About the honesty of the accuser is best
judge by the accusation.
Pliny the Younger

The events of the beginning of the past century today are of particular interest to historians. As a result of declassifying and studying many documents, we learn more and more new and often amazing, even shocking facts from the life of the country. The Soviet extolled some and stigmatized others who played a certain role in the development of the state. A huge number of great people were simply deleted from official sources, or slandered for ideological reasons. One of these victims of the Bolsheviks was the savior of the Baltic Fleet A.M. Happy. How did this man deserve the fierce hatred of Lev Davydovich Trotsky, and why is he called the savior of the Navy in the Baltic?

In 1918, under the terms of the Brest Peace, the Soviet authorities were obliged to withdraw the combat flotilla from the Baltic expanses. However, it turned out to be very difficult to do this, since the waters fettered the ice. This circumstance was beneficial to the Germans, who were on the outskirts of Finnish ports and hoped to get Russian warships without a fight. From the documents studied by F. Zinko, it is known that in order to avoid transferring such a powerful potential into the hands of the Reich, Great Britain offered to pay a large sum for each destroyed warship. The British, thus, got rid of the dangerous presence of the Soviet fleet in the Baltic, and also did not allow Germany to build up its military potential at the expense of abandoned ships. If we consider these facts together, it becomes clear why Trotsky sent an order to Shchastny, ordering to blow up the entire fleet with the promise of a reward for each of the sailors. However, Alexei Mikhailovich belonged to those people who faithfully served not so much the state and bosses as their homeland. Instead of carrying out the order, Shchastny sent him to the Council of Fleet Commissars with an indication that he considered it unacceptable and immoral to destroy ships and pay remuneration for this. This was the first step towards enmity with Lev Davydovich. A particularly important role in the appearance of confrontation was played by the fact that the Council supported Alexei Mikhailovich and declared that the ships would be blown up only in battle, and also if there was no other way left.

In the opinion of some researchers, the Bolsheviks were closely connected with both Germany and Great Britain, which is confirmed by documents on the promotion of a sealed wagon and correspondence that Lenin, Trotsky and others hid and tried to pass off as fake.

The merit of Shchastny, who is the head of the Morsil in the Baltic, lies in the fact that in February 1918 he withdrew all the ships from Reval and directed their relocation to Kronstadt. This decision was made against the will of Trotsky, but then supported by Lenin, largely due to the success of the enterprise and the desire to hide the intention to destroy the country's flotilla. After the arrival of the last ship, it became known about some kind of verbal order from Vladimir Ilyich to relocate. In fact, the Bolsheviks were always afraid of representatives of the naval army, especially after the events in Kronstadt, when the officers were simply torn to pieces. Managing a community like the sailors was very difficult, and the manipulations had to be skillful and subtle.

Imagine the indignation of the German command when it was discovered that there were no ships in the port. An interesting fact, once again confirming the Bolsheviks' plan to destroy the fleet and transfer its individual parts to Germany, are the facts indicating the existence of an agreement. After the Germans did not find the promised ships in Reval, they sent a secret note of protest to Moscow. The question is, what exactly did Shchastny violate when he took the ships to Kronstadt? Under the terms of the Brest Agreement, there was a provision that Russia could not have a fleet in the Baltic, but there was no talk of the complete destruction of cruisers and battleships and the liquidation of the country's Navy.

The personality of Shchastny became popular among the sailors, which greatly alarmed the Bolsheviks. Firstly, Alexei Mikhailovich was a hereditary nobleman, that is, a class enemy of the proletariat. Secondly, his career began even before the revolution, and he was considered an honored military commander in the navy, he had imperial and foreign awards. Thirdly, he was a highly educated person with an unbending will, organizational talent, and independent views. Such an influential admiral automatically became a threat to the only strengthened revolutionary power. In addition, his bold arguments about the authority and organization of the management of naval forces made him a rival in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, and they did not intend to leave competitors alive.

Once, in a conversation with Zinoviev, Alexei Mikhailovich informed him that he had been elected dictator in Petropavlovsk, but he refused. Many researchers believe that from that moment on, the Bolsheviks took all possible measures to get rid of the hated admiral as soon as possible. Shchastny's arrest took place in Trotsky's office after Lev Davydovich's attacks received calm, but very bold and straightforward answers. Alexei Mikhailovich denied his involvement in the counter-revolutionary conspiracy, and since the semblance of justice had to be preserved, Sverdlov developed a provision on the Revolutionary Tribunal. Shchastny became the first defendant in this illusory judicial body.

Fortunately, fragmentary information about the court session has been preserved, and we can reconstruct the course of events and convince ourselves of the accusatory nature of the process on our own. There could be no question of a fair trial, the verdict on Shchastny was passed long before the meeting and was only announced at the trial. Certain persons were formally called as witnesses, but none of them appeared, so the only arguments were Trotsky's testimony. Lev Davydovich took advantage of the opportunity that presented itself and directed all his oratorical talents to destroy the admiral. The verdict sounded ridiculous, since it followed from it that Shchastny, by the heroic rescue of the Baltic Fleet, intended to win favor for unfolding counter-revolutionary activities. However, there are numerous points in the minutes of the meeting and Trotsky's testimony that make one think that the prosecution had another reason for the immediate removal of Alexei Mikhailovich.

During the arrest, the briefcase with the documents of the “red admiral” was first seized. What was in this mysterious briefcase remains to be judged only by fragments of phrases and the further behavior of the Bolsheviks and, most importantly, Trotsky himself. From the testimony of Lev Davydovich, it follows that Shchastny is guilty, among other things, of spreading and maintaining rumors about the connection of the Bolsheviks with Germany, as well as falsifying certain documents confirming this connection. From the verdict, one can single out a phrase that clearly indicates the existence of such documents, since they are called not only fake, but also classified. The simultaneous recognition of the papers that were in the portfolio of Alexei Mikhailovich as both false and secret prompts certain reflections, since it makes no sense to block access to a fake. By the way, after the refusal to pardon the admiral, the Socialist-Revolutionaries defiantly left the Revolutionary Tribunal, sincerely believing that with such a protest they would be able to maintain the predominance of legality over revolutionary expediency. However, history has shown that this was a serious mistake that provoked a series of unjust decisions against "enemies of the proletariat and communism."

Even the fact that Shchastny was shot at night at the Alexander School and the disappearance of the corpse without a trace suggests that the authorities had something to fear. According to Andrievsky, who led the execution, the body of the admiral was buried under the floor in the same school, and the order for an urgent burial came from the leadership, and the officials came to make sure that the task had been completed. You involuntarily wonder if there is not much attention for an ordinary provocateur and traitor? In addition, the death penalty at the time of execution in the Soviet state was not applied, and the case with Shchastny was the first in judicial practice. More dangerous criminals were pardoned, but for some reason they did not do this in relation to Alexei Mikhailovich. The admiral was shot for treason or...?

In the history that is taught to us in educational institutions, it is almost impossible to find mention of this person. Basic information about it became available quite recently, however, even today the topic is quite painful and acute. When talking about the Bolsheviks, one should not go to extremes and repeat their mistake. Soviet historians have sufficiently discredited themselves with a one-sided view of tsarism, as well as the political background of their works, therefore, returning to the events of that period, one should investigate the problem from different angles and try to be as objective as possible. The official interpretation of the reasons for the execution of the admiral is betrayal and counter-revolutionary activity, but there is another point of view that deserves our attention.

Shchastny Alexey Mikhailovich (October 16, 1881 - June 22, 1918) was from the hereditary nobles of the Volyn province. Father - Mikhail Mikhailovich Shchastny, artillery officer. Since 1906 - major general, since 1908 retired with the rank of lieutenant general. Mother - Alexandra Konstantinovna, nee Dubrovina. In 1892-1896 he studied at the Vladimir Kiev Cadet Corps. He graduated from the Naval Corps in 1901 with the second highest academic performance, the Mine officer class in 1905. Since 1901 - midshipman, in 1901 - officer of the coastal defense gunboat "Burun". In 1901-1902 - and. d. company commander and watch officer of the cruiser II rank "Plastun". In 1903 - watch officer of the squadron battleship "Sevastopol". In 1903-1904 - mine officer of the seaworthy gunboat "Manjur". "Diana". A participant in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905, he was awarded the Order of St. Anna 3rd class with swords and bow. He distinguished himself in repelling attacks by Japanese destroyers (June 10-11, 1904), in shelling enemy ground forces (June 26, 1904) and in the battle with the Japanese fleet in the Yellow Sea (July 28, 1904). The commander of the cruiser "Diana" A. A. Liven positively assessed the personal qualities of midshipman Shchastny in characterization: "With his cheerfulness, quick diligence, presence of mind ... he showed combat abilities that are difficult to expect in his youth ... This is a high-quality military officer, he served well in ordinary times, but not every campaigner in peacetime turns out to be in battle at the height of his vocation, like him. "After interning the cruiser Diana in Saigon in 1904, he left for Russia, since 1905 he was a lieutenant. In 1905 - junior mine officer of the training ship "Europe", then commander of the destroyer No. 217. In 1905-1906 he served in the naval department of the headquarters of the Kronstadt fortress. In 1906-1909 he lectured on radiotelegraphy in the Mine officer class. A major communications specialist in the navy. One of the graduates of this class, G. K. Graf, called Shchastny in his memoirs "an outstanding teacher." In 1906-1907 - senior mine officer of the training ship "Nikolaev". In 1907-1909 - the second flagship mine officer of the marching headquarters of the head of the mine training detachment. In 1908 he participated in the fifth All-Russian Electrotechnical Congress in Moscow. In 1909-1912 - and. e. the second flagship mine officer (for radiotelegraph case) of the headquarters of the commander of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea. From 1910 - senior lieutenant. In 1912-1914 - a permanent member of the Naval Ministry of the Interdepartmental Radiotelegraph Committee. In 1913 he was sent to the Caspian Sea to select the sites of coastal radio stations on the island of Ashur-Ade and in Anzeli. From 1913 - captain of the 2nd rank. He married in 1914 Antonina Nikolaevna Priemskaya (1881-1922), from whose marriage a daughter Galina (1913-1982) and a son Leo were born in 1915. Member of the First World War. In 1914-1916 he was a senior officer of the battleship Poltava. In 1916-1917 - commander of the destroyer "Border Guard". In February - May 1917 - a staff officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet. Since May 1917 - flag-captain for the administrative part of the headquarters of the commander of the fleet of the Baltic Sea. From July 1917 - captain of the 1st rank. For military distinctions in the First World War, he was awarded swords to the orders of St. Stanislav 2nd degree and St. Anna 2nd degree.

After the Bolsheviks came to power, he collaborated with the Soviet authorities to protect the country from German troops. In January 1918 he was appointed first assistant to the head of the military department of Tsentrobalt. In fact, he commanded the Baltic Fleet, then in February 1918 he led the relocation of the ships of the fleet located in Revel to Helsingfors, which saved them from being captured by German troops. The last ships left Revel on February 25, the day the Germans entered the city. Shchastny led the Ice Campaign of the Baltic Fleet ships from Helsingfors to Kronstadt in view of the threat to the fleet from the German troops. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Article 6), all Russian ships had to leave the Finnish ports, and it was provided that while the ice did not allow the passage, only “insignificant teams” were to remain on the ships, which could easily be neutralized by the Germans. Under these conditions, it was decided to transfer the fleet to Kronstadt in conditions when the sea was still covered with ice (hence the name of the Ice Campaign).

Initially, accompanied by two icebreakers, 4 battleships and 3 cruisers left Helsingfors on March 12 and arrived in Kronstadt on March 17. On April 4, the second detachment (2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 submarines) left Helsingfors, which arrived in Kronstadt on April 10 (excluding one of the submarines, which was damaged and returned to Helsingfors). Thus, the largest ships of the fleet were out of danger of being captured by the enemy. On April 5, Shchastny was officially appointed head of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces (he acted as early as March, after A. V. Razvozov was dismissed from this position, who held it for only about a week). At this time, he was preparing to leave the third detachment of ships (45 destroyers, 3 destroyers, 10 submarines, 5 minelayers, 6 minesweepers, 11 patrol ships, 81 auxiliary ships), which was sent from Helsingfors in five echelons from April 7 to 11 . Later, these ships joined in one echelon with the support of four icebreakers. Shchastny himself left Helsingfors on the Krechet headquarters ship on April 11, when battles were already underway on the outskirts of the city with the advancing German troops (the city was taken on April 14).

On April 20, the third detachment of ships under the command of Shchastny arrived in Kronstadt. During the campaign, not a single ship was lost, despite the sharp weakening of discipline associated with revolutionary events. The successful leadership of the Ice Campaign in difficult conditions raised Shchastny's authority among the sailors. But already on May 27, he was arrested by the personal order of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs L. D. Trotsky "for crimes in office and counter-revolutionary actions." On June 20-21, he was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies. Shchastny pleaded not guilty. In a speech at the trial, Trotsky stated that: "Shchastny persistently and steadily deepened the gulf between the fleet and Soviet power. Sowing panic, he invariably put forward his candidacy for the role of savior. The vanguard of the conspiracy - the officers of the mine division - openly put forward the slogan "dictatorship of the fleet."

Despite the weak evidence base of the prosecution and the official abolition of the death penalty in the country, Shchastny was sentenced on June 21, 1918 to be shot. This was the first judicial death sentence in Soviet Russia. In one of his suicide notes, Shchastny wrote: "In a revolution, people must die courageously. Before I die, I bless my children Lev and Galina, and when they grow up, I ask you to tell them that I am going to die courageously, as befits a Christian."

On the night of June 21-22 (at 4:40 am) Aleksey Shchastny was shot. In the Soviet military history literature, his role during the Ice Campaign was not mentioned. Lenin developed a treacherous plan that dealt a blow to the power and prestige of the Russian fleet. He gives a stern instruction: “In view of the clear intentions of Germany to seize the ships of the Black Sea Fleet located in Novorossiysk, and the impossibility of securing Novorossiysk from a dry route or transfer to another port, the Council of People’s Commissars, on the recommendation of the High Military Council, orders you to destroy all ships upon receipt of this of the Black Sea Fleet and commercial ships located in Novorossiysk. Lenin. "The Bolsheviks dealt with Rear Admiral A.M. Shchastny only for the fact that he saved the rest of the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea from surrender to the German squadron. Newspapers all over the world wrote about the feat of the outstanding naval commander Shchastny and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. Shchastny was shot by the Bolsheviks by a selected special team of Chinese. According to the Russian historian Sergei Melgunov, Captain Shchastny saved the remainder of the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea from surrendering to the German squadron and brought it to Kronstadt. He was accused, however, of treason. The accusation was formulated as follows: "Shchastny, performing a heroic deed, thereby created popularity for himself, intending to subsequently use it against the Soviet regime." Trotsky was the main and only witness against Shchastny. Shchastny was shot "for saving the Baltic Fleet"

In 1990, in the newspaper Izvestia, in an article by the then assistant to the head of the Office of Military Tribunals V. Zvyagintsev, the question of the possibility of reviewing the "Shchastny case" was first raised. In 1995 he was officially rehabilitated. In 2001, a book by E. N. Shoshkov “Namorsi A. M. Shchastny” was published in St. Petersburg. In 1992, a street in his hometown of Zhytomyr was named after Shchastny.

Since I'm lying anyway, I decided to unsubscribe in more detail about one of the most mythologized moments of the "Red Terror" - the execution of Admiral Shchastny.

Until now, his execution is presented as a kind of atrocity of the crazy Bolsheviks, who SUDDENLY decided to shoot a bad military specialist. What for? Yes, just like that, it's the Bolsheviks.
Actually, the lie begins with the statement itself. On the net, wherever you spit, it says: "Shchastny was shot for saving the Baltic Fleet!" The statement is as meaningless and false as "black is white!", but no one is embarrassed by this.
In fact, even the most tragic episode has its own backstory, and the murder has certain grounds.

Literature on the Shchastny case is available. Not very big, but available. Before all this:
Shoshkov E. N. Namorsi A. M. Shchastny (A tragic biography in events, dates and comments). - St. Petersburg: Petrovsky Fund. 2001
And also - Rabinovich A. Dossier of Shchastnoy: Trotsky and the cause of the hero of the Baltic // Domestic History. 2001. No. 1. S. 61-82
Zvyagintsev V.E. Tribunal for flagships. M., 2007
Zvyagintsev V.E. Rebellious Baltic // Military History Journal. 1994. No. 2. S. 86-89; No. 3. S. 61-65
You can download all this here: http://k-lvk.livejournal.com/16924.html
And finally, the Shchastny case was recently published: http://rutracker.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=4621382

Not so little was written about the "Ice Campaign", which took place under the leadership of Shchastny, even in Soviet times - those who wish can search. What do we learn from these writings?

The background is known. At the beginning of 1918, the question arose about the transition of part of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to Petrograd through the frozen bay. Moreover, it was necessary to hurry, since the Germans were already heading to Finland. In conditions of a severe shortage of coal, weak discipline of the personnel, this was very problematic. Nevertheless, the task was completed successfully - by the beginning of March, the largest ships were transferred to Petrograd. Of course, no one was going to shoot Shchastny for saving him. On the contrary, he was awarded the title of Chief of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces on April 5. Under his leadership, the third and last detachment of ships was transferred to the city.

His merit in this is undeniable. Meanwhile, modern researchers and sympathizers about other participants in the organization of a campaign such as the Council of Commissars, like water in their mouths. Maybe because there were also Bolsheviks there? For example, the ship "Hawk" under the leadership of the Bolshevik midshipman N.N. Varguzin was used in the Ice Campaign as an icebreaker. Varguzin passed the civil, received the Order of the Red Banner. Does anyone know about this? No.

So what does Trotsky's testimony boil down to?
1. Shchastny was clearly sabotaging - he did not follow orders to demarcate the border with the Germans, to negotiate with them, to put the fleet on alert.
2. Shchastny allegedly set sailors against the Soviet regime and vice versa.
3. When Trotsky had the idea, in case the Germans demanded the Baltic Fleet, to blow it up with prepared strike teams of sailors (since the bulk of the personnel decomposed and were against it), Shchastny, in fact, revealed this plan, voicing it at the congress already disbanded Council of Commissioners. In my opinion, it is clear what the consequences of this were. Especially when you consider that the "shock teams" were supposed to be provided with money for fidelity, and the British were not averse to allocating this money, who also did not want ships to get to the Germans. An intelligent demagogue in five minutes will depict this as "the money of the German General Staff" and "the destruction of the fleet loyal to the revolutionary precepts!"
4. When Shchastny was arrested, they found in his briefcase copies of documents on the connections of the Germans with the Bolsheviks from a well-known falsification - "Sisson's documents".
5. Using the formal permission of Moscow, Shchastny blew up the fortified Fort Ino, supposedly so that the Germans would not get it, but in fact, in order to compromise the Soviet government - after all, there were no Germans nearby and nothing threatened the fort.

Actually, everything rests on the question of "German spies." If we accept the version that Trotsky-Lenin and Co. are German spies, everything falls into place. Filthy spies wanted to destroy the fleet on the orders of the Germans, Shchastny, who turned up under their arm, interfered, and he was shot. A number of "researchers" adhere to this version. Including Zvyagin, through whose efforts Shchastny was rehabilitated.
There are, however, two serious blunders in this version. First, why was the fleet never destroyed? And secondly, not a single proof that the Bolsheviks are German spies has been found to date. There is simply no evidence. But that's another story, another topic.

How right was Trotsky in his accusations? The court, according to the sources now available - he was right that Shchastny was sabotaging and revealing the orders of the command among the sailors. Trotsky dragged Fort Ino in vain - he was ordered to blow up the military authorities, since he could be attacked by the White Finns, but there were no forces to defend him.

It would seem that this was unprecedented - disobedience to command in 1918. But you take into account the situation. And the situation was like this - 1918, spring, power is just being built, off the coast of Petrograd, a demoralized fleet that rebels and demands privileges. And then the fleet commander himself reveals a plan for its destruction, and even with obvious overexposure. Consequences - the rebellion of the Mine Division, the most disloyal to the Bolsheviks, where there was ALREADY an officer organization. Surprisingly, almost no one connects this issue with the execution of Shchastny, although the connection is obvious and Trotsky himself directly spoke about this in the accusation.
One of the few exceptions is the article by A. Ganin: Ganin A.V.New documents on the arrests of Petrograd military experts in the autumn of 1918 // Klio (St. Petersburg). 2012. No. 10. S. 27-36.

Protesting against a possible explosion of the fleet, which was advocated by the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs L.D. Trotsky, miners, who gathered on the destroyer Pobeditel on May 11, adopted a resolution demanding the dissolution of the Petrograd Commune and the establishment of a maritime dictatorship of the Baltic Fleet in the region. At one of the rallies, the former midshipman G.N. Lisanevich told the visiting representatives of the authorities, People's Commissar of Education A.V. Lunacharsky and Trotsky's deputy for maritime affairs F.F. Raskolnikov: "As long as the half-educated Raskolnikovs stand at the head of the Russian state, Russia will not get out of a difficult situation." Lunacharsky and Raskolnikov were forced to leave the rally. The delay of the division after the Ice Campaign in Petrograd, which occurred for technical reasons when relocating to Lake Ladoga, caused concern for the Bolsheviks and was among the charges from the death sentence of the head of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea, former captain 1st rank A.M. Shchastny.
The sailors of the division supported the anti-government protests of the workers of the Obukhov plant. According to G.E. Chaplin, on the ships of the Mine Division, with his participation, organization cells were created that planned to undermine the ships if they were handed over to the Germans.
The situation was heating up. On June 20, Commissar V. Volodarsky (M. M. Goldstein) was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary militant who was on his way to a rally at the Obukhov plant. Soon the news came of the execution in Moscow of Shchastny.
After the shooting of Shchastny, riots broke out on several destroyers. Three destroyers ("Svoboda", "Izyaslav" and "Gavriil") moved up the river, prepared their guns for battle and anchored in the middle of the Neva near the village of Rybatskoye. There was a direct threat to the Bolshevik power in the "cradle of the revolution."

Please note that during the speech of the Mine Division, the Bolsheviks simply did not have large military forces in Petrograd and the sailors of Kronstadt had to suppress it - a good irony. By the way, the command of the Mine Division and some officers later noted themselves in the creation of counter-revolutionary underground groups that expected to go over with weapons, if not to the Germans, then to the Entente. See the same article plus: Ganin A.V.Conspiracy of the sailors of the Seligero-Volga flotilla // Marine collection. 2013. No. 2 (1991) . pp. 71-82.

Are you still asking why Shchastny was shot?
Here, in fact, what is the mistake, not bad, in general, the work of A. Rabinovich. He believes that Shchastny was shot as part of a campaign to consolidate power among military experts in order to "teach others a lesson." However, he completely misses the context in which all this was carried out. And the context - here it is: rebellious sailors, conspiring officers, counter-revolutionary terrorist attacks.

Total. I don't know if Shchastny was really a conscious counter-revolutionary and tried to somehow harm the Bolsheviks through machinations in the navy. I will only note that this does not contradict the rescue of the fleet by transferring it to Petrograd. Shchastny quite sincerely could save him from the Germans, and then "save" him from the Bolsheviks, as he understood it. In any case, for the Bolsheviks there is not much difference.

And, of course, the talk that Shchastny was shot "at Trotsky's insistence" is simply stupid. The case was considered by the Supreme Tribunal, the investigator was Kingisepp, who would later investigate the attempt on Lenin. Trotsky had no supporters here, and if these people shot Shchastny, it was because they themselves decided so. I hope that an unbiased study will show the rightness or wrongness of the decision of the tribunal.

In the meantime, I personally got the impression that Shchastny knew what he was getting into. He mistook the Bolsheviks for German agents and was sure that he had saved the fleet in vain, and therefore did not want to obey them. But what we know today was not known then. In any case, Shchastny's suspicions were and remained groundless, and the documents found on him were false, which was proved by a special study by V. Startsev.

AFTERWORD

It is curious that no one is also trying to consider the Shchastny case in the context of saving the Black Sea Fleet. In the meantime, a surprisingly similar situation has developed there. You can read it from N.D. Karpov, "The Tragedy of the White South. 1920" or from the military specialist Kukel.
Briefly, the matter was as follows.

In April 1918, the Black Sea Fleet stood in Sevastopol and decomposed. The Germans also came. The commander of the fleet, Admiral M. Sablin, first made a pathetic attempt to "save the fleet" by raising Ukrainian (!) flags on it - which, in his opinion, would not allow the Germans to take the fleet, because Ukraine is a friendly power to them. But it turned out that the Germans did not care about sophistry, and then Sablin, to the indignant cries of the Ukrainian authorities, took the fleet to Novorossiysk. The Germans demanded that the fleet be handed over to them, and then Lenin, unable to maneuver, sent two orders. One official - to give away the fleet. The second secret is to flood the fleet. However, Sablin did not want to sink the fleet and he began to play on these contradictions, and at the same time turned to the sailors. As a result, the remnants of the fleet were mired in incessant rallies, the essence of which was one thing - to sink or not to sink? The matter was complicated by the independent position of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic, which coveted the fleet and also did not want to sink it. Against this background, Trotsky's idea of ​​creating "shock teams" does not look superfluous ...

As a result, Sablin was summoned to Moscow and arrested for sabotage. With great difficulty, the "savior of the fleet" then fled to the Whites. Instead of him, acting Captain 1st Rank Tikhmenev remained in command, who eventually deceived everyone with ostentatious obedience and "saved" one battleship and six destroyers ... taking them to the Germans. The remnants of the fleet, from which a handful of demoralized sailors fled, who shouted the loudest at the rally about saving ships, had to be sunk by a single destroyer "Kerch" under the leadership of the same Kukel.

I don't know if Shchastny was ready to repeat the same trick - to "save" the fleet from destruction by handing it over to the Germans. Unlikely. But there is information in the co-creations that even before the Ice Campaign, he was negotiating with the Danes or other Scandinavians about the possibility of a fictitious sale of ships to them. Apparently, not only Tikhmenev had such ideas.

Well, in addition - about undermining Fort Eno.

“Given the then general political and military situation and proceeding from the main task set by V.I. Lenin, to ensure a peaceful respite, to prevent the German imperialists from resuming hostilities against Soviet Russia, which could then entail the capture of “Peterburg by the Germans, Moscow and most of European Russia,"13 the Council of People's Commissars on April 25 ordered the military command to use every opportunity to settle that issue peacefully. The head of the naval forces of the republic, passing on the government's order, emphasized: "The Council of People's Commissars does not want, because of Ino, to engage in possible hostile action with the Germans."

On the same day, April 25, at a joint meeting of the military leaders of Petrograd and the command of the Baltic Fleet, a plan for the defense of the fort was developed. This plan included the following provisions:

1. If the enemy tries to capture the fort by force, repel it with fire and bayonet.

2. The garrison must not go outside the fort and do not open fire on the sidings and concentrations of enemy troops.

3. To allow parliamentarians, as well as Finnish Red Guards, into the fort.

The fort's garrison received reinforcements these days. The 6th Latvian Regiment, the Novgorod Red Army Battalion, the Vyborg Red Army Detachment and a detachment of machine gunners arrived here - a total of 1175 people. In addition, there were 250 fighters of the Kronstadt artillery battalion and a detachment of Sestroretsk workers.

However, these forces were not enough to organize a serious defense, besides, all the artillery of the fort, which was at the disposal of those who held the defense, could not be used, since there were not enough gunners and three batteries had no servants. The fort itself was fortified from the sea, at the same time, from the mainland, its defense was weak, and it was from here that the enemy threatened.

It was impossible to support the fort with artillery of warships, as suggested by the military department of the Kronstadt Soviet, which decided to send the battleship Respublika and the destroyer Prytky here, because the Germans in an ultimatum demanded that the Soviet government not send ships of the Baltic Fleet to protect the fort " Ino."

By April 24-25, the total number of Finnish White Guard searchers who approached Fort Ino was at least 200 thousand people, they had field artillery at their disposal. In the first days of May, the White Finns “increased their forces. Divisions of huntsmen with artillery arrived from Koivisto. The enemies began to prepare for the bombardment of the fortress. The command of the Baltic Fleet decided to blow up the fort, pre-/70/- tentatively removing from it the combat stock, military equipment, light artillery, removing the most important parts from large-caliber guns.

On May 12, red Vyborg fell. After that, within a few days, the last scattered detachments of the Finnish Red Guard were defeated. In Finland, the power of the bourgeoisie was established.

On the day of the fall of Vyborg, the commander of the troops besieging the fort, Major Osterman, presented another ultimatum to surrender the fort.

At 10 o'clock. 40 min. On the evening of May 14, the last defenders left the fort on the Zarnitsa yacht. An hour later, Fort Ino was blown up from the Krasnaya Gorka fort with the help of electricity. The enemy was deprived of the opportunity to use it against Kronstadt, and consequently against Petrograd. However, now the German troops have occupied important and convenient strategic positions on the Karelian Isthmus for an attack on Petrograd.

M.O.Malyshev. The defense of Petrograd and the expulsion of the German invaders from the north-west of Russia in 1918. L., 1974. S.70-71.

But the Bolshevik government did not give any instructions, because, having just received a "breathing space", it was ready to sacrifice the Baltic Fleet for the sake of its own salvation. Only three days later, on March 6, after the insistent demands of the commander, Tsentrobalt, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, finally agreed to lead the fleet from Helsingfors to Kronstadt, saving it from German capture. With the exception of the submarines of the forward base and several ships that had neither a move nor full commands, Admiral Shchastny, with great difficulty, managed to lead the entire, then considerable, Baltic Fleet to Kronstadt. A total of 211 ships and transports were saved.

Alexey Shchastny. Videofilm

Trotsky could not deny the colossal merit of Rear Admiral Shchastny. At the meeting revolutionary tribunal On June 18, 1918, acting as a "witness" in the case of the convicted commander of the Baltic Fleet, the chairman of the Supreme Military Council testified:

“I first saw citizen Shchastny at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council at the end of April, after Shchastny’s skilful and energetic conduct of our fleet from Helsingfors to Kronstadt.”

Rear Admiral Shchastny was a great Russian patriot who deeply felt the shame of the Brest surrender to the Germans. And after saving the fleet from Revel and Helsingfors occupied by the Germans without a fight, he could not, as the general could not before Dukhonin to enter into negotiations with the Germans. He refused the role imposed on him by the party, for he knew in advance that he would have to surrender the Russian forts around Kronstadt and, very likely, also the ships of the Baltic Fleet he had just saved.

From Trotsky's explanations at the meeting of the Revolutionary Tribunal, it becomes quite clear that Shchastny, as far as he could, evaded the surrender negotiations prescribed for him with the Germans. Trotsky very muffled, but quite clearly, speaks of the German conditions known to him in advance, which Shchastny was ordered to sign. Describing the same meeting of the Supreme Military Council at the end of April, to which Shchastny was summoned, Trotsky accuses the commander of the fleet that “when certain proposals were put forward at a meeting of the Air Force in order to streamline international relations of the Baltic Fleet, having clarified first of all the question of the demarcation line, Shchastny rejected these proposals.

What could be hidden behind the words "international relations of the Baltic Fleet"? This highly bizarre formulation of Trotsky's about the fleet is complemented by Shchastnoy's stubborn demand to establish some kind of "demarcation line" that clearly did not correspond to the official borders drawn by the Germans in Brest.

The question of the so-called demarcation line was, in particular, the question of the surrender to the Germans and Finns of Fort "Ino", which, together with the forts "Red Hill" and "Gray Horse", was the node of the last defensive position on the immediate approaches to Kronstadt and Petrograd. It was too much for Shchastny to surrender Fort Ino - the key point of this last position to the Germans, after the surrender of Gangut, Revel and the Portland position.

“To Shchastny’s question about the fate of this fort,” Trotsky goes on to say about the discussion about the fate of Fort Ino at the Supreme Military Council, “I answered Shchastny that in this particular issue, the naval command should be consistent with our general policy.”

In other words, Trotsky demanded that in the matter of the last defensive line defending Petrograd, the naval command should fulfill the surrender obligations of the Bolsheviks to the Germans.

When the Finns, together with the Germans, approached the fort, Shchastny tried to defend it and sent a detachment of Admiral Zeleny to Ino as part of the cruiser Oleg and other ships. Convinced that there was no defense on land from Petrograd, Shchastny, at his own peril and risk, ordered that this fort be blown up, which could now become a base for an attack from the Karelian Isthmus against Kronstadt and Petrograd. On May 14, 1918, the fort was blown up by Rear Admiral Zeleny. Trotsky called this step "untimely" in connection with negotiations with the Germans.

By the act of the explosion, Shchastny violated the demand of the Supreme Military Council of April 25, 1918, to enter into negotiations with the Germans on a “demarcation line,” a formula that covered up the demands for the surrender of the fort.

But the unwillingness to enter into negotiations with the Germans on the transfer of Fort Ino to them and, apparently, on the disarmament of the fleet was only half the fault of Rear Admiral Shchastny. Summoned to Moscow, Shchastny carried with him documents exposing the Bolsheviks about an agreement with the Germans regarding the Baltic Fleet. Trotsky does not disclose the content of these papers, but, according to him, Shchastny's fault was that he "did not mention the documents lying in his portfolio, which were supposed to testify to the secret connection of the Soviet government with the German headquarters".

After reading the materials of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it does not seem improbable that the relations of the Bolsheviks with the German headquarters in this matter corresponded to the subsidies they received. Documents that fell into the hands of Shchastny, apparently through left SRs, and perhaps simply presented by the German command as rights to Fort Ino, were never published and are known only from the words of Trotsky. But the fact that the secret of relations with the Germans was revealed by Rear Admiral Shchastny was the main reason for his death. He was shot (by a detachment of Chinese "internationalists") on June 21, 1918. It is characteristic that on June 9, 1918, General Ludendorff sent a sharp memorandum to the German Secretary of State, where, referring to the issues of military depots on the Murmansk railway. etc., Czech, Serbian and other volunteers, as well as ships of the fleet, demanded "strict and merciless treatment" of the Bolshevik government, which, according to the German general, "exists by our grace" .

The fate of the Black Sea Fleet was somewhat different. Sevastopol, the ports of the Caucasian coast - all the bases of the fleet - Lenin ceded to the Germans. The best part of the fleet left Sevastopol for Novorossiysk at the end of April. One of the prominent Kronstadters, midshipman Ilyin, was sent to the south ( Raskolnikov), who led, probably at his own peril, a double game. Raskolnikov officially agreed to the demand of the Germans, who referred to § 5 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to return the departed part of the fleet to Sevastopol, but in fact encouraged the Socialist-Revolutionary majority of the Black Sea sailors in their intention to drown the fleet in Novorossiysk rather than hand it over to the Germans. Lenin through Chicherina(“Izvestia” of June 22, 1918) agreed with the return of the fleet to the Germans, but at the same time sent a telegram to Raskolnikov in a secret cipher, where he expressed his agreement with the demand of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This dual policy affected the fate of the fleet: part of it - one newest battleship and 9 modern destroyers were sunk by their own, mostly Socialist-Revolutionary, teams, and the other part - one newest battleship and 6 destroyers returned to Sevastopol, already occupied by the Germans, and surrendered to them along with the remaining ships.

On August 27, 1918, during the exchange of secret notes between the German and Soviet governments regarding the remaining ships, it was recognized that the ships could be used by the Germans "for military purposes ... if necessary."

Thus, after four years of fruitless struggle, Germany and Turkey, thanks to the support of the Bolshevik government, gained absolute dominance in the Black Sea.