The state should not only act with great foresight, but also be able to wait patiently

It would seem that the young Soviet branch of science could in no way compete with the German industrial institutions, which had a powerful material base, excellent scientists and strong traditions. German concerns have long maintained large research institutions. Here they well remembered the statement of Professor P. Thyssen: “Research is the foundation of technical superiority over the enemy. Research is the basis for worldwide competition." However, it is not enough to have power - you still need to use it correctly.

The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the USSR was able to fully utilize its modest scientific resources. All research institutions and organizations that could bring at least some benefit were involved in solving the pressing problems of tank building.

It should be noted that this was facilitated by the entire system of Soviet applied science, originally created to serve the interests of not individual firms and factories, but at least the industry. By the way, such a system does not necessarily stem from the socialist system: the first industry-wide scientific structure appeared in Sweden in 1747 as part of the so-called Iron Office. By the way, it still operates today under the name "Association of Steel Producers of the Scandinavian Countries."

Departmental institutions of the NKTP

The People's Commissariat of the tank industry of the war years consisted of two main research institutions: the "armor" institute TsNII-48 and the design and technology institute 8GSPI.

NII-48 (director - A. S. Zavyalov) became part of the newly formed NKTP in the fall of 1941 and was immediately evacuated to Sverdlovsk, closer to the new tank factories. In accordance with the regulations approved on July 15, 1942, it became officially known as the State Central Research Institute of the NKTP of the USSR (TsNII-48). His list of tasks included:

"a) development and introduction into production of new types of armor and armor, structural and tool steel grades, non-ferrous and various special alloys in order to reduce the scarce or potentially scarce alloying elements contained in them, improve the quality of products manufactured by NKTP plants, and increase productivity the latter;

b) development and implementation of rational wartime metallurgical technology in the industries existing at the NKTP factories and armored factories of other people's commissariats, in order to maximize the output of products, improve their quality, increase the productivity of factories and reduce the consumption rates of metal, raw materials and materials;

Collage by Andrey Sedykh

c) technological assistance to factories in mastering new technologies or equipment for them, as well as working methods in order to overcome bottlenecks and production difficulties that arise at factories;

d) assistance in improving the technical qualifications of workers at NKTP plants by transferring to them the theoretical and practical experience accumulated in the USSR and abroad in armor production and other industries of the profile of NKTP plants;

e) organization of interfactory exchange of advanced technical experience of factories;

f) development of the theory and new ways of using armor protection for the armament of the Red Army;

g) coordination of all research work carried out in the NKTP system on issues of armor, metal science, metallurgy, hot working and welding of metals and alloys;

h) comprehensive technical assistance to design bureaus and other organizations and enterprises of other people's commissariats on all issues of armored production.

A clear idea of ​​the scope of NII-48's activities is provided by its annual reports. So, in 1943 alone, proposals were developed and partially implemented in practice to reduce the number of consumed rolled profile sizes by 2.5 times. The technical processes for forging and stamping parts of the T-34 tank were also unified for all plants, the technical conditions for their heat treatment were revised, the processes for welding T-34 armored hulls and steel casting were unified, a chemical-thermal method for sharpening cutters was created, casting of tank turrets into a chill mold was introduced at UZTM, new grades of armor steel: 68L for cast parts T-34, an improved version of 8C for rolled armor, I-3 - steel with high hardness in a highly tempered state. At the Ural Tank Plant, employees of NII-48 worked out and introduced into production an improved brand of high-speed steel I-323. To this it is necessary to add surveys of defeats of domestic and enemy armored vehicles, which have become regular, both at repair plants and directly on the battlefield. The received reports and recommendations were immediately brought to the attention of all the chief designers of combat vehicles.

Or, for example, information of a different kind: during January-October 1944, at meetings of the Technical Council of the NKTP (where representatives of all factories were invited), the following reports of TsNII-48 were discussed:

"Unified technological processes for the manufacture of castings from iron, steel and non-ferrous metals."

"Documentation on the technology of forging - stamping".

"Influence of strain rate on metal penetration resistance".

"Modern Types of Anti-tank Artillery and the Development of Tank Armor".

"High-tempered armor of high hardness".

"Technological properties of low-alloyed high-speed steel P823 and the results of its implementation in the production of plant No. 183".

"Improving the strength of steel due to intensifiers (boron-containing additives, zirconium, etc.)".

"Improving the strength of steel for heavily loaded gears".

"Improving the fatigue strength of crankshafts made from steel grade 18KhNMA".

"Normals of chemical composition and mechanical properties of steel grades used in tank building".

And so - throughout the war years. The workload and pace are unbelievable, given that at the end of 1943, TsNII-48 had only 236 employees, including janitors and technicians. True, among them were 2 academicians, 1 corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 4 doctors and 10 candidates of sciences.

The 8th State Union Design Institute of the Tank Industry (director - A. I. Solin) was evacuated to Chelyabinsk at the end of 1941. In the first period of the war, all the forces of the 8GSPI were directed to fulfill the tasks of the People's Commissariat for the deployment and commissioning of evacuated tank and engine factories, as well as the development of simplified wartime technologies.

By the middle of 1942, other tasks came to the fore: the unification of technological processes (primarily machining and assembly) and the provision of various scientific and technical assistance to enterprises. So, at the Ural Tank Plant, a team of scientists and designers 8GSPI in the summer and autumn was engaged in a comprehensive calculation of the plant's capacity, theoretical calculations of the tank's transmission, reduction of the range of ferrous metals used, improvement of the design and manufacturing technology of 26 machine parts, unification of the cutting tool. The Central Bureau of Standardization, which operated as part of the 8GSPI, created and implemented directly at enterprises standards in the field of drawing facilities, parts and assemblies of tanks, organization of control and measuring facilities, unification of tools, fixtures, dies, and technological documentation. Thanks to the help of the bureau, the thirty-four manufacturing plants managed to achieve complete interchangeability in terms of components: final drive, final clutch, gearbox, main clutch, drive wheel, road wheels with external and internal shock absorption, sloth. The introduction of the developments of the bureau made it possible, according to estimates in 1944, to reduce the labor intensity in the industry by 0.5 million machine hours per year. The quality of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns was largely predetermined by technical control standards, also drawn up by employees of the 8GSPI.

A separate and important area of ​​work of the 8GSPI is the creation of documentation for the army repairmen and repair plants of the NKTP for the restoration of tanks and engines of all types, including captured ones and those supplied by the Allies. During 1942 alone, technical conditions appeared for the overhaul and military repairs of the KV, T-34, T-60 and T-70 tanks and the V-2-34, V-2KV and GAZ-202 engines, as well as albums of drawings of devices for dismantling and installation of T-34 and KV units in the field.

Involved technological research institutes and laboratories

In addition to the main institutions, scientists from many design and technological institutions that previously operated in other sectors of the national economy worked for the tank industry.

It is known that the main part of the staff of the central laboratory of plant No. 183 was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, which was evacuated together with the enterprise in 1941. At one time, in 1928, this scientific institution was established as a branch of the Leningrad All-Union Institute of Metals of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. The latter has been conducting its own since 1914 and was originally called the Central Scientific and Technical Laboratory of the Military Department. In September 1930, the Kharkov Institute of Metals became independent, but retained its former research topics: heat power engineering of metallurgical furnaces, foundry technology, hot and cold working and welding, physical and mechanical properties of metals.

The State Allied Research Laboratory of Cutting Tools and Electric Welding named after Ignatiev (LARIG) was located on the site of plant No. 183 in accordance with the order of the NKTP dated December 26, 1941, and retained the status of an independent institution. The duties of the laboratory included the provision of technical assistance to all enterprises in the industry in the design, manufacture and repair of cutting tools, as well as the development of electric welding machines.

The first major result of the work of LARIG was obtained in July 1942: at plant No. 183, the introduction of boring multi-cutter blocks developed in the laboratory began. At the end of the year, scientists, using new cutters of their own design and changing their modes of operation, achieved a significant increase in the productivity of carousel machines that processed the drive wheels of the tank. Thus, the "bottleneck" that limited the tank conveyor was eliminated.

During the same 1942, LARIG completed the work begun before the war on the introduction of cast cutter holders instead of the generally accepted forged ones. This reduced the cost of the tool and unloaded the forging industry. It turned out that cast holders, although inferior in mechanical strength to forged ones, served no worse than the latter. By the end of the year, the laboratory introduced shortened taps into production. This project also began before the war, and together with the 8GSPI Institute.

At another NKTP enterprise, Uralmashzavod, ENIMS operated during the war years, that is, the Experimental Scientific Institute of Metal-cutting Machine Tools. Its employees developed, and UZTM manufactured a number of unique machine tools and entire automatic lines used throughout the people's commissariat.

So, in the spring of 1942, at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183, the ENIMS brigade “set up” the production of rollers with internal shock absorption. She created the technological process and working drawings for three fixtures and 14 positions of cutting and auxiliary tools. In addition, projects for a multi-spindle drilling head and modernization of the ZHOR rotary machine were completed. An additional task for ENIMS was the development and manufacture of eight special machines for turning wheels.

The same thing happened in the processing of balancers. The ENIMS team was engaged in both the technological process as a whole and the creation of a special tool. In addition, the institute took over the design and manufacture of two modular boring machines: one multi-spindle and one multi-position. By the end of 1942, both were made.

Academic and university science

The most famous academic institution that worked for the tank industry is the Kyiv Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Academician E. O. Paton. During 1942–1943, the institute, together with employees of the armored hull department of plant No. 183, created a whole range of machine guns of various types and purposes. In 1945, UTZ used the following auto-welding machines:

Universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts;
-simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
- installations with a carousel for product rotation when welding circular seams;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.

In 1945, automatic weapons accounted for 23 percent of the welding work (by weight of weld metal) on the hull and 30 percent on the turret of the T-34 tank. The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 at only one plant No. 183 to release 60 qualified welders, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam in automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing to machine the edges of armor parts. Throughout the war, as the instruction for the operation of automatic welding machines at the enterprises of the industry, the “Guidelines for Automatic Welding of Armored Structures” compiled by employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR in 1942 were used.

The activities of the institute were not limited to automatic welding. Its employees introduced a method of repairing cracks in tank tracks using welding with austenite electrodes, a device for cutting round holes in armor plates. The scientists also developed a scheme for the in-line production of high-quality MD electrodes and a technology for drying them on a conveyor.

Much less known are the results of work at the NKTP of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Throughout the war, he continued to study the problems of the interaction of the projectile and armor, created various options for constructive armor barriers and multilayer armor. It is known that prototypes were manufactured and fired at Uralmash.

A very interesting story is connected with Bauman Moscow State Technical University. At the beginning of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP became interested in a cutting tool with rational sharpening angles, created in the course of many years of work by scientists from this famous Russian university. It was known that such a tool had already been used at the factories of the People's Commissariat of Arms.

To begin with, an attempt was made to obtain information about the innovation directly from the People's Commissariat of Armaments, but, apparently, without much success. As a result, scientists from the Department of Theory of Machining and Tools of the Moscow State Technical University headed by Professor I.M. In the summer and autumn of 1943, quite successful experiments were carried out, and on November 12, an order was issued by the NKTP for the widespread introduction of such a tool and the dispatch of MVTU employees to factories No. 183 and No. tool with rational geometry.

The project turned out to be more than successful: cutters, drills and milling cutters had 1.6-5 times longer durability and allowed to increase machine productivity by 25-30 percent. Simultaneously with rational geometry, MVTU scientists proposed a system of chip breakers for cutters. With their help, plant No. 183 at least partially solved the problems with cleaning and further disposal of chips.

By the end of the war, scientists of the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University. Bauman compiled a special manual called "Guidelines on the geometry of the cutting tool." By order of the People's Commissariat, they were approved "... as mandatory in the design of special cutting tools at the NKTP factories and in the further development of new 8GPI normals" and sent to all enterprises and institutions of the industry.

Another interesting technology - surface hardening of steel parts using high-frequency currents - was introduced at the enterprises of the tank industry by employees of the laboratory of electrothermy of the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute, headed by Professor V.P. Vologdin. At the beginning of 1942, the laboratory staff consisted of only 19 people, and 9 of them operated at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. The most massive parts were chosen as the object of processing - final drive gears, cylinder liners and piston pins of the V-2 diesel engine. Once mastered, the new technology freed up to 70 percent of CHKZ thermal furnaces, and the operation time decreased from tens of hours to tens of minutes.

At Tagil Plant No. 183, HDTV hardening technology was introduced in 1944. At first, three parts were subjected to surface hardening - the trunnion of the gun, the main friction clutch and the axle of the drive wheel roller.

The list of research institutes and laboratories that created technologies for the tank industry of the USSR is not exhausted by the examples given. But what has been said is enough to understand: during the war years, the NKTP turned into the largest scientific and production association in our country.

Swan, crayfish and pike in the German version

In contrast to the USSR, German industrial science was divided into cramped corporate cells and cut off from university science by an iron curtain. In any case, this is what a large group of scientific and technical leaders of the former Third Reich claims in the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science” compiled after the end of the war. Let us quote a rather extensive quotation: “The research organization of industry was independent, did not need the help of any ministry, state research council or other departments ... This organization worked for itself and at the same time behind closed doors. The consequence was that a researcher from any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about those discoveries and improvements that were being made in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions of their scientists secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a large common cauldron and could only bring partial success for a common cause. The Minister of Armaments and Military Production A. Speer tried to unite industrialists in the system of branch "committees" and "centers", to establish technological interaction between factories, but he could not completely solve the problem. Corporate interests were above all.

If branch institutes worked for concerns, then German university science in the first period of the Second World War was generally out of work. Based on the strategy of a lightning war, the leadership of the Reich considered it possible to complete it with the one with which the troops entered the battle. Consequently, all studies that did not promise results in the shortest possible time (no more than a year) were declared unnecessary and curtailed. We read further the review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Scientists were assigned to the category of human resources from which replenishment for the front was scooped ... As a result, despite the objections of the arms department and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical educational institutions and various research institutes, including indispensable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, engine building, etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as a soldier." Major defeats and the appearance on the battlefield of new types of weapons (Soviet T-34 tanks, British radars, American long-range bombers, etc.) forced Hitler and his entourage to moderate their rejection of intellectuals: 10 thousand scientists, engineers and technicians were withdrawn from the front . Among them were even 100 humanitarians. J. Goebbels had to issue a special directive on the prohibition of attacks against scientists in the press, on radio, in cinema and theater.

But it was too late: due to the loss of pace, the results of research and new developments, sometimes promising, did not have time to get into the troops. Let us give the general conclusion of the same review “The Rise and Decline of German Science”: “Science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must not only act with great foresight and skill, but also be able to patiently wait for these fruits.

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Badly Fine

Retired Major General I.N. Vorobyov Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor

Colonel V.A. Kiselev Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor

In recent years, the journal Military Thought has published a number of articles on questions of military science. Attention is drawn to the conclusion made by Professor Major General S.A. Tyushkevich that "the state of our military science does not fully meet modern requirements ...". The military philosopher G.P. Belokonev expressed his agreement with this conclusion in the article "Philosophy and Military Science". Unfortunately, the authors did not adequately substantiate their thesis, and most importantly, they did not put forward constructive proposals on what should be done to solve this problem. While agreeing in principle with the opinion of the authors, we would like to express our opinions on this issue.

The main reason that Russian military science, starting from the 90s of the last century, began to decline and lose its prestige as the most advanced military science in the world, was that military development in the country, military service, military history, and Also, the methodological basis of military science - dialectical materialism - was subjected to the sharpest ideological abstractionism, and in a number of cases - falsification. The centuries-old traditions of the Russian state were simply ignored during the implementation of the military reform. The negative consequences of such a policy were not long in affecting a sharp decline in the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces, a reduction in the financing of the military budget, and a decrease in the prestige of military service. This had the most tangible impact on the conduct of two Chechen military campaigns.

Under present conditions, military science is in the stage of "catching up development." We are now talking about its revival, increasing its role and place in the system of other social sciences, clearly defining tasks in ensuring the defense security of the state and preparing the Armed Forces for armed struggle, developing new forms and methods of waging it.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that recently the military leadership of the country has been striving to raise the status of military science, to intensify the research and theoretical activities of scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense and to ensure proactive scientific and practical study of the most important problems in the field of military and military-technical policy in the interests of strengthening national defense states.

Former Minister of Defense, now First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov, speaking on January 24, 2004 at the military scientific conference of the Academy of Military Sciences, emphasized that “the further development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the creation of a professional army of the 21st century is impossible without military science standing at the height of the most modern requirements. Further, S. B. Ivanov stated: “We must admit that, to date, military science has not revealed a clear generalized type of modern war and armed conflict ... The task of military science today is to reveal their general patterns, so that reasonable forecasting of the nature of future wars and effective planning".

It is positive that military science is becoming a state priority. At the same time, it is important that this be supported by the allocation of the necessary financial resources to strengthen the military-industrial complex, the conduct of promising research work, the training of military scientific personnel and the publication of works on general theoretical and methodological

problems of military science, including foreign publications on military topics.

At the present stage, military science faces ever more complex tasks. This is due to the fact that the main object of her research - war, like a chameleon, is increasingly changing its strategic appearance, and therefore becomes difficult to predict. Recently, the term "wrong" wars has even flashed in the press, as opposed to the established views on "classical" wars. Yes, indeed, if we take the two wars against Iraq (1991 and 2003), then by their nature, the methods of warfare, the types of weapons used, they do not fit into the prevailing stereotypes. It turns out that military practice has begun to outstrip military theory, and military science is beginning to lose its main function as a "searchlight" for military events, which, of course, cannot be reconciled with.

Life, the practice of military construction, urgently demand from military science that it squeeze out sufficiently accurate and well-founded forecasts in the range of 15-20 or more years ahead, answer questions about what an armed struggle, operation, battle can be technologically; how the content of military-political, military-economic and military-technical factors, their influence on the forms and methods of military operations will change; what requirements must be met by the composition, organization and technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the forms and methods of command and control of troops in peacetime and wartime; how it is necessary to prepare the population and mobilization resources for war.

Military historical experience has shown that military science could rise in its development to a qualitatively new level, develop correct long-term guidelines for military development, military doctrine, and not only keep up with scientific and technological progress, but also outstrip it when it relied on time-tested philosophical and methodological basis - dialectical materialism. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the judgment of A.A. Svechin: “Dialectics cannot be expelled from the everyday life of strategic thought, since it constitutes its essence.”

It is precisely by relying on dialectical principles, the system of learned laws and regularities inherent in war, that military science is able to "look" far ahead, to play the role of a "seer" in military development. Now, when more and more new concepts appear, the so-called non-contact, remote, robotic, aerospace, situational, transcontinental wars, the creative function of military science is especially important. The emergence of new views on the nature of the armed struggle of the future at the present stage is naturally inevitable, just as on the eve of World War II, new theories of air warfare (Duai), mechanized wars by small professional armies (Fuller, Mitchell, Seeckt, de Gaulle), which, although not justified suddenly, but foreshadowed the coming changes in the methods of warfare. In part, they were adopted by the "armament" of the Nazi army.

The great seer K.E. Tsiolkovsky wrote: “Performance is preceded by thought, accurate calculation by fantasy.” Nowadays, it no longer seems like a fantastic embodiment of such technical “super projects” as the transmission of energy without wires; control of gravitational systems, and consequently, the creation of gravitational weapons; the creation of an engine made of ceramics, “cybernetic” organisms, a train “floating” through the air; the search for psychotropic devices that allow "control" of thoughts, acoustic generators that disrupt brain function; powerful microwave energy emitters to detonate ammunition before use; combustion inhibitors; chemicals that make metal brittle; microbes that turn fuel into jelly; "sucking" foam, non-lethal weapons, etc.

To assess how these and many other technological discoveries will affect the development of forms and methods of military operations is the primary task of futurological forecasts. Extrapolating the directions of the development of armed struggle, the following leading trends can be distinguished: further integration of the combat use of the types of armed forces in all spatial spheres - on continents, seas, oceans, under water, in the ether, near-Earth airspace, near, middle and far space; complication of the conditions, methods of unleashing and waging both large-scale and local wars and armed conflicts with and without the use of weapons with unlimited strategic capabilities; the likelihood of conducting fleeting, but extremely tense, decisive and dynamic military operations; strengthening the role of information confrontation; further aggravation of the contradictions between the means of attack and defense; transformation of power and non-power forms of struggle with the transfer of the center of gravity to non-traditional types using the strategy of "indirect actions".

The military science of the 21st century should be a science of divination, unacceptable to dogmas, immutable canons, and at the same time relying on the experience acquired by previous generations, developed methodological principles, such as purposefulness and non-stereotyping of search; logical sequence of research; consistency; perspective; reasoning of the received results; objectivity of conclusions; historicity.

In general terms, the goal of predictive research is to determine the fundamental guidelines for transformative military-theoretical and practical activities, the formation of an asymmetric military policy, the planning of advanced military development, and the development of new concepts for the use of armed forces based on new high technologies. The transition from the mechanized wars of the industrial society to the intellectual, information wars of the technological era implies the need to develop a new strategy, new operational art and new tactics for the future using electromagnetic (super EMP, laser weapons, radiation of a certain frequency affecting the human nervous system), acoustic, gravitational and other types of weapons, including those based on new physical principles. The effectiveness of forecasting the armed struggle of the technological era depends on the depth of revealing its new patterns, the ability to use them correctly, to model them, on the completeness of the disclosure of new factors influencing the forms and methods of conducting non-contact, remote warfare, identifying their relationship, extrapolating trends, applying correlative analysis.

The gradual evolutionary process of the technologization of armed struggle, characteristic of the past, is now giving way not just to a rapid, but to an abrupt renewal of its material basis. But if the base is modernized radically and in the shortest possible time, then the superstructure - the forms and methods of military operations - should also undergo corresponding transformations. In practice, this means the possibility of the emergence of non-standard - gravitational, robotic, cybernetic, space and other wars. Thus, the appearance on the “chessboard” of strategy of such a revolutionary factor as space radically changes the idea of ​​future armed clashes without the participation of mass land armies.

The hypothesis is that the use of third-generation combat orbital systems capable of hitting objects not only in space, but also from space using the entire arsenal of "star wars" - from combat space stations (platforms) to aerospace aircraft and reusable spacecraft gives grounds to expect in the future the appearance in near-Earth airspace of space operations to destroy means of nuclear attack in flight, to block outer space, to destroy orbital and ground-based space constellations, to seize and hold important areas of near-Earth space, and to suppress the radio engineering systems of orbital ground constellations. The ability of space weapons to hit basic military facilities anywhere on the planet gives armed confrontation a volume-global character. This means that there will be no inaccessible places in the location of the warring parties for space and other means of destruction, which means that the concepts of front and rear, operational lines and flanks will lose their former meaning.

It follows logically from what has been considered that to create a model of an operation of the future means to create a physical, mental or combined analogue of such an operation that would reflect the experience of the past and new patterns of military operations, taking into account the development of weapons and military equipment.

Nowadays, more and more attention is being paid to the study of information warfare, which is expected to develop into an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, armed and other forms of struggle. Based on the experience of local wars, since the 1980s, the United States has been making intensive efforts to improve information technology. Thus, out of 22 strategic-level critical technologies determined for the future, 12, i.e. more than half relate directly to computer science. It is characteristic that the total share of expenditures in the budget of the US Department of Defense for control, communications, intelligence, electronic warfare and computerization systems reached 20% in the 90s of the last century against 7% in the 80s and continues to grow.

The principles of conducting information confrontation are: secrecy, sophistication; systematic; activity; variety of methods; credibility; selectivity; knowledge of the enemy's psychology, reflective control of his behavior; preemption of the enemy. The components of such a struggle can be: information blockade, counterintelligence activities, electronic suppression of enemy combat control systems; conducting an electronic fire information and strike operation; a combination of fire, electronic and massive information and psychological impact on the enemy.

In the United States, information confrontation is considered as one of the methods of conducting the so-called "controlled war" (R.Kann), when the strongest side, through informational influence, dictates its will to the enemy without the use of weapons. Forceful actions in such a confrontation are envisaged at the final phase of actions, if the political, diplomatic and other possibilities of "bloodless crushing" of the enemy state are exhausted. New in conducting a complex information-strike operation, according to the experience of local wars, is that the massive use of the latest electronic means, setting up radio curtains, radio interference, creating a false electronic situation, simulating false radio networks, radio blockade of channels for collecting and processing enemy information are combined with air-ground operations, the launch of sea-based cruise missiles, the actions of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire systems, remote-controlled and manned vehicles.

The predictability of military science largely depends on the improvement of research methods that make it possible to extract, systematize and analyze knowledge, make generalizations, conclusions, conclusions and verify their truth. However, it should be noted that the methods developed to date impose fundamental limitations on the possibility of forecasting both in the time range and in the range of forecasting objects. The point is that all the factors influencing the armed struggle are amenable to predictive assessments. Hence, the maximum possible lead time for predicting a given accuracy in warfare is still small. The deviation of the forecast from the actual state of the object can be quite significant. Based on this, it is important to improve the methodology of military scientific research, which would ensure the interconnection and subordination of forecasts of various levels of the hierarchy of the forecasting object (wars, operations, battles, battles), the continuity of the research process, the consistency of various types of forecasts; identifying emerging contradictions and ways to resolve them, correcting the results of the forecast.

The arsenal of modern methods for studying military science is extensive - these are, first of all, general scientific methods: intuitive-logical, logical, historical, heuristic, extrapolation, system analysis, mathematical modeling, empirical, probability theory, factor analysis, the "tree of goals" method, etc. The peculiarity of the human intellect, as noted by N. Wiener, is that the human brain has the ability to "operate" with vaguely defined concepts. This gives him the opportunity to solve logical problems in terms of complexity, to create, to foresee, to discover something new. Great hopes at one time were placed on the use of cybernetic and mathematical modeling methods, the use of electronic computers for collecting, processing and analyzing information in the process of forecasting. However, the hopes were justified only partially.

And yet, despite certain prognostic shifts, the "barrier of uncertainty" in military affairs could not be overcome with the help of new methods. The greatest success in forecasting has been achieved in those areas that are relatively easy to quantify (development of weapons systems, determination of the combat potential of groupings of troops, military-economic capabilities of the parties, calculation of the balance of forces, etc.) and, conversely, where it is necessary to operate with qualitative indicators and concepts, which constitute the core of warfare forecasting, the “far-sightedness” of military theory is still limited.

Their own specific methods of researching military science need to be improved, such as research and experimental military, aviation and naval exercises, research command and staff exercises, military games and maneuvers, which are carried out to solve problems of strategy, operational art and tactics, questions of the development of the armed forces, improving combat and mobilization readiness, organizational structure, equipping troops with weapons and military equipment. Scientific and methodological improvement of ongoing exercises and military games using computer technology is one of the important areas of predictive research. Many unresolved problems confront military science in the area of ​​developing the theory of organizational development of the Armed Forces, maintaining them in readiness to ensure reliable defense of the state against any aggression. The sharp deterioration of the geostrategic position of the state after the collapse of the USSR, the unsettled land border in many directions and, at the same time, the reduction to a minimum of the Armed Forces, especially the Ground Forces, require the development of new approaches in determining the organizational structure of formations, formations and units, the system of organization and methods of manning, organization and services, creating the necessary stocks of material resources. We believe that the main thing on which the system of building the Armed Forces should be based is on the principle of strategic mobility, their ability, in the presence of limited capabilities, to flexibly respond to emerging crises by quickly maneuvering forces and means to threatened areas.

Solving the problems of military science is also inextricably linked with the development of theories of military training and indoctrination, the theory of military economics, the theory of weapons, the theory of command and control of the Armed Forces, the theory of types and logistics of the Armed Forces, which have accumulated many unresolved issues related to changes in the ideology and policy of the state. Within the framework of the article, it is not possible even to briefly touch upon these issues, especially since a detachment of highly qualified military scientists of the Academy of Military Sciences, headed by the president of the academy, General of the Army M.A. Gareev, is working on their solution. I would like to note that the recommendations of military scientists, mostly honored veterans of the Armed Forces, do not remain "a voice crying in the desert", and be heard by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, so that we do not return to the memorable times of the 30s of the last century, when military theory was developing in itself, and the practice of military construction in itself. We must honor military history and draw instructive lessons from it. It is known that the present stands firmly on the shoulders of the past. Of course, history is not able to provide answers to the problems of today, it cannot open the veil of the future, but historical experience is able to inspire creative thought, prompt reflection, expand knowledge, general outlook, and warn against possible mistakes. Today, military science is faced with the task of defending our country's military history from falsifications and unfounded attacks. There are especially many ill-wishers inside the country in order to discredit the holy of holies - the feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, to debunk the military activities of Soviet military leaders.

Russia, perhaps like no other country in the world, has a rich military history. The unprecedented exploits of our ancestors, who throughout the thousand-year history of Russia had to fight for the preservation and establishment of their statehood, are now hushed up, and even distorted in history textbooks in secondary schools.

It is striking that on the ideological front, our state is now taking a defensive position, as if justifying itself for the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces had to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States from the fascist yoke in World War II, and after the war to fight Bandera in Western Ukraine, "forest brothers" in the Baltics.

One of the authors of the article had to start his military service before the war, being a cadet of the newly created in 1940. in Estonia of the Tallinn Military Infantry School, and subsequently during the war to participate in hostilities - to liberate the Baltic States in 1944-1945. from the fascist invaders. I must testify with what kindness, one might say frugality, we, Soviet soldiers, treated the local population - Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians during the war. And now it becomes extremely unfair and insulting with what black ingratitude the leadership of the Baltic states responds, calling us, the soldiers-liberators, occupiers and equating us with fascist executioners - SS men. The actions of the Estonian authorities over the monument - the "bronze" Soviet soldier - can only be called a desecration of the fallen Soviet soldiers.

In conclusion, the article would like to express the pain for the current state of our military science. For more than a decade, military-theoretical works, textbooks and teaching aids on tactics, which are so necessary not only for military students and cadets of military educational institutions, but also for students of civilian universities, students of general education schools, ROSTO organizations, have not been published. The experience of combat and operational training does not become available even to military academies and military schools, since combat training information bulletins are not published, as in the old days. For many years, the works of military classics and modern foreign military scientists have not been published. One cannot fail to mention that candidates and doctors of military sciences do not have any privileges and are dismissed from military service, like all officers of the Armed Forces, upon reaching the so-called "limit" age. And it is especially bitter and insulting that such libels on our country, the army and navy as the "Icebreaker" of the traitor Rezun fill the shelves of bookstores in millions of copies. We regard this as one of the manifestations of information confrontation.

military science

a system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of war by states, coalitions of states or classes to achieve political goals. Soviet V. n. explores the nature of possible wars, the laws of war and the methods of its conduct. It develops the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations on the organizational development of the Armed Forces, their preparation for war, determines the principles of military art, the most effective forms and methods of conducting military operations by groupings of the Armed Forces, as well as their comprehensive support. Based on political goals, assessments of a potential enemy and one's own forces, scientific and technological achievements and economic capabilities of the state and its allies, V. n. in unity with practice, determines ways to improve existing and create new means of armed struggle. The constituent parts of modern Soviet V. n. are: the theory of military art (See Military art) (strategy, operational art and tactics), which develops provisions and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of military operations; the theory of organizational development of the Armed Forces, which studies the issues of their organization, technical equipment, recruitment and mobilization; theory of military training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces; theory of party-political work in the Armed Forces; the theory of military economy, which studies the use of material, technical and financial means to ensure the activities of the Armed Forces; military geography (see military geography); Military History, studying the history of wars and the art of war; military-technical sciences, with the help of which various types of weapons, military equipment and means of material support of the Armed Forces are developed. Soviet V. n. serves the interests of the armed defense of the Soviet socialist state. It is based on Marxist-Leninist theory and relies on the progressive Soviet state and social system, the leading and guiding force of which is the CPSU.

The fundamental difference between bourgeois V. n. from Soviet V. n. lies in its reactionary ideological basis and class essence. Bourgeois V. n. serves both the aggressive foreign and reactionary domestic policies of the ruling exploiting classes of the capitalist states; is in the service of an aggressive imperialist policy directed chiefly against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The modern scientific and technological revolution causes intensive differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, which leads to the emergence of new branches, directions and disciplines in most sciences. A similar process is natural for V. n. V.'s development n. occurs on the basis of a generalization of the historical experience of waging wars, an analysis of all types of practical activities of troops in peacetime, foresight of the development of new means of war and probable forms and methods of waging it in the future, a comprehensive study of a potential adversary, as well as trends in the development of international relations.

V. n. formed and developed over a long historical period. Its elements originated in antiquity, when during the period of the slave-owning society in Egypt, Persia, China, Greece and Rome, generals and military theorists raised and resolved some issues related to strategy, tactics, military geographical conditions, organization and education of troops, as well as analyzed and summarized the experience of battles and campaigns. V. n. continued to develop in the Middle Ages. As the productive forces of society grew, weapons and military equipment improved, command and control of troops and military art in general became more complicated, and military historical experience accumulated. All this ultimately led to the design of V. n. as a certain system of knowledge.

The formation of bourgeois V. n. modern military researchers attribute it to the 18th and early 19th centuries, when the rapid development of the political, economic, and natural sciences began on the basis of the developing capitalist mode of production. At this time, military theory was further developed in various countries. One of the first representatives of foreign bourgeois V. n. in the 18th century was the English General G. Lloyd. He outlined some of the general foundations of the theory of war, pointed out the connections between war and politics, and emphasized the importance of the moral and political factor. However, he believed that V. n. applicable only to prepare the army for war. The course and outcome of the war, in his opinion, entirely depend on the genius of the commander, since this area has no regularities and, therefore, has nothing to do with military science.

Serious progress in the development of Russian V. n. at the beginning of the 18th century. associated with the name of the statesman and commander Peter I, who carried out military reforms, created a regular army and navy. Peter I was the creator of the new "Military Regulations", which outlined the generalized experience of the battles and battles carried out, issues of military administration and education of military personnel. He laid the foundation for an independent Russian national military school. Great contribution to V. n. introduced by major military leaders of Russia in the second half of the 18th century. P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov and F. F. Ushakov. Rumyantsev paid much attention to improving the organization of the Russian army, increasing its mobility and improving the combat training of troops. He introduced the principle of decisive battle as the main way to achieve victory. Rumyantsev's work "Rite of Service" (1770) was adopted as the charter of the Russian army, and his "Memorandum to Catherine II on the organization of the army" (1777) formed the basis for further improvement in the organization of the army. Suvorov had a great influence on the formation of the military art of the Russian army, on improving the training and education of troops. He sharply opposed the cordon strategy and linear tactics that dominated the West. In his "The Science of Victory" (1795-96), Suvorov developed a number of important rules on military training, indoctrination and combat operations. Ushakov developed and put into practice new forms and methods of military operations at sea, which proved the advantages of maneuverable offensive tactics over linear tactics that dominated foreign fleets.

The experience of wars in defense of the Great French Revolution had a decisive influence on military theory. V. I. Lenin pointed out: “Just as inside the country the French revolutionary people then for the first time showed a maximum of revolutionary energy unprecedented for centuries, so in the war of the end of the 18th century they showed the same gigantic revolutionary creativity, recreating the entire system of strategy, breaking all the old laws and the customs of war and creating, instead of the old troops, a new, revolutionary, people's army and a new conduct of the war ”(Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 32, pp. 79-80). A significant contribution to the theory and practice of military art was made by the French commander Napoleon I. He gave a more harmonious organization to divisions and corps, sharply reduced the convoys, thanks to which the army acquired greater mobility. The main goal of military operations, Napoleon I set the defeat of the enemy's manpower in one pitched battle, constantly sought to destroy the enemy in parts, achieving maximum superiority of forces in the direction of the main attack.

In the development of Russian V. n. The military skill of M. I. Kutuzov, who managed to defeat one of the first-class armies of the early 19th century, was of great importance. - the army of Napoleon I. Among the military theorists of the 18th - early 19th centuries. in Germany, a prominent place was occupied by G. D. Bulow, who made an attempt to theoretically generalize everything new that was created in the era of the Great French Revolution. He correctly believed that military strategy is subject to politics and fulfills its requirements, but he did not understand the class content of politics. V. n. he divided into strategy and tactics and thus reduced it to only the art of war.

The development of bourgeois V. n. 1st half of the 19th century is closely connected with the names of A. Jomini (a Swiss by birth) and K. Clausewitz (a German theorist), who served in the Russian army for a considerable time and made full use of its experience in their historical and theoretical works. Jomini believed that military art could and should have its own scientific theory, but at the same time he recognized the dominance in military art of the “eternal principles” inherent in wars of all times, and thus deprived the theory he created of a genuine scientific basis. He erroneously asserted that the influence of politics on strategy is limited only to the moment of making a decision, and that in the course of a war, strategy allegedly does not depend on politics. The theoretical provisions of Jomini, his ideas, which emphasized the importance of military theory, found followers in various armies of the world. The merit of Clausewitz lies in the fact that he deeply revealed the connection between war and politics and many phenomena of war (the nature and essence of war, armed forces, offensive, defense, war plan, etc.). He attached great importance to the material, geographical and moral factors in the war, as well as the role of the commander. Being a bourgeois military thinker, Clausewitz could not reveal the class content of politics, he defined it as an expression of the interests of the whole society and did not connect it with classes and class struggle.

The question of the subject and content of V. n. constantly attracted the attention of Russian military theorists. Back in 1819, Major General I. G. Burtsev, in his article “Thoughts on the Theory of Military Knowledge” (see Military Journal, book 2, 1819, pp. 55, 63), pointed out the connection between politics and war, believed that V. n. cannot be limited to the framework of military art and must include in its subject the study of regularities in military affairs. Major-General A. I. Astafiev in his work “On Modern Military Art” (part 1, 1856) also believed that the subject of military science was wider than martial arts. Astafiev criticized Lloyd, Bulow and other foreign military theorists for their desire to turn the art of war into a code of immutable rules. Prominent Russian military theorists of the second half of the 19th century who influenced the development of military science were Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, Admiral G. I. Butakov, generals G. A. Leer, M. I. Dragomirov, Rear Admiral S. O. Makarov. Under the leadership of Milyutin, military reforms of the 1860-70s were carried out in Russia. aimed at overcoming backwardness and routine in the army. In the work "The First Experiments of Military Statistics" (1847-48), Milyutin was the first in V. n. outlined the basics of military statistics (military geography). Butakov in his work "New Foundations of Steamship Tactics" (1863) summarized the experience of combat operations of ships of the steam fleet and proposed rules for their restructuring in a squadron for naval combat. These rules have received recognition in all fleets of the world. Leer recognized the unity of politics and strategy with the leading role of the former. In the works Notes of Strategy (1867), Method of Military Sciences (1894), Applied Tactics (1877-80), Leer critically summarized the most common views on the solution of many issues of strategy and tactics and developed a military theory based on a generalization of military historical experience. Dragomirov widely covered the issues of tactics, education and training of troops. His Textbook of Tactics (1879) served as the main textbook at the Academy of the General Staff for 20 years. Makarov's work had a significant impact on the development of domestic and foreign naval thought. Makarov's book Discourses on Naval Tactics (1897) was the first major work on the naval tactics of a steam-powered armored fleet. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. definition of the subject V. n. given in Russian encyclopedias - "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" (vol. 2, 1885) and "Military Encyclopedia" (vol. 6, 1912); the latter defines that “military science is engaged in a comprehensive study of wars. It studies: 1) phenomena in the life of society and 2) the forces, means and methods for waging a struggle" (p. 476).

In the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. With the further development of technology, means of communication, means of communication, with the advent of more advanced weapons for the ground forces and the armored steam navy, the strategy, tactics of the ground forces, and naval art are intensively developed. The complication of command and control required the creation of general staffs, which began to determine the general direction of development of military-theoretical views, military science. generally. Assessing the military capabilities of both their own and other states, they to a certain extent influenced the policy of their states.

Along with the development of bourgeois V. n. in the 2nd half of the 19th century. the foundations of VN began to be laid, which considered phenomena from a dialectical-materialist point of view. The discovery by Marx and Engels of the materialistic understanding of history produced a revolutionary revolution in the social sciences, including the military one. For the first time, the dependence of the methods of waging war, the organization of the army, its weapons, strategy and tactics on the nature of the economic system of society and its political superstructure was scientifically revealed. F. Engels was one of the first Marxist military theorists; his works are devoted to the development of the doctrine of war and the army, their origin and class essence, questions of military science. and the history of military art. The manuscript "Possibilities and preconditions for the war of the Holy Alliance against France in 1852" outlines the theoretical provisions on the development of military art in various socio-economic formations, and especially in the period of the proletarian revolution and classless society. The proletarian revolution, as Marx and Engels showed, requires the destruction of the old, bourgeois state apparatus and the creation of a new, and consequently new, socialist military organization in the interests of the armed defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the New American Encyclopedia, Engels for the first time gave a materialistic coverage of the history of military theory and practice, showed the dependence of the development of military art on the growth of productive forces, the development of social relations and on major revolutionary upheavals in society. In contrast to the then prevailing theory of the "free role of the commander," Engels formulated the law: "... the entire organization of armies and the methods of combat used by them, and along with this victory and human material and from weapons, therefore - from the quality and quantity of the population and from technology ”(Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 20, p. 175).

Great influence on the development of bourgeois V. n. had the 1st World War 1914-18. In the course of this war, military-technical means of combat continued to be improved, new types of troops appeared (aviation, tank, chemical troops); rich experience was gained in the field of organization of wars, operational art and tactics. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the main task of bourgeois V. n. began the development of methods of waging war, ensuring the rapid defeat of the Soviet state and the revolutionary movement in their countries.

In the 20-30s. 20th century theories of warfare were created, which took into account the possibility of equipping the armies with qualitatively new, more effective military equipment and replacing man with machine. The bourgeois military theories of the "small army" (J. Fuller, Liddell Hart - in Great Britain, H. Seeckt - in Germany) and "air warfare" (J. Douhet - in Italy, Mitchell - in the USA) were widely known at that time. . Fuller first laid out his views in Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918. (1923). It overestimates the role of technology and underestimates the role of man. The theory of "air warfare" assigned the decisive role in the war to the air fleet. It was believed that the achievement of victory in the war could be ensured only by gaining air supremacy, after which the air fleet should quickly crush the resistance of the enemy country with broad offensive operations. The ground forces were assigned only occupying functions in a country that had been destroyed by aviation.

V. n. Nazi Germany was aimed mainly at developing the theory of "blitzkrieg", which provided for a surprise attack and the rapid advance of tank groups with the support of aviation in order to "blitzkrieg" defeat the enemy. The plans of German imperialism, calculated to win world domination, were based on the theory of "total war", previously developed by the military ideologist of German imperialism, E. Ludendorff. He believed that such a war would be of a lightning-fast nature, but in its scope would cover the entire territory of the warring states, and in order to achieve victory, it was necessary to participate in the war not only of the armed forces, but of the entire people. In French V. n. the concept of “positional warfare” dominated: defense was considered more effective than offensive. Great hopes were placed on the long-term structures of the Maginot Line and the Belgian fortified areas. The basis of warfare was considered a continuous front, based on a developed system of fortification. In the United States and Great Britain, the theory of "sea power" was most widely used, according to which the main attention was paid to the fleet as the most important branch of the armed forces.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet military science began to take shape. It was based on the provisions of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army, developed by Lenin in relation to the new conditions of the era of imperialism. He revealed the economic basis of wars and gave their classification. Lenin pointed out that “... there are wars, just and unjust, progressive and reactionary, wars of advanced classes and wars of backward classes, wars that serve to consolidate class oppression, and wars that serve to overthrow it” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5 ed., vol. 38, p. 337).

Based on a generalization of the experience of armed uprisings of the proletariat and wars of the era of imperialism, Lenin developed many questions of Marxist military theory: on the decisive role of the masses of the people, economic and moral-political factors in modern war, on the connection of military organization and military art with the social and state system, state and the development of military technology, the patterns, methods and forms of military operations, the unity of political and military leadership in war. He created a coherent and coherent doctrine of a new type of army and the defense of the socialist Fatherland, pointed out specific ways of building the Soviet Armed Forces, developed the principles of training and education of soldiers in the army and navy, unity of the army and people, front and rear, leadership of the Communist Party of the Armed Forces, centralism, unity of command and collective leadership, efficiency in command and control of troops, control over execution, selection and placement of personnel, and conscious military discipline. Lenin taught us to take a creative approach to solving problems of protecting the socialist Fatherland, to take into account the real balance of our forces and the forces of potential opponents, economic and socio-political factors, and the state of the Armed Forces. In developing the theoretical foundations of military development, Lenin wrote that "... without science, a modern army cannot be built..." (ibid., vol. 40, p. 183). During the Civil War, Lenin was directly involved in directing military operations. During these years, the formation and development of Soviet V. n. The works of V. I. Lenin, as well as his practical activities, are of inestimable importance for the development of Soviet military science. The Marxist-Leninist principles of purposefulness, activity, determination, courage, combined with the high art of conducting military operations, were of great importance in all the military victories of the Soviet people.

A great contribution to the development of Soviet V. n. made by prominent military figures of the Soviet state: M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, as well as N. E. Varfolomeev, V. K. Triandafillov, V. A. Alafuzov, I. S. Isakov and others. An advanced Soviet military-theoretical school gradually took shape. A special role belongs to Frunze's works The Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army, The Front and the Rear in the War of the Future, and others. the basics of training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces, etc. In his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army" (vols. 1-3, 1927-29), B. M. Shaposhnikov analyzed a large historical material, showed the role and functions of the General Staff, put forward valuable proposals on the theory of military strategy, the development of war plans and strategic leadership. In 1929, V. K. Triandafillov’s work “The Character of the Operations of Modern Armies” was published, in which the author made a deep scientific analysis of the state and development prospects of the armies of that time, revealed the patterns of their technical equipment and organization. Triandafillov noted the increased role of tanks and considered them one of the most powerful offensive means of a future war. He studied the offensive and defensive capabilities of a division, corps, army, army group, the approach of troops to the battlefield, the initiation and conduct of the battle, the duration and depth of the operation. In 1930-37, M. N. Tukhachevsky published military-theoretical articles on the nature of a future war, on the foundations of strategy and operational art, both in theory and in practice. Tukhachevsky proved that new forms of deep battle were emerging. He defended the provisions on the inseparable connection of military art with the social system of the country and its production base, studied the initial period of the future war.

An outstanding achievement of Soviet V. n. was the development of the theory of a deep offensive operation, the foundations of which were set forth in the Instructions for Conducting a Deep Battle (1932). This theory contributed to the way out of the positional impasse created during the First World War. Soviet military theory received concrete expression in the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army (1936). The charter emphasized the decisive nature of Soviet military art: creating superiority over the enemy in the main direction, the interaction of all branches of the military, surprise and speed of action, skillful maneuvering. In recommendations for the development of the Armed Forces, Soviet military-theoretical thought proceeded from the likelihood of a war with fascist Germany and its allies. A deep analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the Armed Forces of a potential adversary allowed Soviet military science. it is reasonable to assume that the war will be tense and prolonged and will require the mobilization of the efforts of the entire people, the country as a whole. The main type of strategic actions was considered to be an offensive, ensuring a decisive defeat of the enemy on his territory. The defense was assigned a subordinate role as a forced and temporary phenomenon, ensuring the subsequent transition to the offensive.

In the views on the initial period of the war, Soviet V. n. proceeded from the fact that wars are not declared in the modern era and that aggressive states tend to surprise attacks on the enemy. Under these conditions, military operations from the very beginning will take the form of decisive operations and will be predominantly maneuverable. However, positional forms of struggle in some theaters of military operations and strategic directions were not excluded. Soviet V. n. an important place was given to the development of the theory of the use in operations of the air force, mechanized formations and methods of conducting modern warfare at sea.

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 showed that the Soviet military science developed by the views on the nature and methods of military operations were basically correct. From the beginning of the war, it became necessary to further develop such important problems of the theory of Soviet military art and practice of conducting operations as the leadership of the Armed Forces in the situation of the initial period of the war, in the context of general mobilization, the deployment of groupings of the Armed Forces and the transfer of the national economy to a war footing, as the centralization of control groupings of the Armed Forces operating in various theaters of military operations (directions), and coordination of their efforts. The war enriched the Soviet Armed Forces with vast combat experience. In the course of it, the following problems were comprehensively developed: the choice of the direction of the main attack, taking into account not only the provisions of the theory of military art, but also the requirements of politics and economics; organizing and conducting a strategic offensive and strategic defense; breaking through the enemy's strategic front; strategic use of the branches of the Armed Forces and coordination of their efforts to jointly solve important strategic tasks; covert creation, use and restoration of strategic reserves; use of the factor of strategic surprise; organizing and conducting operations to encircle and destroy large enemy groupings; leadership of the partisan movement, etc. The high level of Soviet military art was especially clearly manifested in the battles near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, in operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Belarus, Iasi-Kishinev and Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Manchuria.

The American and British armed forces during the years of the 2nd World War gained experience in strategic bombing, large-scale air operations and combat operations at sea; conducting operations by field armies and army groups in cooperation with large aviation forces, mainly in conditions of overwhelming superiority over the enemy. V. n. questions were developed: conducting large-scale amphibious landing operations with the participation of ground forces, the navy, aviation and airborne assault forces; organization of strategic coalition leadership of troops; planning and ensuring operations, etc.

Postwar development of Soviet V. n. relied on a generalization of the experience of World War II and followed the line of further improvement of the theory of military art, taking into account the development of armaments, combat equipment, and the organization of the Armed Forces. A great contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of V. n. and in the practice of military art during the war years and in the post-war period, Soviet military leaders, commanders and naval commanders, advanced during the war, theoretical scientists, generals, admirals and officers of the General Staff, the Main Staffs of the branches of the Armed Forces and the headquarters of the armed forces, military educational institutions , military scientific bodies, headquarters of formations and units of the army, aviation and navy.

V.'s development n. in the most developed countries is characterized by research on a wide range of problems associated with the emergence in the 50s. 20th century nuclear weapons, which caused a change in the nature of war, methods and forms of warfare, new methods of training and education of personnel. The role of the psychological preparation of soldiers and officers for war, the development of methods of propaganda and counter-propaganda in the conditions of "psychological warfare", etc., has increased (see Military psychology).

In various capitalist countries V. n. develops differently. The most extensive development in the 2nd half of the 20th century. it received in such capitalist powers as the USA, Great Britain, France. Other capitalist countries in the area of ​​V. n. borrow a lot from them.

Soviet V. n. in the postwar years, she developed new theoretical views on the nature of a future war, on the role and significance of the branches of the Armed Forces and means of armed struggle, and on methods of conducting battles and operations. It became obvious that the war, if it could not be prevented, would be waged by qualitatively new means. Beneficial influence on the development of Soviet V. n. provided the provisions of the Program of the CPSU, decisions and documents of party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The role and significance of economic, socio-political and moral-psychological factors in achieving victory in modern warfare have been deeply studied. Soviet V. n. revealed and substantiated the nature of a possible future world war and created a theoretical basis for the formation of a modern military doctrine of the state.

The aggressive policy of the imperialist states, their preparation for a new war against the countries of socialism, and the unrestrained arms race demand from Soviet military science. further development of effective ways to ensure the constant high readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces to defeat any aggressor.

Lit.: K. Marx, The Civil War in France, K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 17; Engels F., Chosen. military works, M., 1958, pp. 3-29, 195-305, 623-49; Lenin V.I., The Fall of Port Arthur, Poln. coll. soch., 5th ed., v. 9; his, Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government, ibid., vol. 10; his, Lessons of the Moscow uprising, ibid., vol. 13; his, Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution, ibid., vol. 30; his own, Impending catastrophe and how to deal with it, ibid., vol. 34; his, the Seventh Emergency Congress of the RCP (b), ibid., vol. 36; his own, vol. 38, p. 139; v. 39, p. 45-46; v. 41, p. 81; Program of the CPSU, M., 1967, part 2, sec. 3; Marxism-Leninism about the war and the army, 5th ed., M., 1968, p. 262-80, 288-300; Methodological problems of military theory and practice, M., 1966; Malinovsky R. Ya., On guard of the Motherland, M., 1962; 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, M., 1968, p. 520-27; Frunze M.V., Unified military doctrine and the Red Army, M., 1965; Tukhachevsky M.N., Izbr. Prod., vol. 2, 1964, p. 3-8, 180-198; Zakharov M. V., On the scientific approach to the leadership of troops, M., 1967; Milstein M.A., Slobodenko A.K., On bourgeois military science, 2nd ed., M., 1961. See also lit. to articles

Technology has gone through a long historical path in its development, including a number of stages. Technical knowledge is knowledge about the ways, techniques and methods of possible transformation by a person of objects of the surrounding reality in accordance with the goals set. Four main stages can be distinguished in the development of technical knowledge: pre-scientific, the emergence of technical sciences, classical, non-classical.

First stage - prescientific. It covers a rather long period of time, from the primitive community to the Renaissance. Technology is as old as humanity. Ancient techniques and technologies were formed back in archaic culture, where man discovered and learned to use various natural effects by creating tools, weapons, clothing, etc., because even hunting and fishing required the use of primitive tools.

Ancient technical knowledge and technical action were closely connected with magical action and mythological world outlook. The main way of transmitting technical experience was oral speech, tradition, memorization, imitation. Ancient man worked by trial and error, accidentally coming across the right solution. It can be said that technology in the literal sense of the word did not yet exist, in agriculture, hunting, fishing, people were limited to natural means of labor - sticks, stones, etc. therefore, the rate of development of technology at the stage of origin and formation of technology was very low. This stage itself was very long and, apparently, lasted hundreds of millennia.

With the advent of ancient civilizations, technical products become much more diverse, and their manufacture is quite complex, which leads to the formation of a layer of artisans. Handicraft technical knowledge was passed down from generation to generation, and the craft could only be mastered empirically, so it was experience that contributed to the improvement and development of technology for a very long time. The inventors of the bow intuitively guessed that a stretched bowstring stored energy, and their experience confirmed that it could be usefully used with an arrow. The builders of water wheels knew from experience that moving water carries energy, but they could not calculate and use it effectively, because. the equations describing the energy components of the water flow were not known.

However, in antiquity the ancient Greeks already carried out a clear distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical craft, differs from the concept of technology in the modern sense. "Technique", as you know, - from the ancient Greek "techne" but it is closer to art than science. And the understanding of technology as a skillful type of activity in the ancient world had its own grounds: the effectiveness of human activity in a period when the tools of labor were extremely primitive depended to a large extent on the skill and skills of a person. Those. technical activity in antiquity was filled with creative content. And since the concept of "techne" covers both technology, and technical knowledge, and art, technology receives the status of art in antiquity.

Although scientific knowledge was born in ancient culture, science and technology were considered as fundamentally different activities. In antiquity, mathematics and physics did not care about any applications in technology, and ancient technology did not have any theoretical foundation. She was prone to routine, skill, skill, ancient artisans relied on tradition, experience and ingenuity. The application of scientific knowledge to technology in antiquity was out of the question, although in the phenomenon of Archimedes we meet with the precedent of "scientific technology" 7 , and Archimedes considered any art associated with application to the daily needs of a person to be a rude and base occupation. At the same time, mechanics in Archimedes is an important auxiliary means of solving mathematical problems, where, for example, the appeal to solving practical problems associated with the creation of military machines was caused by special reasons, and many of Archimedes' technical inventions appeared in general in the form of fun. In this era, the machine was generally regarded as a means of entertainment, a game of the mind, a means to outwit nature, while demonstrating the power of knowledge.

Thus, in antiquity, technology remained neglected, and this happened for two main reasons. Firstly, because the technical products of that time were not yet decisive in human life. And, secondly, technology was associated with the art of a craftsman, which was considered secondary, unworthy of the attention of a philosopher. In many ways, this tradition was inherited by thinkers up to the industrial revolution of the 18th-19th centuries.

Medieval culture was canonical culture. In handicraft production, reference to authority was fundamental. The manufactured samples of equipment had to be no worse than the reference sample, but no better. Inventions as such were perceived negatively, so only inventions borrowed from other cultures were allowed to be put into practice. In addition, the peculiarity of science and technology in the Middle Ages was determined by the Christian worldview.

So, for example, in comparison with ancient culture, in the Middle Ages, under this influence, the attitude towards manual labor changed: from the standpoint of the Christian worldview, labor was seen as a form of service to God. That is, if in antiquity heavy manual labor was equated with unfree, slave labor and was considered unworthy of a free person, then in Christian society, physical labor associated with economic activity belongs to the kind of worthy occupations, is considered a form of service to God. In this regard, in the Middle Ages, there was a desire to alleviate heavy and monotonous manual labor, which required the introduction of new methods and technologies. As noted by V.P. Gaidenko and G.A. Smirnov, the process of technical development of the Renaissance dates back to the Middle Ages 8 .

From the 9th century a slow rise in the development of technology begins, going beyond the achievements of ancient culture. Advances in technology have affected the methods of activity in agriculture, military affairs, textile production, metallurgy and handicraft production. In addition, advances in technology are also associated with the development of new sources of energy: in the Middle Ages, along with the muscular strength of man and animals, the development of the power of water and wind began, water and windmills spread and improved. So, for example, with the invention of the crank and flywheel, it was possible to make water not only grind grain, but also sow flour, set in motion hammers in forges, machines in fullers and rawhides, etc.

This period covers the period from the second half of the 15th century to the 70s of the 19th century. It is characterized by the transformation of technical knowledge into a separate area of ​​scientific knowledge, which has its own subject, methods and means of research. In the Renaissance, the rapid development of statehood and trade leads to technical problems, for which handicraft skills were no longer enough, so the idea begins to take shape. practice oriented theory. At this time, the social status of artisans also changed. Gradually, engineering activity is born.

Experience can also contribute to the improvement of technology, but its value is limited, because. Empirically found dependencies are always of particular importance and can be applied in a limited range of inventions. Experience cannot give certainty in substantiating the idea, due to the fact that it substantiates the idea based on the law of nature. And scientific knowledge begins to be attracted to solve practical problems during this period. The technical object could now be represented as a natural process, and the theoretical model for describing the technical object could be drawn from natural science. In the science of this period begins to take shape experimental method. It is at this stage, at at the intersection of production and natural science and scientific technical knowledge arises.

With the development of industry, various specific technical problems that need to be solved began to arise systematically. The solution of these problems required not only the involvement of natural science and mathematical knowledge, but also the processing of this knowledge, its adaptation for practical use in the field of creation and application of technology. The solution of these problems could no longer be carried out on the basis of accumulated experience and the initial generalization of empirical data. The technical sciences were thus called into being by the needs of engineering, but ideal of engineering science, capable of solving engineering problems by theoretical means, appears only in modern times. It was this ideal that ultimately led to the emergence of technical science. So, the formation of scientific and technical knowledge is affirmed on the basis of experimental science, when the formation of a technical theory turns out to be necessary to have a basic natural science theory.

Every created technical device acts as "natural-artificial" system, representing, on the one hand, a phenomenon of nature that obeys natural laws, and on the other hand, a mechanism that must be created artificially. Objects of technical sciences are products of human activity, but are created from natural materials according to natural laws. Therefore, one of the important tasks of scientific and technical knowledge is the study of natural processes, to the extent that they determine technical means. The natural sciences revealed the essence, described the phenomena and processes used in industrial technology, made it possible to present an ideal model of the process implemented in a technical device. This became the starting point for the design of technical objects. Knowledge of nature and its laws is a condition without which technology is impossible.

The formation of technical sciences is also associated with the desire to give engineering knowledge scientific form. This was reflected in the creation of research laboratories and the adaptation of mathematical theory and experimental methods of science to the needs of engineering. In addition, technical sciences provide a detailed description of the technical properties of objects, their structure and technical processes that determine these properties. Thus, technical science deals not simply with the processes of nature, but with artificial processes that are the product of human activity. Therefore, the goal of technical science is to study the patterns of functioning of technical devices and their creation.

This stage in the development of technical sciences is divided into two sub-stages. On the first sub-stage (the second half of the 15th century - the beginning of the 17th century) the formation of scientific and technical knowledge takes place based on the use of knowledge of natural sciences in engineering practice. Since at first the technical sciences were formed as an application of natural science to a certain class of engineering problems, the technical sciences were often considered as applied natural science. However, the technical sciences represent a special class of scientific disciplines that differ from the natural sciences both in the object of study and in their internal structure.

And now the technically prepared experiment has become the basis of classical natural science. It is known that a natural science experiment is, first of all, an idealized experiment operating with ideal objects and schemes, it is an attempt to create artificial processes and states in order to obtain new scientific knowledge about nature and confirm scientific laws, and this, for example, is the great merit of G. Galileo. According to Galileo, the study of nature is not reduced to either passive observation or pure theory. It was from Galileo that science began to rely on technically trained experiment.

On the second sub-stage (beginning of the 18th century to the 70s of the 19th century) preconditions are being created and the first technical sciences appear. Technical sciences were formed in connection with the complication of technical means of production during the formation of machines and were a kind of tool that radically changed the way of designing technology, therefore natural science knowledge is only a preliminary step in the creation of technical objects. Due to the fact that the technical sciences were formed primarily as an application of various areas of natural science to certain classes of engineering problems, from the beginning of its scientific development, engineering activity was focused on the application mainly of physics and mathematics. From natural sciences, the first initial theoretical positions, methods of representing objects of research and design, basic concepts, the ideal of scientific character, an orientation towards the theoretical organization of scientific knowledge, the construction of ideal models, and mathematization were translated into technical sciences from natural sciences. But at the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that technical sciences are not an application of natural science to subject-practical activity. The development of natural science only makes it possible to combine technical experience with scientific knowledge, while the knowledge of nature and its laws does not yet represent technology. Only application of this knowledge to purposeful changes in reality constitutes technique. And of course, this is not about the transformation of the laws of nature, but about adaptation to them.

Thus, the technical sciences represent a special class of scientific disciplines that differ from the natural sciences, although there is a rather close relationship between them. Based on natural science knowledge, it was possible to present an ideal model of the process implemented in a technical device. Natural-science knowledge made it possible to set the natural-science process that is implemented in engineering devices, as well as to determine and calculate the exact characteristics of structures that provide this process.

But for engineering activities, in addition to natural science, one also needs technological knowledge - description of structures, technological operations, etc. Therefore, the elements borrowed from the natural sciences in the technical sciences have undergone a significant transformation, as a result of which there is a new type of organization of theoretical knowledge.

The concepts of "artificial" and "natural" play an important role in distinguishing between natural science and technology. Any technical device acts as a "natural-artificial" system. On the one hand, it represents a phenomenon of nature that obeys the laws, and on the other hand, it is a tool, a mechanism that must be created artificially. Technical sciences are aimed at studying the laws of the “artificial world”: they describe what happens in technology and formulate the rules by which technology should function. At the same time, one of the important tasks of technical science is the search for the principles of operation and principles of organization of certain technical objects and technologies. In addition, technical sciences should be focused on describing the structure of technical systems, on describing the technical processes occurring in them and the parameters of their functioning, and this knowledge should also fix the methods for creating technical systems and the principles of their use. It can be said that technical theory constitutes prescriptions for optimal technical action.

At the end of the 18th - the first half of the 19th, the formation of the technical sciences of the mechanical cycle took place - the theory of machines and mechanisms, machine parts, ballistics, heat engineering, etc. By the beginning of the 18th century. extensive practical experience has been accumulated in the creation and operation of various technical means created on the basis of mechanics. This led to the fact that the technical sciences of the mechanical cycle appeared earlier than other sciences. The technical sciences, representing various sections of mechanics, evolved under the influence of the demands of practice: ballistics satisfied the demands of artillery; the strength of materials appeared as a result of the development of mechanical engineering and construction; hydraulics solved the problems that arose during the construction process.

The combination of the theoretical constructions of natural science and technical experience manifested itself most clearly in the creation of a steam engine. The universal steam engine of J. Watt and many other machines of the "first wave" of the industrial revolution were the pinnacle of technical knowledge based on empirical natural science. But their further development could be carried out only through theoretical thinking, through the synthesis of scientific knowledge about natural and artificially created technical means. The increasing use of steam engines has led to the need for a theoretical study of the actions of a steam engine and, above all, to study the process of converting heat into work.

One of the first technical sciences was thermodynamics. The French engineer set himself the task of creating a theory Sadie Carnot(1798–1832). Carnot, who first formulated the principles of thermodynamics, noted that the phenomenon of obtaining motion from heat was not considered from a sufficiently general point of view. In order to consider this in its entirety, according to S. Carnot, it is necessary to study this phenomenon independently of any particular mechanism, to study the operation of a steam engine as a natural process. To describe the theoretical process that takes place in a technical object, Carnot abstracts from the specific designs of steam engines. He creates a theoretical model of a steam engine - an ideal steam engine. Carnot's approach required not only knowledge about the structure, capabilities and methods of functioning of a steam engine, but also a theoretical analysis of the physical principles implemented in the design. Thus, the development of an ideal model becomes the starting point design of technical objects. However, S. Carnot failed to develop a sufficiently complete theory of the transformation of heat into work, since he adhered to the theory of caloric. Later, when heat began to be considered as motion, this issue was resolved. But this happened only after the law of conservation and transformation of energy was discovered in 1842. Yu.R. Mayer.

In the 19th century a range of new technical disciplines mechanical cycle (statics, hydrostatics, rigid body dynamics, hydrodynamics, the theory of friction, resistance of materials, etc. is developing). Thus, the end of the XVIII century. - mid 19th century are the period of the emergence of technical sciences.

In the second half of the XIX century. the formation of technical sciences electrotechnical cycle. Electrical engineering arose under the influence of the needs of production in close connection with the developing technical activity of society. But unlike the technical sciences of the mechanical cycle, the subject of scientific and technical knowledge in the field of electrical engineering was formed not in the process of long-term practical activity, but as a result of the unfolding in the XVIII-IX centuries. experimental studies of magnetism and electricity.

Of fundamental importance for the development of electrical engineering was the discovery of the action of electric current on a magnetic needle by a Danish physicist H.K. Oersted(1820). Prior to this discovery, electricity and magnetism were considered phenomena, although similar, but having a different nature. And the next important step in the development of electrical engineering was the discovery M. Faraday electromagnetic induction (1831). These works became the basis for subsequent achievements in this area - the development of electrical machines, other branches of electrical engineering, including communications.

During the formation of electrical engineering, the problem of creating an electric motor that could compete with a steam engine was in the foreground. The task of creating an engine with better technical and technical and economic characteristics than that of a steam engine arose from the real demands of the industry, so inventions in this area followed one after another. Only in the second half of the 19th century, as a result of the work of a number of scientists and inventors, an electric motor appeared, which began to be widely used in technology.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the theory of electrical engineering became a generally recognized branch of science and scientific and technical activity. The role of theory in the technical progress of electrical engineering becomes all the more important because by this time there were already many varieties of machine designs that had different individual characteristics. The task of establishing generalizing indicators of electrical machines, the development of such theoretical knowledge that could be used as the basis for engineering methods for calculating the designs of new technical means, has ripened. During this period, DC electric machines appeared and the foundations of electrical engineering were created.

However, the development of electric power transmission by direct current met with serious obstacles - large losses in the transmission of low voltage direct current. Electrical engineering at that time did not yet have either scientific knowledge or technical means for the successful use of high voltage direct current. Therefore, the growing interest of scientists and engineers in alternating current has become quite legitimate.

In 1883-1886. a new upsurge in the development of electrical engineering began. He was associated with the introduction of alternating current into the industry. For the development of the alternating current system, not only the invention of the generator and alternating current transformer, but also theoretical research of a scientific and technical nature was of fundamental importance.

It should be noted that a common feature of all technical sciences is that the improvement of designs and the increase in the efficiency of technical means cannot be divorced from technical practice. As in the technical sciences of the mechanical cycle, in electrical engineering theories are formed on the basis of experimental studies and descriptions of specific phenomena and designs of real technical devices through theoretical generalization and direct assimilation of data and observations obtained from practice through mathematics and a specially created conceptual apparatus. At the same time, scientific knowledge about physical properties and phenomena used in the creation of electrical devices with predetermined operational characteristics is included in an integral system of specialized scientific knowledge of various levels of generality, forming its fundamental core.

In electrical devices, therefore, not only scientific knowledge about electricity and the laws of motion of material bodies is objectified, here, as in the sciences of the mechanical cycle, knowledge about materials and their physical properties, methods of processing them, etc., turned out to be necessary as well. The scientifically substantiated design of electrical devices made its own demands on the production technology. Literally from the first steps of electrical engineering, its development was determined not only by natural science and scientific and technical knowledge, but also by technical and economic factors. The cycle of electrical sciences had a huge impact both on production and on the further development of all technical sciences.

Third stage in history in the development of technical knowledge can be called classic. It begins in the 70s of the XIX century and continues until the middle of the XX century. The classical period is characterized by the formation of a number of technical theories that formed the foundation for the further development of technical knowledge. As already noted, the classical technical sciences were formed as an application of natural science to the solution of various classes of engineering problems. Thus, the technical sciences of the classical type are formed on the basis of some natural science.

Classical technical sciences borrowed theoretical means and patterns of scientific activity from natural science theory. Ultimately, they themselves became independent scientific and technical disciplines. The technical sciences are now a special area of ​​scientific knowledge with their own theoretical principles and methods of obtaining and constructing. Technical objects are beginning to be considered not just as expediently functioning structures, but also as structures that implement, use some natural process.

In the technical sciences of the classical type, the principle of operation of a technical object is given on a natural scientific basis, and the design is considered as a way of its implementation. Therefore, scientific technical knowledge appears, in which technical devices are described as natural-artificial formations, and there is also a differentiation of technical knowledge. In addition, during this period, the technical sciences enter the stage of maturity, and the various sciences are very uneven, where one of the characteristics of maturity is the application of scientific knowledge in the creation of new technology. Thus, at this stage, science not only provides for the needs of technology, but also outstrips its development, forming schemes for future possible technologies and technical systems.

So, the science of the late XIX - early XX century. began to meet the needs of developing technology and even outpace its development. In addition, classical technical science turned out to be subject-oriented to a certain class of technical systems - mechanisms, machines, radio engineering devices, etc.

In the second half of the 20th century, significant changes took place in the field of scientific and technical disciplines, which led to the formation of a new, non-classical stages of their development. A distinctive feature of new scientific and technical disciplines is complexity of theoretical research.

The task of non-classical scientific and technical disciplines is to solve a wide variety of complex and practically oriented problems. Qualitatively new areas of research are being formed, in which scientific-theoretical and engineering-practical aspects are inextricably linked. Therefore, modern complex non-classical scientific and technical disciplines are no longer guided by some basic theory, but by a whole range of scientific knowledge and disciplines. If classical engineering activity was aimed at creating individual technical devices, then modern practice requires the creation of complex technical systems, the creation of which, in turn, requires the integration of specialists from various fields of science and technology: mathematical, natural and even social sciences.

In addition, at this stage, the penetration of social and humanitarian knowledge into engineering activities occurs, which is explained by the following reasons: 1) engineering activities should be guided by the interests of the consumer and cultural and historical traditions; 2) the engineer must take into account the social consequences of his activities; 3) complex systems created by modern designers and engineers are not just technical, but sociotechnical, i.e. a component of such systems is human activity. It is at this stage, as a result of the complication of the design of engineering objects, that such scientific and technical disciplines as cybernetics, ergonomics, systems engineering, design systems, systems analysis etc. These sciences are consolidated around the solution of a certain new type of tasks and problems put forward by society, with the involvement of the entire arsenal of knowledge, ideas and experience currently available in science and practice to support their solution.

At the same time, new methods and tools are being developed in non-classical scientific and technical disciplines, designed specifically to solve a certain complex scientific and technical problem. These means and methods are not found in any of the synthesized disciplines. Therefore, the formation of technical sciences of a non-classical type is associated with the transformation of modern scientific and engineering thinking. As a result, an alternative to the traditional image of science is formed: a new image of science, new forms of organization of knowledge, a new epistemological ideal are put forward.

It is also important to note that the technical sciences of the non-classical type are system-oriented: they attach great importance to the system approach, from which they draw their basic concepts and ideas. The systems approach, as is known, focuses research on revealing the integrity of the object and the mechanisms that ensure this integrity, therefore modern technology is increasingly turning into the technology of complex systems. A complex system consists of many interacting subsystems, where the elements of a complex system are also systems. And at the same time, the properties of a complex system are not reducible to the properties of its constituent elements, but arise from their combination. Thus, the creation of complex systems involves not only heterogeneous knowledge, but also various types of activities. Therefore, for the study and design of complex systems, it is necessary to solve the problem not only of coordinating and coordinating synthesized knowledge, but also coordinating and coordinating knowledge about various synthesized activities aimed at the object of complex research.

In modern scientific and technical disciplines, the goal of activity is often the creation of complex human-machine systems (computers, control panels, semiautomatic devices, etc.). One of the characteristics of such systems is that the development and improvement of such a system does not stop with its creation. For example, in the design of a human-machine system, it was impossible to take into account all its parameters and features of functioning.

A feature of modern scientific and technical disciplines is that the object of complex research is not a material object, but a speculative one. Therefore, computer modeling plays an important role in solving research problems. It allows taking into account various and numerous data about a complex system. It allows you to present the system as an integral object, analyze and calculate the individual components of the system, take into account various factors affecting the system, analyze and calculate the possible future functioning of the system, etc.

Since modern scientific and technical disciplines rely on many scientific disciplines and many research methods, they need to develop a generalized theoretical framework. The position of any representative of a particular complex discipline must be systemic, that is, the researcher must proceed from a holistic (systemic) view. Therefore, most often, to develop a generalized theoretical scheme, a systematic approach (general systems theory) is used, where cybernetic representations and concepts are often used.

Questions for self-examination

What was the development of technical knowledge in the ancient era?

How was the relationship between science and technology considered in ancient times?

What is the status of technical knowledge and technical activity in ancient culture?

Sadi Carnot in his book “Reflections on the Driving Force of Fire”, written in 1824, noted: “In order to consider the principles of obtaining movement from heat in its entirety, it is necessary to study it independently of any mechanism, any specific agent; it is necessary to carry out reasoning that is applicable not only to steam engines, no matter what the substance used in the case, and no matter how it is affected. What feature of the structure of technical knowledge does Sadi Carnot insist on? What is the structure of technical knowledge in your specialty?

What are technical sciences of the classical type? What are the stages of their formation?

What aspect of technology is studied by engineering sciences?

Max Born, in My Life and Views, writes: “I defend my own thesis that science and technology are destroying the ethical foundation of civilization, and this destruction is already completely irreparable ... due to the very nature of the revolution in human thinking caused by scientific technical revolution." How is this point of view usually argued? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this position? Isn't it strange to hear this from a prominent physicist? How do you yourself look at this problem?

How are the history of technology and the history of society related?

What are the features of the "science-technology" system in classical and post-non-classical science?

What do natural and technical sciences have in common and how do they differ from each other?

What are your views on the status and role of technical sciences in the structure of scientific knowledge?

ANNOTATION. On December 25, 2017, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, laureate of the State Prize of the USSR, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Major General Stepan Andreyevich Tyushkevich turned 100 years old. The article is devoted to the disclosure of the contribution of the hero of the day to the development of domestic military science.

SUMMARY. On 25 December 2017, Major-General Stepan Tyushkevich, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, USSR State Prize Laureate, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, will celebrate the 100-year birth anniversary. The article is dedicated to his contribution to the national military science development.

Your scientific motto is weighty and bright,

He is holy and dear, like a Banner:

In history you are not looking for ashes,

And most importantly - fire and flame!

A. Paderin

LIFE and activity of S.A. Tyushkevich is a truly worthy and complete reflection of an entire historical era in the fate of our Motherland. However, it is simply impossible to reveal the identity of a scientist without at least a brief analysis of what he accomplished in science.

In the field of scientific interests of Professor S.A. Tyushkevich - philosophy, military history and theory, problems of war and peace, political and ideological issues of international relations and much more. Undoubtedly, one of the main directions of his scientific research was and remains the development of the problems of the methodology of military history, the most important aspects of the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. The role of the hero of the day in the development of domestic military-historical science is enormous. Over the past decade, he has published a number of new fundamental works in this area2. Therefore, I would like to dwell in more detail on Stepan Andreevich's contribution to the development of philosophical and methodological problems of military theory and practice. And this is no coincidence - one of the main directions of his scientific research was and remains the development of problems of military science, the methodology of its research and development.

An important step in this direction was the critical comprehension of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of military science, to the study and description of which Stepan Andreevich made a considerable contribution. There is no doubt, the scientist rightly believes, that the main provisions of Marxist methodology have stood the test of time and have not lost their significance to this day. At the same time, some of its principles and provisions were either absolutized, or simplified, or dogmatized. But this is not the fault of the methodology, but the fault of those who did it, including those who ineptly applied them in military science. The methodology of Marxism, like Marxism in general, is not to blame for the fact that they turned out to be both canonized and perverted in many respects.

The justice of what has been said, Professor S.A. Tyushkevich confirms with the conclusions from the historical experience of the existence and development of the USSR in peaceful years and during the trial of his like-minded person S. Kara-Murza by the war: “... Only Marxism could ... connect the worldview matrix of Russian communal communism with the rationality of the Enlightenment. And only this new “image of truth”, which combined the idea of ​​justice with the idea of ​​development, allowed Russia to break out of the historical trap of peripheral capitalism and make a breakthrough, on the inertia of which it lasted another half century after World War II.

The basis for development and practical application in various spheres of public life, but above all in ensuring the military security of the Fatherland, its armed defense, S.A. Tyushkevich, are the modern advanced worldview, the dialectical-materialistic method and special techniques and methods of cognition and application of its results in practice. In their dialectical unity, they give the student of that Ariadne a thread, following which one can confidently follow the path of finding the truth in the chosen sphere. It was then that military science had its greatest scientific achievements when its researchers and creators were guided by advanced philosophy and methodology. However, it must be remembered that this can be achieved only on the basis of studying the history of philosophy, military history, the history of past wars, armies, and military art. The conclusions drawn at the same time are a springboard to a true knowledge of military affairs, mastery of the art of defending the Motherland, protecting it from military dangers and threats.

The interconnection of history with advanced modern philosophy and reliance on dialectical materialist methodology increase the efficiency and effectiveness of military science as a factor in the spiritual life of society. It gives people a social and cultural experience that combines both the heroic and the dramatic. “Knowledge and understanding of the causes and conditions for the outbreak of wars in modern conditions,” the scientist points out, “allows us to identify possible military dangers and threats, to see their nature, possible ways of development, which is essential for effectively solving the problems of ensuring our national security, strengthening defense power country and the development of the Armed Forces”4.

Focusing for many years on the study, analysis and explanation of the categories of military science on the experience of history, the content of the Great Patriotic War, S.A. Tyushkevich never limited himself to this front of research. New principles for assessing war, the relationship between politics and war, national and international security, and a number of others, he believes, enrich the methodology of military theory and military history in many ways, modify the relationship between various areas of knowledge about war. Military doctrine and military science, military art are acquiring a new base. The interpretation of these most important provisions is contained in a number of major works by Stepan Andreevich, including one of his first monographs "Philosophy and Military Theory" (1979), in the book "Domestic Military Science: Pages of History, Problems, Trends" (2001), in cited work “The Laws of War: Essence, Mechanism of Action, Factors of Use” (2002), supplemented by a new, 4th, part “From the Experience of Actualizing Military Theory and Methodology” in the recently published second edition entitled “On the Laws of War (Issues of Military Theory and methodology)", in the monographs "A New Redistribution of the World" (2003), "In the past they are not looking for ashes - fire" (2008, republished with additions in 2017 under the title "Struggle for Fire") and "The unquenchable flame of the Great Victory" ( 2013), developed using many of the materials published by him in periodicals. A large place in these works is devoted to the analysis of domestic experience in solving modern problems of military and political practice by military science, the conclusions and recommendations arising from it, as well as the rationale for measures to overcome crisis phenomena.

In the works of Professor S.A. Tyushkevich considers not only general issues of war and peace, but also more specific ones. They explore the problems of the military-political situation in the world during the transition period, militarism, various aspects of international security, strategic stability, Russia's military security, and others. First, these problems and questions were analyzed in his monograph "Strategic Stability in the Historical Dimension" (1995), and later - in two editions of the named monograph on the laws of war (2002, 2017).

As for the first book, it focuses on strategic stability in the world and the military security of the Fatherland, the provision of which remains relevant even now, because strategic stability is violated under the influence of various factors, which leads to new military dangers and threats, to hotbeds of military conflicts in different, especially "hot" regions and - to an arms race in different countries. This, in particular, is evidenced by the armed aggressions of the United States and its allies in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, as well as their desire to create, in order to minimize a retaliatory strike against their forces, elements of a strategic missile defense system near Russia's western and eastern borders.

In connection with the foregoing, dangers and threats, their differences from each other and their interrelation are considered. This is important because often these concepts are identified, applied incorrectly. Meanwhile, as the book says, the military danger acts as a potential opportunity for the outbreak of war, armed conflict. And a military threat is a real, real danger that comes from a certain carrier (subject) of military-political relations and is directed against their other carrier (subject). Both one and the other have the same sources and causes that are inherent in armed conflicts, wars large and small.

S.A. Tyushkevich succeeded in revealing the dialectic of the action of two tendencies. One - to the establishment of a unipolar world, and the other - a multipolar one; the inadmissibility of a unipolar world and the advantages of a multipolar world with several centers of power. This means the diversity of the political, economic and cultural development of countries. Under these conditions, there is a growing understanding that what is needed is mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and not hegemonism and power politics; dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation. This is all the more important because the role of military force in world politics is not diminishing, but, on the contrary, is growing, taking into account nuclear weapons.

Domestic philosophy, military-historical science and military theory, of course, received an increment with the publication of the fundamental complex interdisciplinary work of S.A. Tyushkevich, dedicated to the laws of war. Before the publication of its first version (2002) by Professor S.A. Tyushkevich published many works on determinism in military and military-historical sciences, especially such components as causality, necessity and chance, regularity, on the history of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, their results and lessons and, importantly, on methodology research and explanation of the nature of these military-political events.

However, the time has come to bring these developments together, and then develop them in a new edition, taking into account the international and domestic Russian conditions that have changed over the capacious 15 years of the 21st century, to show their impact on military science and, most importantly, to assess the prospects for its development and application in real life. politics. S.A. Tyushkevich in his work considered the problem of the laws of war systematically, investigated, and in a number of cases personally formulated or clarified the definitions of the laws of war, based on the achieved level of military science, built a coherent theoretical system.

About twenty years before this, works devoted to general scientific and methodological problems of such a phenomenon that has not outlived itself, unfortunately, are still war, were not actually published. The explanation is simple: there were simply no researchers of such a scale and such a breadth of outlook, and even Stepan Andreevich himself took some time to comprehend the dramatic changes that took place in our country and in the whole world under the influence of a systemic crisis, and then to assess the impact of new phenomena. XXI century on military science. There were, of course, individual works that the author deeply and carefully analyzed and indicated in the list of references. However, they touched only one or another aspect of the science of war.

The uniqueness of this work, combined with its fundamental nature, lies in the fact that it contains a body of scientific knowledge about the laws of war, their system, the mechanism of manifestation in specific conditions, as well as information and provisions on the forms and methods of knowing the diverse types and types of laws of war, about their use in the course of war, armed struggle in the interests of achieving the set goals. It is this circumstance that justifies and, moreover, important a detailed analysis of the content of the work, which in the first edition consists of three interrelated parts and an appendix, and in the second edition is supplemented by a new part that reveals the problems of updating military scientific knowledge.

In the first part of the work "War and Its Laws" (this is its most complex and important part), war is considered as a historical and socio-political phenomenon - an extreme phenomenon, its essence, content, types and types, the subordination of war to objective scientific laws are revealed. Here, the features of empirical (sensual) and theoretical (logical, rational) knowledge of the regular relations of war, the scientific system of its own laws are deeply analyzed and shown, the mechanism of their action is explained.

The author showed the failure of the "equalization of rights" of war as a violent armed form of relations between states and other "wars" - economic, financial, ideological, diplomatic, etc., which are types of competitive international relations. In wartime, however, these forms of struggle, although they become aggravated, still only supplement and provide the main, decisive form of struggle - the armed one. Actually, the war in its content differs from all other "wars" by an essential feature - armed struggle, which gives the war in its original understanding a qualitative property inherent only in it. It lies in the fact that the war is waged by the armed forces and the peoples as a whole, while other forms of struggle, accompanying the armed struggle, are waged by civilian state institutions. In addition, they can be used in peacetime. Putting exactly this meaning into the concept of "war", the author reveals the systemic laws of this complex phenomenon.

Philosopher S.A. It is no coincidence that Tyushkevich was awarded the academic title of professor in the field of military history. For many years he has been solving the problem of using the laws of war by analyzing rich historical material, tracing the change in the content of war from ancient times to the present day. The author showed that the war went through a complex dialectical path of development: in primitive society it was practically identical to the armed struggle aimed at ensuring the conditions for the existence of groups of people (the struggle to expand pastures, hunting areas, etc.); in the 21st century, war has become much more complicated in content, has taken on an interstate form, and is, as a rule, aimed at fighting for financial, natural, energy, biological, and other resources.

The work under consideration notes that the development of military theory, a deep understanding of everything that has been born and is being born by a revolution in military affairs, is the most important duty of military personnel. Comprehension of the essence of modern wars, their socio-political, military-technological and strategic nature, improvement of the system of laws of military science and the principles of military art is a necessary condition for the successful solution of the tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces. In this sense, the following provisions contained in the work are of particular importance.

Of fundamental importance is the provision on the essence of war as a continuation of the policy of certain classes, states by means of armed violence, the justification and development of which Stepan Andreevich paid special attention to. Politics gives rise to war, determines the goals of war, its socio-political and military-strategic character; has a decisive influence on society in order to create and use the necessary military power; ensures the achievement of the set goals with the help of not only armed violence, but also other types of struggle in the war (economic, scientific and technical, diplomatic, ideological); determines the character and direction of the post-war world.

The other side of the essence of war - armed struggle - has the property of a reverse effect on politics: it can force a review not only of the political goals of the war, but also of the entire domestic and foreign policy of the belligerent side (belligerents), the political system of society, its spiritual life, economy, etc. Moreover, the emergence of nuclear missiles and other types of weapons of mass destruction radically changed not only the nature of the armed struggle, but also its political content, making the war as a whole irrational, incapable of achieving the set political goals.

On this basis, the work convincingly proves that the so-called new interpretation of war, which ignores armed struggle as its decisive specific feature, is untenable. It is also unjustified to assert that wars can take place without the use of armed violence, that they are not necessarily associated with the direct use of weapons, that both "hot" and "cold" wars are a phenomenon of the same essential order, that the confrontation between states and social forces, national and other movements in modern conditions, even without armed struggle - this is also a war.

Having explored and revealed the meaning, essence of war, S.A. Tyushkevich proceeds to consider the systemic laws of this extremely complex and contradictory social phenomenon. At the same time, he notes that the process of cognition of laws historically and logically includes two stages. The first is empirical, which is based on the reproduction and use of experience in the preparation and conduct of armed struggle, wars; the second is rational (logical, theoretical), which is based on the knowledge of the essence of the phenomena and processes of armed struggle, wars, their interconnection and interaction.

At first, generals and researchers seemed to "feel" that in the course of hostilities certain connections and relationships arise that literally dictate the course of the struggle and largely determine its outcome. The reproduction and use of experience was precisely the content of the empirical (sensory) stage of the knowledge of the laws of war. An extended generalization of such experience in memoirs and treatises against the background of the general rapid development of military history led to a qualitatively new method and level of knowledge of the laws of war - logical (rational). At the same time, it is noted that the process of creative knowledge of the laws of war is the process of development of military science itself as a special branch of scientific knowledge. The deeper and more thoroughly the laws of armed struggle and war are shown, the more perfect their theoretical system, the more mature is military science. This means that the process of learning the laws of war and improving military science continues.

The author sees the purpose of the scientific system of the laws of war in the fact that it should “be the most important theoretical basis of military science, its core, and in this case act as the basis of the military policy of the state, its military doctrine, military construction”5. Based on the achievements of the Soviet military-theoretical school,6 he put the principle of full coverage of the life cycle of a war as a social system - from inception to transition to other stages and levels of development.

The author identifies and analyzes in detail the following groups of the system of laws of war : the laws of the origin and emergence of war are genetic; the laws that determine and "stabilize" the course of the war are functional; the laws governing the transition of war from one state, qualitative level to another - the laws of development7.

Knowledge the first group of laws (genetic) necessary for understanding the history of wars, their place in the life of human society at each specific stage of its evolution, as well as for preventing war, especially in our turbulent times. These laws make it possible to understand the causes of war, the conditions in which they operate (may appear). This is extremely important for the political and military leadership, for the development of military policy and military doctrine.

A serious scientific contribution to the development of the system of laws of war is the identification by the author of the law of the dependence of the origin, course and outcome of war on the correlation of geopolitical and demographic factors8. Accounting for the effect of this law is very important for modern Russia, since serious geopolitical and demographic changes have taken place and are taking place inside and around it. Unpopulation and destruction of the economic infrastructure of vast areas due to the critical unevenness of their settlement with unclear demographic prospects, exacerbated by the expansion of the NATO bloc to the East, the advancement of its large strike groups of troops to the Russian borders, the deployment of offensive and defensive weapons systems, reconnaissance, control and warning systems, poor border equipment between the CIS countries - all this creates conditions for Russia when the laws of war, if it is unleashed, will act against it. This necessitates the adoption of emergency preventive compensatory measures of a comprehensive nature.

The second and third groups of laws of war make it possible to determine policy, strategy and military art in the event that war becomes a fact. Then the knowledge of these laws becomes the basis for the activities of military personnel, troops, aimed at repelling aggression and achieving victory.

Both theoretically and practically, interesting and instructive are the provisions of the work on the system of connections and relations that determine the emergence of wars, their nature, course and outcome. These are not only causes, conditions, but also interests and goals in war, necessity and chance, possibility and reality, necessity and freedom, as well as some other connections and relationships that are covered by the concept of determinism. Knowledge of these connections and relationships, S.A. Tyushkevich, is important both for research, theoretical activity, and for practical activity, primarily because the activity of people is included in the mechanism of operation and use of the laws of war. This means that a person is not powerless, but can create more or less favorable (very unfavorable) conditions for both the operation of laws and their use, which is fraught with negative consequences. How precise are the propositions put forward! Even in the first edition of S.A. Tyushkevich foresaw (and warned!) the events that followed soon in South Ossetia, caused by the lack of responsibility of the Georgian "popularly elected" President M. Saakashvili for his extravagantly free actions before his own and other peoples, and then caused not without outside influence "Maidan" upheavals in Ukraine, which led to bloody events and the split of the country.

It is important to distinguish between the laws of war and the laws of armed struggle, Stepan Andreevich teaches us, considering the latter in a special section of the third chapter of the second edition of the work. For military personnel, the understanding that the laws of armed struggle are, as it were, a projection developed by S.A. Tyushkevich of the system of laws of war on the actual armed confrontation. In this regard, the work speaks very instructively of the principles of military art, which are based on the laws of armed struggle and are derived from them.

The author rightly emphasizes that there can be no "final solution" to the problem of the laws of war, since they are historical. "The historicism of laws is expressed in the change of tendencies operating in war and armed struggle"9. Indeed, a change in the content of war and armed struggle, especially in the direction of complication, inevitably leads to the evolution of their ontological connections and relations. As a result of this, some laws may not manifest themselves so clearly, up to complete extinction, while others may increase their effect.

Finally, new laws and regularities may appear, caused both by qualitative changes in the content of military confrontation, for example, in connection with the use of outer space, weapons based on new physical principles and cybernetic control systems, and by the increased influence of changes in the environment on the course of hostilities ( the onset of "nuclear winter" in the event of a massive use of nuclear weapons, pollution of the atmosphere, lithosphere, seas and oceans, climate change after environmental disasters caused by the war, etc.). It was the establishment and analysis of the principle of historicism that allowed the author to conclude that the system of laws of war should be open.

The second part of the work, "Conditions and factors for the use of the laws of war", is devoted to the analysis of the purposeful activity of the political and military leadership, commanders and troops. It reveals the features of the use of laws in wars of various historical eras, especially in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people of 1941-1945, and speaks of the specifics of the conscious activity of people in the war.

The third part of the work, "Methodological Functions of the Scientific Laws of War", formulates theoretical and methodological provisions and recommendations that are important for understanding the structure and content of modern military theory, military science, their development trends, as well as their components such as the theory of victory, the theory of military security, etc. The need to know the mechanism of the evolution of the laws of armed struggle and war as an obligatory, necessary prerequisite for the creative activity of military personnel, including military historians, is convincingly discussed in a special section of the work10.

The scientific system of the laws of war plays an important role in the interconnection and interdependence of the military and military-historical sciences, excluding the so-called subordinate relations between them, the author rightly believes. The specificity lies in the fact that military history primarily studies the connections that characterize the war and the army in chronological development, while military science studies structural connections. Therefore, each of these relatively independent sciences expresses different methods of cognition - historical and theoretical. The objects and subjects of research also differ significantly.

An important indicator of the fundamental nature of the work of the hero of the day on the laws of war is the discovery of the relationship between military theory and practice. The development of the first is carried out in the interests of the second, the development of a methodology for understanding and understanding the laws of war is carried out in the interests of ensuring the military security of Russia, the implementation of its military reform and the development of the Armed Forces. The reverse side of this relationship is the use of vast empirical material, primarily the experience of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, revolutionary changes in military affairs in the postwar years, the experience of local wars and armed conflicts, including the clearly aggressive actions of the United States and some of its allies in the second half of the 20th century. - at the beginning of the 21st century against a number of sovereign countries (for example, against Vietnam, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya ...) and the so-called humanitarian interventions, in the interests of deepening military theory, clarifying the laws and patterns of war, which in the second edition of S.A. Tyushkevich paid great attention to the new, fourth part "From the experience of updating military theory and methodology", the final chapter of which, "A necessary condition for the development of military science", was developed by the author on the basis of his article of the same name in the journal "Military Thought"11.

On the whole, the work is of great cognitive, ideological and methodological significance and should be a reference book for everyone who deals with military-scientific problems. It provides military personnel with a theoretical and methodological tool for solving the main task - preparation, based on military science, for the defense of the Fatherland. The following conclusion of the author is extremely important: "... the objective laws of war and armed struggle have always been and remain the basis of all conscious activity in the war." Taking them into account is a condition for victory over any aggressor in war, and in peaceful conditions it is the most important factor in ensuring Russia's military security and preventing wars.

Professor S.A. Tyushkevich was one of the first Russian scientists who gave a verified historical-philosophical and military-scientific explanation of many military phenomena, including the causes of wars, the laws and patterns of their course and development, which make up victories and the cost of war. His conclusion is indisputable that the causes of wars are general, special and private, including accidental ones, manifesting themselves, of course, depending on the concretely developing objective conditions and subjective circumstances.

The common causes of wars still actively influence social relations at all their levels. The possibilities of their manifestation and action are essentially determined by a number of circumstances in which the general globalization of politics, economics, military-political, information and other processes plays a special role. It takes place in the struggle between two main tendencies: the trend towards the formation of a unipolar world led by the United States and in the interests of the United States and the so-called golden billion, and the trend towards the formation of a multipolar world in the interests of the vast majority of states.

These trends have already manifested themselves in the past century12. The attempts of fascist Germany and its allies under the Anti-Comintern Pact to arrange the world in their own interests and in their own image and likeness, that is, to make the world unipolar, failed. In the Second World War they unleashed, they were defeated. At the same time, the balance of power at all levels has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The emergence of a bipolar world after the Second World War for some time weakened the trend towards the formation of a unipolar world, and significantly, although it did not eliminate it from the arena of world history. The main and main limiter of this trend was the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization headed by it.

However, after, as Professor S.A. Tyushkevich, prepared from outside, relying on the internal destructive forces of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the military-political situation in the world and the course of history have changed again: the United States and NATO have made desperate efforts to form a unipolar world and implement their policy of global domination. First of all, these are military efforts and economic diktat. Each such step by the United States and its associates leads to an increase in injustice in the distribution of property not only at the global, but also at the regional and national levels. This is the main reason, says S.A. Tyushkevich, generating wars and armed conflicts in the 21st century. Unfortunately, this factor was not the only one; interacting with other sources (common causes) of wars, it is strengthened and modified.

This is, firstly, an unfavorable balance of military, political and economic forces in the world for most countries, which significantly limited their role in solving international problems, as well as negatively affecting the activities and authority of the UN.

Secondly, the former separatist, terrorist forces, acting under religious, ideological, ethnic and other slogans and pretexts, became more active and new ones emerged. Moreover, terrorism has become an international phenomenon.

Thirdly, globalization has left a deep imprint on the sphere of interstate and intercivilizational relations, led to intolerance of dissent, gave dangerous directions to the rejection of the way of life of many peoples who have chosen their own path of development.

However, the general causes, the sources of wars, do not act automatically. They are manifested in the activities of certain political forces that use military force in the name of their selfish interests. At the same time, the general causes of wars are actualized through special and single causes and, as a rule, manifest themselves in private and even accidental causes, as well as in occasions and pretexts, and always depending on specific circumstances and conditions. This is confirmed by the entire history of wars of past eras and modern times.

The current military-political situation in the world, the balance of power on a global and regional scale, the nature and trends in the development of military affairs under the influence of the scientific and technological revolution, as well as the content of the activities of the military-political forces that dominate the world, allowed the scientist to draw some contours of wars and military conflicts of the present. and future, bearing in mind their socio-political, military-technical and legal aspects.

First. The initiators of new wars and military conflicts, in the first place, can be economically and militarily powerful states (for example, the United States), partly because the USSR no longer exists as an adequate counterbalance. Wars can start under the imaginary pretexts of protecting or establishing a system of democracy, protecting justice, human rights, universal values, etc. But wars can also start for independence, protecting sovereignty, etc.

The spectrum of wars can still be quite wide for all reasons: socio-political, legal and strategic. Thus, for socio-political reasons, wars are possible that correspond to national interests and those that do not correspond to them; just and unjust wars; wars that differ in the type of conflict resolution - political, economic, territorial, national-ethnic, religious, as well as in the socio-political composition of the belligerents - interstate, national liberation and civil. Legally, wars can either violate international law or be conducted in accordance with international law. In a strategic sense, wars can be both military actions, local, world, fleeting, protracted, coalition and bilateral; according to the method of conducting combat operations - offensive, defensive, maneuvering, positional; according to the means used - nuclear and with the use of conventional means of destruction; by tension - high, medium and low intensity.

Second. Changes in the military-political goals of wars are possible: not the defeat of the enemy and not the seizure of his territory, but disorganization in the political, economic, military and other spheres of activity, coercion to accept conditions unfavorable to the enemy without special costs and losses on his part (as was, for example, with Serbia).

The third. It is likely that the space for conducting armed struggle will expand: from battles on land theaters to joint operations (aerospace, air-land, land-sea) and up to the development of the information continuum. The tendency to unite the actions of all types and branches of the troops, the actions of offensive and defensive strategic forces and means in the air, space environment, etc., will manifest itself.

Fourth. A new dialectic of war will appear: from gaining initiative and superiority in the information sphere to creating superiority in the aerospace sphere and, on this basis, changing the balance of forces in their favor. As a result, the achievement of quantitative and qualitative superiority in forces and means in armed struggle.

Fifth. Due to the fact that contact combat is increasingly being replaced by cruise and ballistic missile strikes, a change in the ratio of strategy, operational art and tactics is likely. A change in time relations in armed struggle is inevitable: an increase in the period of preparation for it and a reduction in the duration of the action itself. The outstripping development of means and methods of defeat in comparison with means of protection will be manifested.

Sixth. A gradual transition from command and control of troops to command of armed struggle and war as a whole is inevitable.

Seventh. The importance of strategic non-nuclear deterrence of an aggressor from unleashing hostilities with any weapon will increase by creating a real threat of inflicting unavoidable unacceptable damage on him with precision weapons.

Ideas about the wars of the past century and some features of future wars, Stepan Andreevich believes, are changing, and new theoretical studies of the problem of war, its essence and content, nature, types and types, etc. are needed. Their results should serve to solve the problem of ensuring the military security of Russia in the new historical conditions, the fulfillment by the Armed Forces of the functions of ensuring its sovereignty, integrity and prosperity.

The ideas of the front-line soldier S.A. Tyushkevich, set forth by him in a number of works, including the monograph "Duty and Memory"13.

In order to overcome the crisis in Russia, the professor believes, it is necessary to put into action the material and spiritual factors of development with the obligatory reliance on huge potential for the Great Victory. The actualization of the latter is the primary task of the political leadership of the state, political parties, public organizations, and the entire people. It can inspire the people to take action to overcome the systemic crisis, to ensure Russia's sustainable development, and, if necessary, to defend it.

In order to develop, society needs moral guidelines and a consolidating idea, a goal. Instructive experience in the implementation of such ideas and goals was accumulated in the peaceful years of the development of Soviet society. Stepan Andreevich is far from idealizing it, because a society that is completely just and suits all the people living in it can exist only as an ideal that must be strived for, but which cannot be realized. However, it should be recognized that Soviet society took a serious step towards this ideal and, despite various (including dramatic) excesses and deviations, it was a society of social justice14.

Inextricably linked with the choice of the type (character) of society should be the development (elaboration) of the national idea. History shows that no matter what is done in society, in the state to improve life, there will be no nationwide result if the people are deprived of a common, unifying idea. For example, the ongoing national projects in the field of health, education, etc. are a good and necessary thing. However, deprived of a common big idea, if implemented, they will, of course, give a positive result, but they will not be able to bring society out of a deep crisis.

Even now, in post-Soviet Russia, efforts are being made to somehow improve the situation of the people. But this is done, unfortunately, without a big, national idea. Stepan Andreyevich sees the reason for this in the fact that the neoliberal reforms dealt a mortal blow to the principle of social justice and led to the terrible polarization of Russian society15.

The formation of a national idea is not an isolated act: it is inextricably linked with the awareness of Russia's national interests in the realities of the 21st century. All previous history testifies that a society, a state with a developed self-consciousness, usually does not voluntarily sacrifice its national interests. The highest interests of Russia as an expression of the needs of society, the motives of the state, individual social groups, individuals, taken together, cover all forms of their life and activity - from material to spiritual, have an internal aspect and an external orientation.

They didn't appear out of nowhere. No matter how independent Russia may be, its national interests in one way or another contain the past of the country, especially the nearest, but in a "removed" form. Basically, it is the axis of national interests that forms the present and future of Russia. The axis of interests here refers to certain ideas (ideas, doctrines, concepts) about society, statehood, in combination with a certain system of power, i.e., a political regime. With all the diversity of views on this matter, we can say that the desired trend is already being established. Its essence lies in the fact that the priority national interest of Russia is expressed in the preservation of its territorial integrity as a multinational federal state, a single economic and cultural space, in ensuring the security of all Russian peoples and the Russian state as a whole. Russia must remain in the world system as an independent center of power interacting with both the East and the West16.

In the new, very difficult conditions, Professor S.A. Tyushkevich continues to solve the fundamental issues covered by the concept of "war and peace", which he refers to in a number of works17. Since the highest value of human civilization is peace, and the advanced, most progressive part of humanity is fighting against war, for peace, then, according to Stepan Andreevich, it is legitimate to talk about the concept of "peace and war", it's time to change the focus of research from the study of military art (t i.e. the art of preparing and waging wars, which, in principle, has not yet lost its significance) to the study of experience and the development of conceptual provisions for the "art of preventing wars and maintaining peace."

In the nuclear age, the issue of preventing nuclear war, both large and small, is particularly acute. The scale of the nuclear danger for peoples and states, and life in general, is so enormous that there can be no other formulation. Realizing this, humanity, unfortunately, as the events of the late 20th - early 21st century showed, still continues to follow the path of war. In the nuclear era, the philosophy of peace, its culture, and on their basis, concrete actions to strengthen national and international security and stability are becoming increasingly important.

The new dialectics of war and peace, its conditionality by the processes taking place in the world, primarily global ones, deepen our understanding of the nature and paths of the historical process, civilization, the fate of states, peoples, classes, social groups and individuals. The unity of man and nature, society and personality, the organic and ever-increasing interconnection and interpenetration of phenomena and processes - this and much more gives rise to a new worldview, promotes socialization and humanization of social relations. “Peace, not war, should characterize both the relations of individual states and the entire system of interstate relations as a whole”18. However, Stepan Andreevich notes, these processes are stubbornly and persistently aggressively opposed by the neoliberal worldview, ageless militarism and American-style globalization. The desire to impose a "unipolar world" is a brake and an obstacle to the development of civilization on a peaceful basis.

War as a socio-political phenomenon will leave human civilization, Stepan Andreevich is convinced, when the causes that give rise to this phenomenon are eliminated. But this is not enough. There will be no wars when forces such as the individual, society and the state in all countries begin to act in one direction, for the sake of one goal, enter into "resonance". This will be a qualitatively new phenomenon in the history of mankind. In the meantime, it is necessary to fight the war, and for this it must be constantly and comprehensively studied as a phenomenon, the professor believes. And he doesn't get tired of doing it.

Modern Russian military science is quite well developed, has accumulated vast empirical material, has a developed theory of historical processes, having mastered which, we can fairly correctly judge the past, which contains both dramatic and heroic, look for and find in it not ashes, but flames . The veteran of the Great Patriotic War, the coryphaeus of military science, Major General Stepan Andreevich Tyushkevich, sacredly believes in this.