Defensive "line of Stalin". The memory of the war years

Mikhail Vinichenko, Valentin Runov

"Stalin Line" in battle

Introduction

The appearance on the battlefield and a sharp increase in the number of tanks and aircraft, the mechanization and motorization of military formations and the activities of troops, including sappers, the experience of using underground space by armed formations during the struggle for fortresses and in the field during the First World War could not but affect on the further development of the theory and practice of using underground space for military purposes. The desire of the leadership of many states in peacetime to protect themselves from a sudden invasion of the enemy led to the emergence in the interwar period of a new type of use of the underground space of long-term fortifications, which was laid during the First World War. Then, having lost operational independence, fortresses and forts began to fit into the defense of armies as its constituent parts. As a result, they were transformed into long-term field-oriented fortifications. With the improvement of the defense of armies, field positions and fortresses began to form a single whole, which served as the basis for the emergence of a trend towards the creation of lines of long-term fortifications by many European states. This trend was significantly developed in the 30s of the XX century, when fortification lines began to be erected on the borders of various countries. The main ones were the "lines" of Maginot, Siegfried, Mannerheim, fortified areas on the western Soviet border, in the Far East and others.

The essence of the new use of the underground space of long-term fortifications by the armed formations was the integration of forms with a significant shift in the emphasis in the ground-underground system to the underground component. The lines of long-term fortifications embodied almost all the experience of using underground space gained during the First World War, including conducting mine (counter-mine) combat in the field.

In the interwar period, the main forms of using the underground space were sheltering troops, maneuvering underground, and mine (counter-mine) combat. Each of these forms in this period had its own peculiarity and differences from those used earlier. The form that appeared during the First World War, such as conducting combined arms combat underground in the field, as well as its combination with other forms of using underground space, as well as with ground, air-ground combat operations, has not yet been clearly described and comprehended by military scientists. and practices. Therefore, in scientific works, instructions, in the training of troops, they were not given sufficient attention.

The development of the underground infrastructure of large cities and the theater of operations itself created favorable conditions for the evolution of views on the use of underground space by armed formations in the lines of long-term fortifications. In many European cities, subways, underground communications, sewerage, water supply, cable routing, gas pipelines, etc. began to be laid. Streletsky) and near Saratov (designed by engineer V.V. Vishnitsky). The construction of the subway in Moscow began. By 1931, the Rovsky underground canal was put into operation in France and the Brommat underground hydroelectric power station was under construction.

Rovsky underground channel was part of the Marseille-Rhone canal and had a length of 7118 meters with a navigable width of 18 meters. Its clear opening reached 22 meters and a height of 15.4 meters, which exceeded the width of the Paris Metro tunnel at the Auteuil station, where the tunnel had 20 meters of clear light, as well as the Barcelona Metro stations.

The Brommat Underground Power Plant was a 7,200 meter long underground channel that housed a 180,000 hp turbine. After passing through the turbine of the underground station, the water went out through the sewer at the confluence of the Truyère and Bromme rivers. The placement of energy sources underground made it possible to increase their survivability from the impact of enemy aircraft in the event of hostilities in the area, as well as the stability of industrial enterprises dependent on electricity.

These and other underground structures testified to the desire of civil builders to develop underground infrastructure. However, in the theory and practice of the use of underground space by armed formations, there have been no significant changes in the use of existing and under construction underground structures in cities and field conditions.

Long-term structures, on the contrary, absorbed the accumulated experience of using the underground to strengthen the defense of the borders of states. The lines of fortified areas became the basis of the strategic defense of the Soviet Union and other European states. Absorbing large material and labor resources, they gave hope to the military and political leadership to gain time in the event of foreign aggression. However, not a single state was able to put into practice the strengths of these fortifications in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy.

Unlike the "lines" created in the West (Maginot, Siegfried, Mannerheim), the official term "Stalin's line" did not exist in the Soviet Union. This term first appeared in colloquial jargon, and later was used by some researchers for the general name of what was created along the line of our western borders in case of war. Therefore, the "Stalin Line" significantly went beyond the defensive engineering structures and, in addition to the fortified areas proper, also included the defensive positions of the border troops, the foreground of the military cover formations, the positions of the field filling of the state border cover army formations, army and front reserves.

It is known that on June 22, 1941, ten armies were deployed from the Baltic to the Black Sea as part of three Soviet fronts.

Two armies were deployed in the Baltic region. The 8th Army of the Northwestern Front was commanded by Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, and the chief of staff was Major General G.A. Larionov, the 11th Army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov, Chief of Staff Major General I.T. Shlemin. These armies were to resist the German troops advancing on Leningrad.

In the zone of the Western Front were deployed: 3rd Army - Commander Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff, Major General A.K. Kondratiev; 10th Army - Commander Major General K.D. Golubev, Chief of Staff Major General P.I. Lyapin and the 4th Army - Commander Major General A.A. Korobkov, Chief of Staff Colonel A.M. Sandals. These armies were intended to repel the aggression of the German troops advancing on Minsk and further on Moscow.

The largest was the Southwestern Front, in which four armies were deployed to cover the state border. The 5th Army was commanded by Major General of the Tank Forces M.I. Potapov, and the chief of staff was Major General D.S. Pisarevsky. It was followed by: 6th Army - Commander Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko, chief of staff - brigade commander N.P. Ivanov; 26th Army - Commander Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, chief of staff - Colonel I.S. Varennikov; 12th Army - Commander Major General P.G. Ponedelin, Chief of Staff - Major General B.I. Arushunyan. These armies covered the Soviet territory in the Kiev strategic direction and directly Kyiv from the German troops.

On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, to counteract mainly the allies of Germany - Hungary and Romania - the 9th Army of the Odessa Military District was deployed, commanded by Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, Chief of Staff - Major General M.V. Zakharov. On June 25, 1941, the Southern Front was deployed on the basis of this army and other formations - commander I.V. Tyulenev, Chief of Staff Major General G.D. Shishenin. These armies had to resist the German troops, who were striving to capture the southern (seaside) regions of Ukraine.

Then the tactical level begins, at the top of which were the corps controls. These were rifle corps, which, as a rule, constituted the first echelon of armies covering the state border, behind which powerful army reserves were deployed, which were based on mechanized corps. The covering armies included 20 rifle, 15 mechanized, 2 cavalry and one airborne corps. The commanders and staffs of these formations planned and conducted battles in one or two operational directions.

Each division and corps relied on one or two fortified areas, and frontier guards were in front of each fortified area.

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Mikhail Vinichenko, Valentin Runov

"Stalin Line" in battle

Introduction

It is known that on June 22, 1941, ten armies were deployed from the Baltic to the Black Sea as part of three Soviet fronts.

Each division and corps relied on one or two fortified areas, and frontier guards were in front of each fortified area.

Thus, the "Stalin Line" in practice was the first operational echelon of forces covering the state border and had a depth of 50 to 100 kilometers. According to pre-war views, this space was quite enough to wear down and bleed the enemy’s main strike groupings with a tough defense of units and formations of the first army echelon in order to then defeat them with counterattacks by army and front reserves, restore the state border line, and, if necessary, transfer combat actions on enemy territory.

Therefore, the actions of the troops within the "Stalin Line" should be considered in their entirety, starting from the battles of border detachments and outposts and ending with the conduct of army and front-line counterattacks. In time, they began at dawn on June 22 and continued throughout the first week of the war.

Chapter one

Creation of the "Stalin Line" and other fortifications

What were the fortified regions of Soviet Russia for?

The Soviet state after the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917–1922 sought to cover its borders. The previous experience of defending the stretched borders of Russia, as a number of military theorists and practitioners believed, was not suitable for the Soviet Republic. It was necessary to rely on the latest achievements of domestic and foreign science, which carefully studied and partly introduced experience into practice.

Scientific research in the field of military theory developed especially widely after the end of the Civil War and the military intervention in Russia in 1917–1922. Their main content was a comprehensive study and generalization of the experience of using fortified areas, fortresses, underground space on the battlefields of the Civil and First World Wars, taking into account the expected conditions for future military clashes with the enemies of Soviet Russia.

Soviet military scientists, the bulk of the senior leadership, believed that a future war would be waged by massive, multimillion-strong armies, military operations would unfold over vast expanses. The war will most likely take on a protracted character and will require the maximum exertion of the material and spiritual forces of the country. Based on the practice of the final phase of the First World War, the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917-1922. military theorists made a well-founded conclusion that in such a war, maneuverable, offensive forms of action would mainly prevail. Positional warfare was not completely ruled out, but the emphasis was on the offensive.

E.P. Egorov, V.P. Andreev, S.F. Begunov and other military scientists who studied the history of Soviet military engineering believed that, based on such an assessment of the nature of a future war, enemy actions in it, as well as taking into account the state and prospects of the technical equipment of the army and navy, the most appropriate methods of combat operations and the use in them, the available forces and means will at the first stage repulse enemy aggression based on fortified areas using underground space and subsequently go on the counteroffensive.

One of the main tasks of the Soviet military art was to conduct theoretical research and practical work in the field of military engineering preparation of the territory of the state for war. The defense of the country, which was surrounded mainly by unfriendly states, had to be based on the solid defense of its borders, and primarily in those directions from which aggression was most likely. Since the borders of the Russian Empire had changed, it was necessary to organize the preparation of defense in engineering terms, especially from the western border, completely anew. Therefore, from the beginning of the 1920s, Soviet scientists and military engineers conducted extensive research on the system of military engineering preparation of the borders and territory of the state for war, forms and structures of long-term fortification.

The experience of the First World War showed that under the action of mass armies a separate, isolated fortress (Verden, Przemysl, Osovets, etc.) as the basis of a system of long-term fortifications in the theater of military operations had already outlived its usefulness. In a situation where military operations are being deployed on broad fronts, long-range fortified zones are accordingly required, capable of resisting the onslaught of large masses of people and withstanding the fire of large-caliber artillery by their system of fire and their depth. This form of fortification appeared during the war. With the transition to positional forms of combat, continuous positional fronts were created, within which the underground space was actively used to deploy troops, move units during the battle, conduct combat operations, underground mine and counter-mine attacks. Fortresses became only tactically important areas, strongholds of the general defensive front, and in this case, relying on field troops, they played a certain role in repelling the enemy offensive.

During the years of the Civil War and military intervention in Russia 1917-1922. new contours of the development of border fortifications were only fragmentarily outlined. Then, in order to cover the main directions and protect the important political and economic centers of the country, closed circular and linear (with an open rear) fortified areas of the field type were erected in advance. They helped the troops of the Red Army to successfully resist the advancing enemy, and also served as springboards for them to go on the offensive.

Scheme of the fortified area of Golenkin: A-D - arc positions; a, b, c - intermediate positions

Based on the analysis of the use of fortifications in wars of the early 20th century, in the first post-war years, the development of general principles, systems and forms of military engineering training of theaters of military operations was carried out, corresponding to the new conditions of armed struggle. The main requirements put forward by Soviet fortifiers were that, firstly, the fortifications in the border zone should be echeloned to a great depth and, secondly, they would allow their troops to conduct not only defensive, but also offensive operations.

As studies by E.P. Egorova, V.P. Andreeva, S.F. Begunova and others, in 1920 F.I. Golenkin suggested building fortified areas (UR) of a circular shape with a diameter of up to 80 kilometers in the border zone, which were supposed to serve as a base for a covering army. The main element of the SD was considered to be "arc positions" - strong points located at a distance of 25-35 kilometers from each other. In the intervals, the linear positions of the field troops were to be erected. In depth, at a distance of 100-200 kilometers, it was supposed to create a second defensive line, designed to cover the areas of mobilization, deploy the main forces and provide favorable conditions for going on the offensive.

Scheme of the arc position of the Golenkin area: I–VIII – traverse positions; A-3 - main nodes; a-and - auxiliary nodes

In the work “Experience in the study of forms of advance fortification” published in 1922, G.G. Nevsky proposed the form of a fortified area, consisting of strongholds being built in the most important directions - "outposts" and "fortresses". The fortification-tactical element of the stronghold, in his opinion, should be a “small knot” with an area of up to 4 square meters. kilometers, having up to 12 armored and reinforced concrete firing structures, of which a third are artillery. The supporting section - the "outpost" should include up to 16, and the "fortress" - up to 30 small knots. The total area of the fortified area could reach 3 thousand square meters. kilometers.

Scheme of the long-term part of the defense unit G.G. Nevsky: K - cannon caponier; BU - armored gun mounts; P - armored machine gun installations

A harmonious system of engineering fortification of border regions (theaters of military operations) was proposed by N.I. Kokhanov. He believed that the fortification preparation of the border area should include: a strategic forefield, equipped in advance with strongholds of border guard units and outpost forts of field troops, to ensure defensive operations to cover the deployment of the main forces; a line of fortified areas covering the concentration and deployment of armed forces and consisting of positions created in advance in the most important operational areas; the rear line of fortified areas in case of a breakthrough of the main line; cut-off lines between the main and rear lines; prepared bases of the front in depth (a set of storage facilities for material resources and devices that provide for the needs of the troops).

The complete scheme of the defense unit G.G. Nevsky

Interesting research in the field of engineering training of theaters of military operations was carried out by S.A. Khmelkov, who became one of the creators of the theoretical foundations of new forms of long-term fortifications. Based on the experience of the First World War, in his work "Knots of resistance of modern long-term fortified positions" (1926), he proposed the form of a linear fortified area. In contrast to the established form of fortifications - a fortress, a circular position, protected from attack from all sides, the proposed fortified area was a deep frontal position with protected flanks and an open rear. It was envisaged that it would consist of a forward position, a line of main resistance and a rear line. The basis of its engineering equipment will be long-term resistance nodes, with an area of 3-3.5 square meters. kilometers, which are group locations of firing points protected from artillery fire and covered by artificial anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles. In the intervals between the nodes, field-type structures should be created.

As noted in the book "Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army 1918-1945", in 1927, at a meeting of the chiefs of engineers of the districts and representatives of the central administrations, recommendations were adopted regarding fortification forms of advance engineering preparation of state borders for defense. It was decided to consider the fortified area (not a fortress) as the main form, and the battalion defense area as the main fortification-tactical element of the fortified area.

The next step in the development of the theory of the use of fortified areas and underground space was a proposal to improve border fortifications. In the early 1930s, it was believed that the length of the fortified area along the front would depend on its purpose and terrain conditions. Its length should not exceed 40–60 kilometers, and its depth should be within 20 kilometers and consist of a strip of advanced positions of one or two defensive and rear lines.

General scheme of the fortified area

The line of advanced positions was to be located 2-4 kilometers ahead of the first defensive line and equipped with long-term points forming a continuous front of automatic fire; at the same time, it was expedient to create strong points capable of independent defense in the main directions. The first defensive line was to consist of long-term nodes of resistance located at a distance of about 3 kilometers from each other. Between the nodes, even in peacetime, it was necessary to equip intermediate strongholds, as well as flanking firing structures and shelters for field troops. The second lane was located 8-10 kilometers from the first and was equipped in the same way as the previous one, but with fewer permanent structures. Between the first and second lanes, the basis of cut-off positions was to be arranged. Artillery batteries and ammunition depots were located in the rear of the first and second lanes and in the inter-positional space.

Scheme of the main line of defense

The rear lanes, equipped mainly with field-type structures, were supposed, according to some military theorists and commanders, to cover the most important routes, road junctions and unloading stations located near them, artillery, engineering, food and other warehouses, workshops, hospitals, airfields or landing sites , power stations and other rear institutions and structures. It was assumed that the fortified area would be connected with the rear by railroads and highways for the transportation of all necessary means. In the most fortified area, it was planned to create a network of radial and lateral highways and narrow-gauge railways and a communication system.

In peacetime, the fortified area was supposed to have a permanent garrison, consisting of several machine-gun battalions, artillery, sapper, electrical, chemical and other special units. In wartime, the fortified area was subordinated to the commander of the army with which, according to the plan of upcoming operations, it was necessary to act.

Skeleton diagram of the battalion area

On the basis of studies carried out by military engineers, combined arms commanders, in the Provisional Field Manual of 1936, provisions were clearly formulated on the purpose of fortified areas and their place in the fighting of the Red Army. Isserson, Karbyshev, Varfolomeev and others played a special role in the development of this charter. Fortified areas, designed for long-term resistance in them by special garrisons and combined arms formations, it was noted in the charter, provide the command with freedom of maneuver and allow you to create powerful groups to deliver a crushing blow to the enemy. They are created in advance with the aim of keeping important economic, political and strategic points or areas in their hands; provide space for deployment and maneuver; cover the flanks of formations striking in the main direction, providing them with freedom of maneuver. The task of a fortified area is to force the enemy to a frontal attack, to concentrate large forces and powerful means of suppression for this, which is associated with the loss of time by the enemy, to weaken the enemy with the fire of long-term fortifications and thereby create favorable conditions for his defeat by a strike of field troops on the flank.

The work that began on the construction of a system of fortifications at land and sea borders, as well as the construction of protective structures for various purposes in the depths of the country (large underground command posts, communication centers, underground air defense shelters, warehouses, etc.) that began in the 1930s, put before the military engineers the problem of expanding theoretical and experimental research in the field of calculation of fortifications and structures, finding appropriate materials, methods for performing surface and underground work, and creating more advanced fortification structures. The leading role in solving these problems was played by the teaching staff of the Military Engineering Academy, the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, scientists of the Scientific and Testing Engineering and Technical Testing Ground (since 1935 - the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering Technology).

Scheme of long-term firing points

Specialists in fortification have been successful in creating special grades of concrete that surpass foreign designs in their impact and blast resistance. The authors of the work "Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army 1918-1945" noted in their work Soviet scientists and military engineers who developed the theory of strength, deeply investigated the issues of reinforcing fortifications, determining the composition and technology of concrete, compacting the concrete mixture by vibration, and accelerating its setting. Among others, E.V. Sakhnovsky, B.G. Skramtaev, A.I. Pamgksen, B.A. Kuvykin, P.M. Miklashevsky. The discoveries of Soviet scientists made it possible to increase the strength of fortifications, speed up the process of their construction with a more rational use of building materials.

In the works of V.M. Keldysh, S.S. Davydova, K.A. Vakhurkina, D.I. Shora, V.V. Yakovlev and others presented the theory of calculation and design of underground fortifications, developed various types of structures and methods for their construction. THEM. Rabinovich, O.E. Vlasov and others in the prewar years created a new theory for calculating engineering structures for the action of loads arising from weapons of destruction, i.e., for the action of impact and explosion, and developed the application of this theory to solving practical problems related to the design of protective structures.

Taking into account the experience of building fortified areas under the leadership of K.I. Ivanova, V.N. Uskov and S.Ya. Nazarov, intensive design and testing of more advanced long-term fortifications (DFS), their protective structures and internal equipment continued. For example, for long-term firing structures, special installations were developed for an easel machine gun, a 45-mm anti-tank gun coaxial with a machine gun, and a 76-mm gun (ball and ball-mask design), which provided protection for crews and weapons from direct hits of bullets and small-caliber projectiles and from the penetration of toxic substances. Thanks to such installations, the embrasures of the pillboxes were tightly closed even during firing, which significantly increased the combat and protective properties of long-term structures. The desire to protect the garrisons of fortifications from defeat was based on the experience of building and using DOS during the First World War, in various wars and military conflicts of the interwar period.

The experience of the Soviet-Finnish war, the aggression of fascist Germany against Poland and France made it necessary to look for new solutions to the problem of the effectiveness of firing with casemate guns. In the prewar years, more advanced and powerful long-term structures with armored gun turrets were developed, which eliminated the shortcomings of the casemate gun mounts that had a limited firing sector (60 °) and increased the activity of the gun in battle. Armored turret installations of 45-mm and 76-mm guns were created and successfully tested, which made it possible to fire in a wider or even circular sector. Unfortunately, before the war they did not go into mass production. Armored closures for observation posts, metal protective doors and hatches were developed.

New samples of fortifications were seriously tested at the training grounds, in the fortified areas under construction, as well as during special exercises. As a result, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, promising types of fortifications were created, which were used in the construction of new ones, as well as in the retrofitting and strengthening of already built fortified areas.

In general, in the interwar period, as a result of the hard work of Soviet military scientists and practical engineers, fundamentally new systems and forms of engineering preparation of state borders were developed and partially implemented. The system of fortified areas, covering a large area along the front, was supposed to provide the possibility of stubborn joint defense of permanent garrisons of permanent structures and field troops and create favorable conditions for repelling an enemy offensive and conducting the first counteroffensive operations of friendly troops.

In addition to the defense of land borders, the reflection of the aggression of the enemy's naval forces was considered. For example, N.I. Ungerman and a number of other scientists have developed the basic methods of engineering training of naval theaters of war. It was believed that, depending on the specific strategic tasks of a particular theater, the composition of the naval forces of the parties and local conditions, the engineering preparation of naval theater of operations can take on a variety of forms: fortresses, forts, fortified areas, positions, stationary batteries, coastal groups, etc.

It was envisaged to conduct joint actions of naval and ground forces to ensure the protection of important objects, naval bases, and repel enemy attacks from the sea, land and air. To do this, it was planned to create long-term fortified points in the form of a seaside fortress, capable of providing all-round defense of the object and repelling enemy attacks from various directions. At the same time, the equipment of its land front was to be organized on the same principles that are used in the creation of fortified areas in the land theater. If it was necessary to protect a separate object only from the sea, it was recommended to equip a coastal fortified position, the outline of which could be straight or arc, depending on local conditions. Primorsky fortified areas were considered as a form of fortification preparation of the entire or part of the coast to repulse large enemy amphibious assault forces by coastal defense forces. They were supposed to be created in the most threatened directions and include the main lane 3–5 kilometers deep, equipped directly on the coastline, rear and cut-off lanes designed to repel attacks by enemy landing units that broke through the main lane, as well as lines of communication and communications along the front and in depth. At the same time, the enemy landing could be supported from the sea by both naval artillery and aviation.

On the eve of the war, there were some changes in the views on the conduct of defense, especially with regard to the border armies, which were supposed to operate based on fortified areas.

The actions of the fortified areas were considered in close connection with the repulse of aggression by the combined arms army, whose troops partially served as field reinforcements for the fortified areas.

On an army scale, the engineering equipment of lines, areas and positions was carried out in two zones: tactical and operational. In addition, in the absence of direct contact with the enemy, a forward operational zone of obstacles 25–50 kilometers deep was to be created in front of the tactical defense zone. When organizing defense on a frontal scale, it was supposed to create a "rear zone of defensive operations" up to 50 kilometers deep. The defense of the operational zone of obstacles was to be carried out by part of the troops allocated by the army.

Tomasz Wiesolowski

Magazine "Gryfita" №10/1996

Translation from Polish: E. Khitryak

As a rule, very little attention is given to Soviet border fortifications in post-war historiography. Information about them, given the nature and extent of the defeats in 1941, was generally rather sketchy. A few successful battles are mentioned, with the focus being on examples of the personal heroism of the defenders rather than recreating the actual course of the fighting. The few published memoirs of the participants in the construction of fortifications create a false image of the Soviet defensive system. The authors often released the reins of fantasy, interfering with real events and facts with propaganda nonsense. They exaggerated the capabilities of the fortifications built with their participation, often giving completely unrealistic data on the number and size of the structures built. Offended that their efforts to build fortification lines were in vain, they blamed all military failures on the high command of the Red Army, directly on Stalin. A few Western historians take a completely different position when they evaluate in their works the defense capabilities of the Soviet Union at that time. Their conclusions are based on data from German reports and descriptions of the captured fortifications, eloquently pointing to the mistakes made in their placement and construction. Such overly critical assessments often underestimate, and sometimes even ignore, the significance and possibilities of the Soviet system of long-term fortification.

Obviously, both of these positions are polar, so it makes sense to take a closer look at the construction and fate of these most mysterious fortifications of all built in the interwar period in Europe.

The twenties were marked by the gradual fading of internal conflicts in Soviet Russia. The conclusion of peace treaties with neighbors formidable for the young state was a half-hearted measure and did not adequately ensure the security of the borders. The experience of the war with Poland has shown that the rapid and maneuverable actions of troops are fraught with a threat to the safety of the mobilization and concentration of Soviet troops. The construction of a system of fortifications on the western border of the country was vital. Such massive construction exceeded the economic capabilities of the country and the technical capabilities of the engineering troops of the Red Army. An important fact was that the leading cadres of the engineering troops consisted of officers of the pre-revolutionary tsarist army. Surrounded by a wall of distrust and hardly tolerable, the old cadres were replaced by young officers devoted to the revolution, who, however, often did not have the knowledge appropriate to their position.

The chance to successfully implement ambitious plans appeared only at the end of the 1920s, along with projects of large-scale industrialization of the country. The implementation of the first five-year plan made it possible to allocate appropriate funds and forces for the construction of fortifications.

Due to the extreme length of the western borders of the USSR, which is 2000 km, it was impossible to build a continuous line of fortifications near the border. This was unrealistic not only from an economic point of view, but also for military reasons, since there was a fear that an excessive dispersion of defensive forces would paralyze the maneuverability of the troops. More acceptable was the concept of building separate fortified areas protecting the most important operational areas, separated by significant spaces that did not have long-term fortifications. The task of the line of fortifications was to delay the enemy's offensive for a certain time, sufficient for mobilization, concentration of troops, and also for counterattacking the enemy with the forces of their own regular army.

According to the Soviet definition, a fortified area was "a strip of terrain equipped with a system of long-term and field fortifications, prepared for long-term defense by specially designed troops in cooperation with combined arms units." reach lengths along the front up to 70 km. It usually consisted of several positions echeloned in depth: the forefield, on which fortifications were not built, but various obstacles and barriers were erected; advanced (forward) position, consisting of field fortifications, as well as the main defensive position, which included battalion defense units with a front of 3.5-6 km and a defense depth of 1.5-3 km, located in a line. The defense units consisted of 3-5 company strongholds, which included several dozen pillboxes and shelters. It was planned to build second-echelon defense nodes solely on the flanks of the UR, in order to prevent the encirclement of the fortified area. It was also planned to build cut-off positions on the alleged directions of the enemy’s offensive.2

Work on the construction of the SD began in 1929 in the Leningrad and Belorussian military districts, and by 1935 a total of 6 fortified regions were built in them: Karelian, Kingisepp, Pskov, Polotsk, Minsk and Mozyr. Until 1937, 4 URs were built in the Kiev Military District: Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Letichevsky, as well as the Kyiv UR, which was defending the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. The border with Romania was protected by 3 fortified areas built in the Odessa Military District along the Dniester: Mogilev-Yampolsky, Rybnitsa and Tiraspol. ,2%) of which were armed with artillery pieces. Gradually, garrisons for the built SDs were also formed. In 1937, the fortified areas were occupied by a total of 25 separate bulbats, numbering about 18,000 soldiers.4

Construction management was carried out by the Construction Directorate of the Red Army. In 1932, as a result of the reorganization, the management of the construction of fortifications fell under the competence of the Main Engineering Directorate of the Red Army, or rather, the special Defense Construction Directorate. engaged in the construction of separate fortified areas. They were divided into construction sites and subsections responsible for the construction of defense centers and strongholds. In operational and organizational terms, the fortified areas were subordinate to the UR Department of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The official name of the built fortifications was "the line of fortified areas on the state border." The term "Stalin's Line", although widely used in the post-war Soviet historiography, appeared only in the late 1930s in the literature of the states of Western Europe.

Assessing the created fortifications, it should be said that these were structures that were outdated even at the time of construction. URs did not have sufficient depth of defense, and the location of individual defense nodes was far from ideal. Most of the bunkers were armed with machine guns and only a small part of the structures were armed with guns. Anti-tank artillery was not used at all. In addition, pillboxes were designed exclusively for frontal fire, which could lead to their rapid destruction. The shortcomings of the SD can also include primitive types of armor masks, as well as a poor level of quality of internal equipment. The structures did not have chemical protection at all, and also often were not equipped with water wells and sewers. The advantages of the built fortifications include their excellent adaptation to the terrain and original forms of camouflage.

In 1937, the line of fortifications became the object of political battles between I. Stalin and the command staff of the Red Army. There was sharp criticism of the expediency of the adopted concept of border fortifications. A thorough check carried out by a commission led by Kuzma Podlas revealed a number of shortcomings in the placement and organization of the defensive system. The flaws and errors discovered became the reason for the accusations of some commanders of the Red Army, which resulted in show trials that took place in the summer of 1937. For example, the commander of the BVO, commander of the 1st rank, Ieronim Uborevich, was absurdly accused of refusing to build fortifications in the area of the Pinsk swamps.6

The "purges" carried out in the army in 1937-38 also hit the cadres of the fortified regions. In the Kiev Military District, all 4 commandants of the UR were arrested, only one of the chiefs of staff of the UR remained in office. The repressions also covered the cadres of the machine-gun and artillery battalions. Some of the officers were arrested and convicted, many were dismissed from the army. As a result of this, many trained, experienced, and often also named specialists were lost, such as the commandant of the KIUR Pavel Kulaginsky, who was previously awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star.7

The scrupulous activity of the control commission, despite the political nature of the audit, had, however, a significant positive effect. The conclusions drawn have concentrated all the positive experience of building fortifications accumulated over the years of construction. At the same time, mistakes and shortcomings in the organization of construction were pointed out.

Intensive research work led to changes in the concept of fortified positions. In the new directives, the length along the front of the fortified area was increased (up to 100-120 km). It was decided to place the defense nodes of the main line of defense in two echelons and in a checkerboard pattern. It is recommended to build field cut-off positions between defense nodes and strongholds, as well as a cut-off field position in case of a breakthrough of UR.8

The aggravated political situation in 1938 became the reason for the further construction of fortifications in the USSR. on the western borders, the Department of Defense Construction began the construction of 8 new fortified areas: Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Slutsky, Izyaslavsky, Shepetovsky, Starokonstantinovsky, Ostropolsky, and Kamenetz-Podolsky. New URs were supposed to fill operational gaps in the "Stalin Line", linking together, in most cases, already built fortifications. At the same time, the modernization of a part of the old SDs began, which consisted in the construction of new defense centers, as well as in the saturation of the existing SDs with artillery installations.

Until the autumn of 1939, 1028 new structures were built in the new SDs. This amounted to hardly 50% of the planned number, in addition, the pillboxes were not armed and equipped.9 The further fate of the Stalin Line was decided by the Soviet-German pact concluded on August 23, 1939.

On September 17, 1939, the Red Army entered the western territories of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The final course of the USSR border with No. Reich was established on September 28, confirmed by a treaty of friendship and borders.

armed conflict with Finland ended with new territorial acquisitions in Karelia and Lapland.

In June 1940, the Red Army entered the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In July 1940, Bessarabia and part of Bukovina were also captured.

new territorial acquisitions, moved the western border of the state in places up to 300-400 km.

Built for 10 years and requiring a huge expenditure of manpower and resources, the "Stalin Line" ended up in the rear. It was necessary to begin the construction of a new border fortification line. The decision to build it hastened the rapid fall of France, as well as the deterioration of Soviet-German relations. In July 1940, construction began on a belt of fortifications along the new border, with a total of 20 fortified areas. The old line of fortifications was supposed to be reorganized and gradually disarmed. As early as November 15, 1939, the Military Council of the Red Army decided to reduce the strength of the fortress garrisons by 1/3 and to disarm part of the fortifications. The issue of disarmament of the old fortifications was again considered in February 1941, when it became obvious that the defense industry was not able to cope with the production of the required amount of weapons and special equipment for fortifications on the new state border. In this situation, the deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense - Marshal Kulik for armaments and Marshal Shaposhnikov for SD, as well as Comrade Zhdanov, a member of the Military Council, put forward a proposal to remove part of the artillery weapons from some of the old Stalin Line SDs. This proposal was sharply criticized by both the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Timoshenko, and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Zhukov. The final point on this issue was put by Stalin, who ordered the transfer of part of the artillery weapons from the old fortified areas to the new ones.

However, its unscrupulous implementation led to the fact that the removed weapons instead of fortifications on the new border settled in warehouses.

A completely different decision was made in relation to the URs built in 1938-39. In a directive dated February 8, 1941, the General Staff ordered the leadership of the Western and Kyiv Special Military Districts to repair and prepare the fortifications of these SDs for subsequent armament and equipment. This decision clearly indicates that the "Stalin Line" was not only not destroyed, but was also preparing for reorganization and modernization. Of course, there have been cases of misinterpretation of instructions issued from above. Some commanders understood the order to liquidate the fortifications too literally. As a result, many sections of the line lost absolutely all weapons and equipment. Part of the structures was transferred to the balance of the local civil authorities, which, in addition to looting equipment from pillboxes, also led to the use of structures for other purposes. For example, some pillboxes were turned into warehouses for collective farms and state farms. The fortress garrisons were disbanded or transferred to a new border. The defensive value of the "Stalin Line" declined very quickly. In this form, deprived of weapons and garrisons, she met the war.

The German attack on June 22, 1941 took by surprise the builders of fortifications on the new border of the country. In most areas, the new line of border fortifications was broken through on the first day of the war. Thousands of soldiers and officers of the fortress troops surrendered. Huge stocks of equipment and building materials, as well as a mass of weapons and equipment, fell into the hands of the Germans. Those few garrisons that managed to escape capture were used for other purposes, most often as infantry units. Paralyzed by chaos, the Supreme Command of the Red Army ordered a retreat to the line of the old SDs, not realizing the true state of the disarmed and mothballed SDs. At this time, the German tank units, ahead of the Soviet units retreating back, already on June 25 reached the forefield of the Minsk UR. A chaotic attempt to detain the Germans, relying on fortifications, was made by units of the 13th Army. After short fighting on June 26, the Germans broke through the defensive positions. At the same time, after short skirmishes, the Slutsk UR was also occupied. Fortified areas located north of Minsk: Sebezhsky and Polotsk - were hastily occupied by units of the 22nd Army. Defensive battles, which lasted until July 4, ended with the capture of fortifications. The situation was slightly better in the northwestern sector of the front, although even there it was not possible to stabilize the front line, relying on the old fortifications. German tank units broke through the fortification line and occupied Ostrov on July 6, and three days later Pskov. The garrison of the Kingispesky UR fought longer. Attacked from the rear, he was surrounded and after 10 days of fighting fell. Only an attempt to break through the Karelian UR, which defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, was unsuccessful. Troops of the 23rd Army stopped the offensive of the Finnish army here. The war here took on a positional character and the situation remained generally unchanged until the beginning of the offensive of the Leningrad Front in June 1944.

The most significant concentration of Red Army troops was in KOVO, so their retreat was more organized. On July 4, it was possible to stop the German troops in the position of the Novograd-Volynsky UR, which, however, was soon overcome. An attempt to counterattack to ensure the withdrawal of the UR garrison also failed. The pace of the German offensive slowed down as a result of the stubborn defense of units of the 5th and 12th Armies, which occupied the Korostensky and Letichevsky URs. Only towards the end of July, after heavy fighting, did the German troops approach Kyiv. The defenders of the city had a relatively long time to prepare the approaches to the city militarily. Most of the pillboxes of the KIUR were armed and occupied by garrisons; with the assistance of the civilian population, a gigantic network of field fortifications was built. The German attacks, which began on July 30, ended only on September 20 with the capture of the city and the destruction of the Soviet army group.

The fortified areas built along the Dniester brought great problems to the German and Romanian troops. The fighting in Bessarabia and Bukovina lasted almost a month. Only at the end of July, successful attempts were made to force the Dniester. Operational fracture was achieved on July 25-28 in Rybnitsa UR. Then the Romanian troops entered into lengthy battles with the garrison of the Tiraspol UR, culminating in the capture of Odessa on October 10.

The battles in the "Stalin Line" zone demonstrated that a fortified line occupied by sufficiently strong troops and echeloned in depth is capable of delaying the advance of an enemy that has a multiple superiority in combat methods and means. The effectiveness of the defense, however, was due to the presence of sufficiently strong and mobile reserves that could be thrown into battle in the event of a breakthrough of the fortification line.

The army retreating under constant enemy pressure, now and then attacked from the flanks by the enemy's mobile forces, was unable to organize a stable defense in the zone of the old fortification line. The breakthrough of individual fortified areas created a threat of encirclement for the garrisons of neighboring SDs and forced them to leave their positions. The few reserves, instead of carrying out counterattacks, were directed to closing the gaps in the front line.

6 - P. Wieczorkiewicz, Sprawa Tuchaczewskiego, Warszawa, 1994, s. 98, 137.

7 - D. Volkogonov, Triumph and tragedy. Political portrait of I.V. Stalin, vol. 1, Moscow, 1989, p. 275.

8 - Denkschrift, pack. cit. pp. 32-33.

9 - A. Khorkov, pack. cit. page 48.

10 - G. Zukow, Wspomnienia i reflaksje, Warszawa, 1970, s. 285-288.

The "Stalin Line", which was never officially called that in the USSR, was one of the largest defensive projects ever implemented in mankind. It was a chain of fortified areas stretching along the western borders of the USSR, practically "from sea to sea." With its flanks, the line rested against the Karelian Isthmus and the Black Sea. The total length of the fortifications reached 1200 km. On the one hand, it actually could not be bypassed, on the other hand, too large a length did not allow creating a sufficiently dense defense. In terms of its fortifications, the line was clearly inferior to the Maginot line, although it brought much more benefit.

"Stalin Line"

Officially, the chain of these URs (mostly not bordering on each other) was never called the "Stalin Line". This name first appeared in December 1936, with the light hand of journalists from the Latvian Russian-language newspaper Segodnya. Later, her article was reprinted by the English newspaper "Daily Express", and the term "Stalin's Line" became firmly established in everyday life.

The construction of fortifications on the Stalin Line began in 1928 and continued until 1939. The line included 23 fortified areas (UR), in which more than 4,000 different long-term firing points (bunkers) were built, which were designed not only for the installation of machine guns, but also artillery pieces - first 45-76 mm, and since 1938 and guns of caliber 107, 122 or 152 mm. The battles on the "Stalin Line" even left their artistic mark in literature. Soviet writer Igor Alekseevich Akimov wrote the adventure story "The Legend of the Small Garrison".

The construction of the defensive line began in 1928 on the western border of the USSR (with Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania), initially 13 fortified areas were created: Karelsky, Kingiseppsky, Pskov, Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Kyiv, Letichevsky, Mogilev-Podolsky, Rybnitsky, Tiraspol. These fortified areas had a length along the front from 50 to 150 km, if possible, the flanks of the URs were covered by natural obstacles. Fortified areas were built in such a way that each of them provided control over some important route. In total, by 1938, 3196 various defensive structures were erected in 13 URs.

Artillery two-gun semi-caponier

All fortified areas built in these years had a number of identical features. The length of one UR along the front averaged 35-50 km. For defense, dense machine-gun and artillery fire was used, dispersed along the front and in depth, with a noticeable predominance of machine-gun fire. The main form of defense organization was battalion defense areas (BRO), which were in fire communication with each other. The dimensions of the BRO on the ground were most often 1x1 or 2x2 km. Such an area was intended to be occupied by one rifle battalion. For each BRO, the construction of up to 18-20 bunkers was envisaged. The firing points were located in several lines, the first line consisted of 7-8 firing points. Pillboxes were located with the possibility of fire cover for neighboring structures. The gaps between the armored personnel carriers were to be covered by artillery fire. Often the gaps between battalion defense areas were 2.5-3 km.

Reinforced concrete firing points provided the possibility of all-round fire with a predominance of frontal fire. The most common structure was a bunker with three machine gun embrasures. Among the artillery, the most widespread were two-gun semi-caponiers, in which 76.2-mm field guns were installed. In addition, anti-tank pillboxes and small machine-gun embrasures were created, with 1-2 machine-gun embrasures. The level of protection of bunkers allowed them to withstand 1-2 hits of 152-mm shells. Since the bunkers had the ability to cover each other with fire, the distance between them was usually 500-600 meters. A common feature of SDs is the relatively low number of artillery emplacements.

Three-hambrazurny machine-gun bunker

In 1938, the construction of 8 more fortified areas began in the USSR: Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Slutsky, Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Starokonstantinovsky, Ostropolsky, Kamenetz-Podolsky. During the period from 1938 to 1939, 1028 structures were erected in these URs (according to plans, it was planned to build about 2 thousand). The construction of the fortification was stopped due to the transfer of the border to the west in 1939-1940. The construction of new SDs on the new border has begun. Most of the fortifications on the "Stalin Line" were mothballed.

Minsk fortified area

On the territory of Belarus, 4 Urs were built - Polotsk, Minsk, Slutsk and Mozyr, in which there were 966 bunkers. The strongest not only of the Belarusian, but also of all the other URs of the "Stalin Line" was considered the Minsk UR. Which is not surprising, because it was here that the direct road to Moscow passed, which for hundreds of years has been used by all would-be conquerors.

The length of the Minsk UR was 140 km. In total, it consisted of about 327 bunkers. The depth of its line of defense in the main directions reached 6 km, in peripheral directions up to 2-3 km. The fortified area included in its structure not only bunkers, but also a developed network of various engineering barriers, full profile trenches, overhead and underground communication lines, as well as a developed network of roads.

The machine-gun pillboxes of the Minsk UR were mostly three-pipe and were armed with machine guns of the Maxim system mounted on a special caponier machine. Most of the artillery was located in two-gun semi-caponiers. Such a semi-caponier was equipped with two 76-mm guns in an armored caponier mount. In addition, there were special anti-tank firing points, which were created using towers decommissioned from the T-26 tanks (45-mm cannon and machine gun).

Machine gun "Maxim" on caponier installation

The reinforced concrete walls of the pillboxes were up to 1.5 meters thick, and the ceilings were up to 1.1 meters and could withstand heavy artillery shells of up to 152 mm caliber. Each bunker was equipped with a gas filter-absorber, a fan for the removal of powder gases from the bunker and the inflow of fresh air, a periscope, electrical alarms, speaking pipes, and telephone communications.

In tactical terms, the bunkers of the Minsk UR were supposed to cover the capital of the Republic of Minsk and the city of Borisov from enemy attacks from the Molodechno and Vileyka regions. Already on June 24, units of the 3rd Panzer Group of Gotha crossed Viliya, and on June 25, the German 57th Motorized Corps captured Molodechno. On the same day, German tanks came close to the fortification zone of the Minsk UR, which was not occupied by troops. The fortified area was to be defended by units of the 44th Rifle Corps of Divisional Commander Yushkevich, who was assigned the task of defending the UR on the evening of June 24th. The echelons of the 64th and 108th rifle divisions of his corps went from Smolensk and Vyazma to Minsk, and from there they went on foot to occupy the fortifications in its western sector. Two more rifle divisions, the 100th and 162nd, from the 2nd rifle corps occupied the defense zone east and northeast of Minsk. At the junction of Minsk and Slutsk URs, the 20th mechanized corps of General Nikitin was supposed to take up defense.

German soldiers inspecting a bunker on the Stalin Line

However, the units simply did not have time to completely occupy the fortification zone, while the northwestern approaches to Minsk turned out to be practically uncovered. The Soviet command dispersed the available forces on a broad front, thereby predetermining their further defeat. On average, one division accounted for up to 50 km along the front. With such a density of defense, many pillboxes were simply not occupied by troops, which negatively affected the possibility of holding the UR.

Already on the 26th, the German 20th Panzer Division broke through the Minsk SD in the zone of the 64th Infantry Division. And on June 27, the commander of the 100th Infantry Division Russiyanov, in order to rectify the situation, was forced to conduct a counterattack without artillery and anti-tank weapons. Instead, the division commander, relying on his Spanish combat experience, ordered 12 trucks of glass containers and several tons of fuel to be delivered from the Minsk glass factory. The 100th division was one of the first to meet the German tanks with Molotov cocktails.

In the end, all the fortified areas were broken through to the full depth, and by December 1941 the Germans stood at the gates of Moscow. But even those days, somewhere weeks, and near Kyiv and months, during which the built URs helped the Red Army units to restrain the advance of the Nazis to the East, contributed to the victory of 1945.

Sources used:

www.belgazeta.by/20060626.25/010162211/
www.volk59.narod.ru/Stalinline.htm
www.fortressby.com/index.php?option=com_deeppockets&task=catShow&id=10&Itemid=15
www.belarustourism.by/belarus/history/sovet/object-war/stalin-line/

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