People's militia in the war of 1812. Old Believer suburbs

Peasant unrest in 1812 and the people's militia

And now a few words about the patriotism of the common people of the Russian Empire.

In the corresponding chapter of his book "The People's Militia in the Patriotic War of 1812" V.I. Babkin writes:

“The perfidious invasion of the Napoleonic hordes into the borders of Russia stirred up the mighty patriotic forces of the masses. The first to act were Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants, who were attacked by the French occupiers earlier than others.

We have already spoken about the "perfidy" of Napoleon. Now - about the Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants.

Let's start with the fact that the territory of Lithuania and Belarus (formerly it was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and then the Polish-Lithuanian state of the Commonwealth) in the XVIII century was divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. Accordingly, most of Lithuania and Belarus were annexed to Russia. It is clear that under such conditions the Lithuanian population could not feel any particular enthusiasm towards the Russians.

On the one hand, Emperor Alexander contributed to the development of the Lithuanian and Belarusian provinces, annexed to Russia after the divisions of the Commonwealth, on the other hand, under the influence of Russian nationalists, violations constantly took place there, which were a heavy burden on the local population. Alexander's vacillations ranged from the idea of ​​restoring the Principality of Lithuania for its subsequent reunification with Poland to the idea of ​​completely Russifying it.

In short, life for people in Lithuania and Belarus was not easy.

As historian I.Yu. Kudryashov, “Until recently, the point of view was seriously taken, according to which the peoples who then inhabited the Russian Empire, almost in unison, rose up against the French invaders<…>It turned out that the vast majority of the population of the western provinces was ready to enthusiastically turn their necks under the sweetest yoke of Orthodoxy and serfdom. It wasn't all that clear."

When Napoleon entered Vilna, he was met by a huge crowd of people who greeted him as their liberator. By the way, the first regiment of the Great Army to enter the capital of Lithuania was the 8th Lancers under the command of Dominik Radziwill.

“Undoubtedly, this was one of the most solemn moments in the life of Vilna and, at the same time, an extremely subtle tactic on the part of Napoleon, who did not bind himself with any statements and promises in relation to Lithuania, but, as it were, testified to the deed, sending to liberate the city from Russian rule descendant of Lithuanian princes.

Solemn entry of Napoleon into the city

When on June 26 (July 8) the vanguard of the French corps of Davout entered Minsk, the marshal, after greeting the local gentry, said that the Napoleonic army did not want to oppress the Belarusians, but had come to return their homeland to them. He was greeted with applause and illuminations. On the same day, the vanguard of the troops of Jerome Bonaparte, the division of the Polish cavalry of General Rozhnetsky, entered Novogrudok. And in the evening, accompanied by an orchestra, infantry and a regiment of Polish cavalry led by Prince Jozef Poniatowski himself and General Dombrowski.

Soon Napoleon created the Principality of Lithuania. It was formed on the territory of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk provinces and Bialystok region, which made up four departments. Vilna became the capital, with a population of 35,000.

Being engaged in the arrangement of temporary administration in the newly formed principality, Napoleon was forced to stay in Vilna.

This interim administration was "a mixture of forms of French administration with the local order of things." It was entrusted to the locals, but under the leadership of the French.

Bearing the name of the government commission of Lithuania, it consisted of seven prominent residents of Lithuania (Stanislav Soltan, Karl Prozor, Józef Serakovsky, Alexander Sapieha, Franz Elsky, Alexander Potocki, Jan Snyadetsky) and was directly dependent on the French commissioner (Baron Bigion), who should was to serve as an intermediary between Lithuania and Napoleon.

The power of this commission, extended to the Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Bialystok provinces, was limited to the management of local parishes, the delivery of provisions and fodder for the troops, and the organization of the Vilna municipal guard and the gendarmerie throughout Lithuania.

The supreme military authority in the principality belonged to the governor-general, Count Dirk van Hogendorp, appointed by Napoleon, and a military governor acted in each department. In the Vilna department, he became a well-known military theorist and historian in the future, General Antoine-Henri Jomini, in Grodno - General Jean-Antoine Brun, in Minsk - General Joseph Barbanegre (later - Polish General Mikolay Bronikovsky), in Bialystok - General Jacques-Joseph Ferrier .

Dirk van Hohendorp

By order of Napoleon, a national guard was created in the cities (in Vilna, it numbered 1,450 people, and a retired colonel Kozelsky became its commander).

In addition, Napoleon ordered the formation of several Belarusian-Lithuanian regiments according to the Polish model. And they were created. In particular, the guards lancer regiment consisted of one nobility, in other regiments the nobles were appointed officers.

Historian I.Yu. Kudryashov writes:

“The newborn state machine worked with a creak from the first days. General Hogendorp was very dissatisfied with the work of the new authorities: "They do nothing." As a result, on August 24, he was put at the head of the commission. “Military power and civil power must be combined,” wrote Napoleon on this occasion. Among the French themselves, too, not everything went well. Hogendorp and General Jomini did not get along with each other. The conflict was quickly resolved in favor of the senior rank - on August 30, Jomini was removed from the post of Vilna governor and sent to an equivalent position in the scorched Smolensk.

And what about the Lithuanian and Belarusian peasants, who allegedly opposed the Napoleonic invaders first?

As noted by the same I.Yu. Kudryashov, “The population supported the new regime and resisted the Russian army. Here are just a few facts: Shavel landowners armed themselves and defended their lands from the Russians; the inhabitants of the Pinsk district did not supply horses and oxen for the export of food and artillery, then they rebelled and prevented the Russians from evacuating the warehouses; a detachment under the command of Tvardovsky attacked the carts of Tormasov's army and took 80 prisoners. Fabian Gornich captured the convoy of the uhlan regiment of the Russian army, outfitted and armed his detachment, and General Mirbach, a participant in the uprising of 1794, gathered a detachment of 2000 people within a few days, of which he formed a regiment of chasseurs and 3 squadrons of cavalry. In the town of Krozhi, the peasants, mobilized to export grain, unharnessed their horses and went into the forest; Bogush, an inhabitant of the Mozyr district of the Minsk province, hid in the forest a transport of 12 oxen, destined for the Russian army, and then handed it over to the French; Peter Bilinsky, manager of the Viktorishki estate (on the Vilna-Oshmyany road), armed the peasants and, having surrounded a group of Russian marauders who robbed the estate, captured 55 people and escorted them to Vilna.

It turns out that the peasants of the western provinces of the Russian Empire were sincerely waiting for Napoleon, hoping that he would free them from serfdom. Not only did they not oppose the "Napoleonic invaders", on the contrary, they met the French with even more enthusiasm than the local gentry.

I.Yu. Kudryashov writes:

“The big nobility also showed a maximum of enthusiastic activity, the youth was just as energetic. Some part of the petty nobility, who lost their profitable service under Alexander, reacted negatively to the French. There was no unity in the views of the clergy. If the Catholic and especially the Uniate priests supported Napoleon, then the Orthodox clergy, who prevailed in Belarus, remained for the most part on the side of the Russian Tsar.

Speaking of the "mighty patriotic forces of the masses", one should not forget that in 1812 many Belarusian-Lithuanian natives served in the Russian army. So - with the beginning of the war, their desertion began to take on rampant proportions. Deserters joined the ranks of the troops formed by Napoleon. For example: only the 18th infantry regiment of Alexander Khodkevich received 354 people.

It should be noted that at the end of the war, the Belarusian-Lithuanian regiments took part in the hostilities: the 22nd and 23rd infantry regiments, as well as the 18th Lancers, were almost completely exterminated near Novosverzhen, the guards regiment of Jan Konopka died in the battle near Slonim (himself the general was taken prisoner, and after the war he lived in Warsaw), other units defended Vilna, and then retreated to Warsaw and Koenigsberg.

Lithuanian-Tatar cavalry in the service of Napoleon

Minsk historian M. Goldenkov claims that about 25,000 natives of Belarusian lands fought for Napoleon. At the same time, there were up to 32,000 of them in the 2nd and 3rd Russian armies.

According to M. Goldenkov, “The distribution of Belarusians into two opposing camps is quite easy to explain: some did not lose hope of regaining their lost freedom, others resigned themselves, considered themselves part of the Russian Empire, or simply fulfilled their military duty and oath to the Russian Tsar.”

Now - about the Russian peasants.

As A.P. writes in his book Napoleon: Attempt No. 2, Nikonov, “The soldiers of the Napoleonic army, like the Germans later in 1941, were simply shocked by the poverty in which the Russian peasants lived. And the complete absence of all ideas about human dignity. General Kompan wrote that pigs live better in France than people in Russia.

It was difficult to expect a patriotic feeling in the modern sense of the word from such an enslaved and extremely downtrodden people.

To make it clear, let's look at some facts.

After the call of Emperor Alexander to repulse the enemy and gather the militia, no one from many villages joined the militia at all. There were a great many such "deviators", and the composition of those "exposed" often did not meet any requirements. Basically, sick, old and crippled people "donated" to the militia. M. Goldenkov states: “Yes, there was an upsurge of patriotic spirit among the nobility. Especially young boys were eager to fight, but in the villages, villages and farms of the vast expanses of Russia, no one was eager to go to war.

In cities, too, because those wishing to join the militia from among the urban population had to first pay all taxes, and then be “under arms” at their own expense. Naturally, there were few of them.

The decree of Emperor Alexander emphasized the temporary nature of the convened militia. It said:

“The entire internal force that is now being composed is not a militia or a recruiting set, but a temporary militia of the faithful sons of Russia, arranged out of precaution to reinforce the army and for the proper protection of the fatherland<…>After the need has passed, that is, after the enemy has been driven out of our land, everyone will return with honor and glory to his original state and to his former duties.

The fact is that the country's leadership was very afraid of a rebellion by serfs.

For example, in St. Petersburg, in connection with the proposed departure of ministries from the capital, the following considerations were expressed:

“Everyone who only has serf servants knows that this kind of people are usually dissatisfied with their masters. If the government is forced to leave the capital, then before the invasion of the barbarians could follow, these domestic people, incited by violent minds, living here without any fortune and kinship, of which there are quite enough here, in conjunction with the mob, will plunder, ruin, devastate everything " .

The future Decembrist V.I. Steingel, who joined the militia in 1812, noted that “In Moscow alone, there are ninety thousand of some courtyards ready to take up a knife, and our grandmothers, aunts, sisters will be the first victims.”

Accordingly, recruitment into the militia was strictly “filtered”, and the militia was in no hurry to arm.

The militia warriors could be landlord peasants, but they did not have the right to join the militia voluntarily. As V.I. Babkin, "The militia warrior was regarded only as a" gift "of the landowner, brought in to protect the Fatherland." There was even a special explanation on this topic:

“The call of those wishing to [serve] for the benefit of the Fatherland cannot be extended<…>on householders and landlord peasants, who are directly disposed of by their owners, and it depends on their will to declare any donation for the common good.

However, such volunteers were known (for example, a certain Ivan Konkov, who belonged to the landowner Minina), but they were declared “fugitives” for this, returned to their owners and severely punished.

Russian militias

M. Goldenkov emphasizes:

"Patriotism of commoners without lordly approval, as we see, was not only not encouraged, but even punished."

The feudal landowners basically sent to the militia (we emphasize - they sent by force) only those of their peasants who were either unrestrained drunkards, or from whom there was simply no sense in the estate. In this regard, when accepting warriors, it was proposed not to reject "neither in height, nor in anything, I would only be healthy."

In the Moscow province, as V.I. Babkin, it was allowed to take even curves into the militia, "Only not in the right eye, the fingers would be intact."

The owner of thousands of peasants, Count V.G. Orlov ordered the manager of the Usolsky estate:

“Observe the line between the peasants in recruitment, drunkards, spendthrifts, fragile for the patrimony, should not be protected at all, even if there was no queue.”

Theoretically, the people represented in the militia were supposed to be provided with clothes according to the established form, weapons and provisions for three months. But not everyone did it. For example, Prince P.V. Meshchersky "donated" 23 warriors without any uniforms, in one of their own clothes. He also transferred exhausted horses to the militia for the cavalry regiment.

"Patriotic" approach, nothing to say...

As you know, the militia recruitment was announced in the 16 provinces of Russia closest to the theater of operations, divided into three districts. At the same time, in these 16 provinces there was a collection of funds for the conduct of the war.

Military historian M.I. Bogdanovich makes the following assessment:

“Based on the available insufficient information about the donations made by the sixteen provinces that participated in the Militia of 1812, the total amount of donations is over thirty-six million rubles; but it can be unmistakably assumed that each of the provinces that were part of the first two districts donated at least 4 million rubles, and the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Smolensk and Tula provinces - much more; among the provinces of the third district, Penza donated up to 21/2 million, and the rest, with the exception of Kazan and Vyatka, up to 11/2 million rubles. According to this approximate calculation, the provinces, having put up 220 thousand warriors, donated about sixty million rubles in money, supplies and supplies.

Regarding the number of militia, there are other figures.

For example, the Soviet historian P.A. Zhilin writes:

“The total number of militias in all three districts was 192,976. Of the almost 200,000 militia army, 147,000 people were directly involved in the fight against the enemy during Napoleon's stay in Moscow.

According to V.I. Babkina, all in Russia "within a few weeks, a militia army of 420,297 men was created."

But according to N.A. Trinity, "Joined the regular army and started fighting more than 120 thousand militias", the rest “remained in reserve and performed very important security functions.”

As you can see, the figures vary greatly and (especially among Soviet historians) do not inspire much confidence.

According to eyewitnesses, a significant part of those taken into the militia were “due to old age and health, she is completely unfit for military service”. There were a lot of people aged 50-60 years and at the same time "in scabs and weakness of strength." The warriors had neither hats nor boots. There is no need to talk about worthy weapons at all ...

Matveev - a warrior of the 1st squad of the St. Petersburg militia

For example, the soldiers of the Moscow militia in the Mozhaisk district received only 5 rifles, 4 pistols, 34 sabers, 1600 pikes and 11 useless cannons; in the Kolomna district - 9 rifles, 29 sabers, 11 cleavers and 485 peaks. And so on in all counties.

Unfortunately, there were practically no real volunteers in the militia. For example, the future Decembrist D.I. Zavalishin recorded the words of one of these "volunteers":

“Now, gentlemen, if you then told us that there would be a deduction from service, that they would not be driven into a coffin with sticks, that you would not walk around with a bag after retirement, that children would not be irrevocably taken to the soldiers, well, for this we would went".

Here they were in 1812 "the mighty patriotic forces of the masses." And it would be difficult to expect anything else from completely disenfranchised people, practically slaves.

It should be noted that the provinces that were not among the sixteen “chosen ones” made donations of money, provisions, etc.

General M.I. Bogdanovich says:

“From the information that has come down to us about this glorious era, we can conclude that the offerings of the provinces that were not part of the three militia districts amounted to at least 25 million rubles. But as many of the donations in kind are not evaluated and are not even included in the available lists, there is no doubt that these deliveries, together with monetary offerings, exceeded the number shown by at least one and a half times.

The same military historian concludes:

“Consequently, Russia, despite several sets made in the course of 1811 and the first half of 1812, despite the devastation of many regions of the empire by the enemy,<…>benefited a total of at least one hundred million rubles.

ON THE. Troitsky calls a similar figure:

“On the whole, the population of the country donated 100 million rubles, that is, an amount equal to all the military expenses of the empire for 1812 according to the state budget.”

Such figures look very serious, but do not forget that money for the war was given mainly by wealthy merchants and landowners. But, donating millions, they immediately returned them, "selling their goods quickly and at exorbitant prices." In addition, unprecedented theft flourished, and the millions allegedly collected for the needs of the army went anywhere, but not to the army cash desks.

In this sense, General A.P. Ermolov. According to him, General N.O. Laba, the Chief Provisional Officer of the army, reported to the Minister of War that a warehouse was burned in Velizh, which contained several thousand quarters of oats and 64,000 poods of hay. All this was allegedly done with the commendable intention of depriving the enemy of the opportunity to take advantage of all this. But then it turned out that all this was a fraud committed for the purpose of profit: the warehouse was burned empty, and the money from the treasury was put in his pocket. On this occasion, combat general Yermolov said that "for such a brazen robbery, it would be worthy to burn the commission agent himself along with the store."

There were a great many such cases. This gave the historian E.V. Tarle has every right to write the following woeful words:

“The commissariat was put out of hand badly. Theft was indescribable."

As for the radical proposal of General Yermolov, it was useless: it was impossible, as E.V. Tarle, "burn the entire food department in its entirety."

In 1812, the serfs numbered 23 million people, or about 44% of the population of the empire.

The living conditions of most serfs were simply monstrous, and, speaking of popular patriotism in 1812, many historians, as A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, "They are actively hushing up the realities of serfdom, trying in every possible way to embellish it."

What for? Yes, to create the same myth about the "club of the people's war."

In fact, the peasants were extremely dissatisfied with their position and their masters.

Historian E.V. Tarle says:

“Of course, the class struggle, the struggle of the serfs against the landlords, did not stop in 1812, just as it did not stop for one year, not for one month, before and after 1812. But the expulsion of the enemy from the borders of Russia became a priority task for the Russian peasantry throughout the second half of 1812.

The predator, invading Russian borders, brought the peasants not freedom, but new heavy chains. And the Russian peasantry understood this very well and appreciated it.

If the Russian serf peasantry soon became convinced that no liberation could be expected from Napoleon, it does not follow from this that in 1812 there was no peasant movement against serfdom in Russia at all. It undoubtedly existed, but in the overwhelming majority of its hopes it did not connect with the invasion<…>

The general impression is this: the peasants in 1812, now in one place and now in another, rebelled against the landowners, as they did in previous and subsequent years. But the presence of an enemy army in the country, of course, did not strengthen, but, on the contrary, weakened the movement against the landowners. The ruthlessly plundering enemy decisively diverted the attention of the peasants from the landowners, and the idea of ​​the impending doom of Russia, of the enslavement of the entire Russian people by a foreign predator and rapist, came to the fore more and more.<…>The feeling of the motherland flared up among the people, especially after the death of Smolensk.

In fact, this is all just another myth. Peasant unrest blazed everywhere in Russia in 1812, and no enemy distracted the attention of the peasants from their main enemies - the landlords.

Even the Soviet historian V.I. Babkin admits that the peasants fought in 1812 “simultaneously with the enemy and with the local landlords. They attacked the estates, took away the bread.”

Accordingly, in 1812, the landlords were more afraid not of the French, but of a revolt of their serfs. As a result, as E.V. Tarle, "very many of the landowners simply ran away from their villages to the capitals and provincial cities." The French military authorities, on the other hand, took Russian landowners under their protection and assigned special detachments to suppress peasant unrest.

On the other hand, Napoleon was well aware of the "hidden reserves" of this phenomenon and even wrote to his stepson, General Eugene de Beauharnais:

"Let me know what kind of decree and proclamation could be issued in order to stir up an uprising of the peasants in Russia and win them over to their side."

It is said that, while already in Moscow, Napoleon ordered to search the surviving archives for everything related to the peasant revolt of 1773-1775. At the same time, he was especially interested in the latest appeals of Emelyan Pugachev. Even projects of similar appeals to the Russian people were written.

V.N. Kurdyumov. The looting of the manor

V.V. Vereshchagin. Captured rioters. Powdered hands? Shoot!

And Napoleon, talking to Madame Marie-Rose Aubert-Chalmet, the owner of a very large Moscow store of women's clothes and luxury goods, asked her:

– What do you think about the liberation of the Russian peasants?

She replied that, in her opinion, one third of them, perhaps, would appreciate this boon, while others would not even understand what they were being told.

“But talking like the former would have carried others along,” Napoleon objected.

“Sir, give up this delusion,” his interlocutor assured him. - It's not like in Europe. The Russian is distrustful, it is difficult to induce him to revolt. The nobles would not hesitate to take advantage of this moment of hesitation. These new ideas would be immediately presented as anti-religious and impious. It would be difficult, even impossible, to captivate them.

In the end, Napoleon abandoned his intention to try to incite a revolt of the Russian peasants, because their actions against their masters went without any special efforts on his part.

Then he said:

- I am only waging a political war against Russia ... I could arm the largest part of its population against it by proclaiming the emancipation of slaves; in many villages I was asked about it. But when I saw the coarsening of this numerous class of the Russian people, I refused this measure, which would have betrayed many families to death and the most terrible torment.

Nevertheless, as Soviet historians calculated, in 1812 there were 67 anti-serf uprisings in Russia, but M. Goldenkov is sure that "This figure is greatly underestimated and needs to be clarified."

In particular, the peasants of the village of Trostyany, Borisov povet, killed their landowner Glazko, along with his entire family of nine people. The act of reprisal against the landowner was committed under the following circumstances. When the French approached, the peasants fled into the forest, followed by the landowner, but he continued to demand from them the performance of overwork and subject them to punishments even more inhuman than before. In response, angry peasants dealt with the landowner, and at the same time with his family. At the same time, the corpses of all those killed were dumped in the courtyard of the landowner's estate and burned at the stake. The manor's house and all outbuildings were also burned.

In the Lepel district, the rebellious peasants of the landowner Malyshev destroyed the estate of their master, took away bread and 5,000 rubles of money from him, the peasants of the Porkhov and Novorzhevsky districts, united in a detachment, attacked the village of Kostomary at night, killed the landowner Kalyubakin and took the master's property ...

In the Vitebsk province there was not a single county where the peasants did not oppose their landowners.

The Marquis de Pastore, who was appointed quartermaster of the Vitebsk province by Napoleon, says in his Notes:

“Attachment to the land, the obligation to give the masters part of their working time, the requirement of the master’s permission to marry, the prohibition to marry a woman from another estate, punishments at the discretion of the master, merciless corporal punishment at his peremptory order, the possibility of a complete change in the fate of a person who has grown old in engaging in some kind of craft, and turning him into a soldier or sailor - we find all this in the cold climate of Belarus.

The marquis complains that a terrible disorder reigned in the villages of the Vitebsk province as a result of the uprising of the peasants, who “They were taught that freedom is nothing but extreme willfulness.”

It is known that Vitebsk Polish nobles turned to Napoleon with a request to suppress the riots that violated their rights.

Peasant uprisings were also suppressed by Russian troops. For example, the peasants of the Polotsk district defeated the punitive detachment of Lieutenant Kvitkovsky, sent to pacify their uprising. It was then suppressed by a squadron of cavalry, allocated by General P.Kh. Wittgenstein.

Peasants of the Driza district, "having gathered in the plural and sat in a large forest, from it they made an attack on various hostile transports and landowners." And this performance was suppressed by military force. The organizers of the speech, Kovzel and Guzik, were brought to court-martial and " to the abstinence of others executed by death».

It should be said that Alexander I took precautions long before the war: seeing that the war with Napoleon was inevitable, and fearing popular uprisings, he ordered to suppress them in advance to place punitive detachments in each province - "on a semi-battalion of 300 people."

During the war, peasants rebelled against their landowners and arson of estates took place in the Minsk province. The French governor of the city of Borisov, responding to the requests of these landowners, already at the end of July 1812 was forced to send a punitive detachment to the Esmonsky volost.

Peasant unrest took place in Smolensk, Kostroma, Kaluga, Orel, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Saratov and other provinces.

Even in the Moscow province there were unrest. For example, in one estate in the vicinity of Mozhaisk, the peasants killed the Scots manager, plundered, burned the landowner's house and fled through the forests and neighboring villages. And in the estate of Count M.A. Dmitriev-Mamonov, two peasants convinced their comrades that they no longer belonged to the count, since Bonaparte was in Moscow and now he was their sovereign.

In Arkhangelsk, in the estate of Prince N.B. Yusupov, where the owner has collected a fine collection of works of art, the peasants strewn the gardens with fragments of Carrara marble statues by famous Italian sculptors. Calmness was restored only by a detachment of mounted police.

Such examples could be given for a very long time.

M. Goldenkov quite rightly says that "The war with Napoleon, like a litmus test, clearly demonstrated the true attitude of the majority of peasants towards their masters and that, in principle, any conqueror can be regarded by a slave as a liberator."

We emphasize once again that regular Russian troops were very often used to suppress peasant uprisings. For example, in the Pskov province, the rebel peasants of the landowner Repninsky captured the village of Kamenki, and then formed a detachment of 1,000 people, who began to smash the landowners' estates. To suppress it, General P.Kh. Wittgenstein was forced to send a whole regiment. His commander tried to persuade the peasants to go home peacefully, but this did not help. As a result, armed massacre followed and the main "disturbers" were executed.

In the Dorogobuzh district, the peasants declared themselves free, but a military detachment under the command of Colonel Dibich was sent to pacify them, on whose orders the peasant leaders of this action were shot.

As you can see, in all these cases, the Russian peasants were clearly not fighting the "French occupiers." In fact, it was more like a civil war ...

As V.I. Babkin, “There are cases when the nobility, in the interests of preserving their class privileges, embarked on the path of betrayal of their homeland, often turning to the enemy for assistance. So did, for example, the nobles of the Vitebsk province. Frightened by the rebellious peasants, they turned for military assistance to the French governor in Vitebsk, General Charpentier. And the Napoleonic governor sent punitive detachments of French troops through the villages, who mercilessly dealt with the Russian peasants, restoring the privileges of the landlords.

The same thing happened in the Smolensk region.

But in the Volokolamsk district, the local administration was powerless before the rebellious peasants, and General F.F. Vinzengerode, rightfully considered the first Russian army partisan, singled out as many as two regiments of regular troops.

The anti-serfdom uprising of the Penza militia, which took place in December 1812 in three cities of the province - Insar, Saransk and Chembar, is also well known.

The head of the Penza militia was retired Major General N.F. Kishinsky. And the reason for the uprising was a rumor that suddenly spread among the warriors that there was a royal decree declaring the will of all participants in the war, but the noble commanders were hiding this decree.

There was another serious reason for the discontent of the warriors: they were fed very poorly.

This was the main reason for the uprising. Pogroms were carried out: the property of nobles, merchants and raznochintsy was plundered. At the same time, local residents actively helped the warriors.

About the goals of this uprising, the eyewitness of the events, the Penza landowner I. Shishkin, later wrote as follows:

“They wanted, having exterminated the officers, to go with a whole militia to the army in the field; appear directly on the battlefield, attack the enemy and defeat him; after<…>as a reward for his service, ask for forgiveness and eternal freedom from the possession of the landlords.

To suppress this uprising, in which up to 7200 people took part, regular troops were once again sent. As a result, the main participants in the unrest (more than 300 people in total) were punished with gauntlets, sticks and whips. According to eyewitnesses, “Three days the blood of guilty warriors shed, and many of them lost their lives under the blows of the executioners! Of the survivors who remained after the punishment of the warriors, some were sent to hard labor, some to a settlement, and others to eternal service in further Siberian garrisons.

The abandonment of Moscow caused strong irritation of the common people against Emperor Alexander. His sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, wrote to her brother from Yaroslavl:

“Discontent has reached the highest degree, and your person is far from being spared. Judge the rest by what it comes to my attention. You are openly accused of the misfortune that has befallen your state, of the ruin of the general and private individuals, and, finally, that both Russia and you personally have been dishonored. Not just one class of the population, but all unanimously shout against you.

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Liberation of Moscow (Nizhny Novgorod militia) 1612 At the beginning of the 17th century, the Russian state was going through hard times. False Dmitry princes succeeded each other, tsars were erected and overthrown, armed gangs that obeyed no one terrorized entire regions.

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1812 MIRF. Ch. 13. S. 241.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia on June 12, 1812 caused a broad patriotic movement of the masses.

The militia was created in 16 provinces adjacent to the theater of operations, divided into three districts. The task of the militias of the first district was to protect Moscow, the second, which included the St. Petersburg militia, was to protect St. Petersburg; the militias of the third district were reserve. Its formation began after the publication of manifestos of July 6 and 18, 1812 on the creation of a militia "to reinforce the troops and most reliably protect the fatherland."

On July 17, the St. Petersburg nobility at the governor's meeting decided to hold a meeting of the militia and unanimously elected M.I. Kutuzov. At his suggestion, two committees were created - organizational and economic. The first was engaged in the reception, training, arming of the militias, the formation of squads. The second - the supply of food, uniforms, horses, collection of donations.

The committees were located in the house of Baron Rahl on the Moika Embankment, opposite New Holland. (Now this section of the house N 108 on the Moika embankment). Most of the militias were serfs, there were volunteers from among the courtyards, artisans, officials, students, retired soldiers.

The formation of the Petersburg militia took place quickly, clearly and more successfully than in other provinces. This was a great merit of M.I. Kutuzov. By his order, officers, non-commissioned officers and experienced soldiers from regular units were sent to the squads to organize and train the militias. They were better than others armed with firearms. In total, the militias numbered 15,279 people.

On August 30, the new head of the St. Petersburg militia, who replaced M.I. Kutuzov, who was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky reported to Alexander I that he was ready to go on a campaign.

Solemn farewell to the St. Petersburg People's Militia took place on September 1 at St. Isaac's Square. “The day was clear and quite hot...,” wrote F. Politkovsky, a pupil of the Mountain Cadet Corps. “The banners of the St. Petersburg militia were consecrated in St. ..".

The Petersburg militia came out to reinforce a separate corps of General P.Kh. Wittgenstein, who covered the St. Petersburg direction.

On October 6, a stubborn and bloody battle for the liberation of Polotsk began, in which the Petersburg People's Militia received its first baptism of fire.

The corps commander reported on October 8: "... The St. Petersburg militia ... to the admiration of everyone fought with such desperation that they did not lag behind their comrades old soldiers in anything, and most of all they acted perfectly in columns on bayonets ...".

"Bearded people," the French marshal Saint-Cyr admitted, "fought with the greatest bitterness and showed the greatest courage."

Having liberated Polotsk, P.Kh. Wittgestein began to pursue the French.

In the last days of December 1812, the liberation campaign of the Russian armies in Europe began. The Petersburg militia took part in the offensive in East Prussia. On December 25, Koenigsberg was occupied.

In June 1813, the Cossack regiments of ataman Platov came to Danzig. Several militias were sent to reinforce them, including the Petersburg one, but only on December 17, 1813, Danzig capitulated. The siege of Danzig was the last battle of the Petersburg militia.

On January 22, 1814, the Petersburg militia set out on their way back, which ended on June 12. On this day, 4197 militia entered St. Petersburg, where they were solemnly welcomed on St. Isaac's Square. Soon they were disbanded to their homes, and the banner of the militia was transferred for storage to the St. Petersburg arsenal.

NOU UVK "Swipe"

The role of the people's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Scientific adviser: Alexander Gorets

1. Introduction.

2. People's militia 1812. What is it? Formation of the people's militia.

3. Heads of the militias.

4. The most important battles in which the people's militias took part.

1.1. The first battle near Polotsk.

1.2. The second battle near Polotsk.

1.3. Battle of Borodino.

5. Conclusion.

Chapter #1

People's militia 1812. What is it?

Formation of the people's militia.

People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - military formations created in Russia during the war according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6, 1812. They were used to replace regular troops in the interior of the country and reinforce them in the event of an invasion of the Napoleonic army deep into the country. In connection with the unfavorable development of hostilities for Russia, the militia, which was one of the manifestations of the patriotic upsurge of the population, became one of the sources of replenishment of the Russian regular army, since with the recruiting method of recruitment and a 25-year term of military service in the country there was no trained reserve. Warriors in the people's militia were put up by landlords from serfs (usually 4-5 people aged 17-45 from 100 revision souls). A small number of militias were volunteers from artisans, philistines and the clergy. The serfs willingly went to the people's militia, hoping after the war to be freed from serfdom, which was a myth, since after the end of the war all the serfs returned to their landowners. The collection of warriors, their armament and supply were carried out by committees of district noble assemblies at the expense of voluntary donations (their amount in 1812-14 amounted to 83 million rubles), and from March 1813 at the expense of the treasury. Officers were appointed from noble volunteers who had previously served in the army. District commanders were elected by the noble assemblies. According to the manifesto of July 18, the areas of formation of the people's militia were limited to 16 central provinces. The people's militia of the Moscow, Smolensk, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan, Tver, Yaroslavl and Vladimir provinces was the 1st district (commander General F. V. Rastopchin) and was intended for the defense of Moscow. The 2nd district (commander General M. I. Kutuzov, from August 27 - General P. I. Meller-Zakomelsky, from September 22 - Senator A. A. Bibikov) included the militia of the Petersburg and Novgorod provinces, covering the St. Petersburg direction. the militia of the Kostroma, Vyatka, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Simbirsk and Penza provinces was part of the 3rd district (commanded by General P. A. Tolstoy) and constituted a reserve. Later, a horse and foot militia was formed in the Poltava and Chernigov provinces (commander General N.V. Gudovich). On the initiative of the local authorities, people's militia detachments were created in the Pskov, Tambov, Kursk, Kiev, and other provinces. The total number of N. o. amounted to over 300 thousand people. From the militias, foot 4-battalion regiments (2500 people each) were created. ), horse regiments (1400 people each) and squads (820 people each). The main weapons were pikes, axes and sabers, a small number of warriors were armed with guns. By the end of 1812, most of the militias received guns. The warrior's clothing consisted of a cloth caftan, trousers, a shirt, boots and a cap with a copper cross. Regiments of the people's militia participated in the Smolensk and Borodino battles, in the battles near Polotsk, Chashniki, on the river. Berezina, in foreign campaigns of 1813-14, during the siege of the fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Hamburg. Upon returning to Russia (March 1813 - October 1814), the people's militia was disbanded, and the serfs were returned to the landowners.

Chapter number 2.

Militia leaders.

In my opinion, it would be foolish to talk about the people's militia without mentioning those under whose leadership the people drove the French invaders from Russian lands. I propose to start from Moscow. Since there are a lot of them, I will talk about two, in my opinion, the most important generals.

Moscow military general-governor, infantry general F.V. Rostopchin

Fedor Vasilyevich Rostopchin was born on March 23, 176 in the village of Kosmodemyanskoye, Livensky district, Oryol province. January 18, 1826, Moscow - Russian statesman, infantry general, favorite of Emperor Paul and head of his foreign policy, Moscow mayor and governor-general of Moscow during the Napoleonic invasion, alleged culprit of the Moscow fire. After the publication of the manifesto on July 6 on the convening of the people's militia, Rostopchin personally supervised the gathering of the provincial militia, which took place not only in Moscow, but also in six neighboring provinces. From the emperor, he received general instructions on strengthening Moscow and on evacuating state valuables from it, if necessary. In just 24 days, Rostopchin formed 12 regiments in the First District with a total number of almost 26,000 militias. Among other defensive preparations of this period, one can note the financing of the Leppich project for the construction of a combat controlled balloon, intended for bombing enemy troops and landing troops. Despite the large funds spent on the Leppikha project (more than 150 thousand rubles), however, it turned out to be untenable.

Lieutenant General I.I. carrots

In 1792, he was in the mission of M. I. Kutuzov at the conclusion of peace with Turkey and was sent to Catherine II with the news of the signing of the Iasi Peace, for which he received the rank of major general. In the same year, he fought with the Poles, commanding a separate detachment in the corps of General Kakhovsky, and was awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd class, for distinction in the battle of Gorodishche. No. 29 June 26, 1792 In August 1812, during the Patriotic War, at the election of the Moscow nobility, he was appointed head of the Moscow militia and was with him at Borodino and in battles near the river. Maloyaroslavets, Vyazma and Krasny, for which he was awarded the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky (December 1812). In 1813, due to illness, he left military service. He died in Moscow at the age of 76; buried in Moscow at the Vagankovsky cemetery.

Chapter number 3.

The most important battles, in which the people's militias took part.

First Battle of Polotsk.

In July 1812, both sides, as by agreement, preferred to leave military operations aside and confine themselves to observations until almost the end of July. After the retreat of the French troops led by Marshal MacDonald to Polotsk, Count Wintgenstein remained on the right side of the Drissa River near the village of Sokolishche. Under the command of our commander, Major General Gelfreich, there was a vanguard, consisting of six battalions, eleven squadrons and several hundred Cossacks with twelve guns.

At the same time, the Bavarian corps moved to the right side of the Dvina. At the beginning of the war, when crossing the Neman, it numbered 25 thousand people in its ranks, noticeably weakened, mortality increased from disease and hunger. The Bavarian troops were in this position until they were ordered to immediately march on Polotsk.

After the battle of Klyastitsy and the defeat of the French troops, led by Marshal Oudinot, his troops were forced to retreat to Polotsk in the St. Petersburg direction. Wintgenstein without thinking twice, decided to attack the French in the early morning of the next day. The day before, to help General Oudinot, Napoleon sent Major Saint-Ciri to help him, led by the 6th Bavarian Corps.

Early in the morning, our troops, under the command of Peter Khristianovich, attacked the positions of the French troops near the village of Spas on August 17th. Since it was in the morning, the French were able to be surprised and forced to retreat. That same night, Oudinot with his corps continued to retreat to Gamzelevo to Polotsk. Having received an order from Napoleon to follow the general, Saint-Cyr with his troops, bypassing the village of Arteykovichi, reached Polotsk by morning. The crossing was very long and lasted all night. Hunger, exhaustion, and ever-increasing mortality were killing the soldiers, which means that by the beginning of the battle the French had not so many troops left, which benefited the Russian troops during the battle.

From our side, General Gelfreich received an order to clear a forest defile near Polotsk. After a three-hour skirmish, the Chasseurs regiments of the 25th, under the command of Major Vetoshkin and the 26th Colonel Roth, sent from the avant-garde, drove the enemy out of the forest by the dawn of August 17 and took possession of the country house Prismenishcheyu. In this battle, General Verdier, a veteran of the French army, was seriously wounded. The French were forced to withdraw to the city and position themselves in front of it.

On August 17, the troops of General Gelfrecht and Colonel Vlasov, leaving the forest, came under heavy fire from enemy batteries. The French took an advantageous position for the battle: the Dvina River on the right, the Polotaya River in the rear, and Polotsk could serve as a good stronghold during the retreat.

Count Wittgenstein launched an attack in order to encourage the enemy to retreat behind the Dvina.

The village of Spas was chosen as the point for the attack. At seven o'clock in the morning, the arrows of the 24th Chasseurs and Perm regiments knocked out the enemy from several buildings in the village and threw him over the ravine. Here, Marshal Oudinot was seriously wounded in the shoulder, after which he transferred command to Marshal San Cyr, whom I mentioned earlier, and soon died. The French constantly made attacks on the positions of our batteries, but each time they were overturned by our arrows.

On the night of August 17-18, Saint-Cyr gathered all his generals at headquarters, and informed them of his intentions to attack the Russian army with all the forces of both corps located near Polotsk. At the council, it was decided to put the soldiers into battle the next day at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Count Wittgenstein, in turn, noticing the indecision of the enemy, decided to remain in their positions.

The next day, at half past 4, General Valentine's division crossed the Dvina following Merle's divisions. By this action, Saint-Cyr wanted to draw Wittgenstein's attention to the column behind the Dvina and take the main troops by surprise. Suddenly, for our troops, close to the positions of the French, and the infantry went on the offensive. But quickly taking control of the situation, our gunners fought back and stopped the offensive. A battle ensued.

At a moment when it seemed that just a little more, and the French infantry would reach our positions, Colonel Sukhozanet took over, along with his first cavalry company. With his soldiers, he stepped forward and gave battle to the troops of the generals Merle and Castex. This surprise attack not only stopped the advance of the French, but also made it possible to freely attack Dunmerck's division. The outcome of the entire battle may have depended on this attack.

After another counter-attack, the French returned to their original positions, and Wittgenstein, noticing the numerical superiority of the enemy, decided to retreat.

The second battle near Polotsk.

After the retreat of the French troops of General Saint-Cyr to Polotsk, Lieutenant General Steingel came out to help Wittgenstein. At the beginning of October, Wittgenstein had forty thousand men with one hundred and fifty guns, while Stengel had about ten thousand men with eighteen guns. To cross the Dvina, instead of pontoons, two bridges were specially built, through which the troops could reach the village of Goryan, which was located above Polotsk.

On October 15, Wittgenstein divided his troops into three columns for the offensive on Polotsk, and two of them made up the first corps under the personal command of Wittgenstein, and the third column was the second corps, entrusted to Lieutenant General Yashvil, and the reinforcements that arrived significantly strengthened the corps of the commander in chief. While Wittgenstein was preparing to attack, Saint-Cyr, realizing that there was no help from anyone, tried to strengthen his positions as much as possible and prepared for defense. Foraging became painful and dangerous, and the delivery of provisions from Vilna was insufficient to support the troops gathered at Polotsk. Since the keeping of horses was not available in this place at the moment, Saint-Cyr decided to send all paired ungulates beyond the Dvina, because there were still stocks of oats and hay. But before these actions were carried out, Wittgenstein opened offensive actions, to which the Marshal of France turned his attention exclusively to the defense of the occupied position.

On October 17, the vanguard of General Balk moved to the village of Yuryevichi and attacked the enemy there, occupying the left bank of Polota and part of the village. Saint-Cyr noticed this and ordered Legrand's division to cover the rear of the seventh redoubt.

Meanwhile, Count Wigenstein decided to outflank the French army from the right flank and enter the city from the rear along with the Combined Cavalry Regiment and the Kaluga Infantry. The French, in turn, noticed this, and hit several squadrons on our left-flank detachment, threatening to throw it back to the Dvina. The reserve squadrons of the Consolidated Regiment entered the business. They hit the attacking French in the forehead, and Major Nabel with a battalion of Grodno hussars hit them on the flank and overturned the enemy.

In continuation of these hostilities, General Begichev came to the battlefield with a reserve, who received an order from the commander-in-chief to reinforce the center with two battalions. Meanwhile, on the left side of Polota, the battle stopped, Prince Yashvil received an order to attack the enemy. At the end of the day, Count Steingel informed Wittgenstein that the Finnish Corps could attack Polotsk the very next day, but the commander-in-chief decided not to take any action.

On the morning of October 19, the troops of both sides remained in their positions: Saint-Cyr was waiting for news from the cavalry detachments sent by him to the left bank of the Dvina, and Wittgenstein intended to attack the enemy on both sides of the Polota.

The unexpected appearance of the Finnish Corps upset all the calculations of Saint-Cyr at three o'clock in the afternoon: he was going to withdraw across the river, but he wanted to retreat at night, slowly and keeping silence. Fortunately for the French, thick fog accelerated the onset of darkness, and that forced Count Steingel to stop four miles from Polotsk. Prince Yashvili received an order from the commander-in-chief to open a cannonade on all enemy positions, as soon as the Finnish Corps approached the French, as soon as he noticed the chaotic movement of enemy troops along the left bank of the Dvina, he opened fire from all batteries. According to Saint-Cyr, one of the generals of Lengrand's division ordered the barracks to be burned so that the Russians would not get them. The flames spread at lightning speed throughout the French camp, which made it clear to our commander in chief: the enemy was leaving the positions he had occupied. From our side, the cannonade in the city was strengthened. The shelling of Polotsk led to panic in the ranks of the French troops and their retreat. Because of this, their carts became a heavy burden for them, which they did not want to leave to the enemy. The French were ready to defend.

At two o'clock in the morning Wittgenstein ordered to go on the assault. Polotsk was attacked by General Vlatsov and General Ridiger. To get to Polotsk, one has to cross the Polota River, which flows in a deep ravine, over which a wooden bridge was thrown. A small plan was formed to cross the river. The provincial secretary Petrov was supposed to wade across the river and strike with bayonets at the enemy, and then give a sign for the main troops to cross the bridge. This order was carried out unconditionally: the Russian squad crossed the river and captured the left bank of the river. According to Saint-Cyr, our troops fought with unusual ferocity and fearlessness. At three o'clock in the morning, the French, having destroyed the bridges across the Dvina, opened heavy fire on the city. On our side, the cannonade was stopped. On the part of the French there were many prisoners, about six to seven thousand people were lost. We lost from eight thousand people, among whom were generals Prince Sibirsky and Gamin and Colonel Roth. Count Wittgenstein entered the city even before the heyday and brought troops with him.

On the morning of the 21st, a messenger came from St. Petersburg with a rescript, which the commander-in-chief could print out only after the capture of Polotsk. It said that he had been promoted to the rank of general of the cavalry. Meanwhile, the construction of a bridge on rafts across the Dvina was in full swing to maintain communication with General Steingel, who was in danger of being attacked by the enemy's superior numbers. Despite the efforts of our sappers, who worked under the guidance of engineer-colonel Sievers, the construction of the bridge could not be completed until October 23.

Despite the fatigue and exhaustion of the French-Bavarian soldiers, Saint-Cyr wanted to attack the troops led by Steingel, and only part of Lengrand's division, which crossed the Dvina before the rest and had a good rest, was able to attack.

On the morning of October 20, having gathered troops, General Wrede moved against Steingel. The count, having decided that Saint-Cyr was following Verde, retreated to the Desna River and crossed to the right side of the Dvina. General Sazonov was sent to help our general with twelve thousand people.

The next day, our troops went on the offensive and pushed the French troops away from Polotsk.

Battle of Borodino.

One can talk about the Battle of Borodino for a very long time and a lot, and therefore, I will describe only the main and most important moment of the battle at the village of Borodino.

We must start with the fact that people came to sign up for the militia already on the Borodino field. Those who were recorded just before the battle were not included in the lists of the militia. They came to stand, to die for their homeland. They knew they were going to die and still came. They defiantly went into battle under the command of Peter Bagration, who died during the battle.

The feat of the Moscow militia was great. Of the ten thousand militias, only hundreds survived. By order of Napoleon Bonaparte, given to Marshals Davout, Murart and Ney, attack the left flank of the Russian position. The most brutal and bloody battle took place at five in the morning where the people's militia was located.

The first attacks were repulsed by Russian artillery and heavy rifle fire. Marshal Davout was shell-shocked in the head, and his horse was killed. In the very first attacks, a lot of French commanders were killed - several generals and colonels. Napoleon ordered to "pour" with dense fire from one hundred and fifty guns of Bagration's position. They fought for the Semyonov flushes. We got the flushes, but not for long. Soon a hail of buckshot rained down on our positions.

It is impossible to lose sight of the cuirassier Adrian, who served Bagration during the battle. When a fragment from the core hit the general, he was the first to pick it up and carry it away from the battlefield. When he was taken to a safe place, he ran up and told him: “Your Excellency, you are being taken to be treated, you no longer need me!” Then, eyewitnesses report, “Adrianov, in the sight of thousands, launched like an arrow, instantly crashed into the ranks of the enemy and, having hit many, fell dead.” As a result, the Semyonov flushes were captured, but one way or another, Napoleon left the positions he had occupied and retreated.

Conclusion.

Having analyzed the most important battles, in my opinion, and having told what the people's militia was in the 19th century, we can draw a line under this - the people's militia greatly influenced the Patriotic War of 1812. Having analyzed the material of sources that are very important for me, the authors of which are Bogdanovich and Tarle, I came to the conclusion that the Russian Empire owes victory to its people. He rebelled against the invaders. There are many cases when the inhabitants of simple villages met the French as heroes, liberators. Then they were drunk and killed.

The people's militia struck me with their selflessness. They went into battle and knew they were going to die. I believe that the highest spiritual country is the Russian Empire, and that only its people are capable of such a thing.

Bibliography:

1. M.I. Bogdanovich "History of the Patriotic War of 1812" (2012 "Eksmo")

2. E.V. Tarle "1812 year of Russian glory" (2012 "Eksmo")

3. "Historical archive of St. Petersburg"

On June 12, 1812, French troops invaded Russia. Napoleon, who by this time had conquered almost all of Europe, threw his 600,000-strong army to the east. He declared: "In five years I will be the master of the world: there is only Russia left, but I will crush it."

Mortal danger hung over the country. It quickly became clear that the Russian army was not sufficiently prepared to conduct real combat operations. The troops, stretched for almost five hundred kilometers and inferior to the enemy in numbers by almost three times, retreated with heavy fighting. Napoleon determined three directions for the offensive on the territory of Russia, he called the Kiev direction "the legs of Russia", the Moscow one - the "heart", and the Petersburg one - the "head". The main forces of the French army moved to Moscow, but the threat to Petersburg was also considerable. By July, the situation escalated so much that the tsar ordered to prepare for the evacuation of the "shrines" of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, the State Council, the Senate, the Synod, the Hermitage treasures and even the monuments to Peter, which Napoleon intended to send to France after the capture of St. Petersburg. The royal family was also preparing to move to Kazan.

Emperor Alexander I

In mid-July, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was invited to the Committee of Ministers, who was entrusted with the leadership of the defense of the capital. A few days later, a royal decree appeared on the organization of a corps for the defense of St. Petersburg. Alexander I, who did not like Kutuzov, this time sincerely turned to him: "Your military virtues and your long-term experience give me full hope that you will completely justify this new experience of my power of attorney to you."

Emperor Napoleon I

Meanwhile, things were not going well in the active army, and Napoleon was already boastfully declaring that in a month he would be in Moscow. But to fight the enemy, as happened in Russia in case of real danger, the whole people rose up. In Smolensk, the first detachments of the people's militia began to be created, then representatives of the nobility and merchants of Moscow decided to assemble the militia of the Moscow province, and a few days later in the noble assembly of St. Petersburg at a general meeting of the nobility, merchants, officials and clergy of the capital, it was decided to create a militia of St. . From every hundred souls of serfs, ten people stood out in its composition. Kutuzov was unanimously chosen as the head of the militia.

A whole delegation, its representatives, were sent home to the old general and conveyed to Kutuzov a request to take command of the St. Petersburg militia. Touched by the trust of the townspeople, Kutuzov arrived at the noble assembly, entered the large hall, where they were patiently waiting for him, and with tears in his eyes said: "Gentlemen! I wanted to tell you a lot ... I can only say that you adorned my gray hairs!..." . In 1812, the general turned 67 years old. A few days later, Alexander I officially entrusted Kutuzov with the command of the militia of the Petersburg and Novgorod provinces, as well as e by all land and sea forces located in St. Petersburg, Kronstadt and Finland.

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov

Kutuzov set about organizing the defense of the capital. A special military corps was formed, named Narva, the troops were redeployed in the most dangerous directions, their engineering equipment was strengthened, supplies were replenished, and the construction of new defensive fortifications began. At the same time, work was underway to form a militia army: they accepted warriors, collected donations, while the landlords, who put up their serfs for the militia, were obliged to ensure the cultivation of the fields of those who had gone to fight, pay taxes for them, provide them with provisions and salaries.

The number of the militia soon amounted to about 13 thousand people, it was divided into squads, and Kutuzov demanded that in one squad there were people who had previously lived nearby, this, in his opinion, should contribute to mutual assistance in battle. The militias underwent special training in shooting, formation, methods of action with weapons, combat tactics, they had to be armed and deployed. Gradually, all these tasks were solved, and during the solemn ceremony each militia received a weapon, and each squad received its own banner. Then the entire militia army marched solemnly along Nevsky Prospekt.

The situation in St. Petersburg was still very tense: the issue of evacuation was discussed again, the Hermitage valuables were packed and taken to Petrozavodsk. But at the same time, as contemporaries noted, “great excitement of the people” reigned in the capital: whole families went to the militia, money and jewelry were given for the benefit of the army, patriotic performances about Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Minin and Pozharsky were given in the theaters of the capital.

The military actions of the French in the St. Petersburg direction were controlled by the corps under the command of P. Wittgenstein, and Kutuzov sought to combine the forces of the army and the militia. Napoleon, having thrown his main forces to Moscow, did not expect much resistance during the defense of St. Petersburg, but on July 19, the first fierce battle took place near the village of Klyastitsy, in which the French were defeated and lost about a thousand people as prisoners. This turn of events came as a huge surprise to them, and the French command was forced to refrain from active operations in the direction of St. Petersburg. For the Russian army, the victory at Klyastitsy was a huge moral boost. The Petersburg militia, having passed its first baptism of fire, on August 3 took the oath on the parade ground of the Semenovsky regiment. The ceremony was attended by Alexander I, before whom the army passed in a solemn parade. The emperor finally appreciated the merits of Kutuzov and appointed him a member of the State Council. However, the commander did not have to command the St. Petersburg militia: after long discussions in a special emergency committee that was supposed to choose the supreme commander of the Russian army, it was Kutuzov who was nevertheless approved for this position. Soon the old general departed for the place of the main hostilities. The Petersburg militia united with Wittgenstein's corps, and the warriors more than once showed themselves to be fearless warriors.

Cossack of the 1st regiment and warrior of foot squads
St. Petersburg militia

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was never destined to return to St. Petersburg again. After the victorious expulsion of the French from Russia in the spring of 1813, he died in the small town of Bunzlau (modern Poland). The ashes of the great commander were solemnly transported to St. Petersburg through all of Europe. They decided to bury Kutuzov in the Kazan Cathedral. The whole city met the mournful procession with the body of the commander, they even unharnessed the horses from the chariot and carried the coffin on their shoulders. On June 11 and 12, many Petersburgers came to the cathedral to say goodbye to the savior of the Fatherland, and the burial ceremony itself took place the next day. At that moment, the mourning ringing of bells floated over St. Petersburg, the troops gave a triple salute. Kutuzov's grave can still be seen in the cathedral today: it is covered with a marble slab and surrounded by a metal lattice with gilded wreaths with a bronze family coat of arms in the middle. Around the grave are military trophies: enemy banners and standards, keys to fortresses and cities taken by Russian troops, here is the marshal's baton of General Davout, captured along with the office of the French commander.

Monument to M.I. Kutuzov at the Kazan Cathedral

Other memorable places associated with the victory in the liberation war of 1812 appeared in the capital. Already in 1814, in honor of the Russian troops returning from foreign campaigns, at the beginning of the Peterhof highway (now Stachek Square), according to the project of the architect D. Quarenghi, the solemn Narva triumphal gates were erected, later rebuilt in stone by V. Stasov. The triumphal arch of extraordinary beauty and solemnity adorned Palace Square - it became part of the General Staff building, built by the architect Rossi.

Here, on Palace Square, the Alexander Column ascended to a height of more than 47 meters, its top is crowned by the figure of an angel trampling a snake with a cross - a symbol of victory over evil. But by right, the main memorial to the victories in the Patriotic War of 1812 was the Kazan Cathedral and the square in front of it, where in 1837 monuments to Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly by the sculptor B. Orlovsky were erected.

The text was prepared by Galina Dregulyas

For those who want to know more:
1. Patriotic War of 1812. Encyclopedia. M., 2004
2. Troitsky N.A. Great Year of Russia. M., 1988
3. Shishov A. Kutuzov. Field Marshal of the Great Empire. M., 2006

From 6 (18) July 1812 and his appeal to the inhabitants of the "Eternal Throne of our Moscow" with a call to act as the initiators of this "people's armament".

Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection within the state of the Zemstvo militia. July 6 (18), 1812

The widespread convocation of zemstvo militias that had begun was limited by the Manifesto of July 18 (30) “On the compilation of a temporary internal militia” by 16 central provinces adjacent to the established theater of military operations, which were divided into three districts. The first (I-th) district (Moscow, Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Smolensk provinces) was intended to protect Moscow. The second (II) district (St. Petersburg and Novgorod provinces) ensured the "guard" of the capital. The Volga provinces of the third (III) district (Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Kostroma, Simbirsk and Vyatka) were to serve as a reserve for the first two militia districts. The rest of the provinces were ordered to remain “inactive” until “there is no need to use them for uniform sacrifices and services to the Fatherland.”


M.I. Kutuzov - head of the St. Petersburg militia. Artist S. Gerasimov

Formation of militias

By legislative acts, the collection of militias was assigned to the apparatus of state power, the nobility and the church.

The general leadership of the formation of the militias was carried out by the Special Committee under the emperor, which included the general of artillery, the minister of police, lieutenant general, and the secretary of state, vice admiral. The heads of the three districts of the militia were appointed by decrees of the emperor, and the entire leadership of the provincial militia, from the commander to the commanders of the regiments (teams), was elected by the local nobility and presented for the highest approval.

Chiefs of the militias of the Patriotic War of 1812

Militias of districts and provinces of Russia Chiefs
I-st (Moscow)
militia district
Moscow military general-governor, infantry general (Rastopchin)
Moscow Lieutenant General (Markov)
Tverskaya Lieutenant General
Yaroslavskaya Major General
Vladimirskaya Lieutenant General
Ryazan Major General
Tula Civil Governor, Privy Councilor
from 16.11. 1812 Major General
Kaluga Lieutenant General
Smolensk Lieutenant General N.P. Lebedev
II-nd (St. Petersburg)
militia district
General of Infantry (Golenishchev-Kutuzov),
from 27.8. on 09/22/1812 lieutenant general,
then a senator
St. Petersburg General of Infantry
M.I. Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov),
from 8/8/1812 Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky
Novgorod Gene. from infantry,
from sept. In 1812, Lieutenant-General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky,
III-th (Volga region)
militia district
Lieutenant General
Kazanskaya Major General
Nizhny Novgorod Valid. chamberlain, prince
Penza Major General
Kostroma Lieutenant General
Simbirskaya Actual State Councillor
Vyatskaya -

The military department assisted in the training of warriors, provided them with firearms and ammunition from their arsenals and warehouses. The Ministry of Finance controlled the storage and proper spending of funds collected for the militia. On July 25 (August 6), 1812, Alexander I approved the report of the Most Holy Governing Synod, according to which the Russian Orthodox Church allocated 1.5 million rubles for the organization of the St. and "clerks, children of clergy and clergymen and seminarians" were allowed to be released into warriors.


Highly approved on July 23, 1812, the drawing of the banner of the St. Petersburg People's Militia

The procedure for the collection of zemstvo troops was established in the highest approved on July 14 (26) "Report on the composition of the Moscow military force" - the rules for organizing the Moscow militia. The local nobility was entrusted with its formation, leadership and mandatory personal service in it in general and officer positions. Retired officers entered the zemstvo army with the same rank, and civil officials lost one of their class ranks according to the Table of Ranks. Nobles from retired non-commissioned officers and those who served in the public service were assigned to the positions of conscripts (non-commissioned officers). The militias were to be disbanded "on the expulsion of the enemy from our land", and the officers and warriors who were in them - to return "to their original state and to their former duties."

The creation of the zemstvo army began with the convocation by the governor and the provincial marshal of the nobility of a congress of representatives of the "noble class" of all counties. It adopted the Regulations on the militia, and also established its number, the procedure for the allocation and equipment of warriors, the timing of their collection; Elections were made for the chief of the provincial army and commanders of regiments (teams). At the same time, the governor, together with the noble assembly, formed the Organizing Committee, which was directly involved in the formation of the militia. It included the governor (usually he presided), the provincial marshal of the nobility, the city head and officials elected by the nobility or appointed by higher authorities. Militia committees in their activities had the right to apply to any "places and persons and demand from whom you need assistance and help." After the meeting, the nobility traveled to their estates, and his decision served as a guide for the activities of the established provincial committees of the militia, local administration, provincial and district leaders of the nobility.

Each landlord was obliged to submit to the militia a certain number of equipped and armed warriors from his serfs within the prescribed time. The unauthorized entry of serfs into the militia was a crime. The selection of warriors was carried out by the landowner or peasant communities by lot. Noble estates that put up warriors in the militia were exempted from recruitment sets until it was dissolved. Other categories of peasants - state, economic, appanage, as well as philistines and artisans were subject to recruitment in the usual manner.


Blessing of the militiaman in 1812. Artist I. Luchaninov. 1812 For this picture in 1812 I.V. Luchaninov received a gold medal of the first dignity and the title of an artist with a certificate of the first degree

The reception of warriors and horses was carried out in prefabricated places in the counties by special commissions consisting of an official (officer) from the militia, the leader of the county nobility, the mayor and the doctor. Physical and age requirements for the militias, as a temporary army, have been reduced compared to recruiting sets. The people rejected by the selection committees were to be replaced by their deliverers.

Warriors of the provincial militias united in regiments of horse and foot Cossacks (in the provincial militias formed according to the Manifesto on July 18 (30), 1812, the Cossacks meant not representatives of the Cossack military class, but lightly armed horse or foot soldiers), as well as foot rangers (in In the 2nd district, the regiments were called squads). Foot regiments were divided into battalions, battalions into hundreds and tens. Mounted regiments - hundreds, hundreds - dozens. The "Smolensk militia" consisted of district militias, headed by a thousandth chief, which in turn were divided into "five hundred", hundreds and fifty. The militia of each province was under the command of its chief.


Chief officer, sergeant and Cossack of foot regiments of the Tula militia. Colorized lithograph by Klevezat based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

The provincial militias were equipped, armed and maintained until they entered the active army from a special fund, which included mandatory cash and in-kind contributions, as well as donations. The main part of the donations came not from individuals, but from social groups and was made without fail. The nobility, merchants, philistines, artisans, peasant societies at their meetings established the total amount of the collection and made its layout among the members of their class, depending on their property status. The collection of funds for the militia and defense was carried out throughout Russia and amounted to about 100 million rubles in monetary terms. For 1812-1814 government spending on the army amounted to 157.453 million rubles. With the inclusion of the provincial troops in the army, the militia committees transferred the remaining money to the Ministry of Finance.


The agenda of the city elders of the St. Petersburg merchants to the merchant M.M. Balakhnov dated 08/14/1812 with a notice of the need to make a sum of money for the organization of the militia

The collection of reserves for the maintenance of zemstvo troops in the provinces was limited by the decree of Alexander I to 3 months, in the future they had to be content at state expense. In reality, this transition took place only in March 1813, when most of the militias, together with the army, left the borders of Russia. The chiefs of regiments (druzhinas), commanders of battalions were not supposed to be paid "due to the importance of the rank in which they serve and by special power of attorney of the sovereign emperor, out of zeal for the Fatherland." Poor nobles from the militia fund were paid an allowance for equipment. The norm for providing a warrior at the expense of a payer was the government-established rations of a three-month allowance for recruits sent to collection points. His uniform consisted of a cloth caftan, trousers, a shirt, boots and a cap with a brass cross and the inscription "For Faith and the Tsar" on it.


Huntsman, foot and horse Cossacks of the Tver militia.
Colorized lithograph by P. Ferlund 2nd after a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

The militias were short of firearms, ammunition and military equipment, as they were primarily allocated to form the reserve units of the regular army. Provincial troops received guns only when they were included in the active army. Therefore, after the end of the collection, all the militias, except for St. Petersburg, were armed mainly with edged weapons - pikes, spears and axes. By the beginning of December 1812, about 49.5 thousand guns were issued to the militias from the arsenals and weapons factories.


Foot and mounted Cossacks of the Ryazan militia.
Colorized lithograph by Beck after a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

The military training of the warriors took place according to a shortened recruit training program, the instructors in the training were officers and lower ranks from the army and Cossack units, located in the places where the provincial troops were formed.

The extraordinary circumstances associated with the retreat of the Russian armies to Moscow forced the government of Alexander I to give the "people's armament" a wider scope than originally envisaged by the Manifesto of July 18. In addition to the Zemstvo (peasant), the formation of Cossack militias (from representatives of a special military estate) began, the structure of which was determined by the “Regulations of the Cossack troops”, approved by Alexander I at the beginning of the 19th century.

In the Ukrainian provinces, a Cossack (22 regiments) and two zemstvo militias (Poltava and Chernigov) with a total number of 70-75 thousand people were assembled. The Bug Cossack army (Kherson province) equipped at its own expense a squad of 500 Cossacks, which did not participate in hostilities, but served on the cordons established in connection with the plague epidemic in the autumn of 1812.

The Don Army formed 22 militia regiments numbering 12.7 thousand people, which were joined by 4 regiments of "serving Cossacks" left in the city of Novocherkassk to carry out construction work and carry out internal service.

On the territory subordinated to the Orenburg military governor, the prince, from the Bashkir-Meshcheryak irregular army, the Orenburg and Ural Cossack troops, 23 (2 Meshcheryak, 18 Bashkir, 2nd Teptyar, Orenburg No. 3 and Ural No. 5) five-hundred and one thousand strong ( Orenburg Ataman) Cossack regiments with a total number of 13 thousand Cossacks.

In the Livland province, a 2,000-strong "mounted police" was organized, then reorganized into a Cossack regiment with a staff of 800 people.

In addition, temporary armed formations (regiments, squadrons and detachments) were formed on the private initiative of the nobility to strengthen the active army. From the state peasants of the Vologda and Olonets provinces, more than 1 thousand warriors were gathered into the St. Petersburg militia; from the coachmen of the tract Petersburg - Moscow, the Tver-Yamskaya Cossack regiment was formed, numbering about 800 people. The governor of the Pskov province is allowed to recruit Russian refugees from the Western regions, captured by the enemy, "on the rules of the temporary militia". Armed detachments were created from the shooters of the forest guards of the Western provinces, subordinate to the Forest Department of the Ministry of Finance. From the huntsmen of the Courland and Bushvechter villages, the “Corps of Courland Riflemen” was composed of several hundred warriors. In the forest estates of the Derpt and Pernovsky districts, about 200 shooters were gathered.


Matveev is a warrior of the 1st squad of the St. Petersburg militia. Lithograph by V. Timm. 1850s

At their own expense, with the highest permission, the 1st Jaeger Privy Councilor and the 1st Foot Chamberlain of Prince P.P. Gagarin regiments, in Tver from the specific peasants of 12 provinces - the Battalion of Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna, in the Kherson province - a squadron of a landowner. In the Smolensk province, the family of a retired major general formed from their yard and serf peasants the “equestrian hundred of the brothers Leslie of the Smolensk militia”, which, with the permission of the military command, became part of the army in the field. Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov, at the request of the local nobility, allowed the militia, gathered in the Dmitrovsky district of the Oryol province, to be sent to the army in the Mogilev province, etc.

In Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Baltic States, "volunteer" regiments and detachments were formed, staffed by recruiting volunteers "from persons of the free state" - nobles, officials, philistines, merchants and young students. With the highest permission, on the initiative of the nobility, the following gathered: Moscow Cossack counts and P.I. Saltykov regiments; in St. Petersburg - the 1st St. Petersburg volunteer Cossack regiment "Deadly" under the leadership of retired lieutenant Count F.M. de Olivera (Oliveira), and then a colonel, and the 2nd St. Petersburg Volunteer Cossack Regiment "Alexandria" of the retired staff captain Baron K.K. von Bode. Since it was difficult to staff them with the recruitment of "free" people, the Moscow Count M.A. Dmitry-Mamonov, the regiment was not formed until the end of 1812, and the personnel of the hussar count P.I. Saltykov regiment went to replenish the Irkutsk hussar regiment. Half of the number of the 1st and 2nd volunteer Cossack regiments of Colonel A.A. Yakhontov and Baron K.K. von Bode were militia warriors received from the St. Petersburg Organizing Committee. In the Baltics, detachments numbering several hundred people were assembled under the command of retired lieutenants K.K. Shmit (“Courland Corps of Free Equestrian and Foot Rangers”) and K. Nirota (“Volunteer Cossack Hundred”) from volunteers who lived in the Ostsee provinces.


Sergeant of the foot squads of the St. Petersburg militia.
Colorized lithograph of Ferlund the 2nd based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

In addition to the provincial zemstvo troops in the counties, cities, villages adjacent to the theater of military operations of the Smolensk, Moscow, Kaluga, Tula, Tver, Pskov, Chernigov, Tambov, Oryol provinces, "cordons" or "militia guards" were formed. They were gathered by the local administration and the nobility for self-defense and maintaining internal order, and in them the arming of the “inhabitants” took place without interruption from economic activities and the performance of public duties.


Badge of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of the Simbirsk reserve militia

Temporary armed formations were also created on the initiative of urban and peasant societies. The magistrate of Kyiv formed a cavalry regiment of about 1 thousand people from the townspeople to carry out internal guard duty, and Riga - eight "birger companies". The townspeople and merchants of Roslavl, Smolensk province, for their own protection, gathered an armed detachment, led by the mayor I.S. Polozov and merchant I.F. Golikov. In front-line villages and villages abandoned by landowners and local authorities, peasant societies themselves armed themselves to defend themselves against marauders and deserters.

The convocation of the militia, in comparison with the recruitment, allowed the government of Alexander I to mobilize large human and material resources for the war in a short time. In 16 militia provinces, 208-233.8 thousand warriors were deployed, of which: in the I district - 121.5-136.8 thousand, in the II-m - 23.0-25.9 thousand and in the III -m - 63.5-71.1 thousand people. Of this number of militias, 74 foot regiments, 2 battalions, 9 brigades (28 squads), 13 cavalry regiments and 3 hundreds were formed. In other provinces and regions not called by the Manifesto for militia (including Ukraine and the Don), about 104 thousand more people were gathered, amounting to 16 foot regiments and one battalion, 88 cavalry regiments and 3 squadrons. In total, up to 320 thousand warriors (including 50 thousand horsemen) served in the militias of the Patriotic War of 1812, according to other sources - up to 420 thousand. During the same period, 81 and 82 recruit sets were collected in the Russian army 107 thousand people and on the 83rd - 181.6 thousand recruits.

After the completion of the formation, the militias were under the unified command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov and the supreme leadership of Emperor Alexander I.

The militias "made up a second fence to reinforce the first and protect the homes, wives and children of each and all"

During the retreat of the Russian armies to Moscow, separate detachments of the Smolensk militia, together with regular units, fought near Krasnoy, and then defended Smolensk. About 28 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias participated in the battle of Borodino.

While the Great Army was in Moscow, the Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Ryazan and Kaluga militias defended the borders of their provinces from enemy foragers and marauders and, together with army partisans, blocked the enemy in Moscow. Part of the forces of the Tver and Yaroslavl provincial troops was part of the detachment of the adjutant general of the baron, who covered the road to St. Petersburg. Part of the Kaluga militia was sent to cover Bryansk with its foundry and artillery park.

In early October, the reinforcement of the general's corps by 15 squads of the Petersburg militia allowed his troops to liberate Polotsk from the enemy. Together with the Main Army, the retreating Napoleonic troops were pursued by the militias of the Moscow, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl, Tula, Kaluga, St. Petersburg and Novgorod Zemstvo provincial troops, the Don, Little Russian and Bashkir Cossack regiments, as well as individual battalions, squadrons and detachments. At the end of 1812, the Volga reserve militia, reinforced by Cossack regiments and the Ryazan provincial army, was sent first to the Little Russian provinces, and then to Volyn, and did not participate in hostilities on Russian territory.

During the critical periods of the war of 1812, the provincial militia served as a reserve for units of the army in the field. The militia regiments of the Cossack troops significantly strengthened the light cavalry of the armies of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov and ensured the successful conduct of the "small war" and the pursuit of the retreating enemy. But the main task of the zemstvo troops was to free the field units from serving in the rear garrisons, from guarding communications and escorting convoys and prisoners of war, from caring for the wounded and sick in hospitals and other non-combat duties.

Weak military training and weapons did not allow the use of the militias as an independent fighting force. Therefore, they were attached to army corps (lieutenant general P.Kh. Wittgenstein,), separate detachments (adjutant general F.F. Winzingerode,), where they retained their organizational independence (St. Petersburg, Novgorod militia, etc.), or , like Moscow, went to replenish them. The provincial troops, reinforced by army and Cossack units, acted as independent corps (detachments) under the command of a lieutenant general (the united Chernigov-Poltava militia) and a lieutenant general (militia corps of the III (Volga) district).

Zemsky militias and cordons (self-defense units) from local residents of the front-line provinces (Kaluga, Smolensk, Moscow, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Pskov and Chernigov) fought against enemy foragers, marauders, deserters, and also performed police functions to maintain internal order . They destroyed and captured 10-12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. Temporary armed formations of Tambov, Oryol and other provinces, which did not have to conduct combat operations, maintaining order on their territory, provided the local authorities with a favorable environment for recruiting and organizing the supply of the army.

After the end of hostilities on the territory of Russia, all provincial militias, except for Vladimir, Tver and Smolensk, participated in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. In the spring of 1813, the Moscow and Smolensk troops were disbanded, and by the end of 1814, all the other Zemstvo troops. In December 1816, the Special Committee for Internal Militia Affairs under the Emperor, as well as the last provincial committees, ceased their work.


I.A. Ivanov. The return of the St. Petersburg militia. 1814

"Moscow military force" in the Patriotic War of 1812

Shortly after the start of the Patriotic War, Emperor Alexander I, in the Manifesto on the collection within the state of the Zemstvo militia of July 6 (18), 1812, called for “gathering new forces inside the state, which, inflicting new horror on the enemy, would constitute a second fence in reinforcing the first and in defense houses, wives and children of each and all." At the same time, the emperor sent an appeal "to the ancient capital of our ancestors, Moscow", calling on Muscovites to set an example for "the whole of vast Russia" in creating a militia.


Moscow militia in the battles on the Old Smolensk road. Artist V. Kelerman. 1957

Already on July 11 (23), the decision to assemble the militia was adopted by the provincial noble assembly of the Mother See. Arriving in Moscow, the emperor on July 14 (26) approved the procedure for the formation and composition of the "Moscow military force". The next day, he met with the Moscow nobility, who volunteered to send one warrior from every 10 serfs (a total of 30 thousand warriors) to the militia, form one cavalry, 3 chasseurs and 8 foot regiments from them, equip and supply them with a three-month supply of food.

A number of nobles undertook to form regiments at their own expense: Chief Prosecutor of the 6th Department of the Senate M.A. Dmitriev-Mamonov - cavalry regiment, Privy Councilor N.N. Demidov - 1st Chasseur, and real chamberlain P.P. Gagarin - 1st foot.

On July 16 (28), the Moscow nobility elected M.I. Kutuzov, but in connection with his approval, the head of the St. Petersburg militia "Moscow military force" was headed by Lieutenant General I.I. Morkov (Markov). Governor-General of Moscow, Infantry General Count F.V. Rostopchin became the commander of the militia of the 1st district, which included the Moscow province. Prior to the arrival of Morkov in Moscow, the militia was commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Chicherin. Since July 20, two committees have been involved in the formation of the militia: the first - to receive the militia, weapons and food; the second is for collecting and distributing donations. In the manifesto of Alexander I of July 18, it was emphasized that "each of the soldiers, after the enemy has been driven out of our land, will return with honor and glory to his primitive state and to his former duties." The generals and officers of the militia were selected from retirees and officials who received military ranks in accordance with the Table of Ranks.
, 6th - Adjutant General, 7th - Major General, 8th - Major General V.D. Laptev.

On July 29 (August 10), the placement of warriors in the Golovinsky, Khamovniki and Sretensky barracks began; militia weapons were in the Nikolsky barracks, provisions - near the Serpukhov outpost. By August 1, 546 people joined the militia, food was collected for 117 people. The delay in the collection of the militia was caused by the beginning of the harvesting of bread, the lack of cloth, and the high cost of equipment. The combat training of the warriors was carried out for 7-10 days with the help of the soldiers of the Moscow garrison. On August 14, almost 6 thousand militiamen, after a solemn review in front of the Spassky barracks, a prayer service, the presentation of two banners-banners and a blessing by Archbishop Augustine, marched to the army.


Banner of the Moscow militia, 1812. Colored lithograph by A. Petrovsky based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

At the same time, militia units formed in Mozhaisk (4 regiments of the 3rd division), Ruza (4 regiments of the 1st division) and Vereya (3 regiments of the 2nd division) also acted. By August 18, the Moscow militia numbered 24,835 people, but only half had guns, the rest had pikes. On August 21-26, militia units approached the Mozhaisk and Borodino region and were distributed to help infantry corps, sappers, orderlies, military police: 2 thousand soldiers went to the commandant of Mozhaisk, 1.5 thousand to army convoys, about 17 thousand - in the 1st and 2nd armies, more than 3 thousand were left in reserve.


Warrior and chief officer of the merchant meshchyansky hundreds of the Moscow militia. Colorized lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

During the battle of Borodino, a detachment of the Moscow militia (16-18 battalions, up to 10 thousand people in total) under the command of Morkov was on the left flank of the Borodino position in the area of ​​the village of Utitsa. During the battle, he was joined by 4 battalions of militia, who came with the 2nd and 3rd infantry corps. In total, 19-20 thousand Moscow warriors were in battle formations at Borodino. Morkov's corps, located in the 2nd line, did not enter the battle, separate battalions were sent for a counterattack to the village of Utitsa, and were also used to carry out the wounded. 3.5-5 thousand warriors during the battle performed police functions in the near rear. On the evening of August 26 and the following days, 6 thousand soldiers of the Moscow militia ensured the passage of convoys and transports with the wounded to Mozhaisk and further to Moscow, suppressed riots and cases of looting.


Mounted Cossack of the Moscow militia. Colorized lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

On August 29, the troops remaining under the command of Morkov (1st - 3rd chasseur regiments, 1st - 3rd and 5th - 7th foot regiments, about 14 thousand people in total) were distributed among the regiments of the 1st and 2nd armies to make up for losses. The 4th and 8th Foot Regiments and teams were assigned to the 3rd and 7th Infantry Corps and the 27th Infantry Division. In the future, these warriors participated in the battles at Chirikov, Chernishna, Maloyaroslavets, Vyazma, Krasny. At the end of the 1812 campaign, they formed the garrisons of Orsha and Borisov.


Foot Cossack and huntsman. Colorized lithograph by P. Ferlund based on a drawing by P. Gubarev. Mid 19th century

In total, 27,672 warriors of the Moscow militia participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. By an imperial decree of March 30 (April 11), 1813, the militia was disbanded "to go home" with "an expression of royal goodwill and gratitude." The militia suffered the main losses due to illnesses, some of the militia ended up with troops abroad. On August 15 (27), 1813 in the Kremlin in a solemn atmosphere I.I. Morkov returned to Bishop Augustine the banners of the militia, “like a sacred monument of meritorious deeds,” which were later kept in the sacristy of the Assumption Cathedral.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (Military History)
Military Academy of the General Staff

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation