I specifically decided to wait until the annual parade dust around May 9 settles a little. Below you can see several dozen pictures taken in May of this year in one of the bloodiest "squares" of the "Demyansky Cauldron". I have been going there for far from the first year, I try to communicate as much as possible with the few participants in the events there and eyewitnesses, since there are still such people. I didn’t write about my impressions, it’s too violently there you can feel everything described. But I’ll say one thing - now a kind of animal fear sometimes rolls over there, especially when you try to imagine what exactly those who fought there experienced.

From January 7 to May 20, 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front (P.A. Kurochkin) carried out the Demyansk offensive operation. In the course of it, by the end of February, Soviet troops separated the old Russian and Demyansk enemy groups, and surrounded the latter, consisting of six divisions of the 16th Army. However, the liquidation of the encircled group was delayed, and by April 23 the enemy managed to unite with the encircled troops, forming the so-called Ramushevsky corridor 4 km wide. Further offensive actions of the Soviet troops in order to eliminate the Demyansk group were not successful. The struggle of the parties unfolded in the zone of the formed corridor, which by the end of April was expanded by the enemy to 6-8 km.

Map of military operations

Map of military operations

Not far from the mouth of the corridor, in the winter of 1941-1942, truly tragic events unfolded. Attempts to advance the Red Army only on a small sector of the front turned into bloody losses: about 18,000 soldiers and officers and more than 80 tanks. Soldiers of the SS division "Totenkopf" and the Danish SS corps also fought against the Red Army. The Germans staunchly defended themselves, turning the forests adjacent to settlements into deeply echeloned fortified areas. Blockages, barbed wire and continuous minefields awaited the attackers in addition to cold, non-freezing swamps, machine-gun and artillery fire.

There are a lot of such funnels filled with water in the forest. Quite often they are found dropped after the battle killed.

There are a lot of such funnels filled with water in the forest. Quite often they are found dropped after the battle killed.

Scattered everywhere helmets with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps, and those of them that are not too rusty and mutilated are used to build simple home-made monuments

Scattered everywhere helmets with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps, and those of them that are not too rusty and mutilated are used to build simple home-made monuments

The forest in our offensive zone is crammed with rusty, mutilated iron. And of course people...

The forest in our offensive zone is crammed with rusty, mutilated iron. And of course people...

British smoke mine

British smoke mine

german newspaper

german newspaper

Asterisks from fraternal mogi, where their comrades were buried namelessly in 1941-1942

Asterisks from fraternal mogi, where their comrades were buried namelessly in 1941-1942

About unknown soldiers

Several units of medallions for several hundred found Red Army soldiers are a common thing. As a rule, the dead lie quite shallow, right under the turf. They do not have weapons with them or it was damaged in battle. Well, if a person is wearing a helmet, there is a chance to find him with a metal detector. We just found such a "mounted" fighter.

Of his personal belongings, he had only two coins of 20 kopecks, a bottle of cologne and a spoon with the brand of the city of Kirov. The spoon lay in a felt boot. There were no inscriptions or signs that could help identify the deceased ...

Sailors in the "cauldron"

Sailors also fought in the Demyansk "cauldron". As part of the naval infantry brigades. Naval rifle brigades began to be formed according to GKO Decree No. 810 of 10/18/41 on the formation of 25 rifle brigades and Order of the NPO of the USSR No. 00110 of 10/18/41 on the same (from number 61 to number 85). The recently adopted state of cadet rifle brigades was taken as a basis, in which there was one rifle regiment until the end of October. From the beginning of November, the brigades were transferred to the state of a separate rifle brigade with three rifle battalions. The name "marine rifle brigades" was given by the Order of NPO No. 0512 dated 12/27/41. Nothing other than the presence of 20 to 80% of sailors in l / s and the assignment of a different number of undergraduate cadets of military schools and district courses to them did not differ from ordinary rifle brigades. After the "October" brigades, according to the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 935 of 11/22/41, 116, 138, 142 Omorsbr brigade were also formed according to the state of separate rifle brigades. In December 1941 - January 1942, the 154th Omorsbr brigade was formed (according to a separate NPO Directive).

It was formed on January 2, 1942 in Moscow as a result of the renaming of the 166th Marine Brigade, which, in turn, was renamed on December 28, 1941 from the 1st Moscow separate detachment of sailors withdrawn from the front to the capital. On January 19, the brigade was sent to the 3rd Shock Army of the Northwestern Front. Not a single brigade retained the word "cadet" in its name. Omorsbr of the formation of 1942 also did not have "cadet" in the name. The expression "cadet marine brigades" appeared, as it seems, by mixing heterogeneous facts into one. During the formation and in everyday life, the fighters of the omorsbr could call themselves the marines, the command too, but "marine rifle brigades" remained in history. As in the Order of the NPO.

The Order of Alexander Nevsky was awarded to commanders of the Red Army who showed personal courage, courage and courage in the battles for the Motherland and ensured the successful actions of their units with skillful command, for the initiative shown in choosing the right moment for a sudden bold and successful attack on the enemy and inflicting a major defeat on him with small losses for their troops.

The order was awarded to the commanders of regiments, battalions, companies, platoons. According to the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of November 10, 1942, the award of the order was extended to the commanders of divisions and brigades.

The first awarding of the order took place according to the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of November 5, 1942. Badge No. 1 was received by the commander of the marine battalion of the 154th marine rifle brigade, senior lieutenant (later - lieutenant colonel) I.N. Ruban. .

The sailors really fought famously. Suddenly, boldly and courageously. In black pea coats, to the hoarse "Polunra!" they threw the Germans out of the small village and prepared for the next attack. And the Germans were also preparing. Reconnaissance, especially aerial reconnaissance, was excellent. And therefore, when the sailors fearlessly attacked again, the Germans met them with dagger fire from machine guns and self-propelled guns. They killed or wounded almost all the attackers, several dozen sailors were captured. Later, the Germans gathered all the dead and threw them into a deep adit in a sand pit. And bombarded with an explosion. Demyansk search engines have been looking for this adit for many years. Found.

Every day, a careful accounting of the found fighters is carried out. In total, over 300 fighters of the Red Army were found during the entire spring Watch

Every day, a careful accounting of the found fighters is carried out. In total, over 300 fighters of the Red Army were found during the entire spring Watch

About monuments

The Demyansk detachment has a commander. His will and hands created the vast majority of monuments and burials in those places. His detachment found and buried almost 9,000 dead soldiers - more than a DIVISION!

About beavers

Beavers have become the scourge of this year. The beavers skillfully dammed a small stream through which our troops advanced in the autumn and winter of 1941-1942.

Undermined

Undermined

Previously, it was possible to jump over the rivulet, but now we had to seriously overcome it by boat.

Previously, it was possible to jump over the rivulet, but now we had to seriously overcome it by boat.

About life

WESTERN FRONT,

1) the operational-strategic unification of the Russian army in the western strategic direction in the 1st World War. It was formed on 4 (17) 8/1915 as a result of the division of the North-Western Front into two - Northern and Western. The Western Front at various times included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th Armies. In August - October 1915, the troops of the front fought heavy defensive battles for Vilna (now Vilnius), liquidated the breakthrough of the 1st and 6th cavalry corps of the German troops in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Sventsiany. In the spring of 1916, the troops of the Western Front carried out an offensive operation in the area of ​​Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. During the June offensive of 1917, the troops of the Western Front, having taken the first position of the German troops in the Vilna region, under the influence of the Bolsheviks [by October 1917, the troops of the front had about 21.4 thousand members of the RSDLP (b) and over 27 thousand sympathizers] refused to continue the offensive and returned into their trenches. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) of the western regions and the front was created on the Western Front. The Military Revolutionary Committee removed the commander of the front, General of Infantry P. S. Baluev, who was loyal to the Provisional Government, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov in his place. The congress of representatives of the troops of the front on November 20 (Z.12). 1917 elected the commander of the troops of the Western Front, the Bolshevik A.F. Myasnikov. In early December 1917, the demobilization of the troops of the Western Front began. Despite this, in February 1918 his troops (about 250 thousand people) participated in repelling the German offensive against the RSFSR. Since 29.Z.1918, the command of the Western Front was operationally subordinate to the Western section of the curtain detachments, formed by the RVSR to defend the demarcation line in the western direction from a possible invasion of German troops. Disbanded on April 18, 1918, about 15 thousand people from the front joined the ranks of the Red Army.

Commanders: Infantry General A.E. Evert (August 1915 - March 1917), Cavalry General V.I. Gurko (March - May 1917), Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin (May - June 1917), General Lieutenant P. N. Lomnovsky (June - August 1917), General of Infantry P. S. Baluev (August - November 1917), Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov (November 1917), A. F. Myasnikov (November 1917 - April 1918 ).

2) The operational-strategic association of the Red Army in the western and northwestern strategic directions during the Civil War of 1917-1922 in Russia. It was formed in accordance with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army I. I. Vatsetis on February 19, 1919 on the basis of the field administration of the Northern Front. The structure of the Western Front at different times included the 3rd, 4th, 7th and 12th, 1st Cavalry, Western (1Z.3-9.6.1919 - Belarusian-Lithuanian, from 9.6.1919 - 16th) and Estonian armies, Mozyr group of troops, the army of Soviet Latvia (since 7/6/1919 - the 15th army) and the Dnieper military flotilla. The troops of the Western Front conducted military operations on the front with a length of over 2 thousand km: against the armed formations of the White movement and the troops of the Entente in the Murmansk direction; against the Finnish troops - in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions and the Karelian Isthmus; against the troops of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian bourgeois governments, the White armies, the German and Polish troops in the Baltic and Belarus. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the troops of the Western Front were forced to retreat from the Baltic by July 1919. In the July operation of 1920, the troops of the Western Front defeated the main forces of the Polish North-Eastern Front. During the Warsaw operation of 1920, the troops of the front reached Warsaw, but were defeated and forced to withdraw from Poland. The troops of the Western Front participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising of 1921.

On April 8, 1924, the Western Front was transformed into the Western Military District.

Commanders: D. N. Reliable (February - July 1919), V. M. Gittis (July 1919 - April 1920), M. N. Tukhachevsky (April 1920 - March 1921, January 1922 - March 1924), I. N. Zakharov (March - September 1921), A. I. Egorov (September 1921 - January 1922), A. I. Kork (March - April 1924), A. I. Cook (April 1924).

3) Operational-strategic association of Soviet troops in the western strategic direction in the Great Patriotic War. Formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District as part of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th combined arms armies. Subsequently, the Western Front at different times included 5, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th combined arms , 1st shock, 10th and 11th guards, 3rd and 4th tank, as well as 1st air armies. The troops of the front in 1941 participated in the strategic defensive operation in Belarus, in the battle of Smolensk in 1941, in the battle of Moscow in 1941-42.

During the Rzhev operations of 1942-43, the troops of the Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin Front, liquidated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region (July - August 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in the defense of the German troops (March 1943). In July - August 1943, the troops of the left wing of the front during the Battle of Kursk 1943, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation to eliminate the enemy's Oryol grouping. At the same time, the main forces of the Western Front, using an advantageous enveloping position, in August - September, together with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk operation 194З. In late 1943 - early 1944, the troops of the front, advancing in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, reached the eastern regions of Belarus. On April 24, 1944, the Western Front, on the basis of a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated April 12, 1944, was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front, and 2 of its armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (June - July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (July - September 1941); Lieutenant General, from September 11, 1941, Colonel General I. S. Konev (September - October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); Army General G.K. Zhukov (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from 27.8.1943 Army General V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944).

In German military-historical literature, the Western Front refers to the areas of combat operations of German troops in Western Europe against British, French and American troops in the 1st and 2nd World Wars.

Lit .: Military personnel of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Reference and statistical materials). M., 1963; Directives of the High Command of the Red Army (1917-1920): Sat. documents. M., 1969; Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922): Sat. documents: In 4 vols. M., 1971-1978; Strokov A. A. Armed forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; History of the First World War. 1914-1918: In 2 vols. M., 1975; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975-1977. T. 4-8; Rostunov I. I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976; Civil War in the USSR: In 2 vols. M., 1980-1986; Red Banner Belarusian Military District. 2nd ed. M., 1983; Zhukov G.K. Memoirs and reflections: In 2 volumes, 13th ed. M., 2002; Fronts, fleets, armies, flotillas of the period of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: A Handbook. M., 200Z.

At the same time, the Military Council of the Southwestern Front considered a plan of action for the troops in the spring and summer of 1942. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, N. S. Khrushchev, General I. Kh. Bagramyan believed that our troops in the south in able to defeat the opposing enemy grouping, liberate Kharkov and thereby create conditions for the expulsion of the invaders from the Donbass. After the conference, which has already been discussed, we, the army commanders, were also imbued with the same conviction.

Looking ahead a little, I will list the forces that participated in the Kharkov offensive operation.

To break through the enemy defenses in sectors with a total length of 91 km, 22 rifle divisions were assigned, supported by 2860 guns and mortars, 560 tanks. This meant that a rifle division had about 4 km of breakthrough area and that for every km we had 31 guns and mortars, as well as 6 tanks of direct infantry support.

In addition, two tank corps, three cavalry divisions and a motorized rifle brigade were to be introduced into the gap. Finally, two more rifle divisions - the 277th and 343rd, as well as the 2nd cavalry corps and three separate tank battalions (32 tanks each) remained in the reserve of the commander of the Southwestern Front.

The southern front was not assigned tasks for active operations. It was supposed to organize a solid defense and ensure the offensive operations of the Southwestern Front, as well as allocate from its composition to reinforce the latter three rifle divisions, five tank brigades, fourteen artillery regiments of the RGK and 233 aircraft.

The task of the advancing troops was to strike the enemy in a two-sided strike in converging directions from the areas north and south of Kharkov, followed by the formation of strike groups west of the city. It was envisaged that at the first, three-day stage, we would break through the enemy's defenses to a depth of 20-30 km, destroy the nearest reserves and ensure the introduction of mobile groups into the breakthrough. At the second stage, the duration of which should not exceed three or four days, it was necessary to destroy the operational reserves and complete the encirclement of the enemy grouping. At the same time, part of this grouping in the area of ​​​​the cities of Chuguev, Balakliya was planned to be cut off and destroyed by the forces of the 38th Army and the right flank of the 6th Army.

The main blow was dealt by the 6th Army on a 26-kilometer front. Eight rifle divisions and four tank brigades, with the support of 14 artillery regiments of the RGK, were supposed to break through the defenses and ensure the entry into the gap of two tank corps that made up the mobile group. In the future, the army, in cooperation with the mobile group, was to develop a strike on Kharkov from the south towards the troops of the 28th Army in order to encircle the entire enemy grouping (see the diagram on page 143).

To the left of the 6th Army was the offensive zone of General Bobkin's army group, which consisted of two rifle divisions and one tank brigade. This group was entrusted with the task of breaking through the defenses and ensuring the entry of the 6th cavalry corps into the breakthrough. The latter, by the end of the fifth day of the operation, was supposed to capture Krasnograd and provide the troops of the 6th Army from counterattacks from the west.

The second blow was delivered on a 15-kilometer front by the 28th Army with the forces of six rifle divisions and four tank brigades, supported by nine artillery regiments of the RGK. She was supposed to break through the enemy defenses and by the end of the third day to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and a motorized rifle brigade. These two formations, in turn, were to bypass Kharkov from the north and connect to the west of the city with the tank corps of the 6th Army.

The offensive of the 28th Army against possible enemy counterattacks was provided from the north and northwest by the 21st Army, from the south and southwest by the 38th. The first of them was tasked with breaking through the enemy defenses in a 14-kilometer section. By the end of the third day of the offensive, the troops of both armies were to gain a foothold on the achieved lines and reliably ensure the maneuver of the formations surrounding Kharkov.

The 38th Army then included the 81st, 124th, 199th, 226th, 300th and 304th rifle divisions, the 13th, 36th and 133rd tank brigades. It was reinforced with six RGK artillery regiments and six engineer battalions. Four rifle divisions and all three tank brigades participated in breaking through the enemy defenses. We were to strike at the 26-kilometer sector Dragunovka, Bolshaya Babka. By the end of the third day, the Lebedinka-Zarozhnoye-Pyatnitskoye line had to be captured. In the future, with the development of the offensive on Rogan, Ternovaya and with the release of the strike group in the Vvedenka, Chuguev area, the troops of the 38th Army, together with three reinforced regiments of the 6th Army, were to complete the encirclement, defeat the enemy’s Chuguev grouping and prepare for an attack on Kharkov from the east .

Having become acquainted with these data on the composition of the forces and means involved in the offensive, I experienced a feeling of great joy. For the first time since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, I had to participate in an offensive operation in which we outnumbered the enemy in manpower, artillery and tanks, and were not inferior to him in aviation. For example, never before have there been so many tanks in direct infantry support on our front. 560 is it a joke? And we had not only that, but also in the second echelon two tank corps (269 tanks), designed to develop the offensive after breaking through the enemy’s tactical defense zone. Yes, in the reserve of the front - about a hundred tanks alone.

In a word, a great force was indeed concentrated in the hands of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front. This is evidenced by the data above.

Sources and literature.

Chapter Two

The enemy in front of the Western Front in January 1942

General assessment of the position of the enemy in early January 1942

The 9th and 4th German armies, consisting of fourteen corps, several separate divisions and groups, as a result of the December defeat near Moscow, rolled back to the west under the blows of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts. During the withdrawal, the enemy waged stubborn containment defensive battles, turning into counterattacks in a number of sectors of the front with the support of tanks and aircraft.

By the beginning of January, the Germans, on their northern wing and in the center, with extraordinary efforts and fierce resistance, managed to stop the offensive of the troops of the Western Front and take an advantageous line of defense. This line passed along the western bank of the rivers Lama, Ruza, Nara to Bashkino (10 km southwest of Naro-Fominsk), inclusive, then went west of Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets to Detchino, descending to the south west of Kaluga.

On its southern wing, the enemy, under pressure from the 50th and 10th armies, withdrew to the west and northwest, waging stubborn battles on the intermittent broken line Zubovo (30 km southeast of Yukhnov), Dolgaya (10 km south of Yukhnov), Yukhnov , Mosalsk, Meshchovsk, Sukhinichi, Maklaki (28 km southwest of Sukhinichi), Klintsy, Belev (claim).

When advancing on Moscow, the German command, due to the successful development of the operation, did not provide for the possibility of a deep retreat. According to reports, deep rear lines, although they were outlined, were not sufficiently prepared in advance, and at the disposal of the command of the central army group and the commanders of the 9th and 4th armies there were no free reserves that could occupy a new line of defense and take over rolling front.

Insignificant cash reserves during the retreat were used by the German command to restore the situation, but they could not save him. As a result, the enemy failed to carry out a planned withdrawal and create strong strike groups at the expense of reserve units and formations.

The main operational directions and the grouping of enemy forces in defense

The most important operational areas for the enemy in the zone of action of the Western Front in the first half of January were the following:

1. Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk the direction (against the 1st, 20th and 16th armies) was the most serious and dangerous on the left wing of the Germans. Gzhatsk is a junction of routes leading to Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, according to its military-geographical position, it covers the most convenient routes to Vyazma and further to Smolensk, Gzhatsk forms the top of the triangle of the enemy’s defensive position, the base of which is Rzhev, Vyazma. The capture of the Gzhatsk defense center violated the defensive system of the Germans and made it possible to bypass the Vyazma resistance center from the north.

2. Mozhayskoye the direction (against the 5th Army) was important for the enemy, since it led directly to Gzhatsk along the shortest distance.

3. Medynskoye the direction (against the 33rd and 43rd armies) led directly to Yukhnov and made it possible to bypass the Vyazma center of resistance from the southeast and south.

4. Yukhnovskoe the direction (against the 49th and 50th armies) covered the shortest routes from the east and southeast to Roslavl and Vyazma; it was of great operational importance to the enemy.

5. Sukhinichskoe the direction (against the 10th Army) was also of great importance. Sukhinichi is a railway junction where the tracks coming from Smolensk, Roslavl and Bryansk converge, allowing the transfer of troops and cargo.

In the second half of January, due to the development of a successful offensive by the troops of the Western Front, the most threatened operational areas for the enemy were:

1. Novoduginskoe(against the 20th Army) - as the shortest direction, which made it possible to cover the Gzhatsk center of resistance from the north. The subsequent withdrawal of the 1st Army from the Western Front (the 1st Army was transferred to the North-Western Front) undoubtedly influenced the development of the operation of the 20th Army, which alone, having taken over the sector of the 1st Army, was supposed to lead further offensive on the 35-km front (instead of 20 km). By this time, the enemy had strengthened his defenses by introducing new reserves and occupying advantageous lines.

2. Gzhatskoe the direction (against the 5th Army) led directly to Gzhatsk. However, in this direction too, with the departure of the 16th Army to the southern sector of the Western Front, the zone of operations of the 5th Army increased to 50 km (instead of 20 km), which also influenced the course of the further offensive. The enemy, taking into account the importance of this direction, significantly strengthened its defense capability by bringing in new reserves from the deep rear.

3. Yukhnovo-Vyazemskoe the direction (against the 33rd, 43rd, 49th and 50th armies) made it possible to deep bypass the Vyazemsky fortified area from the southeast and south. The enemy attached great importance to holding the Yukhnov center of resistance behind him and concentrated units of eight divisions in the Yukhnov area on the 75-km front.

4. Spas-Demenskoe direction (against the 10th Army and the group of General Belov), threatening a deep bypass of the Yukhnovo-Vyazma grouping of the enemy. In this direction, the enemy sought to retain the Sukhinich stronghold; later, maneuvering with reserve units assembled from different divisions and consolidated detachments, the Germans stubbornly held the line of defense they had occupied, covering the Yukhnov-Roslavl highway.

5. Bryansk a direction leading to an important junction of paths. The enemy fought stubborn battles in this direction, trying to win time, to ensure the strengthening of the defensive line in front of the 61st Army and the supply of reserves from the deep rear.

Usually the German command distributed its forces in accordance with the importance of one or another operational direction. During the December retreat in defensive battles, the bulk of enemy military formations were in the first line.

But by the beginning of January this was no longer observed: a significant number of military formations were withdrawn to the second line. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the total number of formations located in front of the Western Front. If at the beginning of January the 9th and 4th German armies numbered forty-three divisions in front of the Western Front, by January 15 their number had increased to forty-eight.

Depending on the situation, the enemy sought to maneuver along the front and from the depth to provide the most important of the threatened operational areas with the necessary forces.

The operational density of the defense was expressed by the following data:

Thus, during January, despite the lengthening of the front line, the average operational density of the defense remained almost the same. The width of the front of defense per division of the first line increased on average from 13 to 18 km; consequently, there was a decrease in the density of defense of the enemy's first line. This is due to two reasons: 1) the enemy on the right wing and in the center retreated to stronger defensive lines; 2) by the end of January, the number of reserve divisions increased (from 8 to 15).

The tactical density of the defense of the enemy in different sectors of the front was different. In the strike directions, the German divisions occupied denser areas.

By January 5, the maximum density of defense in the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk directions was: one division per 8 km; the minimum - in the Sukhinich direction - one division per 33 km of the front.

On January 15, the maximum density of defense was in the Yukhnov direction: one division per 6 km; on Volokolamsk-Gzhatsky - one division per 8 km; the minimum tactical density - in the Spas-Demen direction - is one division per 29 km of the front.

By January 25, the maximum tactical density of defense moved to the Novoduginsk direction: one division per 5.8 km; there were no changes in Gzhatsky: one division per 8 km; in the Spas-Demensky direction, the density remained minimal, but even more rarefied: one division per 38 km of the front.

The weak saturation of the defense front of the southern wing of the 4th German Army made it possible to conduct a rapid offensive by the 50th and 10th armies and the group of General Belov; there was no solid front here, as was the case in the north in the 9th Army. The front line was broken and had a discontinuous character. The Germans in the course of the struggle were forced to throw up separate units and consolidated detachments, tearing them out of the composition of various divisions and even special units.

The grouping of enemy forces at different stages of a defensive battle was different and depended on the situation at the front and on the importance of the operational direction. Appendix 1 (see at the end of the book) gives the combat schedule of the German troops by periods. It follows from it that by January 5, the largest enemy groupings were operating in the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk (13 divisions) and Mozhaisk (10 divisions) directions. On January 15, the most saturated were the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk direction (13 divisions), Mozhaisk - against the 5th Army (7 divisions) and Yukhnovskoe (6 divisions). By January 25, large enemy groupings were concentrated in the Novoduginsky (9 divisions) and Gzhatsky (11 divisions) directions.

The enemy was constantly striving to oppose the right wing and the adjoining part of the center of the Western Front with the largest forces, which made it possible to delay our advance.

This happened due to the fact that the Germans took into account the danger of the right wing of the Western Front overhanging their left wing, as well as the breakthrough and entry into their rear of the troops of the Kalinin Front west of the Rzhev-Sychevka line. Under these conditions, the German command decided to stubbornly hold the area of ​​Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, Sychevka.

As can be seen from the combat schedule, the bulk of the defending German troops of the first line were infantry divisions. On January 5, the first line consisted of 25 infantry divisions, on January 15 - 29 infantry divisions, on January 25 - 28 infantry divisions. The basis of the defense of tank divisions was mainly motorized regiments. In more important operational areas (Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk, Mozhaisk, Sukhinichskoe), groups of tanks in the amount of 15 to 30 were used.

Motorized divisions in the defense were used as infantry formations. Army reserve divisions were concentrated at various depths from the front line and, as a rule, were located in settlements adapted for defense, as resistance centers with bunkers, wire fences, ice ramparts, etc. (Gzhatsk, Mozhaisk, Vereya, Yukhnov, Zhizdra ) or as hastily fortified strongholds (Sereda, Porechye, Trinity, Kondrovo, Linen Factory, Sukhinichi, etc.).

Combat composition of troops and characteristics of enemy divisions

The combat composition of the 9th and 4th German armies on January 5 in operational areas was as follows:

The table shows that the two most threatened operational directions against a large grouping of armies of the right wing and part of the center of the Western Front (1st, 20th, 16th and 5th armies) were provided by the enemy with the strongest grouping of his troops consisting of: 65,700 soldiers (48% of all forces), 463 field guns (47% of field divisional artillery) and 175 tanks (97% of all available tanks).

In the Yukhnov direction, the Germans, not having enough forces and means, were defending on a wide front, grouping up to 25% of all their forces, except for tanks (3%).

By January 5, units of the 2nd Air Fleet, the 8th Aviation Corps, whose headquarters were in Smolensk, were operating in front of the Western Front. Combat strength of aviation: 270 bombers, 95 fighters, 35 reconnaissance aircraft, total 400 aircraft.

Until the end of January, there were no sharp changes in the quantitative composition and location of the 8th Aviation Corps. The airfields were mainly located to the west of the line Pogoreloye Gorodishche, Gzhatsk, Yukhnov. The number of aircraft at the airfields ranged from 8 to 12. Aviation operations were carried out mainly in small groups with the task of covering their retreating troops. At the same time, fascist aviation bombarded our units on the front line and conducted reconnaissance of rear facilities.

* Only divisional artillery guns are taken into account.

The table shows that in the most threatened Gzhatsk direction on a front of 50 km, the enemy concentrated more than a quarter of all infantry and artillery. Despite the increase in the total number of divisions from forty-three (January 5) to forty-nine (January 25), the number of manpower decreased due to the losses that the Germans suffered in defensive battles and the retreat that followed.

By January 25, the enemy had almost the same available amount of artillery and tanks in his troops as he had by January 5; this happened as a result of the delivery of several new divisions from the rear and the partial restoration of the artillery and tanks lost in battle.

The table also shows that, compared with the enemy combat strength on January 5, all operational directions, except Novoduginsky, had a small number of tanks by January 25. The operational importance of this direction, as the shortest for deep coverage of Gzhatsk from the north, was clear to the enemy, and therefore it was provided with a stronger tank group.

The combat characteristics of the formations of the German army (operating on the Western Front), compiled according to various sources for January 1942, can be reduced to the following.

Combat characteristics of tank divisions

Tank formations (2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 19th and 20th tank divisions) have been operating on the Eastern Front since the beginning of the war, except for the 2nd and 5th tank divisions, which were transferred to the Eastern Front in October 1941. During the period of fighting on the Eastern Front, all tank divisions suffered heavy losses and were repeatedly (two or three times) replenished with people and materiel. Losses in the materiel of enemy tank divisions are characterized by the following data: on average, the regular strength of a tank division included from 150 to 200 tanks; with the start of the offensive on Moscow, most of the tank divisions were almost completely equipped with materiel; as a result of the October-December battles, the total number of tanks in all nine divisions in the first half of January was estimated at 250-300 vehicles. Some of them were at the front, some were sent to the rear for repairs. A brief combat description of tank divisions for the first half of January 1942 is shown in the table.

Brief combat characteristics of the enemy tank divisions in the first half of January 1942

These combat characteristics demonstrate:

1) heavy losses of tank divisions during the October-December battles near Moscow as a result of the crushing blows of the troops of the Western Front;

2) the drop in the combat capability of the German tank formations, caused by combat failures and major losses in manpower and materiel.

3) the fact that the German command was forced to use the predominant part of the tank divisions, which still retained combat capability, in defense as infantry units, dispersing tanks in small groups in close cooperation with the infantry.

Combat characteristics of motorized divisions

The motorized divisions, despite the heavy losses (from 60 to 70%) in manpower and artillery suffered in previous battles, basically retained their combat capability. These divisions in the January battles on various sectors of the defense front of the 9th and 4th German armies either occupied a defensive sector or were in reserve.

Combat characteristics of infantry divisions

The vast majority of infantry divisions (thirty-two out of thirty-eight) were transferred to the Eastern Front at the end of June, in July and in the first half of August 1941. Six divisions (35th, 63rd, 208th, 211th, 213th and 216th Infantry Divisions) were transferred to the Eastern Front in December 1941 and early January 1942 from Belgium and France. Of the total, seven infantry divisions are personnel, the rest (thirty-one) were formed in the divisional districts of the Reichswehr for mobilization.

Due to the heavy losses suffered during the war, all divisions changed their personnel several times, which could not but affect their condition. However, the predominant number of infantry divisions by the beginning of January still retained their combat capability. Only individual divisions (52nd, 56th, 197th and 267th Infantry), which had suffered heavy losses in previous battles (especially in December 1941), turned out to be unfit for combat.

In addition, the harsh winter (frost reached 35 °), lice, illness, lack of warm clothes, war fatigue, not always normal food delivery, etc., influenced the political and moral state and the fall in discipline. cases when the officers, in order not to arouse the discontent of the soldiers, were forced to cancel previously given orders. In individual divisions, in connection with the arrival of reinforcements, the officers promised the soldiers that the units operating in the winter (56th Infantry Division, etc.) would be relieved and that the spring offensive would eliminate all difficulties. It must be said that such agitation in January 1942 still had an impact on a certain part of the Nazi army. Along with this, in cases of open discontent among the soldiers (197th and 267th infantry divisions), severe repression was immediately applied.

Thus, the combat effectiveness of the enemy infantry divisions by the beginning of January was as follows:

It should be added that during the October and December battles of 1941, regiments were increasingly disbanded due to heavy losses. Separate divisions had two regiments instead of three, and regiments had two battalions.

The general nature of the enemy's defense

The general principles of the defense of the 9th and 4th German armies against the troops of the Western Front basically corresponded to the regulations.

In connection with winter conditions and the changed nature of hostilities, the formation of enemy defenses had some peculiarities.

When attacking Moscow, the German command planned a number of defensive lines in its rear. In some places (for example, beyond the Ugra River), reconnaissance noted enemy trench work even before our counteroffensive. By the beginning of January 1942, in the immediate rear of the 9th and 4th German armies, the general contours of the defensive line along the line of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma and further to Bryansk had already been determined. The German command tried, under the guise of strong rearguards with tanks, to hold back the pressure of our troops in order to gain a foothold on the line of Lama, Ruza, Nara and further on the line Maloyaroslavets, Sukhinichi, Belev with the main forces. The defense in the northern sector was partly based in the old trenches, ours and the Germans, built back in the period of the October battles on both banks of the Lama and Ruza rivers.

From the captured orders for enemy military formations (23rd Infantry Division) it is clear that the positions on Lama and to the south were to be defended to the last man. Hitler gave similar instructions in his order, demanding "to cling to every settlement, not to retreat a single step."

The defensive line, for which the 9th and 4th German armies clung, on January 5, basically passed along the western (and in some places along the eastern) banks of the Lama, Ruza and Nara. On its northern flank and in the center, the enemy carried out a tough defense; on the southern wing - fought containment battles, turning in places into counterattacks.

The enemy defense system during this period was built on the principle of organizing strongholds and centers of resistance, the base of which in winter conditions were settlements. The defensive position of each formation consisted of company strongholds and battalion resistance centers with gaps between them. The latter were covered by a system of flanking cross machine-gun fire, mortar battery fire and submachine gunners; in some places the gaps were filled with snow trenches and snow (poured with water) ramparts.

The interaction of enemy firing structures in the system of a company stronghold was created by strong machine-gun, automatic and mortar fire in the main directions. A company stronghold basically had two or three platoon defensive areas, and, in turn, each platoon defensive area had two or three firing points. The rear was the most poorly protected place of the strong point.

The depth of the battalion resistance center is 1.5 km, the depth of the company stronghold is 500–750 m. The enemy infantry divisions occupied 8–10 km on the defensive in important and dangerous directions; on less threatened - from 12 to 15 km. However, there were cases of taking up defense with a front width of up to 20 km (98, 258, 31 and other infantry divisions). In such cases, such divisions were reinforced by artillery or infantry from another formation. The fire system mentioned above was quite widely supplemented by field-type engineering fortifications.

The firing points were located in stone or wooden structures adapted for defense, as well as in wood-earth snow points specially built for this purpose and in snow trenches. All enemy installations in the vast majority of their design were light field buildings. The enemy made extensive use of thermal insulation in dugouts located along the main lines of communication. In these dugouts, the Germans with machine guns and machine guns sat out until the moment of the attack; with the beginning of the attack, they ran out and took up positions in the nearby trenches and firing points.

Enemy company strongholds were often located on high ground; the terrain in front of the leading edge was clearly visible and allowed for a good shelling. Firing points were sometimes located on the reverse slopes, at a distance of 150-200 m from the crest of the height, and strong points with circular fire were often encountered. For fire weapons, the enemy widely used several spare positions; machine gunners, submachine gunners and individual guns, moving from one position to another, created the impression of a large number of forces on the defender.

Large settlements and cities were equipped by the enemy as centers of resistance, and the defense system was built on close fire interaction of strong points. The approaches to the nodes of resistance and the gaps between the strongholds were covered by a system of barriers. The roads leading to the stronghold and the node of resistance were mined. The Germans widely used mining in defense. Thus, in January, over 7,300 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were destroyed by engineering units of the Western Front in different areas of the defensive line. Inside settlements, mines were placed on streets, squares, public buildings, residential buildings and outbuildings. So, for example, when leaving Naro-Fominsk, the enemy mined a textile factory, the square in front of the monument to Lenin, the area of ​​workers' barracks (100 minutes); in Medyn, ditches on Kirov Street, barricades and all exits from the city were mined (183 mines).

In the intervals between the strong points, a poorly developed wire network, slingshots, inconspicuous obstacles made of smooth wire, wire fences on pole stakes and other equipment options were used.

The groves located in the depths of the defense turned into anti-tank defense areas (ATDs), which were surrounded by a line of trenches and covered by anti-tank defense guns.

An anti-tank ditch sometimes came off in areas where there were dangers of tanks. The enemy in defense often used "surprises" in various forms.

When conducting a defensive battle, the enemy shifted the center of gravity to holding the tactical defense zone, using for this purpose the force of a previously prepared fire system. With concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire, artillery fire, mortars, machine guns, he sought to destroy the advancing units even before they approached the front line. In the event of a breakthrough of the forward edge and the invasion of our attacking units into the depths of the defensive zone, the Germans carried out counterattacks with regimental and divisional reserves on the flanks of the tactical breakthrough with a strike in the direction of the center of the breakthrough on the forward edge. When the situation was favorable, and the advancing troops were weakened and disordered, counterattacks were also used in front of the main line of defense. With a deeper penetration of the attacking units into the defensive zone and the threat of a breakthrough of the tactical zone (6-8 km), the corps and army reserves delivered a counterattack. Thus, the formations of the first line of defense, which occupied the defensive zone, gave the full and maximum tension of forces and means, and only when they were exhausted, deeper reserves were brought into action. Behind the first defensive line, 8–10 km away, was the second. This defensive line was discontinuous and included separate strongholds or centers of resistance, partly occupied by corps reserves.

The third line of defense of the 9th and 4th German armies was located 18-20 km from the front line. It passed along the line of Knyazhy Gory, Shakhovskaya, Sereda, Porechye, Mozhaisk, Vereya, Medyn, Kondrovo, Linen Factory, Yukhnov; in front of the front of the 50th and 10th armies, the enemy had a discontinuous line of defense, fought defensive battles on a wide front and, apparently, did not have a line prepared and fortified in advance.

Such settlements as Shakhovskaya, Sereda, Porechye, Mozhaysk, Kondrovo, Linen Factory, etc., were turned into strongholds with snow trenches dug between them, light dugouts and bunkers. The gaps between the strong points (just as in the first line of defense) were shot through by flanking fire of all kinds; on the main, most threatened axes against the 20th, 16th, 5th, 33rd and 49th armies, the enemy erected artificial ice ramparts in places. In the area of ​​​​Medyn, the Germans, during the withdrawal, quite thoroughly destroyed the highway Maloyaroslavets, Medyn; almost all bridges were blown up, partly mined. On parallel roads, the enemy set up a fairly large number of obstacles. Settlements east of Medyn (Aduyevo, Ilyinskoye, Podsosino, etc.) were fortified as company strongholds. In a significant part of the forests, the enemy managed to fill up the passages, braid them with wire and mine them. This greatly hampered the actions of our advancing units and required a lot of time, effort and means to overcome the barriers.

The army reserves of the 9th and 4th German armies were located on the indicated line of defense: the 106th and 85th infantry divisions, the remnants of the 10th tank division (which was being completed), the 107th and 230th infantry and the 20th tank division. The first rear main defensive line of the central army group passed along the line of Ostashkov (140 km northwest of Rzhev), Bely, Yartsevo, Yelnya, Bogdanovo, Zhukovo, Bryansk. Field-type fortifications were built on this rear line.

The general defense system in January included the defensive line Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, the Zanoznaya station (30 km north of Kirov). This line was strongly strengthened by a system of strongholds and centers of resistance. In the Gzhatsk area in early January, the reserves of the central army group were concentrated - the 63rd and 255th infantry divisions, located 80–90 km from the front line.

On January 15, the general enemy defense system on its northern wing remained almost unchanged. In the center, German troops fought defensive battles along the lines of Vereya, Linen Factory, Yukhnov, on the southern wing - at the turn of the station Zanoznaya, Olshanitsa, Zikeevo, Melekhova, Fedinsky, Mtsensk.

By this time, the defense was already a more reinforced and developed system of strongholds and centers of resistance.

The German command, having set itself the task of holding the triangle of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma at all costs, feverishly erected field-type fortifications here and concentrated troops of the 3rd and 4th tank groups and separate infantry divisions (5th, 7th and 9th Army Corps). By mid-January, the enemy had strengthened his resistance by increasing the number of divisions of the first line, trying to hold back the ever-growing pressure of the armies of the Western Front.

By January 25, the general defense system of the 9th and 4th German armies was an even more developed network of fortifications. The divisions of the first line fought stubborn defensive battles at the line of Vasilyevskoye (12 km southeast of Pogoreloy Gorodishche), Tresely, Batyushkovo station, Azarovo, Vyazishcha, Koshnyaki station, Plyuskovo (25 km southwest of Kondrov), Yukhnov, Zimnitsy (6 km southeast of east of Fomin), Podpisnaya station (7 km southwest of Kirov), Sukhinichi, Polyudovo (10 km northeast of Zikeev), Ktsyn, Ploskoye, south of Belev and further to Mtsensk.

On their northern wing and partly in the center, the Germans succeeded, relying on a more developed system of strongholds and centers of resistance, to delay the further advance of the 20th, 5th and 33rd armies. This was also facilitated by the fact that the right wing of the Western Front allocated part of its forces from its composition to another direction. The total length of the defense line of the 9th and 4th German armies increased by almost 150 km compared to the beginning of January, but the enemy managed to pull up new reserve divisions, pull separate units from the front and create rather large reserves in the main, most threatened operational areas, especially strong in the Gzhatsk direction (four infantry, one motorized and one tank division).

The 197th Infantry Division, as having lost its combat effectiveness, was assigned to the Gzhatsk region to be put in order. The remnants of the 52nd and 56th Infantry Divisions occupied secondary sectors and were incorporated into other divisions; The 267th Infantry Division was withdrawn to the Vyazma region for staffing.

On their southern wing against the 10th and 61st armies, the Germans continued to conduct containment battles on a wide front. In the Sukhinichi area, the enemy’s Zhizdrinskaya grouping consisting of the 208th Infantry Division, the 35th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division) and the 691st Column (up to an infantry battalion) fought stubborn battles, trying to break through to join the Sukhinichsky garrison.

The operational structure of the German defense was:

1) a tactical defense zone with a total depth of 6 to 8 km (sometimes 10 km); it included divisional and corps reserves, the latter forming at the same time the second line of defense;

2) a strip of army reserves 18–20 km from the front line; this strip formed the third line of defense and was a combination of strongholds and centers of resistance in fire communication;

3) a strip of army group reserves 60-80 km from the front line, which was also fortified by an intermittent system of strong points and was occupied by military formations in the most important directions;

4) and finally, in the area of ​​​​the first rear defensive line (the area east of Smolensk), usually at the junction of a well-developed road network, at a distance of 150-200 km from the battle line, there was a front-line reserve.

However, it must be borne in mind that the Germans had few reserves, and in essence everything was based on the defense of the tactical zone.

Ways of communication

By the beginning of January 1942, the enemy, through great effort, managed to change part of the railways to the European gauge. In the zone of operations of the 9th and 4th German armies, both gauges were changed on the Minsk-Smolensk-Vyazma line, one track was changed on the railway sections: 1) Vyazma-Mozhaisk, 2) Smolensk-Roslavl-Bryansk, 3) Bryansk-Orel .

However, for the operation of these lines, it was necessary to transfer from Germany not only rolling stock, but also railway workers. The delivered rolling stock, which was structurally very outdated and worn out, was very diverse: the steam locomotives serving the tracks were predominantly German, while the car fleet was predominantly assembled from occupied European countries.

The capacity of the rebuilt roads is small: on double-track railways it did not exceed 20–25 pairs of trains per day, on single-track railways - about 15 pairs of trains. The reasons lie in the rather low technical condition of these roads, in the shortcomings of the constructed bridges, in the absence of inter-station communication, traction equipment, power plants and water supply. In addition, frequent partisan raids had an effect, which is why in a number of sections the movement of trains was carried out for less than a day.

There were enough highways and dirt roads in the front line of the German armies.

The main rear routes were: 1) Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma-Smolensk, 2) Maloyaroslavets-Medyn-Yukhnov-Roslavl, 3) Orel-Bryansk-Roslavl-Smolensk.

The maneuver of the troops along the front was provided by the roundabout routes: a) Rzhev - Zubtsov-Gzhatsk-Yukhnov-Sukhinichi-Zhizdra; b) Rzhev-Vyazma-Mosalsk-Meshchovsk-Lyudinovo; c) Sychevka-Dorogobuzh-Yelnya-Roslavl.

During the withdrawal of the German troops in the front line, vehicles were largely used, despite the great difficulties in its operation in winter, the lack of fuel and the huge loss of trucks.

German command plan

The operational situation of the German troops in January was difficult. The German command sought by all means to restore order in the retreating troops and delay the offensive of the Red Army. Hitler in his order gave the following instructions:

“To cling to every settlement, not to retreat a single step, to defend ourselves to the last bullet, to the last grenade, this is what the current moment requires of us.

Each populated area occupied by us must be turned into a stronghold. Surrender to his opponent should not be allowed under any circumstances, even if he is bypassed by the enemy.

If, nevertheless, by order of the higher command, the point should be left by us, it is necessary to burn everything to the ground, blow up the furnaces.

To reinforce the 9th and 4th German armies were transferred from France: in December - the 16th Infantry Division, in January - the 208th, 211th and 213th Infantry Divisions. In these divisions there was a lack of officers, poorly trained contingents of soldiers and a shortage of weapons. In addition to the divisions transferred from the deep rear, front-line reserves (63rd and 255th infantry divisions) and individual units taken from other sectors were thrown up. These reserves were used to restore the situation in the operational directions threatened for the Germans. In addition, the remnants of individual divisions (52, 56, 197 and 267th) were hastily reduced to regiments, the remnants of regiments - to battalions and poured into more preserved formations.

The remaining materiel of the tank divisions was partly used at the front, partly withdrawn to the rear for immediate recovery.

Along the way, groups of reservists were hastily thrown up from the rear to complete the most battered, but still retained a certain combat capability of the divisions. In the course of the battle, consolidated detachments and groups were created (groups of Chevalieri, Kuno, etc.).

At the beginning of January, the plan of the German command included the task at all costs to stop the further retreat of the exhausted and bloodless units of the 9th and 4th German armies, pressed by the Kalinin and Western fronts, to take up a convenient defense and gain time to prepare the defensive line of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, Zanoznaya, Bryansk. The enemy made extensive use of individual pockets of resistance (Yukhnov, Sukhinichi) in the most important threatened areas and fought stubborn containment battles in other sectors of the front.

The largest concentration of retreating fascist troops was observed in the area of ​​Sychevka, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, and also in the area of ​​Yukhnov.

findings

1. The general situation and condition of the German troops in front of the Western Front in January 1942 were unfavorable for them. Having suffered heavy losses, the enemy was no longer capable of active operations. The initiative of action was in the hands of the Red Army.

2. In the January battles, the enemy, given the threat of envelopment of both flanks, tried on his northern wing and in the center to hold on to a number of intermediate lines, withdrawing the main forces westward, initially to the line of the Lama, Ruza, Nara rivers, and then to the line of Rzhev , Gzhatsk and to the south. On its southern wing, the enemy sought to prevent our units from reaching the Maloyaroslavets-Roslavl highway in order to ensure the withdrawal of their main forces.

It should be noted that, despite the difficult conditions of the struggle, the enemy managed to restore the combat capability of his troops and for quite a long time to secure a line along Lama, Ruza and to the south.

Thus, the enemy won about three weeks of time and brought the Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Yukhnov line into a stronger defensive state.

3. Due to the heavy losses suffered by the 9th and 4th German armies in December - January, and insufficient replenishment, the German command was forced to resort to disbanding individual regiments and reducing some divisions to two-regiment, and regiments - from three-battalion to two-battalion. However, the width of the combat sectors of the troops remained almost unchanged, which could not but lead to a general weakening of the defense.

In addition, by the beginning of January, the German divisions and regiments in terms of organizational and staffing had long ceased to correspond to those full-blooded divisions that in June 1941 treacherously invaded the USSR. The troops of the 9th and 4th German armies, instead of the 300,000 soldiers prescribed by the state, had about 142,000 soldiers. total 262 tanks. Finally, the divisional artillery instead of 1960 guns consisted of 979 guns. And this means that the 9th and 4th German armies in infantry and artillery suffered losses from 50 to 56% in the course of previous battles. Panzer divisions lost 61.5% of their tanks. At the end of January, as a result of heavy defensive battles for the enemy and a large number of frostbite, losses in manpower and materiel increased even more.

4. The political and moral state of the German troops in front of the Western Front in January was characterized by the following data;

a) the difficult operational situation created for the Germans at the front;

b) heavy losses suffered by German troops as a result of withdrawal from Moscow;

c) severe winter with frosts reaching 30–35°; lack of provision of troops with warm uniforms, lice, exhaustion, fatigue, undermining faith in a quick victory for Germany.

All this led to a decrease in the combat capability of the German troops.

Western Front It was formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the order of the USSR NKO dated June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District as part of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies. Subsequently, it included the 1st shock, 5, 11, 16 (from May 1, 1943 - the 11th Guards Army), 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30 (from May 1, 1943 10th Guards Army), 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 39th, 43rd, 49th, 50th, 61st, 68th Armies, 3rd and 4th Tank, 1st Air Armies.

The troops of the front participated in the strategic defensive operation of 1941 in Belarus, in the battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941), in the Moscow battle (September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942)

During the Moscow strategic offensive operation (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942), the troops of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin and South-Western fronts, inflicted the first major defeat on the troops of Army Group Center and pushed the enemy back 100-250 km from Moscow.

During the Rzhev-Vyazemsky strategic operation (January 8-April 20, 1942), the troops of the front, in cooperation with the formations of the Kalinin Front and with the assistance of the troops of the North-Western and Bryansk fronts, threw back the enemy in the western direction by 80-250 km, liberated the Moscow and Tula region, many districts of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

July 30-August 23, 1942, the troops of the Western Front, together with the Kalinin Front, carried out the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, liquidated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region.

In the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation (March 2-31, 1943), the troops of the Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin Front, liquidated the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in the defense of the German troops, moving the front line from Moscow another 130-160 km.

During the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943, the troops of the left flank of the front, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation (July 12-August 18, 1943) to eliminate the enemy grouping. At the same time, the main forces of the front, using an advantageous enveloping position, conducted the Smolensk strategic operation on August 7-October 2, 1943, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front. As a result of a successful operation, the troops of the front advanced westward to a depth of 200-250 km and liberated part of the territory of the Kalinin region and the Smolensk region.

The troops of the front during the offensive in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions in late 1943 - early 1944 entered the territory of the eastern regions of Belarus.

On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 12, 1944 April 24, 1944. The front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front. Three of his armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Front commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General Eremenko A. I. (June-July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko S. K. (July-September 1941); Lieutenant General, from September 1941 - Colonel General Konev I. S. (September - October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); General of the Army Zhukov G.K. (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from August 1943 - General of the Army V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944)

Members of the Military Council of the Front: Corps Commissar Fominykh A. Ya. (June-July 1941); army commissar of the 1st rank, from October 1942 - Lieutenant General Mehlis L. 3. (July 1941 and December 1943 - April 1944); Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus Ponomarenko P. K. (July 1941); Lieutenant General Bulganin N. A. (July 1941 - December 1943); Lieutenant General Makarov V. E. (April 1944)

Chiefs of staff of the front: Major General V. E. Klimovskikh (June 1941); Lieutenant General Malandin G.K. (July 1941); Lieutenant General, from June 1942 - Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky (July 1941 - January 1942 and May 1942 - February 1943); Major General V. S. Golushkevich (January-May 1942); Lieutenant General Pokrovsky A.P. (February 1943 - April 1944)