By 1990, Barre was no longer in control of most of Somalia, while several large armed groups moved on to the country's capital, Mogadishu. Mohammed Siad Barre was forced to flee his residence "Villa Somalia" in a tank. Having captured Mogadishu, the opposition informal armed groups could not agree on the creation of a government of national unity and continued to fight, now among themselves.
Most of Mogadishu, and therefore the country, was controlled by the most powerful of the field commanders, a former graduate of the Soviet military school, Mohammed Farah Aidid (Mohammed Farah Aidid). Outright banditry flourished in the country. In November 1991, fighting broke out with renewed vigor in the capital of Somalia between rival armed groups. General Mohammed Farah Aidid attempted to remove President Ali Mahdi. By December 1991, about 4,000 people, mostly civilians, had died in fierce fighting. At least 20,000 people were injured. The capital of the country turned into ruins.
The infrastructure of Somalia was completely destroyed. The state actually ceased to exist. To all the troubles, the country was engulfed in drought. Famine and severe epidemics raged in Somalia. By the autumn of 1992, more than half of the population of Somalia, almost 5 million people, suffered from hunger and epidemics, more than 300 thousand people died. Most of the dead were children. About 2 million refugees were forced to leave their homes to escape hunger, disease and civil war.
Despite the massive supply of food and medicine organized by the world community, the situation of Somali refugees has not improved. UN humanitarian aid often did not reach the addressee, ending up in the hands of bandit armed groups. The small peacekeeping military contingent of the UN could not provide protection for transport food caravans and humanitarian aid distribution points. Mohammed Sakhnoon, the UN plenipotentiary in Somalia, spoke out with harsh criticism of UN officials and demanded that urgent measures be taken to prevent the deaths of hundreds of Somalis.
On December 3, 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 794 (1992), which dealt with the creation of a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The Security Council welcomed the US initiative to send military personnel to Somalia and, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized them to "use all necessary means" to achieve their peacekeeping goals. The rest of the states were also invited to replenish the UN peacekeeping contingent and make financial contributions for peacekeeping operations in Somalia.
On December 4, 1992, US President George W. Bush announced the launch of Operation Restore Hope under UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992). Unified command of the UN peacekeeping force was entrusted to the United States.
In addition to the US military, the joint peacekeeping military contingent included military units from 20 more countries that are members of the UN, a total of 17,000 people. On December 8, 1992, the UN Secretary General, in a telephone conversation with US President George W. Bush, defined the concept of the distribution of responsibilities between the UN and the US as follows:
“…the United States of America has committed itself to playing a leading role in creating a secure environment, which is a prerequisite for the fulfillment by the United Nations of the tasks of providing humanitarian emergency assistance and promoting national reconciliation and economic recovery, which were originally included in various Security Council resolutions on Somalia…”

On December 9, 1992, on the east coast of Somalia, near Mogadishu, the United Task Force (UNITAF) began landing with a total of 17 thousand people. The peacekeeping forces had an international character in the truest sense of the word. Their military personnel were provided by: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Egypt, Zimbabwe, India, Italy, Canada, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, New Zealand, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, France and Sweden. The landing took place without visible complications. Nevertheless, UNITAF forces occupied a small part of the narrow coastal strip. In order to penetrate the territory of Somalia, it was necessary to carry out a series of special operations, to seize strategic facilities held by opposing Somali groups. This difficult task was entrusted to the US Army Special Forces.
On the night of December 13, 1992, US troops captured the strategically important airfield in Beledweyne, and by December 16, 1992, captured the city of Baidoa, located in southwestern Somalia. This made it possible to begin a large-scale transfer of the US Army contingent. By January 1993, the number of US military personnel had reached 28,000. The US Army Central Command has developed a four-stage plan to take control of the main regions of Somalia. It included the seizure of port facilities, airports, central highways, as well as humanitarian aid distribution points.
Despite the declared neutrality, the UNITAF military contingent, wanting to ensure the safe passage of vehicles with humanitarian aid and create all the necessary conditions for the normal functioning of food distribution points, became more and more involved in intra-Somali inter-clan conflicts. However, despite the enormous difficulties, the main goal was achieved. Already in the spring of 1993, they managed to persuade the armed groups to end the civil strife. The leaders of the fifteen largest military groups put their signatures under the disarmament agreement. The guarantor of the agreement was to be the military peacekeeping contingent of the UN. In May of the same year, the United States reduced the size of its military contingent to a few thousand people, transferring command of the multinational force to the UN.
All this time, Osama bin Laden from his headquarters in the suburbs of Khartoum closely followed the developments in Somalia. He believed that the entry of the UN peacekeeping contingent into the territory of this country was "...another confirmation of the imperialist essence of America and its undisguised expansion against Muslims...", and the UN turned into an obedient toy in the hands of the United States. First Egypt, then Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, this time Somalia. The explosion of the "hell machine" at the hotels of Aden in December 1992 was supposed to serve as a warning to the Americans, but they "... ignored the Islamic army and invaded Somalia ..."
Back in 1991, close contacts were established between Osama bin Laden and field commander Mohammed Farah Aidid through Sudanese and Egyptian Islamists. Mohammed Farah Aidid, hoping to receive financial support, moved away from pro-Soviet beliefs and returned to the fold of Islamic fundamentalism. On the personal orders of Osama bin Laden, the head of the Al-Qaeda Military Committee, Mohammed Atef, set up an operational headquarters in the capital of Kenya, Nairobi. In the summer of 1993, Bin Laden organized the transfer of hundreds of "Afghan Arabs" to Somalia. Mostly they were people from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen. One part of the militants, under the cover of night on small fishing boats, landed in remote areas of the Somali coast and infiltrated in small groups into Mogadishu. Another part of the light aircraft crossed the Somali border from Kenya and Ethiopia. "Afghan Arabs" arriving incognito in Somalia joined the ranks of Aidid's militants. "Bin Laden's people" agreed with Aidid in advance that al-Qaeda militants would not take part in the Sudanese civil strife. They had a different, more important target - American soldiers. It was only necessary to wait for the right moment to strike.
Bin Laden visited Somalia several times during 1993, carrying false documents. However, he himself did not lead military actions, this was entrusted to his closest deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and Afghan veteran Ali al-Rashidi. It was Ali al-Rashidi, the right hand of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who directly led the attack on American troops on the night of October 3-4, 1993.
In June 1993, street fighting broke out with renewed vigor in Mogadishu. However, if earlier armed clashes were in the nature of inter-clan squabbles, this time the blow was delivered to Pakistani servicemen from the UN peacekeeping force. As a result of the attack by Aidid's militants, 25 Pakistanis were killed. By mid-summer, in similar clashes with the “Aidid army”, another 30 military personnel of the UN peacekeeping contingent and several hundred civilians were killed. It became clear that while Mohammed Farah Aidid is at large, it is impossible to normalize the situation in Somalia. UN representatives demanded the immediate arrest or destruction of Aidid. This operation was entrusted to the special forces of the US Army, which included rangers and fighters from the Delta anti-terrorist group.
The plan of operation, developed by the US Central Intelligence Agency, was to launch a surprise strike and capture Mohammed Farah Aidid, as well as his inner circle. Thus, the Americans hoped to behead and completely demoralize the most powerful military group in Somalia, the so-called Aidid militia. But the CIA did not even know that in Mogadishu they were confronted not by the half-starved thugs of Aidid, but by well-trained and well-armed professionals from among the “Afghan Arabs” of Osama bin Laden. A subsequent investigation into the causes of the tragedy revealed that several people in the office of the UN Secretary General knew about the presence of a large number of al-Qaeda militants in Mogadishu, but deliberately withheld this information from the US government. There is no doubt that the American command would have assessed the threat posed by fired veterans who have gained experience in combat operations on the battlefields of Afghanistan with one of the strongest armies in the world in a completely different way. Unlike the Americans, who had no idea about the location of Aidid and his entourage, the “Afghan Arabs” almost completely controlled the situation in Somalia and were privy to all the plans of the United States military contingent.
There are good reasons to believe that bin Laden's people are in possession of secret codes stolen by high-ranking CIA officer Aldrich Ames and handed over to an individual at UN headquarters in New York. Among them were also the secret signals of the operation in Mogadishu. The FBI suspected Ames of spying for Russia, and perhaps Ames himself thought he was working for Moscow. One way or another, but the fact remains: Bin Laden's people penetrated the very heart of the CIA, and top-secret information was at Bin Laden's disposal.
By the start of the raid in Mogadishu, al-Qaeda's illegal operational headquarters based in neighboring Kenya's capital, Nairobi, was so well informed of the US plans that it was able to take the initiative into its own hands. Mohammed Atef developed a counter-battle plan, which was to draw the US military into a trap at the very first stage of the American special operation - deeper into the urban areas of Mogadishu. The defeat of the US Army Special Forces was largely a foregone conclusion.
October 2, 1993 a certain American intelligence informant in Somalia told the command of the joint military group that people from Aidid's inner circle - Foreign Minister Omar Salad and chief political adviser Abdi Hassan Awal - were hiding in the building opposite the central market of Mogadishu, in the Olympic Hotel. With a very high probability, Mohammed Farah Aidid himself could be in this shelter at this time. It was extremely difficult to double-check the information received due to a number of objective reasons, and another such case to capture Aidid and his senior officers could no longer be presented. It was decided to immediately begin a military special operation, taking place in secret documents under the code name "Irene".
No one from the American command even suspected that the Sudanese informant had long been recruited by Al-Qaeda agents. Thus, it was not the Americans, but Ayman al-Zawahiri who gave the signal to start Operation Irene. It is likely that Aidid himself did not know that Bin Laden's people turned him into live bait for American soldiers. In any case, Ayman al-Zawahiri believed that as soon as the American troops fell into the trap, the Sudanese would join the al-Qaeda militants and attack the enemy with all their cruelty.

October 3, 1993 the informant additionally confirmed that at 14.50 in the building of the Olympic Hotel opposite the central market, in the most densely populated area, in the center of Mogadishu, the leaders of the rebellious Habr Hydra clan, to which Mohammed Farah Aidid himself belonged, gathered.
At 15.30 the command of the joint military group handed over the secret code "Irene". Hearing a code word on the air, the officers shouted “Irene” to the soldiers waiting in the cockpits of helicopters and inside armored cars, which meant the order to start a special operation.
According to the military plan, the rangers and fighters of the Delta anti-terrorist group were supposed to suddenly land from helicopters on the roof of the building and capture everyone who was inside the Olympic Hotel. A few minutes later, a military convoy was supposed to arrive at the landing site to pick up the captives and retreat outside Mogadishu. Exactly 90 minutes were allotted for the entire special operation, including the arrival at the landing site, the capture of the object, the unification with the UN military convoy and the retreat to their original positions.

Noon, October 3, 1993, Mogadishu.
At 15.32 US Army Special Forces, which included 19 helicopters, which housed US Rangers and fighters of the Delta anti-terrorist group, as well as 12 UN ground combat vehicles, began moving towards the central market of Mogadishu. A total of 120 US military personnel rushed to the center of Mogadishu.
At 15.42, ten minutes after the start of the special operation, helicopters of the US Army Special Forces entered the facility and began to storm. The 1st Delta Squad landed on the indicated building and, with a lightning strike, captured everyone inside the hotel, including Omar Salad and Mohammed Hassan Auvale. In parallel, four groups of rangers began to descend along the lines around the perimeter of the captured object in order to provide cover for the Delta group located inside the building.
During the landing, one of the rangers, Todd Blackburn, fell off the halyard and fell from a height of 25 m. numerous fractures, severe internal bleeding opened, endangering his life.
At 15.47, about five minutes after the landing of special forces, a crowd of Somalis spontaneously began to gather at the site of the assault. The situation could get out of control at any moment. The ground convoy, which was supposed to arrive at the landing site immediately after the assault, got stuck in the narrow streets of Mogadishu. The Somalis and the local militia, under the complete control of Aidid, erected many barricades of burning tires and stones on the streets of the city, completely blocking the approach to the rangers and the Delta group, who took up all-round defense in the captured building. The situation became even more complicated when at 15.58 a five-ton truck was unexpectedly hit by a rocket fired from an RPG. Several American soldiers in the car were seriously injured.
At this time, armed people began to gather towards the occupied building. Wanting to get closer to the American troops who had taken over the building, they used the Somali crowd as human shields. But this fact did not embarrass the beleaguered American soldiers, who, wanting to prove the seriousness of their intentions, opened heavy shooting to kill, and the crowd quickly retreated. No one else at that moment could appreciate the tragedy of the situation in which the besieged American soldiers found themselves. Everything that is happening in the center of Mogadishu, at first glance, looked like nothing more than spontaneous street riots.
In spite of everything, three cars from the convoy group made a desperate attempt at any cost to break through to the besieged, in order to take Private Blackburn and the prisoners. To 16.15 they finally managed to make their way to the landing site, but the incessant heavy fire did not allow them to pick up the wounded ranger and the captured leaders of the Habr Hydra clan to take them to the base.
Five minutes later, a message came that at 16.20 an RPG missile had shot down an American Black Hawk Super 61 combat helicopter. It fell five blocks from the main theater of operations. An angry crowd of Somalis rushed to the site of the helicopter crash.
The besieged commandos and the convoy group, realizing that further delay would worsen their situation even more, decided to break through. At 16.26 the entire convoy, having loaded the prisoners and the wounded Blackburn, began to fight their way to the crash site of the Black Hawk Super 61 helicopter.
In parallel with this, the main headquarters of the command of the joint military group decided to send a rescue helicopter to help the crew of the Black Hawk Super 61. At 16.28 rescuers found the collapsed side of the Black Hawk Super 61, and paratroopers on halyards began to descend towards it. Approaching the wrecked car, they found that the pilot and both of his assistants were dead.
The message about the death of the crew of the downed helicopter was received by the ground convoy, however, he decided to continue the search in order to take the bodies of the dead pilots with him. However at 16.35 the convoy lost its way, took a wrong turn, and under heavy fire began to wander through the narrow streets of Mogadishu, making a frantic attempt to find the crashed helicopter.


A short time later, another alarming message came: a rocket fired by an RPG shot down a second helicopter that had taken off from the base to adjust the exit and provide fire cover for the convoy. Attack helicopter "Black Hawk Super 64", piloted by Mike Durant (Mike Durant), fell among the city blocks, southwest of the scene of hostilities. Crowds of armed Somalis began to converge on the downed helicopter.
At 16.42 two snipers from the Delta team landed at the crash site of the Black Hawk Super 64 in order to protect the wounded Mike Durant and his crew from an angry mob. Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart and Master Sergeant Gary Gordon knew they were taking risks. Nevertheless, they volunteered to protect the downed crew of the Black Hawk Super 64 and tethered down to the wreckage of the crashed helicopter.
At 16.54 The convoy stopped searching for the first Black Hawk Super 61 helicopter that was shot down. The convoy was disoriented, losing most of its personnel, either wounded or killed. Those who remained with a fight began to break through to the base, every minute running into impenetrable street blockages and well-thought-out ambushes of Somalis and al-Qaeda militants.
At 17.03, wanting to save the remnants of the convoy, the command of the joint military group sent a new convoy to the aid of the encircled American soldiers. It was noticeably smaller than the first, since it consisted mainly of the so-called rapid reaction forces. The second convoy began to make its way to the site of the crash of Mike Durant's helicopter, but after passing several blocks deep into Mogadishu, they also fell into a well-prepared ambush.
Half an hour later, at 17.34, both convoys made a forced decision to return to base. The losses were huge. The surviving rangers and fighters of the Delta group, cut off from the main forces, began to fight their way to the crash site of the first helicopter. because for the command of the combined group, this point was the only accurate reference point in the reigning chaos of Mogadishu.
Despite huge losses, the Somalis continued to attack the beleaguered crew of Mike Durant and the Delta snipers covering them. It was worth repulsing one wave, as another immediately rolled. Shooting back at an angry mob was like shooting at a pack of hungry rats. At 17.40, after an hour-long battle, the annular defense of the Americans was broken through by the Somalis. The brutal mob seized the downed helicopter and lynched the crew members, as well as snipers Shugart and Gordon. The jubilant Somalis dragged the torn bodies of American soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu. The only survivor was helicopter pilot Mike Durant, who was rescued by the Aidid militia from an angry mob and handed over as a living trophy to their leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid.
About at 17.45 both convoys broke out of the city with heavy losses and returned to base. In the center of the capital of Somalia, 99 rangers remained in a dense encirclement. They understood perfectly well that they would not have to count on outside help in the next few hours. Despite air support, they were forced to fortify themselves in one of the houses of Mogadishu. The Rangers began to simply fight for their own lives. One of the American soldiers, Corporal Smith (Smit), was seriously injured, and he began to bleed heavily. The medic, who was in the forefront of the attackers, demanded his urgent evacuation, since the blood could not be stopped in the field. The assault team leader requested a helicopter to evacuate Corporal Smith. The situation was aggravated by the fact that in urban combat, against RPGs, combat helicopters are practically defenseless, since descending to an extremely low altitude to pick up the wounded or drop ammunition, they become a convenient target.
At 19.08 one of the cover helicopters, a Black Hawk Super 6, made another attempt to approach the beleaguered Rangers. After making another circle, he dropped ammunition, water and medical supplies to the Rangers. The Black Hawk Super 6 attempted to land to take the wounded Corporal Smith with it. However, having barely descended to the height of the city roofs, he was hit by an RPG missile. Despite serious damage, he still manages to reach the base, but the wounded ranger cannot be picked up.
At 20.27 Corporal Smith bled to death.
AT 22.00 the command of the joint military group, realizing that they have no chance of saving the encircled rangers on their own, decided to ask for help from other units that make up UNITAF. A new, very large convoy gathered in a single fist in the new port of Mogadishu, which included two companies of the 10th Motorized Group, Malaysian armored cars and Pakistani tanks, as well as the remnants of rangers capable of holding weapons in their hands.
About at 23.30 the third rescue convoy entered the city.

Early morning, October 4, 1993, Mogadishu.
At 1.55 the rescue convoy reached the city center. He split into two groups, and one part of the convoy went out to the besieged rangers. The other part of the convoy finally reached the crash site of the Beck Hawk Super 64 helicopter piloted by Mike Durant. However, they did not find any of the crew members.
3 am. Since the body of pilot Cliff Wolcott from the Black Hawk Super 61 helicopter could not be found, the decision was made not to leave the city. All the forces of the Americans are thrown at any cost to recapture the bodies of the pilot and the rest of the dead American servicemen.
Only about an hour and a half later at 5.30 managed to find the body of Cliff Wolcott, and the combined forces of the third rescue convoy began to gradually withdraw from the city. The shelling of the column did not stop for a second. Complete chaos reigns around, despite the appearance of a well-coordinated and methodical withdrawal of troops. Since there was no room in armored cars for the rangers, for whose sake, it is worth noting, the third rescue operation was organized, they had to run next to the column. At some point, the column entered the wide streets of the city and, speeding up the movement, left the fleeing rangers completely alone, without the cover of armored vehicles. The Rangers had to flee under incessant shelling in the direction of the "Pakistan" stadium, the end point of the withdrawal of troops. This episode of the UN Operation Restore Hope went down in history as the Mogadishu Mile.
At 6.30 all forces returned to the "Pakistan" stadium.

It was one of the heaviest urban battles ever experienced by US troops in Somalia. American losses were 18 killed and 73 wounded. Somalis and al-Qaeda fighters lost hundreds of people. Instead of a fast-paced special operation, which was given 90 minutes, the American military had to fight for 14 hours with a heavily armed and outnumbered enemy. It was then that al-Qaeda militants first showed themselves as cruel and professional soldiers. As a special commission of the US Congress, created to investigate the causes of the tragedy in Mogadishu, found out, the people of Osama bin Laden opposed the American special forces. The militants of General Mohammed Farah Aidid were entrusted with a secondary function, the organization of riots and blockages on the path of the paramilitary UN transport convoy.
The United States has not experienced such a shock since Vietnam. All the world's television channels broadcast around the clock as a rampant Somali crowd torturing the corpses of American soldiers, dragging them through the streets of Mogadishu. America has experienced a real shock! In this regard, US President Bill Clinton, under pressure from public opinion and the US Congress, announced his intention to withdraw US troops from Somalia by March 1994.
Referring to the explosive situation in Mogadishu, in September 1994, the US State Department decided that the American presence in this country and the complete evacuation of its diplomatic mission, including the marines guarding it, were inappropriate.
Later, al-Qaeda claimed that it was thanks to the activities of the “Afghan Arabs” that the United States suffered a crushing defeat in Somalia. For Osama bin Laden and his entourage, as well as for Islamists throughout the Arab-Muslim world, the withdrawal of the American military contingent and the evacuation of the US diplomatic corps was clear evidence that the United States can be forced to retreat and go home. For Osama bin Laden, this was the biggest personal victory since the end of the Afghan war. The retreat of powerful America only strengthened the spirit of bin Laden and his associates, proving that the strategy they have chosen is promising. If the Americans have left Somalia, then they can be forced to leave the Middle East as well.
Then, in March 1994, in an interview with the British newspaper Independent, Osama bin Laden said:
“…We believe that Allah used our holy war in Afghanistan to destroy the Russian army and the Soviet Union. And now we ask Allah to use us once again to do the same to America so that only a shadow remains of her.
We also believe that our battle against America is much easier than against the Soviet Union, because some of our Mujahideen who fought in Afghanistan also fought in Somalia, and they were surprised at the collapse of American morale. This convinces us that Americans are a paper tiger…”
For the sake of truth, it is worth noting that the Somali operation of al-Qaeda, like the explosion in the Yemeni hotel on December 29, 1992, was not properly carried out by the chain of command emanating from Bin Laden himself. He, of course, authorized the preparation of subversive actions against US military personnel and UNITAF forces, as well as the terrorist attack in a Yemeni hotel, but there is no complete certainty that the “Sheikh of the Mujahideen” himself fully foresaw the possible result. The withdrawal of the American military contingent from Somalia came as more of a surprise to him than one might have expected.

As you know, Americans sometimes mediocrely lose wars and battles, and then they are heroically won on the screens of Hollywood blockbusters. They are undeniably talented in this. This is how they lost the Vietnam War in reality, and then heroically won it on the screen.

The on-screen victories of Hollywood supermen help Americans more easily endure the bitterness of real defeats on the battlefields. From the same row - the defeat of the Americans in the mountains of Afghanistan and the sands of Iraq, followed by an ongoing series of American victories over the Taliban and Iraqis in the movies.

But the most humiliating for the Americans was, of course, the 1993 defeat in Mogadishu, from which they fled in disgrace. So, in order to survive it, the Americans had to create a truly epic work in terms of its drama. That's exactly what became the film "Black Hawk Down", filmed by the creator of "Gladiator" Ridley Scott.

Hawks in Mogadishu

This film is a historical war drama based on real events. It is a newsreel of the 1993 battle in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. The film is based on the book of the same name by Mark Bowden. The title of the book and film comes from the name of the American military transport helicopter UH-60, better known as "Black Hawk", or "Black Hawk". During the battle in Mogadishu, two such helicopters were shot down by the Somalis.

The film takes place on October 3-4, 1993 in Somalia, where a civil war is going on and people are dying en masse. According to the script, the Americans, as always generously, arrived in Somalia to save the "good guys" from the "bad guys". The fact that civilians were killed en masse does not count. However, something went wrong with the American warriors and almost the entire film is devoted to the bloody mess in which they fell under Somali fire.

Only 19 Americans and up to a thousand Somalis died in this mess. And yet, this operation became a disgrace to the US Army and so spiritually broke the American nation and the American government that the "invincible" Yankees cowardly fled Somalia. So what really happened in Mogadishu then?

History of the operation

Since the late 1980s, a civil war has been going on in Somalia, which, by the way, has not ended so far. In 1991, the country's president, Muhammad Siad Barre, was overthrown by armed opposition forces, after which a period of anarchy and chaos began. The outbreak of famine claimed the lives of 300 thousand Somalis; attempts by international humanitarian organizations to provide the country's population with food failed due to ongoing civil unrest.

In December 1992, a multinational UN force under US command entered Somalia. Operation Restore Hope was intended to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the country. The success of this action convinced the UN leadership to expand the mandate of its forces in Somalia, and in May 1993 a new operation, "Continuation of Hope", began.

This was negatively perceived by one of the field commanders, Muhammad Farah Aidid, who opposed international interference in the affairs of Somalia. In response, the UN troops carried out an armed action against the forces of Aidid, accompanied by the death of civilians.

From that moment on, the peacekeepers and Aidid were at war. A reward of 25 thousand dollars was assigned for the head of the field commander.

The failures of international forces and the first losses of the American contingent (in August, as a result of two mine explosions, 4 Americans were killed and about 20 were injured) led the US government to decide to send special forces to Somalia to capture Aidid. Task Force Ranger included one company of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, a Delta squadron, and helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The special forces arrived in Somalia on August 22 and a week later carried out their first raid, which ended, however, in embarrassment: UN employees were mistakenly detained. New operations followed in September with limited success.

Hunt for Aidid

During this period, the American command made a serious mistake by underestimating its enemy. Aidid had a military education received in the USSR and Italy, participated in the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978 and held the rank of general in the former Somali army. Many of his subordinates also had military education and combat experience. In addition, there is evidence that foreign volunteers, veterans of the Afghan jihad against the USSR, took part in the battle on the side of Aidid.

Since all the raids of the tactical group "Ranger" were carried out according to a single template, Aidid's supporters were able to study the tactics of the Americans and draw the appropriate conclusions. The US command did not attach much importance to the episode when a UH-60 ("Black Hawk") helicopter was shot down in Mogadishu on September 25, considering the incident an accidental success of the "militants", but in vain.

The commemorative battle in Mogadishu, known in Somalia as "Ranger Day", took place between US Special Forces and Mohammed Aidid's fighters on October 3-4, 1993, and is the most famous event of this operation. While on a mission to capture two of Aidid's subordinates, the US forces faced heavy Somali pressure and suffered unnecessarily high casualties.

So, on October 3, the next (seventh in a row) raid of the American special forces in Mogadishu was scheduled. This time the task was to capture two supporters of Aidid - the minister in his "government" Umar Salad Elmi and Muhammad's adviser Hasan Awal. After receiving confirmation from the agents that Elmi and Aval were in a house not far from the Olympic Hotel, the code signal "Irene" was given to start the operation.

Somali Nightmare Night

At about 15:40, the commandos began landing from helicopters with the help of the so-called. "fast ropes". The capture of both supporters of Aidid was successful, the only incident was the fall of one of the rangers from the "fast rope" from a height of 20 m (he was evacuated and survived). A ground convoy approached the site of the operation, picking up the prisoners. The only thing left for the American forces to do was to return to the base, but it was at this moment that events began to develop not according to plan.

Having discovered the Americans, Aidid's detachments began to arrive at the place of their landing. A firefight ensued, and after a short time, the partisans managed to shoot down the second "Black Hawk" with the boastful call sign "Super 61". The helicopter crashed at some distance from American forces. Rangers and Delta troops broke through to the wreckage to evacuate the dead and survivors.

By this time, the main forces of Aidid had pulled up to the battle area, besieging the Americans at the site of the helicopter crash. They also shot down another helicopter. The Americans no longer had reserves to evacuate his crew.

During the evening and night, the encircled special forces fought with the pushing forces of the Somalis. From the American base, two attempts were made to break through to them, however, in both cases, the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division met with serious resistance and were forced to retreat.

Since the Americans did not have armored vehicles, they had to turn to units of other countries for help. At about 11:30 p.m., a column of American infantry, tanks, and armored personnel carriers from other army units began to advance towards the battlefield. She managed to break through to both the Ranger forces and the wreckage of the second downed helicopter. With the onset of dawn on October 4, the evacuation of the special forces and the bodies of the dead was completed.

Shock to the American Nation

During the fighting on October 3-4, 1993, the losses of the Ranger tactical group, the Rapid Reaction Forces and peacekeeping units amounted to 19 dead, about 80 wounded, 1 captured, two helicopters and several vehicles. It is difficult to determine the losses of the Somali side.

There are quite high ratings. For example, the American ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, believed that up to 2,000 Somalis were killed and wounded in the battle, but the estimate made by Muhammad Aidid himself - 300 dead and 800 wounded - seems more plausible. It is difficult to determine how many civilians were among them, because, according to the Americans, both women and teenagers participated in the battle with weapons in their hands.
The battle in Mogadishu decisively influenced the actions of the US administration in Somalia. Despite the fact that the goal of the October 3 raid was achieved (both supporters of Aidid were detained), the losses of the special forces turned out to be too high for the Americans, who were not used to the deaths of even their own soldiers. Television footage was shown of triumphant Somali fighters dragging the body of a dead Delta fighter through the city.

The nation was shocked by what they saw. The American public found that the country was on the verge of intervening in a foreign civil war, as happened three decades earlier in Vietnam. The position of the Bill Clinton administration after the incident was unequivocal: all military operations in Somalia were stopped.

A truce was concluded with Aidid, and the nation was declared the intention to withdraw American troops from Somalia by March 1994. A year after the departure of the Americans, other foreign troops also left the country. The civil war in Somalia continued, and the history of the UN was replenished with one of the most unsuccessful peacekeeping operations.

Screen "healing"

The bitterness of the actual defeat of the American special forces, the shock of the unexpectedly large losses of the special forces and what they saw on the screen, how the Somalis drag the body of a dead American soldier around the city, were incredibly difficult for the Americans. To heal them, the American propaganda machine and the film industry had to work hard.

Two Sergeants Gary Gordon and Randall Shughart were posthumously awarded the highest US military award, the Medal of Honor, for their participation in the battle. This was the first time the award had been presented since the Vietnam War. In 1999, American writer Mark Bowden wrote Black Hawk Down: A History of Modern Warfare, a book about the battle of Mogadishu.

In 2001, the book was made into a feature film, Black Hawk Down, which won two Oscars. The Americans, clinging to the screens, experienced the Somali catastrophe over and over again and made sure that, in spite of everything, their guys are the “coolest” in the world. And the computer game "Delta Force: "Black Hawk" Down" released in 2003 allowed them to take out all their fear and humiliation in front of the "wild" Somalis, killing them by the thousands with a joystick and gaming machine guns.

But nothing could hide from the rest of the world what the Americans themselves so carefully wanted to forget. This was perfectly expressed by a contemporary of those events: “After our victory in Afghanistan and the defeat of the oppressors [USSR], who killed thousands of Muslims, the legend of the invulnerability of the superpowers melted away. Our guys [mujahideen] no longer perceived America as a superpower. So when they left Afghanistan, they went to Somalia and carefully prepared themselves for a long war... They were amazed when they found how low the morale of the American soldiers was. ... The United States has assumed the titles of world leader and master of the new world order. After a few blows, she forgot about these titles and left Somalia in shame and disgrace, dragging the bodies of her soldiers.”

As you know, Americans sometimes mediocrely lose wars and battles, and then they are heroically won on the screens of Hollywood blockbusters. They are undeniably talented in this. This is how they lost the Vietnam War in reality, and then heroically won it on the screen.

The on-screen victories of Hollywood supermen help Americans more easily endure the bitterness of real defeats on the battlefields. From the same series of American defeats in the mountains of Afghanistan and the sands of Iraq, followed by an ongoing series of American victories over the Taliban and Iraqis in the movies.

But the most humiliating for the Americans was, of course, the 1993 defeat in Mogadishu, from which they fled in disgrace. So, in order to survive it, the Americans had to create a truly epic work in terms of its drama. That's exactly what happened in Black Hawk Down, directed by Gladiator creator Ridley Scott.

Hawks in Mogadishu

This film is a historical war drama based on real events. It is a newsreel of the 1993 battle in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. The film is based on the book of the same name by Mark Bowden. The title of the book and film comes from the name of the American military transport helicopter UH-60, better known as the Black Hawk, or the Black Hawk. During the battle in Mogadishu, two such helicopters were shot down by the Somalis.

The film takes place on October 3-4, 1993 in Somalia, where a civil war is going on and people are dying en masse. According to the script, the Americans, as always generously, arrived in Somalia to save the good guys from the bad guys. The fact that civilians were killed en masse does not count. However, something went wrong with the American warriors and almost the entire film is devoted to the bloody mess in which they fell under Somali fire.

Only 19 Americans and up to a thousand Somalis died in this mess. And yet, this operation was a disgrace to the US Army and so spiritually broke the American nation and the American government that the invincible Yankees cowardly fled Somalia. So what really happened in Mogadishu then?

History of the operation

Since the late 1980s, a civil war has been going on in Somalia, which, by the way, has not ended so far. In 1991, the country's president, Muhammad Siad Barre, was overthrown by armed opposition forces, after which a period of anarchy and chaos began. The outbreak of famine claimed the lives of 300 thousand Somalis; attempts by international humanitarian organizations to provide the country's population with food failed due to ongoing civil unrest.

In December 1992, a multinational UN force under US command entered Somalia. Operation Restore Hope was intended to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian aid into the country. The success of this action convinced the UN leadership to expand the mandate of its forces in Somalia, and in May 1993 a new operation, Continuation of Hope, began.

This was negatively perceived by one of the field commanders, Muhammad Farah Aidid, who opposed international interference in the affairs of Somalia. In response, the UN troops carried out an armed action against the forces of Aidid, accompanied by the death of civilians.

From that moment on, the peacekeepers and Aidid were at war. A reward of 25 thousand dollars was assigned for the head of the field commander.

The failures of international forces and the first losses of the American contingent (in August, as a result of two mine explosions, 4 Americans were killed and about 20 were injured) led the US government to decide to send special forces to Somalia to capture Aidid. Task Force Ranger included one company of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, a Delta squadron, and helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The special forces arrived in Somalia on August 22 and a week later carried out their first raid, which ended, however, in embarrassment: UN employees were mistakenly detained. New operations followed in September with limited success.

Hunt for Aidid

During this period, the American command made a serious mistake by underestimating its enemy. Aidid had a military education received in the USSR and Italy, participated in the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978 and in the former Somali army he held the rank of general. Many of his subordinates also had military education and combat experience. In addition, there is evidence that foreign volunteers, veterans of the Afghan jihad against the USSR, took part in the battle on the side of Aidid.

Since all the raids of the tactical group Ranger were carried out according to a single template, Aidid's supporters were able to study the tactics of the Americans and draw the appropriate conclusions. The US command did not attach much importance to the episode when a UH-60 (Black Hawk) helicopter was shot down in Mogadishu on September 25, considering the incident an accidental success of the militants, but in vain.

The commemorative battle in Mogadishu, known in Somalia as Ranger Day, took place between US Special Forces and Mohammed Aidid's fighters on October 3-4, 1993, and is the most famous event of this operation. While on a mission to capture two of Aidid's subordinates, the US forces faced heavy Somali pressure and suffered unnecessarily high casualties.

So, on October 3, the next (seventh in a row) raid of the American special forces in Mogadishu was scheduled. This time the task was to capture two supporters of Aidid, the minister in his government, Umar Salad Elmi and Muhammad's adviser Hasan Awal. After receiving confirmation from the agents that Elmi and Aval were in a house not far from the Olympic Hotel, Irene was given a code signal to start the operation.

Somali Nightmare Night

At about 15:40, the commandos began landing from helicopters with the help of the so-called. fast ropes. The capture of both Aidid supporters was successful, the only incident was the fall of one of the rangers from a fast rope from a height of 20 m (he was evacuated and survived). A ground convoy approached the site of the operation, picking up the prisoners. The only thing left for the American forces to do was to return to the base, but it was at this moment that events began to develop not according to plan.

Having discovered the Americans, Aidid's detachments began to arrive at the place of their landing. A firefight ensued, and after a short time the partisans managed to shoot down a second Black Hawk with the boastful call sign Super 61. The helicopter fell at some distance from the American forces. Rangers and Delta troops broke through to the wreckage to evacuate the dead and survivors.

By this time, the main forces of Aidid had pulled up to the battle area, besieging the Americans at the site of the helicopter crash. They also shot down another helicopter. The Americans no longer had reserves to evacuate his crew.

During the evening and night, the encircled special forces fought with the pushing forces of the Somalis. From the American base, two attempts were made to break through to them, however, in both cases, the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division met with serious resistance and were forced to retreat.

Since the Americans did not have armored vehicles, they had to turn to units of other countries for help. At about 11:30 p.m., a column of American infantry, tanks, and armored personnel carriers from other army units began to advance towards the battlefield. She managed to break through to both the Ranger forces and the wreckage of the second downed helicopter. With the onset of dawn on October 4, the evacuation of the special forces and the bodies of the dead was completed.

Shock to the American Nation

During the fighting on October 3-4, 1993, the losses of the Ranger tactical group, the Rapid Reaction Forces and peacekeeping units amounted to 19 people dead, about 80 people wounded, 1 person captured, two helicopters and several cars. It is difficult to determine the losses of the Somali side.

There are quite high ratings. For example, the American ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, believed that up to 2,000 Somalis were killed and wounded in the battle, but Muhammad Aidid himself's estimate of 300 dead and 800 wounded seems more plausible. It is difficult to determine how many civilians were among them, because, according to the Americans, both women and teenagers participated in the battle with weapons in their hands.
The battle in Mogadishu decisively influenced the actions of the US administration in Somalia. Despite the fact that the goal of the October 3 raid was achieved (both supporters of Aidid were detained), the losses of the special forces turned out to be too high for the Americans, who were not used to the deaths of even their own soldiers. Television footage was shown of triumphant Somali fighters dragging the body of a dead Delta fighter through the city.

The nation was shocked by what they saw. The American public found that the country was on the verge of intervening in a foreign civil war, as happened three decades earlier in Vietnam. The position of the Bill Clinton administration after the incident was unequivocal: all military operations in Somalia were stopped.

A truce was concluded with Aidid, and the nation was declared the intention to withdraw American troops from Somalia by March 1994. A year after the departure of the Americans, other foreign troops also left the country. The civil war in Somalia continued, and the history of the UN was replenished with one of the most unsuccessful peacekeeping operations.

Screen healing

The bitterness of the actual defeat of the American special forces, the shock of the unexpectedly large losses of the special forces and what they saw on the screen, how the Somalis drag the body of a dead American soldier around the city, were incredibly difficult for the Americans. To heal them, the American propaganda machine and the film industry had to work hard.

Two Sergeants Gary Gordon and Randall Shugart were posthumously awarded the highest US military award, the Medal of Honor, for their service in the battle. This was the first time the award had been presented since the Vietnam War. In 1999, American writer Mark Bowden wrote the book Black Hawk Down: A History of Modern Warfare, dedicated to the battle in Mogadishu.

In 2001, the book was made into a feature film, Black Hawk Down, which won two Academy Awards. The Americans, clinging to the screens, experienced the Somali catastrophe over and over again and were convinced that, in spite of everything, their guys are the coolest in the world. And the computer game Delta Force: Black Hawk Down, released in 2003, allowed them to take out all their fear and humiliation in front of wild Somalis, killing them by the thousands with a joystick and gaming machine guns.

But nothing could hide from the rest of the world what the Americans themselves so carefully wanted to forget. This was perfectly expressed by a contemporary of those events: After our victory in Afghanistan and the defeat of the oppressors [USSR], who killed thousands of Muslims, the legend of the invulnerability of the superpowers melted away. Our guys [mujahideen] no longer perceived America as a superpower. So when they left Afghanistan, they went to Somalia and carefully prepared themselves for a long war. They were amazed when they found how low the morale of the American soldiers was. The United States has assumed the titles of world leader and master of the new world order. After a few blows, she forgot about these titles and left Somalia in shame and disgrace, dragging the bodies of her soldiers.

October 3-4, 1993 for our country is the time of confrontation between the Supreme Council and the President on the streets of Moscow. By pure coincidence, on the same days, on the other side of the world, a dramatic story took place, which is now known to the whole world. The operation of American troops against the military leader of Somalia resulted in a large-scale street battle between special forces and local detachments and gangs.

Since the 1980s, Somalia has been heading towards civil war. Like many other African states, this country included many tribes and clans. When another local dictator weakened, and the economic situation in the country worsened, Somalia simply exploded. In 1991, when dictator Mohammed Siad Barre fled his capital residence, the state was divided among rival armed gangs. Of course, when they entered Mogadishu, the main city of the republic, they could not find a common language. The capital of Somalia has become a doomsday zone. The sewerage did not work, the city of two million was mired in sewage, many residents were starving. The districts were controlled by field commanders. The most powerful of them soon became the former general Mohammed Farah Aidid.

In the early 1990s, a single state did not exist in Somalia (in fact, it does not exist even now). It was in this hornet's nest that the UN stepped in. Initially, it was only about the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, this assistance did not reach its destination. It was successfully stolen by local bandits, and small peacekeeping detachments could protect themselves at best. UN members paid a humiliating tribute to Somali criminals, no one could guarantee the safety of workers. In December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the entry of peacekeeping units into the country.

In the maze of streets

The largest contingent of peacekeepers was the American one. Two-thirds of the 37,000-strong UN forces were Americans. They also led the entire operation, which received the traditionally pompous name "Revival of Hope."

Initially, the operation developed quite successfully. The Americans and allies took control of key points in Somalia and were able to force some commanders to end the war. However, the field commanders were not at all pleased with the attempts to disarm the tribal militias and gangs. The allies decided to start with a blow to the strongest of the military leaders - Aidid. A Pakistani peacekeeping force tried to detain the Somali leader and was defeated by an ambush. Peacekeepers lost dozens of soldiers, and the leaders of the operation realized that a full-fledged war was ahead. It was difficult to count on peacekeepers from India or Zimbabwe as a striking force, so the Americans brought additional units from their army into the country, including parts of the Delta detachment, a regiment of rangers and a very well trained 160th air regiment, armed with a variety of helicopters.

The Somalis, who until recently recklessly cut each other, perceived the intervention as an attempt to conquer, and the peacekeepers were drawn into a grueling guerrilla war. Aidid remained elusive, and his people acted more and more boldly. Explosions, ambushes and shelling followed one after another. At the same time, the leaders of the uprising were very close, in the labyrinths of the dirty streets of Mogadishu, but they could not be caught. Meanwhile, the situation was heating up, on September 15, in broad daylight, a peacekeeping helicopter was shot down from a grenade launcher. Intelligence was knocked off its feet, trying to find traces of Aidid, but the search was not very successful.

On October 3, agents reported that two of Aidid's associates were in an inconspicuous building in Mogadishu. Perhaps the restless ataman himself was with them. The opportunity looked too tempting to pass up.

carnage

Aerial reconnaissance followed the house where the rebel leaders had gathered. The agent deliberately drove up to the building he was looking for in his car, which was clearly visible from the air, and stopped to orient the helicopter pilots who were following him. At this time, at a base in the vicinity of Mogadishu, General Harrison was issuing orders, and the rangers and helicopter pilots were preparing to attack. The plan was audacious and spectacular: to land troops from helicopters, to take Aidid's men by surprise, to round up and take the prisoners out of Mogadishu in a convoy of armored Humvees and trucks. It is hard not to note the adventurism of the Americans: a detachment of only 160 people, albeit armed to the teeth, penetrated the center of Mogadishu, where thousands of Aidid's militants settled. The plan could have worked if the surprise factor had been fully utilized, but what to do if something went wrong, Harrison seemed to have no idea.

At 15:40, the assault group in helicopters went to the object. The Rangers, like in a movie, descended the ropes and burst into the building. However, at this stage, the operation did not go according to plan. First, one of the fighters, Todd Blackburn, broke and fell from a height of twenty meters. He was alive, but suffered many fractures, so he needed to be evacuated. But the main thing is that Aidid's militants were rapidly accumulating around. The special forces captured both Aidid's associates (Aidid himself was not on the spot) and two dozen more militants, but now they were sitting in a tight ring inside a hostile city. The militants tried to approach under the cover of an unarmed crowd. The Americans began to shoot at everyone in a row, and scattered the attackers.

The transport column was able to quickly make its way through the streets, and it seemed that the operation, despite all the overlays, was developing almost successfully. At least there would be something to report. The first three Humvees immediately left with the wounded, the rest remained to load the prisoners. The column with the wounded passed through the city relatively successfully, shelling along the way killed only a machine gunner in one of the jeeps. But the rest fared worse. The Somalis had RPG-7 grenade launchers. Of course, there were far fewer of them than the Chechens in Grozny, but enough to inflict heavy losses on transport rushing around the city. Soon, two cars were shot down in the convoy that took the prisoners, and most importantly, a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down from a grenade launcher. The pinwheel collapsed literally 250-300 meters from the building where the rebels were captured. After that, the combat operation finally turned into a rescue one.

Another one landed next to the downed helicopter. The two surviving wounded were loaded inside, the corpses were thrown on the spot, and most importantly, they could not take two more survivors under fire. To save them, another 15 people landed at the crash site, but the helicopter on which they flew in received a grenade from an RPG-7 and left for the base with heavy damage. For the Americans, the situation was continuously deteriorating: a group with the wounded in their arms sat down in the center of Mogadishu, a convoy with prisoners was driving through the streets to the base, and around a crowd of militants with machine guns and grenade launchers.

At 17:00, another helicopter was knocked out from a grenade launcher. This time it was not possible to go to the base, the car with its tail blown to smithereens collapsed in the depths of Mogadishu.

Leave alive

Now Harrison had sent a reinforced company into town in a Humvee to get everyone who was left behind. The convoy pulled into the city, firing at everything that moved - and itself stuck under fire. The Somalis fired from rooftops, from cellars, windows, barricades blocked the streets. At this time, in order to protect the crew of the last downed helicopter, two Delta snipers were thrown there. Both pilots were sitting in the cockpit wounded with broken legs. For several hours, snipers fought with a crowd of militants surrounding the helicopter, but they no longer had a chance to survive. Help never came. One of the helicopter pilots died along with the Delta during the battle, the surviving pilot named Durant, seriously wounded, was captured.

At this time, the Humvee column with the prisoners was rushing around Mogadishu, having lost their bearings. She barely escaped from the city, losing half the people killed or wounded. However, now a group remained in the city, surrounded by the first downed helicopter and a convoy going to the rescue. Fortunately for the Americans, Aidid's fighters had few heavy weapons, so they could not defeat the defending squad with brute force. However, evening came, the encircled were running out of ammunition and water, and the convoy going to the rescue was tightly blocked and, on the orders of Garrison, returned to the base.

However, the Yankees could not just leave 80 people to be slaughtered, many of whom were wounded. But this time the Americans received help from an unexpected quarter. In addition to them, units of peacekeepers from Malaysia and Pakistan were stationed in Mogadishu. The allies formed a column, which was already seriously able to break into the depths of the city. It included up to seventy pieces of equipment, including tanks. The Americans reinforced this armada with their infantry. The night attack was the last chance, but this time Aidid's men were simply crushed by fire. Apparently, the militants either managed to shoot stocks of grenades for RPGs in a day, or initially they did not have so many grenade launchers. The decision to attack in the dark of night looked frankly controversial, and if Aidid's people had a large number of RPG-7s or even disposable "shaitan-pipes", this expedition could have ended fatally. However, at about two o'clock in the morning the column reached the encircled detachment. But the armored group that made its way to the place of death of the Delta snipers did not even find corpses.

It was a massacre. The Americans announced the death of one and a half thousand Aidid fighters, the Somalis themselves insisted on the loss of 133 comrades. Under hurricane fire (only during an unsuccessful attempt to break through to the surrounded one of the columns shot 60,000 rounds of ammunition), at least two hundred civilians were killed. The Americans lost 18 people killed, one helicopter pilot was captured, peacekeepers from other countries died. The Somalis got the corpses of the Delta people, and they dragged them around the city with triumphant cries. What gave a special drama to the situation in the eyes of the Americans was that not ordinary infantrymen died, but special forces.

This operation had a huge impact. Few people were interested in the capture of a couple of "ministers" of the field commander and the death of militants. But now few people believed in the ability of peacekeepers to quickly end the war. In addition, society in the United States was not eager to get involved in the "new Vietnam" with unclear goals. Moreover, the battle in Mogadishu took place shortly after the death of a helicopter with the Americans. As a result, the Americans decided to completely interrupt their participation in the peacekeeping operation. And since they were the backbone of the UN contingent, the entire operation was curtailed. Pilot Durant was later released. This comforted his loved ones, but politicians and generals could not even sweeten the pill.

The civil war in Somalia continued. It continues to this day. Aidid died in 1996 in a battle with competitors, but peace did not come after his death.

The operation in Somalia was one of the most unsuccessful in the entire history of the UN. In fact, the impulsive reaction of one man - General Harrison - buried the entire complex and expensive operation. The Americans were even lucky with the enemy. The detachments of Aidid allowed surprisingly much. If Chechen fighters, with their number and variety of weapons and tactical skills, were in the place of the Somalis, Delta and the rangers could only sing a retreat. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the Americans as soldiers.

Although they planned the operation adventurously, not to say carelessly, the soldiers of the American special forces fought literally to the last bullet and made impressive efforts to save their comrades who were surrounded. In a sense, they even acted irrationally: simply by abandoning the crew of the first wrecked helicopter, the Yankees could suffer fewer casualties. However, they stubbornly continued to send detachments into the city, which themselves fell into traps, but in the end they pulled out everyone they could from Mogadishu. The rank and file managed to at least save their own honor and show themselves to be good soldiers. But from the point of view of strategy, the operation in Mogadishu in October 1993 is an example of adventurism and irresponsibility.

Recently, there has been a widespread opinion about the "coolness" and invincibility of the American army. Indeed, the American military machine looks very impressive. The United States spends untold sums on military programs, improving the military equipment and training of its army, but are their soldiers really invulnerable? A convincing answer to this question was given by the militants of the Somali field commander Mohammed Aidid during the battles with the elite units of the American army on the streets Mogadishu 3-4 October 1993. It turned out that the Americans are by no means gods. In close combat, they can be effectively hit with conventional small arms. It is enough to have ingenuity and fortitude.

SITUATION IN SOMALIA IN 1991-1993

In 1991, during civil clashes in Somalia, the centralized power of the dictator Siad Beir was overthrown. Instead, militant groups reigned in the country, at enmity with each other. A struggle began, primarily for warehouses with food. The economy was completely destroyed, even such a traditional industry for this country as agriculture. Drought and crop failures completed the picture. Famine began in the country.

In order to end the war between the clans and deliver food to the local population, the UN Security Council in April 1992 approved Resolution 751 on the UNOSOM-I (United Nations Operations in Somalia) peacekeeping operation in Somalia. However, the UN forces were not able to carry out this operation on their own. Armed clans prevented the fair distribution of humanitarian aid among the people of Somalia by seizing food and terrorizing international organizations. Then the United States intervened. The US military launched Operation Provide Relief, during which 28,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were delivered to Somalia. However, the situation in the country, and especially in its capital, Mogadishu, continued to deteriorate. In order to stabilize the situation, Operation Restore Hope was launched in December 1992. During this operation, the Americans planned to lead a contingent of peacekeeping troops, and after the stabilization of the situation in the country, withdraw their troops and transfer the territory of Somalia under the control of UN forces.

In March 1993, the UN Security Council launched the UNOSOM-II peacekeeping operation. The purpose of the operation was the disarmament of Somali militants and the restoration of state power throughout the country. The operation was led by the Turkish General Civic Bir. Soon, at the request of the UN Security Council, US Rapid Reaction Forces under the command of Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, commander of the US 10th Mountain Division, were introduced into Somalia. This did not go unnoticed by the field commanders of the militants.

Among them, Mohammed Farah Aidid (translated from Somali, Aidid means “a person who should not be insulted”), a former general and chief of staff of the Somali army, stood out in particular. His group, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), was the most disciplined and combat-ready of all the formations of its kind. Aidid had a radio station, and with its help he could contact the inhabitants of Somalia. He issued a proclamation calling on all Somalis to fight against UN troops. After that, General Bir sent a Pakistani light armored brigade to disarm the SNA, detain its leaders, and shut down the radio station. However, Aidid's intelligence learned about the preparation of this operation in time. On June 5, 1993, when a Pakistani column was advanced by SNA militants, a sudden ambush was launched, during which 24 soldiers were killed and 44 were wounded.

In response to this action, the UN Security Council took measures to defeat the SNA units and capture Aidid. It was assumed that the arrest of a major leader and the liquidation of his group should force other field commanders to stop fighting. Heavy armored vehicles patrolled the streets of Mogadishu.

Additional forces were deployed to Somalia: 130 combat helicopters and C-130 cargo planes with weapons for fire support of ground forces, which in the period from June 7 to July 14 launched a series of attacks on SNA facilities: armories, clusters of militant vehicles, Aidid radio station.

On July 12, the headquarters of the SNA was stormed by American troops using combat helicopters, and many of its functionaries were captured. However, Aidid himself went into hiding, and continued to lead the Alliance from underground. A $25,000 reward was posted for his capture.

For a while, the situation in Somalia stabilized. The militants have reduced their activity. However, after some time they again demonstrated their strength by carrying out a series of mortar attacks on American helicopter bases in Mogadishu.

To speed up the capture of Aidid, the US Department of Defense planned Operation Goth Serpent, under which units were sent to Somalia: a company of the 75th Ranger Regiment and a unit. From this force, Task Force Ranger was formed to capture Aidid, under the command of Major General William F. Garrison, commander of the Delta.

They were supplied with operational information by CIA agents and reconnaissance aircraft from the air tactical group. In August, Operation Eyes on Mogadishu began, during which a reconnaissance helicopter or Orion reconnaissance aircraft was constantly over the city, monitoring the movement of vehicles on the streets. It was assumed that as soon as Aidid's movement through the streets of the city was recorded, this area would be blocked by special forces, and the leader of the SNA was captured. However, intelligence could not obtain reliable information about the whereabouts of Aidid. Six times special forces landed on the streets of Mogadishu, capturing members of the SNA, but Aidid was not among them.

Meanwhile, the situation was heating up.

On September 8, there was a major attack by militants on a peacekeeping checkpoint using recoilless rifles, grenade launchers and small arms. About 1,000 local residents also joined the militants. Aviation support was needed to suppress the gun emplacements of the militants. Six peacekeepers were injured.

On September 16 and 21, there were attacks on the Pakistani military, and during the battle on September 21, two soldiers were killed, seven soldiers were wounded, and an armored personnel carrier was shot down.

On September 25, 1993, an American helicopter "Blackhawk" ("Black Hawk") was shot down by RPG militants. Three Americans were killed. Prior to this, the grenade launcher was not used on air targets, so General Garrison considered the incident to be an accident. When planning further operations, the possibility of destroying helicopters from RPGs was not taken into account, which led to fatal consequences.

Mortar attacks on helipads and the destruction of the Black Hawk showed that the situation in the country was becoming unmanageable. There was only one way to stop the activities of the SNA - to capture its leader.

PREPARATION FOR OPERATION

The decisive operation to capture Aidid and his closest associates was decided to be carried out on Sunday, October 3, 1993. Usually every Sunday, members of the SNA held an anti-American rally in Mogadishu. One of the speakers was Omar Salad, Aidid's adviser. After the rally ended, he went by car to a large (by Somali standards) white three-story house a block from the Olympic Hotel. Dirty slums surrounded the building. Nearby was the Bakara market, a territory completely hostile to the Americans, a stronghold of the SNA. In this area of ​​the city, which the Americans called the "Black Sea", hundreds of thousands of Aidid's supporters, by no means unarmed, lived in a labyrinth of dirty streets and nooks and crannies.

Salad was being monitored by American agents. At about 13:30, agents reported that in the indicated house, Salad was supposed to meet with Abdi Gasan Awal, nicknamed Kebdid, the Minister of Internal Affairs in the shadow government of Aidid. Aidid himself could also be there, but it was impossible to establish this with certainty. On that day, an Orion reconnaissance aircraft was circling in the sky over Mogadishu. He was soon joined by "Little bird" reconnaissance helicopters to monitor the house Salad had entered.

To accurately indicate the target, a local agent had to bring his silvery car visible from the air to the facade of the Orion Hotel, raise the hood and simulate an engine failure, allowing helicopter operators to point cameras at him, then drive down the street and stop exactly opposite the desired at home.

At this time, the Rangers and Special Forces received a command to prepare for an operation to capture Aidid and his supporters. The commanders of the assault groups additionally coordinated the tactics of actions, using personnel transmitted by air reconnaissance. Copies of the operation plan were issued to the commanders of the rangers, the helicopters were prepared for departure. It was possible to start the operation, but the order was delayed.

UNINTENDED DIFFICULTIES

After some time, it turned out that the agent, due to fear of the militants, did not do what was required of him. Having driven from the hotel, he stopped at the wrong place and opened the hood of the car. Through the fault of intelligence, special forces units almost attacked a false target.

Group commanders again gathered in the operations center to receive instructions. The agent was told by radio to go around the block again and stop right at the required building. This time he drove to the right place.

At 1500, the headquarters of the Ranger group reported to General Montgomery that they were ready to start the operation. Reconnaissance aviation was ordered to clear the airspace over the target. One of the companies of the 10th mountain division was put on full alert. Electronic warfare units began jamming radio and cellular communications in Mogadishu (there was no fixed telephone network in the city).

In total, sixteen helicopters were involved in the operation: four for fire support, six transported special forces from the Delta, four more carried the second company of the third battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment, one - a search and rescue team, and the last served as an air headquarters to control the operation. It contained senior officers whose task was to control the actions of helicopter pilots and ground forces.

At the gates of the base in full combat readiness was a column of nine armored army jeeps "Hummer" and three military trucks. The vehicles were filled with Rangers, Delta and four SEALs. The column was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donnie McKnight. In total, the consolidated group, including air reconnaissance, had twenty aircraft, twelve vehicles and about one hundred and sixty personnel.

According to the plan of the operation, "Delta" and rangers from helicopters were supposed to parachute near the building with the help of "fast ropes". "Delta" was supposed to break into the building, capture the leaders of the militants, and take them to the street. At this time, a motorcade was supposed to drive up to the house, pick up the rangers along with the prisoners, and take them out of the city. The Delta fighters were supposed to be evacuated by helicopters. The American command hoped that the surprise and speed of the operation would not allow the militants to put up serious resistance.

At about 3:40 p.m., the landing on the object began. The main assault group, having landed, threw stun grenades over the building's yard through the wall and then, having run through it, broke into the inside of the house. Two more fours, spetsnaz, having landed in front of the facade of the building, advanced to the main entrance. Here they broke into the premises of the stationery shop, but quickly realizing their mistake, they left it and followed the main group. In the meantime, two more helicopters hovered over the operation site, from which Delta fighters landed on the ropes - the second wave of attackers.

They were followed by helicopters with rangers who began to land in the corners of the block to block the perimeter of the operation zone. During the descent, ranger Todd Blackburn fell off the rope and fell from a height of twenty meters.

Almost immediately, the rangers began to fire from neighboring buildings. Several fighters were injured. Such a quick reaction of Aidid's militants came as a surprise to the Americans.

Meanwhile, Delta had completed its assault on the building. Salad and Qebdid, as well as 22 other members of the SNA, were captured, but Aidid was not in the house.

Soon a column of "Humvees" drove up to pick up prisoners and rangers. Three Hummers under the command of Sergeant Strucker immediately went to the base with Blackburn injured in the fall, who needed urgent medical attention. While moving through the city, the convoy periodically ran into barricades erected by the inhabitants of Mogadishu and came under fire from small arms. During one of the attacks on the Hammer, a machine gunner was killed.

That part of the column that remained for loading the prisoners also had a hard time. A Hammer and a truck were hit by machine gun and RPG fire. But these were relatively minor annoyances compared to the chain of tragic events that followed.

Five minutes after the convoy approached, an RPG shot down one of the Black Hawks with the call sign "Super 61st", piloted by Clifton P. Walcott and Donovan Brealey. The helicopter crashed on the street 270 meters east of the building seized by special forces. There were six servicemen in the downed helicopter, and their comrades could not leave them. An AN-6 helicopter piloted by Keith Yones and Karl Mayer landed near the crash site. It turned out that the pilots of the downed hawk were already dead. Yones ran to help two soldiers who, after the helicopter crash, were lucky enough to survive. At this time, Mayer covered him with fire from personal weapons. The helicopter took off under heavy fire, carrying the rescued fighters on board. The dead had to be left in the helicopter.

After that, a group of rangers and a search and rescue service (PSS) - a total of 15 people - was landed on the crash site from another MH-60 helicopter on ropes. Immediately after they landed, the helicopter was subjected to massive fire and was hit by an RPG-7 grenade. As a result, the car was damaged and barely made it to the airfield.

The Rangers took up a perimeter defense around the helicopter crash site, and PSS soldiers began rescue work. They saw Walcott and Brealey dead, but the crew members, Staff Sergeant Ray Dowdy and Staff Sergeant Charlie Warren, were still alive among the wreckage. It took about an hour to remove the bodies of the dead from under the wreckage of the helicopter. During this time, part of the rangers from McKnight's column arrived on foot to the area where the helicopter fell. Additional forces of militants also pulled up, a fierce firefight ensued. A Black Hawk, call sign Super 64, flown by Michael Durant and William Cleveland appeared over the crash site to pick up the crashed helicopter and bring it back to base. Meanwhile, the militants continued to arrive. Among them were even women and children with weapons in their hands.

McKnight's Hummers attempted to break through to the helicopter crash site, but were met with heavy fire. Barricades blocked the way, the drivers turned onto the wrong streets several times, and as a result, the convoy returned to the place where the operation began. For this episode, McKnight's convoy was nicknamed "The Lost Convoy". By this point, half of the squad's men had been killed and wounded, and Garrison ordered McKnight to take the prisoners to Ranger Group Headquarters in order to complete at least the original objective of the mission. As soon as the Hummers started moving, the Super 64th was shot down from an RPG. The grenade hit the tail rotor. The helicopter pilots tried to pull to the base, but soon the tail rotor completely fell apart, the car lost control and crashed two miles from the first helicopter. This happened around 5:00 pm.

McKnight's column still made it to the base. However, the fall of the Super 64 made it impossible to evacuate the remaining units that were fighting on the ground ...

Meanwhile, at the headquarters of the group, General Harrison assigned the task of Lieutenant Colonel Bill David to conduct a search and rescue operation in the area of ​​​​the helicopter crash. At his disposal was allocated a detachment from the military personnel of the headquarters of the tactical group "Ranger" and a company of light infantry on twenty-two "Humvees". At 17.45 David advanced his column in the direction of the battle area. But a few minutes later, the convoy was stopped by heavy fire from an ambush, while two Hummers were hit. The detachment was surrounded by militants and forced to repulse their attacks. David reported to Garrison that his squad was blocked and unable to break through to the helicopter crash site. At 18.21, a command was received to return to the deployment point, but it took the Americans about an hour to break out of the encirclement. In this battle, they shot 60,000 (!) Cartridges.

DEATH OF DELTA SNIPERS

SNA fighters rushed to the crash site of the Super 64th. After it became clear that David's convoy would not be able to save the pilots of the downed car, and the only search and rescue team was involved in the crash site of the 61st, an MH-60 helicopter with the call sign "Super 62nd" was sent there, which delivered two snipers from Delta. Sergeant First Class Randall Shugart and Master Sergeant Harry Gordon parachuted from the Super 62 to protect the crew of the downed helicopter. They landed a hundred meters from the downed helicopter, but as soon as their helicopter began to take off, it was immediately hit by a grenade. The pilot managed to drag the car to the airfield, not far from which the helicopter crashed to the ground.

Upon examination of the downed 64th, it turned out that during the fall, Durant and Cleveland broke their legs, and also received other injuries. At this time, a large group of militants surrounded the helicopter. Despite the heroic resistance of Gordon and Shugart, who held the line for an hour, the militants killed both snipers and Cleveland (for their feat, Gordon and Shugart were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, which has not been awarded to anyone since Vietnam). Durant was taken prisoner to be exchanged for arrested Aidid supporters. He was subsequently released and was able to return to the US.

THE SITUATION IS BECOME CRITICAL

Meanwhile, about eighty fighters of the Ranger group, having taken up defensive positions in buildings near the crash site of the Super 61st, fought a hard battle against many times superior enemy forces. Having used up almost all the ammunition and deprived of air support, they suffered losses from the strongest fire of the militants.

The night has come. The defenders reported to headquarters that the situation had become critical. They were running out of water, ammunition and medicines. Among the rangers was a seriously wounded Corporal Jamie Smith, who was urgently needed to be evacuated. At about 20:00, a Super 66 helicopter delivered ammunition, medicines and water to the besieged, but it was impossible to evacuate Smith due to heavy fire from the militants. An hour later he died. In the current situation, the American command had only one way out - to ask for help from the allies from the UN peacekeeping forces, which was done around 21.00.

ENVIRONMENT BREAKTHROUGH

At the city stadium, which served as a base for Pakistani peacekeepers, the formation of a column of armored vehicles began to assist the surrounded Americans. The convoy included four light Pakistani tanks, twenty-four Malaysian armored personnel carriers, as well as vehicles - a total of more than sixty pieces of equipment. The armor housed two companies of light infantry from the US 10th Mountain Division, as well as about fifty fighters from the Ranger group. The column was covered by AH-1 Cobra fire support helicopters, OH-58A Kiowa helicopters conducted reconnaissance.

Around 23.30 the column moved towards the target. On the streets of Mogadishu, she faced fierce resistance from militants. We had to slowly move through the city, suppressing their firing points. After two and a half hours of fierce fighting, the column approached the place of the American defense. But there were fears that in the dark the peacekeepers would pass the rangers without finding them. Therefore, it was decided to divide the column into two parts.

At about 1:55 a.m., the first column managed to detect and identify the defending Americans in the area of ​​​​the fall of the Super 61, and soon the fighters of the Ranger group joined the peacekeepers. Not all fighters were able to accommodate on the armor. Some had to flee, using vehicles as cover. When the convoy left for the base, the militants continued shelling it. The helicopters retaliated, allowing the convoy to continue moving. During the night battle, helicopters used up 80,000 rounds of ammunition and about 100 rockets.

The second column at about 2.00 went to the crash site of the Super 64, but everything was already over there. In addition to the wreckage of the helicopter and traces of the battle, the peacekeepers did not find anything.

At about 6.30 am, both columns arrived separately at the Pakistani base.

RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

In the battle, the Americans lost 18 people killed and missing, 84 soldiers were wounded. Considering that these soldiers were the elite of the American army - special forces and pilots, for the training of each of which were spent many years and hundreds of thousands of dollars, such losses in one operation can be considered a disaster. In addition, three Black Hawk helicopters, three Hummers and a truck were destroyed. The peacekeepers also had losses - two killed and nine wounded. Of course, the losses of the militants were much higher (according to the SNA - 133 people, according to the US - up to 1,500 people), however, since the cost of a Somali fighter is equal to the cost of a Kalashnikov assault rifle, the SNA command was not too upset about this. Aidid, for whom everything was started, was not caught. He continued to be a major field commander, and was mortally wounded in 1996 during a clash with a rival faction.

The failure of the American special forces operation caused a wide resonance in the United States. The public was shocked when jubilant militants were shown on television carrying the body of a slain Delta soldier. US Secretary of Defense L. Aspin resigned. A truce was concluded with Aidid. The UN has begun winding down its peacekeeping mission. In 1994, US troops were withdrawn from Somalia. A year later, UN troops also left the country.

CONCLUSIONS

You should not think that the crash of the Super 61 was the only reason for the failure of the operation. The very number of downed helicopters - three, and with the Black Hawk downed two weeks earlier - four, suggests that in this case there was a system. A number of shortcomings in the work and tactical errors on the part of the leadership of the Ranger group led to the defeat of the special forces. Namely:

1) Underestimation of the enemy. When planning the operation to capture Aidid, he was perceived as an illiterate rebel, completely unaware that this man received serious training in the military academies of Italy and the Soviet Union, took part in the war with Ethiopia, and previously held a high position in the armed forces.

2) Weak intelligence. The operation was carried out on the basis of incomplete and unverified intelligence. CIA intelligence work was at a low level. The information received from the agents often turned out to be contradictory and unreliable. There was no single center capable of analyzing and comparing agent messages and air reconnaissance data. Instead, for any outwardly plausible message, the leadership of the Ranger group reacted with an airborne assault. This led to the third error.

3) Template and predictability of actions. Prior to this, landings of special forces from helicopters in Mogadishu were carried out six times - once a week. Local residents, among whom were Aidid's scouts, could observe the landing of American troops from helicopters. Considering that two SNA leaders were nevertheless captured, it cannot be argued that the Americans fell into a trap specially set up by Aidid, although he could have done it. However, Aidid, judging by the actions of his formations, implemented and used an effective muster system in the right place, which speaks of his military competence.

4) Incorrect assessment of the forces and capabilities of the enemy. If General Harrison had correctly assessed the situation, he would have carried out the operation with different forces and according to a different plan. He did not take into account that just two and a half weeks earlier, Aidid's militants shot down a helicopter with a grenade launcher. Garrison continued to believe that the SNA fighters did not have effective anti-aircraft weapons.

Nor did he draw any conclusions from a successful Somali raid on a Pakistani armored brigade. Therefore, the movement of the Hammer column in the city was organized illiterately, without counting on serious opposition from the militants. To ensure the exit of the ground column on the roofs of buildings at key points, it was necessary to leave roadblocks that would control the situation and prevent the movement of enemy units. In fact, it is strange that the convoy in the current situation managed to escape from the city at all. The attempt by David's column to enter the city was, from a tactical point of view, stupidity, similar to suicide (although, humanly, their desire to help their surrounded comrades is understandable).

5) Ignoring by the American command of the specifics of the area of ​​operation. The Bakara market area where the operation took place was completely controlled by Aidid's supporters. In the afternoon, many of them used the herbal drug, becoming active and fearless. At night, on the contrary, they fell into apathy. Thus, the Americans began the operation when the Somalis were at the peak of their "combat form".

6) Insufficient training of rangers. Paradoxically, the commandos from the 75th Ranger Battalion were not quite ready for battle. The average age of the soldiers was 19 years old, which indicates their length of service and combat experience. In addition, the rangers were relaxed by previous raids, during which no clashes took place. Many lightened their bulletproof vests by removing additional plates, night vision goggles and water flasks were not taken. The Rangers were counting on a short operation and return to base before dark.

7) Unsatisfactory organization of communication. The Orion reconnaissance aircraft transmitted information to the base, from there it was transmitted to the column commander McKnight, and he already gave orders to the drivers of the vehicles. As a result of untimely receipt of commands, drivers, walking at high speed, missed the necessary turns.

8) Choosing the wrong vehicle. Lightly armored "Hammers" made their way even from machine guns. Machine gunners were especially vulnerable. These relatively light vehicles were not suitable for ramming the barricades. Full-fledged infantry fighting vehicles would be better suited here.

9) Weak air cover for ground forces. It is difficult to explain why the ground operations of the Americans were so weakly covered by helicopter fire from the air. The Littlebird helicopters could secure the hawk's crash site by carouseling over it and firing at anything that moves. While some would shoot, others would refuel and load their weapons.

10) Insufficient firepower of the units participating in the operation. The operation did not take M-19 automatic grenade launchers and M-203 underbarrel launchers. Their firepower would come in handy for the special forces. Apparently, the underestimation of the enemy also affected here. The Americans were preparing for a spectacular action, not a hard fight.

11) Separation of combat training of special forces from reality. One gets the impression that in the process of training, the special forces worked out the scenario of the operation without taking into account the complication of the situation and the fire impact from the enemy. But as soon as the real war began, everything they were taught in the camp turned out to be of little use.

However, do not underestimate the Americans. For example, in 2004, their units from the peacekeeping forces in Iraq had to fight urban battles with large forces of the “Mahdi Army”. However, the rebels, armed mainly with AKs and RPGs, failed to inflict enough losses on the Americans to break their morale, as in Somalia. There are a number of technical and tactical reasons for this, which are not the subject of this article. Let's just say that the Somali lesson, apparently, was learned by the American command.

Based on the events in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, a feature film “Black Hawk Dawn” was shot, and a number of books were also written.

(Bybrochurese"TheUnited States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994", J.T. Manuszak, 1994,Internet materials) .