Creation of the Red Army

The main part of the armed forces of the RSFSR during the Civil War, the official name of the ground forces of the RSFSR - the USSR in 1918-1946. Arose from the Red Guard. The formation of the Red Army was announced in the Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, approved on 01/03/1918 by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 01/15/1918 V.I. Lenin signed a decree establishing the Red Army. The formations of the Red Army received a baptism of fire when repelling the German offensive on Petrograd in February - March 1918. After the conclusion of the Brest peace in Soviet Russia, full-scale work began on the creation of the Red Army under the leadership of the Supreme Military Council created on 03/04/1918 (the Air Force headquarters was partly created on the basis of the previous Headquarters Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and later, on the basis of the headquarters of the council, the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) arose). An important step in strengthening the Red Army and attracting former officers into it was the order of the Supreme Military Council of March 21, 1918, which abolished the elective beginning. For the transition from the voluntary principle of manning the army to universal conscription, a military administrative apparatus was needed, which was created in Soviet Russia in the spring of 1918. An important advantage of the Bolsheviks over their opponents was the ability to rely on the ready-made control apparatus of the old army.

On March 22-23, 1918, at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, it was decided that the division would become the main unit of the Red Army. On the twentieth of April 1918, the states of units and formations were published. In the same days, work was completed on a plan for the formation and deployment of a million-strong army.

Creation of military bodies and military districts

In April 1918, under the leadership of the Air Force, the formation of local military administration bodies began, incl. military districts (Belomorsky, Yaroslavl, Moscow, Orlovsky, Priuralsky, Volga and North Caucasian), as well as district, provincial, district and volost commissariats for military affairs. When forming the military district system, the Bolsheviks used the front and army headquarters of the old army, the former corps headquarters played a role in the formation of the headquarters of the curtain troops. The former military districts were abolished. New districts were formed, uniting the provinces according to the composition of the population. During 1918-1922. 27 military districts were formed or restored (after the capture by the Whites or liquidation). The districts played a crucial role in the formation of the Red Army. The rear districts were subordinate to the Higher General Staff, the front-line districts - to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, the Revolutionary Military Council of the fronts and armies. A network of provincial, district and volost military commissariats was created on the ground. By the end of the Civil War, there were 88 provincial and 617 county military commissariats. The number of volost military registration and enlistment offices was measured in thousands.

In early July 1918, the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets decided that every citizen between the ages of 18 and 40 must defend Soviet Russia. The army began to be recruited not voluntarily, but by conscription, which marked the beginning of the formation of a mass Red Army.

Organization of the political apparatus of the Red Army

The political apparatus of the Red Army was formed. By March 1918, in order to organize party control and restore order among the troops, the institution of commissars was formed (two in all units, headquarters and institutions). The body that controlled their work was the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, headed by K.K. Yurenev, originally created at the Air Force. By the end of 1920, the party and Komsomol stratum in the Red Army was about 7%, the Communists made up 20% of the command staff of the Red Army. By October 1, 1919, according to some sources, up to 180,000 party members were in the army, and by August 1920 - over 278,000. During the Civil War, over 50,000 Bolsheviks died at the front. To strengthen the Red Army, the communists repeatedly carried out party mobilizations.

The Air Force organized the registration of military units, united them into curtain detachments under the guidance of experienced military leaders. The forces of the curtain were grouped in the most important directions (the Northern sector and the Petrogradsky region of the curtain, the Western sector and the Moscow defense region, later, by a decree of the Air Force of August 4, 1918, the Southern sector of the curtain was formed on the basis of the Voronezh region of the Western sector of the curtain, and on August 6 for defense from the interventionists and whites in the North, the North-Eastern section of the curtain was created). Subordinate to the sections and districts were the curtain detachments, which, in accordance with the Air Force order of May 3, 1918, were deployed into territorial divisions, which were named after the names of the corresponding provinces. The first conscription to the Red Army took place already on June 12, 1918. The Air Force outlined a plan for the formation of 30 divisions. On May 8, 1918, on the basis of the GUGSH (i.e., the General Staff) and the General Staff, the All-Russian General Staff (VGSh) was created.

RVSR

On September 2, 1918, by a resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, on the initiative of Trotsky and the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Ya.M. Sverdlov, the RVSR was created, to which the functions of the Air Force, the operational and military statistics departments of the Higher General Staff and the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs were transferred. The composition of the new body was as follows: Chairman L.D. Trotsky, members: K.Kh. Danishevsky, P.A. Kobozev, K.A. Mekhonoshin, F.F. Raskolnikov, A.P. Rozengolts, I.N. Smirnov and commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the republic. The headquarters of the Air Force was transformed into the headquarters of the RVSR. N.I. became the chief of staff of the RVSR. Rattel, formerly head of the Air Force headquarters.

Almost all military administration bodies were gradually subordinated to the RVSR: the commander-in-chief, the Supreme Military Inspectorate, the Military Legislative Council, the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (abolished in 1919, functions were transferred to the Political Department, later transformed into the Political Directorate of the RVSR), the administration of the RVSR, the Field headquarters, the Higher General Staff, the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Republic, the Central Administration for the Supply of the Army, the Higher Attestation Commission, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate. In fact, the RVSR was swallowed up by the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, especially since the key posts in these two bodies were occupied by the same persons - People's Commissar for Military Affairs L.D. Trotsky, who is also the chairman of the RVSR and his deputy in both bodies, E.M. Sklyansky. Thus, the RVSR was entrusted with the solution of the most important issues of the country's defense. As a result of the transformations, the RVSR became the supreme body of the military administration of Soviet Russia. According to the plan of its creators, it was supposed to be collegial, but the realities of the Civil War led to the fact that, with a fictitious presence of a large number of members, few actually participated in the meetings, and the work of the RVSR was concentrated in the hands of Sklyansky, who was in Moscow, while Trotsky was the hottest time of the Civil War spent on tours along the fronts, organizing military command in the field.

The post of commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the republic was introduced in Soviet Russia by a decree of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on September 2, 1918. The first commander-in-chief was the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, former colonel I.I. Vatsetis. In July 1919 he was replaced by former Colonel S.S. Kamenev.

The RVSR Headquarters, which arose on September 6, 1918, was deployed into the RVSR Field Headquarters, which actually became the Soviet Headquarters of the Civil War era. At the head of the headquarters were former General Staff officers N.I. Rattel, F.V. Kostyaev, M.D. Bonch-Bruevich and P.P. Lebedev.

The field headquarters was directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief. The structure of the Field Headquarters included departments: operational (departments: 1st and 2nd operational, general, cartographic, communications service and magazine part), reconnaissance (departments: 1st (military intelligence) and 2nd (undercover intelligence) reconnaissance departments, general department and magazine part), reporting (duty) (departments: accounting (inspector), general, economic) and military-political. As in the VGSh, the structure changed. Directorates were created: operational (departments: operational, general, intelligence, communications service), organizational (accounting and organizational department; later - administrative and accounting department with accounting and organizational department), registration (undercover department, undercover department), military control, Central Directorate of Military Communications and Field Directorate of the Air Fleet. An important achievement of Soviet military construction was that, finally, the dream of many old-school General Staff officers came true: the Field Headquarters was freed from organizational and supply issues and could concentrate on operational work.

On September 30, 1918, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was established under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin, designed to coordinate the solution of military issues with civilian departments, as well as to restrain the almost unlimited power of the chairman of the RVSR Trotsky.

The structure of the field control of the fronts was as follows. At the head of the front was the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS), to which the headquarters of the front, the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, the political department, military control (counterintelligence), and the department of the chief of supply of the armies of the front were subordinate. The front headquarters included departments: operational (departments: operational, reconnaissance, general, communications, maritime, topographic), administrative and military communications, inspections of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, directorate of the chief of aviation and aeronautics.

Fronts of the Red Army during the Civil War

During the years of the Civil War, 11 main fronts of the Red Army were created (Eastern June 13, 1918 - January 15, 1920; Western February 19, 1919 - April 8, 1924; Caucasian January 16, 1920 - May 29, 1921; Caspian-Caucasian December 8 1918 - March 13, 1919; Northern September 11, 1918 - February 19, 1919; Turkestan August 14, 1919 - June 1926; Ukrainian January 4 - June 15, 1919; South-Eastern October 1, 1919 - January 6, 1920 .; Southwestern January 10 - December 31, 1920; Southern September 11, 1918 - January 10, 1920; Southern (second formation) September 21 - December 10, 1920).

Army in the Red Army during the Civil War

During the period of the Civil War in the Red Army, 33 regular armies were created, including two cavalry ones. The armies were part of the fronts. The field administration of the armies consisted of: RVS, headquarters with departments: operational, administrative, military communications and inspectors of infantry, cavalry, engineers, political department, revolutionary tribunal, special department. In the operational department there were departments: reconnaissance, communications, aviation and aeronautics. The army commander was a member of the RVS. Appointments in the Revolutionary Military Council of fronts and armies were carried out by the Revolutionary Military Council. The most important function was performed by the reserve armies, which provided the front with ready replacements.

The main unit of the Red Army was a rifle division, organized according to a trinity scheme - from three brigades of three regiments each. The regiments consisted of three battalions, there were three companies in the battalion. According to the state, the division was supposed to have about 60,000 people, 9 artillery divisions, an armored detachment, an air division (18 aircraft), a cavalry division and other units. Such a staff turned out to be too cumbersome, the actual number of divisions was up to 15 thousand people, which corresponded to a corps in the white armies. Since the states were not respected, the composition of the various divisions varied greatly.

During 1918-1920. The Red Army gradually grew stronger and stronger. In October 1918, the Reds could field 30 infantry divisions, and in September 1919 - already 62. At the beginning of 1919 there were only 3 cavalry divisions, and at the end of 1920 - already 22. In the spring of 1919, the army consisted of about 440,000 bayonets and sabers with 2,000 guns and 7,200 machine guns in combat units alone, and the total number exceeded 1.5 million people. Then the superiority in forces over the whites was achieved, which then increased. By the end of 1920, the number of the Red Army exceeded 5 million people, with a combat strength of about 700,000 people.

Command cadres were mobilized in the person of tens of thousands of former officers. In November 1918, the RVSR issued an order to call up all former chief officers under 50 years of age, staff officers under 55 years of age and generals under 60 years of age. As a result of this order, the Red Army received about 50,000 military specialists. The total number of military experts of the Red Army was even higher (by the end of 1920 - up to 75,000 people). The "military opposition" opposed the policy of attracting military experts.

Personnel training

Through an extensive network of military educational institutions, cadres of red commanders were also trained (about 60,000 people were trained). Such military leaders as V.M. Azin, V.K. Blucher, S.M. Budyonny, B.M. Dumenko, D.P. Zhloba, V.I. Kikvidze, G.I. Kotovsky, I.S. Kutyakov, A.Ya. Parkhomenko, V.I. Chapaev, I.E. Yakir.

By the end of 1919, the Red Army already included 17 armies. By January 1, 1920, the Red Army at the front and in the rear numbered 3,000,000 people. By October 1, 1920, with a total strength of the Red Army of 5,498,000 people, there were 2,361,000 people on the fronts, 391,000 in reserve armies, 159,000 in labor armies and 2,587,000 in military districts. By January 1, 1921, the Red Army had 4,213,497 eaters, and the combat strength included 1,264,391 people, or 30% of the total. On the fronts were 85 rifle divisions, 39 separate rifle brigades, 27 cavalry divisions, 7 separate cavalry brigades, 294 light artillery battalions, 85 howitzer artillery battalions, 85 field heavy artillery battalions (a total of 4888 guns of different systems). In total in 1918-1920. 6,707,588 people were drafted into the Red Army. An important advantage of the Red Army was its comparative social homogeneity (by the end of the Civil War, in September 1922, 18.8% of workers, 68% of peasants, 13.2% of others served in the Red Army. By the fall of 1920, 29 different charters were developed in the Red Army , 28 more were in operation.

Desertion in the Red Army

Desertion was a serious problem for Soviet Russia. The fight against him was centralized and concentrated since December 25, 1918 in the Central Temporary Commission for Combating Desertion from representatives of the military department, the party and the NKVD. Local authorities were represented by the respective provincial commissions. Only during raids on deserters in 1919-1920. 837,000 people were detained. As a result of amnesties and explanatory work from mid-1919 to mid-1920, more than 1.5 million deserters voluntarily turned up.

Armament of the Red Army

In 1919, 460,055 rifles, 77,560 revolvers, and over 340 million were produced on Soviet territory in 1919. rifle cartridges, 6256 machine guns, 22,229 sabers, 152 three-inch guns, 83 three-inch guns of other types (anti-aircraft, mountain, short), 24 42-line rapid-fire guns, 78 48-line howitzers, 29 6-inch fortress howitzers, about 185,000 shells , 258 airplanes (another 50 have been repaired). In 1920, 426,994 rifles were produced (about 300,000 were repaired), 38,252 revolvers, over 411 million rifle cartridges, 4,459 machine guns, 230 three-inch guns, 58 three-inch guns of other types, 12 42-line rapid-firing guns, 20 48- linear howitzers, 35 6-inch fortress howitzers, 1.8 million shells.

The main branch of the ground forces was the infantry, the shock maneuverable force was the cavalry. In 1919, the cavalry corps of S.M. Budyonny, then deployed to the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1920, the 2nd Cavalry Army of F.K. was created. Mironov.

The Red Army was turned by the Bolsheviks into an effective means of disseminating their ideas widely among the masses. By October 1, 1919, the Bolsheviks opened 3,800 Red Army literacy schools, in 1920 their number reached 5,950. By the summer of 1920, more than 1,000 Red Army theaters were operating.

The Red Army won the Civil War. Numerous anti-Bolshevik armies were defeated in the South, East, North and North-West of the country. During the Civil War, many commanders, commissars and Red Army men distinguished themselves. About 15,000 people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner was awarded to 2 armies, 42 divisions, 4 brigades, 176 regiments.

After the Civil War, the Red Army underwent a significant reduction of about 10 times (by the mid-1920s).

Kamenev Sergey Sergeevich
Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich
Frunze Mikhail Vasilievich
Chapaev Vasily Ivanovich

Kamenev Sergey Sergeevich

Battles and victories

One of the founders of the Red Army and its leaders during the Civil War. The commander-in-chief of the Red Army is the highest position in Soviet Russia that a non-party military specialist could count on.

For his merits, he received, in particular, an Honorary firearm - a Mauser pistol with the sign of the Order of the Red Banner on the handle.

Kamenev was born in Kyiv into a noble family, the son of a mechanical engineer at the Kyiv Arsenal plant, an artillery colonel. He dreamed of becoming a surgeon as a child, but chose the military path. He graduated from the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps (1898), the elite Alexander Military School (1900, graduated third in his graduation) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in the 1st category (1907). Kamenev entered military service in 1900, having gone to his native Kyiv, to the 165th Infantry Regiment of Lutsk, served in the army infantry and only after graduating from the academy, after serving the combat qualification, did he join the General Staff.

Prior to the First World War, he held the positions of assistant senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Irkutsk military district, senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 2nd cavalry division and assistant senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Vilna military district. In addition, Kamenev taught tactics and topography at a military school. In the prewar period, Kamenev participated in numerous maneuvers and field trips, which significantly expanded his horizons and training as a General Staff officer and commander. During these trips, Kamenev visited the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. Kamenev also studied the unsuccessful experience of the participation of the Russian army in the war with Japan.

Kamenev went to the front of World War I with the rank of captain. He served as a senior adjutant of the operational department of the headquarters of the 1st Army, commanded the 30th Poltava Infantry Regiment. According to the certification in connection with his service at the headquarters of the 1st Army, Kamenev was evaluated by his superiors as "in all respects an outstanding officer of the General Staff and an excellent combat combat commander."

The officer was considered worthy of promotion to general positions.

As regimental commander, Kamenev showed himself to be a firm leader, possessing courage, diligence and composure, loving military affairs, knowing the life of an officer and a soldier and taking care of them. Concern for the soldiers, apparently, played a role in the fact that in 1917 he was elected commander of the regiment.

Then Kamenev served as chief of staff of the XV Army Corps (in this position he met the events of October 1917), chief of staff of the 3rd Army. During this period, Kamenev had to deal mainly with the demobilization of troops. The army headquarters was located in Polotsk, however, in connection with the advance of the Germans, it was evacuated to Nizhny Novgorod, where Kamenev's service in the old army ended.

Kamenev in 1919

Having experience working with committees, Kamenev joined the Reds quite early as a military specialist, voluntarily enlisting in the Red Army. Apparently, he considered it necessary to continue the fight against an external enemy, but initially did not seek to be involved in the Civil War. (The party pseudonym "Kamenev" was also worn by a prominent Bolshevik, member of the Politburo, chairman of the Moscow City Council).

From April 1918, Kamenev served in the curtain troops, which covered the territory of Soviet Russia from a possible resumption of war with Germany, was an assistant to the military leader and military leader of the Nevelsk curtain detachment. From the very beginning of his new service, Kamenev faced the costs of the first period of the existence of the Red Army - partisanship, disobedience to orders, the presence of criminal elements in subordinate detachments, and desertion.

In August 1918, Kamenev was appointed assistant to the military leader of the Western Veil V. N. Egoryev and military instructor of the Smolensk region with the Nevelsk, Vitebsk and Roslavl regions subordinate to him. The task of Kamenev at that time was to receive the counties of the Vitebsk province from the Germans who left them, as well as the formation of divisions for the Red Army. In a short time, under his leadership, the Vitebsk division and the Roslavl detachment were formed and sent to the Eastern Front.

They noticed Kamenev and began to promote him to major posts in the autumn of 1918. It was then, in September 1918, that he was entrusted with the key post of commander of the Eastern Front at that time. The front was still being formed. The headquarters of the front also had to be created, since the former commander I. I. Vatsetis, who became commander in chief, took the former headquarters with him. The fight against the Whites unfolded in the Volga region, and already in October 1918, the troops of the front pushed the enemy back from the Volga to the east. In late 1918 - early 1919, the Reds captured Ufa and Orenburg. However, in connection with the spring offensive of the Kolchak armies, these cities had to be abandoned, and the front again rolled back to the Volga region.

Blucher and Kamenev at the parade

According to legend, V. I. Chapaev, having learned about the appointment of a colonel of the General Staff of the old army to the post of commander of the front, sent his representative Yakov Pugach to Kamenev to find out what kind of person led the front and, probably, whether there was a threat of counter-revolution. The envoy, having returned, reported (there are different versions of this “report”): “First of all, sigh in-oh-oh! Eyes - like the robber Churkin. Whatever you need.

Hands ... in! One word, the old man is correct (Kamenev was actually 38 years old. - A G.). As he blinks his eyes, goosebumps will go down the neck. Doesn't play around. Orderlies and loafers in general do not keep around him. He cleans his boots himself, like our Vasily Ivanovich. Firm and bold in speech. He holds assistants in his hands. Above the plans they sit up to the roosters. Bab did not notice at the headquarters. The old man is “his own” and is not arrogant: with a single swoop he slipped into his hut. He says, say hello to the valiant red troops of the Pugachev district and Chapaev. Himself, he says, I will soon come to get acquainted, as soon as, they say, I will breathe here. To say goodbye, he took by the hand.

In the 1919 campaign, Kamenev played an important role in the victory over the armies of Admiral A. V. Kolchak on the Eastern Front. However, in the midst of operations, as a result of a conflict with commander-in-chief I. I. Vatsetis, he was unexpectedly removed from his post and was forced to remain inactive for several weeks, although he tried to influence events at the front. Instead, the front was headed by A. A. Samoilo, sent from the north of Russia. But due to a conflict with the RVS of the front and subordinates, Samoilo did not last long in this post, and Kamenev, who enlisted the support of V.I. Lenin, again took the post of commander.

Named Mauser pistol

By his own admission, Kamenev was poorly oriented in the political situation, which he saw "as if in a fog." An important role in the political development of Kamenev was played by a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front, S. I. Gusev. In July 1919, as a result of the scandalous “affair” of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which became a manifestation of the political struggle of groups in the Bolshevik elite, commander-in-chief I. I. Vatsetis was removed and arrested along with his inner circle. Kamenev became the new commander-in-chief of all armed forces. It was S. I. Gusev who contributed to the fact that the Bolshevik leader V. I. Lenin drew attention to Kamenev. As a result, Kamenev ended up in the post of commander-in-chief - the highest position in Soviet Russia that a non-party military specialist could count on. Pavel Pavlovich Lebedev, a former general and talented general staff officer, became Kamenev's closest ally in the Civil War, both on the Eastern Front and as commander in chief.

“In the war of modern large armies, for the actual defeat of the enemy, a sum of continuous and systematic victories on the entire front of the struggle is needed, consistently complementing one another and interconnected in time ... Our 5th Army was almost nullified by Admiral Kolchak. Denikin almost destroyed the entire right flank of the Southern Front. Wrangel disheveled our 13th Army to the last.

And yet the victory remained not for Kolchak, not for Denikin and not for Wrangel. The side that managed to sum up their blows, inflicting those continuously and thereby not allowing the enemy to heal his wounds, won.

In the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: S. S. Kamenev, S. I. Gusev, A. I. Egorov, K. E. Voroshilov, P. P. Lebedev, N. N. Petin, S. M. Budyonny, B M. Shaposhnikov

It fell to Kamenev to lead the fight against the troops of General A. I. Denikin, who were then advancing on Moscow. Even on the Eastern Front, he drew up a plan to fight Denikin, which provided for actions to prevent his connection with the armies of Kolchak. By the time Kamenev was appointed commander-in-chief, such a plan was already outdated, since Kolchak was defeated, and his connection with the white armies of the South of Russia already seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, Kamenev showed great stubbornness in defending his plan, which provided for an offensive through the Don region, where the most fierce resistance of the anti-Bolshevik Cossacks awaited the Reds. Kamenev's plan was supported by the Bolshevik leader Lenin, who was poorly versed in strategic issues. As a result, the Reds failed the August offensive of the Southern Front, and the Whites reached the distant approaches to Moscow (reached Orel and Mtsensk, which posed a threat to the main Soviet arsenal - Tula), threatening the existence of Soviet Russia.

“Only a successful combination of a communist and a general staff officer (general staff officer) gives all 100% of command”

Plans had to be urgently changed and urgently saved the situation through coordinated actions of the fronts, as a result of which a turning point was reached. As commander-in-chief, Kamenev also led the fight on other fronts - against General Yudenich near Petrograd, against the Poles during the Soviet-Polish war (Kamenev was the developer of plans for an attack on Poland), against General Wrangel in the South (in the latter case, Kamenev personally participated in the development of the plan Perekop-Chongar operation). After the end of the large-scale Civil War in November 1920, Kamenev had to lead operations to eliminate banditry, the insurgent movement, to suppress the uprising in Karelia (he went to the theater of operations). He led the fight against Basmachi, directly being in Turkestan. During this struggle, Enver Pasha, who tried to resist the Bolsheviks under the slogans of pan-Islamism, was eliminated.

Kamenev received an ambiguous assessment of his contemporaries and descendants.

Commanders of the Red Army - delegates of the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b). 1934

Detractors spoke of him as "a man with a big mustache and little ability." An important characterization of Kamenev was given by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, L. D. Trotsky. In his opinion, Kamenev “was noted for his optimism and speed of strategic imagination. But his outlook was still comparatively narrow, the social factors of the Southern Front: workers, Ukrainian peasants, Cossacks were not clear to him. He approached the Southern Front under the angle of vision of the commander of the Eastern Front. The closest thing was to concentrate the divisions withdrawn from the East on the Volga and strike at the Kuban, Denikin's original base. It was from this plan that he proceeded when he promised to deliver the divisions on time, without stopping the offensive. However, my acquaintance with the Southern Front told me that the plan was fundamentally wrong ... But my struggle against the plan seemed to be a continuation of the conflict between the Military Council (RVSR. - A. G.) and the Eastern Front. Smilga and Gusev, with the assistance of Stalin, portrayed the matter as if I were against the plan, because I did not trust the new commander-in-chief at all. Lenin apparently had the same apprehension. But it was fundamentally wrong. I did not overestimate Vatsetis, I met Kamenev in a friendly manner and tried in every possible way to facilitate his work ... It is difficult to say which of the two colonels (Vatsetis and Kamenev. - A. G.) was more gifted. Both possessed undoubted strategic qualities, both had experience of the great war, both were distinguished by an optimistic temperament, without which it is impossible to command. Vatsetis was more stubborn, more willful, and undoubtedly succumbed to the influence of elements hostile to the revolution. Kamenev was incomparably more accommodating and easily succumbed to the influence of the communists who worked with him ... S. S. Kamenev was undoubtedly a capable military leader, with imagination and a capacity for risk. He lacked depth and firmness. Lenin later became very disappointed in him and more than once very sharply characterized his reports: "The answer is stupid and in places illiterate."

Kamenev S. S. among the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army

On the whole, Kamenev enjoyed the favor of Lenin. It was under Kamenev that the Red Army defeated all its enemies and emerged victorious from the Civil War. He was an active supporter of the offensive strategy as the only possible way to fight in the Civil War. A major military administrator, due to the gravity of the conditions of the Civil War, he was forced to behave extremely carefully in relation to the party leadership, to curry favor with the party elite.

For his activities during the years of the Civil War, Kamenev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. He also had rarer awards, testifying to special merits to Soviet Russia. So, in April 1920, Kamenev was awarded an Honorary Golden Weapon (saber) from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for victories on the Eastern Front, and in January 1921 he received an Honorary firearm - a Mauser pistol with the sign of the Order of the Red Banner on the handle (besides him, such an award was awarded only to S. M. Budyonny).

In the summer of 1922, Kamenev received the Order of the Red Star of the 1st degree of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic for organizing the fight against Enver Pasha, and in September 1922 he adorned his chest with the military Order of the Red Banner of the Khorezm Autonomous Soviet Republic "for helping the Khorezm working people in their struggle for their liberation and for their services in the fight against the enemies of the working people of the whole world.

After the Civil War, Kamenev continued to work to strengthen the Red Army. In his military scientific works and lectures, he rethought the experience of the First World War and the Civil War. Participated in the development of new charters for the Red Army, after the liquidation of the position of commander-in-chief in March 1924, he held the posts of inspector of the Red Army, chief of staff of the Red Army, deputy people's commissar for military and naval affairs and chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, chief head of the Military Academy of the Red Army for tactics, head of the air defense department Red Army. In his last position, Kamenev made a significant contribution to improving the country's defense capability, under him the air defense forces were re-equipped with new equipment. Kamenev was also one of the founders of the famous Osoaviakhim (Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction - a Soviet voluntary public organization that supported the army and the military industry), contributed to the organization of the development of the Arctic as chairman of the government Arctic Commission. He was the chairman of the commission for large flights organized by Osoaviakhim. The last military rank of Kamenev in the old army was the rank of colonel, in the Red Army - commander of the 1st rank.

Kamenev joined the party only in 1930 and, on the whole, his fate in Soviet times was successful, unlike dozens of his colleagues. Kamenev died of a heart attack before the beginning of the Great Terror and did not go through the slander, humiliation and betrayal of his comrades. The urn with the ashes of Kamenev was buried in the Kremlin wall. Nevertheless, posthumously, Kamenev was ranked among the "enemies of the people", and his name and works were forgotten for several decades. Subsequently, the name of Kamenev was rehabilitated.

Budyonny Semyon Mikhailovich

Battles and victories

Soviet military leader, legendary hero of the Civil War, Marshal of the Soviet Union, three times Hero of the Soviet Union.

Having defeated Denikin's troops, the Budyonnovists, in fact, saved Soviet Russia from destruction; without their actions, the path to Moscow would have been open for the Whites. The strategic cavalry in the Red Army, as a powerful strike force, became an important factor in the victory of the Reds. Under the conditions of the Civil War, the First Cavalry Army of Budyonny made it possible to carry out deep breakthroughs of the front, which changed the strategic situation.

Budyonny was born into the family of a farm laborer on the Kozyurin farm in the village of Platovskaya, Don Region. His ancestors came from the Voronezh province. In childhood and adolescence, Budyonny worked as a boy for a merchant, as an assistant to a blacksmith, a hammerer, a stoker, and a threshing machine driver. As for the military education, initially Budyonny actually did not have it. He has completed the courses of riders for the lower ranks at the Officers' Cavalry School. But after the Civil War, he worked privately with an outstanding military scientist, General Staff Officer of the old army, former General A.E. Snesarev, and in 1932 he graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

In the autumn of 1903, the future marshal was drafted into the army, into the Primorsky Dragoon Regiment. Participated in the Russo-Japanese War, mainly in skirmishes with the Honghuzi. After the war, Budyonny was promoted to non-commissioned officer, remained in extra-long service. During the First World War, Budyonny gained fame as a brave cavalryman, became a full St. George Knight for courage, received four St. George's crosses and four St. George's medals, and ended the war as a senior non-commissioned officer. Among his exploits are the capture of a German convoy near Brzezin in 1914, the capture of a Turkish battery near Van. Budyonny repeatedly participated in risky reconnaissance searches in enemy territory.

After the February Revolution in Russia, in the summer of 1917, in Minsk, he was elected chairman of the regimental committee and deputy chairman of the divisional committee. Participated in the disarmament of units loyal to L. G. Kornilov in Orsha. At the end of 1917 he returned home, did not take part in political events. He was elected a member of the district executive committee and head of the land department of the Salsky district.

In February 1918, he formed and led a cavalry detachment, with which he opposed the whites, subordinated to B. M. Dumenko. The partisan detachment gradually grew to a regiment, brigade and division. Budyonny acted near Tsaritsyn. In 1919, Budyonny joined the RCP (b), although he was not going to do this initially.

In June 1919, Budyonny's troops were deployed to the corps, and in November - to the First Cavalry Army. The creation of a strategic cavalry in the Red Army as a powerful strike force became an important factor in the victory of the Reds. The cavalry made it possible in the conditions of the Civil War to carry out deep breakthroughs of the front, which changed the strategic situation. Moreover, along with the excellent composition of the cavalry, the excellent equipment of the fighters in the First Cavalry included artillery, aircraft, armored trains and armored vehicles. At its core, the First Cavalry Army was a peasant-Cossack army. Captured White Guards were also placed in the ranks. Budyonny participated in the defeat of the troops of General A. I. Denikin in the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation. In fact, the Budennovites then saved Soviet Russia from death, since on the outskirts of Moscow the Whites were able to defeat the 8th Soviet Army.

Semyon Budyonny - full St. George Cavalier, hero of the First World War

Subsequently, the First Cavalry Army participated in the Donbass, Rostov-Novocherkassk, Tikhoretsk operations, and in the battle of Yegorlyk. At the same time, in the course of the fight against Denikin's cavalry, Budyonny was twice defeated by the Whites on the Don - near Rostov and on Manych in early 1920.

The Yegorlyk battle took place from February 25 to March 2, 1920 during the Tikhoretsk operation. The confrontation unfolded between the Budennovites and the cavalry group of General A. A. Pavlov, a large cavalry commander on the part of the Whites. In the course of an unexpected clash south of the village of Sredneegorlykskaya, the Budennovites shot Cossack marching columns from artillery and machine guns, after which they attacked them in horseback formation, turning them to flight. On both sides, a total of up to 25,000 people participated in the battle.

“If we talk about myself, then I do not want a different fate than the one that fell to my lot. I am happy and proud that I was the commander of the 1st Cavalry ... I have a photograph in which I was taken in the uniform of a senior non-commissioned officer of the Seversky Dragoon Regiment with four St. George's crosses on my chest and four medals. As they used to say in the old days, I had a full St. George bow.

The motto is minted on the medals: "For the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland." But we, Russian soldiers, fought for the Fatherland, for Russia, for the people"

During the Soviet-Polish war, Budyonny's army was deployed in marching order to the Polish front (in 53 days), where it participated in the Kyiv operation, carried out the Zhytomyr breakthrough, reaching deep behind enemy lines. The army liberated Zhytomyr and Berdichev, Novograd-Volynsky, Rovno, Dubno, Brody. During the Lviv operation, the army of Budyonny pinned down significant enemy forces and left the encirclement in Zamosc. However, near Warsaw, where it was urgently needed, the army was not transferred. Budyonnovtsy participated in the battles in Northern Tavria against the troops of Wrangel, in the Perekop-Chongar operation.

S. M. Budyonny, M. V. Frunze and K. E. Voroshilov. 1920

In 1920–1921 the army was engaged in the elimination of banditry in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The history of the First Cavalry was immortalized by a participant in the events, the writer Isaac Babel in the collection of short stories Cavalry. Budyonny was outraged by the way Babel described the events of the Polish campaign, and responded with a sharp rebuff, “Babel’s Babism from Krasnaya Nov.” The article was published in the magazine "October" in 1924, the writer was called "a degenerate from literature" in it.

Budyonny proved himself to be an excellent tactician in cavalry combat, but he did not have military leadership skills or strategic thinking. For military distinctions in the Civil War, he was awarded three Orders of the Red Banner (1919, 1923, 1930), honorary revolutionary cold steel and firearms (1919,1923). Abroad, Budyonny received the nickname "Red Murat".

At the same time, the strength of the Red Army was precisely the possibility of nominating such "people's commanders" to leading positions, who could hardly have been promoted by the Whites, although they had outstanding commanding qualities.

In 1921–1923 Budyonny was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District. The First Cavalry Army was disbanded in October 1923. Budyonny took the post of assistant commander-in-chief of the Red Army for cavalry, became a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.

Veterans of the First Cavalry - K. E. Voroshilov and Budyonny came to leading positions in the Red Army. Cavalrymen formed a kind of community in the Red Army and helped each other.

In 1924–1937 Budyonny was an inspector of the Red Army cavalry.

In 1931, together with students of the Academy, he made a parachute jump. In 1935, Budyonny became one of the first marshals of the Soviet Union. The question of Budyonny's attitude to repression is ambiguous. On the one hand, he acted as one of the supporters of the policy of terror in the army, on the other hand, he contributed to the release of some of those arrested. During the repression, Budyonny's wife was arrested.

From 1937 he commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District. Member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (since 1937), since 1938 - member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, since 1934 - candidate member, since 1939 - member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Since August 1940, he served as the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (since 1939 he was Deputy People's Commissar). An active supporter of the formation of horse-mechanized formations in the army.

A high, somewhat idealized assessment of Budyonny was given by the Bolshevik leader V. I. Lenin. In a conversation with Clara Zetkin in the autumn of 1920, he said: “Our Budyonny now, probably, should be considered the most brilliant cavalry commander in the world. You know, of course, that he is a peasant boy. Like the soldiers of the French revolutionary army, he carried the marshal's baton in his knapsack, in this case in the bag of his saddle. He has a wonderful strategic instinct. He is brave to the point of folly, to insane audacity. He shares with his cavalry all the cruelest hardships and the most severe dangers. For him, they are ready to let themselves be cut into pieces.

S. M. Budyonny with K. E. Voroshilov

During the Great Patriotic War - a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Directions from July to September 1941. He gave the order to blow up the Dnieper hydroelectric power station during the retreat of the Red Army, which led to extensive flooding, but the Germans did not get the industrial reserves of Zaporozhye.

Marshals of the Soviet Union: M. N. Tukhachevsky, S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, A. I. Egorov, V. K. Blucher. 1935

In September-October he commanded the Reserve Front. It was he who hosted the legendary parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. In April - May 1942, Budyonny served as commander-in-chief of the North Caucasian direction, and from May to August 1942 - commander of the North Caucasian Front. His activities during the war were not successful. In 1942, he was removed from command posts. In January 1943 he received an honorary appointment as commander of the Red Army cavalry and a member of the Supreme Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

Moscow, November 7, 1941 Red Square. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny accepts the parade

After the war, along with the post of commander of the cavalry in 1947-1953. - Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR for horse breeding. Withdrawn from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1952, again becoming a candidate member of the Central Committee. Since 1954 - in honorable retirement in the group of general inspectors of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. Until a very old age, Budyonny rode horseback, loved horses all his life.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny

Already at an advanced age, Budyonny became three times Hero of the Soviet Union (1958, 1963, 1968) for previous merits, published three-volume memoirs "The Path Traveled". Budyonny died in Moscow at the age of 91 on October 26, 1973, the ashes were buried on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

After the Great Terror, official propaganda turned him into one of the winners of the Whites in the Civil War. The name of Budyonny is carried by several settlements and many streets.

Ganin A. V., Ph.D., Institute of Slavic Studies RAS

Frunze Mikhail Vasilievich

Battles and victories

Soviet military-political figure, one of the leading workers of the Red Army during the Civil War and the first half of the 1920s. Frunze acquired the status of the winner of Kolchak, the Ural Cossacks and Wrangel, the conqueror of Turkestan, the liquidator of the Petliurists and the Makhnovists.

Having replaced Trotsky in the military leadership, he was not a member of the Stalinist group, remaining a mysterious and unusual figure at the top of the party.

Mikhail Frunze was born in the city of Pishpek (Bishkek), Semirechensk region, in the family of a Moldavian paramedic who served in Turkestan, and a Voronezh peasant woman. Apparently, he was the bearer of a certain Turkestan worldview, imperial consciousness. Mikhail graduated from the gymnasium in Verny with a gold medal, studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, where he studied economics. The student environment of the capital influenced the formation of Mikhail's political views. Frunze was a romantic and an idealist.

Populist views played a significant role in his convictions, only he saw his going to the people not in moving to the countryside and working there, but in working with the proletariat in the factories.

Frunze's views changed over time. The pre-revolutionary period of Frunze's activity can be called anti-state and anti-social (it is interesting that he combined this with patriotic views, for example, during the Russo-Japanese War). He never graduated from the institute, carried away by the revolutionary struggle. In 1904, at the age of 19, Frunze joined the RSDLP. He took part in the demonstration on January 9, 1905 (Bloody Sunday), and was wounded in the arm. Under the pseudonym "Comrade Arseniy" (there were other underground nicknames - Trifonych, Mikhailov, Vasilenko), Frunze became involved in active anti-government activities. Already in 1905, he worked in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Shuya, which were the centers of the country's textile industry (the third largest industrial region of the Russian Empire after St. Petersburg and Moscow), led the general strike of textile workers and created a combat squad. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the first Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Russia arose. Under the leadership of Frunze, strikes, rallies, seizures of weapons are carried out, leaflets are compiled and published. During this period, Frunze also collaborated with representatives of other political parties. In December 1905, with his militants, Frunze took part in an armed uprising in Moscow on Presnya. In 1906, at the IV Congress of the RSDLP in Stockholm, Frunze (the youngest delegate to the congress) met V. I. Lenin.

Frunze did not shy away from terrorist acts. So, under his leadership, an armed seizure of a printing house in Shuya on January 17, 1907, an armed attack on a police officer was organized. For this, Frunze was twice sentenced to death, but under public pressure (including as a result of the intervention of the famous writer V. G. Korolenko), the sentence was commuted. He ended up in hard labor, later lived in exile in Siberia. In 1916, he fled, moved to European Russia and ended up at the front as a volunteer. However, soon Frunze, on the instructions of his party, got a job in the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, while at the same time doing revolutionary work among the soldiers on the Western Front (including campaigning for fraternization with the Germans). By this time, Frunze among the Bolsheviks already had a reputation as a military man (although he never received a military education), a person associated with underground militant organizations. Frunze loved weapons, tried to carry them with him.

M. V. Frunze in 1907 Vladimir Central

In 1917, Frunze led the Minsk organization of the Bolsheviks, participated in the battles in Moscow, where he ordered to send his detachment. With the coming of the Bolsheviks to power, the nature of Frunze's activities changed radically. If until 1917 he worked for the destruction of the state and the disintegration of the army, now he has become one of the active builders of the Soviet state and its armed forces. At the end of 1917 he was elected to the Constituent Assembly from the Bolsheviks. At the beginning of 1918, Frunze became chairman of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Provincial Committee of the RCP(b), military commissar of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk province. In August 1918, Frunze became the military commissar of the Yaroslavl military district, which included eight provinces. It was necessary to restore the district after the recent uprising in Yaroslavl, it was necessary to form rifle divisions for the Red Army in a short time. Here, Frunze began cooperation with the former General Staff, Major General F. F. Novitsky. Cooperation continued with the transfer of Frunze to the Eastern Front.

According to Novitsky, Frunze had an amazing ability to quickly understand the most complex and new issues for him, to separate the essential from the secondary in them, and then distribute the work among the performers in accordance with the abilities of each. He also knew how to select people, as if by instinct guessing who was capable of what ...

Of course, the former volunteer Frunze did not possess the technical knowledge of the preparation and organization of military operations. However, he appreciated military professionals, former officers, and united around him a whole galaxy of experienced General Staff officers, with whom he tried not to part. Thus, his victories were predetermined by the active and highly professional work of the team of military specialists of the old army, whose work he supervised. Realizing the insufficiency of his military knowledge, Frunze carefully studied military literature and was engaged in self-education. However, according to the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, L. D. Trotsky, Frunze "was carried away by abstract schemes, he had a poor understanding of people and easily fell under the influence of specialists, mostly secondary ones."

M. V. Frunze and V. I. Chapaev near Ufa. Artist Plotnov A. 1942

There is no doubt that Frunze possessed the charisma of a military leader, capable of leading the Red Army masses, great personal courage and determination. It is no coincidence that Frunze liked to be in front of the troops, with a rifle in his hands in battle formations. He was shell-shocked in June 1919 near Ufa. However, first of all, he was a talented organizer and political leader, who knew how to organize the work of headquarters and rear in emergency conditions. On the Eastern Front, under Frunze, local mobilizations were successfully carried out.

From a speech by Frunze in 1919: “Every fool can understand that there, in the camp of our enemies, there can be no national revival of Russia, that it is from that side that there can be no question of the struggle for the well-being of the Russian people. Because it is not because of the beautiful eyes that all these French, the British help Denikin and Kolchak - it is natural that they pursue their own interests. This fact should be clear enough that Russia is not there, that Russia is with us... We are not a weakling like Kerensky. We are fighting to the death. We know that if we are defeated, then hundreds of thousands, millions of the best, staunchest and most energetic in our country will be exterminated, we know that they will not talk to us, they will only hang us, and our whole homeland will be covered in blood. Our country will be enslaved by foreign capital. As for the factories and factories, they have long been sold ... "

Frunze received direct front-line experience only in 1919, when he took the post of commander of the 4th Army of the Eastern Front and commander of the Southern Group of Forces of the Front, which dealt the main blow to the admiral A. V. Kolchak's advancing troops. The strike of the Frunze group on the flank of the Western Army of the Whites in the Buzuluk region brought success and ultimately led to a turning point in the situation at the front and the transfer of initiative from the Whites to the Reds. The whole series of operations of the Reds turned out to be successful - the Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa operations, carried out from the end of April to the second half of June 1919. As a result of these operations, the Kolchakites were thrown back from the Volga region to the Urals, and later ended up in Siberia. Frunze commanded the Turkestan army and the entire Eastern Front. For successes on the Eastern Front he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

M. V. Frunze. Turkestan. 1920

From Frunze's appeal to the Cossacks in 1919: “Has Soviet power collapsed? No, it exists in spite of the enemies of the working people, and its existence is stronger than ever. That this is so, it is enough to consider the following words of the sworn enemy of labor Russia, the British First Minister Lloyd George, which he said the other day in the British Parliament: “Apparently, the hopes for a military defeat of the Bolsheviks are not destined to come true. Our Russian friends have lately suffered a number of sensitive setbacks…”

Who are the Russian friends of Mr. Lloyd George? These are Denikin, Yudenich, Kolchak, who sold to English capital the property of the Russian people - Russian ore, timber, oil and grain, and for this they were awarded the title of "friends".

What happened to Lloyd George's friends that made him lose faith in the military defeat of the Bolsheviks?

The answer to this is provided by the picture of martial law on the fronts of the Soviet Republic… two of the three main enemies of labor Russia: Kolchak and Yudenich have already been removed from the scene… Soviet power, which is the power of the working people, is invincible.”

“A people of many millions can be defeated, but it cannot be crushed ... The eyes of the enslaved all over the world are turned to our impoverished, exhausted country”

From August 1919 to September 1920 he commanded the Turkestan Front. As a native and connoisseur of Turkestan, he was in his place. During this period, under the leadership of Frunze, the blockade of Turkestan was broken (on September 13, at the Mutodzharskaya station south of Aktyubinsk, units of the 1st Army united with the Turkestan formations of the Reds), the region was cleared of the Whites, the South, Separate Ural, Separate Orenburg and Semirechensk armies of the Whites were defeated , the Emirate of Bukhara was liquidated, successes were achieved in the fight against the Basmachi.

M. V. Frunze. Artist Brodsky I. I.

In September 1920, Frunze, who had gained a reputation as a successful party commander, was appointed commander of the Southern Front, whose task was to defeat the Russian army of General P. N. Wrangel in the Crimea. The Perekop-Chongar operation against the Russian army of Wrangel with the passage through the Sivash was developed by a team of staff workers of the Southern Front, which had formed around M.V. Frunze on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. Commander-in-chief S. S. Kamenev and head of the RVSR Field Headquarters P. P. Lebedev were directly involved in the preparation of the operation. As a result of this operation, the Wrangel army was forced to evacuate from the Crimea abroad. The large-scale Civil War in Russia ended there.

As a result of the Civil War, Frunze acquired the status of the winner of Kolchak, the Ural Cossacks and Wrangel, the conqueror of Turkestan, the liquidator of the Petliurists and Makhnovists. This was the status of a real party military nugget. In fact, of the three main enemies of Soviet power, Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel, Frunze was considered the winner of two.

MV Frunze takes the parade of troops on Red Square. 1925

In the early 1920s Frunze headed the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea. His main attention was focused on the elimination of banditry in Ukraine, which he brilliantly coped with, earning the second Order of the Red Banner. In the summer of 1921, Frunze was wounded in a skirmish with the Makhnovists. As a contemporary noted, “from the Central Committee of the CPB (u) for this risk, comrade. Frunze received a nadir, and from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic - the second Order of the Red Banner. In 1921–1922 Frunze went on a military-diplomatic mission to Turkey, where he brought financial assistance to Mustafa Kemal.

Frunze was not a cruel person. During the Civil War, orders were issued for the humane treatment of prisoners under his signature, which, for example, caused dissatisfaction with the party leader V. I. Lenin. As a decent man, he was a bad politician. It is no coincidence that V. M. Molotov subsequently noted that Frunze was not completely his own for the Bolsheviks. Possessing a special sense of responsibility, he was more of a talented executor of orders from above than a leader.

During the period of the struggle between the Stalinist group and L. D. Trotsky in 1924, Frunze took up the posts of Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, and Head of the Military Academy of the Red Army. In 1925, he became chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Contrary to subsequent myths, Frunze, in leadership positions in the Red Army, continued Trotsky's course towards reforming the army. The reform consisted in an attempt to create a cadre army, organize a territorial system of troops, improve the quality of command staff and improve combat training, remove unreliable elements, reduce the central apparatus, reorganize supplies, introduce new military equipment, and strengthen unity of command. The military reform was not very well thought-out and largely proceeded under the influence of the political struggle in the party.

From an article by Frunze in 1925: “The lack of modern military equipment is the weakest point of our defense ... We must become independent from abroad, not only in mass-industrial activity, but also in constructive and inventive work”

Frunze compiled a number of military-theoretical works, including the development of the military doctrine of the Red Army.

Monument to M. V. Frunze in Ivanovo

Having replaced Trotsky's henchmen, and later the leader of the Red Army himself in the military leadership, Frunze, nevertheless, was not a member of the Stalinist group. He remained independent and had a certain authority in the troops, which, of course, could not suit the party elite. It is doubtful that Frunze had any Bonapartist intentions. However, for those around him, he remained a mysterious and unusual figure at the top of the party.

The untimely death of 40-year-old Frunze on the operating table of the Soldatenkovskaya (Botkinskaya) hospital still remains largely mysterious. Versions that he was killed during a surgical operation on the orders of I.V. Stalin have been widespread since the mid-1920s. Frunze was buried at the Kremlin wall. Frunze's son Timur became a fighter pilot, died in action in 1942, and was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Academy them. Frunze. Moscow

After his death, the figure of M. V. Frunze was mythologized and idealized. His merit was to promote the official ideology, since he was dead, and during his lifetime he had little connection with Trotsky. In fact, the figure of Frunze as the leader of the Red Army was replaced by the figure of the true leader of the army during the Civil War and the early 1920s. - Leon Trotsky. A posthumous cult of Frunze developed in the USSR, his name was immortalized in the names of numerous settlements, districts, streets and squares, metro stations, in the names of geographical objects (Frunze Peak in the Pamirs, Cape Frunze on the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago), in the names of various enterprises and organizations , in many monuments, in books, philately and cinema.

Ganin A. V., Ph.D., Institute of Slavic Studies RAS

Chapaev Vasily Ivanovich

Battles and victories

The legendary figure of the Civil War in Russia, the people's commander, self-taught, advanced to high command posts due to his own abilities in the absence of a special military education.

Chapaev can hardly be attributed to the generals of the traditional warehouse. It is rather a partisan leader, a kind of "red chieftain".

Chapaev was born in the village of Budaika, Cheboksary district, Kazan province, into a peasant family. Chapaev's grandfather was a serf. The father worked as a carpenter to feed nine children. Vasily's childhood years were spent in the city of Balakovo, Samara province. Due to the difficult financial situation of the family, Chapaev graduated from only two classes of the parochial school. Chapaev worked from the age of 12 for a merchant, then as a floor clerk in a tea shop, as an assistant organ grinder, and helped his father in carpentry. After serving military service, Chapaev returned home. By this time, he managed to get married, and by the beginning of the First World War he was already the father of a family - three children. During the war, Chapaev rose to the rank of sergeant major, participated in the famous Brusilov breakthrough, was wounded and shell-shocked several times, his military work and personal courage were awarded with three St. George's crosses and the St. George medal.

Chapaev. World War I

Chapaev was wounded and sent to the rear of Saratov, whose garrison was subjected to revolutionary decay in 1917. Chapaev also took part in the soldiers' unrest, who initially, according to the testimony of his comrade-in-arms I.S. member of the regimental committee. Finally, on September 28, 1917, Chapaev joined the Bolshevik Party. Already in October 1917, he became the military leader of the Nikolaev Red Guard detachment.

Chapaev turned out to be one of the military professionals on whom the Bolsheviks of the Nikolaevsky district of the Samara province relied in the fight against the performances of peasants and Cossacks. He took up the post of county military commissar. At the beginning of 1918, Chapaev formed and led the 1st and 2nd Nikolaev regiments, which became part of the Red Army of the Saratov Soviet. In June, both regiments were consolidated into the Nikolaev brigade, which was headed by Chapaev.

In battles with the Cossacks and the Czech interventionists, Chapaev showed himself to be a firm leader and an excellent tactician, skillfully assessing the situation and offering the best solution, as well as a personally brave commander who enjoyed the authority and love of the fighters. During this period, Chapaev repeatedly personally led troops into the attack. Since the autumn of 1918, Chapaev commanded the Nikolaev division, which, due to its small number, was sometimes called Chapaev's detachment.

According to the temporary commander of the 4th Soviet Army of the former General Staff, Major General A. A. Baltiysky, Chapaev’s “lack of general military education affects the technique of command and control and the lack of breadth to cover military affairs. Full of initiative, but uses it unbalanced due to lack of military education. However, Comrade Chapaev clearly indicates all the data, on the basis of which, with an appropriate military education, both technology and a reasonable military scope will undoubtedly appear. The desire to get a military education in order to get out of the state of "military darkness", and then again join the ranks of the military front. You can be sure that the natural talents of Comrade Chapaev, combined with military education, will give bright results.

In November 1918, Chapaev was sent to the newly created Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army in Moscow to improve his education.

The following passage will say a lot about his academic success: “I have not read about Hannibal before, but I see that he was an experienced commander. But I do not agree with his actions in many ways. He made many unnecessary reorganizations in front of the enemy and thereby revealed his plan to him, hesitated in his actions and did not show perseverance for the final defeat of the enemy. I had a case similar to the situation during the Battle of Cannes. It was in August, on the river N. We let up to two regiments of whites with artillery across the bridge to our bank, gave them the opportunity to stretch along the road, and then opened heavy artillery fire on the bridge and attacked from all sides. The stunned enemy did not have time to come to his senses, as he was surrounded and almost completely destroyed. The remnants of it rushed to the destroyed bridge and were forced to rush into the river, where most of them drowned. 6 guns, 40 machine guns and 600 prisoners fell into our hands. We achieved these successes thanks to the swiftness and surprise of our attack.

Military science turned out to be too much for the people's leader, after studying for several weeks, Chapaev arbitrarily left the academy and returned to the front to do what he knew and could do.

“Studying at the academy is a good and very important thing, but it’s a shame and a pity that the White Guards are beaten up without us”

S. P. Zakharov - head of the Nikolaev division and brigade commander of this division V. I. Chapaev. September 1918

Subsequently, Chapaev commanded the Alexander-Gai group, which fought against the Ural Cossacks.

Opponents cost each other - Chapaev was opposed by Cossack cavalry formations of a partisan character.

At the end of March 1919, Chapaev, by order of the commander of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front of the RSFSR, M.V. Frunze, was appointed head of the 25th Infantry Division. The division acted against the main forces of the Whites, participated in repelling the spring offensive of the armies of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, participated in the Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa operations, which predetermined the failure of the Kolchak offensive. In these operations, Chapaev's division acted on enemy communications and carried out detours. Maneuvering tactics became the hallmark of Chapaev and his division. Even whites singled out Chapaev and noted his organizational skills.

A major success was the crossing of the Belaya River, which led to the capture of Ufa on June 9, 1919 and the further withdrawal of the Whites. Then Chapaev, who was on the front line, was wounded in the head, but remained in the ranks. For military distinctions he was awarded the highest award of Soviet Russia - the Order of the Red Banner, and his division was awarded the honorary revolutionary Red Banners.

Chapaev stood out as an independent commander from the non-commissioned officers of the old army. This environment gave the Red Army many talented military leaders, including such as S. M. Budyonny and G. K. Zhukov. Chapaev loved his fighters, and they paid him the same. His division was considered one of the best on the Eastern Front. In many ways, he was precisely the leader of the people, who fought with guerrilla methods, but at the same time possessed a real military flair, great energy and initiative that infected those around him. A commander who aspired to constantly learn in practice, directly in the course of battles, a simple and cunning person at the same time. Chapaev knew perfectly well the area of ​​operations, located on the right flank of the Eastern Front, which was remote from the center. By the way, the fact that Chapaev fought in approximately the same area throughout his activities is a weighty argument in favor of the partisan nature of his activities.

Chapaev - Furmanov. Ufa, June 1919: “Comrade Furman. Please pay attention to my note to you, I am very upset by your leaving so much that you took my expression personally, which I inform you that you have not yet managed to bring me any harm, and if I am so frank and a little hot , not at all embarrassed by your presence, and I say everything that I can think of against some personalities, to which you are offended, but so that there are no personal scores between us, I am forced to write a report on removing me from my position than to be in disagreement with my closest employee about which I inform you as a friend. Chapaev.

At the same time, Chapaev managed to fit into the structure of the Red Army and was fully used by the Bolsheviks in their interests. He was an excellent divisional commander, although not everyone in his division was doing well, especially in terms of discipline. Suffice it to say that as of June 28, 1919, “boundless drunkenness, outrages with strangers flourished in the 2nd brigade of the division - this shows not at all a commander, but a hooligan.” The commanders clashed with the commissars, there were even cases of beatings. The relationship between Chapaev and the commissar of his division D. A. Furmanov, who met in March 1919, was difficult. They were friends, but sometimes quarreled because of the explosive nature of the division commander.

Chapaev. September 1918. Frame from the chronicle

After the Ufa operation, the Chapaev division was again transferred to the front against the Ural Cossacks. It was necessary to act in the steppe area, far from communications (which made it difficult to supply the division with ammunition), in conditions of heat with the superiority of the Cossacks in the cavalry. This situation constantly threatened the flanks and rear. The struggle here was accompanied by mutual bitterness, atrocities against the prisoners, uncompromising confrontation. As a result of the horse raid of the Cossacks into the Soviet rear, the headquarters of the Chapaev division in Lbischensk, located at a distance from the main forces, was surrounded and destroyed. On September 5, 1919, Chapaev died: according to some sources, while swimming across the Urals, according to others, he died of wounds during a shootout. The death of Chapaev, which occurred as a result of carelessness, was a direct consequence of his impulsive and reckless character, expressing the unbridled folk element.

Chapaev's division later participated in the defeat of the Ural separate army, which led to the destruction of this army of the Ural Cossacks and the death of thousands of officers and privates during the retreat through the desert regions of the Eastern Caspian Sea. These events fully characterize the cruel fratricidal essence of the Civil War, in which there could be no heroes.

Chapaev lived a short (he died at 32), but a bright life. Now it is quite difficult to imagine what he really was - too many myths and exaggerations surround the image of the legendary commander. For example, according to one version, in the spring of 1919, the Reds did not surrender Samara to the enemy only because of the firm position of Chapaev and Frunze and contrary to the opinion of military experts. But, apparently, this version has nothing to do with reality. Another later legend is that L. D. Trotsky fought in every possible way against Chapaev. Unfortunately, even today such propaganda legends have their short-sighted supporters. In fact, on the contrary, it was Trotsky who awarded Chapaev with a gold watch, distinguishing him from other commanders. Of course, Chapaev can hardly be attributed to the generals of the traditional warehouse. It is rather a partisan leader, a kind of "red chieftain".

Appeal to the enemy: “I am Chapaev! Drop your weapon!"

Some legends were no longer created by official ideology, but by popular consciousness. For example, that Chapaev is the Antichrist. The demonization of the image was a characteristic reaction of the people to the outstanding qualities of this or that figure. It is known that the Cossack atamans were demonized in this way. Chapaev, over time, entered folklore in its more modern form - as the hero of many popular jokes. However, the list of Chapaev's legends is not exhausted by this. What is the widely spread version that Chapaev fought against the famous General V. O. Kappel. In reality, most likely, they did not fight directly against each other. However, in the popular understanding of such a hero as Chapaev, only an opponent equal in strength to him, as Kappel was considered, could defeat him.

Vasily Ivanovich Chapaev was not lucky with an objective biography. After the publication of the book by D. A. Furmanov in 1923, and especially after the release in 1934 of the famous film by S. D. and G. N. Vasiliev, Chapaev, who was a far from the foreground figure, was once and for all enrolled in a cohort of selected heroes of the Civil War. This group included politically safe (mostly deceased) Red military leaders (M. V. Frunze, N. A. Shchors, G. I. Kotovsky and others). The activities of such mythologized heroes were covered only in a positive light. However, in the case of Chapaev, not only official myths, but also fiction, firmly overshadowed the real historical figure. This situation was reinforced by the fact that many former Chapaevites held high positions in the Soviet military-administrative hierarchy for a long time. From the ranks of the division came at least one and a half dozen generals alone (for example, A. V. Belyakov, M. F. Bukshtynovich, S. F. Danilchenko, I. I. Karpezo, V. A. Kindyukhin, M. S. Knyazev, S. A. Kovpak, V. N. Kurdyumov, A. A. Luchinsky, N. M. Mishchenko, I. V. Panfilov, S. I. Petrenko-Petrikovsky, I. E. Petrov, N. M. Khlebnikov) . The Chapaevs, along with the cavalry, formed a kind of veteran community in the ranks of the Red Army, kept in touch and helped each other.

Turning to the fate of other national leaders of the Civil War, such as B. M. Dumenko, F. K. Mironov, N. A. Shchors, it is difficult to imagine Chapaev living to the end of the war. The Bolsheviks needed such people only during the period of the struggle with the enemy, after which they became not only inconvenient, but also dangerous. Those of them who did not die because of their own recklessness were soon eliminated.

Ganin A. V., Ph.D., Institute of Slavic Studies RAS

Blucher Vasily Konstantinovich

Battles and victories

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Soviet military and political figure, one of the prominent Soviet military leaders of the Civil War and the interwar period, for a long time led the Soviet armed forces in the Far East. The first holder of the orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star.

A number of successful operations made Blucher a legend in the Red Army, and in the Far East he embodied Soviet power itself. G.K. Zhukov admitted that he always wanted to be like this commander, and the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek said that one Blucher is equal to a hundred thousandth army.

Blucher was born into a peasant family in the village of Barshchinka, Rybinsk district, Yaroslavl province. During the Crimean War, his family received an unusual surname from a landowner in honor of the Prussian Field Marshal G. L. von Blucher. Vasily Blucher studied at the Serednevskaya parochial school.

He has been working since childhood. Already in the summer of 1904, his father took him to St. Petersburg, where Vasily began to serve as a boy at the shop of the merchant Klochkov, then as a worker at the Byrd factory.

It was in the capital of the young Vasily Blucher that the first Russian revolution found him, which could not but affect the formation of his political views.

In 1906 Blucher returned to his native village and continued his studies.

In the autumn of 1909, in Moscow, Blucher got a job in a locksmith's shop, later at a car-building plant in Mytishchi, took part in the riots, as a result of which he ended up in prison for three years. After his release, Blucher worked as a plumber in the workshops of the Kazan Railway until he was mobilized.

Junior non-commissioned officer V. K. Blucher

Blucher participated in the First World War. As a militia soldier, he was enrolled in the 56th Kremlin Reserve Battalion, and from November 1914 he served at the front as a private in the 19th Kostroma Infantry Regiment. During the war years, he rose to the rank of junior non-commissioned officer, and distinguished himself as a brave and skillful fighter, was awarded the St. George medal of the 4th degree. In March 1916, due to being wounded, Blucher was dismissed from the army. He worked at the Sormovsky shipbuilding plant near Nizhny Novgorod and in Kazan at the Osterman mechanical plant. In June 1916, he joined the Bolsheviks, and in May 1917, on the instructions of the party leadership, he rejoined the army, falling into the 102nd reserve regiment, where he became a deputy chairman of the regimental committee. In November 1917, Blucher became a member of the Samara Military Revolutionary Committee, participated in the establishment of Soviet power in the Samara province.

Blucher was one of the founders and organizers of the Red Army. From the end of 1917, as a commissar of one of the Red Guard detachments, he participated in the fight against the Orenburg Cossacks of Ataman A.I. Dutov, who opposed the Reds. Blucher was mainly based in Chelyabinsk, where until the spring of 1918 he conducted organizational work on the creation of new local authorities. In March 1918, he was even elected chairman of the Chelyabinsk Council of Deputies, and became chief of staff of the Red Guard.

The struggle against the Orenburg Cossacks developed with varying degrees of success. Ataman A. I. Dutov with a small number of associates at the beginning of 1918 was driven into the Ural outback and actually surrounded. However, his troops managed to break through and leave for the Turgai steppes. In the meantime, in the spring of 1918, a large-scale uprising of the Cossacks began, as a result of which the Bolsheviks were forced to send punitive expeditions to the villages. Blucher also participated in these expeditions, and he gained fame as a leader of decisive measures. At the same time, Blucher personally met with representatives of the Cossacks and negotiated with them. In May 1918, at the head of the 1,500-strong Consolidated Ural Detachment, Blucher was sent near Orenburg. The large-scale growth of the Cossack uprisings was facilitated by an armed uprising against the Bolsheviks at the end of May 1918 by the Czechoslovak Corps.

Engineering equipment of the Kakhovka bridgehead in August - October 1920

Blucher became widely known already in 1918, when he led an amazing 1,500-kilometer campaign along the white rear. After Orenburg was blocked as a result of the uprising of the Orenburg Cossacks, the leaders of the Red Guard detachments located in the city, at the end of June 1918, decided to break through to their own. Part of the troops withdrew to Turkestan, and the detachments of Blucher and the Red Cossacks - N. D. Tomin and the brothers I. D. and N. D. Kashirin moved north, hoping to find support in their native villages. However, for the most part, the villagers were anti-Bolshevik, they failed to gain a foothold in the Cossack territory, as a result, it was necessary to break through further. The movement passed through the Ural factories. During the campaign, the disparate detachments were united under the leadership of Blucher, and on August 2 he was elected commander-in-chief of the Consolidated detachment of the South Ural partisans (over 10,500 people). The campaign revealed the great military-administrative abilities of Blucher, the ability to maneuver. Periodically, Blucher's troops clashed with the heterogeneous forces of the Whites, but there was no continuous front line. The formations of Blucher and his associates not only passed through the entire Urals, but by September 12 they were able to join the main forces of Soviet Russia (parts of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front), which was facilitated by both the discontinuous front line of the Civil War and the low density of troops. For this campaign, Blucher on September 28, 1918, by order of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, becoming his first cavalier in Soviet Russia.

On September 20, 1918, Blucher headed the 4th Ural Division of the Red Army (since November - the 30th Infantry Division). From the end of January 1919, he was assistant commander of the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front of the RSFSR, and then formed and led the 51st Rifle Division, which later became legendary. Together with the division, Blucher participated in the offensive across the Urals to the territory of Siberia and in the defeat of the Kolchak troops. The division took Tobolsk, and it also participated in the capture of Omsk, the capital of White Siberia.

V. Blucher and I. Stalin. March 1926

In August 1920, Blucher's division was transferred to the South of Russia, where it took part in the fight against the troops of the Russian army, General P. N. Wrangel. The Blucherites defended the Kakhovka bridgehead, where the Whites used English tanks en masse. Blucher's division in October 1920 was significantly strengthened by the shock and fire brigade, and became the strike force of the front. Later, the division reached Perekop and participated in the assault on the Turkish Wall and its capture on November 9, 1920 (according to the participants in the events from the White side, they left Perekop before the assault), on November 11, the Yushun positions of the Whites were taken. On November 15, units of the division entered Sevastopol and Yalta. For these successes, Blucher was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. Blucher's division, which suffered heavy losses in battle, received the honorary name of Perekopskaya.

Due to the fact that the Civil War was still going on in the Far East, Blucher was sent to this region. There he took the key post of Minister of War of the buffer Far Eastern Republic, created specifically to ensure that parts of the Red Army avoided clashes with the Japanese invaders in the Far East. Under the leadership of Blucher as commander-in-chief, the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic was created, which by the end of 1922 liberated the Far East from whites and interventionists (Blucher was recalled from the Far East in July 1922). The most famous battles of this army were the battles under the Volochaevka station near Khabarovsk on February 10–12, 1922 (assaulting the June-Koran height fortified by the whites) and near Spassk in October 1922. At the request of Blucher, his old ally was sent to the Far East from 1918 N. D. Tomin.

“In my letter, sent to you before the battle near Volochaevka, I pointed out to you the behind-the-scenes diplomatic work of the interventionists, which is now going on behind your back, and the uselessness of your resistance. Now, by fighting near Volochaevka and Kazakevichevo, the People's Revolutionary Army has proved to you the folly of further struggle against the will of the people.

Draw an honest conclusion from this and submit to the will of the working Russian people without further stubborn play with human heads who entrusted you with their fate ... I would like to know how many victims, how many Russian corpses are still needed to convince you of the futility and fruitlessness of your last attempts to fight with the strength of the revolutionary Russian people, who are building their new statehood on the ashes of economic ruin? How many Russian martyrs are you ordered to throw at the foot of Japanese and other foreign capital? ..

Do you now understand the stubbornness with which our staunch revolutionary regiments fight under the Red Banner for their great new Red Russia? We will win, because we are fighting for progressive beginnings in history, for a new statehood in the world, for the right of the Russian people to build their lives in the way that their forces, awakened from centuries of stupor, prompt them ...

The only way out for you, and an honorable way out, in your current position, is to lay down your fratricidal weapons and end the last outbreak of the civil war with an honest soldier's confession of his delusion and refusal to further serve foreign headquarters "

From a letter to the White General V. M. Molchanov February 23, 1922

From the end of the Civil War, Blucher, despite the lack of a military education and a very weak general education, became part of the military elite of Soviet Russia. On the fronts of the World War and the Civil War, Blucher received eighteen wounds.

In 1922, Blucher was appointed commander of the 1st Rifle Corps, and later headed the Petrograd fortified area. In 1924, he was seconded to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR for especially important assignments.

In 1924–1927 By decision of the leadership of the USSR (in connection with the request of the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen), Blucher, instead of the tragically deceased commander P. A. Pavlov, was sent to serve in China as the chief military adviser in the south of the country. Blucher worked in the interests of the Cantonese government under the pseudonym Galin. During this period, Blucher was subordinate to a group of military-political advisers (their number reached about a hundred people by mid-1927), who oversaw the issues of reforming the army and creating a new type of armed forces in China - the Kuomintang party army. In accordance with the plans of Blucher in 1926-1927. The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army was carried out, the purpose of which was to be the national unification and liberation of China. Blucher won the popularity and respect of the Chinese authorities. Subsequently, the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, who knew Blucher, said that Blucher's arrival in China during the struggle against Japan in the second half of the 1930s. "would be equal to sending a hundred thousandth army." For his work in China, Blucher was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and received a gold cigarette case with diamonds from the Comintern.

According to Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, who met Blucher for the first time in the mid-1920s, “I was fascinated by the sincerity of this man. A fearless fighter against the enemies of the Soviet Republic, the legendary hero V.K. Blucher was an ideal for many. Frankly, I always dreamed of being like this wonderful Bolshevik, wonderful comrade and talented commander.

The defeat of the Chinese militarists in 1929

Blucher commanded the Special Far Eastern Army from 1929, and in the same year he led the fight against Chinese militarists during the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. In December 1929, a Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed to eliminate the conflict on the CER. In 1930 Blucher became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. He was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1934. He was a kind of symbol of the Bolshevik power in the Far East, and his sphere of influence extended both to military and economic issues, up to participation in collective farm construction, supply of cities and mines. Blucher was a real legend of the Red Army. In the 1930s the parents of conscripts sent him thousands of letters asking him to accept their children to serve in the Far Eastern Army.

“The Special Far Eastern Army won its victories due to the fact that it is strong with the support of the working class, strong with the alliance of the working class with the peasantry, strong with the wise leadership of the party.

Comrade People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, I was just one of the particles of this glorious army forging the victory of the working class.

I was not embarrassed in battles and did not get lost. Today I am confused and therefore I can respond to the high award I received with the answer that a fighter, a proletarian, a member of the party can answer.

I will honestly serve the Party, the proletariat, and the socialist revolution to the best of my ability and skill. I assure you, People's Commissar, and ask you to convey to the Central Committee of the Party and the government that I will continue to be an honest fighter of the Party and the working class. And if the party and the working class demand my life for the cause of socialist construction, I will give my life without hesitation, fear, without a moment's hesitation.

From the speech of V. K. Blyukher at the solemn plenum of the Khabarovsk City Council when he was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Star on August 6, 1931

Blucher in 1930

Blucher was the first holder of not only the Order of the Red Banner, but also the Order of the Red Star. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, five Orders of the Red Banner. In 1935, Blucher was awarded the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Similar titles were given to the people's commissar of defense and his deputies.

Blucher was interested in the development of military thought, took care of raising the horizons of the command staff, and even prepared some military scientific works himself. Despite the severity of the 1930s, Blucher, through the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, subscribed to foreign journals and studied them.

Blucher also led the military operations against the Japanese on Lake Khasan in July - August 1938, the Japanese attack was then repelled, the inviolability of the Soviet border was protected. After these events, Blucher was summoned to Moscow and never returned to the Far East.

Blucher actively participated in organizing political repressions against the commanding staff in the Far East. In the end, he himself fell victim to them. He was arrested on October 22, 1938. During the investigation, the famous military leader was beaten and tortured, in which L.P. Beria, First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, personally participated.

During the investigation, Marshal Blucher was killed in the inner prison of the NKVD (according to other sources, in the Lefortovo prison). Rehabilitated posthumously on March 12, 1956.

Ganin A. V., Ph.D., Institute of Slavic Studies RAS

Tukhachevsky Mikhail Nikolaevich

Battles and victories

Soviet military leader, military politician, marshal of the Soviet Union (1935).

Tukhachevsky perfectly understood the nature of the Civil War and learned to achieve success in its conditions by imposing his will on the enemy and active offensive operations.

Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky was born in the Alexandrovskoye estate of the Dorogobuzh district of the Smolensk province into a noble family. The commander spent his childhood in the Penza province, on the estate of his grandmother Sofya Valentinovna, located near the village of Vrazhskoye, Chembarsky district. Since childhood, Misha was fond of playing the violin, astronomy, invention and design, and was engaged in Russian and French wrestling. Tukhachevsky studied at the 1st Penza Gymnasium, later at the 10th Moscow Gymnasium and at the 1st Moscow Empress Catherine and the Cadet Corps, graduating in 1912. For excellent studies, Tukhachevsky's name was entered on the marble plaque of the corps. In the same year he entered the Alexander Military School. After graduating from it in 1914, he was promoted to second lieutenant of the guard with access to the Semyonovsky regiment of the Life Guards. Other representatives of the Tukhachevsky family previously served in this regiment.

Literally a week after the promotion of Tukhachevsky to officers, the First World War began. The Semyonovsky regiment was sent to East Prussia, and then reassigned to Warsaw. In battles, Tukhachevsky proved himself to be a brave officer. On February 19, 1915, near Warsaw, Tukhachevsky, who led the battle after the death of his commander, was captured. In captivity, he was held together with the future French President Charles de Gaulle. The young guards officer, longing for exploits and glory, was forced to remain inactive for several years. During the period of captivity, Tukhachevsky made five attempts to escape. Only the last one was successful. In September 1917, he made his way to Switzerland, from where he got to France and, with the assistance of the Russian military agent in France, Count A. A. Ignatiev, returned to Russia through Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Tukhachevsky arrived in the reserve battalion of the Semyonovsky regiment, stationed in Petrograd, where he was elected company commander, and then demobilized and left for an estate near Penza.

In the spring of 1918, Tukhachevsky arrived in Moscow, where he decided to link his future fate with the Red Army. Having missed, in fact, the entire world war, he could not boast of any awards or ranks that were awarded to the surviving fellow soldiers. With the painful ambition, arrogance, posturing of Tukhachevsky noted by his contemporaries, his desire to “play a role”, to imitate Napoleon, undoubted careerism, this turned out to be a significant factor that influenced the further choice. Perhaps, seeing no prospects for White for himself, Tukhachevsky made a bet on the Reds - and did not lose. Fate elevated him, potentially hostile to the new government, a nobleman, a former monarchist, an officer in an elite guards regiment, to the top of the Soviet military-political Olympus for almost two decades. During the years of the Civil War, Tukhachevsky was often driven by the desire to show his superiority to the old generals who led the White armies.

Already on April 5, 1918, he joined the Bolshevik Party. Apparently, his career aspirations had an effect, because neither at that time, nor ten or twenty years later, joining the party was not yet mandatory even for representatives of the highest command staff (it became such only after the Great Patriotic War). And in the future, Tukhachevsky, to the point and out of place, demonstrated his devotion to the party ideals. Former officers who joined the Bolshevik Party were so rare that Tukhachevsky was immediately offered the post of representative of the military department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and a job in the Kremlin. It was necessary to inspect local military establishments, which gave Tukhachevsky an idea of ​​the nascent Red Army.

Soon, on May 27, a new responsible appointment followed - the military commissar of the Moscow Defense District, and on June 19 Tukhachevsky went to the Eastern Front at the disposal of the front commander M.A. Muravyov to organize Red Army units into higher formations and lead them. On June 27, he accepted this post of commander of the 1st Army, operating on the Middle Volga. During Muravyov's speech against the Reds that took place soon after, Tukhachevsky was arrested by a rebel in Simbirsk and narrowly escaped execution as a Bolshevik. After Muravyov was killed on July 11, Tukhachevsky temporarily, until the arrival of I. I. Vatsetis, commanded the front.

It fell to the lot of Tukhachevsky and his associates not only to create and strengthen the army, but also to reorganize it from disparate partisan formations into a regular association. Tukhachevsky, who had no military administrative experience, relied on a highly qualified cadre of old officers with a higher military education. In the selection of personnel, he proved himself as a talented organizer. At the same time, he liked to be in battle formations, as if making up for what he was almost deprived of in the world war.

On September 12, Tukhachevsky's troops took Simbirsk, the hometown of the Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin. In this regard, Tukhachevsky did not fail to send a congratulatory telegram to the wounded after the assassination attempt, Lenin, stating that the capture of the city is the answer for one of Lenin's wounds, and the second wound will be answered by the capture of Samara. In the future, victories followed one after another. Tukhachevsky took Syzran, the whites retreated to the east.

In connection with the growing tension in the South, Tukhachevsky was appointed assistant commander of the Southern Front, and at the front he led the 8th Army, which operated near Voronezh against the Don Army. Interestingly, in the spring of 1919, Tukhachevsky advocated offensive operations of the Reds not through the Don region, but through the Donbass to Rostov. As a result of a conflict with the front commander V. M. Gittis, Tukhachevsky asked for a transfer to another front.

He again found himself on the Eastern Front, now as commander of the 5th Army, which was operating in the direction of the main attack of the Whites. Tukhachevsky successfully proved himself in the defeat of the whites during the Buguruslan, Bugulma, Menzelinsky, Birsk, Zlatoust, Chelyabinsk, Omsk operations. As a result of a series of victories, the whites from the Volga region were driven back to Siberia. For the liberation of the Volga region and the Urals and successes in the Chelyabinsk operation, Tukhachevsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and at the end of 1919, following the results of the campaign, he was awarded an honorary golden weapon. The 27-year-old former lieutenant defeated the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak.

From a lecture by M. N. Tukhachevsky in 1919: “We all see that our Russian generals failed to know the Civil War, failed to master its forms. Only a very few generals of the White Guard, capable and imbued with class bourgeois self-consciousness, proved to be at the height of their cause. The majority, however, arrogantly declared that our Civil War was not quite a war, just some kind of small war or commissar guerrilla warfare. However, despite such ominous statements, we see before us not a small war, but a large planned war, almost millions of armies, imbued with a single idea and performing brilliant maneuvers. And in the ranks of this army, among its devoted commanders, born of the Civil War, a certain doctrine of this war begins to take shape, and along with it, its theoretical justification ... "

Tukhachevsky's army had a powerful political composition - the largest number of communists were gathered here in comparison with other armies of the front. On the Eastern Front, Tukhachevsky collaborated with another nugget in the highest positions of the Red Army - M.V. Frunze. At the same time, already at that time, the obstinate character of the ambitious military leader manifested itself. Tukhachevsky, for example, came into conflict with the former General A. A. Samoilo, who commanded the front for a short time. As a result of Tukhachevsky's alliance with members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front, who did not accept Samoilo (instead of the former commander S. S. Kamenev), the latter was recalled.

The first five marshals: Tukhachevsky, Voroshilov, Egorov (sitting), Budyonny and Blucher (standing)

After the defeat of Kolchak, Tukhachevsky at the beginning of 1920 was again sent to the South, where he headed the Caucasian Front. His tasks included completing the defeat of the white armies of the South of Russia under the command of General A. I. Denikin. After the liquidation of the resistance of the whites in the Caucasus, Tukhachevsky issued an order to the 11th army, which was part of the front, to occupy Azerbaijan, which was done. However, at that time Tukhachevsky was sent to save Soviet Russia to a new sector - to the Western Front, where the struggle against the Poles was becoming more and more intense.

“We will shake Russia like a dirty carpet, and then we will shake the whole world ... We will enter chaos and exit it only by completely destroying civilization”

Tukhachevsky was appointed to the post of commander of this front on April 28. By this time he had gained a reputation as one of the best Bolshevik commanders. On the front entrusted to Tukhachevsky, the strongest specialists of the General Staff and experienced command staff in the republic were concentrated. The impetuous offensive undertaken by Tukhachevsky brought the Red Army from the Berezina to the Vistula in a month. In the first half of August 1920, parts of Tukhachevsky were actually under the walls of Warsaw, but there were not enough forces to take the Polish capital.

Tukhachevsky's military style was characterized by deep ramming with the rapid introduction of reserves into battle (later Tukhachevsky acted as the developer of the theory of deep combat), which led to the exhaustion of the troops and all sorts of surprises that there was nothing to fend off. This approach has been developed into the concept of sequential operations, in which the enemy's forces are successively depleted in successive battles.

In practice, Tukhachevsky implemented this concept in the fight against Kolchak's troops.

“Consistently conducted operations will constitute, as it were, dismemberments of the same operation, but dispersed, due to the retreat of the enemy over a large area ... heroism. On the contrary, the retreating, even if discipline is maintained, the combat capability is constantly decreasing.

M. N. Tukhachevsky. Top command issues. M., 1924

Soviet military commanders of the Red Army - delegates of the XVII Party Congress. 1934

Repeatedly taken by Tukhachevsky (both against the Whites and against the Poles), but attempts to encircle the enemy were not crowned with success. Contemporaries noted not only the deep mind of the young Soviet commander, but also his penchant for adventurous enterprises. In general, Tukhachevsky perfectly understood the nature of the Civil War and learned how to achieve success in its conditions by imposing his will on the enemy and active offensive operations. In this regard, his adventurism sometimes had a beneficial effect on the results of operations. At the same time, Tukhachevsky always relied on highly qualified staff teams. The question of the military leadership abilities of Tukhachevsky himself remains open. It is also unknown how he could prove himself as a commander in a big war, which was radically different from the Civil War.

At the celebration of the 18th anniversary of the revolution

The end of the Civil War was marked for Tukhachevsky by the leadership of the liquidation of the Kronstadt uprising and the suppression of the uprising of the Tambov peasants (at the same time, suffocating gases were used to a limited extent, but not in the form of large-scale gas balloon attacks that destroy all living things, as it seems from the experience of the First World War, but in the form of shelling with chemical projectiles, widely used in the Civil War by both Reds and Whites).

"I am convinced that with good management, good staffs and good political forces, we will be able to create a large army capable of great feats"

During the Civil War and especially after it, Tukhachevsky began to actively speak in the military-scientific field. One after another, his books “The War of Classes”, “Maneuver and Artillery” are published. And here he worked closely with the leading military-scientific personnel of the country. So, his closest collaborator was the famous military scientist V. K. Triandafillov. Tukhachevsky's in-depth acquaintance with the military scientific world is associated with the period of his leadership of the Military Academy of the Red Army.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevsky M.N.

In 1922–1924 Tukhachevsky commanded the Western Front, and his intervention in the political life of the country was extremely feared by the party elite, bogged down in internal squabbles and struggles. Tukhachevsky really had political ambitions. Behind him secret surveillance was conducted, compromising material was collected.

As a result, in the most tense period of confrontation between the supporters of I. V. Stalin and L. D. Trotsky, Tukhachevsky turned out to be completely passive.

In 1924, he became an assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, and in 1925-1928. - Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Despite being busy, Tukhachevsky also found time for military pedagogical work, lecturing to students of the academy. In May 1928 he was commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

In 1931, Tukhachevsky became Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov. At the initiative of Tukhachevsky, new equipment was introduced in the army. The troops were rearmed and re-equipped with aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Tukhachevsky was supported by such innovative developments for that time as airborne assaults, radar, jet weapons, rocket technology, air defense, and torpedo-carrying aircraft. At the same time, Tukhachevsky was also characterized by excessive projecting, sometimes far from reality (suffice it to note that in 1919, according to an informed contemporary, he proposed to the Bolshevik leadership a project to introduce paganism in the country, and in 1930 put forward an absurd program of an annual tank building norm in the country in 100,000 tanks by booking tractors - in this way he counted on the practical embodiment of the theory of deep operation).

As a supporter of the strategy of destruction, Tukhachevsky opposed the well-known military scientist, former General A. A. Svechin, who acted as the ideologist of the strategy of exhaustion. In the spirit of the times, this discussion turned into a persecution of the scientist, headed by Tukhachevsky. The executed “red Bonaparte” was by no means averse to persecuting his opponents. The future Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was also an opponent of Tukhachevsky.

In November 1935 Tukhachevsky became Marshal of the Soviet Union.

As A. I. Todorsky, who knew him, rightly noted, Tukhachevsky was not destined to live to see the Great Patriotic War. But Tukhachevsky, along with her heroes, smashed the fascist armies. The enemies were attacked by the equipment that Tukhachevsky built together with the party and the people. Soldiers and generals destroyed the enemy, relying on Soviet military art, to which Tukhachevsky made a great contribution.

In 1937, Tukhachevsky, on false charges of preparing a fascist military conspiracy against the leadership of the USSR, was arrested and shot (rehabilitated in 1957). The reason for the repressions was Tukhachevsky's ambitions, which went beyond the official framework, his undoubted authority, leadership in the highest command staff and many years of close ties with other high-ranking military leaders, threatening a military coup. At the same time, he, of course, was not any foreign spy.

Ganin A. V., Ph.D., Institute of Slavic Studies RAS

Background to the conflict

To understand the nature of Russian-Polish relations, it is very important to apply the concepts that are discussed in the analysis of the Polish national and national liberation movement.

For a hundred years (1815–1915), when the territory of ethnic Poland was part of the Russian Empire, a certain image of the “Russian” as a representative of the ruling system in the state was formed in the Polish public consciousness.

With such an interpretation of the manifestations of the national liberation struggle of the Polish people, when the main emphasis was on the presence or absence of an anti-Russian moment, it was as if an equal sign was put between tsarism and Russia, the Russian people. At the same time, historians strongly emphasized that these are different concepts, using such formulations as “anti-autocratic”, “anti-tsarist”, “directed against tsarism”, etc. to characterize the Polish uprisings and other speeches. These formulations, on the whole, correctly reflected the objective fact the non-identity of tsarism and the Russian people, nevertheless, did not take into account an important subjective factor, namely, that in the minds of the Poles such identification occurred under the influence of hatred for the tsarism that oppressed them, and this hatred was transferred to everything Russian. Just as in Russian society only a small part was able to resist the ideas of great power and rise to a genuine understanding of the Polish question, so in Poland not every revolutionary could separate the Russian people from the hated tsarism, but only the most perspicacious, thoughtful and sensitive. Distrust and hostility towards Russians became an element of national consciousness during the period of its formation. On the one hand, they affected the Polish national character, and on the other hand, they largely determined the stereotype of the Russian, which was entrenched in the minds of Polish society. All these moments were and are of great importance not only for Russian-Polish, and then Soviet-Polish relations, but in general for the destinies of peoples.

When analyzing national problems, evaluating certain national manifestations, the researcher, as a rule, faces the question: where, when, under what conditions, why patriotism, national feeling, national liberation aspirations pass into another category; where is the line separating them from nationalism.

It seems that one can speak of nationalism in a negative way when manifestations of national feeling turn out to be aimed at distrust and hatred of other peoples or to the detriment of the interests of these peoples, when one's own people are placed above others and judged by different standards. Such trends can be traced in Polish patriotism. Elements of national egoism and domination are characteristic of the views of many of the most prominent representatives of the Polish liberation movement. This concerned not only the attitude towards Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, who were not recognized by the majority of Polish ideologists as independent nations.

It should also be remembered that in 1815 Poland again disappeared from the political map of Europe. The borders established in Eastern Europe by the Congress of Vienna lasted until 1914, when the outbreak of the First World War raised the question of a new territorial redistribution.

Already on August 14, 1914, the Russian government announced its desire to unite all Poles within the borders of the Kingdom of Poland under the scepter of the Russian emperor. For their part, Germany and Austria-Hungary limited themselves to rather general declarations about the future freedom of the Poles without any specific promises.

On the first day of the war, the famous Appeal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, to the Poles was published. Written in a high style, it became the basis of Russia's policy towards the Slavic neighbor. The text of the appeal read: “Poles! The hour has struck when the cherished dream of your grandfathers and fathers can come true. A century and a half ago, the living body of Poland was torn to pieces, but her soul did not die. She lived in the hope that the hour would come for the resurrection of the Polish people, for their fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia!

Russian troops bring you the good news of this reconciliation. Let the borders that cut the Polish people into pieces be erased! May he be united under the scepter of the Russian Tsar! Under this scepter, Poland will be reborn, free in her faith, in her language, in self-government.

Russia expects one thing from you - the same respect for the rights of those peoples with whom history has connected you!

With an open heart, with a brotherly outstretched hand, Great Russia is coming towards you. She believes that the sword that slew the enemy at Grunwald will not rust. Russian armies are moving from the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the North Seas. The dawn of a new life is engaged for you. May the sign of the cross shine in that dawn - a symbol of the suffering and resurrection of peoples!

Written in a high style, with pathos quite appropriate here and designed for a strong emotional impact, the Appeal, according to the testimony of many Polish political figures of that time, found a fairly wide positive response from many parties and individual authoritative persons both within Poland and among the Polish emigration.

On August 16, 1914, the People's Democracy Party, the Polish Progressive Party, the Real Policy Party, the Polish Progressive Association adopted a joint document welcoming the Appeal of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army. In addition, the Party of People's Democracy and the Party of Real Politics protested in connection with the formation of J. Pilsudski's legions in Austria-Hungary in order to participate in the war against Russia. In general, the Appeal was assessed by the Polish side as an important positive political step towards granting autonomy to Poland with the prospect of further transferring relations with Russia to federal ones and contributing to the restoration of Polish state independence following the example of Finland.

A year later, speaking in the Russian Council of Ministers, its chairman, I. L. Goremykin, described the Polish policy of the government as follows: “I consider it my duty today to touch on only one issue that stands, as it were, on the verge between the war and our internal affairs: this is the Polish question. Of course, it can be resolved in its entirety only after the end of the war. Now Poland is waiting first of all for the liberation of her lands from the heavy German oppression. But even these days, it is important for the Polish people to know and believe that their future structure is finally and irrevocably predetermined by the Appeal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, announced from the highest command in the very first days of the war.

... His Majesty ordered the Council of Ministers to develop bills on granting Poland, at the end of the war, the right to freely build its national, cultural and economic life on the basis of autonomy under the scepter of Russian sovereigns and while maintaining a single statehood.

However, subsequent events showed a completely different course of events than the Petrograd plans. During the war, national Polish military units were created as part of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and French armies. After the occupation of the Kingdom of Poland by German and Austro-Hungarian troops in 1915, the vast majority of the Polish population came under the control of Germany and Austria-Hungary, which on November 5, 1916, proclaimed the "independence" of the Kingdom of Poland without specifying its borders. In December 1916, the Provisional State Council was established as a governing body. Russia's retaliatory countermeasure was the statement on December 12, 1916, about the desire to create a "free Poland" from all its three parts. In January 1917 this statement was generally supported by Britain, France and the USA.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918 set before the government of the RSFSR the task of protecting its western border. Initially, this was carried out with the help of partisan and volunteer detachments put forward by the population of the border strip and reinforced by several similar formations sent from the center.

Already in March 1918, the headquarters of the Western section of the curtain detachments was created to unite the management of all these detachments. The task of this headquarters in combat terms was to guard and defend our western border; organizationally, it was necessary to reorganize all these partisan detachments and bring them into the same type of regular military formations in accordance with the decree on the formation of the Red Army.

At the same time, the position of the German Empire and its allies was deteriorating more and more. On October 31, 1918, a revolution began in Austria-Hungary. In Lviv, on October 18, the Ukrainian National Council headed by E. Petrushevich was created, proclaiming the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), whose army was created on the basis of the Ukrainian military units of the Austro-Hungarian army. Accordingly, the Polish national movement became more active.

On October 1, the National Polish Council was formed in the Principality of Cieszyn, which announced on October 30 the return of this territory to Poland. On October 23, the Polish Regency Council announced the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War, headed by Jozef Pilsudski, who at that time was imprisoned in the fortress of Magdeburg in Germany.

On October 25, the Liquidation Commission was created in Krakow, which took over power in Western Galicia on behalf of the Polish state. On October 27, the Regency Council announced the creation of the Polish army with the inclusion of all Polish military formations in its composition. On November 7, a "people's government" arose in Lublin, which announced the dissolution of the Regency Council, proclaimed civil liberties, an 8-hour working day, the nationalization of forests, granted and majorate estates, the creation of self-governments and a civil militia. All other social demands were postponed until the decisions of the Legislative Seimas.

Realizing that power was slipping out of their hands, the Regency Council secured the release of Pilsudski from Germany, who arrived in Warsaw on November 10. Negotiations with the Regency Council and the Lublin government led to the fact that on November 14, power was transferred to Pilsudski. On November 22, 1918, he signed a decree on the organization of the highest power in the Polish Republic, according to which Pilsudski was appointed "temporary head of state", who had full legislative and executive power. In fact, it was about the creation of Pilsudski's dictatorship, covered with a beautiful position - at the end of the 18th century. The head of state was Tadeusz Kosciuszko.

November 11, 1918 Germany signed an armistice in Compiègne, according to which it abandoned the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On November 13, Moscow also annulled this agreement, which made its provisions non-existent. On November 16, Piłsudski notified all countries, except for the RSFSR, of the creation of an independent Polish state. On November 26-28, during the exchange of notes on the fate of the mission of the Regency Council, located in Moscow, the Soviet government announced its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Poland. On December 4, Warsaw announced that there would be no discussion of this problem until the issue of the mission was resolved.

During the exchange of notes in December 1918, the Soviet side three times offered to establish diplomatic relations, but Poland refused these proposals under various pretexts. On January 2, 1919, the Poles shot down the mission of the Russian Red Cross, which caused a new exchange of notes, this time with accusations from the RSFSR. Thus, Moscow recognized Poland and was ready to normalize relations with it, but Warsaw was preoccupied with defining its borders. Like most other politicians, Piłsudski was a supporter of the restoration of the Polish border of 1772 and believed that the longer the confusion continued in Russia, the more territories Poland would be able to control. Piłsudski's original maximum program was the creation of a number of nation-states on the territory of European Russia, which would be under the influence of Warsaw. This, in his opinion, would allow Poland to become a great power, replacing Russia in Eastern Europe.

It faced problems typical of young states that emerged after the collapse of three empires: the formation of an internal power structure and the design of external borders. The latter was largely connected with the decision of the fate of the eastern territories, still occupied by the troops of the Oberkommando-Ost, although Austria-Hungary and Germany, paralyzed by the revolution, had already ceased hostilities. Under the terms of the armistice on November 11, 1918, Germany renounced the conditions of the Brest Peace and, in the matter of evacuating troops from the eastern territories it occupied, was placed under the complete control of the Allied Powers until the conclusion of a peace treaty. On November 13, after the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Red Army began its offensive to the west. Under these conditions, the head of the only representative office of the Polish state in the international arena of the PNK in Paris, the leader of the party of national democrats (endeks) Roman Dmovsky turned to the Entente with a request to postpone the evacuation of German troops because of the threat to Poland from Bolshevik Russia, as well as the absence of the Polish army and the insecurity of the eastern borders.

By the autumn of 1918, two most common points of view on the problem of the eastern territories had developed in Polish society. The Endeks developed the so-called "incorporative" doctrine, according to which it was supposed to include the eastern territories that were part of Poland before 1772 into the Polish state. the territory is indicated, to which, according to the authors, Poland has the right as historically Polish.

It included part of Courland (the southern part of Lithuania), most of the Minsk province with Minsk and Slutsk, Kovno, the northwestern part of Vilna with Vilna, a significant part of the Suwalki provinces, as well as lands along the Lower Neman. For the 2.5 million Lithuanians living in this territory, autonomy was envisaged as part of the Polish state. In addition, the Endeks made claims to Eastern Galicia with Lvov and part of Volhynia and Podolia and Kamenetz-Podolsk. Geographically, Poland was to be equal to Germany and border on Russia. Its population, as a result of expansion, would have grown to 38 million people, of which only 23 million were Poles. Later, the territorial program of endeks was further expanded.

The peoples who inhabited the territories that, according to the Endeks, should have been part of Poland - Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians - were considered as not having the right to claim their own state due to their small number. This point of view was also shared by Piłsudski's supporters.

The beginning of large-scale hostilities

By the end of 1919, the Polish armed forces numbered 21 infantry divisions and 7 motorized brigades - a total of 600,000 soldiers. In the first months of 1920, mobilization was announced, which brought a significant replenishment to the personnel. By the beginning of the 1920 campaign, Poland fielded more than 700,000 soldiers.

The Soviet government, striving to move on to a lasting peace, addressed peace proposals to a number of European states, including Poland. However, the Polish government rejected the offer of peace, counting on a quick victory over the Soviet Republic devastated as a result of the Civil War, and, together with the Petliurists, launched an offensive on April 25, 1920.

The Red Army could oppose the White Poles on the Southwestern Front with the 12th and 14th Armies, and on the Western Front with the 15th and 16th Armies. The four armies included 65,264 Red Army men, 666 guns, and 3,208 machine guns.

By the beginning of hostilities, the White-Poles had a significant superiority in forces. On the Southwestern Front, it was five times. This allowed the White Poles to succeed and create an immediate threat to Kyiv.

Parts of the 12th Army, having put up stubborn resistance, still could not contain the superior forces of the White Poles and left the cities of Ovruch, Korosten, Zhitomir, Berdichev.

In the rear of the Red Army, the situation was significantly complicated by the Petliura, Makhnovist and other gangs. Part of the troops had to be withdrawn from the Southwestern Front to fight them.

M. P. Grekov. Trumpeters of the First Cavalry Army. 1934 Oil on canvas. State Tretyakov Gallery. Moscow

The 12th Army withdrew to Kyiv across the Irpin River. And its flanks are towards the Dnieper River; The 14th Army fought stubborn battles in the Gaisin-Vapnyarka area. A gap of about 200 km formed between the armies, which was used by the command of the White Poles. White-Poles approached Kyiv. On May 6, units of the 12th Army left Kyiv and retreated beyond the Dnieper. Having captured Kyiv, the Poles occupied a small foothold on the left bank of the Dnieper.

The command of the Red Army took decisive measures to disrupt the offensive of the Polish troops. The combat operations of the troops of the 12th and 14th armies were intensified, and on May 14, 1920, the armies of the Western Front went on the offensive.

However, underestimating the enemy and overestimating their own strength, the command of the Western Front, headed by M.N. Tukhachevsky, faced with the need to support the troops of the Southwestern Front, launched an offensive without completing preparations and without organizing interaction between the 15th and 16th armies. Due to the poor organization of communications, command and control of the troops was lost, which led to their dispersal in different directions. All this allowed the Polish troops not only to avoid defeat, but also to counterattack and push back parts of the Western Front. However, the May offensive of the Red Army in Belarus still had a certain positive value. It was possible to frustrate the plans of the Polish command for an offensive in Belarus, and the area occupied by Soviet troops on the left bank of the Western Dvina could be used as a springboard for preparing a new offensive by the Red Army. The May offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus forced the Polish command to use up a significant part of its reserves and transfer part of the troops from the South-Eastern Front to the north, which weakened its strike force in Ukraine and forced it to abandon new operations in this direction. All this made it easier for the troops of the Southwestern Front to go over to the offensive.

By that time, the Kolchak, Ural and Orenburg White Cossacks and Denikin had been completely defeated by the Red Army. But, unfortunately, many of the liberated Red Army units were at a great distance from the new front, and the railways worked with a small capacity.

To reinforce the Southwestern Front, the command of the Red Army sent the 25th Chapaev division from the Uralsk region, the Bashkir brigade from the Urals, and the 1st Cavalry army from the Maykop region. Other military units from different regions of the country were also sent.

During the battles with the Poles, the troops of the Southwestern Front, putting up stubborn resistance, exhausted the enemy, but they themselves suffered significant losses. To strengthen the front, the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny and the Bashkir Brigade of Murtazin arrived in the combat area. The 25th Chapaev division also approached. The offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front was scheduled for May 26.

By the beginning of the operation, the armies of this front had 22.3 thousand bayonets and 24 thousand cavalry. Against them were three Polish armies, which had 69.2 thousand bayonets and 9 thousand cavalry.

The 3rd Polish Army occupied the Kyiv region, from the mouth of the Pripyat River to the White Church, and a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper. The White Poles had an order to hold the Kyiv region at all costs. To the south of this army, up to Lipovets, was the 2nd Polish Army, and the 6th Army of the White Poles was located in the Lipovets-Gaisin sector to the Dniester. The enemy troops were three times superior to the troops of the Red Army in terms of the number of infantry. However, we had 2.5 times more cavalry. This was of great importance at that time. The troops of the South-Western Front were assigned the immediate task of encircling and destroying the 3rd Polish Army of General Rydz-Smigly, then, together with the troops of the Western Front, defeat the enemy and liberate Ukraine.

The plan of encirclement and destruction of the 3rd Polish Army, which was retreating from Kyiv, outlined by the command of the Southwestern Front, unfortunately, was not carried out. Firstly, because units of the 12th Army could not quickly cross the Dnieper: retreating, the enemy blew up the bridges. Secondly, a strong strike group was not created in time to cover the 3rd Polish Army from the northwest. Thirdly, the Fastovskaya group failed to flank the enemy and link up with the 12th Army. The 1st Cavalry Army was in the regions of Zhytomyr and Berdichev and was not transferred to the area of ​​the Borodyanka station, where the enemy fought major battles, breaking through to the northwest.

After bloody battles, units of the 3rd Army of the Poles with heavy losses retreated through Borodyanka and Teterev, leaving a large number of carts and weapons.

The successful offensive of the Red Army on the Polish front caused confusion among the Pilsudski government and alarm in Entente circles. The Entente presented an ultimatum to the Republic of Soviets, which went down in history as "Lord Curzon's ultimatum". The Soviet government was required to stop hostilities against the Polish interventionists and conclude a truce. The line of location of the Polish troops was indicated: Grodno - Yalovka - Nemirov - Brest-Litovsk - Ustilug - Krylov, further west of Rava-Russkaya and east of Przemysl - to the Carpathians. The Red Army was asked to withdraw 50 kilometers east of this line.

British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon demanded that a truce be signed with Wrangel as well and that the Crimean Isthmus be declared a "neutral zone." If the Soviet government refused to accept these conditions, the Entente threatened to provide all possible assistance to the Polish troops.

Curzon's ultimatum aroused general indignation among the Soviet people. In accordance with the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Soviet government sent a reply note to England on July 17, 1920. The Bolshevik Party and government rejected the ultimatum. Curzon was told that England had no grounds and no right to act as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Pan Poland.

A few days later, the Red Army, having launched a large-scale counteroffensive, not only liberated the occupied territory, but on August 12, 1920 approached Warsaw. However, the Polish troops defending their capital managed not only to repulse the attack, but also, having launched a counteroffensive, move forward hundreds of kilometers and capture the western territories of Belarus and Ukraine.

The battle on the Vistula began on August 13, 1920. As the Soviet troops approached the Vistula and the capital of Poland, the resistance of the Polish troops increased. The enemy tried, using water barriers, to delay the further advance of the Soviet troops and put his units in order in order to subsequently go on the counteroffensive. On August 13, the 21st and 27th Soviet divisions captured a strong enemy stronghold - the city of Radzimin, located 23 km from Warsaw. The breakthrough in the Radzimin area created a direct threat to Warsaw. In this regard, General Haller ordered to speed up the start of the counterattack of the 5th Polish Army and the shock group on the river. Vepshe. Having thrown up two fresh divisions from the reserve, the Polish command launched fierce counterattacks on August 14, trying to restore the situation in the Radzimin area. Soviet troops repulsed the onslaught of the enemy and even moved forward in some places. The Soviet 3rd Army, in cooperation with the left flank of the 15th Army, captured two forts of the Modlin fortress that day. In the battles near Radzimin, the Soviet troops clearly showed a shortage of ammunition and especially shells. It is no coincidence that on the evening of August 13, the commander of the 27th division, V.K. own initiative than to retreat under compulsion from the enemy and defeated. Of course, this offer was rejected.

On August 14, the 5th Polish Army went on the offensive. North of Warsaw, at 10 am on August 15, her cavalry group broke into Ciechanow, where the headquarters of the 4th Soviet army was located. The disorderly retreat of the army headquarters led to the loss of communication with both its troops and the front headquarters, as a result, the entire right flank was left without control. Having received information about the enemy's action north of Warsaw, the command of the Western Front ordered the troops of the 4th and 15th Soviet armies to smash the enemy wedged between them. However, unorganized counterattacks did not bring results, although units of the 4th Army had the opportunity to reach the rear of the Polish troops north of Warsaw. On August 14, by order of the chairman of the RVSR, L. D. Trotsky, the commander-in-chief demanded that the troops of the Western Front occupy the Danzig corridor, cutting off Poland from the military supplies of the Entente.

During the fighting on the outskirts of Warsaw on August 14-15, Soviet troops were still fighting fierce battles for Radzimin, which was eventually occupied by the enemy, and the 8th Infantry Division of the 16th Army broke through to the Vistula near Gura-Kalvaria, but it was felt that these success was achieved already at the limit of their strength. At 14.35 on August 15, the command of the Western Front ordered the regrouping of the 1st Cavalry Army in the Ustilug - Vladimir-Volynsky region for 4 transitions. However, the order signed only by Tukhachevsky caused a correspondence between the headquarters about its confirmation. On the same day, the front command, having received from the 12th Army information about the concentration of enemy forces beyond the river. Vepsh, ordered the 16th Army to move the front to the south, but time had already been lost. News from the front indicated that the initiative was slowly beginning to pass to the enemy.

On August 16, the offensive of the Polish troops began on the Ciechanow-Lublin front. At the dawn of that day, Pilsudski's shock group went on the offensive from the Vepsh River, which broke through the weak front of the Mozyr group without much effort and began to quickly move to the northeast. Having received information about the activation of the enemy on the front of the Mozyr group, its command and the command of the 16th Army initially decided that it was just a small counterattack. In this situation, the Polish troops received an important gain in time for their operation and continued their rapid advance towards Brest-Litovsk, trying to cut off and press all the armies of the Western Front to the German border. Realizing the danger from the south, the Soviet command decided to create a defense along pp. Lipovets and the Western Bug, however, it took time to regroup the troops, and there were no reserves in the rear of the front. Already on the morning of August 19, the Poles knocked out the weak parts of the Mozyr group from Brest-Litovsk. An attempt to regroup the troops of the 16th Army also failed, since the enemy was ahead of the Soviet units when reaching any lines suitable for defense. On August 20, Polish troops reached the line Brest-Litovsk - Vysoko-Litovsk - pp. Narew and the Western Bug, covering the main forces of the Western Front from the south. It should also be taken into account that all this time the Polish command had the opportunity to intercept and read the radio messages of the Soviet command, which, of course, facilitated the actions of the Polish Army.

By August 25, the front had stabilized along the line Augustow - Lipsk - Kuznitsa - Visloch - Belovezh - Zhabinka - Opalin. As early as August 19, when the troops of the Western Front had already retreated from Warsaw, the 1st Cavalry Army began to withdraw from Lvov. However, feeling the weakening of the onslaught of the Soviet troops, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks, and on August 21-24 Cavalry units had to support their neighbors. Trotsky’s directive of August 20, which demanded “energetic and immediate assistance from the Cavalry Army to the Western Front,” did not add clarity, but called “special attention of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army to the fact that the occupation of Lvov itself would not affect the deadline for the implementation of these orders.” Thus, instead of a clear order to stop the attack of Lvov, Moscow again limited itself to a vague order. Not to mention the fact that now the transfer of the 1st Cavalry Army was no longer needed. Moreover, on August 25, the 1st Cavalry Army, by order of the commander-in-chief, was thrown into a raid on Zamosc, which had neither meaning nor purpose.

After the hostilities, lengthy peace negotiations began, the result of which was the Riga Peace Treaty, signed at 20.30 on March 18, 1921. The parties pledged to respect each other's state sovereignty, not to create or support organizations fighting with the other side. A procedure for the option of citizens was envisaged. The Soviet side undertook to pay Poland 30 million rubles in gold in coins or bullion and to transfer the train and other property worth 18,245 thousand rubles in gold. Poland was freed from the debts of the Russian Empire and negotiations on an economic agreement were envisaged. Diplomatic relations were established between the parties. The agreement was ratified by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on April 14, by the Polish Sejm on April 15, and by the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR on April 17, 1921. On April 30, after the exchange of instruments of ratification in Minsk, the agreement entered into force. The Soviet-Polish war ended.

The events of 1920 showed that it was impossible to implement both Polish and Soviet plans in full, and the parties had to compromise. Finally, they looked at each other as equals, which was reflected in the course of peace negotiations and the Treaty of Riga. The territorial issue was resolved between Moscow and Warsaw in the classic way of power compromise. The Soviet-Polish border was determined arbitrarily according to the random configuration of the front line. This new frontier had no other justification, nor could it have. Having received 1/2 of the territory of Belarus and 1/4 of Ukraine, perceived as “wild outskirts” intended for Polonization, Poland became a state in which the Poles made up only 64% of the population. Although the parties renounced mutual territorial claims, the Riga border became an insurmountable barrier between Poland and the USSR.

N. Kopylov

During the Great Patriotic War, combined arms and tank armies as part of the Red Army were large military formations designed to solve the most complex operational tasks.
In order to effectively manage this army structure, the commander had to have high organizational skills, be well aware of the features of the use of all types of troops that make up his army, but of course, have a strong character.
In the course of hostilities, various military leaders were appointed to the post of army commander, but only the most trained and talented of them remained in it until the end of the war. Most of those who commanded the armies at the end of the Great Patriotic War held lower positions before it began.
Thus, it is known that during the war years, 325 military leaders were in the position of commander of a combined arms army. And the tank armies were commanded by 20 people.
At the beginning, there was a frequent change of tank commanders, for example, the commanders of the 5th tank army were Lieutenant General M.M. Popov (25 days), I.T. Shlemin (3 months), A.I. Lizyukov (33 days, until his death in battle on July 17, 1942), the 1st was commanded (16 days) by artilleryman K.S. Moskalenko, 4th (within two months) - cavalryman V.D. Kryuchenkon and least of all commanded the TA (9 days) - combined arms commander (P.I. Batov).
In the future, the commanders of tank armies during the war years were the most stable group of military leaders. Almost all of them, starting to fight as colonels, successfully commanded tank brigades, divisions, tank and mechanized corps, and in 1942-1943. led tank armies and commanded them until the end of the war. http://www.mywebs.su/blog/history/10032.html

Of the combined arms commanders who ended the war as commanders, 14 people before the war commanded corps, 14 - divisions, 2 - brigades, one - a regiment, 6 were in teaching and command work in educational institutions, 16 officers were staff commanders of various levels, 3 were deputy division commanders and 1 deputy corps commander.

Only 5 generals commanding the armies at the start of the war finished it in the same position: three (N. E. Berzarin, F. D. Gorelenko and V. I. Kuznetsov) - on the Soviet-German front and two more (M. F. Terekhin and L. G. Cheremisov) - on the Far Eastern Front.

In total, 30 commanders from among the army commanders died during the war, of which:

22 people died or died from wounds received in battle,

2 (K. M. Kachanov and A. A. Korobkov) were repressed,

2 (M. G. Efremov and A. K. Smirnov) committed suicide in order to avoid captivity,

2 people died in air (S. D. Akimov) and car accidents (I. G. Zakharkin),

1 (P.F. Alferyev) went missing and 1 (F.A. Ershakov) died in a concentration camp.

For success in planning and carrying out combat operations during the war and immediately after it, 72 commanders from among the commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them twice. After the collapse of the USSR, two generals were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

During the war years, the Red Army in its composition totaled about 93 combined arms, guards, shock and tank armies, of which were:

1 seaside;

70 combined arms;

11 guards (from 1st to 11th);

5 drums (from 1 to 5);

6 tank guards;

In addition, the Red Army had:

18 air armies (from 1 to 18);

7 air defense armies;

10 sapper armies (from 1 to 10);

In the Independent Military Review of April 30, 2004. The rating of commanders of the Second World War was published, below is an extract from this rating, an assessment of the combat activities of the commanders of the main combined arms and tank Soviet armies:

3. Commanders of combined arms armies.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From September 1942 - Commander of the 62nd (8th Guards) Army. Particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Batov Pavel Ivanovich (1897-1985) - army General. Commander of the 51st, 3rd armies, assistant commander of the Bryansk Front, commander of the 65th army.

Beloborodov Afanasy Pavlantievich (1903-1990) - army General. Since the beginning of the war - the commander of a division, a rifle corps. Since 1944 - commander of the 43rd, in August-September 1945 - the 1st Red Banner Army.

Grechko Andrey Antonovich (1903-1976) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From April 1942 - Commander of the 12th, 47th, 18th, 56th Armies, Deputy Commander of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front, Commander of the 1st Guards Army.

Krylov Nikolay Ivanovich (1903-1972) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From July 1943 he commanded the 21st and 5th armies. He had unique experience in the defense of besieged large cities, being the chief of staff for the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad.

Moskalenko Kirill Semyonovich (1902-1985) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1942 he commanded the 38th, 1st Tank, 1st Guards and 40th armies.

Pukhov Nikolai Pavlovich (1895-1958) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 13th Army.

Chistyakov Ivan Mikhailovich (1900-1979) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 21st (6th Guards) and 25th armies.

Gorbatov Alexander Vasilyevich (1891-1973) - army General. From June 1943 - Commander of the 3rd Army.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964) - Colonel General. During the war years, he commanded the troops of the 3rd, 21st, 58th, 1st Guards armies from 1945 - commander of the 3rd shock army.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990) - army General. Since 1944 - commander of the 28th and 36th armies. He especially distinguished himself in the Belorussian and Manchurian operations.

Ludnikov Ivan Ivanovich (1902-1976) - Colonel General. During the war he commanded a rifle division, a corps, in 1942 he was one of the heroic defenders of Stalingrad. Since May 1944 - commander of the 39th Army, which participated in the Belarusian and Manchurian operations.

Galitsky Kuzma Nikitovich (1897-1973) - army General. Since 1942 - commander of the 3rd shock and 11th guards armies.

Zhadov Alexey Semenovich (1901-1977) - army General. From 1942 he commanded the 66th (5th Guards) Army.

Glagolev Vasily Vasilyevich (1896-1947) - Colonel General. He commanded the 9th, 46th, 31st, in 1945 - the 9th Guards Armies. He distinguished himself in the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Caucasus, during the crossing of the Dnieper, the liberation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Kolpakchi Vladimir Yakovlevich (1899-1961) - army General. He commanded the 18th, 62nd, 30th, 63rd, 69th armies. He acted most successfully in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Pliev Issa Alexandrovich (1903-1979) - army General. During the war years - commander of the guards cavalry divisions, corps, commander of cavalry mechanized groups. He especially distinguished himself by bold and daring actions in the Manchurian strategic operation.

Fedyuninsky Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1977) - army General. During the war years, he was commander of the troops of the 32nd and 42nd armies, the Leningrad Front, the 54th and 5th armies, deputy commander of the Volkhov and Bryansk fronts, commander of the troops of the 11th and 2nd shock armies.

Belov Pavel Alekseevich (1897-1962) - Colonel General. Commanded the 61st Army. He was distinguished by decisive maneuvering actions during the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Shumilov Mikhail Stepanovich (1895-1975) - Colonel General. From August 1942 until the end of the war, he commanded the 64th Army (from 1943 - the 7th Guards), which, together with the 62nd Army, heroically defended Stalingrad.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945) - Colonel General. Commander of the 27th, 34th Armies, Deputy Commander of the 61st, 20th Armies, Commander of the 39th and 5th Shock Armies. He especially distinguished himself by skillful and decisive actions in the Berlin operation.

4. Commanders of tank armies.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976) - Marshal of the armored forces. One of the founders of the Tank Guard was the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 1st Guards Tank Corps. Since 1943 - Commander of the 1st Tank Army (since 1944 - Guards).

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960) - Marshal of the armored forces. Since 1943 he commanded the 2nd (since 1944 - Guards) tank army.

Rybalko Pavel Semyonovich (1894-1948) - Marshal of the armored forces. From July 1942 he commanded the 5th, 3rd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987) - army General. From October 1941 he commanded the 5th, 30th, 1st, 3rd Guards, 4th Tank (since 1945 - Guards) armies.

Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich (1901-1982) - Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces. He commanded a tank brigade, a corps, distinguished himself in the Stalingrad operation. From 1943 he commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army. Since 1944 - Deputy Commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army.

Kravchenko Andrey Grigorievich (1899-1963) - Colonel-General of Tank Troops. Since 1944 - commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He showed an example of highly maneuverable, swift actions during the Manchurian strategic operation.

It is known that army commanders were selected to this list, who had been in their positions for a relatively long time and showed rather high military leadership abilities.

The Red Army was created, as they say, from scratch. Despite this, she managed to become a formidable force and win the civil war. The key to success was the construction of the Red Army using the experience of the old, pre-revolutionary army.

On the ruins of the old army

By the beginning of 1918, Russia, having survived two revolutions, finally emerged from the First World War. Her army was a pitiful sight - the soldiers deserted en masse and headed for their native places. Since November 1917, the Armed Forces have not existed and de jure - after the Bolsheviks issued an order to dissolve the old army.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of the former empire, a new war broke out - a civil one. In Moscow, battles with the junkers had just died down, in St. Petersburg - with the Cossacks of General Krasnov. Events grew like a snowball.

On the Don, generals Alekseev and Kornilov formed the Volunteer Army, in the Orenburg steppes an anti-communist uprising of Ataman Dutov unfolded, in the Kharkov region there were battles with the cadets of the Chuguev military school, in the Yekaterinoslav province - with detachments of the Central Rada of the self-proclaimed Ukrainian Republic.

Labor activists and revolutionary sailors

The external, old enemy did not sleep either: the Germans stepped up their offensive on the Eastern Front, capturing a number of territories of the former Russian Empire.

At the disposal of the Soviet government at that time were only Red Guard detachments, created on the ground mainly from activists of the working environment and revolutionary-minded sailors.

In the initial period of general partisanship in the civil war, the Red Guards were the backbone of the Council of People's Commissars, but it gradually became clear that the draft principle should replace voluntariness.

This was clearly shown, for example, by the events in Kyiv in January 1918, where the uprising of the workers' detachments of the Red Guard against the authorities of the Central Rada was brutally suppressed by national units and officer detachments.

The first step towards the creation of the Red Army

On January 15, 1918, Lenin issued a decree on the creation of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. The document emphasized that access to its ranks is open to all citizens of the Russian Republic at least 18 years old who are ready "to give their strength, their lives to defend the conquered October Revolution and the power of the Soviets and socialism."

This was the first but half step towards the creation of an army. For the time being, it was proposed to join it voluntarily, and in this the Bolsheviks followed the path of Alekseev and Kornilov with their voluntary recruitment of the White Army. As a result, by the spring of 1918, there were no more than 200 thousand people in the ranks of the Red Army. And its combat effectiveness left much to be desired - most of the front-line soldiers rested from the horrors of the world war at home.

A powerful incentive to create a large army was given by the enemies - the 40,000-strong Czechoslovak corps, which in the summer of that year rebelled against Soviet power along the entire length of the Trans-Siberian Railway and overnight captured vast expanses of the country - from Chelyabinsk to Vladivostok. In the south of the European part of Russia, Denikin's troops did not doze off, who, having recovered from the unsuccessful assault on Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar), in June 1918 again launched an offensive against the Kuban and this time achieved their goal.

Fight not with slogans, but with skill

Under these conditions, one of the founders of the Red Army, the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Lev Trotsky, proposed moving to a more rigid model of building an army. According to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on July 29, 1918, military conscription was introduced in the country, which made it possible to bring the number of the Red Army to almost half a million people by mid-September.

Along with quantitative growth, the army was strengthened and qualitatively. The leadership of the country and the Red Army realized that slogans alone that the socialist fatherland was in danger would not win the war. We need experienced cadres, albeit not adhering to revolutionary rhetoric.

En masse, the so-called military experts, that is, officers and generals of the tsarist army, began to be called up to the Red Army. Their total number during the Civil War in the ranks of the Red Army numbered almost 50 thousand people.

The best of the best

Many then became the pride of the USSR, such as, for example, Colonel Boris Shaposhnikov, who became Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff of the Army, including during the Great Patriotic War. Another head of the General Staff of the Red Army during the Second World War, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky entered the Civil War as a staff captain.

Another effective measure to strengthen the middle command level was military schools and accelerated training courses for red commanders from among the soldiers, workers and peasants. In battles and battles, yesterday's non-commissioned officers and sergeants quickly grew to commanders of large formations. Suffice it to recall Vasily Chapaev, who became a division commander, or Semyon Budyonny, who led the 1st Cavalry Army.

Even earlier, the election of commanders was abolished, which had an extremely harmful effect on the level of combat effectiveness of units, turning them into anarchist spontaneous detachments. Now the commander was responsible for order and discipline, albeit on a par with the commissar.

Kamenev instead of Vatsetis

It is curious that a little later, whites also came to the draft army. In particular, the Volunteer Army in 1919 largely remained so only in name - the bitterness of the Civil War imperiously demanded that the opponents replenish their ranks by any means.

The first commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR in the autumn of 1918 was appointed former Colonel Joakim Vatsetis (since January 1919 he simultaneously led the actions of the army of Soviet Latvia). After a series of defeats by the Red Army in the summer of 1919 in the European part of Russia, Vatsetis was replaced at his post by another tsarist colonel, Sergei Kamenev.

Under his leadership, things went much better for the Red Army. The armies of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel were defeated. Yudenich's attack on Petrograd was repulsed, the Polish units were driven out of Ukraine and Belarus.

Territorial-militia principle

By the end of the Civil War, the total strength of the Red Army was over five million people. The red cavalry, initially numbering only three regiments, in the course of numerous battles grew to several armies, which operated on widely stretched communications of countless fronts of the civil war, performing the role of shock troops.

The end of hostilities required a sharp reduction in the number of personnel. First of all, the war-exhausted economy of the country needed this. As a result, in 1920-1924. demobilization was carried out, which reduced the Red Army to half a million people.

Under the leadership of People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Mikhail Frunze, most of the remaining troops were transferred to the territorial-militia principle of recruitment. It consisted in the fact that a small part of the Red Army soldiers and unit commanders were in permanent service, and the rest of the staff was called up for five years for training camps lasting up to a year.

Strengthening combat capability

Over time, the Frunze reform led to problems: the combat readiness of the territorial units was much lower than the regular ones.

The thirties, with the arrival of the Nazis in Germany and the Japanese attack on China, began to smell distinctly of gunpowder. As a result, the transfer of regiments, divisions and corps to a regular basis began in the USSR.

This took into account not only the experience of the First World War and the Civil War, but also participation in new conflicts, in particular, a clash with Chinese troops in 1929 on the CER and Japanese troops on Lake Khasan in 1938.

The total number of the Red Army increased, the troops were actively re-equipped. First of all, this concerned artillery and armored forces. New troops were created, for example, airborne. Mother infantry became more motorized.

Premonition of World War

Aviation, which previously carried out mainly reconnaissance missions, was now becoming a powerful force, increasing the proportion of bombers, attack aircraft and fighters in its ranks.

Soviet tankers and pilots tried their hand at local wars taking place far from the USSR - in Spain and China.

In order to increase the prestige of the military profession and the convenience of serving in 1935, personal military ranks were introduced for military personnel - from marshal to lieutenant.

The law on universal conscription of 1939, which expanded the composition of the Red Army and established longer terms of service, finally drew a line under the territorial-militia principle of manning the Red Army.

And there was a big war ahead.

On January 15 (28), 1918, V. I. Lenin signed a decree on the organization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, and, consequently, its component - the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Force (RKKVF).

On May 24, 1918, the Directorate of the Air Force was transformed into the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Air Force (Glavvozdukhoflot), headed by a Council consisting of a chief and two commissars. Military specialist M. A. Solovov, soon replaced by A. S. Vorotnikov, became the head of the Glavvozdukhoflot, K. V. Akashev and A. V. Sergeev became the commissars.

SOLOVOV Mikhail Alexandrovich

Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (05-07.1918)

Russian, Soviet military leader, mechanical engineer (1913), colonel (1917). In military service since 1899. He graduated from the courses of the Naval Engineering School of Emperor Nicholas I (1910).

He served in the Naval Department in the following positions: junior mechanical engineer (1902-1905), acting assistant. senior ship mechanic of the mine cruiser "Abrek" (1905-1906), ship mechanic of the yacht "Neva" (1906-1907).

From June 1917 on the staff of the Directorate of the Military Air Fleet: I.d. head of the 8th (factory management) department, from October 11 - I.d. assistant to the head of the department for the technical and economic part. From March 1918 in the Red Army. Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (05.24-07.17.1918). Since July 1918 - head of the procurement department of the same department, later - as part of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the Russian Republic.

Awards: Order of St. Anne 3rd class (1909), St. Stanislaus 2nd class. (1912), St. Anna (1914), St. Vladimir 4th class. (1915); medals "In memory of the 300th anniversary of the reign of the Romanov dynasty" (1913), « In memory of the 200th anniversary of the Gangut victory" (1915); foreign orders and medals.

VOROTNIKOV Alexander Stepanovich

Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (07.1918-06.1919).

Russian (Soviet) military leader, military pilot, colonel (1917). He has been in military service since September 1899. He graduated from the Chuguev Infantry Cadet School (1902, 1st category), the Officer School of Aviation of the Air Fleet Department (1912). He served in the 121st Penza Infantry Regiment. Member of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): head of the "hunting team" (08-09.1904), equestrian "hunting team" (since 09.1904).

From January 1912 in the Military Air Fleet: head of the lower ranks team of the Officer Aviation School of the Air Fleet Department (02.1912-01.1913), officer of the 7th aeronautical company (01-04.1913), acting officer. head of the 1st detachment of the company (04-06.1913), head of the 9th corps squadron (from 08.1913). Participated in the organization of long-distance air flights in Russia.

During the First World War: commander of a corps squadron (until 02.1915), 2nd aviation company (02.1915-10.1916), 2nd aviation division (10.1916-01.1918), assistant inspector of aviation of the armies of the Western Front for the technical part (02-03.1918) , commander of the 3rd aviation division (03-05.1918). Called to serve in the Red Army. From May 30, 1918, he was the head of the aviation detachments of the Veil of the western strip, from July 5, he was the head of the district department of the RKKVVF of the Moscow Military District. Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (17.07.1918-06.1919). Military pilot at the Main Directorate of the Head of Supply of the RKKVVF (06-12.1919), Technical Inspector of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (12.1919-04.1920), Assistant to the Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF for the organizational and construction part (05-09.1920), Assistant for Aviation, Chief Technical Inspector of the Main Directorate RKKVVF (09.1920-04.1921). From April 1921 he was the head of the 1st military school for pilots of the RKKVVF, from December 1923 he was a permanent member of the tactical section of the Scientific Committee under the Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army. Staff teacher at the Higher School of Military Camouflage of the Red Army (1924). In December 1924 he was transferred to the reserve of the Red Army. In 1925-1926. worked in the Aviation Trust under the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet.

Awards: Order of St. Stanislav 3rd class with swords and a bow (1905), St. Anne 4th class. (1905), St. Vladimir 4th class. with swords and a bow (1905), St. Anne 3rd class. with swords and a bow (1906), 2nd class. with swords (1906), St. Stanislaus 2nd class. with swords (1906), St. George's weapons (1915); gold watch RVSR (1919).

Head of the Field Directorate of Aviation and Aeronautics at the Field Headquarters of the RVSR (09/22/1918 - 03/25/1920).

Soviet military leader, pilot. In military service since 1915. He graduated from the courses of aviation mechanics and theoretical courses for pilots at the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute (1915), the Sevastopol Aviation School (1916), the Air Force Academy of the Red Army (1926).

During the First World War: private of the 171st reserve infantry battalion, then of the 1st aviation company (1915-1916), pilot of the 1st corps, then of the 7th Siberian air squadron (1916-1917), senior non-commissioned officer. He took part in the revolutionary movement in Russia. Since August 1917, the elected commander of the air squadron, since September 1917, a member, then chairman of the Executive Bureau of the All-Russian Council of Aviation, since January 1918, a member of the All-Russian Collegium for the Management of the Air Fleet of the Republic, special commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR for the evacuation of aviation equipment and property from the Northern areas.

During the Civil War in Russia: member of the Council and commissar of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (05-08.1918), chief commissar of the RKKVVF at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Eastern Front and chief of aviation of the 5th army (08-09.1918), head of the Field Aviation and Aeronautics Directorate at the Field headquarters of the RVSR (09.1918-03.1920), chief of staff of the Air Fleet (03.1920-02.1921), head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (09.1921-10.1922). He showed outstanding organizational skills in the formation and construction of the Red Air Fleet, personally participated in the hostilities on the fronts of the Civil War.

Since 1926, in the reserve of the Red Army with secondment at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Internal Trade. In 1926-1928. worked as a military attache in France, since 1928 - in the USA, where he headed the aviation department of Soviet trade missions (Amtorg).

From March 1933 he was the head of transport aviation of the USSR and deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Tragically died in a plane crash (1933). Author of numerous articles and a number of scientific papers on the history of aviation.

Reward: Order of the Red Banner (1928).

The structure of the Red Air Fleet did not take shape immediately. Ultimately, an aviation detachment consisting of 6 aircraft and 66 personnel was adopted as the main tactical and administrative unit. The first regular aviation detachments were created in August 1918 and sent to the Eastern Front.

The Soviet Republic, which found itself in the middle of 1918 in a fiery ring of fronts, turned into a military camp. All the armed forces at its disposal, including the Air Fleet, were sent to the fronts. The current situation required the creation of a body that would unite aviation units on a republic scale, organize and lead their combat operations. To this end, on September 22, 1918, the Field Directorate of Aviation and Aeronautics of the Army (Aviadarm) was established at the headquarters of the RVSR. It combined operational, administrative, technical and inspection functions in relation to all front-line units and institutions of the Air Fleet, was in charge of their formation, staffing and combat use, development of tactics and operational art of the Air Fleet, generalization and dissemination of combat experience, political and military education aviators. A large place in his work belonged to the issues of providing air squadrons with aircraft, fuel, and food.

The head of the Field Directorate of Aviation and Aeronautics throughout the entire period of its existence was a military pilot A.V. Sergeev. A. N. Lapchinsky, A. A. Zhuravlev, S. E. Stolyarsky, V. S. Gorshkov occupied leading positions in the administration. The air force played an important role in the mobilization and effective use of aviation forces in the fight against internal and external counter-revolution. On March 25, 1920, on the basis of the conclusions of a commission chaired by a member of the RVSR K. Kh. Danishevsky, who studied the state and structure of the central bodies of the RKKVF, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic transformed the Field Directorate of Aviation and Aeronautics into the Headquarters of the Air Fleet.

Akashev Konstantin Vasilievich

Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (03.1920-02.1921).

Soviet military leader, designer, military pilot. He graduated from the Dvina real school, the flight school at the Italian flying club (1911), the higher school of aeronautics and mechanics (1914) and the military aviation school in France (1915). professional revolutionary. Since the summer of 1909 in exile.

During the First World War, an ordinary volunteer pilot of the French aviation (1914-1915). Upon his return to Russia: designer and test pilot at an aircraft factory (Petrograd), commissar of the Mikhailovsky Artillery School (since 08.1917), member of the Bureau of Aviation and Aeronautics Commissars (since 11.1917).

During the Civil War in Russia: Chairman of the All-Russian Collegium for the Management of the Air Fleet of the Republic (01-05.1918). Under his leadership, the selection of personnel for the RKKVVF was carried out, a lot of work was done to preserve the property and material assets of aviation units. From May 1918 he was a commissar, from July he was a military commissar of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF.

Remaining in his former position, from August 1918 on the fronts of the Civil War: commander of the air fleet of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front, head of aviation and aeronautics of the Southern Front. He headed a special-purpose air group created to fight the white cavalry corps operating in the rear of the troops of the Southern Front of the Red Army (08-09.1919). Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (03.1920-02.1921).

Since the spring of 1921, on a business trip abroad to organize orders and receive aircraft and aviation equipment. Participant of international aviation conferences in London and Rome, an expert on the Air Fleet at the international Genoa Conference (1922). Trade representative of the USSR in Italy, later - in senior positions in Aviatrest, at aircraft factories in Leningrad and Moscow, teacher at the Air Force Academy of the Red Army. prof. N.E. Zhukovsky. Unreasonably repressed (1931). Rehabilitated (1956, posthumously).

Heads of the RKKVVF, Air Force of the Red Army, commanders of the Air Force of the Spacecraft

SERGEEV (PETROV) Andrey Vasilievich

Chief of Staff of the Air Fleet (03/25/1920-02/1921).
Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (09.1921-10.1922).

Znamensky Andrey Alexandrovich

Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (10.1922-04.1923).

Soviet military and statesman, diplomat. He studied at the Tomsk Technological Institute (1906-1908), graduated from the Faculty of Law of Moscow University (1915). He took an active part in revolutionary activities, was arrested twice. Member of the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP (b) (02-10.1917), Deputy Chairman of the RVC Blagushe-Lefortovsky district of Moscow (11.1917). Since December 1917, he was the head of the 1st communist detachment of the Red Guard of the Blagushe-Lefortovsky district, which acted against the Ukrainian Central Rada and the German interventionists in Belarus.

During the Civil War in Russia: a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Council and a member of the MK RCP (b) (1918-06.1919), a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 10th Army of the South - South-Eastern - Caucasian Front (07.1919-07.1920). Since June 1920, the chairman of the executive committee of the Don Regional Council. From August 1920, he was a member of the Far-Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and, at the same time, since November, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Far Eastern People's Republic. In leadership work in the Moscow Council (1921-04.1922).

From October 1922 to April 1923 - Head of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF. One of the initiators of the creation of the Society of Friends of the Air Fleet (ODVF), a member of its presidium. Authorized by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in the Bukhara SSR, representative of the USSR in Bukhara (09.1923-04.1925), authorized by the NKID of the USSR in Central Asia (until 06.1928).

From May 1929 he was Vice Consul of the Consulate General of the USSR in Harbin, from May 1930 he was Consul General of the USSR in Mukden (Shenyang) (China). In 1941, he was dismissed from the service without any official charges and enrolled in the reserve of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

ROZENGOLTS Arkady Pavlovich

Head and Commissioner of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (since 1924 - Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army) (04.1923-12.1924).

Soviet statesman and military figure. Graduated from the Kyiv Commercial Institute (1914). In military service since 1918. Until 1918, he was an active party worker (member of the RSDLPb) from 1905), a participant in the revolution (1905-1907), the February and October revolutions (1917). One of the leaders of the armed uprising in Moscow, a member of the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee.

During the Civil War in Russia: member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (09.1918-07.1919), at the same time political commissar of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front (08-11.1918), later a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of this army (04-06.1919). Since December 1918, a member of the RVS of the 8th Army of the Southern Front (12.1918-03.1919), the 7th Army of the Northern (from 02.1919 - Western) Front (06-09.1919), the 13th Army of the Southern Front (10-12.1919), the Southern (08-12.1918) and Western (05-06.1920) fronts. In 1920, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of Railways of the RSFSR, in 1921-1923. - People's Commissariat of Finance of the RSFSR.

From the end of 1922, he was engaged in the creation and development of the USSR Civil Air Fleet, establishing business relations with airlines of other countries. From April 1923 to December 1924 he was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, head and commissar of the Main Directorate of the RKKVVF (since 1924 Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army) and at the same time chairman of the Council for Civil Aviation of the USSR. Under his leadership, a plan for the development of the Red Army Air Force for the next three years was developed and then approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1925-1927. on diplomatic work in England. Since 1927 he was a member of the board, deputy people's commissar of the workers' and peasants' inspection of the USSR (12.1928-10.1930). Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign and Domestic Trade of the USSR (10-11.1930), People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR (since 11.1930). Since February 1934, a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

In June 1937, he was relieved of his post, in August he was appointed head of the State Reserves Department under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Unreasonably repressed (1938). Rehabilitated (1988, posthumously).

Awards: Order of the Red Banner.

In accordance with the decision of the Soviet government of April 15, 1924, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet was renamed the Air Force of the Red Army (VVS RKKA), and the Main Directorate of the Air Fleet was renamed the Directorate of the Air Force (UVVS), subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR .

BARANOV Petr Ionovich

Head of the Red Army Air Force (12/10/1924-06/1931).

Soviet military figure. In military service since 1915. He graduated from the Chernyaev general education courses in St. Petersburg. professional revolutionary. From March 1917 he was the chairman of the regimental committee, from September he was the chairman of the front department of Rumcheroda (the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Romanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Odessa Military District), from December he was the chairman of the revolutionary committee of the Romanian Front.

During the Civil War in Russia: Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the 8th Army (01-04.1918), Commander of the 4th Donetsk Army (04-06.1918), Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces of the South of Russia (06-09.1918), military commissar of the headquarters of the 4th army (since 09.1918). During the period 1919-1920. served in the following positions: a member of the RVS of the 8th Army, the Southern Army Group of the Eastern Front, the Turkestan Front, the 1st and 14th armies.

In 1921, he was the head of the political department of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea. In 1921-1922. member of the RVS of the Turkestan Front and acting commander of the troops of the Fergana region, in 1923 the head and commissar of the armored forces of the Red Army. From August 1923 - assistant to the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Fleet for political affairs, from October 1924 - deputy head, from December - head of the air force, from March 1925 - head of the Red Army Air Force, at the same time in 1925-1931. member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR.

With his active participation, the Air Force was restructured in accordance with the military reform of 1924-1925, decisions were implemented to mobilize command personnel from other military branches in the Air Force. From June 1931 he was a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR and head of the All-Union Aviation Association, from January 1932 he was deputy people's commissar of heavy industry and head of the Main Directorate of the aviation industry. Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

Tragically died in a plane crash (1933).

Awards: Order of Lenin, Red Banner; Military Red Order of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic; Order of the Red Star of the 1st degree of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic.

Commander 2nd rank ALKSNIS (ASTROV) Yakov Ivanovich

Head of the Red Army Air Force (06.1931-11.1937).

Soviet military leader, commander of the 2nd rank (1936). He has been in military service since March 1917. He graduated from the Odessa Military School of Ensigns (1917), the Military Academy of the Red Army (1924), the Kachin Military Aviation School (1929).

During the First World War: officer of the 15th Siberian Reserve Regiment, ensign. After the October Revolution (1917) he worked in the Soviet bodies of Latvia, Bryansk.

During the Civil War in Russia: military commissar of the Oryol province, commissar of the 55th rifle division, assistant commander of the Oryol military district (spring 1920-08.1921). In the period 1924-1926. assistant to the head of the organizational and mobilization department, head and commissar of the department for the organization of troops of the Headquarters of the Red Army, head of the department for the organization of troops of the Main Directorate of the Red Army. From August 1926 he was deputy head of the Air Force Directorate, from June 1931 he was head of the Red Army Air Force and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, later of the Military Council of the NPO of the USSR. From January to November 1937, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for the Air Force - Head of the Red Army Air Force.

He did a great job of improving the organizational structure of the Air Force, equipping them with new military equipment. One of the initiators of the deployment of activities OSOAVIAKHIM and for the training of pilots and paratroopers.

Unreasonably repressed (1938). Rehabilitated (1956, posthumously).

Awards: Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Red Star; foreign order.

Colonel General LOKTIONOV Alexander Dmitrievich

Head of the Red Army Air Force (12.1937-11.1939).

Soviet military commander, colonel general (1940). In military service since 1914. He graduated from the Oranienbaum ensign school (1916), the Higher Academic Courses (1923) and advanced training courses for senior officers (1928).

In the First World War: commander of a company, battalion, ensign. After the February Revolution (1917), he was a member of the regimental committee, then assistant to the regiment commander.

During the Civil War in Russia: commander of a battalion, regiment, brigade. After the war, assistant commander, commander and military commissar of the 2nd Rifle Division (1923-11.1930), commander and commissar of the 4th Rifle Corps (11.1930-10.1933). In 1933 he was transferred to the Air Force and appointed assistant commander of the Belarusian, then Kharkov military districts for aviation (10.1933-08.1937). In August - December 1937 - Commander of the Central Asian Military District. In December 1937 he was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force (until 11.1939). In 1938, he participated in the organization of a non-stop flight of the Rodina aircraft on the Moscow-Far East route. From November 1939 to July 1940 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for Aviation. From July to December 1940, commander of the forces of the newly created Baltic (from August - special) military district.

Unreasonably repressed (1941). Rehabilitated (1955, posthumously).

Awards: 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star; medal "XX years of the Red Army"

Air Lieutenant General SMUSHKEVICH Yakov Vladimirovich

Head of the Red Army Air Force (11.1939-08.1940).

Soviet military figure, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (21.6.1937, 17.11.1939), lieutenant general of aviation (1940). In military service since 1918. He graduated from the Kachinsk military pilot school (1931), advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze (1937).

During the Civil War in Russia: political instructor of a company, battalion, commissar of a rifle regiment. Since 1922, in the Air Force of the Red Army: political instructor of the squadron and commissar of the air group. Since November 1931, commander and commissar of the 201st air brigade.

From October 1936 to July 1937, he took part in the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people (1936-1939), senior military adviser for aviation under the command of the Republican troops, led the organization of air defense in Madrid and military installations in the Guadalajara region. From June 1937, Deputy Chief of the Air Force of the Red Army, from September 1939 - I.d. Commander of the Air Force of the Kyiv Special Military District.

In May - August 1939, during the fighting with Japanese troops on the river. Khalkhin-Gol (Mongolia) commanded the 1st air group. Head of the Red Army Air Force (11/19/1939-08/15/1940).

From August 1940 - Inspector General of Aviation of the Red Army, from December 1940 - Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation.

Unreasonably repressed (1941). Rehabilitated (1954, posthumously).

Awards: 2 orders of Lenin; 2 medals "Gold Star"; medal "XX years of the Red Army"; foreign order.

Air Lieutenant General

Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force (08.1940-04.1941).

Soviet military figure, lieutenant general of aviation (1940), Hero of the Soviet Union (12/31/1936).

In military service since 1928. He graduated from the 2nd Military Theoretical School of Pilots. OSOAVIAKhIM of the USSR (1930), 2nd military pilot school in Borisoglebsk (1931). He served in the following positions: (3rd Aviation Squadron of the 5th Aviation Brigade of the Ukrainian Military District): junior pilot (11.1931-07.1932), flight commander (07.1932-1933), commander of a fighter squadron (1933-09.1936); commander of the 65th Fighter Squadron of the 81st Air Brigade of the Ukrainian Military District (since 09.1936).

From November 1936 to February 1937, as a flight commander, he participated in the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people (1936-1939), shot down 6 enemy aircraft. Upon returning to his homeland from February 1937, Deputy. commander, from July commander of a fighter squadron, from December - senior military adviser on the use of Soviet volunteer pilots in China, where he commanded Soviet military aviation, participated in air battles with the Japanese. Since March 1938, the commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military Circle, since April - the Primorsky Group of Forces, OKDVA, the Far Eastern Front, since September - the 1st Separate Red Banner Army. During the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940) commander of the Air Force of the 9th Army.

From June 1940, Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force, from July - First Deputy, from August - Head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, from February 1941, simultaneously Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for Aviation. Being in high positions in the Air Force, he persistently dealt with the issues of improving the quality of aircraft, improving the professional skills of pilots, attached great importance to the construction of new and reconstruction of old airfields. He was convinced that in the coming war, air supremacy would be won mainly in the course of fighter aviation battles over the front line.

In April 1941, he was removed from his posts and enrolled to study at the Academy of the General Staff. Unreasonably repressed (1941). Rehabilitated (1954, posthumously).

Awards: 2 Orders of Lenin (twice 1936), Gold Star medal, 3 Orders of the Red Banner (1936, 1938, 1940); medal "XX years of the Red Army" (1938).

Air Chief Marshal ZHIGAREV Pavel Fyodorovich

Commander of the Air Force KA (06.1941-04.1942).
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (09-1949-01.1957).

Soviet military leader, Air Chief Marshal (1955). He has been in military service since 1919. He graduated from the 4th Tver Cavalry School (1922), the Leningrad Military Observer Pilot School (1927), the Air Force Academy of the Red Army. prof. N.E. Zhukovsky (1932), postgraduate course with her (1933), Kachinskaya military aviation school (1934).

During the Civil War in Russia, he served in a reserve cavalry regiment in Tver (1919-1920). After the war, he successively held the following positions: commander of a cavalry platoon, pilot-observer, instructor and teacher of the pilot school, chief of staff of the Kachinskaya military aviation school (1933-1934). In 1934-1936. commanded aviation units, from a separate squadron to an air brigade.

In 1937-1938. was on a business trip in China, leading a group of Soviet volunteer pilots. From September 1938 he was the head of the combat training department of the Red Army Air Force, from January 1939 he was the commander of the Air Force of the 2nd Separate Far Eastern Red Banner Army, from December 1940 he was the first deputy, from April 1941 he was the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force.

During the Great Patriotic War: Commander of the Air Force of the Red Army (from 06/29/1941). He initiated the creation of mobile aviation reserves of the Civil Code at the beginning of the war, was directly involved in planning and directing the combat operations of Soviet aviation in the Battle of Moscow (12.1941-04.1942). Since April 1942, the commander of the Air Force of the Far Eastern Front.

During the Soviet-Japanese War (1945) commander of the 10th Air Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front. First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (04.1946-1948), Commander of Long-Range Aviation - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1948-08.1949).

From September 1949 to January 1957 - Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, from April 1953 simultaneously Deputy (from March 1955 - First Deputy) Minister of Defense of the USSR. Head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. (01.1957-11.1959), head of the Air Defense Military Command Academy (11.1959-1963).

Awards: 2 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, orders of Kutuzov 1st class, Red Star; USSR medals.

Air Chief Marshal NOVIKOV Alexander Alexandrovich

Commander of the Air Force KA (04.1942-04.1946).

Soviet military figure, commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (04/17/1945, 09/08/1945), Air Chief Marshal (1944). He has been in military service since 1919. He graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod infantry command courses (1920), the Shot courses (1922) and the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze (1930).

During the Civil War, he went from a Red Army soldier to an assistant chief of intelligence division. After the war, he successively held the following positions: company commander (1922-1923), battalion commander (1923-1927), head of the operational department of the rifle corps headquarters (1930-02.1931). From February 1931 as part of the Red Army Air Force: chief of staff of an air brigade, from October 1935 - commander of the 42nd light bomber squadron, from 1938 - chief of staff of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District. Member of the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940): Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the North-Western Front. Since July 1940, commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War: Commander of the Northern Air Force, from August 1941 - of the Leningrad Fronts and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction for Aviation. From February 1942 he was First Deputy Commander of the Red Army Air Force, from April - Commander of the Air Force - Deputy (until May 1943) People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for Aviation. As a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, he coordinated the combat operations of aviation from several fronts in the battles of Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, in operations to liberate the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Poland, during the assault on Koenigsberg, in the Berlin operation and in the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

He made a lot of new things in the theory and practice of aviation. In April 1946, he was subjected to unjustified arrest and was sentenced to 5 years in prison. In 1953, he was rehabilitated, the criminal case against him was terminated for lack of corpus delicti, his military rank was restored and all awards were returned.

Since June 1953, commander of Long-Range Aviation, at the same time Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (12.1954-03.1955). From March 1955 to January 1956 at the disposal of the Minister of Defense of the USSR. With the transfer to the reserve (1956), the head of the Higher Aviation School of the Civil Air Fleet in Leningrad, at the same time headed the department, professor (1958).

Awards: 3 Orders of Lenin, 2 Gold Star medals, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st class, Order of the Red Banner of Labor, 2 Orders of the Red Star; USSR medals; foreign orders and medals.