The Charter of the Internal Service (UVS-37) in force in the Red Army should be recognized as not fully consistent with modern requirements for discipline and internal regulations in the Red Army.
UVS-37 to be revised and published within 2 months no later than July of this year, giving it the name "Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army of 1940" (UVS-40).
When revising the Charter, take the following main provisions as the basis for UVS-37 and for guidance:
1) Each serviceman in the service and out of service is obliged to unquestioningly and within the established time limits to fulfill all orders of the superiors.
2) Divide all military personnel into groups: senior, senior, middle, and junior officers and rank and file. On the basis of existing provisions, clearly determine which categories of command personnel are included in the corresponding groups (rank and file, junior command personnel, etc.), namely: privates - in a group of privates; junior command staff of fixed-term and extra-long service - to the group of junior command staff; junior lieutenants, lieutenants, senior lieutenants, captains and their respective ones - to the middle command staff group; majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels and their respective - to the group of senior command staff; brigade commanders, divisional commanders, commanders, army commanders and marshals - in the group of higher command personnel.
3) All commanding officers are the chiefs for all ordinary and junior commanding staff of the urgent and extra-long service of the Red Army, and the commanding officers are senior in relation to these categories.
Persons in the commanding staff are chiefs only in relation to the rank and file and junior command staff of their unit. The junior commanding staff is the head of the rank and file of his unit and the senior in relation to the entire rank and file of the Red Army.
4) All persons of command and command staff are the chiefs of military personnel of junior rank, except in cases where a senior in rank is subordinate to a junior in the order of service.
5) The direct superior is the one who permanently or temporarily manages the official activities of military personnel, is responsible for them and to whom the military personnel is subordinate in the service. The closest direct supervisor is called the immediate supervisor.
6) All orders and orders to give only in order of subordination. The issuance of orders and orders, bypassing the immediate superior, should be carried out only in exceptional cases, immediately informing the immediate superior about this.
7) The anthem "Internationale" is performed only for the meeting of the chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union Republics, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Marshals of the USSR.
8) It is obligatory to introduce a mutual greeting, establishing that the junior in rank greets the senior not only in the service, but also outside the service.
9) All military units, subdivisions and teams, when passing, must greet their direct and all direct superiors in the prescribed manner, starting with the company commander, and emphasize that after the command "at attention" the transition to the combat step is obligatory.
10) The section of official duties of the commanding and commanding staff should be redone, fully providing for the rights and duties of each chief and supplementing it with the duties of chiefs and persons of the administrative and economic service introduced by the new staff of the rifle division. In particular:
b) oblige the commander of a rifle battalion to bear full responsibility for the condition of the battalion's weapons and to inspect and verify it at least once a month;
d) to raise the authority of the foreman of the company, squadron and batteries, subordinating to him all the personnel of the company except for the middle command staff, and demand full responsibility for the economy and combat training of the company to the company commander;
e) to develop the duties of a platoon commander, which should be given the same rights in a platoon as a foreman in a company. Release the platoon commander from the middle command staff from the household and responsibility for it, placing all this on the assistant platoon commander;
f) oblige the squad leader to be responsible for weapons and property in the squad;
g) the chiefs of the regiment's services for better management, ensuring the life and combat of the regiment, subordinate to the chief of staff of the regiment, the same should be done in divisions, corps and higher, leaving only the chiefs of the armed forces under the direct subordination of the commander;
h) develop the duties of an assistant regiment commander for combat operations.
11) To remove the definition of the number of training hours per day from the Charter, giving this right to the commander of the unit, depending on instructions from above and the combat training plan of the unit.
12) Squad commanders, at the end of the morning review of fighters, should report not to the foreman, but to their platoon commanders.
13) To take food, companies, squadrons and batteries should follow the command not of a duty officer, but of a foreman or a deputy appointed by him.
14) The dismissal of ordinary and junior command personnel of military service from the location of the unit should be carried out only on the days determined by the unit commander, and only with the permission of the company commander or persons of the command personnel corresponding to him. The right to dismiss the political instructor of the company is limited, obliging him to coordinate this issue with the company commander.
15) A serviceman, having received permission to leave before leaving and upon returning, must appear before the foreman of the company, who is obliged to believe the neatness of clothing and the ability of the dismissed to behave outside the barracks and in public places.
17) Subordinate the officer on duty not only to the commander and military commissar of the unit, but also to the chief of staff of the unit.
18) For bathing, Red Army soldiers should be sent only in the ranks under the command of a foreman or middle commander.
19) The right to dismiss military personnel from the location of the camp is granted only to the head of the camp assembly and the commander of the unit, if the latter is located separately and is not part of the camp assembly.
20) Calling on duty to the line without special orders is also made to the head and military commissar of the camp collection.
21) Exemption from medical practice is given depending on the illness. The Charter does not regulate the terms of release due to illness.
22) The foreman is primarily responsible for the condition of the horse composition and caring for it in the company, squadron and battery.
23) The entire junior command staff, headed by a foreman, must be present at the cleaning of the horse staff, the middle command staff is present at the direction of the company commander, squadron commander, battery commander in accordance with the rules established by the unit commander.
24) All other content of UVS-37 must be carefully edited.
Divisional Commander D. Kozlov
RGVA. F. 4. Op. 14. D. 2768. L. 127-131. Script.
The Charter of the Internal Service (UVS-37) in force in the Red Army should be recognized as not fully consistent with modern requirements for discipline and internal regulations in the Red Army.
UVS-37 to be revised and published within 2 months no later than July of this year, giving it the name "Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army of 1940" (UVS-40).
When revising the Charter, take the following main provisions as the basis for UVS-37 and for guidance:
1) Each serviceman in the service and out of service is obliged to unquestioningly and within the established time limits to fulfill all orders of the superiors.
2) Divide all military personnel into groups: senior, senior, middle, and junior officers and rank and file. On the basis of existing provisions, clearly determine which categories of command personnel are included in the corresponding groups (rank and file, junior command personnel, etc.), namely: privates - in a group of privates; junior command staff of fixed-term and extra-long service - to the group of junior command staff; junior lieutenants, lieutenants, senior lieutenants, captains and their respective ones - to the middle command staff group; majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels and their respective - to the group of senior command staff; brigade commanders, divisional commanders, commanders, army commanders and marshals - in the group of higher command personnel.
3) All commanding officers are the chiefs for all ordinary and junior commanding staff of the urgent and extra-long service of the Red Army, and the commanding officers are senior in relation to these categories.
Persons in the commanding staff are chiefs only in relation to the rank and file and junior command staff of their unit. The junior commanding staff is the head of the rank and file of his unit and the senior in relation to the entire rank and file of the Red Army.
4) All persons of command and command staff are the chiefs of military personnel of junior rank, except in cases where a senior in rank is subordinate to a junior in the order of service.
5) The direct superior is the one who permanently or temporarily manages the official activities of military personnel, is responsible for them and to whom the military personnel is subordinate in the service. The closest direct supervisor is called the immediate supervisor.
6) All orders and orders to give only in order of subordination. The issuance of orders and orders, bypassing the immediate superior, should be carried out only in exceptional cases, immediately informing the immediate superior about this.
7) The anthem "Internationale" is performed only for the meeting of the chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union Republics, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Marshals of the USSR.
8) It is obligatory to introduce a mutual greeting, establishing that the junior in rank greets the senior not only in the service, but also outside the service.
9) All military units, subdivisions and teams, when passing, must greet their immediate and all direct superiors in the prescribed manner, starting with the company commander, and emphasize that after the command "at attention" transition to the combat step is obligatory.
10) The section of official duties of the commanding and commanding staff should be redone, fully providing for the rights and duties of each chief and supplementing it with the duties of chiefs and persons of the administrative and economic service introduced by the new staff of the rifle division. In particular:
b) oblige the commander of a rifle battalion to bear full responsibility for the condition of the battalion's weapons and to inspect and verify it at least once a month;
d) to raise the authority of the foreman of the company, squadron and batteries, subordinating to him all the personnel of the company except for the middle command staff, and demand full responsibility for the economy and combat training of the company to the company commander;
e) to develop the duties of a platoon commander, which should be given the same rights in a platoon as a foreman in a company. Release the platoon commander from the middle command staff from the household and responsibility for it, placing all this on the assistant platoon commander;
f) oblige the squad leader to be responsible for weapons and property in the squad;
g) the chiefs of the regiment's services for better management, ensuring the life and combat of the regiment, subordinate to the chief of staff of the regiment, the same should be done in divisions, corps and higher, leaving only the chiefs of the armed forces under the direct subordination of the commander;
h) develop the duties of an assistant regiment commander for combat operations.
11) To remove the definition of the number of training hours per day from the Charter, giving this right to the commander of the unit, depending on instructions from above and the combat training plan of the unit.
12) Squad commanders, at the end of the morning review of fighters, should report not to the foreman, but to their platoon commanders.
13) To take food, companies, squadrons and batteries should follow the command not of a duty officer, but of a foreman or a deputy appointed by him.
14) The dismissal of ordinary and junior command personnel of military service from the location of the unit should be carried out only on the days determined by the unit commander, and only with the permission of the company commander or persons of the command personnel corresponding to him. The right to dismiss the political instructor of the company is limited, obliging him to coordinate this issue with the company commander.
15) A serviceman, having received permission to leave before leaving and upon returning, must appear before the foreman of the company, who is obliged to believe the neatness of clothing and the ability of the dismissed to behave outside the barracks and in public places.
17) Subordinate the officer on duty not only to the commander and military commissar of the unit, but also to the chief of staff of the unit.
18) For bathing, Red Army soldiers should be sent only in the ranks under the command of a foreman or middle commander.
19) The right to dismiss military personnel from the location of the camp is granted only to the head of the camp collection and the commander of the unit, if the latter is located separately and is not part of the camp collection.
20) Calling on duty to the line without special orders is also made to the head and military commissar of the camp collection.
21) Exemption from medical practice is given depending on the illness. The Charter does not regulate the terms of release due to illness.
22) The foreman is primarily responsible for the condition of the horse composition and caring for it in the company, squadron and battery.
23) The entire junior command staff, headed by a foreman, must be present at the cleaning of the horse staff, the middle command staff is present at the direction of the company commander, squadron commander, battery commander in accordance with the rules established by the unit commander.
24) All other content of UVS-37 must be carefully edited.
Divisional Commander D. Kozlov
RGVA. F. 4. Op. 14. D. 2768. L. 127-131. Script.
26The contractor of the work, the site they have chosen and to provide the builders with a master plan, project and estimate, without which I forbid starting the construction of central warehouses.
9. The military councils of the districts (fleets) urgently revise the remnants of materials and equipment, implement everything superfluous and unnecessary for 1937, resolutely fighting the tendency of builders to leave materials and equipment “just in case”. For each section, draw up a calendar plan for implementation and establish control over implementation. Maneuver materials, transferring them, if necessary, from site to site, especially if they are prepared "for the future" and will not be used this year.
To the head of the RKKA SKU to check and reduce the plans for material supply and resolutely stop the sending of unnecessary property to the districts.
10. Acceptance of finished buildings and structures is carried out according to projects and estimates by competent commissions appointed by the military councils of the districts (fleets) under the chairmanship of the commanders of the military units for which the buildings are being built, with the involvement of well-versed engineers in the commission. Acceptance certificates with the addition of general plans and executive drawings to be approved by the military councils of the districts (fleets).
11. At each facility, under the responsibility of the chief engineer, foremen to keep a laced and sealed work log, entering into it all production data (who, when and what did); the chief engineers, together with the foremen, to act in the journal of works on the quality and compliance with the designs of finished structures and building elements; Any defects found should be corrected immediately.
12. All accidents at construction sites should be telegraphed to the chief engineers, as an emergency, to report to the commander of the troops of the districts (fleets) and the head of the ICU of the Red Army. The last to carry out a thorough investigation into the causes of each accident, to bring the perpetrators to justice, not leaving a single case of an accident unpunished. The head of the ICU of the Red Army should ensure that the engineering and technical workers study the causes of accidents in order to prevent the possibility of a recurrence.
13. The leaders, political workers and engineers of military construction should widely develop mass work among the engineering and technical personnel and workers, explain the current situation, mobilizing the public to eliminate the consequences of sabotage and the lag in the implementation of the construction plan in the shortest possible time, to further develop the Stakhanov movement, to fight for saving materials, for the order at the construction site.
Appropriate conclusions must be drawn from the hard lessons of sabotage at military construction sites.
We must continue to root out the wrecking and espionage elements, remembering that the capitalist encirclement will not leave us in peace.
At the same time, every effort must be made to eliminate the consequences of sabotage and to eliminate the consequences of sabotage and completely complete the construction program of 1937
All Bolsheviks in military construction - party and non-party - must realize and remember their greatest responsibility for the fate of the 1937 plan, on the fulfillment of which the further strengthening of the combat might of our valiant Red Army depends to no small extent.
Bring this order to all military construction workers.
K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d, 14-a, l. 277-278. Printing house copy.
ORDER ON ACCIDENTS ON LVO MANEUVERS WHEN DELIVERY OF PARACHUTES
September 9 p. during the maneuvers of the Leningrad Military District, during the exercise, a parachute landing was dropped. Due to the complete disregard of the requirements of the Manual on parachute training of the Air Force and the Training Course for the drop and landing of paratroopers of the Red Army Air Force, as well as my order No. 0169 of December 7, 1936, categorically parachute landing on September 9 was allowed with a wind strength of about 12 meters per second.
As a result of this criminal attitude to existing instructions, 4 fighters died and 38 fighters received fractures of limbs and bruises of varying degrees.
I order:
1. For violation of my order No. 0169 of December 7, 1936, the Instructions for Parachute Training of the Air Force and the Training Course for the Drop and Landing of Paratroopers of the Air Force of the Red Army Commander of the Leningrad Military District Commander of the 2nd Rank Comrade Dybenko P. E. from his position immediately dismiss and put at my disposal *.
2. Army Inspector of the LVO Divisional Commander Comrade Khozin to enter the temporary command of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
3. To my deputy commander for the Air Force, commander of the 2nd rank, comrade Alksnis Ya. I., together with the deputy head of the PU of the Red Army, army commissar of the 2nd rank, comrade Bulin A.S., the head of the control group, commander of the division commander, comrade Cherepanov, and paratroopers, comrade t. Chernyshev, Petrov and Kaitanov to conduct a thorough investigation on the spot of this outrageous incident and all the circumstances of the death and injury of paratroopers.
Comrade Alksnis to submit the results of the investigation with conclusions and proposals to me on September 13, 1937.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 14, l. 303. Printing copy.
ORDER TO BRING TO JUDICTION AND
IMPOSITION OF DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES ON PERFORMERS
ACCIDENTS ON LVO MANEUVERS WHEN
PARACHUTE DELIVERY
By my order dated September 10, 37, No. 197 **, my deputy for Air Force commanders of the 2nd rank, comrade Alksnis Ya. commander t. Cherepanov A. I. and parachute specialists
* See doc. No. 16. ** See doc. No. 15.
Landing affairs captain comrade Petrov and military technician 1st rank comrade Chernyshev investigated all the circumstances of the death and injury of paratroopers 3 adb during their drop 9.9 s. on maneuvers of the LVO. The investigation found that:
1. The death and injury of paratroopers during the parachute landing are the result of poor organization, fuzzy conduct, poor leadership of the parachute operation and criminal violation of the requirements of my order No. 0169 of 1936.
2. The main cause of the disaster is the complete disregard by the command of all degrees of wind force, which is crucial when paratroopers land:
A) the command of the district set the time for the landing at 14-15 hours, when the wind, as a rule, is the strongest, instead of morning or evening, when weather conditions are most favorable;
B) the entire mass of paratroopers was thrown out in difficult weather conditions: a wind of 9-12 meters per second on rough terrain, and all the fighters, in addition to weapons, also had full combat equipment, with which they jumped for the first time.
3. On the site, at the site of the landing, there was also the Military Council (commander of the 2nd rank comrade Dybenko and brigade commander comrade Mager), and. Commander of the Air Force of the LVO, Divisional Commander Comrade Testov and Commander of the 3rd Adb - Head of the landing operation Brigade Commander Comrade Zaitsev. However, despite the increase in wind to 9-10 meters per second with gusts up to 12 meters per second, none of them made a decision to ban the drop, despite the clear need to prohibit the landing and land or return it. The role of the chiefs who are on the site and are obliged to direct the airborne operation has been reduced to the role of ordinary spectators.
Due to all this disorganization, the stretching of the ships in the formation of the squadron, the poor calculation of the navigators, the delay in the start of the drop on individual ships of the squadron, the delay in the drop of paratroopers from ships up to three minutes, the paratroopers landed on an area up to 8 km along the front and in depth. Many of them hit boulders, peat bogs, bushes and other obstacles near the Pustynka site. Due to a strong gusty wind (11-12 meters per second), paratroopers hit the ground hard, injuring and maiming; a number of fighters and commanders who did not have time to pay off their parachutes dragged up to 2 km.
As a result of this drop of 999 paratroopers, 59 fighters and paratrooper commanders were injured, including 4 killed, 8 people with hip fractures, 3 of them with fragment fractures, 6 people with concussion, 5 cases of sprains, 5 dislocations, in the remaining 30 cases - light bruises and sprains,
I order:
1. The commander of the 3rd adb brigade commander comrade Zaitsev, who was entrusted with command of the entire airborne operation and who:
A) did not accept for exact execution the requirements of my order No. 0169 of 1936, both in preparation and during the airborne operation;
B) knowing the Manual and the Airborne Training Course, he repeatedly violated them in the process of training paratroopers;
C) misled the commander of Comrade Testov and the Military Council of the district with a deliberately false report about the possibility of dropping paratroopers in winds up to 8 meters per second;
D) having arrived at the drop site, he criminally removed himself from the command of the paratroop operation and did not take any measures to cancel the drop of paratroopers, having all the means to cancel (radio communication for transmitting orders from the ground to the air and ground prohibition signs);
E) did not check the knowledge and firm assimilation of the signals for the release and for the abolition of the release before the departure of the ships - remove him from his post and bring him to trial by the Military Tribunal.
„ 2. Commissar 3 Adb Brigadier Commissar Comrade Rosset, who, knowing that the Manual and the Airborne Training Course forbid dropping paratroopers in winds of more than 6 meters per second, did not fight against the retreats that took place in the brigade and did not take measures on the day of the operation to prevent ejection, -
Remove from office and appoint to a lower position.
I confine myself to this measure of penalty in relation to Comrade Rosset only because at the time of the release he was in the air on the U-2.
3. Chief of Staff of the 3rd Adb Colonel Comrade Yeshurin, who:
A) violated the requirements of my Order No. 0169 of 1936;
B) knowing the requirements of the Manual and the Course, which prohibit the dropping of paratroopers when the wind is over 6 meters per second, not only did not take measures to prevent the landing in high winds, but, on the contrary, misled everyone who contacted him with a report and certificate that the drop possible with a wind of 8 meters per second;
C) did not check until the end of the assimilation by the navigators of the signals about the prohibition of the release;
D) sent an aerologist to the drop site instead of a meteorologist or even the head of a weather station in order to ensure proper observation of the wind strength at the site - remove him from his post and bring him to court-martial.
4. The chief of staff of the Air Force of the LVO, Colonel Comrade Makovsky, who did not study my order No. 0169 of 1936, Instruction and Course on Parachute Training, blindly trusted the certificate of Colonel Comrade Yeshurin that you can jump in winds up to 8 meters in second, and instructed Colonel Comrade Yeshurin to warn the paratroopers that they would have to jump in high winds, -
Move to a position two ranks lower.
I am not putting Comrade Makovsky on trial just because he took over as chief of staff 20 days before the start of the district's exercises.
5. I. D. Commander of the Air Force of the LVO Divisional Commander Comrade Testov, who:
A) did not accept my Order No. 0169 of 1936 for precise guidance and execution, did not read and study the Manual and the Airborne Training Course, did not personally check the preparation for the upcoming airborne operation to the end;
B) misled the Military Council with a false report about the possibility of dropping paratroopers in winds up to 8 meters per second, without having checked the instructions in force in this regard;
C) being present on the site and observing the strengthening of the wind, he withdrew himself from the leadership of the parachute landing operation and did not report to the Military Council about the need to cancel the landing, but, on the contrary, convinced the Military Council about the possibility of landing the landing in this situation, to remove him from his post and place him under military tribunal court.
6. To a member of the Military Council of the LVO, brigade commander comrade Mager, who, knowing about the upcoming large airborne operation during maneuvers, did not personally familiarize himself with my order No. 0169 of 1936 and the current Manual and Course for the training of paratroopers, but blindly trusted the information of comrades Testov and Zaitsev about the possibility of dropping paratroopers in a wind of 8 meters per second and did not personally check the course of preparation, -
I issue a severe reprimand and warn that henceforth, for such an omission, he will be removed from office and brought before the court-martial.
7. In order to change my order No. 197 of September 10, p. d. in relation to the commander of the LVO troops, commander of the 2nd rank, comrade Dybenko, the Government recognized that it was possible to limit this time to imposing a disciplinary sanction on comrade Dybenko by the authority of the people's commissar of defense.
In addition, the Government instructed me to warn Comrade Dybenko (which I did "" - personally on September 17 of this year) that henceforth, for violations of existing orders, instructions and provisions of the NPO, he, like any commander of the Red Army, will be brought to justice military tribunal.
On the basis of this decision of the Government to the commander of the troops of the LVO, commander of the 2nd rank comrade Dybenko, who:
A) having decided to carry out a large landing operation, he did not bother to familiarize himself with and accept for guidance and execution my order No.
B) did not personally check the requirements of my order No. 0169 of 1936 on the preparation of paratroopers for the upcoming maneuvers-exercises;
C) while on the site, did not cancel the drop of paratroopers, despite the apparent increase in wind - I declare a severe reprimand with a warning. Read the order to the entire command staff of the military units of the Red Army.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 14, l. 308-309. Printing house copy.
ORDER ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE STAFF OF THE RKKA COMMAND AND OFFICIAL STAFF
I establish the following procedure for the dismissal of the command and command staff of the Red Army from the personnel of the Red Army.
1. To stop the dismissal of command, military-political, military-technical, military-economic and administrative, military-medical, military-veterinary and military-legal staff from the Red Army personnel, including those expelled from the ranks of the CPSU (b), by orders of the military district councils.
Dismissal from the cadres of the Red Army of persons of command and command staff will henceforth be carried out only upon receipt of orders from the NCO of the USSR on the personnel of the army.
In cases where the military council of the district (army, navy) for political reasons considers it necessary to immediately remove a serviceman from his post, he by telegraph (telephone) asks for this permission from the People's Commissar of Defense.
2. To check and carefully study the materials on the persons of the command and command staff submitted for dismissal from the cadres of the Red Army, create commissions:
A) In the districts (armies, navies) to consider materials on persons of the command and command staff of the district (army, navy).
Composition of the commission: chairman - deputy commander of the district troops (army, navy), members - head of the political department of the district (army, navy), chief of staff of the district (army, navy), military commissar of the district headquarters (army, navy), head of the personnel department of the political administration district (army, navy), head of the corresponding type of troops and head of the department for the command and command staff of the district (army, navy), he is also the secretary of the commission.
The materials considered in the district (army, navy) commission are approved by the military council of the district (army, navy) and submitted for consideration to the commission under the NGOs of the USSR.
B) Under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR to consider materials received from the district (army, navy) commissions and departments of the NPO of the USSR.
Composition of the commission: chairman - head of the Department for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army, members: deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, head of the personnel department of the Political Directorate of the Red Army and head of the corresponding type of troops.
The materials reviewed by the commission at the NGO of the USSR are submitted to me for approval.
3. District commissions, when considering materials on persons submitted for dismissal from the ranks of the Red Army, be guided by the following:
A) the decision on the need to dismiss officers and commanders from the Red Army personnel must be preceded by a mandatory call to the district commission for a personal conversation, familiarization with them and checking all the materials on them:
B) the decisions of the commission must be based on carefully studied and verified data.
4. Materials on those expelled from the CPSU(b) are not considered in the commissions, but are submitted by the military councils of the districts to the Directorate for the command staff of the Red Army only after confirmation of the exclusion from the party by the party instance to which the expelled from the party appeals (OPK or the party commission of the Red Army Party). Their dismissal is carried out only after the order of the NPO.
5. Materials on the command and command staff dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army due to illness, as a result of a court verdict or arrest by judicial or investigative authorities, are not considered in the commissions, but are sent by the military councils of the districts (army, navy), respectively, to the Office for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army or to Political Directorate of the Red Army for announcements in the orders of the NGOs of the USSR on the personnel of the army.
6. Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of 1932 No. 03 to cancel 21 .
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 13, l. 313. Printing copy.
No. 18 ORDER ON THE SELECTION OF POLITICAL STAFF
The staffing of the Red Army with political personnel, especially at the top and senior levels, is proceeding extremely slowly. There is still a lot of inertia and routine in the selection of personnel - they are looking for ready-made workers and the advancement of young, capable, people devoted to the Party is not bold enough.
This is the result of a poor knowledge of people, the political and business qualities of each, the lack of strict consideration of the individual abilities and characteristics of a person. There is, therefore, no real Bolshevik system of selection of personnel.
I order:
1. The military councils, chief okrams, military commissars and chief political bodies again and again carefully and thoughtfully review the cadres of political workers and party activists, regardless of rank and official position, and establish the political and business suitability of each with strict individual consideration of the nature of the work for which he is most suitable (organizational, propaganda, propaganda, cultural enlightenment work, team work, etc.).
2. On the basis of these data, fill the vacant positions of the political staff, select deputies in accordance with my order No. 074 and outline a reserve of workers.
The military commissars and chief political departments of formations draw up lists of the most proven, unconditionally loyal to the party, growing people, both from those already nominated and from the reserve, with detailed political and business characteristics and taking into account individual abilities and submit them to the military councils of the districts (armies, navies). The latter, after personal acquaintance with these people, are selected and counted in the district survey in the amount of at least 150 people - for the Moscow Military District, BVO, LVO, KVO, OKDVA 22, ZabVO and 100 people - for other districts (puflots and armies). The rest remain as an internal connection reserve.
Military councils and puokry, in turn, compile selective lists for the most prominent persons in the amount of at least 40 people in the Moscow Military District, BVO, LVO, KVO, OKDVA, ZabVO and 20 people in other districts (fleets, armies) suitable for independent employment. political or command positions (starting with the military commissar of a separate regiment and above), and submit them to the PU of the Red Army by January 1, 1938. After familiarizing themselves with these comrades, the PU of the Red Army selects the army reserve of the senior and senior political staff from them and numbers them on its register.
3. For a more decisive and successful elimination of the shortage of the senior and supreme political council, as well as for the selection of candidates for the reserve of the PU of the Red Army, send to the places of employees of the PU of the Red Army: in the LVO - senior inspector Comrade Survillo, in the KVO - senior instructor Comrade Ryabchey, in the BVO - senior inspector Comrade Gapanovich, in the KhVO - deputy. the head of the III department, Comrade Yudin, in the North Caucasus Military District, the head of the information department, Comrade Pronin, in the PriVO, the head of the party department, Comrade Shpakov, in the SAVO, the senior inspector, Comrade Doronin, in the ZabVO, the senior instructor, Comrade Zhigalin, in the KBF, the senior instructor of the military Kolobaeva.
I entrust the designated persons with the duty, together with the military councils and political directorates, to select and identify candidates for filling the vacant positions of senior and senior political personnel, primarily chief political agencies of formations and schools and military commissars of regiments, separate units and warehouses.
According to the report of the above-named comrades, the candidates for the senior political staff are considered and approved by the military councils, followed by submission to the RKKA PU for execution by order for NPOs. The candidacies of persons of the highest political composition, after discussion by the military councils, shall immediately be submitted to me for consideration and approval through the Red Army PU.
4. The military councils and political directorates of the other districts (armies, fleets) should do the same work independently in such a way that by January 1, 1938, the troops will be fully staffed with senior and senior political staff at the expense of the internal resources of the district (armies, navy).
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 14, l. 350. Typography. copy.
ORDER ON THE RESULTS OF COMBAT TRAINING OF THE RKKA FOR 1937 AND TASKS FOR 1938
I. RESULTS OF 1937
The political and moral state of the personnel of the Red Army, despite the attempts of enemies of the people to interfere with the normal growth of the army by treacherous actions,
It was and remains undeniably strong*. The Red Army soldiers, the commanding and commanding staff are rallied around their government, the Communist Party and the leader of the peoples, Comrade Stalin. High political activity, heroism and selflessness in study and work have been and remain the hallmarks of our army.
The nomination of new young cadres, proven and devoted to the cause of Lenin-Stalin and our Motherland, to command and political work is already yielding the most positive results and will soon be reflected in unprecedented successes in all areas of our work.
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS 1. On ground forces
1) Infantry:
A) The command and command staff of combined-arms formations, as a rule, gives good examples of combat control and the use of technical means of combat in various conditions of the situation.
B) The tactical training of infantry units and units has increased.
C) The mobility of the infantry and its involvement in long marches has increased.
D) The interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks in an offensive battle has improved.
E) The infantry has strengthened their skills in organizing and conducting defensive combat.
2) The cavalry has improved its operational-tactical maneuverability, has already acquired skills in dismembered marches and has achieved significant success in the interaction of machine-gun fire with the maneuver of units on the battlefield.
3) In artillery, the fire control of the division, group has increased. The first successes have been achieved in the accelerated preparation of the attack. Improved fire training of anti-aircraft artillery of air defense points.
4) Mechanized formations and tank units have achieved good coordination of the crew, platoon and company, and satisfactory - the battalion.
There are good results in making large marches secretive and "at night.
Examples of tank-to-tank battles are shown.
The material part of the machines and their driving are assimilated quite satisfactorily.
5) The engineering troops have mastered the technique of constructing roads, bridges and crossings well.
6) During exercises and maneuvers, chemical troops acquired practice in providing combined arms combat.
7) Communications units mastered their equipment and fully provided the troops with communications equipment during exercises and maneuvers.
8) Military academies, refresher courses and military schools gave the Red Army fully trained commanders, political workers and military specialists.
2. By Air Force
The Air Force of the Red Army for 1937, like the entire army, has achievements in all sections of combat training. Aviation received the practice of operating from field airfields. Improved interaction between aviation branches.
Parts of the Air Force have increased their success in the tactical training of crew units.
* The text in Section I, from the words "regardless of attempts ..." to the words "certainly strong" was entered in the original order in black ink by K. E. Voroshilov.
Increased the number of full-range flights using jump airfields. The number of targeted bombings at ranges has increased.
3. By Navy
Tactical interaction of surface forces and submarines with aviation was carried out on a larger scale and with great success.
Massive use of submarines has been achieved, in particular, in remote areas of the sea, and the first successes have been achieved in anti-submarine defense.
The actual use of the weapon in a tactical setting brought the firing closer to actual combat conditions.
The preparation of anti-aircraft artillery has improved.
Satisfactory results had ship and coastal artillery.
Mine-torpedo training was carried out quite satisfactorily. The personnel mastered their complex materiel well.
There are advances in the use of aviation at sea at night.
MAIN FAULTS
Despite the growth of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in all areas of combat training, the tasks set for 1937 were not fulfilled.
Shortcomings in combat training, economy and everyday life of the troops, which were repeatedly noted in orders over the past years, still occur to this day. Many of these shortcomings and shortcomings have become chronic. They seemed to get used to them, they stopped noticing, feeling all their acuteness. Hence the lack of sharpness of eye on the surroundings among many commanders and political workers, the lack of will and desire to concentrate all their forces, to mobilize all their Bolshevik organization for the immediate elimination of these long-standing shortcomings, the elimination of which does not require, in essence, any special talents and forces. These shortcomings can and, I am sure, will be eliminated in the shortest possible time, if only correctly, skillfully and with an ardent desire to get down to business.
We often talk, for example, about shortcomings in command and control of troops, their interaction, fire, tactical and special training; we are talking about an outrageously large number of accidents and catastrophes, in the process of studying, fighters and commanders take away precious lives every year, disable combat vehicles and weapons. But no matter how much we talk and write about these shortcomings, we will not eliminate them if we do not firmly know and comply with the requirements of the charters, instructions, instructions and orders of the Red Army, if we do not observe the strictest military discipline, if internal order is not established in all, necessarily in all, units and institutions, if the command of all levels does not know exactly where, what, how much and what it has, proper service for the fighters and command staff, good-quality and timely food, supply of uniforms, political, cultural and other services, if the weapon is not maintained and stored in exemplary order, if all the property of the unit is not protected from damage and plunder. Where the commander, commissar and party organization work conscientiously, honestly and skillfully, this elementary necessary order can be established immediately, and without it there can be no question of resolving the complex and responsible tasks of combat training of troops and staffs.
Our shortcomings, unfortunately, are often glaring - this is the result of disorganization and sloppiness. You don't have to look far for evidence. Take, for example, our maneuvers. They involve hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands of horses, thousands of planes, tanks, cars; all this moves, lives day and night a tense, seething combat life, and, despite this, everything goes clearly, as a rule, in an organized manner, and emergency incidents these days are a rare occurrence. The same can be said about our large May Day and November parades of troops. With rare exceptions
These very complex and cumbersome combined-arms demonstrations are going well in an organized and good manner with Chenia. And the work goes on in a completely different way during normal times *. Disorganized and uncultured "methods" of work. People are exhausted and twitching. Instead of deeds, the command staff is loaded with unnecessary scribbling and deliberative chatter. Commanders and political workers get used to this "system", sit in the barracks and in the service for 10-14 hours, and do not have time to do their main job. Often the top and senior bosses do what their subordinates are obliged to do under their leadership, they do it worse than they do, and the subordinates get used to it, get out of the rut and lose their will, initiative and skills in work.
All these and other shortcomings, which are detrimental to the most important task of training the Armed Forces of our socialist Motherland entrusted to us, must be decisively eliminated at the very beginning of the 1938 academic year. Only by eliminating the shortcomings in the work of the command, headquarters, units and subunits, one can be sure that the tasks set for 1938 will be fulfilled.
I. Ground Forces
1) Command and control, headquarters service, training of infantry, cavalry and special arms and services for joint work on the battlefield have not reached the level required by the conditions of modern combined arms combat (PU-36, §§ 105-139, 143, 164).
The combat support service, especially intelligence, is organized and conducted unsatisfactorily in all branches of the armed forces (PU-36, §§ 18-39).
2) Fire training in all branches of the military did not give rise.
3) The air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense service has not been worked out (PU-36, §§ 40-74).
4) Engineer units have not achieved the necessary tactical and technical mobility for the timely and required by the situation provision of troops, especially in mobile combat.
In all military branches, field fortification has not yet been mastered, and the commanders themselves are not trained and do not teach Red Army soldiers how to dig themselves in battle (INZH-35, §§ 321-419).
5) All types of troops did not train enough under conditions of prolonged exposure to aviation and 0V.
6) The command and command staff and headquarters have not fully mastered the technique of covert control and violate the statutory rules for using this tool in battle.
7) Physical training is not at the right height and, on the whole, has not been linked to the specific tasks of combat training for troop operations in the field.
8) All types of troops have not fully mastered the operation of small arms and artillery weapons, especially machine guns, artillery and optics materiel, and field repairs.
2. By Air Force
For the main types of special training (fire, navigation, air combat, chemical training), units of the Air Force did not fully fulfill the tasks set for 1937 by order No. 00107.
The main shortcomings are:
1) Low level of combat readiness of units, especially on combat alerts; air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense of airfields have not been practically worked out.
2) As before, the weak point in the combat training of the Air Force is interaction with ground forces.
* The text from the words "the same can be said ..." to the words "work during normal hours" was entered in the original order in black ink by K. B. Voroshilov.
3) Fire training of high-speed bomber aviation is unsatisfactory.
4) For actions in difficult meteorological conditions, especially in the clouds, at night and behind the clouds, the units are completely insufficiently prepared.
5) In a number of units, due to unpreparedness for off-aerodrome flights, with their increase this year, the loss of orientation has increased sharply.
6) During off-aerodrome training flights and inter-district exercises, the practice of using and training the VNOS service is weak.
7) High-speed bomber aviation has basically mastered the materiel, but is still insufficiently prepared to carry out various combat missions.
8) Naval aviation did not work out air torpedo throwing on ships of the fleet.
9) The state of the aerodrome engineering service and ground camouflage is unsatisfactory.
10) The accident rate continues to remain at an unacceptably high level. The main reasons for it are still: the disorganization of a significant part of the commanders and political workers, the lack of discipline of a significant number of flight and technical personnel, the lack of systematic control over flight work by commanders and commissars, and the untimely elimination of identified errors in piloting technique and technical operation. The command staff as a whole does not cultivate the inflexible will of the commander and future fearless organizers of victories over the enemy*.
3. By Navy
1) The development of complex forms of naval combat often proceeded without creating strong enemy opposition during exercises and without fire interaction.
2) Interaction with the ground forces has not yet been worked out, especially fire support by ships of the fleet of troops landed on the shore.
3) The setting of the tasks of naval aviation and their fulfillment are still unsatisfactory and do not ensure the full use of the power of aviation. The training of torpedo-carrying aircraft is completely unsatisfactory.
4) The tactical use of a smoke curtain is not always competent.
5) Insufficient leadership in the tactical training of commanders of formations and ships.
6) Navigator training of the commanders of the submarine and surface fleet is insufficient.
7) Naval training, especially for young commanders, is weak. The practical training of university cadets was insufficient due to the small number of trips to the sea and long trips.
8) The organization of covert control is unsatisfactory.
9) The accident rate has not been eliminated and continues to occur on the ships of the fleet and especially in naval aviation.
4. Rear
The tasks set by me for the preparation of the military and army rear have not been fully fulfilled.
Especially poorly studied are the defense of the rear and the service of air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense, washing and treatment of people affected by RH, degassing of the materiel (PU-36, §§ 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 50-89, part 2nd, §§ 85-138).
* Text from the words "commanding staff P as a whole ... ”to the words“ over the enemy ”is inscribed in the original order in black ink by K. B. Voroshilov.
II. MAIN TASKS FOR 1938
To further strengthen the combat power of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, I order:
1) Continue training ground, air and naval forces, in close cooperation between them, to master a complex battle (operation) in maneuverable conditions and in the struggle for fortified positions, relying on modern technical means of combat (aviation, artillery, tanks), giving their due place and taking into account the importance and role of the infantry in the combined arms cooperation ShchU-36, §§ 1-17, 311-316).
2) All troops to fully master the anti-aircraft and anti-chemical defense and service VNOS ShchU-36, §§ 40-67).
3) All troops must learn to master the methods of using guided fire from all types of weapons in cooperation with maneuver, especially in mobile combat (PU-36, §§ 15 and 16; BUP-27, §§ 30-43; BUA-37, § § 9-23).
It is imperative to achieve an increase in the individual shooting training of fighters and commanders from all models of small arms by at least 15-20% against 1937. It is also necessary to improve shooting training for air targets with rifles and machine guns (Fire training course 1937).
The Red Army must shoot better than all the armies of the world. A sharp, cold-blooded and economical shooter - this is the fighter of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army.
4) It is obligatory for all commanding and commanding staff to practically master the field fortification itself and teach the fighters how to use self-digging and camouflage in all field exercises and in all cases of contact with the enemy (INZH-35, §§ 321-419).
5) Commanders, military commissars, political workers of units, formations, ships and flotillas, performing the specified training tasks, achieve the daily combat readiness of the troops and increase the vigilance of all personnel, set all types of economy in an exemplary manner and make every effort to prevent accidents and emergencies.
6) Pay special attention to the training and education of newly promoted commanders and political workers, rendering them all possible assistance and assistance.
1. By ground forces
1) Training of troops to be carried out in a complex, continuously changing environment, making maximum use of all available means of suppression and achieving trouble-free and constant interaction between infantry and cavalry with tanks, artillery and aircraft.
Timely and in the required norm to ensure the maneuver by engineering and chemical measures.
Never, under any circumstances, forget about the work of the rear - actual or designated, but certainly always functioning correctly at all stages of a battle, operation, battle (PU-36, §§ 17, 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 2,3).
2) In an offensive battle, especially when developing a battle in the depths of defense, to achieve full interaction between the infantry (cavalry) and artillery, tanks and aircraft, trying to destroy the enemy, and not push him out (PU-36, §§ 162-223).
Practice and especially encourage skillful, with the use of military cunning, actions on the flanks and behind enemy lines (PU-36, § 173).
3) In a defensive battle, master the interaction of all types of fire and the maneuver of units during a counterattack (PU-36, §§ 238-24*U.
To teach the troops to carry out defensive work by accelerated methods with the maximum use of available engineering equipment.
4) To achieve the timeliness, continuity and succession of the work of intelligence agencies in all conditions of a combat situation.
Consider the organization of combat reconnaissance and its practical work during combat as one of the most important elements of troop command and control.
When evaluating the combat training of the command and staffs, these requirements should be fully taken into account (PU-36, §§ 19-35).
5) To teach the troops the ability to organize continuous observation and combat communications with their neighbors. It is cruel to punish those commanders who carelessly treat the matter of constant, effective, live, fire communication with neighbors (PU-36, §§ 19, 134-137).
6) Master combat in populated areas, in forests, gorges and when forcing water lines (PU-36, §§ 213-223, 293-298, 306-310).
7) Allocate at least 40% of the time for night actions of troops (PU-36, §§ 261-271).
When checking the combat training of units, check the readiness of units and formations for operations at night.
8) It is obligatory to train the rear in close connection with the combat operations of the units, achieving timely and uninterrupted work of the rear, fully able to ensure the combat activities of the troops (PU-36, §§ 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 50-89 and part 2, §§ 85-138).
When evaluating the training of units and formations, the training of the rear should be taken into account on a par with the main sections of combat training.
2. By Air Force
1) The main tasks:
A) fighting to destroy enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground and ensuring the main combat missions performed by ground forces in close cooperation with them;
B) bringing to a high level of fire training in all types of aviation;
C) increasing the constant combat readiness of units of the Red Army Air Force and especially high mobility in the rise and maneuver of fighter aircraft;
D) full mastery of the navigational service for flights in any meteorological conditions, both day and night;
E) practical development of air defense, anti-aircraft defense and fire protection of airfields and nodes;
E) mastering the technique of interaction with the VNOS service and the ground air defense system, especially at night;
G) improvement of the aerodrome engineering service and camouflage on the ground and in the air.
2) Focus on operational-tactical training and conduct it in the interests of ensuring the combat operations of the ground forces and the navy, as well as to ensure the interaction of all branches of aviation in an independent operation of the air forces.
The main type of operational-tactical training of aviation should be both special aviation inter-garrison and district exercises, with units going to field airfields, and the participation of aviation in combined arms exercises to work out all the tasks of fire interaction with ground forces and the navy.
3) High-speed bomber and fighter aviation to master fire and navigation at high, 7-8 km, altitudes and speeds.
4) The main types of aviation, as the main type of combat work, to work out the movement to the target and bombing at night and during the day, always at high, 6-8 km, heights in the clouds and beyond the clouds.
5) In all types of aviation, resolutely switch to flights at the maximum radius of action.
6) For all off-aerodrome flights, inter-garrison and inter-district exercises, involve the corresponding areas of the VNOS service.
7) Work out the fight against the enemy air force at night, especially in the interaction of fighters with air defense.
8) All branches of aviation must fully master maneuver and fire in air combat.
9) At all exercises, work out questions of the organization and service of the rear.
10) In order to radically combat accidents, it is necessary to improve military and flight discipline, to achieve better organization of flight work, systematic control over it and a strict sequence in the training of flight personnel, in strict accordance with existing instructions, manuals and regulations.
3. By Navy
1) Mastering complex forms of naval combat and operations based on close cooperation between the surface and submarine fleets and aviation in order to inflict powerful concentrated strikes on the enemy on the high seas, against his naval and air bases, and in combat in his fortified area in full cooperation of fire weapons, - remains the most important task of the Naval Forces (BUMS-37, §§ 3-8, 147-157, 282, 286, 250, 254).
2) Resolutely improve the operational-tactical training of flagships and ship commanders on the basis of the 1937 Red Army Marines Combat Regulations.
3) Conduct fire training in difficult conditions (for high-speed targets, in fresh weather, for invisible and temporarily hiding targets).
Conduct combat firing against the background of tactical maneuver and master complex brigade and detachment firing.
4) Combat training of submarines to be carried out in a more difficult environment, moving on to covert attacks, observing a strict sequence of training boats with young command personnel.
5) To achieve a decisive increase in the operational-tactical training of naval aviation to carry out tasks of interaction with the fleet and ground forces and in independent operations against enemy ships and bases, especially at night.
6) In all fleets, conduct exercises with the troops of adjacent districts to land and repulse tactical landings, paying special attention to working out the interaction of aviation and support ships with the landing detachment operating on the coast. Bring the organization of landing operations closer to actual combat conditions (BUMS-37, §§ 362-376, 384-394, 340-361).
7) River flotillas work out, in close cooperation with the ground forces, the support of the flanks, the forcing of river lines and the provision of crossings (BUMS-37, §§ 331-339).
8) Work out the air defense of the fleet in open sea combat, achieving full cooperation of all air defense systems (BUMS-37, §§ 301-307).
9) Pay special attention to the further development of anti-submarine and mine defense (BUMS-37, §§ 113-116 and 118).
10) To improve the navigator's training of command personnel and intensify the practice of long voyages, especially for the personnel of training detachments.
III. FOR POLITICAL WORK
1) In 1938, organize all party political work in such a way that the entire mass of fighters, commanders and chiefs is always aware of the most important events in the international and domestic life of the country and the policy of the CPSU (b), is constantly in a state of political mobilization and acute revolutionary vigilance and adamantly strove to better fulfill her military duty and raise the combat power of the Red Army even higher.
The entire party and political composition of the Red Army, military commissars and political workers are primarily obliged to carry out political work among the Red Army masses with redoubled energy, raising each fighter, commander and chief to the height of understanding all the complex political tasks of our time, educating in them the spirit of Bolshevik stamina, courage and energy .
2) To unremittingly continue a thorough study of the personnel and finally clear them of hostile and politically unstable elements.
At the same time, it is the duty of all commanders to promote even more courageous advancement of young, capable people unwaveringly devoted to the Motherland and our Party, daily concern for the education of steadfast, strong-willed commanders and chiefs, capable of fighting the enemies of the people in a Bolshevik way, overcoming difficulties, not afraid to accept and implement responsible decisions.
3) The further strengthening of the institution of military commissars is the most important condition for strengthening the party political leadership and improving the Bolshevik education of the personnel of the Red Army.
Military councils, military commissars and political agencies are obliged to tirelessly work on educating young political workers, cultivating from them genuine Bolshevik commissars, worthy representatives of our great party of Lenin-Stalin, able to delve into all areas of work with their vigilant and vigilant eye and penetrate with their party influence at all pores. complex military organism.
4) Commanders and military commissars are obliged to really protect the units from the penetration of the Trotskyist-Bukharin enemies of the people and other wreckers, spies and saboteurs into them.
To organize the study by all personnel of the techniques and methods of sabotage, sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies, as well as methods of combating them.
5) The year 1938 should be the year of a sharp rise in discipline, a resolute and merciless struggle against slovenliness, disorganization and lack of culture in work and everyday life. To carry on a constant, persistent and always reasonable struggle against intolerable emergencies and immoral phenomena in the Red Army.
6) The highest demands on oneself and subordinates must be combined with unremitting concern for the person. Each case of poor material and sanitary support must be investigated in order to uncover the causes and quickly eliminate them.
7) The all-out development of self-criticism, increasing its effectiveness, should in fact become a powerful means of educating personnel and fighting for strengthening discipline and eliminating all shortcomings in the training and life of units.
The commanders and political workers must lead a powerful new upsurge in socialist emulation, work more directly among the masses, listen attentively and sensitively to their voices, and urgently take action on proposals.
8) To radically improve the organization of Marxist-Leninist training of cadres. Each commander and chief must base the growth of his commanding military-technical qualifications on a systematic and persistent mastery of Bolshevism.
9) The military commissar and every political worker must combine tireless concern for his political growth with systematic improvement in military affairs and in the mastery of military equipment.
The gigantic rise in political activity and creative enthusiasm of the personnel of the Red Army, caused by the election campaign to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, we must firmly consolidate and use so that the year 1938 will bring to our Armed Forces the complete elimination of the consequences of vile sabotage and new, even greater successes in all areas. combat and political training of the Red Army;
For 1938, establish challenge prizes of the Red Army for the best achievements in combat and political training of units and formations.
General Staff to develop and submit to me by 15.1.1938 on
Approval of the provision on challenge prizes (the number of prizes per division, corps, district, army, Red Army; indicators and types of combat and political training for which these prizes will be issued to the best units, units and formations of the Red Army and the fleet; documents on the basis of which the challenge prizes).
Send the order to the commanders of individual units and study it with all command and command personnel up to and including platoon commanders, providing the necessary number of copies for use in work.
A firm knowledge of this order, within the limits of the official duties of each, must be checked during all inspections of the combat training of the Red Army.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 13, l. 232-237. Printing house copy.
ORDER ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CHARTER OF THE INTERNAL SERVICE OF THE RKKA OF 1937
To put into effect the Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army of 1937 (UVS-37). Temporary Charter of the internal service of the Red Army in 1924 to cancel.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
CHARTER INTERNAL SERVICES Red Army
1. The charter of the internal service of the Red Army defines the internal regulations in the military unit and its subdivisions, as well as the general and official duties of military personnel and the relationship between them.
2. A military unit that has an independent economy, a permanent name and an assigned number is called a separate military unit.
A typical separate military unit is a regiment and a separate battalion (division).
To ensure better control, both in peacetime and especially in battle, a separate military unit is organizationally divided into subunits (battalions, divisions, companies, batteries, squadrons, detachments, platoons, squads).
Everything that the Charter of the internal service refers to a regiment, battalion, company, platoon and squad and their commanders applies equally to the corresponding units, subunits and officials of all branches of the Red Army.
This Charter, along with military units and subunits, is guided by all headquarters, departments, institutions and establishments of the Red Army.
31
Composition of the commission: chairman - head of the Department for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army, members: deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, head of the personnel department of the Political Directorate of the Red Army and head of the corresponding type of troops.
The materials reviewed by the commission at the NGO of the USSR are submitted to me for approval.
3. District commissions, when considering materials on persons submitted for dismissal from the ranks of the Red Army, be guided by the following:
a) the decision on the need to dismiss the personnel of the Red Army from the personnel of the commanding and commanding staff must be preceded by their obligatory call to the district commission for a personal conversation, familiarization with them and checking all the materials available on them:
b) the decisions of the commission must be based on carefully studied and verified data.
4. Materials on those expelled from the CPSU(b) are not considered in the commissions, but are submitted by the military councils of the districts to the Directorate for the command staff of the Red Army only after confirmation of the exclusion from the party by the party instance to which the expelled from the party appeals (OPK or the party commission of the Red Army Party). Their dismissal is carried out only after the order of the NPO.
5. Materials on the command and command staff dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army due to illness, as a result of a court verdict or arrest by judicial or investigative authorities, are not considered in the commissions, but are sent by the military councils of the districts (army, navy), respectively, to the Office for the Commanding Staff of the Red Army or to Political Directorate of the Red Army for announcements in the orders of the NGOs of the USSR on the personnel of the army.
6. Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of 1932 No. 03 to cancel 21 .
^ K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 13, l. 313. Printing copy.
No. 18 ORDER ON THE SELECTION OF POLITICAL STAFF
The staffing of the Red Army with political personnel, especially at the top and senior levels, is proceeding extremely slowly. There is still a lot of inertia and routine in the selection of personnel - they are looking for ready-made workers and the advancement of young, capable, people devoted to the Party is not bold enough.
This is the result of a poor knowledge of people, the political and business qualities of each, the lack of strict consideration of the individual abilities and characteristics of a person. There is, therefore, no real Bolshevik system of selection of personnel.
I order:
1. The military councils, chief okrams, military commissars and chief political bodies again and again carefully and thoughtfully review the cadres of political workers and party activists, regardless of rank and official position, and establish the political and business suitability of each with strict individual consideration of the nature of the work for which he is most suitable (organizational, propaganda, propaganda, cultural enlightenment work, team work, etc.).
2. On the basis of these data, fill the vacant positions of the political staff, select deputies in accordance with my order No. 074 and outline a reserve of workers.
The military commissars and chief political departments of formations draw up lists of the most proven, unconditionally loyal to the party, growing people, both from those already nominated and from the reserve, with detailed political and business characteristics and taking into account individual abilities and submit them to the military councils of the districts (armies, navies). The latter, after personal acquaintance with these people, are selected and counted in the district survey in the amount of at least 150 people - for the Moscow Military District, BVO, LVO, KVO, OKDVA 22, ZabVO and 100 people - for other districts (puflots and armies). The rest remain as an internal connection reserve.
Military councils and puokry, in turn, compile selective lists for the most prominent persons in the amount of at least 40 people in the Moscow Military District, BVO, LVO, KVO, OKDVA, ZabVO and 20 people in other districts (fleets, armies) suitable for independent employment. political or command positions (starting with the military commissar of a separate regiment and above), and submit them to the PU of the Red Army by January 1, 1938. After familiarizing themselves with these comrades, the PU of the Red Army selects the army reserve of the senior and senior political staff from them and numbers them on its register.
3. For a more decisive and successful elimination of the shortage of the senior and supreme political council, as well as for the selection of candidates for the reserve of the PU of the Red Army, send to the places of employees of the PU of the Red Army: in the LVO - senior inspector Comrade Survillo, in the KVO - senior instructor Comrade Ryabchey, in the BVO - senior inspector Comrade Gapanovich, in the KhVO - deputy. the head of the III department, Comrade Yudin, in the North Caucasus Military District, the head of the information department, Comrade Pronin, in the PriVO, the head of the party department, Comrade Shpakov, in the SAVO, the senior inspector, Comrade Doronin, in the ZabVO, the senior instructor, Comrade Zhigalin, in the KBF, the senior instructor of the military Kolobaeva.
I entrust the designated persons with the duty, together with the military councils and political directorates, to select and identify candidates for filling the vacant positions of senior and senior political personnel, primarily chief political agencies of formations and schools and military commissars of regiments, separate units and warehouses.
According to the report of the above-named comrades, the candidates for the senior political staff are considered and approved by the military councils, followed by submission to the RKKA PU for execution by order for NPOs. The candidacies of persons of the highest political composition, after discussion by the military councils, shall immediately be submitted to me for consideration and approval through the Red Army PU.
4. The military councils and political directorates of the other districts (armies, fleets) should do the same work independently in such a way that by January 1, 1938, the troops will be fully staffed with senior and senior political staff at the expense of the internal resources of the district (armies, navy).
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 14, l. 350. Typography. copy.
^ ORDER ON THE RESULTS OF COMBAT TRAINING OF THE RKKA FOR 1937 AND TASKS FOR 1938
I. RESULTS OF 1937
The political and moral state of the personnel of the Red Army, despite the attempts of enemies of the people to interfere with the normal growth of the army by treacherous actions,
was and remains undeniably strong*. The Red Army soldiers, the commanding and commanding staff are rallied around their government, the Communist Party and the leader of the peoples, Comrade Stalin. High political activity, heroism and selflessness in study and work have been and remain the hallmarks of our army.
The nomination of new young cadres, proven and devoted to the cause of Lenin-Stalin and our Motherland, to command and political work is already yielding the most positive results and will soon be reflected in unprecedented successes in all areas of our work.
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS 1. On ground forces
1) Infantry:
a) The command and command staff of combined-arms formations, as a rule, gives good examples of combat control and the use of technical means of combat in various conditions of the situation.
b) The tactical training of subunits and infantry units has increased.
c) The mobility of the infantry and its involvement in long marches has increased.
d) The interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks in an offensive battle has improved.
e) The infantry has strengthened their skills in organizing and conducting defensive combat.
2) The cavalry has improved its operational-tactical maneuverability, has already acquired skills in dismembered marches and has achieved significant success in the interaction of machine-gun fire with the maneuver of units on the battlefield.
3) In artillery, the fire control of the division, group has increased. The first successes have been achieved in the accelerated preparation of the attack. Improved fire training of anti-aircraft artillery of air defense points.
4) Mechanized formations and tank units have achieved good coordination of the crew, platoon and company, and satisfactory - the battalion.
There are good results in making large marches secretive and "at night.
Examples of tank-to-tank battles are shown.
The material part of the machines and their driving are assimilated quite satisfactorily.
5) The engineering troops have mastered the technique of constructing roads, bridges and crossings well.
6) During exercises and maneuvers, chemical troops acquired practice in providing combined arms combat.
7) Communications units mastered their equipment and fully provided the troops with communications equipment during exercises and maneuvers.
8) Military academies, refresher courses and military schools gave the Red Army fully trained commanders, political workers and military specialists.
2. By Air Force
The Air Force of the Red Army for 1937, like the entire army, has achievements in all sections of combat training. Aviation received the practice of operating from field airfields. Improved interaction between aviation branches.
Parts of the Air Force have increased their success in the tactical training of crew units.
* The text in Section I, from the words "regardless of attempts ..." to the words "certainly strong" was entered in the original order in black ink by K. E. Voroshilov.
Increased the number of full-range flights using jump airfields. The number of targeted bombings at ranges has increased.
3. By Navy
Tactical interaction of surface forces and submarines with aviation was carried out on a larger scale and with great success.
Massive use of submarines has been achieved, in particular, in remote areas of the sea, and the first successes have been achieved in anti-submarine defense.
The actual use of the weapon in a tactical setting brought the firing closer to actual combat conditions.
The preparation of anti-aircraft artillery has improved.
Satisfactory results had ship and coastal artillery.
Mine-torpedo training was carried out quite satisfactorily. The personnel mastered their complex materiel well.
There are advances in the use of aviation at sea at night.
^ MAIN FAULTS
Despite the growth of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in all areas of combat training, the tasks set for 1937 were not fulfilled.
Shortcomings in combat training, economy and everyday life of the troops, which were repeatedly noted in orders over the past years, still occur to this day. Many of these shortcomings and shortcomings have become chronic. They seemed to get used to them, they stopped noticing, feeling all their acuteness. Hence the lack of sharpness of eye on the surroundings among many commanders and political workers, the lack of will and desire to concentrate all their forces, to mobilize all their Bolshevik organization for the immediate elimination of these long-standing shortcomings, the elimination of which does not require, in essence, any special talents and forces. These shortcomings can and, I am sure, will be eliminated in the shortest possible time, if only correctly, skillfully and with an ardent desire to get down to business.
We often talk, for example, about shortcomings in command and control of troops, their interaction, fire, tactical and special training; we are talking about an outrageously large number of accidents and catastrophes, in the process of studying, fighters and commanders take away precious lives every year, disable combat vehicles and weapons. But no matter how much we talk and write about these shortcomings, we will not eliminate them if we do not firmly know and comply with the requirements of the charters, instructions, instructions and orders of the Red Army, if we do not observe the strictest military discipline, if internal order is not established in all, necessarily in all, units and institutions, if the command of all levels does not know exactly where, what, how much and what it has, proper service for the fighters and command staff, good-quality and timely food, supply of uniforms, political, cultural and other services, if the weapon is not maintained and stored in exemplary order, if all the property of the unit is not protected from damage and plunder. Where the commander, commissar and party organization work conscientiously, honestly and skillfully, this elementary necessary order can be established immediately, and without it there can be no question of resolving the complex and responsible tasks of combat training of troops and staffs.
Our shortcomings, unfortunately, are often glaring - this is the result of disorganization and sloppiness. You don't have to look far for evidence. Take, for example, our maneuvers. They involve hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands of horses, thousands of planes, tanks, cars; all this moves, lives day and night a tense, seething combat life, and, despite this, everything goes clearly, as a rule, in an organized manner, and emergency incidents these days are a rare occurrence. The same can be said about our large May Day and November parades of troops. With rare exceptions
These very complex and cumbersome combined-arms demonstrations are proceeding in an organized and good manner. And the work goes on in a completely different way during normal times *. Disorganized and uncultured "methods" of work. People are exhausted and twitching. Instead of deeds, the command staff is loaded with unnecessary scribbling and deliberative chatter. Commanders and political workers get used to this "system", sit in the barracks and in the service for 10-14 hours, and do not have time to do their main job. Often the top and senior bosses do what their subordinates are obliged to do under their leadership, they do it worse than they do, and the subordinates get used to it, get out of the rut and lose their will, initiative and skills in work.
All these and other shortcomings, which are detrimental to the most important task of training the Armed Forces of our socialist Motherland entrusted to us, must be decisively eliminated at the very beginning of the 1938 academic year. Only by eliminating the shortcomings in the work of the command, headquarters, units and subunits, one can be sure that the tasks set for 1938 will be fulfilled.
I. Ground Forces
1) Command and control, headquarters service, training of infantry, cavalry and special arms and services for joint work on the battlefield have not reached the level required by the conditions of modern combined arms combat (PU-36, §§ 105-139, 143, 164).
The combat support service, especially intelligence, is organized and conducted unsatisfactorily in all branches of the armed forces (PU-36, §§ 18-39).
2) Fire training in all branches of the military did not give rise.
3) The air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense service has not been worked out (PU-36, §§ 40-74).
4) Engineer units have not achieved the necessary tactical and technical mobility for the timely and required by the situation provision of troops, especially in mobile combat.
In all military branches, field fortification has not yet been mastered, and the commanders themselves are not trained and do not teach Red Army soldiers how to dig themselves in battle (INZH-35, §§ 321-419).
5) All types of troops did not train enough under conditions of prolonged exposure to aviation and 0V.
6) The command and command staff and headquarters have not fully mastered the technique of covert control and violate the statutory rules for using this tool in battle.
7) Physical training is not at the right height and, on the whole, has not been linked to the specific tasks of combat training for troop operations in the field.
8) All types of troops have not fully mastered the operation of small arms and artillery weapons, especially machine guns, artillery and optics materiel, and field repairs.
2. By Air Force
For the main types of special training (fire, navigation, air combat, chemical training), units of the Air Force did not fully fulfill the tasks set for 1937 by order No. 00107.
The main shortcomings are:
1) Low level of combat readiness of units, especially on combat alerts; air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense of airfields have not been practically worked out.
2) As before, the weak point in the combat training of the Air Force is interaction with ground forces.
* The text from the words "the same can be said ..." to the words "work during normal hours" was entered in the original order in black ink by K. B. Voroshilov.
3) Fire training of high-speed bomber aviation is unsatisfactory.
4) For actions in difficult meteorological conditions, especially in the clouds, at night and behind the clouds, the units are completely insufficiently prepared.
5) In a number of units, due to unpreparedness for off-aerodrome flights, with their increase this year, the loss of orientation has increased sharply.
6) During off-aerodrome training flights and inter-district exercises, the practice of using and training the VNOS service is weak.
7) High-speed bomber aviation has basically mastered the materiel, but is still insufficiently prepared to carry out various combat missions.
8) Naval aviation did not work out air torpedo throwing on ships of the fleet.
9) The state of the aerodrome engineering service and ground camouflage is unsatisfactory.
10) The accident rate continues to remain at an unacceptably high level. The main reasons for it are still: the disorganization of a significant part of the commanders and political workers, the lack of discipline of a significant number of flight and technical personnel, the lack of systematic control over flight work by commanders and commissars, and the untimely elimination of identified errors in piloting technique and technical operation. The command staff as a whole does not cultivate the inflexible will of the commander and future fearless organizers of victories over the enemy*.
^ 3. By Navy
1) The development of complex forms of naval combat often proceeded without creating strong enemy opposition during exercises and without fire interaction.
2) Interaction with the ground forces has not yet been worked out, especially fire support by ships of the fleet of troops landed on the shore.
3) The setting of the tasks of naval aviation and their fulfillment are still unsatisfactory and do not ensure the full use of the power of aviation. The training of torpedo-carrying aircraft is completely unsatisfactory.
4) The tactical use of a smoke curtain is not always competent.
5) Insufficient leadership in the tactical training of commanders of formations and ships.
6) Navigator training of the commanders of the submarine and surface fleet is insufficient.
7) Naval training, especially for young commanders, is weak. The practical training of university cadets was insufficient due to the small number of trips to the sea and long trips.
8) The organization of covert control is unsatisfactory.
9) The accident rate has not been eliminated and continues to occur on the ships of the fleet and especially in naval aviation.
4. Rear
The tasks set by me for the preparation of the military and army rear have not been fully fulfilled.
Especially poorly studied are the defense of the rear and the service of air defense, anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense, washing and treatment of people affected by RH, degassing of the materiel (PU-36, §§ 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 50-89, part 2nd, §§ 85-138).
* Text from the words "commanding staff P as a whole ... ”to the words“ over the enemy ”is inscribed in the original order in black ink by K. B. Voroshilov.
^ II. MAIN TASKS FOR 1938
To further strengthen the combat power of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, I order:
1) Continue training ground, air and naval forces, in close cooperation between them, to master a complex battle (operation) in maneuverable conditions and in the struggle for fortified positions, relying on modern technical means of combat (aviation, artillery, tanks), giving their due place and taking into account the importance and role of the infantry in the combined arms cooperation ShchU-36, §§ 1-17, 311-316).
2) All troops to fully master the anti-aircraft and anti-chemical defense and service VNOS ShchU-36, §§ 40-67).
3) All troops must learn to master the methods of using guided fire from all types of weapons in cooperation with maneuver, especially in mobile combat (PU-36, §§ 15 and 16; BUP-27, §§ 30-43; BUA-37, § § 9-23).
It is imperative to achieve an increase in the individual shooting training of fighters and commanders from all models of small arms by at least 15-20% against 1937. It is also necessary to improve shooting training for air targets with rifles and machine guns (Fire training course 1937).
The Red Army must shoot better than all the armies of the world. A sharp, cold-blooded and economical shooter - this is the fighter of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army.
4) It is obligatory for all commanding and commanding staff to practically master the field fortification itself and teach the fighters how to use self-digging and camouflage in all field exercises and in all cases of contact with the enemy (INZH-35, §§ 321-419).
5) Commanders, military commissars, political workers of units, formations, ships and flotillas, performing the specified training tasks, achieve the daily combat readiness of the troops and increase the vigilance of all personnel, set all types of economy in an exemplary manner and make every effort to prevent accidents and emergencies.
6) Pay special attention to the training and education of newly promoted commanders and political workers, rendering them all possible assistance and assistance.
^ 1. By ground forces
1) Training of troops to be carried out in a complex, continuously changing environment, making maximum use of all available means of suppression and achieving trouble-free and constant interaction between infantry and cavalry with tanks, artillery and aircraft.
Timely and in the required norm to ensure the maneuver by engineering and chemical measures.
Never, under any circumstances, forget about the work of the rear - actual or designated, but certainly always functioning correctly at all stages of a battle, operation, battle (PU-36, §§ 17, 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 2,3).
2) In an offensive battle, especially when developing a battle in the depths of defense, to achieve full interaction between the infantry (cavalry) and artillery, tanks and aircraft, trying to destroy the enemy, and not push him out (PU-36, §§ 162-223).
Practice and especially encourage skillful, with the use of military cunning, actions on the flanks and behind enemy lines (PU-36, § 173).
3) In a defensive battle, master the interaction of all types of fire and the maneuver of units during a counterattack (PU-36, §§ 238-24*U.
To teach the troops to carry out defensive work by accelerated methods with the maximum use of available engineering equipment.
4) To achieve the timeliness, continuity and succession of the work of intelligence agencies in all conditions of a combat situation.
Consider the organization of combat reconnaissance and its practical work during combat as one of the most important elements of troop command and control.
When evaluating the combat training of the command and staffs, these requirements should be fully taken into account (PU-36, §§ 19-35).
5) To teach the troops the ability to organize continuous observation and combat communications with their neighbors. It is cruel to punish those commanders who carelessly treat the matter of constant, effective, live, fire communication with neighbors (PU-36, §§ 19, 134-137).
6) Master combat in populated areas, in forests, gorges and when forcing water lines (PU-36, §§ 213-223, 293-298, 306-310).
7) Allocate at least 40% of the time for night actions of troops (PU-36, §§ 261-271).
When checking the combat training of units, check the readiness of units and formations for operations at night.
8) It is obligatory to train the rear in close connection with the combat operations of the units, achieving timely and uninterrupted work of the rear, fully able to ensure the combat activities of the troops (PU-36, §§ 75-92; Charter of the rear, part 1, §§ 50-89 and part 2, §§ 85-138).
When evaluating the training of units and formations, the training of the rear should be taken into account on a par with the main sections of combat training.
^ 2. By Air Force
1) The main tasks:
a) fighting to destroy enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground and ensuring the main combat missions performed by ground forces in close cooperation with them;
b) bringing to a high level of fire training in all types of aviation;
c) increasing the constant combat readiness of units of the Red Army Air Force and especially high mobility in the rise and maneuver of fighter aircraft;
d) full mastery of the navigational service for flights in any meteorological conditions, both day and night;
e) practical development of air defense, anti-missile defense and fire protection of airfields and nodes;
f) mastering the technique of interaction with the VNOS service and the ground air defense system, especially at night;
g) improvement of aerodrome engineering service and camouflage on the ground and in the air.
2) Focus on operational-tactical training and conduct it in the interests of ensuring the combat operations of the ground forces and the navy, as well as to ensure the interaction of all branches of aviation in an independent operation of the air forces.
The main type of operational-tactical training of aviation should be both special aviation inter-garrison and district exercises, with units going to field airfields, and the participation of aviation in combined arms exercises to work out all the tasks of fire interaction with ground forces and the navy.
3) High-speed bomber and fighter aviation to master fire and navigation at high, 7-8 km, altitudes and speeds.
4) The main types of aviation, as the main type of combat work, to work out the movement to the target and bombing at night and during the day, always at high, 6-8 km, heights in the clouds and beyond the clouds.
5) In all types of aviation, resolutely switch to flights at the maximum radius of action.
6) For all off-aerodrome flights, inter-garrison and inter-district exercises, involve the corresponding areas of the VNOS service.
7) Work out the fight against the enemy air force at night, especially in the interaction of fighters with air defense.
8) All branches of aviation must fully master maneuver and fire in air combat.
9) At all exercises, work out questions of the organization and service of the rear.
10) In order to radically combat accidents, it is necessary to improve military and flight discipline, to achieve better organization of flight work, systematic control over it and a strict sequence in the training of flight personnel, in strict accordance with existing instructions, manuals and regulations.
^ 3. By Navy
1) Mastering complex forms of naval combat and operations based on close cooperation between the surface and submarine fleets and aviation in order to inflict powerful concentrated strikes on the enemy on the high seas, against his naval and air bases, and in combat in his fortified area in full cooperation of fire weapons, - remains the most important task of the Naval Forces (BUMS-37, §§ 3-8, 147-157, 282, 286, 250, 254).
2) Resolutely improve the operational-tactical training of flagships and ship commanders on the basis of the 1937 Red Army Marines Combat Regulations.
3) Conduct fire training in difficult conditions (for high-speed targets, in fresh weather, for invisible and temporarily hiding targets).
Conduct combat firing against the background of tactical maneuver and master complex brigade and detachment firing.
4) Combat training of submarines to be carried out in a more difficult environment, moving on to covert attacks, observing a strict sequence of training boats with young command personnel.
5) To achieve a decisive increase in the operational-tactical training of naval aviation to carry out tasks of interaction with the fleet and ground forces and in independent operations against enemy ships and bases, especially at night.
6) In all fleets, conduct exercises with the troops of adjacent districts to land and repulse tactical landings, paying special attention to working out the interaction of aviation and support ships with the landing detachment operating on the coast. Bring the organization of landing operations closer to actual combat conditions (BUMS-37, §§ 362-376, 384-394, 340-361).
7) River flotillas work out, in close cooperation with the ground forces, the support of the flanks, the forcing of river lines and the provision of crossings (BUMS-37, §§ 331-339).
8) Work out the air defense of the fleet in open sea combat, achieving full cooperation of all air defense systems (BUMS-37, §§ 301-307).
9) Pay special attention to the further development of anti-submarine and mine defense (BUMS-37, §§ 113-116 and 118).
10) To improve the navigator's training of command personnel and intensify the practice of long voyages, especially for the personnel of training detachments.
^ III. FOR POLITICAL WORK
1) In 1938, organize all party political work in such a way that the entire mass of fighters, commanders and chiefs is always aware of the most important events in the international and domestic life of the country and the policy of the CPSU (b), is constantly in a state of political mobilization and acute revolutionary vigilance and adamantly strove to better fulfill her military duty and raise the combat power of the Red Army even higher.
The entire party and political composition of the Red Army, military commissars and political workers are primarily obliged to carry out political work among the Red Army masses with redoubled energy, raising each fighter, commander and chief to the height of understanding all the complex political tasks of our time, educating in them the spirit of Bolshevik stamina, courage and energy .
2) To unremittingly continue a thorough study of the personnel and finally clear them of hostile and politically unstable elements.
At the same time, it is the duty of all commanders to promote even more courageous advancement of young, capable people unwaveringly devoted to the Motherland and our Party, daily concern for the education of steadfast, strong-willed commanders and chiefs, capable of fighting the enemies of the people in a Bolshevik way, overcoming difficulties, not afraid to accept and implement responsible decisions.
3) The further strengthening of the institution of military commissars is the most important condition for strengthening the party political leadership and improving the Bolshevik education of the personnel of the Red Army.
Military councils, military commissars and political agencies are obliged to tirelessly work on educating young political workers, cultivating from them genuine Bolshevik commissars, worthy representatives of our great party of Lenin-Stalin, able to delve into all areas of work with their vigilant and vigilant eye and penetrate with their party influence at all pores. complex military organism.
4) Commanders and military commissars are obliged to really protect the units from the penetration of the Trotskyist-Bukharin enemies of the people and other wreckers, spies and saboteurs into them.
To organize the study by all personnel of the techniques and methods of sabotage, sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies, as well as methods of combating them.
5) The year 1938 should be the year of a sharp rise in discipline, a resolute and merciless struggle against slovenliness, disorganization and lack of culture in work and everyday life. To carry on a constant, persistent and always reasonable struggle against intolerable emergencies and immoral phenomena in the Red Army.
6) The highest demands on oneself and subordinates must be combined with unremitting concern for the person. Each case of poor material and sanitary support must be investigated in order to uncover the causes and quickly eliminate them.
7) The all-out development of self-criticism, increasing its effectiveness, should in fact become a powerful means of educating personnel and fighting for strengthening discipline and eliminating all shortcomings in the training and life of units.
The commanders and political workers must lead a powerful new upsurge in socialist emulation, work more directly among the masses, listen attentively and sensitively to their voices, and urgently take action on proposals.
8) To radically improve the organization of Marxist-Leninist training of cadres. Each commander and chief must base the growth of his commanding military-technical qualifications on a systematic and persistent mastery of Bolshevism.
9) The military commissar and every political worker must combine tireless concern for his political growth with systematic improvement in military affairs and in the mastery of military equipment.
The gigantic rise in political activity and creative enthusiasm of the personnel of the Red Army, caused by the election campaign to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, we must firmly consolidate and use so that the year 1938 will bring to our Armed Forces the complete elimination of the consequences of vile sabotage and new, even greater successes in all areas. combat and political training of the Red Army;
For 1938, establish challenge prizes of the Red Army for the best achievements in combat and political training of units and formations.
General Staff to develop and submit to me by 15.1.1938 on
approval of the provision on challenge prizes (number of prizes per division, corps, district, army, Red Army; indicators and types of combat and political training for which these prizes will be issued to the best units, units and formations of the Red Army and the fleet; documents on the basis of which the challenge prizes).
Send the order to the commanders of individual units and study it with all command and command personnel up to and including platoon commanders, providing the necessary number of copies for use in work.
A firm knowledge of this order, within the limits of the official duties of each, must be checked during all inspections of the combat training of the Red Army.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
F. 4, op. 15, d. 13, l. 232-237. Printing house copy.
^ ORDER ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CHARTER OF THE INTERNAL SERVICE OF THE RKKA OF 1937
To put into effect the Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army of 1937 (UVS-37). Temporary Charter of the internal service of the Red Army in 1924 to cancel.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov
^ CHARTER INTERNAL SERVICES Red Army
1. The charter of the internal service of the Red Army defines the internal regulations in the military unit and its subdivisions, as well as the general and official duties of military personnel and the relationship between them.
2. A military unit that has an independent economy, a permanent name and an assigned number is called a separate military unit.
A typical separate military unit is a regiment and a separate battalion (division).
To ensure better control, both in peacetime and especially in battle, a separate military unit is organizationally divided into subunits (battalions, divisions, companies, batteries, squadrons, detachments, platoons, squads).
Everything that the Charter of the internal service refers to a regiment, battalion, company, platoon and squad and their commanders applies equally to the corresponding units, subunits and officials of all branches of the Red Army.
This Charter, along with military units and subunits, is guided by all headquarters, departments, institutions and establishments of the Red Army.
During the Second World War, millions of Soviet prisoners of war died in German concentration camps due to the fact that Nazi Germany pursued a policy of genocide towards them, as well as towards the entire Russian people. After the war, the Nazi executioners justified the brutal treatment of the Soviet people by the fact that the USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. Although no one prevented the Germans from observing its principles in relation to Soviet prisoners. Moreover, even now there are historians, including those in Russia, who cynically proclaim that it is not Hitler and his followers who were to blame for the death of our compatriots in the German camps, who starved to death, shot, deprived of medical care those who were captured, that is, actually denounced the Geneva Convention, and Stalin, who refused to sign it. In essence, these historians are repeating Goebbels' propaganda. The purpose of this book is to expose this old but tenacious lie and restore historical truth.
Order on commissioners
Order on commissioners
Before introducing the reader to two directive documents of the Wehrmacht regarding the rules for dealing with captured Soviet political workers, I would like to say a few words.
First of all, here we will talk about two documents (see both documents in Appendix 7), which, unfortunately, are often mixed with each other in historical circulation, as a result of which some confusion arises. Readers who come across quotations from the notorious order on commissars and have a Russian translation of this or that document in their hands often do not find the corresponding places in it, not knowing that the quotation was taken from another document. As a result, there is distrust of what is written in Russian (Soviet) historical sources.
It is worth noting that even German memoirists do not attach too much importance to what is said in one and what is said in another document, especially since the second was published in development and on the basis of the first.
However, one should be precise in such things. Unfortunately, the author does not have these documents in German and is forced to use secondary sources in their translation into Russian, while correcting inaccuracies in the translation (without affecting the very meaning of the text).
So, two documents. Note that both were published before the start of the war.
1. Notes for the report of the Fuhrer's Headquarters of May 12, 1941 "Treatment of captured Russian political and military leaders."
2. Directive OKW No. 44822/41 of June 6, 1941 "Instructions on the treatment of political commissars".
These two documents should be considered in conjunction with another document, namely the Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of May 13, 1941 “On military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa area”. But we will consider this document below.
These documents are so odious and show Germany and the Wehrmacht in such an unsightly form that some very famous Nazi commanders in their memoirs could not pass them over in silence and were forced to justify themselves, get out, and deny their participation in these crimes.
Here is what Field Marshal Erich von Manstein writes in his memoirs:
A few days before the start of the offensive, we received an order from the OKW, which later became known as the “commissar order”. Its essence was that it prescribed the immediate execution of all captured political commissars of the Red Army - carriers of the Bolshevik ideology.
From the point of view of international law, political commissars could hardly enjoy the privileges that apply to military personnel. They certainly weren't soldiers. I would hardly consider, for example, a Gauleiter assigned to me as a political overseer as a soldier. But equally it was impossible to classify these commissars as not participating in combat, such as, for example, medical personnel, military chaplains or correspondents. On the contrary, not being soldiers, they were fanatical fighters, namely, fighters whose activities, according to traditional military concepts, could only be considered illegal. Their task was not only to exercise political control over the commanders, but also to give the war the most brutal character, which completely contradicted the previous understanding of warfare. The commissars were the very people who first of all introduced those methods of warfare and the treatment of prisoners that were in clear contradiction with the provisions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare.
But whatever opinion we may hold regarding the status of commissioners from the point of view of international law; their execution after being taken prisoner in battle contradicted all ideas about soldier morality. Such an order as the order on commissars, in its essence, contradicted it. The execution of this order threatened not only the honor of the troops, but also their morale.
I was therefore compelled to report to my superior that this order would not be carried out in my troops. I acted in this with the consent of the unit commanders, and in my corps I did just that. However, naturally, my bosses were in complete agreement with my opinion.….
… When I took command of the 11th Army, it turned out that my opinion was shared by almost all formations of the ground forces. Even in the 11th Army, the order on commissars was not carried out. A small number of commissars, who, despite this, were shot, were not taken prisoner in battle, a captured in the rear as leaders or organizers of partisans. They were therefore treated according to military law…
Manstein's excuses are curious. The war has not yet begun (the order is dated June 6), but there is already an order to shoot. The commissars of the Red Army have not yet shown themselves to be “those people who, first of all, introduced those methods of warfare and the treatment of prisoners that were in clear contradiction with the provisions of the Hague Convention on the conduct of a land war,” and Manstein retroactively justifies the executions of political workers. That is, the crime charged against the commissars has not yet been committed, and the death sentence has already been signed by them.
It is completely unclear what Manstein refers to in his clumsy justifications, not recognizing the right of political workers to be considered military personnel. After all, they wore military uniforms, weapons and military insignia, which were assigned to them by the military department. They occupied full-time positions in units and subunits, and their service (and not political) duties were stipulated in the relevant military regulations (Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army (UVS-37)).
We can agree with one. With the fact that the executions of prisoners undermine the morale of their soldiers. But regarding the fact that Manstein refused to carry out this order ... Not only is it difficult to believe in such a disregard by the German general of the will and direct requirements of Hitler and the military order, but here is direct evidence that the field marshal is simply elementary and obscenely lying.
Recall the division numbers of the LVI-ro mechanized corps commanded by Manstein in 1941. These are the 290th Infantry Division, the 8th Panzer Division, the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division. Let us also recall the numbers of divisions of the 11th Army, which Manstein commanded from September 1941. This is the 72nd infantry. division, 239th infantry. division, 76th infantry. division, 198th infantry. division, 170th infantry. division, 50th infantry. division, 22nd infantry. division. Let us leave aside the Romanian divisions and brigades that were part of this army.
And now let us turn to the speech of the Deputy Chief Prosecutor from Yu.V. Pokrovsky at the meeting of the Nuremberg Tribunal on February 13–14, 1946.
I quote: “A soldier of the headquarters company of the 8th Panzer Division, Garry Marek, originally from Breslau, also showed that there was a preliminary briefing: “On June 21, the day before the start of the war, we received the following order from our officers: Red Army commissars must be shot on the spot, because there is nothing to stand on ceremony with them ... ".
But the 8th Panzer Division was part of Manstein's corps. As, however, and the 3rd detachment of tank destroyers of the 11th army.
Let us turn to the speech of Yu.V. Pokrovsky again: "O the presence of a directive to exterminate political workers of the Red Army was shown by a soldier of the 2nd company of the 3rd detachment of tank destroyers Wolfgang Scharte from Gerdgardshagen near Braunschweig: “If you meet Russian commissars along the way, who can be recognized by the Soviet star on their sleeves, and Russian women in uniform, then they must be shot immediately. Whoever does not do this and does not comply with the order will be held accountable and punished.”
Another well-known German commander, General G. Guderian, looks no better in his memoirs:
.. .Another order, also notorious, the so-called "order on commissars», never reached my tank group at all. In all likelihood, he was detained at the headquarters of Army Group Center.
Thus, the "order on commissars" was also not applied in my troops. Reviewing the past, one can only regret with pain in the heart that both of these orders were not already delayed in the main command of the ground forces. Then many brave and impeccable soldiers would not have to experience the bitterness of the greatest shame that fell on the Germans.
Regardless of whether the Russians joined the Hague Agreement on the conduct of war on land or not, whether they recognized the Geneva Convention or not, the Germans had to conform their course of action to these international treaties and to the laws of their Christian faith.…
And he also lies along with Manstein. In the speech of Yu.V. Pokrovsky at a meeting of the Nuremberg Tribunal on February 13-14, 1946, the testimony of a soldier of the 4th company, 6th tank regiment of the 3rd tank division, Hans Drews, is given that he personally knew the orders of the commanders of the 3rd tank division and the 18th tank division about executions of commissars. Both of these divisions were part of the 4th Panzer Group, commanded by Guderian.
Something no one has ever found in the archives or information that "... according to in all likelihood, he was detained at the headquarters of Army Group Center, no Manstein report “... in my troops this order will not be carried out».
And if someone from the leading German staff opposed this order, then this is documented. There were only two such people in all of Germany.
This is the head of German intelligence, Admiral Canaris, with his "Notes on the order on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war" (Abwehr OKV No. 9731/41 dated 1.9.41). This document was recorded by the Nuremberg Tribunal as document PS-338, USSR-456.
And the Imperial Minister for the Occupied Territories, Rosenberg, with his memorandum addressed to Keitel (B-35 of 28-2-42). And this document was recorded by the Nuremberg Tribunal as document PS-81, USSR-353.
Only their negative attitude to the executions of commissars has been documented. I do not think that they sympathized with the communists, but only they turned to the leadership of the Wehrmacht with written documents, proving the inexpediency and danger of deviating from the norms of international law for the Germans themselves.
So there is every reason to assert that both Manstein and Guderian are simply shielding themselves, trying to whitewash themselves before their descendants. It is quite possible to say that the entire general staff of the Wehrmacht conscientiously fulfilled Hitler's demands for the destruction of the political workers of the Red Army. And the fact that internally some of them realized the inexpediency of the order and did not really want to fulfill it, is not an excuse. The order was nevertheless carried out.
Some of the German memoirists say that over time, in the years 1942-1943, everyone forgot about this order and it was no longer carried out. Believe it with great difficulty. Most likely, the task of extermination by this time increasingly fell on the Einsatzkommandos of the SS, and the army front commanders were already aware that not only the Russians were captured by them, but vice versa. They somehow didn’t really want to be held accountable for the atrocities, especially since by that time it was already known about the trials in the USSR against some captured German officers. It is better to hand over the commissar of the prisoner to the SS and stay clean. And by that time, the political workers of the Red Army by this time did not differ in any way from the rest of the officers in uniform and insignia, and during captivity they tried to get rid of documents indicating their belonging to the political composition.
I want to return once again to the lines from Manstein's memoirs: “From the point of view of international law, political commissars could hardly enjoy the privileges that apply to military personnel. They certainly weren't soldiers. I would hardly consider, for example, a Gauleiter assigned to me as a political overseer as a soldier. But equally it was impossible to classify these commissars as not participating in combat, such as, for example, medical personnel, military chaplains or correspondents. On the contrary, not being soldiers, they were fanatical fighters, namely, fighters whose activities, according to traditional military concepts, could only be considered illegal. Their task was not only to exercise political control over the commanders, but also to give the war the most brutal character, which completely contradicted the previous understanding of warfare.
And in order to show once again that the German field marshal is simply lying, taking advantage of the fact that few people can look into the Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army of 1937, which was in force at the time the war began, I give here an excerpt from it.
EXTRACTS
Charter of the Internal Service of the Red Army (UVS-37)
Chapter I. Duties of military personnel and relationships between them.
5. Official duties of the commanding and commanding staff of a separate military unit (regiment), its divisions and services.
Military commissar of the regiment
47. Along with the commander, he is the direct head of the entire personnel of the unit and bears full responsibility for the political and moral state of the unit, for the performance of military duty and the conduct of military discipline by all personnel of the unit from top to bottom, for combat and mobilization readiness, for the state of weapons and the military economy of the regiment.
48. The military commissar of the regiment is obliged:
1) to protect the regiment from the penetration and appearance of spies, saboteurs, wreckers and other enemies of the people, immediately and decisively suppressing any actions that could harm the Red Army;
2) to strictly monitor the preservation of military secrets by all personnel;
3) organize and conduct political work, educating the entire personnel of the regiment in selfless devotion to the party of Lenin-Stalin, the socialist homeland and Soviet power, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, in constant revolutionary vigilance and in a merciless struggle against the enemies of the people;
4) daily and comprehensively study and know the personnel, their moods, needs and requests; to certify, together with the commander, the command and command staff;
5) to carry out the necessary political measures to ensure the fulfillment of plans and tasks of combat and political training, the exemplary state of the economy;
6) to carry out the necessary political measures for the development and direction of socialist emulation;
7) to systematically and timely inform the regiment commander, the higher military commissar and the political department about the political and moral state of the regiment;
8) manage all cultural and educational work;
9) have close communication with all personnel;
10) continuously improve their political and military knowledge. The military commissar is guided in his work by the Regulations on the military commissars of the Red Army.
Political leader of a company (squadron, battery)
59. Along with the company commander, he is the direct head of all personnel of the company and is responsible for the political and moral state and combat training of the company, military discipline, for the economy, combat readiness of the company and for maintaining military secrets.
60. The political head of the company is obliged:
1) educate the personnel of the company in selfless devotion to the party of Lenin-Stalin and the socialist homeland, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, personally explain to the Red Army soldiers and commanders the decisions of the party and the Soviet government and constantly inform them of international political events;
2) personally know all the personnel and be closely connected with them, show concern for meeting their cultural and everyday needs, be a close comrade of the Red Army men and commanders and help them in combat and political training;
3) to strengthen military discipline and combat training of the company, personally be a model of Bolshevik vigilance and protect the company from the penetration of spies, saboteurs, wreckers and other enemies of the people;
