A collection of hitherto unknown letters from the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire, member of the State Council and Minister of the Interior, Count N.P. "Count Ignatiev and the Russian St. Panteleimon Monastery on Mount Athos".

The book, consisting of 697 pages, also for the first time, on the basis of previously unpublished archival documents, reflects in detail the multifaceted relations of this outstanding figure of the Russian Empire with the Russian St. also defending the interests of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans in relations with the Ottoman Empire and Western countries.

The lively correspondence between Nikolai Pavlovich and the elders of the Panteleimon Monastery on Athos, covering almost a fifty-year period, is the most valuable historical material. The content of the published letters is an important source for studying the history of Athos, the St. Panteleimon Monastery, the Russian spiritual presence on the Holy Mountain, Athos's relations with Russia and Russian diplomats.

Among other things, the correspondence of Count Ignatiev with the Russian monastery of Athos can serve as important evidence reflecting such moments in the life of the monastery, the views and inner motivations of its elders and fathers, which remain outside the historical and archival presentation. As noted in the preface, “flipping through the letters of Hieroschemamonk Jerome, Archimandrite Macarius and Archimandrite Andrei and, of course, Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev himself, we open the best pages of the history of St. Panteleimon Monastery of the mid-19th - early 20th century.”

The book is divided into two parts. The first included 250 letters from the elders Rusik to N.P. Ignatiev and separately letters from the count himself - in the amount of 38 pieces. The second part of the book contains two historical essays. The first one is devoted to the phenomenon of the diplomatic activity of Count N. P. Ignatiev and tells about the complex and multifaceted political motives that guided the actions of leading European diplomats in the Middle East after the end of the Crimean War.

In another essay, the letters of the elders Rusik to Ignatiev are considered against the background of historical events that took place on the Holy Mountain and in the Russian monastery of St. Panteleimon. As noted in the preface, “these studies, specially written for this book, are necessary to understand the historical context of the published correspondence. At the same time, they only indicate the opportunities that this correspondence provides for everyone who is trying to study the history of Russian Athos and diplomacy in the Orthodox East.

"ABGUMEN OF THE RUSSIAN AFONS - OLD MAN MACARY"

PART ONE.
Correspondence with Count N. P. Ignatiev
Kirill Wah. Preface to the publication of letters
Collection of Letters from the Elders of the Russian Panteleimon Monastery on St.
Letters of N. P. Ignatiev to the elders of the Russian monastery of St. Panteleimon on Athos. 1881-1907
Appendix. Table of contents of letters in the manuscript collection of the Panteleimon Monastery

PART TWO.
Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev - Russian diplomat in Constantinople and clerk of the Monastery of St. Panteleimon on Mount Athos
Oleg Anisimov. “Ignatiev’s spirit burned with an unquenchable lamp” Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev and the Eastern Question
Acquaintance with oriental affairs
Restoration of Russia's positions in the East
Trial by the Cretan uprising
Russian-Turkish cooperation
"Quiet years" of Turkey
The tragedy of the Greco-Bulgarian fault
Eastern Crisis 1875-1877
Via dolorosa: San Stefano - Berlin
Church and diplomatic activity in the Holy Land

Deacon Peter Pakhomov. "A high doer of Christian virtues and a great defender of Russians" Count Ignatiev and the Russian Panteleimon Monastery
Panteleimon Monastery and the Russian diplomatic corps
Visit of Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich
"Unexpected" visit of Nikolai Pavlovich to the Panteleimon Monastery. The beginning of the interaction between Ignatiev and Russik
Archbishop Alexander Lykourgos and Athos
St. Paul case and its consequences for Athos
Status of Athos monks in Russia
Panteleimon process
Diploma of the most holy Joachim, Patriarch of Constantinople, in the Russian cinovium of St. Panteleimon on Athos on the occasion of the cessation of disagreements in it
Establishment of a hospital in Constantinople
The position of the monastery during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
Chapel in Moscow
Compound of the monastery in St. Petersburg
The revival of the temple in the Lycian Worlds
Construction of a temple in the Balkans to commemorate Orthodox soldiers who died in the war of 1877-1878
Chapel in Serbia
Simono-Kananitsky Monastery
Ignatiev's participation in the fate of the Hilandar monastery
Disorders in Andreevsky and Ilyinsky sketes
Problems of Russian Kelliots
Georgian case
Canonism
The Case of Metropolitan Amphilochius
Skete of John the Baptist and the question of citizenship
Ambassador A. I. Nelidov and his visit to Athos
The funeral of consuls Yakubovich and Yakobson on Mount Athos
Fire in the Panteleimon Monastery
Athos icons for the Krupoderintsy estate
The Case of the Brothers of Abbot Macarius
Visit to Athos of the Vice-Director of the Holy Synod Sergius Vasilyevich Kersky
Ignatiev's attitude to the monastery
Instead of a conclusion
Content

For more see:

Material from the site Russian Athos

Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (January 17 (29), 1832, St. Petersburg - June 20 (July 3), 1908, Kyiv province) - Russian statesman, pan-Slavist diplomat; general of infantry (April 16, 1878), count (December 12, 1877), adjutant general.

June 20 ( I mean 1908. Note. website) in his family estate in the Kyiv province, a brilliant Russian diplomat and a rare expert on the affairs of the Far and Near East, Count N. P. Ignatiev, died. Having made himself famous for his bold appearance at the head of 19 Cossacks in the capital of China and the conclusion of the Aigun treaty, which was very beneficial for Russia, Count N.P. honor and held for 12 years (1864-1876). Here he acquired, in all fairness, the fame of a skilled diplomat, entered into the most intimate trust of the late Sultan Abdul Azis, and became the arbiter of affairs in the Middle East for a long time.

The late Count N. P. Ignatiev could not avoid here the urgent need to take an active part in the affairs of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Although he considered himself unprepared for this role - the arbiter of church affairs, but guided by Russian instinct and warm feeling, and listening to the authoritative voice of people devoted to him and well-informed in this kind of affairs (for example, Archimandrite Antonin), he with great success and with good fruits for the Orthodox Church, he took an ardent part in the church life of Constantinople, Athos, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Sinai, etc.

For the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, his merits and labors in the name of the Holy Land and the Russian cause in it will forever be remembered. One sending to Palestine as a leader of the late Archimandrite Antonin Kapustin speaks for itself enough. Loving the deceased arch. Antonin and being in constant friendly correspondence with him, Count N. P. Ignatiev supported him with his authority in all his clashes with the Jerusalem consulate and the Palestinian Commission, ardently advocated for him before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and before the Holy Synod, when he was with this or that the other side was in trouble. The land acquisitions made by the late Archimandrite Antonin, transferred to the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod, such as: in Hebron - the Oak of Mamre, in Hornya and on the Mount of Olives, caused the late Count Ignatiev a lot of trouble and anxiety, and without his assistance they would never have been resolved in favor of Orthodox Russian Church.

Transfer to the name of his mother-in-law, and then the transfer to the late Grand Duke Sergiy Alexandrovich, as Chairman of the Palestinian Society, of the Mirliki land plot, on which stands the ancient temple, where the relics of St. Nicholas rested before being transferred to Bar-Grad, along with the capital that has now increased for 100,000 rubles, for the construction of a vast temple there according to the plan of Saltsman - this is a matter of the entirely personal initiative of the late Nikolai Pavlovich. The count was keenly interested in the Mirlikiy case until the very last days of his life, and it was not his fault that the unfortunate circumstance happened that we lost the ownership of this precious plot for the admirers of St. Nicholas, it seems, irretrievably.

Not only that, we are not even able and cannot now stand up for the desecration of this precious shrine by Muslims, which took place in the very last days. G. P. Begleri, an agent of the R. O. P. and T. in Smyrna, who was intimately familiar with the history of the question of the Russian sector in the Lycian Worlds, at one time even entrusted on behalf of the Society for the conduct of affairs related to this sector, informed us from November 6 of the past year, according to local newspapers, that the Muslim mob, incited by government officials, attacked the monastery in the Lycian Worlds and desecrated the temple.

According to inquiries made through his acquaintances living in Rhodes, G. P. Begleri, in his last letter to us dated December 22, confirms the sad news, saying: “The Turks, indeed, attacked the church of St. Nicholas there, desecrated many icons and took away the ancient marble a plate on which crosses and the year of the foundation of the temple were carved. At the same time, Mr. Begleri is informed that this sad event was given to the knowledge of the hegumen of the monastery to our Rhodian vice-consul, who in turn brought to the attention of our ambassador in Constantinople. What will now be done by our embassy in Constantinople to protect this shrine, dear to all Russian people, admirers of St. Nicholas, we: we cannot say, but we are sure that if Count N.P. Ignatiev lived to see this sad event, his heart would bleed and this news would cause him inexpressible moral suffering.

Home / Humanitarian information portal “Knowledge. Understanding. Skill» / №4 2015

The article was supported by the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (Project No. 12-04-00410a, “The Classical Peninsula”: Crimea in Russian Travel Literature of the Late 15th - Early 20th Century).

The article was written with support from the Russian Foundation for the Humanities (project No. 12-04-00410, “„A Classical Peninsula‟: Crimea in the Russian Travel Literature of the Late 15th - the Early 20th Century”).

UDC 930.85; 93/94

Naumenko V. G. The History of Constantinople: The Diplomatic Relations of the Moscow State with the Crimean Khanate and Turkey

annotation♦ The article is based on documents from the “Embassy of E. I. Ukraintsov to Constantinople in 1699–1700.” and reveals the images of Russia, Turkey and Europe at the turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries.

Keywords: Treaty of Constantinople, Black Sea, Russia, Crimea, Turkey, Europe, Peter I, Emelyan Ukraintsov, Pieter van Pamburg, ship "Krepost", A. Mavrokordato, M. M. Bogoslovsky.

Abstract♦ This article is based on the documents of “Yemelyan I. Ukraintsov’s Embassy to Constantinople 1699–1700”. The author reveals the images of Russia, Turkey and Europe at the turn of the 17th–18th centuries.

keywords: the Treaty of Constantinople, Black Sea, Russia, Crimea, Turkey, Europe, Peter the Great, Yemelyan Ukraintsov, Peter van Pamburg, ship “Fortress”, Alexander Mavrokordatos, Mikhail Bogoslovsky.

In blessed memory of Doctor of Philology,
Professor Vladimir Andreevich Lukov,
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bogoslovsky,
faithfully serving Science,
and the 315th anniversary of the Embassy
Emelyan Ignatievich Ukraintsov
on the ship "Fortress"

In the "Index of treatises and relations of Russia from 1462 to 1826" by S. Dobroklonsky, neither the Karlovitsky Truce for 2 years with the Port (December 25, 1698), nor the Peace Treaty of Constantinople (July 3, 1700), nor Peace Treaty of Prut with Porto (July 12, 1711). We will look for information about Moscow diplomats in the first third of the 18th century in the multi-volume work of Academician M. M. Bogoslovsky "Peter I" among the materials for his biography. From 1699, the Duma clerk E. I. Ukraintsov “with comrades” immediately swims out to meet them. It is he, Emelyan Ignatievich, who will become the very "not noble, but only a smart person" recommended by E. Tsar. Send Vel-va Voznitsyn as a messenger to Tsargorod. The RGADA does not have an article list of Ukraintsov, but there are replies “E. I. Ukraintsov’s embassy to Constantinople 1699–1700”. The same issues that Voznitsyn will present in his "Draft Treaty at the Karlovitz Congress" will be announced in Constantinople for the sake of, most likely, not eternal peace, but a long truce. Special embassy D. M. Golitsyn will be appointed to ratify the charters on December 30, 1700.

Interest in the Crimea at the turn of the 17th-18th centuries determines Russian-Ottoman relations. Dobroklonsky warns in the Introduction to the Index about “a whole chain of treatises and relations, these ties with which Russia strengthened her well-being”, that we will enjoy one more opportunity to make sure that “the true goal of Diplomacy is the well-being of peoples” (Dobroklonsky, 1838: XII ).

"Instead of three days - a year"- this is how Moscow's relations with Porto can be called from the end of August 1699 to November 10, 1700. It is interesting to find out how much pleasure Ukrainians received "with comrades" during the year spent on the road, and whether he received it. On August 28, 1699, the adventures of a Russian 46-gun ship with the reliable name "Fortress" began, on board which was the Embassy of E. I. Ukraintsov to Constantinople. That ship left the Kerch arm for the Black Sea. This trip remained in the replies to the RGADA, which M. M. Bogoslovsky called "extensive and thorough." On August 28–30, the ship circled the Crimea at 8–10 versts “from the shore in sight of Yayla”, moving not at full sail: they were waiting for the bailiff, who caught up with the Embassy on August 31 in the morning 50 versts from Balaklava. The bailiff, who offered to stop in Balaklava, was refused for the sake of direct walking to Constantinople by compass. Ship E. Tsar. Vel-va in sailing by sea was, according to the bailiff, "much better than the Turkish ships." The meeting with the bailiff added to the geographical knowledge of the Crimea by the crew and passengers of the ship. Is it possible to call the adventures of the ship and the crew extraordinary, if on it the Grand Sovereign was carrying the confirmed Letter of Borders by the Embassy, ​​which was escorted by the Sovereign himself? Good weather, calm, then stormy and again the mirror-like Black Sea - everything tuned in to the fact that "good business" is a profitable business.

So, the “Euxinopontian abyss” led the Embassy of Emelyan Ignatievich Ukraintsov to Constantinople. This is the first Russian warship in the open Black Sea, the Day of which is celebrated by all Russians on October 31 every year. From Bogoslovsky, who, as he said, studied the "Article List of the Ukraintsov Embassy", we learn that "that ship cost a good city." Ukrainians will say about him: "My ship." The Sultan did not expect the Embassy to appear so soon. On September 6, he watched the arrival of the ship with cannon salutes from the tower of his palace, and a lot of people in the streets and lanes of Constantinople. On September 7, the ship entered the city and anchored opposite the Sultan's palace itself. "Many thousands of Turks, Greeks, Germans, Armenians" - all praised the "Fortress". On September 9, the Sultan inspected the ship without going on deck. In an unsubscribe dated September 17, 1699, Ukraintsov reported to Moscow that everyone was surprised how the ship overcame the Black Sea abyss. And Ukraintsov’s answers made it clear that “a whole fleet” accompanied him from Taganrog to Kerch, therefore it is not surprising that “they were afraid of the arrival of a whole Russian fleet; they said that the Russian fleet of 10 warships and 40 small ships went to the Black Sea, reached the Anatolian coast and approached Trebizond and Sinop” (Bogoslovsky, 2007: 12). Indeed, there are ships, there is the sea. Let them get to know each other: they are made for each other.

On September 12, Mavrocordato appeared to find out the reasons for the panic and fear instilled by night firing from cannons on the orders of the captain of the Fortress, the Dutchman Pieter van Pamburg. But even on September 25 it was very difficult to appease the captain. The adventures of the captain on the ground and on the ship did not differ significantly. Everyone was against his removal and arrest due to firing. All of them are crew members: lieutenant, navigator, sergeant, 111 soldiers of the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. On September 18, envoys from Russia were received at the grand vizier, on October 8 - at Reiz-Effendi with gifts. Cheredeev held the letter of the Sovereign. Then there was a visit by the ambassadors of the patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem to the joy of them and the great multitude, as on the feast of the Holy Resurrection of Christ, the visit of the Polish ambassador Rzhevussky, then the French.

But let's go back to the Crimea for a while. A sense of duty, a feature of the generations of the era of Peter I, was noted at the very beginning of the path of the Embassy. The power of the Crimean land (Aisky Mountains) and the Black Sea aroused a desire to learn the secrets of Heaven, mountains, people of the region. This means: the August sky, greenery and man under that Heaven and among that greenery. Note that diplomat travelers look at the Crimea not from a horse - from the sea. And from above, the sun looks at the suddenly appeared ship and its passengers, at night - the stars. Only after 45 years will appear the "Catalogue to Navigators", composed by the Marine Fleet, Lieutenant Semyon Mordvinov, which speaks of "the majesty of day and night", of "noble stars". Russians and foreigners from the "Fortress" wanted to know how Yayla, the people living in the mountains and valleys, lived. How many of them and the settlements in those gorges, they also need to know. And the captain was busy: "the sea measured the same." In the role of interlocutors, the sky, the sun, mountains, "venerable trees" - only they are silent, says the bailiff. Good weather greeted the Russian ship, from which a young naval officer, Peter I, had recently left, escorting him to Kerch with a sea caravan. He, perhaps, could not even imagine that “often the initial Turkish people would come to the “Fortress” in Constantinople and look closely, as if he, the Sovereign, would like to come on that ship” (Ustryalov, 1858: 520). So Crimea, Kerch, the Azov and Black Seas met with him, as before Arkhangelsk and the White Sea, with the one who would be called the Great during his lifetime. Couldn't the Great Tsar, with his own hands and the hands of Russian and foreign engineers, artisans, craftsmen, create that miracle ship that caused delight, fear, panic upon arrival in the Tsar's city. Note that Constantinople was afraid of the “Fortress”, Crimea was not. The time will come and the turn of the descendants of this ship and its crew will prove that the Island, as Crimea was then called by many, is the Fortress, great, the best among all the fortresses in the world. So he remained in the famous novel by Count Alexei Nikolayevich Tolstoy "Peter the Great".

Russians, looking for the first time in many centuries from the sea to the Crimea, had many questions at the sight of this eternally beautiful land. And these questions are in no way and in no way similar to those that will be asked by the Cossacks who first appeared on the southern coast of Crimea from the replies of Tarbeev and Basov. Ukraintsov "with friends" was interested in how those mountains live among the flourishing world and people among the mountains? What are they? So ask those whose hearts are disposed to this region, and they want to know even more about it for years to come, of course, for others who are destined to see the Crimea. Those who built this ship together with Peter I ask to ask their questions directly near the shores of the island. And Crimea was silent, listened, remembered. Then, after the traveling diplomats, scientists will come and sail for new geographical and many other knowledge about him. They will glorify it together with writers, poets, artists, musicians, architects. There will be a lot of them, and they, like the embassy of Ukraintsov, will feel that this island is like nothing and no one. Because he is Human. Crimea will still form the spirit of a great number of Russian people and people of other nations, but for now it is only looking at the first diplomats who were not afraid of the Black Sea - they have not yet seen such. And they, those envoys of Moscow, had never yet looked at him from the sea. Did those ambassadors who were destined many years ago to return home from Tsargorod through Kerch or Kafa look? He is already united with them by every path of the Aisky mountains, water running in a whisper on the sand or stones, but they do not yet know this. They have ahead of them the first crossing of the waters of the Black Sea, with which the Russians have a common past and which a Russian person from the distant future century will call "the most festive of the seas." Crimea looked after the ship, flying "to the distant limits", remembering 75 ambassadors, envoys, messengers from Moscow who left their letters to their descendants, and 25 diplomats who wrote article lists about him for them - not only for their overlords.

225 years - is it a lot or a little? The peninsula knew that somewhere far away, where a beautiful ship with a beautiful name flew in full sail, there were already roads from it and to it - the Crimea. What an ancient land the Embassy of E. I. Ukraintsov saw off on the last August day of 1699! On the last day of summer, she also saw off the author of this work for more than one year to Western Ukraine, to Kamchatka, to Estonia, to Moscow - and she always looked back at her, because there, with her, the best people in the world remained.

The history that has flowed into the Crimean peninsula has kept and keeps it in the arms of two seas. Our parents, brothers and sisters, children, grandchildren, friends, school and university teachers, comrades, students are historical people. The great difficult past accompanies us today and fills us with faith and hope. And those who sailed to Tsargorod 315 years ago believed and hoped that they would return to these Aysk mountains with their green gorges under the azure sky. It seems to me that if I now remember those distant travelers, if on the Day of Unity and the Kazan Mother of God I light a candle for them in the Temple overlooking the Kremlin and Red Square, then my native Black Sea, which was once a long time ago, also remembers them. - has long been called the Russian Sea.

The road of ancestors - will it lead to success special Embassy with his instructions (memory)? What will be the path to it: short or long? Everyone believed: short. And who escorts the Embassy home, except for the Black Sea, which is eager to master the handsome Russian ship? Was that the first ship of the future Black Sea Fleet? It seems to me that I know a person who can put it in the right place at the right time. Since questions were born near Balaklava that Russian scientists would ask long before the Manifesto of Catherine the Great, it means that there he, the first warship in the waters of the Black Sea, should stand. In the "Fortress" with its immortal captain Peter van Pamburgh, the work of many enslaved and free people - Europeans, so different, but who were able to send that ship on a swan road, and all together today's Europeans to recreate it is much better than striving for the international isolation of Russia together with Russians. We are convinced that the ship "Fortress" also liked our Crimean land, he wanted to stay near it longer, but a sense of duty called to the sea. Someone who, but he should not have been afraid of the "Euxinopontian abyss": he went to Tsargorod along the path of his ancestors. From paradise to hell of bad weather and again to paradise. And ahead of him, with his restless and fearless captain Peter van Pamburg, a constable and soldiers of the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, there are as many adventures as ... the Embassy has on board. They will be remembered for a long time, forever by Turkey, its capital, its Sultan's palace, cathedrals, streets and streets with cypresses and the Turkish fleet, which returned by November 16 from the White Sea with Admiral Captain Pasha Medzomort, which can be found in a letter from Ukraintsov to the Tsar dated October 17 1699 that he was a sea robber. Algerian.

Ukraintsev, like Voznitsyn, is one of the last diplomats of the first years of the 18th century, who had the Articles list of the Embassy. It makes sense to once again think about the boundaries of eras, creative individuals, the genre of the article list. Location "on the borders" of the Embassy 1699–1700 makes it possible to dwell on the aspects of Ukraintsov's work "with comrades", which are revealed only upon acquaintance with the Articles List of the Embassy. It is the diversity of the studied documents of Voznitsyn, Ukraintsov and others that makes it possible to see their commonality as dwindling phenomena, to come closer to understanding the essence of the “borderline” of the diplomatic process, without which it is impossible to build a truly modern history of diplomacy. Borders clarify the essence of the systems contained in them, transitions throw light on the content of epochs - past and future. It is not at all accidental that F. A. Golovin inserts in his order to Ukraintsov the lines about the appearance of a Russian ship with a shield in the 10th century: “And since ancient times there have been all sorts of changes in the world, and there are many such examples that some peoples in their military affairs are glorified, while others weaken . And the Turkish state was formerly not in such strength and glory as it is now. There were such times and cases that the Russian peoples went by sea to Constantinople and took the annual treasury from the Greek kings, and then it changed ... ”(Bogoslovsky, 2007: 150).

Our task is to consider the transition option associated with the turn of the 17th–18th centuries. The transition can be compressed to a point, to a line - to one text: "The article list of the Embassy of Ukrainians", as before the Embassy of Voznitsyn. If we look at Historical time as a stream in which nothing is limited or isolated, but everything passes into each other, the past and the future are simultaneously imbued with each other, the present always productively contains the past and the future. Then the peace treaty of Karlovitsky turns into the Constantinople peace treaty, Karlovitsky and Constantinople are simultaneously imbued with each other, the Constantinople negotiations of Ukraintsov contain the Karlovitsky negotiations of Voznitsyn and the future ratification of the document by the military man Prince Golitsyn. But for all this to happen, the Russian envoys had to distinguish truth from plausibility. On November 4, they were invited to the Grand Vizier for the first conference, which, according to Mavrocordato, “should have mattered vestibule to further negotiations” (ibid.: 54). “In private, privately, and not publicly” in the presence of Vizier Reiz-Efendi and Mavrocordato as interpreter and treasurer and interpreter Semyon Lavretsky "yes to the record" clerk Lavrenty Protopopov (Bogoslovsky considered him the compiler of this part of the Article List) Ukrainians presented a letter to certify his authority. It becomes clear that the vizier is here for the sake of "renewal of friendship and love between the Sultan's Majesty and the great sovereign - with the Sultan with the Caesar of Rome, the King of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," this has already happened at the congresses in Karlovitsy. Here and now the vizier expressed his readiness to listen to "some initial articles" of the envoys related to "peacemaking". "Brief decision" Ukraintsov announced 4 articles:

1. Tsar. The king is ready to be in strong and unshakable friendship with the Sultan and conclude an agreement on eternal peace or on a long truce through his ambassadors by decree in Karlovitsy.

2. Upon the conclusion of such an agreement, the Crimean Khan and “every kind of Tatar”, who is in the power of the Brilliant Porte, should not cause any harm to the Russian state.

3. Exchange of prisoners.

4. About the desire of the Great Sovereign that in Jerusalem the holy places were given to the Greeks in accordance with many "imperious decrees" of the former sultans.

That was the end of the secret part of the conference, “a good and useful thing for both states” (ibid.: 57).

Between the First and Second and Third Conferences in Constantinople, an exchange of diplomatic visits and a review of the Turkish fleet took place. November 19, Sunday, became a day for work - not for prayer, which upset the Russian envoys. Turning to the study of two conferences: the Second and the Third, we will try to comprehend the processes associated with the rapprochement of the opposing poles of the diplomatic field, which include, on the one hand, the envoys of the Ukrainians and Cheredeev, and on the other, the great chancellor Reiz-Efendi Magmet and "in the internal secret secretary" Alexander Mavrocordato, who would later be joined by his son Nikolai.

The essence of the negotiations at the Second Conference, in the words of Bogoslovsky, was expressed in two questions:

1. About the type of agreement, namely: whether to conclude a peace or a lasting truce?

2. What should be put in the first place in the contract?

The opinion of the Sultan became known immediately: an agreement on eternal peace to establish "peace and silence between the peoples." However, how will it be. The envoys did not deny the possibility of "entering the eternal world." On the second issue, they completely disagreed with the Turkish side. Indeed, where did those peace negotiations begin? “The Turks said that, first of all, it is necessary to agree about frontiers , i.e., to establish borders between the two states, meaning by the question of borders the question of the areas conquered by the Russians: about the Dnieper fortresses and about Azov. For the envoys, the issue of borders, Bogoslovsky pointed out, did not exist: they did not allow the idea that the areas conquered by the Russians could be a subject of dispute, these areas were an integral part of Russia, its integral part. Therefore, the envoys demanded, first of all, an answer to the proposal made by them at the First Conference, to those four or, in fact, to three articles that they then came up with, declaring that they would not talk about anything else until they received an answer ... They came to Constantinople without any intention of ceding to the Turks anything they had conquered in the last war and interpreted the matter as follows: these conquered territories had already been ceded by the Turks to the Muscovite state at the Karlovitsky Congress ”(ibid.: 73–74). Then again, without Academician Bogoslovsky, you will not believe that you understand what you read correctly. Again, as with Karlowitz, the question arises: “Who won that Turkish war: St. League or Sublime Porta? “Meanwhile,” continues M. M. Bogoslovsky, “the Turks put the issue of borders in close connection with the question of the type of agreement. When the envoys asked what they wanted, an eternal peace or a lasting truce, Mavrocordato replied that in this proposal of the envoys "there are two things - either an eternal peace or a truce for happy years, and those things have two powers in themselves." Here, under the "forces" Mavrocordato probably meant the conditions that are the consequences of the adoption of one or another type of agreement. A truce could be concluded on the same terms - leaving at least part of the conquered in the hands of the Russians. In this case, the sultan, without giving up his rights to the lost places, ceded them to the king only for temporary possession, for a more or less long time. Eternal peace entailed other conditions - (sic!) the return of everything conquered to the Sultan. That is why the Turks linked the question of borders so closely with the question of the type of agreement” (ibid.: 74). It seems that one does not need to be Russian in order not to understand and accept such “dependencies” even today. According to Ukraintsov and Cheredeev, the main terms of the treaty could not depend on the agreement. One can understand the hysterical state of the old clever Reyse-Effendi. It became quite obvious that the Turks were ready to consider the issue of borders indefinitely, as it is obvious that the Russian envoys did not imagine that each of them could not have an attack of an unknown disease, but get sick for a long time - for the right to see the world ( land and water) and the contract with my own eyes. Maybe today that Constantinople history with a peace treaty is mastered by someone as a productive model?

“According to the Karlovitsky Instrument,” says the Treaties between Russia and the East, “Ukraintsov and Cheredeev were appointed to negotiate and resolve a peace deal with the glorious great chancellor Megmet Efendiy and with the closest secretary of the Ottoman state, Alexander Scarlati. It does not say what external conditions the glorious and great people created for the Kargopol governor Ukraintsov and the deacon Cheredeev (they settled them for a long time in a cramped corner, in the dead end of Constantinople, forbade meetings with other diplomats, even controlled their walks, etc.). There is no mention of the attempts of the side that lost the war to teach the plenipotentiary Embassy in the person of the extraordinary envoys, one of whom headed the Ambassadorial Order for ten years, how to write a peace treaty so that it would be “ratified” in 1700 and 1701 by the two sides. And they, in the role of invited guests, were interested, seeing the postponement of the “real business”, for which well-known Duma people called them. It was not by themselves that they sailed to Constantinople, but at the solicitation of the Turks at the Karlovitsky Congress. Emelyan Ukraintsov, having taken the articles in Latin from his friend Ivan Cheredeev, finally handed them over to the Turkish representatives on December 2 at the Third Conference. 16 articles contained the conditions proposed by the Russian side. Let's highlight the main questions in those articles:

1. Azov and Kazykermen with the cities belonging to them remain behind the Moscow State.

2. The security of the Muscovite state from the Crimean and other Tatars and the security of Turkey from the Cossacks.

3. Freedom of trade between merchants of both states.

4. Orthodox heritage rights in Turkey.

These are the questions that Voznitsyn touched upon in his "Draft Treaty" at the Karlowitz Congress. Started, although it was already announced earlier, the work of "peace" and had to be careful. Caution concerned the Turkish side. Obviously, in Turkey they were afraid that the ambassadors of St. The Union did not dare to support Russia. That is the "evil reason" for the ambassadors of the Porte. great deal should have been installed via 4 persons. At the same time, the persistent desire of the Turks to separate Russian diplomats from the rest attracts attention. For what kind of benefit? In this regard, of particular interest are the ways in which the Turks demonstrated their views on the articles.

The modeling of the text of the treaty becomes fundamental, taking into account the society in which they, diplomats, were located, and which included other statesmen, the sultan, vizier, treasurer, janissaries, also merchants, residents of Constantinople - people in houses and on the street. Reiz-Efendi and Mavrokordato organized the participation of the Ukrainian Embassy in the review of the Turkish fleet, where everyone was present. For this, they began to touch on the "people's word" in "conversations" with Russian envoys. It is easy to learn about that from the opening and closing conversations between them during two dozen conferences. The ambassadors from Moscow were especially touched by the mention of Reiz-Efendi that “the war against Porte is not terrible with the Muscovite state alone, de Porta stood with its own forces against four Christian states, and now it is possible for her to stand against one state much more.” Ukraintsev noted that “if the local ‘negotiators and unwishers of good’ had said this to the envoys themselves, they would have answered that the tsar, at least one, was not afraid of the war with the Turks, that’s why he lagged behind his allies, not being afraid of such war" (ibid.: 103).

The work on the articles of the peace treaty turned into an active rejection of the position of the Turkish representatives, who are still the same in the Articles list of the Ukrainian Embassy: Reiz-Effendi and Mavrocordato. At the end of the Sixth Conference on December 23, on the eve of the Feast of the Nativity of Christ, alone with the Russian envoys, Mavrocordato expressed his thoughts about the Tatars, which both Theological and modern researchers can perceive as an expression of hostility towards them. “They all know,” he said, “that every reason in the war is repaired from the Crimean Khan from the Tatars, and it’s absolutely time to calm them down from such robbery and bring them to obedience.<…>If an agreement is reached between the tsar and the sultan, the Tatars will be obliged to obey him. And if they disobey and disobey that agreement, and then, de, - Mavrocordato expressed himself decisively, - let them, the Tatars, and with the khan all disappear and disappear, and he, the Saltan, will not stand up for them! » (ibid: 88). The envoys, for their part, said that “many enmities and quarrels come from the Tatars, because they don’t want to go to work and do other field work, they always practice robbery and war. And it was possible for them to feed even without the fact that they have a lot of cattle and their land is grain-growing, and there are no taxes from them to Saltanov's majesty; and it will completely succeed in appeasing them from that self-will. It is curious what Count P. A. Tolstoy, the first permanent Russian ambassador in Istanbul, who appeared there since 1702, thought about the causes of the war. From the “secret articles” of Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy and the “replies” to them, you can find out that “the Turks have a great friend of the Tatar Khan and they revere like a king and helper of the Mahometan faith. And they have a big oath to one another [a Turkish saltan with a Crimean khan] in every need to help against anyone, for all Turkish saltans have an oath that they should help the Tatars in every need, not for the sake of a position, but only for people ... ”(Russian ambassador ..., 1985: 46). Tolstoy wrote: “Royal Majesty of Russia, they revere the great<…>and they lay the blame on the Tatars, as if from their raids the reason was created that Azov was taken ... ". Later, a Russian resident in Turkey will write about the war and its cause: “But if it seems like a way for them to get more wealth from the war, then, without thinking about anything, they start a war, they have more care about collecting wealth than about anything else.” In the description for the third article, he will point out the surprise of the Turks “with horror” from rumors “about the structure of the new Moscow armies, and they have more fear from the newly built, royal majesty of the Moscow sea fleet” (ibid.: 48–49.). Well, the ambassador turned out to be right: the third medal in the "Collection of medals for glorious deeds in Russia" will be the medal "Establishment and first actions of the Russian Navy", the fourth - "The Capture of Azov".

The serious suspicious illness of the envoys “from the air” (“were winded from the Polonians coming from different places,” as Mavrocordato said), the threat of war from “the rabble of gossip,” as he himself argued - in all this and more there was something sinister for negotiations . If there is any point in agreeing with Mavrocordato, it is with his statement that "one must think about treaties and speak and do with great consideration." "Great Consideration" obviously suggested a medium compromise solution. The article list of the Embassy of Ukraintsov calls such a decision "medium", which can satisfy both parties in the transition from the "world" instead of a peace treaty to a 30-year-old eternal peace? Looking ahead, we point out that the sixth medal in the "Collection of medals for glorious deeds in Russia" will be the medal "Thirty Years of Peace concluded with the Ottoman Porte." However, before that, you still had to live.

Be that as it may, but the records of preliminary and final conversations of four people about different subjects, as M. M. Bogoslovsky rightly noted, “displays the whole liveliness of the conversation, so that when reading it, one gets the impression of a conversation of living people with all the variety of its tones and shades ". Hence the noteworthy conclusion about the disappearing genre, to which we devoted a good part of the “diplomatic” chapter of our future “Crimean” book: “A list of articles is not a dry treatise with a business presentation of the course of negotiations; it preserves all the peculiarities and trifles, all the living details of every day of negotiations, of every conference. True, the compilers of the list developed a certain epic form of presentation with repetitions characteristic of the epic style and the use of the same expressions in the same cases; but this epic style does not deaden the breath of life in what it conveys” (Bogoslovsky, 2007: 108). And he conveys how “lengthy” individual conferences were: from coffee they moved on to talking about tea, then to the customs of the Chinese - and, finally, to business. None of those present at the negotiations will know that in 37 years and even earlier, Russians will be compared with polite Chinese, for example, Fokkerodt, secretary of the Royal Prussian Embassy in Moscow. In 1700, however, they sometimes did not look like such, for the reason that "there is no end in sight to their work." The frosts have already ended, the snows have gone, the “radiant spring” has come, and the variety of interpretations of the articles of the treaty determined the conflict between Ukraintsov and Mavrocordato. Each of them continued to represent a complete whole. Somewhere Peter I remained with his impatient expectation of the end of Constantinople history and strong-willed efforts to build a fleet. And here we are talking about some four towns, but also by the water - the Dnieper, about which Voznitsyn said that "he cannot dump a single stone," and the Turks demand to ruin them so that "no stone is left on stone." The issue that became a "stumbling block" in the negotiations. Is it spatial or temporal distance? In Constantinople, the Turkish fleet and the people are happy, or vice versa. From countless "talks" one can understand that the most interesting role belongs to the street. Somewhere in the distance, the Dnieper towns, taken by the Russians with bloodshed, continued to remain, for some reason necessary for the Turkish street and the Turkish fleet. Why was such a "surprise" presented to Ukraintsov and his Embassy? Maybe during the negotiations, Reiz-Efendi and Mavrokordato fought to the point of illness for Kazykermen and other towns, that they were afraid that the Russians would come to ... Constantinople? Indeed, in the 10th century, Prince Oleg came on behalf of a powerful people with a brilliant culture. And it was not for nothing that Admiral F. A. Golovin wrote to Ukraintsov about Oleg’s campaign. The Russian state was strong, the prince of Kyiv took it and appeared with his army at the gates of Constantinople. And what will appear again? In a labyrinthine world, everything is possible. This construction of the world is also being developed in Ukraintsov's article list. It has a "anticipation" and there will be a postscript. Peter I will not stop dreaming about Russia joining the ranks of full members of Europe. The Holy Union is one of the dead ends of the labyrinth, which the allies persuaded to enter. Now the Russian Tsar looks at the world with different eyes.

The ship, which has never moved in front of the “Saltan seraglio”, despite numerous threats and arguments about it to the point of frenzy, is the first results of the activities of young Peter I. It is no coincidence that it continues to stand where it stood at the very beginning of September. In full view of the Sultan's palace and the ship, there is a bargaining for small towns, which, no matter how ornately the Turks say, force them to act as inventors of the “medium”, but all their proposals, especially “from Mavrocordato”, arouse firm resistance from the envoys. However, after the arrival of Sergeant Nikita Zherlov from Moscow with the tsar's instruction on concessions, Ukraintsov and Cheredeev offered their "medium" to the Turkish representatives, calling it "divine", but neither Reiz-Efendi nor Mavrocordato seemed like that. The offer of a 6-7-year stay of the towns in the possession of the Tsar, with subsequent ruin, was not accepted by the Turks, who understand that "six-year holding means like a hundred years." When the envoys agreed to destroy the Dnieper towns immediately after the conclusion of peace and to cede the land to the Sultan forever empty, the battle began for the “cession residential, not empty. It came to the question not to himself, but to the Russians: “What will the Sultan boast to his people if in those towns there will be only“ a haven for all kinds of animals and birds, and not people? and completely presented another "surprise" to the envoys: to arrange a new transfer. Why they needed a "rural fence", which they called either "ditch", then "roller", then "trench", they could not explain and behaved like conspirators. This whole grotesque scene with the extortion of a new village was performed by brilliant actors, and for one of them, Mavrocordato, a medal must certainly have been invented. “The ruin of the Dnieper towns with the return of their territory to the Turks,” says Bogoslovsky, “was a heavy concession for Russia, which explains the stubborn struggle of the envoys for these towns. It was necessary to give up a significant share of the successes achieved with considerable difficulty in the Turkish war.<…>

What was done on the Dnieper without him (Peter. - V.N.), although on his own initiative, remained in the shadows; meanwhile, these results were no less important than those achieved by the acquisition of Azov. It can be said that these were equally significant parts of the same case. With the conquest of Azov, Russia approached the Sea of ​​Azov and through it to the Black Sea from the eastern side of the Crimea. With the conquest of the Dnieper towns located at the very mouth of the Dnieper, Russia approached the same Black Sea from the western side. Crimea, this age-old nest of predators, which for centuries kept the population of the Russian plain in alarm, was controlled from two sides. The Crimean anxiety was coming to an end. The Crimeans, squeezed from both sides, had to stop their destructive raids on the southern Russian spaces.

Now, with the rejection of the Dnieper conquests, it was necessary to lose a stronghold against the Crimea from the west, to move away from the approach to the Black Sea from this side. This sacrifice was made in the name of hopes for the future, for the new prospects that opened up in the north. The stronger the Russian side had to hold on to Azov ”(ibid.: 135).

Like Voznitsyn, who belatedly received a decree from the Sovereign, so Ukraintsov resolved the issue of townships more favorably for Russia than was stated in the letter brought by Sergeant Nikita Zherlov. Negotiations on Azov continued from the 14th conference on March 20 to the 21st on April 27. The reader should not forget the performance in a foreign state because of Azov taken by the Russians, from the expression of joy by the Turks at two conferences about the health of the Moscow Tsar, then the dispute about the cession of land to Azov in the direction of the Kuban, which took four conferences, the calculation of how many miles of driving fit into one a cannon shot, etc. In the course of the bargaining, it turned out that many subjects live in the east of the Sultan, and it is “indecent and shameful” to take away their land and give it to Azov. Not from each other, but from the Russian envoys, the Turkish representatives asked “What should we do now?” and came to the conclusion that they, the Russians, did not need much. The Russians were also ashamed of that. The Turks seem to have forgotten that the conversation is about that land, "without which it is impossible for the city of Azov to exist": the inhabitants of Azov must own the land as "as it used to be." Two conferences figured out how many hours to drive across that land to agree, and, in the end, they decided on 10. And it no longer seems surprising that after disputes over the territories, the articles about the “dacha” to the Crimean Khan and about the prisoners turned out to be “secondary”, or , as the Secretary of State put it, "some of the unfinished articles are not the most difficult."

It seems that Mavrocordato, who for this purpose came to the embassy court on April 29, May 2 and May 22, here surpassed himself. And before, the Turks perceived Ukraintsov's refusals as "biting words": they "ignited thought and heart." But, in our opinion, the comparisons that M. M. Bogoslovsky called "presented in a rough form" are deadly. This is when Mavrocordato, in an atmosphere of "popular suspicion" and not only popular gossip caused by protracted negotiations, which became such, thanks to the Turkish side, urged the Russians to treat his request “with love”. "With love" meant "leaving stubbornness". Ukrainians, however, having heard about the infringement of the freedom of the Azov inhabitants "to arable land and to haymaking and to other uses", immediately demanded that the article be corrected. But then Mavrokordato began to convince Ukraintsov, who had just left the post of head of the Ambassadorial Department, not to refuse the Crimean Khan to send him from time to time “some dacha”, regarding which the Moscow government had already made a firm decision. In addition, Emelyan Ignatievich had lines in front of his eyes, added to Peter’s order by the hand of F. A. Golovin: “And about the annual dacha to the Crimean Khan, what was given to him from this royal majesty, if the vizier or close people learn to speak, and to him, envoy, to refuse them” (ibid.: 149). In addition, Golovin wrote: "And talk about that dacha, deducing lengthy conversations." It was necessary to recall, on the basis of many article lists, that the peace between the states was violated due to the raids of the Crimean Tatars, that there was no satisfaction for the statements of the Russian sovereigns, and that Russian messengers and envoys were detained many times in the Crimea and "beaten, tortured and dishonored." The dacha of the khans was canceled "for many of their untruths." At the center of the conversation were the "Tatar injustice" and the long-term "unappeasement of the Tatars" by the Turkish sultans. When the state E. Tsar. Vel-va "multiplied in strength", the Tatar war became not terrible. This is where the words of the envoy sounded about the changes in the Turkish state, not for the better at that moment, and about an event from the distant past, “when the Russian peoples went by sea to Constantinople and took the annual treasury from the Greek kings, and then it changed…”. Now it's come another time, and it was necessary for the Tatars from giving "to calm down and live with Christian sovereigns in peace, so that for their insolence they would not bring upon themselves and their dwellings what a military presence and ruin."

Mavrocordato, however, for the sake of a positive result, was ready with the Russians "although to sit until night and all night." It is not for nothing that Ukrainians will write to the Sovereign: “Mavrocordat is a faithful slave of the Soltans in everything” (Ustryalov, 1858: 520). No matter how hard the Ukrainians and others tried to convince him that “now and never the Crimean Khan and the Tatars will have no dacha from the royal treasury,” the Greek continued to persuade them, pointing to some “obscenity” known to him alone, consisting in the fact that Impossible is the King. Vel-vu "for the neighborhood with the khan and the Crimean state, refuse to favor the khan and the Tatars with their salaries, as happened from time immemorial." In the course of the meeting, Mavrocordato agreed to the point that the refusal of the Sovereign V. Khan and the Tatars would lead to “complete despair”, and suddenly resorted to a comparison, which we wanted to point out: “And not only mercy is done to people, but dogs are fed but so that they are full and do not die of hunger ”(Bogoslovsky, 2007: 152). Against the backdrop of badly recovering envoys, who were isolated for almost a year in the same dark corner of Constantinople, and the unforgettable picture of the Tatar cavalry standing “along the coast and in the mountains” upon the arrival of the Embassy ship in Kerch, such a request is deadly. It turned out that only with the promise of a dacha “amusement will be made for the Tatars”: “The seas and great rivers have not been spilled, but the Busurman hordes have bred many.” Of these, the Crimean Khan is a close neighbor to the Royal Majesty. Some casuistry. And this is what a philosopher, a writer and a person of the same faith says with the messengers! Mavrokordato seemed to have forgotten who was defeated in the Turkish war, saying that the patience of the Porte should not be carried to the end. This is not surprising for the secretary of state, who earlier, in a dispute about the Dnieper towns, said: “For such small places, the sultan will give up the great and noble fortress of Azov.” However, not only he, but also Reiz-Effendi considered the cession of Dnieper towns by Peter I to Turkey after their ruin was considered "some kind of violence and ridicule." And the question remained for centuries: “Are the people of Reiz-Efendi and Mavrocordato peaceful?” Mavrocordato assured the Russian Embassy that everything in the article about Polonians "will be written without any dispute", however, the delay of the ship "Fortress" will take place precisely because of the presence of 150 Polonians on board. That article will be connected indirectly with the article on trade between the two states, according to which the Turks agreed to overland trade and the navigation of Russian ships from Arkhangelsk to the Mediterranean Sea to the Turkish shores, but they did not want to hear or talk about the Black Sea. “At the previous conferences, XXII and XXI, the words of the envoys about the royal sea caravan and about the sailing of this caravan with trading purposes in the Black Sea were met with the greatest irritation and the admission of Russian ships was decisively refused” (ibid.: 155), Bogoslovsky wrote. The motif of the Black Sea is one of the main spatial motifs of the Article List of the Ukraintsov Embassy.

Indeed, the articles on the list of Ambassador Extraordinary E. I. Ukraintsov are striking in their scope. Here is the whole modern life of the Russian state with the birth of the fleet, the creation of a regular army, the transformation of the soldiers of the Preobrazhensky Regiment into sailors, which even Korb, who had recently left Moscow, knew about, the work of different generations with the highlighting of the Crimean issue, the compositional arrangement of which in the speech of envoys is always associated with something else: Turkish. Russia is perceived not only by the French legate, but also by the Turkish representatives as a separate world, approaching the shores of the Sublime Porte at a menacingly close distance. Neither Reiz-Efendi, nor especially Mavrocordato hide their likes and dislikes. They understand that the Turkish war is an epoch-making event, and they must also leave a memory of themselves - the Karlovitsky and Constantinople treaties. It was impossible not to understand the Grand Chancellor and Secretary of State that the Embassy from Moscow, from Ukraintsov to the captain of the ship, who received an order from the ambassador to prepare for the journey, affirm the value of responsibility by their words and actions. So Pieter van Pamburgh remained in the story, which Constantinople will tell more than once to someone: uninvited guest. The capital of Porta, with its landscapes, of which the cypress alley, the villas in the gardens on the shore, are remembered, was replenished with the most beautiful warship of the E. Tsar Fleet. Vel-va, who anchored directly in front of the Sultan's palace, and he immediately entered the treasury of legends and traditions of Constantinople, and what will happen next? The history of the “Fortress” in Constantinople, the history of the envoys against the backdrop of beautiful nature and a huge number of people, is an integral historical canvas that reflects the history of relations between Turkey and Russia, Crimea and Russia, Europe and Russia. How to forget the words of the captain, “navigators” and soldiers, transmitted through Ukraintsov to the Great Sovereign: “Yes, the Saltan himself and the vizier came and watched ... And most of all, sails, ropes, ropes are praised on the ship for their strength. They blame the Dutch for teaching your people, and reprimanded the Dutch ambassador ... ”(Ustryalov, 1858: 518).

The main semantic beginning of the Article List of the Embassy of Ukraintsov is contained in its title: "1699–1700" is description of the Year of Russia in Turkey. And what a year! Without any doubt, the Embassy proved itself worthy of the award, as did the Voznitsyn Embassy in Karlovitsy. Yes, they are impossible to consider without each other. And yet, although they are historically connected, in the Diary of the Ukraintsov Embassy, ​​the Black Sea, the First Russian warship in its waters, the Crimea, which is watched from the sea by soldiers studying maritime affairs under the guidance of a captain, in conversations with foreigners in Constantinople respectfully called them: "Russian people". The life of ancient Constantinople is built as a change of epochs: X, XV, XVI, XVII centuries, the beginning of the XVIII century. Time can get stuck in the "answer chamber", or the vizier's palace, or at the embassy camp, where there are always disputes - they keep the colorful article list. Speakers from the long past face ambassadors - which of them is more interesting? They have and their russian young there were then such broad plans for trade in the southern seas. And not only in the south! It was necessary to adapt the military Azov fleet for other purposes - for the sake of economic profit. The transformations that could happen to the navy are not only the idea of ​​Peter I, this is the real space of the Article List.

Riding, sailing and riding again that unforgettable Embassy with its protracted negotiations is not at all chaotic. The plan to obtain eternal peace is a mandatory denial of tribute to the Crimean Khan and the Tatars, despite their insistence on having it, and the desire to develop the waters of the Black Sea, which the Turkish sultans so unexpectedly appropriated for themselves at the end of the 15th century. Everyone is remembered, but most of all - the captain of the "Fortress" van Pamburgh! Let's go back to messages ship to its fearless captain and crew. They are one with the ship. The stay of the "Fortress" in Constantinople and before leaving it became a torment for the Sultan and, according to rumors, his people. Not because Pamburg continued to live in peace and "repair many zeal". The captain with his ship may have shown the Turks and the Greeks and other peoples that the past did not die. That the heirs of that past have already arrived. What, how will others appear? "The entire navy" from such "Fortresses" and Pamburgs? Or Ushakov? Or the Senyavins? Who did not understand how this Black Sea can be the "inland sea" of the Turks, so this is a young volunteer captain. He showed his lack of understanding. The plot with the captain, who gave the order on the night of May 17, 1700 to go to the open Black Sea, was not a whim. The Turks unraveled their future, namely: Russia will never be without a Navy. Never! Peter was in a hurry. For the increase of Knowledge. Is it possible to live without it? The main thing for Peter I and his Russia was ahead.

"Army", "bastion", "navy", "politics", "patriot", "Victoria" - words that became the property of Russian speech at the turn of the 17th-18th centuries. Everywhere, everywhere Russians studied. Some went abroad, others came to them from abroad. What did the title of academician mean for Peter I in the future, and he will receive this high title from the French Academy of Sciences? To become worthy of it by spreading science in your Fatherland. Therefore, Captain Peter van Pamburg and the navigator of the ship Otto, being not on a one-day voyage, measure the depths of the Black Sea, doing scientific work. It is a pity that there are no Notes of a captain killed in a duel in a foreign land in 1702. Even today one can learn from the Dutchman Pieter Van Pamburg how to understand the world and how to work in it. Van Pamburg, in order to comprehend navigation, had to seriously get acquainted with physics, geography, mathematics, chemistry. It can be compared with ... his ship-worker, built by the hands of Russian and foreign people. It turns out that such a community can be of great use. In fact, is it possible, as Feofan Prokopovich, a young contemporary of that voyage from the Crimea to Constantinople and back, said, to stand above the water, watch the guests come and go, and not be able to do it yourself? Captain van Pamburgh, who arrived in Russia on hire by Captain Kreis, knows that maritime science is the path to honors, but for some reason he was criticized in Constantinople. Note that the captain did not cry. Wept Mavrokordato, "slave of the Sultan."

But what a creative person Peter van Pamburg turned out to be! He puzzled everyone all the time, activating their activities, including Mavrocordato, as he constantly created problem situations. He and the "Fortress" forever together. The ship had a lot to say about this volunteer, if he was given the floor. For example, about what dialogues sounded between the captain and navigator Otto, Lieutenant Gendrichson when measuring the Black Sea depths. From that voyage, the ship returned with scientific research materials that will not be known to the world for many years, but will still be included in the experiments of Vice Admiral Cornelius Cruis. Ukraintsov reported to Peter I: “And Captain Pampurkh measured the sea in that place, and according to our measure of depth, not in many places it was 11 or half-11 feet, but in another place, I guess, which was much deeper” (ibid.: 507). Then it was learned: “From Kerch to Kafa by dry road, day and night driving, and there are many villages along that road Tatar and forests; and from Kafa to Bulaklava 2 days drive, and from Kerch 3 days drive to Karasev, and to Bakchisaray - 4 days, and to Perekop 5 days on a good horse. They were surprised that the Russian people were able to do what the Dutch did” (ibid.: 510).

The memory of the first warship "Fortress" with the Embassy on board and its captain will be more vivid today when you see the Ship with the same name at Cape "Balaklava". A walk on it near the legendary Balaklava, and even along the southern coast of Crimea to Koktebel and Feodosia with a caravan of small ships that have already registered for the summer in Koktebel, will bring closer the distant past, wonderful people who were "both sailors and heroes." We believe that one day a sail will flash in the Black Sea distance - and one can imagine that after some time we will see Captain Pamburg in all his simplicity. He is still in his uninterrupted labors and "leisure" that amazed the Turkish court. It seems to us that he is our contemporary. And let his name remain among Potemkin, Suvorov, Rumyantsov, Kutuzov, Bagration, Ushakov, Senyavin. Crimea from this will only be more entertaining. The peninsula loves both the captain and the old ship of the Black Sea Fleet. I would also love the Museum of the Sea near Balaklava, if you take care to create it. We believe in it, because Sevastopol is nearby.

It would also be very useful if a Collection of article lists and letters of diplomas about the travels of diplomats to the Crimea and Turkey appeared. 60 years ago, the publication in the Literary Monuments series of “Travels of Russian Ambassadors of the 16th-18th Centuries”, representing a Collection of Article Lists, among which there was one Turkish: about the Novosiltsev Embassy, ​​aroused high approval. We know about this from the Germanist professor of the Department of World Literature of the Moscow State Pedagogical University, headed by the professor of English Nina Pavlovna Mikhalskaya, then the professor of philology and cultural studies Vladimir Andreevich Lukov, Boris Ivanovich Purishev, in whose house unforgettable postgraduate meetings were held 30 years ago. To this day, the scientific publication of the materials of that trip of I.P. Novosiltsev to Turkey (2008) remains the only one of the lists of the southern direction. (How glad we were to purchase the famous Collection at the XXVIII Moscow International Book Fair on September 4, 2015). The transition from the Article List of Ambassadors to the Article List of Embassies in 1698-1700. interesting problem, which is useful for historians, philologists, culturologists, philosophers. Recall, P. B. Voznitsyn: he paired “happiness” precisely with “benefit” and “hope”. The “clever girl” understood how important it is for a diplomat to be happy from a job well done.

Bibliographer. description: Naumenko V. G. History of Constantinople: from the diplomatic relations of the Moscow State with the Crimean Khanate and Turkey [Electronic resource] // Information Humanitarian Portal “Knowledge. Understanding. Skill". 2015. No. 4 (July - August). pp. 5–29. URL: [archived at WebCite] (Accessed: dd.mm.yyyy).

receipt date: 20.08.2015.

see also:

The next notable milestone in the development of ancient Russian diplomacy was the Russian embassy in 838-839. to Constantinople to the Byzantine emperor Theophilus (829-842) and to Ingelheim - the capital of the Frankish state - to Louis the Pious (814-841). Information about this is contained in the Vertinskaya Chronicle, written by Bishop Prudentius. The general outline of events is as follows. In 839, ambassadors of the Byzantine emperor Theophilus appeared at the court of the Frankish emperor Louis the Pious - Bishop Theodosius of Chalcedon and Spafarius Theophanes. Together with the Byzantines, Russian ambassadors arrived in Ichgelheim, returning to their homeland by a roundabout way from Constantinople. Byzantine ambassadors brought Louis gifts and a personal message from Emperor Theophilus, in which he offered to confirm the relationship of "peace and love" between the two countries. On May 18, 839, the Byzantine embassy was solemnly received in Ingelheim. Further, Prudentius reports: “He (Theophilus. - A. S.) sent with them (ambassadors. - A. S.) also some people who said that they (the people. - A. S.) are called Ros (Rhos) , and whom, as they said, their king, named Khakan (Chacanus), sent to him (Theophilus. - A.S.) for the sake of friendship. In the aforementioned message, Theophilus asked Louis to graciously provide the Russian ambassadors with the opportunity to return to their homeland and give them protection, since the paths by which they arrived to him in Constantinople "went among the barbarians, very inhuman and wild tribes," and he would not want to again expose their dangers. According to Prudentius, Louis the Pious asked the ambassadors about the reasons for their appearance in the land of the Franks and found out that they were “Sveons”. The ambassadors were suspected of espionage and detained until the true purpose of their arrival in Ingelheim was clarified, and it was noted that "they came rather to spy than to seek friendship." In a response letter to Theophilus, Louis said that if the ambassadors turned out to be innocent, he would either let them go to their homeland or return them back to Byzantium so that Theophilus would do with them at his own discretion. "This is where Prudentius' information ends. There is no information about the further fate of the Russian embassy .

During the long historiographical life of this message, it was evaluated from different points of view, and only one aspect - diplomatic, directly related to the very essence of the event, has not yet found detailed coverage either in domestic or foreign literature.

A. L. Shletser was the first to express the idea that determined the position of the Normanists in the interpretation of this particular historical fact. “People who are called Swedes in Germany ... - he wrote, - in Constantinople they call themselves Russians, - this is the main position that we deduce from this place.”

The title “kagan” was translated by Schlozer as a Scandinavian proper name Hakan. Finally, he stubbornly defended the thesis about the low prestige of the Russian embassy in Constantinople, since it represented a people unknown to Byzantium 2 .

Following Schlozer, the same point of view was expressed by N. M. Karamzin and S. M. Solovyov.

MP Pogodin shared the Normanist assessment of the Russian embassy in 839: “The Normans, from the tribe of Rus, came to Theophilus to conclude an alliance.” It is clear, he wrote, that “Rhos” is a northern tribe, and it is natural for such a tribe to seek the way of the western...”. W. Thomsen adhered to this point of view. F. I. Uspensky, solving the problem also in the spirit of Normanism, proposed a slightly different option. “Is it not possible to admit,” he wrote, “that in 838 part of the Varangians, ousted from Novgorod, with the assistance of Tsar Theophilus, made their way to their relatives in Scandinavia in order to gather new hunters and make a new attempt to establish themselves in Russia?” The version about the Scandinavian origin of the embassy was supported by M. D. Priselkov. He even believed that the Russians - the Scandinavians - could not return to their homeland precisely because of the hostile attitude of the Eastern Slavs towards them. S. F. Platonov considered the problem to be contradictory and practically unsolvable. The historian was confused by the fact that the ambassadors, calling themselves Swedes, represented the state of Russia, headed by a kagan, which corresponded to the Turkic domineering terminology 4 .

The point of view of domestic Normanists found an echo in the works of foreign authors. Back in 1930, the German bourgeois historian G. Laer denied the Russian character of the embassy, ​​considering it Khazar only on the basis of the title “kha-kan” mentioned by Prudentius. A. A. Vasiliev, in accordance with his concept of “Norman Russia”, considered the members of the embassy to be representatives of the “Russian-Varangian-Swedish state on the Dnieper”. A. Stender-Petersen was convinced that the embassy of 839 was “a trade and diplomatic delegation of the Swedish tribe of Russia”, which, having settled in the Slavic lands, sent its mission through Khazaria to Byzantium and Ingelheim.

The English historian P. Sawyer in his general work “The Viking Age” wrote that the appearance in the west in 839 of the “Swedes”, called “Rus”, indicates an earlier stage of activity of the Scandinavians in the Russian lands than is recorded in the annals, where under 852 It is noted that the "Scandinavians" established "their power" in Kyiv 5 .

In recent years, the history of the embassy has been studied by D. Obolensky and E. Arweiler. D. Obolensky came to the conclusion that, although the Greeks knew Russia from the attack on Amastris, a Norman diplomatic or trade mission visited Byzantium and Ingelheim. E. Arweiler believes that in 838 a Khazar embassy appeared in Byzantium, which included Russians from the Novgorod region. They could not return to their homeland and “unexpectedly discovered” Constantinople for themselves. For the Greeks, “their Russian origin went unnoticed,” since 20 years later, Patriarch Photius, in his sermons on the attack of the Russians on Constantinople in 860, claimed that their name “was unknown in Byzantium.” “Only in 860, - writes E. Arweiler, - the Byzantines began to get acquainted with the Russians” b.

A special position on the issue of the 839 embassy was taken by E. E. Golubinsky and V. G. Vasilevsky. The first believed that the embassy was sent to Byzantium not by Kyiv, but by Tmutarakan, or Azov-Black Sea Rus, which had maintained relations with the empire since ancient times. Vasilyevsky, on the other hand, considered the ambassadors to be representatives of the Dnieper Rus, located closer to the Black Sea and under the rule of the Khazars. He admitted that by kagan one could mean both the Khazar supreme ruler and the Russian prince who bore this Khazar title 7 .

However, along with the formation of Normanist views on the embassy in 838-839. there was also a different point of view, according to which Prudentius mentioned representatives of Kievan Rus, Slavic Rus, the emerging ancient Russian state. Even G. Evers, arguing with A.L. Schlozer, noted that not a single Swedish ruler called himself a kagan and the Franks knew the Swedes under their own name long before the appearance of the Russian embassy in Ingelheim (in 829, the Swedish embassy asked for the same Louis the Pious to help spread Christianity among the Swedes). And the Russians were suspected of espionage only because they called themselves “Sveons”, since two years earlier the Scandinavians had made a frightening raid on the possessions of the Franks 8 .

A number of Russian historians of the XIX-XX centuries. both in special studies and in general works, they opposed the identification of the “hakan”, mentioned by Prudentius, with a certain Scandinavian Gakon. K. N. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, D. I. Ilovaisky, V. S. Ikonnikov, D. I. Bagalei, V. I. Lamansky argued that the Slavs borrowed the title “kagan” from the Khazars, who ruled over the Dnieper region in VII- 8th century They saw traces of Khazar influence in the use of the title “Kagan” by the first Russian Metropolitan Hilarion in the “Sermon on Law and Grace” and “Praise” to Prince Vladimir. The idea of ​​a Kievan, Slavic representation of the embassy in 839 was defended by S. A. Gedeonov. He denied the so-called Swedish Rus and spoke of three or four Normans who "accidentally came to Kyiv in 839". Gedeonov considered it absolutely unbelievable that in Byzantium they would not guess the Swedish name Gakon under the Turkic title “Kagan” and that the Swedes called themselves not by the name of the people who sent them (Rus), but in accordance with their retinue name (Rods). Gedeonov drew attention to the fact that neither the Swedes nor the Danes used their squad names in political relations, but retained their ethnic ones. Prudentius, however, learned about the name of the people whose interests were represented by the ambassadors from Byzantine diplomats, for whom the word “Rus” has long been a collective word and meant sub-Neprovian and northeastern Slavic tribes. Gedeonov, noting the use of the title “kagan” in Kievan Rus in the 11th century, pointed out that Emperor Theophilus called the ruler of Russia a kagan from the words of Russian ambassadors 9 .

The discussion among domestic historians also influenced foreign bourgeois historiography. Some of its representatives actively defended the thesis about the Slavic origin of the state, which sent the "Swedes" to Constantinople in 838. I. Sventsitsky argued that the Vertinskaya Chronicle reports on the “Russian mission” at the Byzantine court, and considered it the beginning of diplomatic relations between Kievan Rus and Byzantium. A. V. Ryazanovsky defended this thesis most convincingly. He emphasized that the Russian Normanists replaced the essence of the issue with its superficial consideration, as they tried to establish the nationality of the ambassadors (who they are - Swedes, Goths, Slavs, Khazars), and not the state that sent them, the ruler. In his opinion, the title "kagan" was common among the Khazars, Danube Bulgarians, Avars and other Eastern European peoples. Ryazanovsky cites an excerpt from a letter dated 871 from the Byzantine Emperor Basil I the Macedonian to Emperor Louis II, from which it follows that the title “Kagan” was not known to the Normans, but was used by the Avars and Bulgarians. On the basis of an analysis of Hilarion's Lay, he came to the conclusion that "the Kagan of the Russians, who sent an embassy ... to Constantinople, was in fact the Prince of Kyiv." There was no need for the Black Sea-Russian or Russian-Khazar mission to return in a roundabout way, since the Black Sea region was under the control of the Khazars, friendly to Byzantium. If we accept the version about the Kiev origin of the mission, then the embassy's return trip from Ingelheim is justified, since it ran along the old trade road through Ingelheim - Krakow - Kyiv 12 . G. Vernadsky, who in some ways, as I. P. Shaskolsky noted, deviated from “traditional Norman concepts”, wrote that the 839 embassy was not Norman, but Russian, and it went to Constantinople to conclude an agreement between Russia and Byzantium thirteen .

Soviet and foreign Marxist historians began to develop the problem from fundamentally different positions. The question of the emergence of the state in Russia began to be resolved in terms of studying superstructural phenomena, in close connection with the level of socio-economic and cultural development of the Russian lands. In the works of B. D. Grekov, M. N. Tikhomirov, B. A. Rybakov, P. N. Tretyakov, V. T. Pashuto and others, it is convincingly shown that in the 9th century. ancient Russia carried out the transition from the primitive communal system to the feudal one, that in the Russian lands there was a process of class formation, the formation of statehood, the formation of a feudal foreign policy, the foundations of ancient Russian culture were laid 14. The high level of political development of Russian lands in the 9th-10th centuries. revealed V. T. Pashuto. He convincingly proved that, in relation to this time, one should not talk about Russian tribes, but about a confederation or federation of tribes, about individual Russian principalities - glades, drevlyans, dregovichi, polochans, slovenes. “The whole structure of the then Russia turns out to be not ethnographic, tribal, but political ... - writes V. T. Pashuto. - The Slavic confederation came into contact with the northern countries, faced with the Norman "finders" and mercenaries" 15 . In his opinion, even in the earliest sources, the Russian principalities “act inside the country and in external relations as political organizations, predominantly having territorial and social (prince, nobility, people) divisions” 16 .

A significant contribution to the development of the problem was made by the Polish historian G. Lovmiansky, who, relying on a wide range of archaeological, etymological, ethnographic and written sources, showed the similarity of the processes of class formation and the development of statehood in the Slavic countries in the 1st millennium AD. e., including in ancient Russia 17 .

In close connection with the study of the socio-economic, political and cultural development of Russian lands in the 9th-10th centuries. Marxist historians also decide the Norman question. Without denying the role of the foreign element in the formation of the state in Russia, they emphasize that the Varangians were essentially not an external impulse for the formation of the ancient Russian statehood, but one of its internal factors. G. Lovmyansky, the author of a special work on the role of the Varangians in the formation of Slavic statehood, wrote: “It is not Kyiv that owes the Normans the beginning of its state organization, but the Normans, thanks to the development of the state system in Russia, and especially on the Middle Dnieper, found the conditions for participation in this process the main way as merchants and hired soldiers” 18 .

The same point of view was expressed by IP Shaskolsky, criticizing the views of the bourgeois Normanists A. Stender-Petersen, G. Pashkevich and others on the decisive importance of the Varangians in the formation of the ancient Russian state. “The Normans,” wrote I.P. Shaskolsky, “were only included in the grandiose process of the formation of class societies and the state on a vast territory from the Ladoga region to the lower reaches of the Dnieper.” At the Copenhagen symposium on the history of the Vikings in 1968, D.S. Likhachev, considering the question of the “calling” of the Varangians, also noted that in addition to “the Rurik dynasty, there were other princely dynasties in Russia, both of Scandinavian and local origin” 19 . At a session on the history of the Normans in Spoleto (1968), M. Hellmann said that “the formation of medieval Russia is depicted as a long and complex process. Indigenous and external factors played their role in this, not at all times equally intense, but they all contributed to the fact that the Kievan state grew into a significant political force within a century and a half” 20 . The only thing that raises an objection here is the motive of the equivalence of “native and foreign” elements in the formation of ancient Russian statehood, which contradicts the facts and the concept of the Soviet historical school based on them about the primary importance of Slavic elements and the secondary role of foreign elements in the genesis of the state in Russia.

From these methodological positions, one should evaluate the fact of the appearance of “Sveons” as part of the Russian embassy in Byzantium and Ingelheim.

At the same time, in Soviet historiography, the fundamentally correct definitions of this embassy as the mission of the Slavic Old Russian state have not yet found research confirmation. So, M. V. Levchenko essentially did not introduce anything new into the argument. M. I. Artamonov noted that the affiliation of the embassy to Kievan Rus “is also evidenced by the title of the head of this Rus - kagan, which is incredible for the northern Slavs, but quite understandable for the Slavs of the Middle Dnieper, who were under the rule of the Khazars. By accepting this title, the Kyiv prince declared his independence from the Khazars. The collective monograph “The Old Russian State and Its International Significance” also emphasized that the Old Russian state “began to liberate the Slavic lands that gravitated towards it from the foreign power of the kaganate, and then subjugated it, usurping (as the Muscovite tsars did later) the title of kagan.” Analyzing the references to the title “Khakan Russ” in the writings of Ibn-Ruste and al-Muqaddasi, A.P. Novoseltsev noted that the time to which the Russians and their Khakan are attributed by Eastern authors and Bishop Prudentius “approximately coincides”, which indicates the adoption of the head Russians of the title “khakan”, “in order to emphasize their power”. G. G. Litavrin considers the embassy as the beginning of direct contacts between Russia and Constantinople and an attempt to establish regular relations between ancient Russia and Byzantium. VT Pashuto characterizes the embassy as a Russian Slavic diplomatic mission, which confirms the existence of peaceful ties between Russia and Byzantium 21 .

This view of the history of the embassy was also reflected in general works 22 .

Let us consider the history of the embassy from the point of view of the diplomatic practice of the first third of the 9th century.

A few words about the chronology of the embassy. In Ingelheim, the Byzantine embassy, ​​with which Russian ambassadors appeared in the Frankish capital, was received in May 839. It arrived there, of course, earlier, since, according to the diplomatic practice of the early Middle Ages, the reception of ambassadors was not carried out immediately upon their arrival in the country, but after their establishment, a preliminary exchange of opinions regarding the reception ceremony, etc. Probably, both embassies, having traveled a long way from Constantinople to Ingelheim, appeared here in early spring. And this means that the Russian embassy spent the winter in the Byzantine capital. Consequently, the Russian ambassadors appeared in Constantinople no later than the autumn of 838 - the end of navigation, for only by water could the embassy get there. The very long stay of Russian ambassadors in Byzantium indicates their certain status: the Russians were not random wanderers, but a political mission, and the duration of her stay in the capital of the empire was typical of the then diplomatic practice.

What are the historical conditions for the appearance of the Russian embassy in Byzantium? This was the time when the emperor Theophilus was waging a desperate struggle with the Arab Caliphate and turned to the countries of Europe for help, for the first time putting forward the idea of ​​a crusade against the Muslim world. In 837-838. the Byzantine army suffered a series of defeats in Asia Minor, and there was a threat of an Arab attack directly on Constantinople. There was also trouble in the north. The Khazars turned to Byzantium with a request to build a military fortress on the Don (the future Sarkel) in order to prevent the advance of new nomadic hordes - the Ugrians or the Pechenegs 24 who pushed them back, and perhaps fearing pressure from the Dnieper Rus, which, with its sea and land raids at the end of the VIII - first third of the ninth century disturbed the borders of both Byzantium and Khazaria. M. I. Artamonov believed that one attack of the Novgorod rati on Surozh was enough to cause fear in Khazaria and speed up the agreement between the empire and the Khazar Khaganate on the construction of a fortress. Soon, Greek builders arrived on the Don, led by the spafar candidate Petrona. He spoke about this in detail in the X century. in his work "On the Governance of the State" Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. Sarkel was built not on a river, but on a land road, when crossing the Don, and was supposed to cover Khazaria (and the Crimean possessions of the Byzantines in the west and north-west. But the attempt of the Byzantines to use the construction of Sarkel to strengthen their influence in this area by planting Christianity met The Byzantines decided to create an independent theme (Byzantine territorial-administrative unit) in the Crimea, headed by the same Petrona, who received the rank of protospafarius 26 .

Thus, the Russian embassy appears in Byzantium precisely at the moment when a complex international knot is being tied in the Black Sea region. Byzantium seeks in these conditions to maintain and strengthen its influence on the northern shores of the Black Sea and at the same time enlist the support of its western neighbors in the fight against the Arabs. It was to this time that her embassies to Venice, Spain 2D, belong to the francs. Therefore, all versions about the random nature of the Russian embassy seem unjustified to us. Slavic embassy to Byzantium in the first third of the 9th century. was not an out of the ordinary event: the whole practice of political relations between the Ants, the ancient Slavs and their neighbors shows that they knew the embassy road to Constantinople well.

It is significant that the Russian ambassadors appeared in Ingelheim together with the official embassy of Emperor Theophilus, which pursued a very responsible goal - to confirm “peace and love” with the Franks in the face of the growing Arab danger. The practice of such accompaniments is typical of both the ancient world and the Middle Ages. In the future, this tradition was developed in Russia. Usually, the duties of the accompanying embassy included guarding foreign ambassadors on their way, observing them, helping them in providing them with means of transportation, food, and also in conducting a new round of negotiations in the capital of a foreign state. In those cases when it was a question of working out common decisions (for example, in the three capitals - Vienna, Krakow and Moscow), not two, but even three embassies or light Gonets missions traveled together. In this sense, the trip of the Russian embassy not only confirms the traditional practice for relations with a friendly state, but also indicates the commonality of issues that could be discussed with the Russians in Byzantium and with the Franks (in the presence of the Russians) in Ingelheim.

It is also important to note the fact that Theophilus personally informed Louis the Pious about the Russian embassy, ​​asked him to assist in returning to his homeland and provide protection, which also indicates a certain political status of the Slavic ambassadors. In Byzantium, according to the report of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the bureaucratic regulation of receptions and seeing off ambassadors was very zealously observed in accordance with the international prestige of their country or its role in current politics 28 . All this, in our opinion, allows us to conclude that neither the small Gothic-Norman centers in the Crimea, nor the random Scandinavian detachments have anything to do with this embassy. The situation dictated serious negotiations with a possible strong ally. Hence the corresponding status of the embassy at the Byzantine court.

The arguments of those historians who drew attention to the illogical characterization of the embassy as Khazar or Azov-Black Sea are also convincing, since in this case the return of the friendly Khazars through the lands would not present great difficulties for him. Another thing is the traditional route in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, which was intercepted by the Ugrians and Pechenegs. This circumstance could violate the original plans of the ambassadors.

The main argument against characterizing the embassy of 839 as a mission of Kievan Rus lies in the very fact of mentioning the ambassadors as “Sveons”. Indeed, the investigation carried out in Ingelheim forced the ambassadors, who introduced themselves on behalf of Russia, to recognize themselves as “Sveons”. Therefore, according to a whole group of historians, the “Swedes” should be identified with Russia. But to agree with this means to take a purely formal moment for the essence of the matter. The fact that the ambassadors were “Sveons” has nothing to do with the characterization of the state that sent them. As reigning IX-X centuries. were already mostly not ethnic, but political in nature, so the representation of these principalities or their federations had not ethnic, but political, state significance. Moreover, the newly organized state, little familiar with the diplomatic practice of resolving international issues, did not have people trained for this purpose (knowledge of diplomatic customs, foreign languages), could use the services of experienced and experienced Vikings. In those distant times, not the nationality of diplomats, but their knowledge of their business, service devotion to one or another throne determined the composition of the mission.

The members of the embassy were the Varangians - constant participants in both bold raids, and border negotiations, and squad service under the East Slavic princes, as well as at the Constantinople court.

The official function of the “Sveons” in the Russian embassy was noted by K. N. Bestuzhev-Ryumin. M.V. Levchenko believed that “the Russian prince sent the Swedes because they were warriors with him and were known as people experienced in diplomatic negotiations.” I. P. Shaskolsky and V. T. Pashuto also wrote about them as “Normans” who served Russia. A. V. Ryazanovsky noted that in Russian history the Varangians repeatedly acted as part of embassies “from the Russian family”, and in particular during the negotiations between the ambassadors of Oleg and Byzantium in 907, as well as the Russian embassy to Constantinople in 911. Ambassadors 839 were Russian, as they represented the ancient Russian state, the Kyiv kagan-prince, although they were “Swedes” by nationality. G. Lovmyansky expressed the idea that at various stages of the history of ancient Russia, the Varangians performed different functions. Until the third quarter of the IX century. they acted primarily as merchants "due to their inherent dexterity in trade affairs, knowledge of foreign countries, which also facilitated their diplomatic functions." Russia used their skills in military affairs and navigation for their own purposes. And from the last quarter of the X century. The commercial and diplomatic role of the Varangians is declining, but their “military-hired” functions are increasing. B. Delmer also believed that the "Sveons" were Scandinavians in the service of the Russian prince.

Apparently, the very fact of the representation of the Varangians in the Russian embassy indicates a stable diplomatic tradition that existed, perhaps, until the end of the 10th century, when Russia in Byzantium - and perhaps in other countries - used their services in conducting diplomatic negotiations. The involvement of the Varangians in the service in Kyiv was caused by the needs of the country's internal development, the formation of the ancient Russian state, and the improvement of its foreign policy functions. The so-called vocation of the prince served the same needs.

The question about the goals of the Russian embassy that arrived in Constantinople is natural. A number of historians believe that it sought to conclude a union treaty 31 . More cautious assessments were also made: D. I. Bagalei wrote about the “relations” of Russia and Byzantium, G. G. Litavrin speaks about the beginning of the establishment of “regular relations” with the empire, he sees the goal of the embassy in establishing “peaceful relations between Russia and Byzantium”. T. Pashuto 32 .

In connection with these different assessments, attention should be paid to one more aspect of the history of the embassy, ​​which was not noted by the researchers. From the message of Prudentius it follows that the Franks suspected the ambassadors of espionage. The history of the ancient world and the Middle Ages knows many examples of embassy and trade missions carrying out reconnaissance functions 33 . The accusation itself is obvious. The embassy, ​​which appeared in Ingelheim under the dubious pretext of the impossibility of returning to their homeland because of the “inhuman and wild tribes” that blocked all routes, the unclear nationality of the Russian envoys could not but arouse suspicion among the Franks.

In our opinion, historians take too seriously Theophilus' version that the ambassadors were deprived of the opportunity to return home in the traditional way. K. Erickson even suggested that the ambassadors were Russian Christians, who feared an attack from their fellow pagans 34 . It seems that the Franks really appreciated the difficulties of the ambassadors and correctly defined the functions of the Russian embassy that came to them.

Prudentius says that the Russian khakan sent ambassadors to Theophilus “for the sake of friendship” (amicitiae causa). According to the international notions of the time, this formulation did not imply a specific political alliance, a military agreement, or the establishment of a stable relationship of "peace and love." By the way, it is precisely this kind of relationship that can be discussed in connection with the embassy to Ingelheim of Bishop Theodosius of Chalcedon and Spafarius Theophan. The Russian embassy, ​​in our opinion, performed a more limited task - to enter into friendly, peaceful relations with the Byzantine Empire, which may have been associated with the recent attack of the Russians on the Asia Minor possessions of Byzantium and the city of Amastrida.

Such an embassy could also perform supervisory functions. Apparently, the stay of the Russian embassy in the lands of the Franks (forced or purposeful) also took place under the sign of the establishment by Russia of relations of “friendship” with the Frankish court. It is possible that the purpose of the embassy was to collect certain information for the correct political orientation of Russia, which was looking for foreign policy contacts.

In Byzantium, the embassy was greeted kindly, since the establishment of friendly relations with Russia corresponded to the goals of the empire. Hence the help in carrying out the further tasks of the Russian mission - establishing contacts with the Franks. The appearance of the Russian embassy in Constantinople can also be regarded as the beginning of the end of that period of isolation in which the East Slavic tribes found themselves after the attack of the Avars, and later in connection with dependence on the Khazars. The sending of the first Russian embassy to Byzantium and its appearance in the lands of the Franks marks a new stage in the formation of ancient Russian statehood.

Russia - England: unknown war, 1857-1907 Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 17

By the end of 1877, the defeat of the Turkish army had become a fait accompli. The crossing of the Balkans by the Russians made a stunning impression on the Turks. The Turkish Minister of War Suleiman proposed to pull Wessel's troops from Shipka to Adrianople before it was too late, but they did not listen to him - having already destroyed Osman's army, the seraskiriat was destroying Wessel's army. The Sultan appointed Minister of War Reuf as commander-in-chief, and ordered Suleiman to take direct command of the Western Turkish army. Suleiman managed to concentrate up to 50 thousand people with 122 guns between Sofia and Philippopolis, and at Yeni Zagra there were another 25 thousand people of Mehmed-Ali. However, on December 29, having received news of the surrender of Wessel's army at Shipka, Reuf lost heart, fearing for Constantinople. Suleiman and Mehmed-Ali were ordered to immediately retreat to Adrianople, and Nejib, who commanded the Eastern Army, to leave only the troops necessary to hold the fortresses in Dobruja and the “quadrangle”, and load the rest in Varna on ships to be sent to Constantinople.

The port hoped to have time to concentrate 120 thousand people at the strong Adrianople fortress (which hoped to delay the Russian offensive). At the same time, she asked England for peaceful mediation, but Russia rejected the proposal of the London Cabinet, suggesting that the Port itself apply for aman, that is, ask for mercy.

Only Mehmed-Ali managed to retreat to Adrianople. Suleiman hastily retreated on December 30 and 31 to Tatar-Bazardzhik. Gurko intended to encircle him here, but on the night of January 2, the Turkish army eluded capture, crossed the Maritsa River, destroying the bridge behind them, and concentrated at Philippopolis on the evening of January 2.

Suleiman decided to give the troops a rest at Philippopolis, and if the Russians attacked him, to accept the battle. This decision horrified the pasha's subordinates, who asked him not to risk the last Turkish army, but they failed to convince the "serdar-ekrem".

On January 2, in the evening, the vanguard of General Gurko (Count Shuvalov with Pavlovtsy and guards riflemen) crossed in the dark, chest-deep in water and in 8-degree frost, the wide and fast river Maritsa, along which ice was already walking. On January 3, the rest of the 2nd Guards Division crossed the same way. The troops that crossed over fought a protracted battle all day, waiting for the deployment of the main forces. Suleiman, noticing the danger, ordered an immediate retreat, but it was too late. On the morning of January 4, the Russians captured Philippopolis, forcing the icy Maritsa wherever there were fords, and in the evening the Life Guards Lithuanian regiment, breaking into the very middle of the retreating Turkish army at Karagach, destroyed an infantry brigade with a sudden night attack and captured 23 guns. On January 5, the Turkish army turned directly south, and two divisions that had lost contact with the main forces were destroyed. The main forces managed to break away from the Russians. Our cavalry under the command of General D. I. Skobelev 1st (father) found out all day on January 6 the direction of the enemy’s retreat, and on the morning of January 7, the Turks were overtaken at Karadzhalar by the dashing 30th Don Regiment of Grekov, who attacked one and a half Turkish divisions and captured the entire remaining the Turks have artillery - 53 guns. This brilliant victory ended the pursuit of Suleiman's army defeated near Philippopolis, which lost 20 thousand people (two-fifths of the composition) and all artillery (114 guns). In Constantinople, for a long time they did not know where its remains were located. By January 15, they gathered at Karagach and from there were transported by sea, partly to Constantinople, partly to Gallipoli. The Russians lost 41 officers and 1209 lower ranks at Philippopolis.

While Gurko was smashing the Turks at Philippopolis, the center of our army wasted no time reaping the fruits of Shein's victory. At the forefront of Skobelev were the 1st Cavalry Division and Shipka's heroes - the Orlovites and the "Iron Riflemen". Immediately assessing the situation in the theater of war, Skobelev, immediately after the occupation of Eski-Zagra on January 1, moved the cavalry he had - three regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division under the command of General Strukov - into a deep raid on Adrianople.

This brilliant raid decided the campaign. On January 2, Moscow dragoons occupied the most important railway junction of the theater of war - Semenli, cutting off Suleiman's army from Adrianople and prejudging its defeat. Nine Russian squadrons violated all strategic calculations of Turkey. The indefatigable Strukov smashed the rear of the enemy, captured the carts, huge warehouses of food and equipment, and on January 6 was already in Mustava Pasha, in the cavalry semi-transition from Adrianople.

On January 8, the powerful fortress of Adrianople was captured without a fight. There were 70 serviceable guns in the fortress.

Naturally, the question arose before the Russian command - to take or not to take Constantinople and (or) the Straits, and how, and under what conditions to conclude peace or a truce with the Turks?

On December 27, 1877, the commander of the Russian army in the Balkans, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, received a telegram from the Turkish Minister of War Reuf Pasha with a request to inform him where to send Mushir Megmet-Ali, authorized to conclude a truce, and on what conditions it can be concluded. On December 28, Nikolai Nikolayevich sent a reply telegram: “The contents of your dispatch have been brought to the attention of the emperor. Negotiations can only be conducted directly with me, but there can be no talk of a truce without accepting the preliminary grounds for peace” (56. Book Two, pp. 399–400).

Alexander II approved all the orders of his brother and said that all the instructions and powers expected by the Grand Duke had already been sent on December 21. The emperor warned that one should not rush to inform the Turks of the conditions for concluding a truce, but that this matter should be dragged out without weakening military operations.

On January 2, 1878, Alexander II received a telegram from Sultan Abdul Hamid II, which stated that, deeply grieving over the circumstances that caused the ill-fated war between the two states, called upon to live in good harmony, and wishing to stop the aimless bloodshed as soon as possible, the Sultan By virtue of the agreement that took place between his government and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, he appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs Server Pasha and the Minister of the Court Namyk Pasha as his authorized representatives, who in three days will go to the Russian headquarters to establish the terms of a truce. Abdul Hamid II expressed the hope that the Russian emperor would order an immediate cessation of hostilities in all theaters of war.

Alexander II replied that no less than the Sultan wanted peace and the restoration of friendship between Russia and Turkey, but he could not stop hostilities until Porta accepted the preliminary peace conditions, which would be communicated to her by the commander-in-chief of the Russian armies.

Alexander II and Queen Victoria informed about the departure of Turkish representatives to the Russian camp. And the British ambassador demanded from Gorchakov another promise not to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula (i.e., the Dardanelles) with Russian troops and declared on behalf of his government that the agreement concluded between Russia and Turkey and concerning the treatises of 1856 and 1871 should be a “European” agreement ”and will not be valid if it takes place without the consent of all the countries participating in the treatises listed above.

As for the Dardanelles, Prince Gorchakov assured the British ambassador that the military operations of the Russian armies would not extend to Gallipoli unless the Turks concentrated their regular troops there, especially since England would not land her troops there either. Taking note of the statement, the British cabinet declared that "under the present circumstances" and did not think about the occupation of Gallipoli.

Alexander II informed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich of the Sultan's appeal and the "obtrusive demands" of British diplomats. Confirming by telegram that all these circumstances should in no way affect the actions of the commander-in-chief prescribed to him by the instruction sent on December 21, he wrote in a letter to his brother: hostilities must continue with all possible energy. May God help us to complete the holy work we have begun, as we wish for the benefit and dignity of Russia” (56. Book Two, p. 401).

On January 8, 1878, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich received the representatives of the Sultan - Server and Namyk. The Russian commander-in-chief began negotiations with the question of what kind of peace terms the Port offers Russia. The Turks replied that the vanquished could not make any demands on the victor and that the Sultan entrusted the fate of his country to the generosity of the Russian Tsar. Then Nikolai Nikolaevich handed over to the representatives of the Sultan the text of the peace conditions received from St. Petersburg and demanded a concrete answer from them, adding that the suspension of hostilities so desired by the Porte depended on this answer.

The Russian terms of peace, consisting of thirteen articles, contained the solution to all the problems that had arisen in the Balkans over the past five years. The conditions were as follows:

Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality and in no way less than those that were outlined by the Constantinople Conference, will constitute an autonomous principality, paying tribute to the Sultan, but enjoying Christian popular government, a people's militia, with the withdrawal of Turkish troops from its borders.

Montenegro, Romania and Serbia are recognized as independent from Turkey and receive a land increment at the expense of it.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is granted autonomous administration with sufficient guarantees, with close participation in the determination of their neighboring Austria-Hungary.

The same transformations are introduced in all other areas subject to Turkey with a Christian population.

The Porte rewards Russia for military expenses. Land rewards are: in Europe - the section of Bessarabia adjacent to the Danube, which went to Moldavia under the Paris Treaty of 1856, and in Asia - the fortresses of Ardagan, Kars, Bayazet and Batum with their districts. Romania receives Dobruja in exchange for a section of Bessarabia. In addition to the land remuneration, the Port pays a cash contribution to Russia.

Having familiarized themselves with the Russian conditions, the ambassadors exclaimed in horror: “This is the end of Turkey!” They promised to give an answer the next day.

On January 9, 1878, the envoys of the Sultan handed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich a note in which most of the Russian conditions were rejected, while the rest were accepted with significant reservations and restrictions. The Russian commander-in-chief, having read the note, declared that he did not want to hear about any changes in the conditions and that the Turks should answer "yes" or "no." To which Namyk Pasha objected: “But an independent Bulgaria marks the death of Turkey, the termination of its dominion in Europe, and after that the Turks have no choice but to go back to Asia” (56. Book Two. S. 404).

Nikolai Nikolaevich allowed the ambassadors to contact the Sultan by telegraph and receive instructions, while stating that Russia would continue active hostilities and that even if a satisfactory answer was received from Porto, he would accept it only after the prior permission of Alexander II.

In a telegram to the tsar, the commander-in-chief asked whether, if the sultan accepted the Russian peace conditions, he could conclude a truce or should he wait for new instructions from St. Petersburg. In the same telegram, the Grand Duke reported: “In addition, in view of the rapidly occurring events, the unexpectedly fast movement of our troops, the possible occupation of Adrianople by us at that very moment, and the desire you repeatedly expressed about the non-stop movement forward of our troops, I ask what I should do in case my approach to Constantinople, which can easily happen during the panic that grips the Turkish population from Adrianople to Istanbul inclusive, and also what to do in the following cases: 1) If the English or other fleets enter the Bosphorus? 2) If there will be a foreign landing in Constantinople? 3) If there will be riots, massacres of Christians and a request for help to us? 4) How to treat Gallipoli, with the British and without the British? (56. Book two. S. 404).

The indecision of the Turkish envoys, apparently, influenced the mood of the commander in chief and changed his views on the outcome of the war. After the occupation of Adrianople by the Russian troops, he telegraphed Alexander II: “Events are taking place so quickly and ahead of all possible proposals that if God blesses further, then we may soon be involuntarily under the walls of Constantinople.” Pointing to the “terrible, indescribable panic that seized the Turks,” he expressed his conviction “that under the present circumstances we cannot stop and, in view of the Turks’ refusal to accept the conditions of peace, it is necessary to go to the center, that is, to Tsaryrad”, and there “finish the holy cause ". “The authorized Ports themselves,” the telegram continued, “say that their business and existence are over, and we have no choice but to occupy Constantinople. At the same time, however, the occupation of Gallipoli, where the Turkish detachment is located, is inevitable, in order to prevent, if possible, the arrival of the British there and, in the final calculation, to have in our hands the most essential points for resolving the issue in our interests. “As a result, I will not settle with the commissioners until I receive an answer to the dispatch, and I go forward with God” (56. Book Two, p. 405), the Grand Duke ended his message.

Having sent Alexander II a detailed report on the negotiations with Server and Namyk, Nikolai Nikolaevich wrote in his own handwritten letter to the emperor from Kazanlak: “I hope that you will see that I have made every effort to act on your instructions and prevent the destruction of the Turkish monarchy, and if this I succeeded, then both pashas are positively to blame, who did not have enough civic courage to take upon themselves and sign our terms of peace. My troops are moving forward unceasingly. The horrors caused by the departing Turks, fleeing in panic, are terrible, destroying everything behind them and betraying much to the flames. The troops follow on the heels of the fleeing and, if possible, put out the burning and help the distressed. I personally leave here tomorrow and on the 14th or 15th I will be in Adrianople, where, I think, I will not stay long and, having crossed myself, I will go further, and who knows, if I do not receive your order to stop, with the blessing of God, maybe I will be soon with mind Tsaryrad! Everything is in the will of God! But my conviction is that the time has come, that it is necessary to go to the end, that is, to the heart of Turkey. I look forward to hearing from you: satisfied or not with my actions? (56. Book two. S. 405).

On January 14, 1878, the commander-in-chief moved his main apartment to Adrianople, and both Turkish pashas followed there. Russian troops continued the offensive. Advance detachments were sent in the east to Karakilissa, and in the south - to Demotika. The vanguard of General Strukov, heading along the railway to Constantinople, occupied Lyule-Burgas and on January 17 took the city of Chorla, located only three miles from Constantinople, with a battle.

As Minister of War D. A. Milyutin wrote in his diary on January 9, 1878, the news of the break in negotiations in Kazanlak and the general advance of our troops towards Constantinople did not in the least embarrass the tsar, but, on the contrary, aroused in him "a lively joy." Alexander II exclaimed: “If it is destined, then let them erect a cross on St. Sofia! “In this mood, he was supported by the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, who spoke at one of the meetings held under the chairmanship of the emperor, with a bold proposal to go straight to Constantinople, occupy it and from there announce to Russia and Europe about the end of the centuries-old struggle of Christianity with Islam and the end of Turkish rule over the Christians, after which Russia, satisfied with the exploits it has accomplished and not demanding anything for itself, convenes representatives of the European powers to Constantinople in order to erect together with them a building worthy of the 19th century on the soil cleared by it from the debris of the past ”(56. Book. Second. S. 406).

However, the ideas of the Admiral General were not supported by the majority of the meeting participants. As always, Gorchakov looked back at England, this time he was supported by Milyutin. Yielding to them, Alexander II decided to launch an offensive against Constantinople only in the event of the final refusal of the Porte to accept all the peace conditions proposed by Russia.

On January 12, the emperor sent the following telegram to the commander-in-chief: “I approve the considerations set forth in your three encrypted telegrams of January 10 regarding the further offensive towards Constantinople. The movement of troops must by no means be stopped until a formal agreement is reached on the foundations of peace and the terms of an armistice. At the same time, announce to the Turkish plenipotentiaries that if, within 3 days from the time they sent the request telegram to Constantinople, the unconditional consent of the Porte to the conditions declared by us does not follow, then we will no longer recognize them as binding on ourselves. In the event that our conditions are not accepted, the issue must be resolved under the walls of Constantinople.

In order to resolve the four questions you have posed for this occasion, I suggest that you be guided by the following guidelines:

According to the 1st. In the event of the entry of foreign fleets into the Bosporus, enter into friendly agreements with the squadron commanders regarding the establishment of order in the city by the common forces.

On the 2nd. In the event of a foreign landing in Constantinople, avoid any collision with it, leaving our troops under the walls of the city.

On the 3rd. If the inhabitants of Constantinople themselves or representatives of other powers ask for the establishment of order and protection of the person in the city, then state this fact by a special act and send in our troops.

Finally, on the 4th. On no account should we deviate from the declaration made by us to England that we do not intend to act on Gallipoli. England, for her part, promised us not to do anything to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula, and therefore we should not give her a pretext for intervention, even if some Turkish detachment were on the peninsula. It is enough to advance an observation detachment to the isthmus, by no means approaching Gallipoli itself.

In view of your approach to Constantinople, I considered it necessary to note the previous order on the congress of commissioners in Odessa, but instead ordered the Adjutant General Count N.P. Book II, pp. 406–407).

On the same day, Count Ignatiev left Petersburg. Gorchakov gave him instructions, which ordered not to give the treatise, which he was supposed to conclude with the Turkish envoys, the form of a final agreement, but only as if a "preliminary" protocol, without going into details, since all issues related to other European powers were supposed to be resolved later , at a pan-European conference.

Count Ignatiev was supposed to call in Bucharest and there negotiate with Prince Charles and his ministers on the exchange of the Danube section of Bessarabia belonging to Romania for Dobruja.

Meanwhile, seeing the Russian troops under the walls of their capital, the Sultan and his advisers were in a panic. They ordered their envoys to immediately accept all Russian conditions for concluding peace. A telegram about this was sent to Kazanlak, but by this time Server and Namyk were already together with the Russian commander in chief in Adrianople. Not knowing this and surprised at the delay that had arisen, Abdul Hamid sent a telegram personally to Alexander I, which said that it had been six days since the Port had accepted all the demands of Russia, and the offensive of the Russian troops had not yet been stopped.

“I still have no news,” the tsar replied on January 18, “about the receipt by Your Majesty’s representatives in the main apartment of your acceptance of the grounds proposed for concluding a truce. After they show this, I will allow my brother to grant a truce. Your Majesty can be sure that he sincerely shares your desire for peace, but I need - I will even say that both of us need - a durable and lasting peace ”(56. Book Two. P. 408).

On January 20, Alexander II telegraphed Nikolai Nikolayevich: “It is desirable to expedite the conclusion of a truce in order to avert criticism. Approaching Constantinople should by no means be part of our plans, as soon as the Port has accepted our conditions ”(56. Book. Second. P. 408).

The emperor's telegram, sent on January 12, Nikolai Nikolayevich received only on the fifth day, the 17th. On the same day, the envoys of the Sultan told the Grand Duke that the Porte accepted all the conditions in the hope that Russia would immediately cease hostilities. Then the Grand Duke decided to sign the preliminary terms of peace and conclude a truce. The orders he received from Petersburg were somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, he had to demand from the Porte a decisive response to all the conditions of Russia, and on the other hand, it was reported that Count Ignatiev would soon arrive in Adrianople to negotiate peace.

Permission to go to Constantinople depended on the refusal of the Porte to respond to the request of the Russian government, and at the same time, the occupation of the Straits, which alone could ensure the dominant position of the Russian army under the walls of the Turkish capital, was strictly forbidden. Gorchakov, although he expressed his opinion that it would be better to wait for the establishment of a final agreement with Austria-Hungary on the foundations of peace, he did not notify whether such an agreement was reliable and how long it could follow. At the same time, he announced the imminent break with England and her intention to lead her squadron to the Bosporus.

This last news put an end to the Grand Duke's hesitation. He ordered that the drafting of an armistice convention be started immediately, and on January 19 he himself signed the preliminary peace conditions with the Turkish representatives. Namyk Pasha for a long time could not decide to sign the protocol, which, in his opinion, concluded the death sentence for Turkey. The Grand Duke extended his hand to him and expressed the hope that, on the contrary, peace would strengthen the existence of the Ottoman Empire, since from now on Russia and Turkey would live in harmony and friendship.

Meanwhile, the British Cabinet discussed the situation in the Balkans almost around the clock. Queen Victoria wrote hysterical letters to the prime minister, assuring that "if she were a man, she would immediately go to beat the Russians" (21. Vol. II. P. 122). The Sultan did not dare to take the initiative and ask for the dispatch of English ships, as Disraeli had been telling him all the time through Ambassador Layard. Abdul Hamid referred to the fact that he was afraid of the Russians, but he was no less afraid of the British, and the prospect of being squeezed between the Russian troops and the British fleet did not smile at all on him.

On behalf of the Prime Minister, the British Cabinet again asked Vienna if they were going to announce mobilization there? Andrássy was ready for this, but at the request of the military command he was forced to repeat the refusal to the British, referring, among other things, to the fact that mobilization costs a lot of money, and only extreme necessity can induce Austria-Hungary to do this.

On January 11 (23), 1878, the British Cabinet finally decided to send a fleet to the Straits. Parliament was asked for £6 million for military expenses. The British cabinet hoped that this move would induce Austria-Hungary to take action.

In protest against the decision, Foreign Secretary Lord Derby and Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Carnarvon resigned.

Soon a telegram was received from Ambassador Layard stating that the Turks had accepted the Russian terms. In the next telegram, Abdul Hamid asked the British Cabinet to either refuse to send the squadron, or publicly declare that the squadron was sent against his will, the Sultan. Immediately reversing its decision, the cabinet sent an order to Admiral Hornby to immediately return to Besik Bay. After this, Lord Derby returned to his post.

Simultaneously with the signing of the peace, Generals Nepokoichitsky and Levitsky signed with the Turkish military commissioners an armistice convention concluded for the entire duration of the peace negotiations, until their completion. This act established a demarcation line between the Russian and Turkish armies throughout the Balkan Peninsula. The Turks were obliged to immediately clear the Danube fortresses of Viddin, Silistria and Ruschuk, as well as Erzerum in Asia Minor. The Russian army occupied all of Bulgaria, with the exception of the quadrangle around Varna and Shumla, bounded by the Black Sea coast between Balchik and Misivri. Further, the dividing line went from Derkos on the Black Sea to the confluence of the Karasu River into the Sea of ​​Marmara. Between the Russian and Turkish demarcation lines was a neutral zone, on which it was not allowed to erect, reinforce or repair fortifications during the entire truce. Russian troops occupied Rodosto on the Sea of ​​Marmara and Dadsagach in the Archipelago, without crossing, however, the isthmus from Tarkioi to Ursha, which separates the Gallipoli peninsula from the mainland. The same convention lifted the Turkish blockade from the Russian Black Sea ports and the Russian barriers on the Danube.

Orders to suspend hostilities were immediately sent to all detachments of the Danube army, to Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, to Asia Minor and the Caucasus.

Meanwhile, the Greeks decided to intervene in big politics. Immediately after the fall of Plevna (November 28, 1877), the Athenian government, under strong pressure from the population, announced mobilization. On January 21, 1878, two days after the armistice was signed in Adrianople, the Greek government, under the pretext of oppression by the bashi-bazouks of the Christian population of Thessaly and Epirus, brought its troops into these areas without declaring war on Turkey. The British government immediately began to persuade the Greeks, threatening to use force.

Emperor Alexander II was also seriously concerned about this "unexpected complication", considering the intervention of Greece extremely untimely, and ordered the Russian ambassador in Athens to give King George I urgent advice to stop hostilities and withdraw his troops, especially since Porta, having concluded a truce with Russia, apparently , was not averse to accepting the challenge and immediately sent a Turkish armored squadron to Piraeus. Having informed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich about this, the tsar noted that no matter how unreasonable the behavior of Greece, “but we cannot leave it to the Turks as a sacrifice, and we may have to threaten them with a break in the truce in the event of new violence” (56. Book. Second. S. 413).

Left without the support of Russia, George I, by the way, married to Olga Konstantinovna, niece of Alexander II, decided to retreat, and the Greek troops left Thessaly and Epirus.

When in London they learned about the armistice that took place on January 19, the question of sending a squadron to the Straits was again raised in the Cabinet of Ministers. In vain did the Russian ambassador try to convince Lord Derby that the appearance of a British squadron under the walls of Constantinople would free Russia from all her previous promises to England and would inevitably entail the occupation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the Russians.

Derby succumbed to pressure from his fellow ministers. The news of the occupation of Chatalzha by Russian troops - a place located just in the transition from Constantinople - was considered in England as the first step towards the occupation of the Turkish capital by the Russians, which, as Lord Augustus Loftus declared to Prince Gorchakov, could no longer be caused by military considerations and, therefore, contrary to the positive promise of Emperor Alexander II.

The conciliatory reply of Prince Gorchakov had not yet reached London, when a new order was sent to Admiral Hornby: to immediately enter the Dardanelles with six battleships and go straight to Constantinople.

Notifying the Russian ambassador, Count P. A. Shuvalov, of the decision to send a squadron to the Straits, Lord Derby tried to assure him that this was solely to ensure the safety of the British living in Constantinople and their property from manifestations of Muslim fanaticism and was by no means a demonstration hostile to Russia. In the same sense, the British Prime Minister expressed himself before both houses of Parliament and in a message to the great powers, in which he invited them to follow the example of England and also send their squadrons to the Bosphorus.

Count Shuvalov flatly refused to send the interpretation of the British minister to St. Petersburg, so as not to mislead his government. After all, it was clear that the real reason for sending the squadron to the Straits was the desire of England to get ahead of the Russians there, and then appear at the conference, the invitation to participate in which, made by Count Andrássy, the British Cabinet hastened to accept.

Count Shuvalov had been pro-English for a long time, but now his indignation knew no bounds. In a letter to Gorchakov on January 28, 1878, he urged the Chancellor to act decisively and announce that sending British battleships to the Marmara measure frees Russia from England's previous promises and that if the British land at least one sailor, then the Russian troops will be forced, "like them" to enter Constantinople. “I think,” Shuvalov wrote further, “that such determination will not only not cause a rupture, but will warn him, stopping the British on an inclined plane of dangerous challenges, which, of course, would have continued without it” (56. Book Two, p. 417 ).

As D. A. Milyutin wrote in his diary, sending a British squadron to the Black Sea Straits immediately after the armistice between Russia and Turkey was a brazen and blatant violation by England not only of a number of European treaties prohibiting foreign ships from accessing the Straits, but also of obligations, accepted by England before Russia during the war, which were the condition for all concessions to Russia. Alexander II took England's actions as an insult, demanding immediate retribution. Declaring to his ministers that he was taking full responsibility “before God and the people,” on January 29 he personally dictated a telegram to the commander-in-chief: “Official notice has been received from London that England, on the basis of information sent by Layard, about the supposedly dangerous situation of Christians in Constantinople, gave the order to part of her fleet to go to Constantinople to protect her subjects. I find it necessary to enter into an agreement with the Turkish representatives on the entry of our troops into Constantinople for the same purpose. It is highly desirable that this introduction could be done in a friendly manner. If the delegates resist, then we need to be ready to take Constantinople even by force. As for the appointment of the number of troops, I leave it to your discretion, as well as the choice of the time when to proceed with the execution, taking into account the actual cleansing of the Danube fortresses by the Turks ”(56. Book Two. P. 418).

However, again Gorchakov and Milyutin began to beg the tsar not to send this telegram, and in the end they got their way. The next day, January 30, Alexander II sent another telegram to his brother, in which the occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops was made dependent on the appearance of an English squadron in the Bosphorus and on the landing of an English landing on the shore. “The entry of the English squadron into the Bosporus relieves us of the previous obligations assumed regarding Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. In the event that the British made a sortie somewhere, the proposed entry of our troops into Constantinople should be immediately carried out. In this case, I grant you complete freedom of action on the banks of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, in order, however, to avoid a direct clash with the British, until they themselves act hostilely ”(56. Book. Second. S. 418), - said in telegram.

Alexander II was in complete disarray. On January 31, secretly from Milyutin and Gorchakov, he nevertheless sent his first telegram, drawn up on January 29, to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich.

The historiographer of Alexander II Tatishchev tried to justify the contradictory actions of the tsar: “In doing so, Alexander Nikolayevich, obviously, wanted to dedicate the commander-in-chief to all his intentions, and one dispatch was supposed to serve as an explanation and addition to the other. In fact, there was not the slightest disagreement between them. The first telegram expressed the sovereign's determination to send our troops to Constantinople, as a direct consequence of the English squadron's breakthrough through the Dardanelles, leaving the discretion of the Grand Duke to determine the time and method of carrying out this order; the second ordered to immediately take this measure of retribution in the event of the appearance of British battleships in the Bosphorus or the landing of the British on its shores ... ”(56. Book. Second. S. 418-419).

In fact, sending both telegrams was nothing more than the classic Russian “execution cannot be pardoned.”

Alexander II thought and thought and decided to inform the Turkish Sultan about the plans to capture Constantinople and on January 30, 1878 sent him a telegram: “Your Majesty, give me justice, recognizing that I continue to sincerely wish for a stable and lasting peace and the restoration of friendly relations between both our countries. At the very time when our mutual representatives are striving for this result, the British government decided, on the basis of the reports of its ambassador in Constantinople, to use the firman previously received in order to introduce part of its fleet into the Bosporus for the protection of the life and safety of their subjects, and other powers accepted the same measure, for the same purpose. This decision obliges me, for my part, to consider measures for the entry of part of my troops into Constantinople in order to protect the life and property of Christians who could be in danger. But if I am forced to take this measure, it will be aimed at only one peaceful goal: maintaining order, and therefore it cannot be in conflict with the intentions of Your Majesty ”(56. Book. Second. S. 419).

Gorchakov informed all the governments of the great powers, including the British, about this decision of the emperor. In his circular telegram dated January 29, he repeated the expressions of the imperial dispatch to the Sultan about the dispatch of the English squadron "to Constantinople", and not to the Bosphorus, as the king put it, and about the pretext with which the St. measures by other powers, and concluded it as follows: “The totality of these circumstances obliges us to take care, on our part, of the means to protect Christians, whose lives and property will be in danger, and to achieve this goal, bear in mind the entry of part of our troops into Constantinople” (56. Book two. S. 419).

Alexander II's decision to occupy Constantinople caused panic in the British cabinet. On the same day, January 30, Lord Derby, through the ambassador Lord Loftus, urgently asked the Russian government whether this measure was due to concern for the safety of the Christian population or military reasons, so that at the time when England and other states raise their flags in Constantinople, there did the Russian banner appear? Gorchakov replied that the Russian government was guided by the same motives as the British, with the only difference that it considered it its duty to patronize not only its subjects in Constantinople, but all Christians in general, that both governments thus fulfill the duty of philanthropy and that their common a peace-loving cause should therefore not have the appearance of mutual hostility.

Lord Derby disagreed with Gorchakov. He argued that the position of England and Russia is not the same, since England is on friendly terms with Turkey, and Russia is at war with her, so the appearance of the British fleet in the Dardanelles cannot be equated with the occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops, in violation of the truce.

The Russian ambassador, Count P. A. Shuvalov, in his explanations to Lord Derby, strongly insisted that Russia was now free from any obligations to England. And it did the right thing. When discussing the issue at the Council of Ministers, the British Foreign Secretary no longer insisted on Russia's refusal of the proposed occupation of Constantinople, but limited himself only to the remark that if, at the same time as the occupation of Constantinople, Russian troops occupy Gallipoli, then England will perceive this as a casus belli, since the British squadron, located in the Sea of ​​Marmara, if the Dardanelles were blocked by mines, it would be trapped. In this case, England would be forced to declare war on Russia.

From this message from Lord Derby, Count Shuvalov concluded that the occupation of Tsargrad threatened Russia with war with England, and therefore advised the Russian cabinet not to occupy Gallipoli and the Bulair line, on the condition that England would not land a single person either on the European or on the Asian coast.

Gorchakov instructed Shuvalov to assure Lord Derby of this and to note to him that, since the British squadron entered the Dardanelles against the wishes of Turkey, the temporary occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops was now inevitable.

A few days later, the British cabinet renewed its protest against the introduction of Russian troops into the Turkish capital without the prior consent of the Sultan, threatening, if not with war, but with the recall of its ambassador from Petersburg and refusal to take part in the congress. Gorchakov, once again recalling that the British ships entered the Dardanelles without the consent of the Porte, replied: “Let the British government do as it pleases. History, and perhaps even contemporaries, will pronounce their verdict on this complete lack of logic and this contempt for the universal world” (56. Book Two, p. 421).

The Sultan was horrified by the news of the inevitability of the invasion of Russian troops into his capital, which was Russia's response to the entry of the British squadron into the Dardanelles. Now Abdul Hamid was between two fires, but still he was more afraid of Russia than England, and therefore refused Admiral Hornby to pass through the Dardanelles, in which he personally notified Alexander II on January 31: “A dispatch sent to me by your imperial majesty on February 11 ( new style) alarmed me greatly. I have made commitments to your delegates with the aim of restoring peace. All peoples subject to my scepter have an equal right to protection and live in perfect security. The rights of my empire are respected, as your imperial majesty, of course, already knows about the most recent incident in the Dardanelles, since the English fleet withdrew immediately after my government reminded that its entry would be repugnant to the treatises. Therefore, I cannot imagine a single minute that your imperial majesty, having already learned about the true details of this case, could set in motion the measures indicated in your dispatch ”(56. Book. Second. P. 421).

But England did not retreat, in St. Petersburg and Constantinople, the British ambassadors notified the governments that the English squadron would enter the Straits, even if this required the use of force.

Therefore, on January 31, 1878, Alexander II telegraphed the Sultan: “I have just received a telegram from Your Majesty from today in the afternoon. I remain in my former friendly and peaceful disposition, but it is difficult for me to reconcile what you ask me to do with the message received from the British Government. It lets me know that, despite the refusal of the firman, part of the English fleet will enter the Bosphorus to protect the life and property of British subjects. If the English squadron enters the Bosporus, it will be impossible for me not to temporarily send part of my troops to Constantinople. Your Majesty has a too high degree of self-esteem not to say to yourself that if the aforementioned event occurs, then I cannot do otherwise ”(56. Book. Second. S. 421-422).

Frightened, Abdul Hamid urgently sent two telegrams. In the first, he urged Queen Victoria to urgently withdraw the squadron from the strait zone. In the second telegram, the Sultan begged Alexander II to postpone the entry of troops into Istanbul, at least until a response was received from London. The king, in his words, "always ready to assist in order to save mankind from disasters," agreed to respect the request of the Sultan. And when Alexander II was informed that the British fleet had already entered the Dardanelles and was stationed near the Princes' Islands, he urgently telegraphed the Sultan that he himself must rightly admit that now the temporary occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops was inevitable.

Abdul Hamid only managed to get the British government to withdraw its squadron from the Princes' Islands to the Gulf of Mandania in the Sea of ​​Marmara, which, as Sultan Alexander II assured, was located far from the Bosphorus. Abdul Hamid also asked the emperor not to send troops to Istanbul, since he had not yet received a response from Queen Victoria. To this, Alexander II replied on February 4: “The theoretical protest did not prevent the English squadron from breaking into the Dardanelles. Your Majesty's direct appeal to the queen will not result in her being recalled. Therefore, I leave it to your justice to decide: is it possible for me to stop the temporary introduction of my troops into Constantinople? They will be there only to make it easier for Your Majesty to maintain public order” (56. Book Two, pp. 422–423).

Abdul Hamid sent three more telegrams to St. Petersburg, begging the emperor to change his mind, expressing his intention to send his ambassador to St. Petersburg, who would personally outline to the tsar all the dangers that threaten the sultan, and notifying him of the order given by him to his representative in Adrianople to speed up the conclusion of a preliminary peace, about which there were already negotiations with Count Ignatiev. But the emperor was unshakable. On February 7, he telegraphed to Constantinople: “As soon as Savfet Pasha finishes negotiations with Count Ignatiev on the grounds accepted by Your Majesty before the conclusion of a truce, and the result of these negotiations is approved by Your Majesty, it will depend on you to send the Ambassador Extraordinary through Odessa. Until then, such a premise would have been pointless. As for the temporary entry of part of my troops into Constantinople, this can neither be canceled nor postponed, as long as the English squadron remains in the Sea of ​​Marmara instead of retreating back beyond the Dardanelles. I will approve the proposals made by my brother on this subject” (56. Book Two, p. 423).

All the telegrams of Abdul Hamid and the answers to them of Alexander II were immediately reported to the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, so that he would be guided by them in his orders. Informing his brother that, despite the protests of the Porte, the British squadron was moving towards Constantinople without waiting for a permission firman, the emperor on February 2 instructed the commander-in-chief: “We must act in accordance with the actions of the British, as I ordered in this case” (56. Book. Second. With 423).

Alexander II notified his brother about the order given to Count Shuvalov to announce to the British government that the appearance of their squadron in the Sea of ​​Marmara makes it inevitable that the Russian troops occupy Constantinople "with the same peaceful purpose." The tsar informed the commander-in-chief that the confirmation of the promise not to occupy Gallipoli was the last concession to England, and even then on the condition that the British did not land a single sailor on the shore, and ordered Nikolai Nikolaevich to control this. In the event of an attempted landing of an English landing, Russian troops, with the consent of the Porte, were to occupy several fortified points on the European coast of the Bosporus.

Having received a telegram from his brother about the occupation of “the suburbs closest to Constantinople” proposed by the Sultan, Alexander II approved this act and insisted on its speedy execution. “For this,” he telegraphed on February 6, “it is necessary to appoint the shortest possible time to obtain the consent of the Sultan and, in case of his refusal, to prepare sufficient forces. According to your message, in general, I leave you to act without waiting for my special permissions ”(56. Book Two. P. 424).

Soon the headquarters of the Russian army was moved from Adrianople to San Stefano, a suburb of Constantinople, but even here Alexander II reminded his brother of the need not to lose sight of the Bosphorus and use all his strength to close the passage to the Black Sea for English ships.

On January 27, 1878, a week after the conclusion of the armistice, Count N. P. Ignatiev arrived in Adrianople, appointed by the Russian commissioner to negotiate a "preliminary" peace with Turkey. And the next day, a Turkish representative arrived. He was Saffet Pasha, who replaced Server as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Negotiations had barely begun when Savfet Pasha informed Nikolai Nikolaevich that the English admiral intended to bring his squadron into the Dardanelles, despite the refusal of the Port to let him through. The Grand Duke approved of this action by Turkey and invited her to enter into an alliance with Russia in order to act together against the violence of the British. “Let's enter Constantinople together with friends,” he said to Savfet Pasha, “and if the British begin to resist, we will oppose them, hand in hand. I will put your guns near my gun in the hope that you have finally realized that the British are exploiting you” (56. Book Two, p. 426).

Savfet Pasha immediately telegraphed to Istanbul about this proposal of the Russian commander in chief.

For his part, Nikolai Nikolaevich sent Ona, the first dragoman (translator) of the Russian embassy, ​​to Constantinople to find out how inclined the Turkish government was to allow the temporary occupation of the capital by Russian troops. Onu reported that the Turkish ministers opposed the introduction of Russian troops more in appearance and in words, and Abdul Hamid was going to send Namik Pasha to Adrianople to try to convince the Russian commander-in-chief to abandon his intention to occupy Constantinople. But, according to Onu, everything should have ended with the Porta bargaining and bargaining and finally giving in. The Turks even called the dragoman the barracks where the Russian soldiers were to be accommodated: Daud Pasha, Ildiz-Ciftlik, on the heights of Eyub.

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