Why did the Bolsheviks win in the struggle for power. Street of the mentally handicapped

Only on the eve of the procession, on January 7-8, the Bolsheviks, realizing the full scale of the goals and appreciating the revolutionary nature of the petition prepared by Gapon, decided to participate in the event, but their group was rather small (like the groups of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries).

Subsequently, the members of the RSDLP (b) recalled that the January strike and the procession came as a complete surprise to the Bolsheviks, they were not prepared for the events either organizationally or technically.

Thus, Gapon and other leaders of the "Assembly" were involved in the revolution of 1905, as well as the authorities themselves, who created the prerequisites for the procession and then dispersed it with the use of weapons. But not the Bolsheviks.

In the February Revolution of 1917, the participation of the Bolsheviks was a little more noticeable - their agitators acted among the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and worked on the streets of Petrograd. However, their influence on events was still small.

The main motive in the actions of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison was the unwillingness to participate in the dispersal of demonstrations, and even more so to shoot at the workers. Also, the soldiers, many of whom were reservists, were driven by the reluctance to go to the front (you can even consider this as a basic motive for the uprising).

The sailors of the Baltic Fleet were driven by hatred for officers, accumulated during a two-year stay on inactive battleships, which actually turned into disciplinary colonies. At the same time, according to political views, most of the sailors were anarchists.

There were no Bolsheviks at all in the executive committee of the Petrosoviet (a council of workers' and soldiers' deputies), which, along with the Duma, became the "parliament of the revolution".

The Bolsheviks, moreover, have nothing to do with the abdication of Nicholas II. Rodzianko (leader of the Octobrists) and a group of generals (Ruzsky, Alekseev and those who joined them) urged the Emperor to abdicate. The railway communication, the interruptions of which violated the plans of the emperor, was taken under control by the deputy Bublikov (progressive).

Lenin learned about the February Revolution, the abdication of Nicholas and the uprising in Kronstadt already in fact, while in Switzerland. The events came as a complete surprise to him and the decision to return to Russia was not taken immediately. Lenin hesitated for some time, assessing the situation, and only on March 31 (a month after the start of the revolution) did he finally decide to go.

Lenin arrived in Petrograd on April 3, a month after the abdication of Nicholas - this in itself clearly shows the degree of readiness of the Bolsheviks for the February Revolution of 1917 and participation in the events.

The Bolsheviks made their first attempt to seize power on July 3-4, 1917. However, there are also different versions about the role of the Bolsheviks in these events. But be that as it may, the attempt to seize power in any case was unsuccessful, and the Provisional Government issued a decree on the arrest of its organizers.

On July 5-9, Lenin was hiding in Petrograd, after which he moved to Razliv and settled first with the worker Yemelyanov, and then in the now legendary hut.

In early August, due to the worsening weather and the approach of autumn, it was decided to transport Lenin to Finland. On August 8, Lenin left the hut, reached St. Petersburg, and from there left for the Principality of Finland, where he stayed until the beginning of October.

So how did the Bolsheviks manage to eventually come to power if, figuratively speaking, they slept through two revolutions in a row - first in 1905, and then in February 1917?

How did the Bolsheviks manage to come to power if Lenin, the undisputed leader of the Bolsheviks, was in Switzerland during the February and March events and learned about the revolution after the fact, returned to Russia only a month later, and then was forced to hide again, left for Finland and finally returned only in October?

Why did the Bolsheviks come to power?

Kerensky and... General Kornilov helped the Bolsheviks come to power.

During July-August the situation in the Provisional Government became extremely complicated. As early as July 7, Prince Lvov, who headed the government, resigned and Kerensky became chairman.

It should be noted here that the Provisional Government was not at all a legal authority in the full sense of the word. It was formed by the Duma "committee", which arose at the end of February as a private meeting of deputies of the Duma, dissolved by decree of the emperor.

The provisional government was created by the Committee, which, in turn, was created not by law, but by the situation, by a narrow group of people who formally did not have any powers at all, because the Duma had already been formally dissolved at that time. But even if the Duma had not been dissolved, the creation of the Committee would still not have been formalized by law. And no one gave this Committee the authority to form a government, and could not give it. The Deputy Committee could not form a government according to the laws that existed at that time.

In fact, starting from March 5, when Mikhail signed his manifesto on the elections of the Constituent Assembly, and until the elections themselves, which were to be held in 6 months, there was no legal power in Russia.

The interim government worked only because someone had to govern the country and other authorities simply did not exist.

The provisional government was a kind of power in a situation of anarchy and uncertainty - uncertainty not only in the composition of the new permanent government, but even in the form of government.

And in this Provisional Government, which already existed on bird's rights, new reshuffles began.

The interim government was not only illegal, but also could not make the necessary decisions on the merits - it was not possible to carry out reforms, disagreements between different groups in the government were growing.

After the July events, contradictions also arose between the Provisional Government and the Soviets (Petrosoviet).

To get rid of the Soviets backed by armed soldiers and sailors, Kerensky decided to rely on General Kornilov and the army. However, Kornilov did not consider it necessary to serve the "temporaries" and was inclined to establish a military dictatorship. Realizing this, Kerensky removed Kornilov from the post of commander in chief, but the general himself did not agree with this.

On the basis of the dismissal of Kornilov and the disobedience of the general, a new split arose both within the government and outside it. The attitude towards Kornilov also became twofold - some supported him, others, on the contrary, considered that the general had placed himself "outside the law" (although the Provisional Government itself was essentially outside the law, starting from the first day).

An episode that vividly illustrates what was happening in those days was the visit on August 28 of the sailors of the cruiser "Aurora" to Trotsky in Kresty, where he was under arrest. The sailors guarding the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government met, came to the arrested Trotsky to consult whether it was time to arrest the Provisional Government.

I think this fully demonstrates the paradoxical and intricate situation of those days.

However, the Kornilov rebellion led not only to a new split in the government and the army, but also to very important practical consequences.

The Provisional Government, concerned about the actions and intentions of General Kornilov, turned to the Petrograd Soviet for help (from which it had recently wanted to get rid of relying on the general). The Petrograd Soviet demanded that the Bolsheviks be released from arrest and that the workers be armed.

As a result, Trotsky and other Bolsheviks were released on bail, and the workers received weapons.

On August 31, the Petrograd Soviet adopted a resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks on the transfer of power to the Soviets.

Following this, on September 1, Kerensky signed a government act proclaiming the Republic (which was again illegal, because the Provisional Government was not authorized to determine the form of government).

So Kerensky, who first tried to enlist the support of General Kornilov and the army, and then tried to enlist the support of the Petrograd Soviet and the workers in order to protect themselves from Kornilov, contributed to the establishment of the power of the soviets.

However, the Bolsheviks at that time did not fully control the Soviets, although they already had significant influence in them.

The growth of the influence of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets was facilitated by the simple fact that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who attempted to work in the Provisional Government, discredited themselves, began to rapidly lose popularity and positions, and demonstrated their incapacity.

The fact that the Bolsheviks “overslept” the February Revolution and did not take part either in the first executive committee of the Petrosoviet or in the work of the Provisional Government began to quickly turn from a disadvantage into an advantage.

The provisional government, which demonstrated its mediocrity and incapacity, illegality and inconsistency, not least through the efforts of Kerensky, was rapidly sinking and dragging to the bottom of everyone who was somehow connected with him. That is, almost everyone except the Bolsheviks.

The last attempt to form a "democratic government" was made in mid-September and again failed - the contradictions intensified, anarchy grew. Events have shown that democracy does not work in the current situation and any government in which all political forces are represented will turn out to be like a swan, a crayfish and a pike from a well-known fable.

On October 18, at the suggestion of Trotsky, at a meeting of representatives of the regiments of the Petrograd garrison, a decision was made to disobey the Provisional Government. In fact, this was the beginning of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

In contrast to the events of July, when demonstrations took place, on the night of October 24-25, small detachments of the Red Guards and sailors of the Baltic Fleet disarmed the guards put up by the government, took control of the stations, power plant, telephone, telegraph and other key objects. Everything happened quietly, almost without shots. The government found out about the coup after the fact, when the telephones in the Winter Palace turned off and the lights went out.

At 21:00, a blank shot from the Peter and Paul Fortress became the signal to storm the Winter Palace. In fact, by that time everything had already been decided, the Provisional Government had lost all means of control and communications last night, the Winter Guard was guarding a relatively small women's battalion (more like a company) and 2-3 companies of junkers.

The assault on the Winter Palace was rather chaotic. The guns of the Peter and Paul Fortress fired over the top of the building, Aurora generally fired blanks. How serious the assault was can be judged by the losses - only 6 dead soldiers and one striker of the female garrison are known for certain. That was such a harsh assault.

On October 25, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies took place in Smolny - and only then did the Bolsheviks, together with the Left SRs, receive the majority of the votes.

As a result of the Congress, a homogeneous socialist government was formed, which put an end to the actual dual power between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, which had lasted for six months, with complete legal anarchy.

So why did the Bolsheviks win?

Why not right-wing democrats, not Cadets, not Mensheviks, not anarchists, not the Provisional Government, or someone else?

Yes, simply because the Bolsheviks turned out to be almost the only political force that did not take part in the work of the Provisional Government, which was a team of swans, crayfish and pikes, unable not only to pull out the load of problems, but even to budge it due to the fact that that the team members were constantly opposing each other.

The Octobrists, Cadets, Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and some others who tried to form a "government hodgepodge" only interfered with each other and as a result drowned all together.

Soldiers and workers are simply tired of waiting for the "swan, cancer and pike" represented by the Provisional Government to finally be "pulled".

In a situation of absolute legal anarchy (legitimate power did not exist in principle) and actual dual power between the Provisional Government and the Petrosoviet, the Petrosoviet won, because it turned out to be more united ideologically, less fragmented, less contradictory.

In the Provisional Government, different forces were pulling in different directions, and Kerensky rushed either to Kornilov or vice versa to the Petrograd Soviet to protect himself from Kornilov - as a result, the “wagon of problems” stood still.

In the struggle between the incapacitated and contradictory Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, the Petrosoviet won, which turned out to be capable and was able to choose its own direction of movement - the right one or not, but the direction.

And inside the Petrosoviet, the Bolsheviks won, because the Mensheviks and Right SRs discredited themselves by trying to work in the Provisional Government and showed the same incapacity.

The anarchists, despite their popularity among the sailors, did not have any clear ideas about what to do in the current situation - they had neither a program nor leaders capable of making decisions and developing any programs. And it could not be, because the main thing among the anarchists was the denial of the monarchy, and what kind of power should be and what to do - there was no clear answer to this question.

We can say that in October 1917 the Bolsheviks simply got the turn of governing the country after all those who stood before them consistently signed their inability.

The Romanovs were the first to sign, back in early March 1917.

Following the Romanovs, Prince Lvov signed.

After that, the Provisional Government and with it the Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries signed their names.

The Bolsheviks remained.

The Bolsheviks won precisely because they "overslept" February 1917 and did not take part in the work of the Provisional Government - this gave them the opportunity to maintain internal unity, trust from the soldiers and sailors (soviets), as well as the opportunity to take into account the mistakes of other political forces and not attack on the rake that the rest jumped on, trying to create a "combined" government.

The Bolsheviks won because in October everyone who was tired of the situation of complete legal anarchy and actual dual power began to unite around them. There was no other political force around which one could unite, all the rest practically trampled each other and lost all confidence.

The Bolsheviks won because no one could interfere with them in October - consciously or not, but the Bolsheviks simply waited for the moment when everyone else gnawed each other, spent their strength and exhausted their political possibilities.

The Bolsheviks were the last or one of the last political forces in line for power.

The principle of "whoever finds a way out is trampled first" worked - everyone climbed into the window of opportunity that opened after Nikolai's abdication, trampling, pushing and throwing each other out. And the Bolsheviks simply waited for the moment and calmly passed through the open, or rather even torn off the door, door.

The Bolsheviks won not because they were so popular among the people - they were not so well known, the works of Marx and Lenin were not read very much by ordinary workers and soldiers.

The Bolsheviks won not because their program was so brilliant or because they had some big forces, money, armed people behind them. Armed people stood behind the Petrograd Soviet, and on the eve of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks had a minority in it.

The Bolsheviks won, because in a situation of anarchy they were almost the only ones who could offer power, moreover, a single, integral power, and not piecewise discontinuous and internally contradictory, which was the power of the Provisional Government.

Soldiers, sailors, workers and everyone else were simply tired of living without power and certainty in the future, without management, without understanding the future, without prospects, in a situation of chaos and crisis - that's why they accepted the Bolsheviks.

Later, when the Soviet power is strengthened and begins to write its own history, everything will be presented in such a way that the Bolsheviks have been marching to power with firm steps since time immemorial, the people have been waiting for them for many years, reading Iskra and Pravda in cities and villages, almost he overthrew the tsar in order to establish Soviet power under the leadership of Lenin.

The result of the many years of spreading this myth will be that many still think that the Bolsheviks drove the tsar away and they made all three revolutions - 1905, February 1917, and then October.

No, the Bolsheviks did not make either the 1905 revolution or the February 1917 revolution. And even the October Revolution was made not so much by the Bolsheviks as by Kerensky, Kornilov and the Petrograd Soviet as a collective body of workers' and soldiers' deputies (most of whom were not Bolsheviks). And the sailors, who were mostly anarchists.

The Bolsheviks completed the revolution, put an end to anarchy and chaos in Russia, put an end to order.

WHY DID THE BOLSHEVIKS WIN?

The Reds won the Civil War. On the ruins of the Russian Empire, they created their own state, the Soviet of Deputies, it is also the Soviet Republic, Soviet Russia, it is the RSFSR since the summer of 1918, it is (since 1922) the Soviet Union.

Why did they win, while white and everyone else lost?

Why did White lose?

Much has been written about the reasons for White's defeat. Whites themselves, in exile, wrote especially a lot. For the Reds, everything was clear: the objective laws of history are on their side.

Most whites agreed that the reasons for the defeat were purely military. Now, if during the offensive near Orel in 1919 it was not necessary to withdraw troops against Makhno ... If Denikin had accepted Wrangel's plan and united with Kolchak ... If Rodzianko had energetically marched on Petrograd ...

Sometimes they even wrote that if Kolchak in the Urals had not divided the armies, but had struck with a single fist at Samara, then at Kazan, then the Bolsheviks would have rolled all the way to Moscow!

For some reason, it was not customary to ask questions: why did Nestor Makhno appear at all? Why did they follow him? And if Makhno was, then why didn't he go along with Denikin? Why did you have to fight both the Bolsheviks and him? Why did Rodzianko behave so indecisively? But without these questions, everything is incomprehensible. Everything really comes down to the tactics of individual battles and the wisdom of certain decisions of military leaders.

It has already become commonplace that the Whites attacked scattered from the outskirts, while the Reds had the advantages of a central position.

In the USSR, it was carefully concealed that the white armies were much smaller than the red ones, that they were worse supplied, were sometimes half-starved and half-dressed.

But why didn't the whites unite? Why were there so few? Why did they remain so poor?

As always in any civil war, behind the military reasons are political reasons. Let's start with the fact that not only whites and reds fought. At the first stage of the Civil War, in 1918, the White movement did not take shape at all, and the Red Army was just beginning to be created.

Why did the "pinks" lose?

Why were the "pink" socialist governments even less able to resist the Bolsheviks than the white ones? The answer is obvious: no one followed them. The Social Revolutionaries were popular among the peasantry. Peasant uprisings adopted SR slogans. Many peasant leaders called themselves SRs, while others called themselves anarchists.

But the peasants did not follow the urban theoreticians and did not recognize the right to lead themselves. They did not join Komuch's People's Army and Tchaikovsky's People's Army. When the Social Revolutionaries tried to create their own Union of the working peasantry, the peasants themselves dispersed them.

Both the anarchist Makhno and the anarchists in Altai theoretically recognized Prince Kropotkin and Tkachev, but politically they did not even think of submitting to them.

Whatever the Socialist-Revolutionaries say, they themselves did not recognize the workers and peasants as their equals. Komuch did not help Prikomuch. And his former leaders honestly confessed to Kolchak that they could not consider the long-bearded cattle as equals.

As a result, the Social Revolutionaries, anarchists, Mensheviks and other townspeople turned out to be politicians without the masses and generals without an army. Their power flared for a moment and ingloriously faded.

And the whites?

Of course, Kolchak and Denikin enjoyed much more respect than the half-forgotten Chernov and Avksentiev. The people did not go to Tchaikovsky, and under the command of Miller, the hunters fought fearlessly and dashingly.

But when Kolchak began mass mobilizations, the result was uprisings and mass insubordination.

And the Cossacks did not follow the Whites: they fought the Reds on their own. Krasnov did not want to obey Denikin. Annenkov and Belov did not obey Kolchak. Semenov generally created his own government and wanted to spit on Kolchak. The Terek Cossacks respected Wrangel, but violated his orders when he ordered not to touch the Jews and not to drive the Kabardians from the land.

Whites could be brave and heroic. They could go on a "psychic attack" and attack an enemy outnumbering them five times. Many white operations are simply a masterpiece of military art. But the whites were unable to create a massive white army.

Their armies have always been small squads of people of one class, one type. As soon as the white armies grew in numbers, they lost their quality. And 3, 5, even 10 thousand enemies were crushed by the Reds, regardless of the quality.

The answer is not military, but political: because they did not have a single powerful idea.

Non-predecision turned into the fact that whites had nothing to say to 90% of the population.

Whites could tell what they were AGAINST. But they could not clearly explain what they were fighting for.

There was no idea - there was no unity of those who are ready to fight for this idea.

There was no idea - and the whites themselves did not have enough will to translate this idea into reality. They themselves had nothing to fight for, no one to rally and no need to make politics.

Non-communist Russia was incredibly fragmented. In February 1917, it disintegrated into peoples, estates, classes, parties, groupings. The Whites failed to unite this Russia.

Wrangel tried to do it, but too late. One can only guess what would have happened if he had begun to implement his ideas not in 1920, but at the end of 1918.

For Wrangel, the reforms are the weapons of the Civil War. Could this weapon work? Probably yes ... But on the condition that the white and red states will live side by side for a long time. Like the GDR and the FRG, like North and South Korea. Only then will the advantage of one system over another become apparent.

“It was too late to carry out this plan in the summer of 1920, when the Red Army had achieved multiple superiority. The inability of the Whites immediately, and not "after the victory" to solve the pressing issues of law and order and the organization of everyday life in alliance with the peasant majority of the population, is one of the main reasons for the collapse of the White movement.

white idea

Why were the whites fighting? For estates? For their factories and plants? But even the aristocrat Kolchak never had estates. And Yudenich did not. Denikin is generally the grandson of a peasant. Kornilov is the son of an ordinary Cossack. Silly lie that they were protecting their incredible wealth.

Then why?

Whites had no idea for EVERYONE. But the whites had an idea for themselves. It was the idea of preserving and continuing Russia. The only question is, which Russia? Russia Russian Europeans. Russia's educated stratum, which in 1917 numbered at most 4-5 million people. Approximately the same number of Russian natives were ready to enter this layer, to accept its ideas as their own. For these 7–8 million out of 140, it was obvious what exactly should be preserved and why.

In the Civil War, this people of Russian Europeans split, dispersed into political parties and trends. Both socialists and communists are also Russian Europeans in their origin and essence.

Some Russian Europeans want to abandon Europeanism itself for a risky but exciting experiment for them - the communists.

Others want different types of social democracy - Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists.

Still others want the continuation and development of historical Russia - these are whites.

They want to preserve the cozy Russia of the intelligentsia, rising from the pages of the books of Bulgakov and Pasternak. In this Russia, there are stacks of books in brown spines on the piano, ancestors look from the paintings and photographs on the walls. This is a very nice Russia, but 90% of that time! population of the former Russian Empire have nothing to do with it. They will not fight and die for the idea of preserving it.

At the same time, 70-80% of Russian Europeans do not want to participate in anything, they do not adjoin anyone or anything. All political groups are very, very small in number ... There are simply few whites, a few tens of thousands of combat-ready men throughout colossal Russia.

Inside the white camp

The whites were constantly squabbling among themselves. They were united in the first troubled days, and then ... Denikin did not like Kolchak and "held" Wrangel. Mai-Maevsky really did not want Kutepov, who was unsympathetic to him, to take Moscow. Wrangel intrigued against Denikin.

Rodzianko was angry with Yudenich for being smarter and more successful. Vermont appropriated the title of Prince Avalov and betrayed Yudenich and Rodzianko in order to try to install a new tsar-father on the throne.

Slashchev negotiated with the Bolsheviks to kill Wrangel and take his place.

Kolchak scolded Denikin and Mai-Maevsky for indecision and cowardice. Kappel sullenly kept silent, and for this he also got it. Pepelyaev also cursed with foul language - but already Kolchak, and also for indecision.

The generals behaved as if everything was a foregone conclusion, their Russia simply could not be saved. Barely imagined success - and they immediately lost unity. Intrigues replaced agreement, everything was drowned in the fog of finding out who is the biggest and most important here.

According to the laws of yesterday

The white generals thought they were morally right. Everyone else must also understand their correctness and act "as it should be." Perhaps such behavior was meaningful while European civilization was on the rise. But the time of the highest take-off was already behind.

Whites never understood that the world had changed. That the Great War itself is a sure sign of these changes and that no one will ever live the way Russian Europeans lived before the Great War. They felt themselves to be the ruling stratum, carriers of higher truths... But the civilization in which they and others like them were the highest and ruling stratum no longer existed. Knights of a non-existent empire. Citizens of a decaying civilization. Owners of a devalued block of shares.

Typical intellectuals, or Without allies

Whites behaved as if everyone was obliged to share their beliefs. In this they were typical Russian intellectuals. They did not want to understand that besides them, powerful new forces had risen in Russia, and without the support of these forces they would perish.

They acted as if they didn't need any allies. They had principles and beliefs. They couldn't…sorry, they didn't want to compromise their principles and beliefs. Including his naive belief that the Russian Empire is eternal.

In Russia itself, the Civil War is going on, the armies of Finland and Poland are much stronger than any of the Russian and Soviet armies. The armies of Estonia and Georgia are at least not weaker, they are necessary allies.

Make an alliance with Finland! Recognize its independence! Grit your teeth and even agree to the birth of a new Commonwealth "from mozha to mozha"! If you do this, the West will start helping you in a completely different way. The mighty armies of Mannerheim and Pilsudski will move on Petrograd and Moscow. Then you will lose the colonies, but save Russia. And himself at the head of this Russia. After all, a hundred times better to keep part of the former Russian Empire than to lose all of Russia to the end.

If you can’t give up the idea of “one and indivisible”, then at least lie, be hypocritical! After the victory, a completely new alignment of forces will develop ... It may well be that Finland will agree to a new alliance with Russia. It is likely that you will force Poland to give up Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. All this is possible if you are smarter, more flexible, more realistic. If you do not rest your horn on your incomparable convictions, but begin to play a real political game.

The same applies to the alliance with the socialist gentlemen. It was necessary to overthrow the Directory and arrest the chatty members of Komuch. Including for the salvation of Russia. But who hinders the recognition of the idea of land socialization? Since she is so dear to the peasants and their pitiful Socialist-Revolutionaries, let them ... Again, do you want to honestly compromise? Well, so lie! Tell me that you yourself are a little Socialist-Revolutionary ... in your soul. Do not hang the Black Sea "regionals", agree at least in words with their crazy ideas. Then "green" uprisings will not rise against you. Once you enter Moscow to the sound of bells, then deal with Ryabovol and other Black Sea “regionals”.

The Bolsheviks did just that: they created a common government with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists, and they themselves turned back what they wanted. And they passed on grief - "allies" when they were no longer needed.

But the whites refused any compromises, any deals both with the Nationals and with other political forces. They believed that if they were morally right, they could go against the Bolsheviks alone, without allies. They went. We are still dealing with the consequences.

Why did the peasantry lose?

This is not the place to write in detail about native Russia. I did this in my other book. Very briefly: the entire St. Petersburg period of our history, from Peter the Great until 1917, there was European Russia, St. Petersburg. And next to her lived native Russia, folk. Russia, living out the ideas and norms of an earlier, Moscow, period of our history.

The Russian peasants, the last Muscovites, are used to it - they are not the ones who manage all the affairs of the Empire. Their job is to deal with purely local problems. Like the men of the time of Razin, like the Cossacks of the time of Pugachev, they do not want to leave their native places.

As long as they are not touched, they are ready to obey everyone who only commands from the cities ... The peasant mass wanted only one thing: to be left alone and not drawn into the Civil War.

All the same, they are drawn in, but even then the peasants defend their yards, villages, at most - their provinces. In an army that would protect everyone, all of Russia, they did not aspire at all. They took rifles from the rebels in Yaroslavl ... And almost everyone dispersed, leaving weapons for their own and only for their own purposes.

It is impossible without a lump in the throat to imagine how children die in their mothers' arms: in a concentration camp in the autumn rain, on a damp swede.

You don't want anyone to die in a Chekist basement, Seeing such a death of your family.

But the peasants did everything necessary for just such an end.

The peasantry lost because they remained native.

Peasants, Russian natives, did not believe in the “city” “Kadyukas” and did not go along with them. Even if the slogans were the same. While there were white armies, the “greens” themselves sat out, they did not help the whites. And the Reds for a long time did not reach their hands, as before the Tambov province. Now there are no whites. The Greens are forced to do what the Whites failed to do: fight the Reds. But they do not have a single leadership, the "Russian natives" are terribly disunited. And now the Reds have a free hand, in each region of the country they crush the "greens" separately.

The Cossacks behaved almost the same way. The farther from their villages, the more reluctantly they fought. After the raid of Mamantov, the Don Cossacks turned not to Moscow, but to the Don. Semirechensky Cossacks fought only at home. The Transbaikal Cossacks did not want to help Kolchak: they have their own ataman Semyonov, their own problems. The Ussuri Cossacks beat the red criminals Lazo, but they did not help Kolchak either.

The Terek Cossacks fought superbly with Uzun-Khodja, but they were sad in Ukraine and Russia. Like for the whites, allies... But as soon as the whites started to lose, they took a traitorously neutral position.

The Ural and Orenburg Cossacks also did not want to go to Russia ... well, and in the end they ended up ... who survived, much further from their land - in Persia.

And the whites lost because they could not rally the rest of Russia against the Bolsheviks. And they remained a handful of heroes going against an obviously strongest enemy.

Why did the Reds win?

The Reds just had an idea!

Great idea. Perhaps this is the most grandiose idea in the history of mankind. They had something to torture, torment, force themselves to make any effort and extra effort. After all, they were building a new world, a new universe, where everything would be different than today.

In their ideology, the Reds combined several ideologies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries at once. They were both revolutionaries and men of the Enlightenment. Supporters of the cult of science and progress, convinced of the "scientific nature" of Marxism. And the builders of the madness of an "alternative" civilization under the banner of Judas and Cain.

The Reds were "for the people" and supported the most bizarre ideas of the "popular masses", but built a totalitarian state. They were supporters of the idea of a nation-state, but swung at the creation of the greatest in history, the extremely huge Zemshar Empire. They were supporters of the primitive communal "socialization of the earth" and rushed into space.

They made sense to force others. The ideology was so grandiose, so dazzling that it kind of made sense to force other people to fight for the idea.

Historian Konstantin Tarasov on the role of losing and winning coalitions in 1917.

Lenin was sure: the "bourgeois-democratic" stage of the revolution was over, it was necessary to proceed to the socialist

The question why it was the Bolsheviks who won in October 1917 was important for the contemporaries of the revolution and has not lost its relevance today. Over these 100 years, many conflicting reasons have been named: from the fanaticism of a close-knit group of conspirators to the search for the roots of Bolshevism in the public mind, from conspiracy theories to the official position of Soviet historiography on the objective prerequisites for October.

After the February uprising, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who led the Petrograd and most provincial soviets, became the most influential leftist parties. They formed a moderate socialist bloc that advocated a long transitional period from capitalism to socialism. The Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were for social partnership between classes, supported the Provisional Government and at the same time sought to control its actions in order to consolidate the revolutionary gains. They converged on the idea of "revolutionary defencism", the continuation of the war while abandoning predatory goals.

The Bolshevik Party by February 1917 was not a significant force. In previous years, the left wing of the RSDLP had been weakened by the revelations, arrests, exile or emigration of its most influential leaders. Many ordinary party members retired due to persecution by the authorities. Even after the events of February, there were no more than 25,000 Bolsheviks in Russia.

Among the wide political spectrum, the Bolsheviks stood out from the very beginning. Until February 1917, they put forward the slogan "Down with the war", took an active part in the anti-war and defeatist movement. After the overthrow of the monarchy, the Bolshevik leadership claimed that the new "bourgeois" government was pursuing the same goals, and the nature of the war had not changed. Some of the controversy among them was the question of power. The Petrograd organization tended to refuse to support the Provisional Government. However, after the return of influential Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin), Mikhail Muranov and Lev Rosenfeld (Kamenev) from exile, the party began to lean towards supporting the decisions of the new government if they were in the interests of the working people. The Bolshevik leaders were ready to put aside factional differences and unite all currents of social democracy.

The situation changed after the return of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) from a long emigration. He offered his comrades-in-arms an unexpected program: to break with the moderate socialists who supported the Provisional Government and end the war by overthrowing power in all the warring countries. Lenin was sure: the "bourgeois-democratic" stage of the revolution was over, it was necessary to proceed to the socialist one. The appearance of the Soviets, which ensured the presence of workers and peasants in the organs of power, facilitated the possibility of a rapid transition to socialism. During April, Lenin persuaded the party to support the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" and the adoption of the majority of the April Theses.

However, it was not the radical program that made Lenin's name famous, but the hype caused by his return to Russia through hostile Germany. The party leader was accused of helping the enemy and declared a German spy. These statements increased the tension in society. Agitators posing as Bolsheviks were often arrested and beaten. This discredited any criticism of the Provisional Government. Moderate socialists in the leadership of the Petrosoviet came to the defense of Lenin's views, as long as they did not go beyond agitation.

By June 1917, the Bolsheviks numbered about 240,000 people. For comparison: in the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries by the summer there were 800,000 people (however, the vast majority were "March Socialist-Revolutionaries"). Membership in the party did not require participation in party work and the payment of dues - there was no need to talk about the unity of action of supporters. The Social Revolutionaries became the "party of power", so many new members were guided by career motives.

The situation was different for the Bolsheviks. In most of the Soviets in the first months of 1917, the party was in the minority, its members argued with more influential moderate socialists, often risking their health by speaking at rallies. In addition, according to the charter of the Bolsheviks, one could join the party only on the recommendation of two of its members. This united the Bolsheviks, brought together the positions of various groups.

Time worked in favor of Lenin and his party. A series of political crises and the government's refusal to make major changes before the Constituent Assembly convened weakened the idea of a coalition of socialists with liberals. The failure of the July offensive organized by the Socialist War Minister Alexander Kerensky at the front strengthened anti-war sentiments in the army. The Bolsheviks called for the re-election of deputies who did not meet the interests of the voters. By the summer of 1917, large factions of the left wing of the RSDLP had taken shape in many Russian cities. However, during this period, the Bolsheviks failed to gain an advantage over the moderate socialists in most of the Soviets.

On July 3, 1917, a spontaneous uprising broke out in Petrograd with the aim of persuading the leadership of the Soviet to take power. The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, seeing that it was developing under its slogans, and fearing to lose its influence among the masses, decided to join the demonstrators. On the Fourth of July, demonstrations led by the Bolsheviks took place in many Russian cities under the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" However, moderate socialists considered that Lenin's supporters were trying to exert armed pressure on the Soviets, and supported the restoration of order in the capital by the Provisional Government. At the same time, Minister of Justice Pavel Pereverzev published documents exposing Bolshevik ties to Germany.

Under his leadership, a press release was prepared based on the testimony of Ensign Yermolenko and the correspondence between Stockholm and Petrograd intercepted by counterintelligence. The testimonies of Yermolenko, a defector recruited by German intelligence, about Lenin's involvement in espionage raised doubts even among his contemporaries, the investigators of the Provisional Government failed to find traces of the financing of the Bolsheviks by the German General Staff. The intercepted documents were of a business nature, and the money went from Petrograd to Stockholm. The investigators had no other evidence.

However, the publication significantly changed the mood in Petrograd: the demonstrations quickly faded away. The government arrested active participants in the demonstrations, unreliable military units were sent to the front, and an investigation was opened against the leaders of the Bolsheviks. Lenin was forced to hide from arrest. For the party, this period was the most difficult. However, he cleared its ranks of those who hesitated, only firm supporters of radical actions remained in it.

The short period of July-August 1917 provided the authorities with an opportunity to resolutely restore discipline in the army and strengthen the authority of the government and moderate socialists. However, everything was thwarted by an attempt to establish a military dictatorship by the commander-in-chief, General Lavr Kornilov. The answer to the speech was the Bolshevization of the Soviets, when the party factions were significantly strengthened in many cities. In Petrograd and other cities, the Bolsheviks were in the lead in the workers' sections, while the SRs continued to dominate in the soldiers' sections. The radicalization of public sentiment strengthened the left wing of the moderate socialists and strengthened their support, weakening the influence of the moderate socialist bloc. The Bolsheviks in the provinces finally broke with the united Social Democratic organizations. The alliance with the left parties and the support of the program associated with the Bolsheviks gave them an advantage in a number of Soviets. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" united radical left parties and groups to fight against the counter-revolution and create an authoritative government capable of starting peace negotiations and preparing the conditions for fundamental social transformations.

The October events in Petrograd are very often called a revolution. There is some truth in this. The capture of urban facilities and the blocking of the Provisional Government on Palace Square was carried out by military means, without signs of a spontaneous uprising. But the coup would not have led to a change of power without the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC), created by the authoritative Petrograd Soviet. By October it was dominated by a bloc of radical left parties led by the Bolsheviks. All parties delegated commissars to the Military Revolutionary Committee to control military units and key objects of the city. If the Bolsheviks had tried to remove the Provisional Government from power only by military means, the events would probably have dragged on and could have ended in the defeat of the radicals.

The victory of the radical left parties depended not only on the events in the capital: the revolution was a large-scale nationwide process. There were many “Octobers”, and somewhere (for example, in Tashkent, Revel (Tallinn) and Kazan) the Soviets took power earlier than in Petrograd, and somewhere much later: the “triumphal march of Soviet power” stretched for more than year. The situation depended on the correlation of political forces in the regions. For example, in the Volga region, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries played the main role in establishing the power of the Soviets. In Krasnoyarsk and Kronstadt, the anarchists ensured the victory of the radical left bloc.

At the front in the summer of 1917, the extreme left forces tried to organize a struggle against the moderate socialists in the Soviets of armies and fronts. This was best done on the northern front closest to the capital, where a “left bloc” was created, uniting 28 regiments of Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Internationalists and Left Social Revolutionaries, including Latvian riflemen. On other fronts, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks dominated the leadership of the upper-level Soldiers' Soviets until October. The Bolsheviks managed to win after the creation of military revolutionary committees.

Such successes were determined by the program of the Soviet government. The Decree on Peace proclaimed the goal of the new authorities to achieve a just peace between all warring countries. However, this was not achieved, and under the threat of the capture of Petrograd, the Council of People's Commissars was forced to conclude a separate peace with Germany. The Decree on Land was the result of concessions to the Left SRs, since it corresponded precisely to their program, which provided for the confiscation of landowners' land and its transfer to the peasants. It also declared the introduction of an eight-hour working day, the equality of all the peoples of Russia and their right to self-determination, the abolition of class restrictions, etc. These important questions posed by the revolution were known to the moderate socialists and the Provisional Government, but they postponed their decision until the Constituent Assembly

Thus, it would be inaccurate to assert that the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917. The transition to the sovereignty of the Soviets took place because the moderate socialist bloc discredited itself with a coalition with the liberals. The change of power was ensured by the unification of the radical left parties under the Bolshevik slogan "All power to the Soviets!". In this sense, the number of Bolsheviks did not play a big role; the struggle against the moderate socialists in the Soviets continued for several more months. However, the country was already slipping into the Civil War, the chance for a compromise was missed. It was time for an uncompromising struggle.

This question does not give rest to many researchers - the disputes of historians continue to this day.

Many different theories are given - from "the will of fate" to simple chance.

Scientists note the disunity of the "white movement", the lack of a single leader and command among the former tsarist generals and Cossack chieftains, the unwillingness to negotiate with the "national outskirts" of the former empire, to recognize the independence of Poland and Finland, the lack of a unified political program and ideological guidelines, weak propaganda and attempts to plant "old regime" in the controlled territories.

The "Reds" - on the contrary, showed amazing solidarity, the ability to concentrate resources and deliver decisive blows, the skillful use of the former imperial military, and a developed propaganda apparatus.

The most interesting theory explaining the victory of the Soviet power was put forward by Moscow researchers. In their opinion, the Bolsheviks won the Civil War in essence. Even before it began, thanks to two decrees adopted by them - the decree on peace and the decree on land.

The Decree on Peace, adopted on November 8, 1917, proposed that “all belligerent peoples and their governments begin immediately negotiations on a just democratic peace”, namely, on “immediate peace without annexations and indemnities”, that is, without seizures of foreign territories and without forcible recovery from the defeated material or monetary compensation.

The continuation of the war is seen as "the greatest crime against humanity".

The Decree on Land, adopted on the same day, declared the confiscation of landowners' lands and estates, as well as the transfer of land to the property of the state, followed by its gratuitous transfer to the peasants.

“All land, after its alienation, goes to the nationwide land fund. The distribution of it among the working people is managed by local and central self-governments, ranging from democratically organized non-estate rural and urban communities to the central regional institutions.

Thus, two major problems of Russia were solved in one day. The war had already lasted for 4 years and people desperately wanted peace, the land issue was even more acute - the peasants at that time, according to various sources, accounted for 85 to 90% of the population of the Russian Empire. The Decree on Land transferred to their full use the lands that they cultivated for centuries but did not belong to them.

With these decrees, the Bolsheviks secured the support of the overwhelming majority of the population, which, coupled with tough management methods and a powerful ideology, bore fruit - the “white” commanders who spoke of “war to a victorious end” and returned land to the landowners in the controlled territories simply had no chance - the people turned away from them.