stalin's daughter, Svetlana. Molotov's son-in-law - Alexei Nikonov, grandson - Vyacheslav.

Molotov left no memoirs. However, his views on the events he witnessed and participated in can be found in F. Chuev's publication One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov (M., 1991). “Despite Chuev’s obvious admiration for Molotov, his presentation of these conversations reflects the intellectual and moral degradation of Molotov” (Rogovin V. Party of the executed. M., 1997. P. 147).

“In general, about Molotov,” said Mikoyan, “our propaganda has created many legends and various tales: that he is very wise, fair, kind ... In general, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich is a big slow-witted, devoid of a sense of a new, bold initiative, and a person he is also very callous and conceited” (Kumanev G.A. Next to Stalin. M., 1999. P. 26).

I. Bunich writes: “Khrushchev had to work hard to expel Molotov and Kaganovich from the party, whose role in the mass extermination of people is well known. But the non-party Molotov continued to quietly enjoy all the privileges, living in a huge apartment on the street. Granovsky in the Government House and relaxing in the luxurious sanatorium of the Central Committee "Forest Dali". Up to the present day, the Administration of the Central Committee of the CPSU extended privileges, including the use of dachas, special rations and other special services, to relatives of Stalin, Beria and many others who had to go public for political purposes recognize as executioners and murderers. In the nomenklatura behind the looking glass, there are their own laws and their traditions "(Bunich I. Gold of the Party. St. Petersburg, 1992. P. 127).

Soon after the 22nd Party Congress, as A.I. Adzhubey recalls, Molotov's wife P. Zhemchuzhina secured an appointment with Khrushchev. “In response to her request to reinstate her husband in the party, Nikita Sergeevich showed her a document with Molotov’s resolution on the execution of the wives of Kosior, Postyshev and other senior officials of Ukraine, then asked if, in her opinion, it was possible to talk about the restoration of Molotov in the party or should he be involved to court ”(Adzhubey A. Those ten years / / Znamya. 1988. No. 6. P. 96). Nevertheless, in 1984, Molotov, at the initiative of Kosolapov, the editor of the Kommunist magazine, was reinstated in the party. Secretary General KU Chernenko personally handed Molotov a party card.

They say that Molotov remained a Stalinist until the end of his days and in a narrow circle, already a widower, proclaimed the same three toasts: “To Comrade Stalin! For Polina! For communism! Perhaps the toasts would have been more varied if Molotov had known O. Wilde's aphorism: "If a person gave his life for an idea, this does not mean at all that he died for a just cause."

No matter what they say, - said the writer F. Chuev, - Molotov went through a heroic path. And heroes have the right to do a lot” (Pravda-5 1995, No. 12, p. 9).

59. Soviet diplomacy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR under N.S. Khrushchev. D.T. Shepilov, A.A. Gromyko.

Soviet diplomacy and Soviet diplomats during the thaw

The period after Stalin's death, and especially the years of Khrushchev's thaw that followed it, are considered by historians, not without reason, as a time of profound changes in the sphere of foreign policy. The Cold War is being replaced by the slogan of “peaceful coexistence”, which is embodied in concrete political actions: suffice it to recall the signing in 1955 of an agreement restoring the independence of Austria, and in 1963 of an agreement on a partial ban on nuclear tests. At the same time, a new problem is emerging, indicating a conceptual ferment in the minds of the ruling apparatus. What happens to the legacy of the Stalin era in the context of these changes? Is it possible to talk about its evolution, transformation, significant changes in the organization and implementation of foreign policy activities? In this article, we will focus our attention on two key issues: firstly, on the general aspects of the activities of Soviet diplomacy, and secondly, on the diplomatic apparatus and the people who made it up.

As V. Molotov emphasized in his conversations with F. Chuev, Stalin's diplomacy was characterized from the second half of the 30s by extremely rigid centralization and concentration of power in the hands of Stalin and his entourage, while the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs gradually lost initiative and freedom of action. In 1937, a commission was established consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Kaganovich and Yezhov, to which the decision of the most secret issues of foreign policy was transferred, which significantly limited the sphere of influence of the NKID and pushed the diplomatic corps into the background. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the situation changes slightly towards a certain normalization. Although until 1953 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which replaced the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, remained only an obedient executor of Stalin's will. The death of Stalin and the subsequent de-Stalinization are gradually changing the balance of power.

1953-1955: A NEW CHANCE FOR THE MFA?

After 1953, the party - at least in theory - regains the prerogatives lost during the Stalinist period. In particular, the general directions of foreign policy are worked out in the bowels of a collegiate body - the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, in practice, the political situation in the country in 1953-1955. remained uncertain, which allowed the Foreign Ministry to try to regain its lost influence.

Molotov was at the head of the Ministry from the death of Stalin until 1956, when Shepilov replaced him in this post. That period is characterized by pronounced competition within the ruling elite. Foreign policy becomes a hostage to the internal political struggle. Thus, in the spring of 1953, Beria's support for the creation of a "peaceful", united - and by no means necessarily socialist - Germany evokes a sharply hostile attitude in the Presidium and becomes one of the reasons for eliminating the powerful "traitor". A few months later, in August 1953, the more than cold reception shown to Malenkov's position on the problem of the nuclear danger already testifies to his certain political marginalization and anticipates his imminent resignation.

It is in this peculiar context that relations between the Foreign Ministry and the party are developing. Theoretically, everything is done in the interests of the party and according to its will. In practice, from 1953 to 1955, Molotov successfully imposed on the Presidium his point of view on a number of problems. In the period of instability and discord that followed Stalin's death, it is Molotov's position, with his black-and-white vision of international relations, that gains significant weight and is reflected in the decisions of the Presidium.

The influence of Molotov and the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the formation of foreign policy is manifested especially during 1954. During the preparation of the quadripartite conference in Berlin, held in February 1954, the services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in particular, the diplomats of the Third European Department dealing with the German question, adhere to an uncompromising position in negotiations with the West and stop any attempts to discuss the possibility of German reunification based on the results of “free” elections. The preliminary reports that they prepare especially for the Presidium express their confidence in the failure of the forthcoming meeting. Similarly, a few months later, the organization of the Moscow conference in November 1954 is under the absolute control of Molotov and the Foreign Ministry apparatus. In other words, by the end of 1953 - 1954, Molotov and the apparatus of his ministry could already impose their theoretical ideas on the Presidium, which are characterized by fundamental hostility towards the United States and the states of Western Europe, sharp criticism of NATO as a hostile and aggressive structure, ineradicable adherence to Eastern European buffer and obsessive preoccupation with the fate of Germany.

At the same time, this apparatus, which theoretically should be the conductor of the will of the party, remains an external structure in relation to it. In 1953-1955. only three ambassadors (to the USA, Great Britain and China) are members of the Central Committee of the party, or, more precisely, candidates for its members. Only Molotov is a full member of the Central Committee, but he cannot be called a professional diplomat. This combination of diplomatic and party functions inherited from the pre-war period turns out to be extremely beneficial for Molotov. It allows him to keep the apparatus of the Ministry under the "hood" at the very time when his own influence in the party is at its zenith.

Indeed, from 1955 the actual influence of the Foreign Ministry on the Presidium began to weaken. Among the members of the Presidium there are people who are competent in matters of foreign policy. They decide not only to have views that are different from those of the Foreign Ministry, but also to make decisions based on them.

Two important strategic questions serve as a touchstone here. In the spring of 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin, supporters of the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, managed to get the upper hand in the Presidium over the desperately resisting Molotov and the central apparatus of the Foreign Ministry, who considered this project an adventure. At the end of May 1955, Khrushchev made a show visit to Yugoslavia, which resulted (again contrary to Molotov's opinion) in a joint declaration recognizing the diversity of paths leading to socialism. The even more complex Austrian question forms the basis of a long-term confrontation between, on the one hand, Molotov and the Foreign Ministry, who deny Austria sovereignty in the name of keeping the Stalinist empire intact, and Khrushchev and his secretariat, who want to end this “echo of the Second World War” , with another. As a result, the presidium decides this issue in favor of Khrushchev. Since that time, the Foreign Ministry has again turned into an obedient executor of the will of the party. In the future, this position will only be strengthened. From 1957 to 1964, the Foreign Ministry apparatus was in strict subordination to the Presidium and, obviously to an even greater extent, to Khrushchev personally.

MFA AGAIN IN THE SHADOW OF THE PARTY?

In 1957, an experienced diplomat Andrei Gromyko was appointed head of the Foreign Ministry, who took part in conferences in Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, Potsdam, a former ambassador in Washington and a full member of the Central Committee of the party since 1956. Despite this, the formation of Soviet foreign policy in the period from 1957 to 1964 remains the prerogative of the Presidium, which less and less often demonstrates the unity of views. In June 1957, the elimination of the “anti-Party group” allows Khrushchev to do away with the old Stalinist guard and consolidate his position. But in the sphere of foreign policy, disagreements - and moreover, contradictions - within the Presidium are multiplying. In particular, Mikoyan, who believes in the possibility of peaceful coexistence both in the present and in the future, is opposed by Suslov and Kozlov, who adhere to a skeptical and even slightly paranoid point of view on international relations. In their opinion, the United States, supported by the Western European powers, began preparations for a nuclear war against the USSR and peaceful coexistence is just a trap. However, they fail to impose their vision on the Presidium, which until 1964 supported Khrushchev's position.

Indeed, from 1956 to 1964, Khrushchev's decisive influence in the sphere of diplomatic relations can be considered an established fact, confirmation of which we find in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the party, as well as in the memoirs of diplomats of that period. In his memoirs “From Kollontai to Gorbachev. Memoirs of a diplomat” Alexandrov-Agentov emphasizes that “Khrushchev was not the kind of person who would allow anyone to shape foreign policy for him.<...>Foreign policy ideas and initiatives were pouring forth from Khrushchev. “To bring to mind”, to process, substantiate and draw up the minister with his apparatus”. And further: “However, the key, most striking moments of our foreign policy of those years are, for example, the conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria (even under Molotov), reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the beginning of a decisive rapprochement with India, proposals to the UN on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, about general and complete disarmament, as well as such negative moments as the break with China, the disruption of the four-power summit meeting in Paris in 1960, the Cuban “missile” crisis of 1962, are the result of Khrushchev’s personal interference in foreign policy and his initiatives."

Khrushchev's influence is evident in a number of episodes, for example, during the Berlin crisis of 1958 and the Paris meeting in 1960. The preparation of the latter was actively carried out by the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and reports from diplomats of the Third European Department regularly reached Gromyko's desk. However, Khrushchev single-handedly makes a decision that provokes an international crisis and leads to the sabotage of the conference. Sometimes this influence of Khrushchev on Foreign Ministry diplomats takes a rather crude form.

Alexandrov-Agentov colorfully and not without irony describes one episode: “In the autumn of 1958, the author of these lines had a chance to witness how Gromyko and two of his employees came to Khrushchev in his office in the Central Committee to report on his thoughts on our further demarches on the then topical issue about West Berlin. Andrei Andreevich put on his glasses and began to read the preparatory note. But Khrushchev immediately interrupted him and said: “Wait a minute, listen to what I say - the stenographer will write it down. If it matches what you have written there, good, but if not, throw your note into the basket. And he began to dictate (as always, chaotically and slovenly in form, but quite clear in meaning) his idea of declaring West Berlin a “free demilitarized city.”

However, the influence of the party and its Secretariat does not completely deprive the MFA of its freedom of action. His position has a certain weight in the course of preparation and decision-making. In particular, the Foreign Ministry staff has a real opportunity to influence through the reports and recommendations that are prepared for the Presidium and the Secretariat, through analytical notes, its own interpretation of events and proposals coming from it.

However, not only the Foreign Ministry had such functions: it was competed with a number of structures that also influenced the preparation and adoption of foreign policy decisions. The most serious rival of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the international department of the Central Committee. Founded in 1943 and directly related to the Secretariat of the Central Committee since 1955, it was originally conceived as a structure dealing with propaganda in the capitalist countries. In April 1956, the dissolution of the Cominform turns the international department into one of the highest authorities in the Soviet foreign policy system, placing it one step above the Foreign Ministry; he is in charge of relations between the CPSU and the communist parties of Western countries. Since June 1957, Boris Ponomarev, a propaganda specialist, has been at the head of the international department. This staunch supporter of orthodox Marxism-Leninism from 1936 to 1943 worked in the apparatus of the Comintern, then, in 1943-1944, was the director of the Marx-Engels Institute.

At the initiative of Ponomarev, the international department began to deal with issues of the communist "family", namely the distribution of financial assistance to the communist parties of Western countries, as well as support for the Marxist movement in third world countries. However, this latter function was a source of friction in his relationship with the Foreign Ministry. According to the instructions of the party, it was the international department that decided which movement would receive financial support - and this was already a diplomatic issue affecting the sphere of authority and interests of the Foreign Ministry. In addition, if a party fighting for independence, which was under the jurisdiction of the international department, really claimed power or received the status of a party-state, it ceased to be within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, in practice, the distribution of powers was quite problematic, and Gromyko complained about the existence of two competing structures dealing with foreign policy issues.

In other words, in the context of the decisive influence of the Presidium on the decision-making process and intense competition, if not rivalry, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the international department of the Central Committee, it is obvious that the freedom of action of the diplomatic apparatus from 1956 to 1964 was very relative. And no matter how insignificant the independence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was possible only thanks to the personal qualities of the employees of the Foreign Ministry.

DIPLOMATIC APPARATUS

In the crucible of great purges, a wave of appointments 1939-1941. in the NKID contributed to the promotion of a new generation of Soviet diplomats. These were young people, people from the common people, mostly from the provinces (about 80%), Russians (more than 85%), who received a technical or engineering education and graduated from the Higher Diplomatic School, created by Molotov specifically for their training.

These characteristics noticeably change in 1949-1950. and even more significantly during the period of de-Stalinization in 1953-1954. The national and social characteristics of young diplomats remain unchanged, but now newcomers enter diplomatic work at a younger age, having no professional experience and having received education at MGIMO. This trend becomes dominant in the early 1960s. In this era, the brilliant career of Anatoly Dobrynin, Deputy Secretary General of the UN from 1957 to 1960, then Ambassador to the United States in 1962-1968, who received his initial education at the Aviation Institute, would no longer be possible.

The initial training of diplomats at MGIMO is one of the most important facts of the Khrushchev period in the history of the Soviet diplomatic corps. In 1944, on the basis of Moscow State University, the Faculty of International Relations was created, which after the end of the Great Patriotic War was transformed into a separate institute, MGIMO. The diplomatic revival of the post-war period revealed the need to train more specialists in international relations, able to work either directly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or in other structures related to international contacts, such as the Union of Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries, publishing houses and magazines engaged in propaganda abroad .

Since 1950, admission to MGIMO has markedly differed from admission to the Higher Diplomatic School. Party and Komsomol workers, representatives of public organizations are mainly sent to the latter; in other words, applicants were selected primarily on the basis of ideological criteria. As for MGIMO, admission took place on a competitive basis, special attention was paid to knowledge of a foreign language. At the same time, young people who did not have professional experience, who had barely received a certificate of secondary education, became students. They were still required to be unconditionally committed to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism (see the interesting and frank memoirs of Georgy Arbatov), but it was no longer the decisive criterion for selecting future diplomats. However, this impulse to renew the diplomatic elite through competitive admission based on real knowledge rather than political reliability in the period from 1953 to 1956 did not lead to the creation of an ideologically independent entity.

Some disciplines, which were preferred even in the programs of the Higher Diplomatic School, remain key at MGIMO as well. One of them was, of course, law, which was taught by both theoretical and practical scientists; in particular, one of them, Professor Durdinevsky, was a member of the Soviet delegation that participated in the creation of the UN charter. It is also necessary to emphasize the high quality of teaching foreign languages.

Otherwise, however, the level of training of future diplomats remains insufficient. Thus, vulgar Marxism-Leninism has a significant influence on the teaching of history, geography, political science and economics. Citation in the works of the “Short Course in the History of the CPSU”, published in 1948, remains obligatory. Zhdanov's black-and-white vision of the world is promoted, namely the need to visually prove the superiority of the socialist system over all others and an almost paranoid concern for the defense of the socialist camp, which is surrounded by imperialism. Finally, and this is very important to note, future diplomats had almost no opportunity to get acquainted with the outside world. MGIMO students could not contact foreign citizens in the USSR, and their direct knowledge of foreign countries was very limited. Yuri Dubinin recalls that, having already chosen France as a specialization, it was only in his last year that he got the opportunity to familiarize himself with the Humanite binder in a special room, while not having access to other French newspapers.

In this context, the question of the competence of diplomats and the effectiveness of the system created by Molotov sharply arises. The latter problem is raised in numerous publications by diplomats published during the period of perestroika.

Alexandrov-Agentov, in his memoirs published in 1994, draws attention to a significant number of failures in the system. In particular, he mentions the period from 1945 to 1956: “As I now clearly understand, the style of their work and their whole way of life at that time quite clearly reflected many of the characteristic features of the administrative machine of the Stalinist regime as a whole: maximum, absolute centralism, disapproval of all free-thinking and "inappropriate" initiative from below, secrecy carried to the point of absurdity and complete isolation of ordinary workers from serious political information - assigning them the role of cogs<...>Dozens of people pored over from morning until late at night on the preparation of papers that had virtually no real significance: they made annotations of the quarterly and annual reports of our embassies and missions, often sucking out “criticism” of these reports, far from real life and the real situation in the country concerned, they constructed references on various issues and characteristics for the dossier (or, as we put it, “for the closet”) copied from the materials of the same embassies, so that there would be something to report on the work done.”

These shortcomings were known to management. Thus, starting from 1954, the director of IMEMO emphasized that changes were needed, that the country needed more and more competent diplomats who could negotiate: “Our foreign policy is intensifying. More and more contacts. And this is just the beginning. And as it turns out, we have almost no workers who know foreign languages. Recently in Geneva, at a conference on Indochina, it turned out that there was no one to provide a correct translation.

In the same context fits the speech of Mikoyan, then Minister of Foreign Trade, two years later, at the 20th Party Congress, which admitted that “we are seriously lagging behind in the study of modern capitalism; we do not study deeply facts and figures; we often confine ourselves, for the purposes of propaganda, to individual facts that present symptoms of an approaching crisis or impoverishment of the workers, instead of making a deep and detailed analysis of what life is like in foreign countries.”

Awareness of this problem underlies the first major changes in teaching at MGIMO, which took place in 1956-1960. The term of study was increased from 3 to 6 years, education becomes more professional due to intensive training in foreign languages, access to better and more complete information about foreign countries. A significant contribution to this is made by new analytical structures that have been created since 1956, the center of which is IMEMO and its journal “Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya”. This publication was founded in 1957, and on its pages the main ideas of Khrushchev's policy towards the countries of the third world and contemporary problems that the USSR is facing are published.

However, has the efficiency of the work of the diplomatic corps increased due to greater openness and access to more reliable information, has the lost freedom of action and influence on the decision-making process been returned? Probably, this cannot be asserted in relation to the Khrushchev era. Having received a new education, young diplomats had no real access to important political posts. Nevertheless, this generation of “international specialists”, which has become the personification of a moderate in its views and a competent diplomatic structure, will gradually begin to strengthen its position, despite the resistance of the international department; it is precisely this that will lead the party to the path of detente. In this sense, most of the “Westernizer” diplomats of the 70s, professionals who sought to establish contacts between the USSR and the West, such as Kovalev, Falin, Dubinin, Abrasimov, are in the full sense of the word the product of Khrushchev’s reforms.

D.T.Shepilov

Born into a family of a railway worker. After the family moved to Tashkent, he studied first at the gymnasium and then at the secondary school.

In 1926 he graduated from the Faculty of Law of the Lomonosov Moscow State University and the Faculty of Agriculture of the Institute of Red Professors.

From 1926 he worked in the organs of justice, in 1926-1928 he worked as a prosecutor in Yakutia. Since 1929 on scientific work. In 1933-1935 he worked in the political department of one of the Siberian state farms. After the publication of a number of notable articles, he was invited to the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1935 in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Department of Science).

“At the age of thirty, a young scientist-economist was hired by the Central Committee of the party, and he allowed himself to object to Stalin at a meeting on science. According to the well-known historian Professor Vladimir Naumov, Shepilov was a man of the Zhukov type - he withstood the Stalinist gaze. At the meeting, a surprised Stalin suggested that the young man recant. It was a lifeline, Shepilov said that he was not going to change his views! Shepilov was expelled from the Central Committee. He's been out of work for seven months."

Mlechin, L. Dmitry Shepilov: he argued with Stalin and criticized Khrushchev / / Novoye Vremya No. 11, 1999. P. 29-31.

Since 1938 - Scientific Secretary of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In the first days of the war, he volunteered for the front as part of the Moscow militia, although he had a “reservation” as a professor and the opportunity to go to Kazakhstan as the director of the Institute of Economics. From 1941 to 1946 in the Soviet Army. He went from private to major general, head of the Political Department of the 4th Guards Army.

Stalin in his old age liked young generals, such as Brezhnev and Shepilov, this sympathy contributed to the promotion of both in the service. In 1946-1947. Shepilov was appointed editor of the propaganda department of the Pravda newspaper. Since 1947, in responsible work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: first deputy. early Department of Propaganda and Agitation, Head. Department, Inspector.

As it was clear from the orientation articles of the head of the agitprop Dmitry Shepilov, the Soviet leadership suspected of “anti-patriotism” anyone who was not sure of the unconditional superiority of the USSR over the West in all respects: “now there can be no talk of any civilization without the Russian language, without science and cultures of the peoples of the Soviet country. They are the priority”; “the capitalist world has long passed its zenith and is convulsively rolling down, while the country of socialism, full of power and creative forces, is moving steeply upward”; the Soviet system is “a hundred times higher and better than any bourgeois system”, and “the countries of bourgeois democracies, in their political system lagging behind the USSR for a whole historical era, will have to catch up with the first country of genuine democracy”. The party organizations had to "spread the work of educating the working people on the ideas of Leninism, developing among the people the sacred feelings of Soviet patriotism, a burning hatred for capitalism and for all manifestations of bourgeois ideology."

In 1952-1956 he was the editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper, in 1953 he was elected a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in 1955-56 and February - June 1957 he was secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He helped Khrushchev prepare a report to the 20th Congress on the cult of personality and its consequences. In 1956-57, candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Foreign Secretary

In 1956, Khrushchev achieved the removal of Molotov from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, putting his ally Shepilov in his place. On June 2, 1956, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, replacing Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in this post.

“Shepilov was the first non-Western in the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He believed that the Soviet Union needed to make friends with the Asian countries, which had previously been ignored in Moscow. Stalin and Molotov considered only America and Western Europe worthy of attention as partners.

Mlechin, L. Dmitry Shepilov: he argued with Stalin and criticized Khrushchev // Novoye Vremya No. 11, 1999. P. 30.

In June 1956, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the first time in history, made a tour of the Middle East, visiting Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and also Greece. During negotiations in Egypt with President Nasser in June 1956, he secretly agreed to the USSR to sponsor the construction.

He represented the position of the USSR on the Suez crisis and on the uprising in Hungary in 1956. He headed the Soviet delegation at the London Conference on the Suez Canal.

He contributed to the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations: in October 1956, a joint declaration was signed with Japan, ending the state of war. The USSR and Japan exchanged ambassadors.

In his speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he called for the forcible export of socialism outside the USSR. At the same time, he participated in the preparation of Khrushchev's report "On the cult of personality and its consequences", but the prepared version of the report was significantly changed.

"And Shepilov, who joined them"

When Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich in June 1957 tried to remove Khrushchev at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, presenting him with a whole list of accusations, Shepilov suddenly also began to criticize Khrushchev for establishing his own "personality cult", although he was never a member of the named group. As a result of the defeat of the Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich grouping at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU that followed on June 22, 1957, the wording "the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov who joined them" was born.

The factional anti-party group, which included Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov, who joined them, tried to put up fierce resistance to the implementation of the Leninist course outlined by the XX Party Congress.

XXII Congress of the CPSU

There is an opinion that if the name Shepilov were simply named in the general row, it would become obvious that the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee opposed Khrushchev. To cover up this fact, they came up with the wording "joining them."

Shepilov was relieved of all party and state posts. Since 1957 - director, since 1959 deputy. director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR, from 1960 to 1982 - archeographer, then senior archeographer in the Main Archival Administration under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Since the cliche “and Shepilov who joined them” was actively exaggerated in the press, an anecdote appeared: “The longest surname is I who joined knimshepilov”; when vodka was divided “for three”, the fourth drinking companion was nicknamed “Shepilov”, etc. Thanks to this phrase, millions of Soviet citizens recognized the name of the party functionary. Shepilov's own memoirs are polemically titled "Unjoined"; they are sharply critical of Khrushchev.

Shepilov himself, according to his memoirs, considered the case fabricated. He was expelled from the party in 1962, reinstated in 1976, and in 1991 reinstated in the USSR Academy of Sciences. Retired since 1982.

Andrei Andreevich Gromyko

Early biography

Andrei Gromyko was born on July 5, 1909 in the Gomel region, in the village of Starye Gromyki. The entire population had the same surname, so each family, as is often the case in Belarusian villages, had a family nickname. The family of Andrei Andreevich was called the Burmakovs. The Burmakovs came from a poor Belarusian gentry family, most of which, during the time of the Russian Empire, was transferred to the taxable estates of peasants and philistines. Official biographies indicated a peasant origin and that his father was a peasant who worked in a factory. Belarusian by origin, although in the official certificate of a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU he was listed as Russian. From the age of 13 he went with his father to work. After graduating from a 7-year school, he studied at a vocational school in Gomel, then at the Staroborisovsky Agricultural College (village of Borisovsky district, Minsk region). In 1931 he became a member of the CPSU (b) and was immediately elected secretary of the party cell. All subsequent years, Gromyko remained an active communist, never doubting his loyalty to the Marxist ideology.

In 1931 he entered the Institute of Economics in Minsk, where he met his future wife Lidia Dmitrievna Grinevich, also a student. In 1932, their son Anatoly was born.

After completing two courses, Gromyko was appointed director of a rural school near Minsk. He had to continue his studies at the institute in absentia.

At this time, the first turn in the fate of Gromyko took place: on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, he, along with several comrades, was admitted to graduate school at the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR, which was created in Minsk. After defending his dissertation in 1936, Gromyko was sent to the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Moscow as a senior researcher. Then Andrei Andreevich became the secretary of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Since 1939 - in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) of the USSR. Gromyko was the protégé of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. According to the version presented to Alferov by D. A. Zhukov, when Stalin read the list of scientific employees proposed by Molotov - candidates for diplomatic work, then, reaching his last name, he said: “Gromyko. Good last name! .

In 1939 - Head of the Department of American Countries of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In the autumn of 1939, a new stage began in the career of a young diplomat. The Soviet leadership needed a fresh look at the US position in the emerging European conflict. Gromyko was summoned to see Stalin. The Secretary General announced his intention to appoint Andrey Andreevich as an adviser at the USSR Embassy in the USA. From 1939 to 1943 - Advisor to the Soviet Embassy in the United States. Gromyko did not develop friendly relations with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinov. By the beginning of 1943, Litvinov ceased to suit Stalin, and Gromyko took over his post. From 1943 to 1946, Gromyko was the USSR ambassador to the United States and at the same time the USSR envoy to Cuba.

In 1945 Gromyko took part in the work of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. He also took an active part in the creation of the United Nations (UN).

From 1946 to 1948 - Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN (to the UN Security Council). In this capacity, Andrei Andreevich developed the UN Charter, and then, on behalf of the Soviet government, signed this document.

From 1946 to 1949 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Already in those days, the magazine "Time" noted the "amazing competence" of Andrei Andreevich. From 1949 to 1952 to June 1952 - 1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

After Stalin's death, Vyacheslav Molotov again became head of the Foreign Ministry, who recalled Gromyko from London. From March 1953 to February 1957 - again the 1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

From 1952 to 1956 - candidate, from 1956 to 1989 - member of the Central Committee of the CPSU; from April 27, 1973 to September 30, 1988 - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Doctor of Economic Sciences (1956).

When in February 1957 D. T. Shepilov was transferred to the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N. S. Khrushchev asked whom he could recommend for the post he was leaving. “I have two deputies,” answered Dmitry Timofeevich. - One is a bulldog: you tell him - he will not open his jaws until he does everything on time and accurately. The second is a man with a good outlook, clever, talented, a star of diplomacy, a virtuoso. I recommend it to you." Khrushchev was very attentive to the recommendation and chose the first candidate, Gromyko. (Candidate No. 2 was V. V. Kuznetsov.)

- (Quoted from an article by Vadim Yakushov about V. V. Kuznetsov).

At the head of the Foreign Ministry

In 1957-1985 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. For 28 years, Gromyko headed the Soviet foreign policy department. Andrey Gromyko also contributed to the process of negotiations on control over the arms race, both conventional and nuclear. In 1946, on behalf of the USSR, Gromyko proposed a general reduction and regulation of armaments and a ban on the military use of atomic energy. Under him, many agreements and treaties on these issues were prepared and signed - the 1963 Treaty on the Ban on Nuclear Tests in Three Environments, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the 1972 ABM Treaties, SALT-1, and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of nuclear war.

Molotov's rigid style of diplomatic negotiations strongly influenced Gromyko's corresponding style. For his uncompromising manner of conducting diplomatic negotiations, A. A. Gromyko received the nickname “Mr. No” from his Western colleagues (Molotov used to have such a nickname). Gromyko himself stated on this occasion that "I heard their 'No' much more often than they heard my 'No'."

Last years

Since March 1983, Andrei Gromyko was simultaneously the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1985-1988 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (after M. S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, E. A. Shevardnadze was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and A. A. Gromyko was offered the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR). Thus, the tradition established in 1977-1985 to combine the positions of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was violated. Gromyko remained as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR until the autumn of 1988, when, at his request, he was released.

In 1946-1950 and 1958-1989 - Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Since October 1988 - retired.

In 1958-1987 he was the editor-in-chief of the International Life magazine.

Gromyko was fond of hunting, collecting guns.

Foreign policy and diplomacy of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA (September 1939 - December 1941)

Foreign policy and diplomacy of the aggressor powers, September 1939 - 1945

Creation and main stages of development of the anti-Hitler coalition (July 1941 - September 1945).

Plans for the post-war organization of the world in the diplomacy of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition (1944-1945)

The formation of the post-war world order: the main decisions of the Yalta, San Francisco and Potsdam conferences of 1945

Political and diplomatic results of the Second World War.

Messages

1) The problem of opening a second front in Europe in the relationship of the anti-Hitler coalition

2) Tehran conference: main decisions.

3) Creation of the UN: from Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco.

4) China's participation in World War II.

Literature 1) Systematic history of international relations. 1945–2003 T.4. Documents 1-6.

2) di Nolfo E. History of international relations. Chapters 4-7 (in part; first of all, no detailed attention to military operations is needed).

3) Systematic history of international relations. T.1. Section IV (link http://www.obraforum.ru/lib/book1/section4.htm)

3) Kissinger G. Diplomacy. Ch. 14-16 (optional).

5) ATTACHED READER.

6) WINKLER AND NUTKIL ATLAS ON THE SECOND WORLD WAR (MANDATORY!!!)

1) Molotov arrived in London on May 20, 1942, making a risky flight through the territory occupied by Germany. Churchill explained to the Soviet People's Commissar that Great Britain could not accept the Soviet proposals in full. However, he added, after the war, the USSR, Great Britain and the United States will cooperate in the post-war world order. Molotov had to be satisfied with this and sign a Soviet-British treaty on May 26. It contained obligations for mutual assistance, as well as an obligation not to conclude a separate peace. The second part of the treaty, which was to remain in force for 20 years, laid the foundation for post-war cooperation both in the prevention of possible aggression and in the post-war settlement. Both sides pledged not to seek territorial gains and not to interfere in the affairs of other countries. This treaty became the formal basis for cooperation between Great Britain and the USSR. Partners have become allies.

The next stop on Molotov's journey was Washington. Roosevelt, impressed by Molotov's ominous prophecies that the Soviet Union might retreat across the Volga, leaving the economically wealthy regions of Germany, if a second front was not opened, asked to be told to Stalin that the Allies planned to open a second front in 1942. But Roosevelt did not specified where exactly - in Northern Europe, as Moscow wanted, or in some other place.

In addition, Roosevelt opened before Molotov brilliant prospects for post-war cooperation. The current aggressors must be disarmed and remain disarmed. Similar controls should be extended to other troublemakers, perhaps even to France. This control should be carried out by the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and, possibly, China.

Molotov declared that the Soviet government fully supported these proposals. Roosevelt moved to colonial possessions belonging to weak powers. For the sake of everyone's safety, they should be placed under international guardianship. Molotov again enthusiastically supported the President.

By evading the dangerous topic of recognizing the new borders of the USSR, the American president opened up dizzying prospects for the Soviet leaders. The USSR was turning into one of the three world policemen. This idea deeply sunk into Stalin's head, and he will build further interaction with the allies on this basis, increasingly reorienting himself to the United States as the main partner.

Goals and objectives of the lesson:

Cognitive:

Follow the process of folding the anti-fascist coalition.
Find out how cooperation was carried out and what tasks the allies solved at different stages of the war.
Assess the role of the anti-fascist coalition in the victory.

Developing: the ability to develop, students have the ability to understand problems, analyze the material, reason independently, find confirmation of their assumptions in the source, argue their point of view - teach historical thinking using specific examples.

Educational: to arouse interest in the studied period of history, to form a sense of pride and patriotism.

Equipment: Lewandowski "Russia in the XX century". Chubaryan “National history of the XX beginning of the XXI”. Aleksashkin "Recent history".

Historical and artistic reader on the Great Patriotic War, posters "The Big Three", "Stalinism and Fascism in the Alliance", a reference diagram.

Lesson on the technology of traditional education combined lesson.

During the classes

1. Introductory word learns, problem statement.

Terrible terrible word war.
There is no scarier place in the world.
It burns, it kills, it chokes.
Everything is in its path.

World War II is the largest conflict in human history. 61 states took part in it. World War II was a war of diplomacy.

(Open notebooks, write down the topic of the lesson: “Diplomacy during the Second World War”).

(Consultant).

The Second World War is a coalition war, one of which - fascist - was formed before the outbreak of hostilities, and the second - anti-fascist - during hostilities for a joint fight against aggression. In the lesson, we must trace the process of the formation of the anti-fascist coalition, how events unfolded on the “diplomatic front”, what tasks the allies set at different stages of the war, assess the role of the anti-fascist coalition in the victory over fascism.

Lesson plan:

Formation of a coalition of fascist states.
Features of Soviet diplomacy 1939 - 1940.
Creation of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The problem of the second front.
Milestones of cooperation and emergence of contradictions.
Soviet diplomats.
Far Eastern Company of the Soviet Army.
Results of the war.
Post-war settlement of the USSR and the UN.

2. Formation of a coalition of fascist states.

a) Working with dates. I post a table: the system of international treaties - the aggressors led to the creation of a fascist coalition. Remember contracts.

Supplement by the teacher

October 25, 1936- Treaty between Germany and Italy on military cooperation.

September 27, 1940- The Berlin Pact on the military alliance of the main participants in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The conclusion of the treaty was influenced by events in Ethiopia and Spain. Germany recognized the capture of Ethiopia by Italy. Countries agreed to delimit spheres of influence in Europe (Berlin-Rome axis).

Under the flag of the struggle against the Comintern, a bloc was formed with the goal of winning world domination.

The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle was created.

1939 - Hungary - Spain - Manchukuo.

The military bloc was finally formed.

Hungary and Romania joined the pact in November. The parties to the pact were Bulgaria, Spain, Finland, Siam, Manchukuo, the puppet states of Slovakia, Croatia.

3. Features of Soviet diplomacy 1939 - 1940s.

a) Interview with students.

In 1940 During a visit to Germany, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov expressed the idea of the possibility of joining the USSR treaty, subject to external political interests. Molotov determined foreign policy during these years; on May 3, 1939, he replaced Litvinov. Did this reflect the reorientation of the Soviet leadership in matters of foreign policy towards rapprochement with Germany?

Let's remember.

How does this convergence take place?

Collective security policy.

(Cooperation of states to maintain peace, signing agreements on mutual assistance of states).

What contracts have been signed?

(Mutual assistance treaties with France, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia on non-aggression with China).

How did the Munich Agreement affect the idea of creating a collective security system?

(The dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia led to the collapse collective security policy. The USSR again had to look for reliable allies to provide assistance in difficult times).

Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations.

When did they happen, what do you know about them?

Molotov-Ribbentron Pact.

Describe the pact. What were the implications of this pact? Give an assessment of the foreign policy of the USSR in 1939.

Conclusion: the policy of Soviet diplomacy was not distinguished by clarity and consistency. Stalin's diplomacy was to try to maneuver, to play on the contradictions of England, France on the one hand, Germany on the other. In pursuing this policy, the Stalinist leadership favored secret diplomacy. In 1939 the orientation of the USSR in the external political course takes place and an alliance of Stalinism and fascism is formed.

4. Creation of an anti-fascist coalition.

a) The teacher's story.

However, this policy, unprincipled deals, the Molotov-Ribbentron pact and its implementation led the world to the beginning of the Second World War. Having captured Poland, Germany found itself close to our borders. June 21 21:30 (read manual p. 127)

Hitler's calculation that the Soviet Union would find itself in international isolation did not materialize. Immediately after the war, the governments of England and the United States issued statements of support for the USSR. The formation of the anti-Hitler coalition began.

b) Work in a notebook(drawing up a reference scheme).

P. 57 Lewandowski p. 256.

Aleksashkin page 131.

At the beginning of the lesson, give students cards to complete tasks:

Check work progress. I'm putting up a poster "folding the coalition".

The coalition-building process was not easy. An important moment in the creation of the coalition was the entry of the United States into the war. On the morning of December 7, 1941 Japan launched air and naval strikes on the main US naval base, Pearl Harbor, in the Hawaiian Islands. The main American forces in the Pacific were concentrated here. The attack was unexpected and the US suffered heavy casualties as a result. On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan. At the same time, the Japanese launched an offensive against the British colonies. As a result, England entered the war with Japan. The union of the USSR, for England and the USA became inevitable, the process of forming a coalition ended in May - June 1942.

5. The problem of the second front.

From the very first days of the war, there were disagreements between the allies on the issue of opening a second front. What is the problem with this issue? One of the reasons for the disagreement lies in the different understanding of the second front. For the Allies, these were military operations against the fascist coalition in French North-West Africa in 1941-1943, and in 1943 a landing in Sicily in southern Italy.

Stalin requested the opening of a second front in September 1941, the landing site for the Soviet leadership in the territory of Northern France. The second front was opened in June 1944. June 6, 1944 landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy.

What other disagreements existed between them? (Find in the textbook Chubaryan p. 137)

The problem of the post-war device.
- The post-war path of development of the liberated countries of Eastern Europe.

Were important decisions on these issues discussed at conferences?

Consider conferences (work with the textbook).

the date
Place	One student at a time illuminate this issue
Members
Solutions

Page 138 Chubaryan.
Page 257 Lewandowski.
Page 134-138 Aleksashkina I am posting tables.

6. Far East Company of the Soviet Army.

In accordance with the agreement reached at Yalta, the Soviet government declared war on Japan. (read out the statement of the Soviet government, p. 280 reader, video film - “And in the Pacific Ocean”)

What operations were carried out by the Soviet army to defeat Japan?

Manchurian offensive operation 9 Aug. – 2 Sep. 1945
- South - Sakhalin offensive 11 - 25 August. 1945
- Kuril landing 18 Aug. – 2 Sep. 1945

7. Results of the war.

Cooperation contributed to the defeat of the fascist bloc, but the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition was the USSR, which took the brunt of the war.

August 21, 1944 In Dumbarton Oaks (a suburb of Washington), a conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China was convened. The Soviet delegation was headed by the USSR Ambassador to the USA Gromyko.

The conference prepared proposals for the creation of an international organization for the preservation of peace and security. A draft of the UN Charter was developed.

At the Yalta Conference, the heads of the three governments agreed to convene in April 1945. at the San Francisco United Nations Conference. The conference was opened on April 25, 1945. – attended by representatives of 50 countries that are considered states -

Soviet diplomats played an important role in the foreign policy of the USSR.

Page 138 name the names.

More than 60 years have passed since diplomats contributed to the victory with their work. But in our republic we can also find such pages in the history of diplomacy. This year, the Russian public is celebrating the 450th anniversary of the entry of Bashkiria into the Russian state. A striking example of diplomacy is the trip of the Bashkir ambassadors in 1556. to Ivan the Terrible, and then the signing of a letter of entry of the Bashkir tribes into the Russian state, which was also reflected on our coat of arms.

8. Final part.

Topic covered:

Diplomacy of the Second World War.

"5" "Big Three". Atomic bombardment of Japanese cities. Defeat of the Kwantung Army. Results, lessons and the price of victory.

p. 139 Aleksashkin questions 3-7
p. 143 Chubaryan 1-2
p. 260 Lewandowski 2.4

Grading.

To understand the conditions in which the Soviet Union was in the late 30s and early 40s of the twentieth century, i.e. just before the start of the Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to correctly assess the international situation of that time and the role of the USSR in the international arena. I.L Israelyan., "Diplomacy during the war years (1941-1945)".: p.51

The Soviet Union at that time was the only country in Europe with a communist regime. The successes of the first five-year plans, the rapid growth of industry, and the improvement of people's lives could not but alarm Western European political circles. The governments of these countries could not allow a repetition of the October Revolution in their countries, they were afraid of the expansion of the revolution from the USSR. First, the leader of the world proletariat V.I. Lenin, and then his successor as head of the Soviet state I.V. Stalin unequivocally declared the spread of the proletarian revolution throughout the world and the world domination of communist ideology. At the same time, Western governments did not want to spoil relations with the growing Union. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, the threat of fascism loomed over Europe. The European states could not allow either one or the other unfolding of events. Everyone was looking for possible compromises, including the Soviet Union. I.L Israelyan., "Diplomacy during the war years (1941-1945)".: p.51

Hitler's rise to power in 1933 forced to speed up the Soviet policy in the direction of creating a system of collective security. after a long break, diplomatic relations with the United States were restored, in 1934. The USSR was admitted to the League of Nations. All this testified to the strengthening of the international prestige of the USSR and created favorable conditions for the intensification of the state's foreign policy activities. In 1935 The Soviet Union concluded agreements on mutual assistance in case of war with France and Czechoslovakia. In 1936 an agreement was concluded with the Mongolian People's Republic, and in 1937. - non-aggression pact with China.

Soviet diplomacy in those years sought, on the one hand, to implement the plan of collective security in Europe, not to succumb to the provocations of the enemy, to prevent a wide anti-Soviet front, and on the other hand, to take the necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense capability.

The Soviet government was looking for ways of a constructive alliance with France and England and offered them to conclude a pact in case of war, but the negotiations on this issue reached an impasse, because the Western powers did not want to take them seriously, and considered them as a temporary tactical move, pushed the USSR to accept unilateral obligations.

At the same time, Germany during this period was not profitable war with the USSR. Her plans included the occupation of France, England, Poland with the further creation of a "united" Europe under the auspices of Germany. The attack on the USSR, with its vast reserves of natural resources, was defined by Germany as a later task.

Under these conditions, the tendency of Soviet foreign policy to normalize relations with Germany began to grow, although negotiations with Britain and France were not completely abandoned. But it soon became clear that negotiations with the military missions of these countries were impossible, and they were interrupted for an indefinite period.

In parallel, on August 20, a Soviet-German trade and credit agreement was signed in Berlin, and on August 23, after 3-hour negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union, a non-aggression pact for a period of 10 years was signed, called the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", named after Ministers of Foreign Affairs, who sealed it with their signatures. This document reflected the legitimate interests of the USSR, providing the necessary reserve of time for our country to prepare for entry into a major war, and also prevented the possibility of a war on two fronts - against Germany in Europe and against Japan in the Far East. At the same time, the secret protocols to this pact testified to the imperial ambitions of both states. They stipulated spheres of influence in Europe, the division of Poland. According to this agreement, the rights to the Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, and Finland were transferred to the USSR. I.L Israelyan., "Diplomacy during the war years (1941-1945)".: p.56

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