"Budyonny's War Diary" and the mystery of the beginning of the war

On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, "AN" continues to publish a historical investigation by the publicist Nikolai DOBRUKHA (beginning in No. 22 - 06/09/2011). Did Stalin know the exact date of the German attack? If you knew, then how? When did you know? What could and what could not be done? The author relies on a previously unpublished source - "The Military Diary of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Budyonny", as well as a number of archival materials that have not yet been introduced into wide scientific circulation.

The previous issue contains documents confirming: Stalin knew! But from where - after all, he did not fully trust the agents?

Bormann, Chekhov or Schulenburg?

So, Stalin calls the agent "Sergeant" a "disinformer", does not believe the "Corsican" and Sorge. It is logical to assume that Stalin had a different source, and a higher level. Who? A man from Hitler's immediate circle? Or just close to the Nazi elite?

In recent years, there have been suggestions that "source" No. 1 could be the German ambassador to the USSR, Count Werner von Schulenburg. A diplomat with 40 years of experience, he revered Bismarck and remembered the “iron chancellor”’s attitude: the biggest mistakes for Germany would be a war on two fronts and a war with Russia. Later, Schulenburg turned into a staunch enemy of the Nazi regime, for participating in the "conspiracy of July 20, 1944" was hanged. But then again - no evidence of his pre-war cooperation with us.

Meanwhile, in our search for agent number 1, we do not ask ourselves the simplest question: when could this alleged super agent know about the impending attack? After all, logically, only after the appropriate decision is made in Berlin. And when was it accepted?

Diary of Goebbels

Let's open the now declassified diary of the Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany, Dr. I. Goebbels:

“May 16, 1941 Friday. In the East, it should start on May 22. But it depends to some extent on the weather…”

(That is, on May 16, even Hitler did not yet know exactly when everything would begin. How was the rest, including Stalin, to know? The plans for the attack were constantly changing the weather and all sorts of inconsistencies in the course of military preparations. after which the eastern campaign largely lost its meaning - after all, its goal was to defeat Russia before winter (and objectively, one of the last ten days of June could become such a deadline).

Recalling the names

The Soviet agent "Sergeant" mentioned in the text is an officer of the Luftwaffe headquarters, Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen. "Corsican" - scientific adviser to the Ministry of Economics Arvid Harnak. Both were not only convinced anti-fascists, but also informed "sources".

June 5, 1941 Thursday Our statements about the upcoming landing (on the British Isles - Ed.) are already beginning to act. And then we can act, taking advantage of the general confusion ...

June 14, 1941 Saturday. British radio stations are already declaring that the concentration of our troops against Russia is a bluff with which we cover up our preparations for a landing in England. That was the purpose of the idea!

June 15, 1941 Sunday. From the intercepted radio message (...) Moscow puts the navy on alert. This means that the situation there is not so harmless as they want to show ... "

These words of Goebbels testify that, contrary to the usual opinion, Stalin talked about his disbelief in the German attack in the summer of 1941, but took the necessary measures!

However, Hitler was still undecided on the exact day and hour of the attack. 6 days (!) Before the outbreak of hostilities, Goebbels writes:

“June 16, 1941 Monday. Yesterday (...) in the afternoon, the Fuhrer summoned me to the Imperial Chancellery. (...) The Fuhrer explains the situation to me in detail: the attack on Russia will begin as soon as the concentration and deployment of troops is completed. This will be done in about a week. (...) Italy and Japan will only receive a notification that we intend to send ultimatum demands to Russia in early July. It will quickly become famous. (…) In order to veil the true situation, it is necessary to continue to relentlessly spread rumors: peace with Moscow! Stalin comes to Berlin!..

June 17, 1941 Tuesday. All preparatory measures have already been taken. This should start on the night from Saturday to Sunday at 3.00. (Here it is!!! - Auth.).

June 18, 1941 Wednesday. We have so flooded the world with a stream of rumors that even I myself can hardly orient myself... Our latest trick: we are planning to convene a large peace conference with the participation of Russia as well...

June 21, 1941 Saturday. The question of Russia is becoming more dramatic every hour. Molotov (yesterday) asked for a visit to Berlin, but was rebuffed...

June 22, 1941 Sunday. (...) the attack on Russia begins at 3.30 at night ... Stalin must fall ... "

(Goebbels' note is typical, specifying the time: "yesterday").

Without a super agent

In other words, no matter who the Soviet superspy was, he could not have known about the German attack before June 17th.

But maybe the very search for this super agent is a false path? And he just wasn't there? After all, intelligence obtains information through different channels. There is, for example, such an interception of diplomatic messages.

Do you remember the words from Goebbels' diary of June 16: inform Italy and Japan that Germany intends to send an ultimatum to Russia in July? The task is to “veil the real situation”.

But diplomats still communicate with each other, discuss current events in an informal manner. Moreover - such an occasion! So Schulenburg then talked with the Italian ambassador to the USSR Rosso.

According to a cipher intercepted by the Soviet secret services, on June 19, 1941, Rosso sent a message to the Italian Foreign Ministry stating: Schulenburg told him in strict confidentiality “that his personal impression (...) is that an armed conflict is inevitable and that it could break out through two or three days, perhaps on Sunday.

Time left

Now, if we bring together all the documents available on this subject (including those cited in the last issue), they will answer the questions posed in the following way: when and how did Stalin learn about the impending attack, what was the further logic of his actions?

Rosso's encryption, apparently, immediately ended up with Stalin.
And he instructed Molotov to urgently apply to the German Foreign Ministry. However, as Goebbels wrote in his diary on Saturday June 21, 1941: “Molotov (yesterday) asked for a visit to Berlin, but received a sharp refusal ...”

"Yesterday" ... That is - June 20th. And the answer came the next day - June 21. Having received it with the comment that “this should have been done six months earlier,” Molotov realized that the intercepted words of Schulenburg were no longer just an assumption. And then he went to the Kremlin. When he entered Stalin's office, the clock showed 18.27.

“... On June 21, at 19 o’clock, Timoshenko, Zhukov (Chief of Staff of the Red Army) and I (Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense) were summoned. I.V. Stalin informed us that the Germans, without declaring war on us, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. June 22, and therefore, what we must and can do today and before dawn tomorrow 06/22/41.

Timoshenko and Zhukov declared that "if the Germans attack, we will defeat them at the border, and then on their territory." I.V. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." And he turned to me and asked: “What do you think?” I suggested the following:

First, immediately remove all aircraft from the jokes and bring them to full combat readiness. Secondly, to push the troops of the border (personal) and military (s) districts to the border and take positions with them, proceeding immediately to the construction of field fortifications ... (the following is a listing of other proposals by Budyonny. - Auth.).

Behind this line of defense, deploy a reserve front, where mobilized divisions and units will be trained, which will carry out all fortification work, as at the front, but in reserve.

... This must also be done because the enemy is already standing on our border in full combat readiness, having fielded an army of many millions, an army that already has combat experience, which is just waiting for orders and may not allow us to mobilize.

I.V. Stalin said that "Your considerations are correct, and I take it upon myself to talk on the issue of aviation with the command troops of the districts, and to give instructions to the people's commissar and headquarters to the districts."

“Do you know what we are doing at the border right now?”
I said no, I don't know...

It turns out that (...) the People's Commissar of Defense makes a defensive line along the entire new border after 1939 and removed all the weapons from the former fortified areas and dumped them in heaps along the border, and over a million people (labor force) worked there on the border, which for the most part fell to the Germans, the weapons dumped also fell to the Germans, and the former fortified areas remained disarmed.

After this exchange of views, Comrade Stalin asked to convene the Politburo ... I.V. Stalin informed the Bureau that during the exchange of opinions it became clear that our people's commissar for defense and the headquarters were dealing with questions of defense superficially and thoughtlessly, and even frivolously.

Tov. Stalin proposed "forming a special front, subordinating it directly to the Headquarters, and appointing Budyonny as front commander ...

After the decisions made at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I went straight to my work ...

At 04.01 on 22.06.41 Comrade Timoshenko called me and said that the Germans were bombing Sevastopol and whether it was necessary to report about it
Comrade Stalin? I told him that it was necessary to report immediately, but he said: you call! I immediately called and reported not only about Sevastopol, but also about Riga, which the Germans are also bombing. Tov. Stalin asked: where is the people's commissar? I answered: here next to me (I was already in the People's Commissar's office). Tov. Stalin ordered the phone to be handed over to him ...

Thus the war began!»

Nikolai Dobryukha

Did Stalin know the time of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War? What did the state security agencies report to him about this? The answers to these questions have been of interest to researchers for several decades. In recent years, a large number of publications on this topic have appeared, a large number of documents have been published, and there are various approaches to their assessment.

Taking into account the fact that new materials on this problem have recently been declassified, we will try once again to analyze the documents reported to Stalin on the eve of the war.

Border fortifications

Let us first mention that Stalin was twice informed about the construction of powerful fortifications on the eastern borders of Germany.

First, on August 1, 1940, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria reported on the intelligence data received, according to which the Germans were building field and long-term fortifications on the border with the USSR.

It was established that in the area of ​​​​the town of Karkle, 12 kilometers north of Memel (Klaipeda), coastal artillery was located. To the north and south of this area, near the towns of Nemerzhara, Gerule, Taralaukoy and Zandkrug, large reinforced concrete fortifications were built. Work began on the Memel fortress. Reinforced concrete fortifications were built 10 kilometers east of it.

Beria also reported that on the Western Bug, on the line of the towns of Dubenka and Grubeshov, and along the western bank of the San River, trenches were dug by the forces of military units. In the area of ​​the town of Helm, as well as on the eastern outskirts of the town of Berdishche, long-term fortifications were built. The area adjacent to this area was mined. In the area of ​​​​the towns of Sosnice, Valava and Zasan, a line of trenches, dugouts, machine-gun nests, interconnected by communication lines, was built, guns were also installed in this area.

Secondly, on January 22, 1941, Stalin asked V. M. Molotov, N. A. Voznesensky, Beria, K. E. Voroshilov, S. K. Timoshenko, K. A. Meretskov, G. K. Zhukov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. M. Budyonny, A. A. Zhdanov, A. F. Khrenova (Department of Engineering Troops of the Red Army) and G. I. Kulik to read the note about the "Siegfried Line", handed over to TASS on January 9.

According to this report, in 1940, the second edition of I. Pechlinger's book "The Siegfried Line" was published in Germany. It reported that from the time the National Socialists came to power, Hitler's first concern, along with the strengthening of the army, was the strengthening of military fortifications on the borders of Germany. In 1935, military engineering headquarters were created, which were instructed to build fortifications east of the Rhine demilitarized zone. Until 1938, they completed a significant part of the construction. On May 28, 1938, Hitler, in response to the mobilization in Czechoslovakia, ordered the speedy completion of the construction of the Siegfried Line. To solve this problem, it was necessary to mobilize all construction organizations in the country.

Pechlinger wrote that from a military point of view, the "Siegfried Line" represents a revolution in the construction of fortifications. It required the use of new military tactics and new methods of warfare.

Parallel to the line of fortifications was the line of air defense. The entire zone of fortifications went inland. In the most critical areas, individual fortifications were connected together into one whole with the help of underground communications. Food, equipment, military units could be brought underground from the rear. Engine rooms were located deep underground to supply the underground rooms with air, water and electricity, and elevators were built between the individual floors of the underground part.

Alarm calls

Other messages sent to Stalin dealt directly with intelligence about Germany's preparations for war with the Soviet Union.

In October 1940, the General Staff of the Red Army informed that German troops were arriving in Finland. Intelligence agencies reported that in Romania Germany and Italy were hastily organizing a fist attack on the left flank of the USSR front, for this purpose Italian troops were being redeployed there. With its completion, both flanks of the USSR front will be under strong threat from the very beginning of hostilities. With the accession of Finland and Romania to the Nazi coalition, the USSR was significantly losing to Germany.

On October 8, 1940, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, sent a special message to Stalin. It said that on October 4, the Yugoslav military attache, Colonel Popovich, informed the head of the foreign relations department, Colonel A. V. Gerasimov, about the report received by their envoy from Berlin. It reported that the Germans were postponing the attack on England until at least spring. They intend to strengthen their fleet during this time, intending to put into operation two 35,000-ton battleships: Bismarck and Tirpitz, submarines and small vessels.

"The Germans cannot reconcile themselves to the USSR remaining in the role of arbiter; they will seek the Soviet Union to come to an agreement with Japan and join the Rome-Berlin Axis, if they do not achieve this through diplomacy, they will attack the USSR."

Earlier, during the work of Popovich at the General Staff in Belgrade, the Italian military attache Bonifati, sent by the Germans, approached him. He tried to find out about the plans for concluding a military alliance with the USSR and, with such a development of events, frightened Yugoslavia with isolation. Two days later, the German military attache Tusen warned Popovich that "we will soon finish the Soviets."

However, Popovich believed that this information was fabricated with the aim of intimidating the Yugoslavs, in order to tear them away from the policy of rapprochement with the USSR and force them to abandon the policy of neutrality.

Popovich asked the USSR to help Yugoslavia with weapons - the country was in dire need of anti-tank, anti-aircraft guns and fighter aircraft.

Then the Yugoslav colonel read to Gerasimov the following message from the intelligence report of his General Staff: “The German military circles are sure that the USSR will avoid a collision with Germany, due to the huge superiority of German forces. Therefore, all rumors about the deterioration of relations between the USSR and Germany are groundless. Germany sooner or will attack the Soviets late, because he considers them "elements of disorder and unrest." The Soviets need at least 2 years to reorganize the army according to the experience of recent wars.

On December 5, 1940, the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany, V. G. Dekanozov, received by mail an anonymous letter with the following content:

"Dear Mr. Plenipotentiary!

Hitler intends to attack the USSR next spring. The Red Army must be destroyed by numerous powerful encirclements. The following evidence for this:

1. Most of the freight transport was sent to Poland under the pretext of a lack of gasoline.
2. Intensive construction of barracks in Norway to accommodate the largest number of German troops.
3. Secret agreement with Finland. Finland is advancing on the USSR from the north. There are already small detachments of German troops in Finland.
4. The right to transport German troops through Sweden is forced from the last force and provides for the fastest transfer of troops to Finland at the time of the offensive.
5. A new army is formed from the draft of 1901-03. Under arms are also those liable for military service 1896-1920. By the spring of 1941, the German army will number 10-12 million people. In addition, the labor reserves of the SS, SA and police amount to another 2 million, which will be drawn into the war effort.
6. The High Command is developing two plans for the encirclement of the Red Army.
a) an attack from Lublin along Pripyat (Poland) to Kyiv.
Other parts from Romania in the space between Zhasi and Bukovina in the direction of Teterev.
b) From East Prussia along Memel, Willig, Berezina, Dnieper to Kyiv. Southern advance, as in the first case, from Romania. Bold, isn't it? Hitler said in his last speech: "If these plans succeed, the Red Army will be completely destroyed. The same as in France. Surround and destroy along the riverbeds."
From Albania they want to cut off the USSR from the Dardanelles. Hitler will try, as in France, to attack the USSR with forces three times yours. Germany 14 million, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Romania - 4 million, total 18 million. And how much should the USSR have then? 20 million at least. 20 million by spring. The state of the highest combat readiness includes the presence of a large army.

Dekanozov sent this message to Molotov, the latter forwarded it to Stalin.

Based on the facts stated in the letter, the military attache in Germany, Colonel N. D. Skornyakov, made the following analysis:

According to paragraph 1 - over the past two or three weeks, a significant amount of auto-empty has indeed been sent to the East.
According to paragraph 2, the construction of barracks for German troops in Norway is also confirmed from other sources.
According to paragraph 4, the Germans have an agreement with Sweden on the transit of troops, according to which they can transport 1 echelon per day without weapons.
According to paragraph 5, it was not known about the formation of a new army from the years of birth specially drafted in 1901-1903. However, among the newly drafted there were indeed ages 1896-1920.

According to Skornyakov, by the spring the Germans could have brought the army to 10 million. The figure of the presence of another 2 million in the form of the SS, SA, labor reserves and the police was also quite real.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko and his deputies, Army Generals G. K. Zhukov and K. A. Meretskov, observe the actions of troops during the exercises of the Kyiv Special Military District. September 1940 Photo: RGAKFD / Rodina Magazine

From London, Tehran and Bucharest

On February 26, 1941, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Great Britain I. M. Maisky reported that, according to information from Czech circles, the Germans were hard at work building fortifications on the German-Soviet border. Workers and German troops were sent there. This line basically follows the Bug and has a depth of 40-50 kilometers. It has not yet been completed and in the future it will go to the north, apparently along the old German-Polish border.

In November 1940, in some military units on the German-Soviet border, small pocket German-Russian dictionaries were distributed with the same set of phrases as the German-Czech dictionaries distributed in German units on the eve of the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Some officials in the administration of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia received notices in January to "be ready to go to their destination at any order." In this connection, it is recalled that at the beginning of last year a German in Prague was appointed chief of police in Oslo, long before the Germans occupied Norway.

In conclusion, Maisky wrote that the source of this information suggests the presence of a certain bias in it, but just in case, he decided to pass on this information. On March 27, 1941, the Soviet ambassador to Iran, M.E. Filimonov, reported that the Germans were intensively transferring disassembled submarines to the Black Sea through Romania and Bulgaria. Somewhat later, it was found that by mid-April they had delivered 16 submarines, two of which were assembled.

On April 16, the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Romania, A. I. Lavrentiev, informed Stalin that the adviser to the French mission, Spitzmuller, in a conversation with the secretary of the USSR mission, Mikhailov, had reported on the concentration of German troops in Moldova. This information was confirmed by the military attache of France, Colonel Seven, who was present at the conversation. In his opinion, together with the newly arrived army corps, about 5 divisions are concentrated in Moldova. Seven believed that in the plans of the German command, the Romanian sector of the front would be of secondary importance, since the main core of the German troops was in former Poland.

The Germans carried out great preparations for war in Finland and Sweden. The arrival of the Swedish military attache in Bucharest Seven put in direct connection with the preparations for the war. According to him, a group of Romanian officers who visited Germany at the invitation of the German General Staff were talking about the upcoming war with the USSR. Based on information received from other sources, Seven believed that war was inevitable. This was confirmed by the fact that the financial institutions of Moldova were instructed to take the money deep into the country, and the urban and rural administrative bodies prepared their archives for evacuation.

Seven also believed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece, Turkey could drastically change its policy and join Germany.

Spitzmüller concluded by remarking that the Germans wanted to start a war against the USSR "as long as they do not have a Western front and as long as the United States has not entered the war."

Lavrentiev himself believed that the information was biased, but nevertheless believed that it deserved attention from the point of view of assessing the German aspirations.

On the same day, Lavrentiev reported that, according to the information of engineer Kalmanovich, in Ploiesti and other places, concrete walls were being built around oil tanks under the leadership of the Germans. A hangar with an area of ​​about a thousand square meters is being built in Focsani. Large fortification works are being carried out near Khush.

On April 23, Lavrentiev reported that, according to the information of the Yugoslav ambassador in Bucharest Avakumovich, two more German divisions had arrived in Moldova, and now there should be about ten of them. Avakumovich was firmly convinced that the Germans would soon start a war against the USSR.

According to Avakumovich, military successes turned the heads of the German military and Hitler and, perhaps, created an idea of ​​​​the ease of fighting the Soviet Union. He noted that the prolongation of the war with England could undermine the combat effectiveness of the German land army, further strengthening the military power of the Soviet Union.

Avakumovich suggested that perhaps the Germans hoped that in military operations against the USSR they would find an ideological basis for a faster conclusion of peace with England.

Not from Sorge

Many researchers wrote that since the spring of 1941, the Soviet resident in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, had received accurate information about the timing of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. However, this statement is erroneous. Moreover, in connection with the distrust created by the leadership of the Intelligence Agency towards him and his work, the information emanating from him was taken into question. Sorge was declared a "double and a fascist." Naturally, the information received from him could not be reported and was not reported to Stalin.

On May 6, 1941, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov reported to Stalin the message of the naval attaché in Berlin, Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov.

According to the latter, the Soviet citizen Bozer reported from the words of a German officer from Hitler's headquarters that the Germans were preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic states and Romania by May 14. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow and Leningrad and parachute landings in border centers were planned.

Vorontsov's conclusion is interesting: "I believe that the information is false and is specially directed along this channel in order to reach our Government, and to check how the USSR will react to this."

On June 17, People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulov sent Stalin a well-known intelligence message received from Berlin on June 16 from the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR P. M. Fitin. He informed that a source working at the German Aviation Headquarters had reported that all German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR had been completely completed and a strike could be expected at any time.

"Hungary will take an active part in the hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on Hungarian airfields." Another source working in the German Ministry of Economy reported that “the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the ‘future districts’ of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made.

The Ministry of Economy says that A. Rozenberg also spoke at a meeting of business executives destined for the "occupied" territory of the USSR, who declared that "the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from the geographical map."

Stalin's resolution was unusually harsh: "To T. Merkulov. You can send your source from the headquarters of the German aviation to f ... th mother. This is not a source, but a disinformer. I. Stalin."

Invasion

Before the start of hostilities, on June 21, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop sent a telegram to German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenberg asking him to "immediately inform Molotov that you have an urgent message for him and that you would therefore like to visit him immediately."

It was proposed to convey to Molotov a statement that Germany had a number of claims against the Soviet Union. The document indicated that the USSR was involved in subversive activities against Germany. Thus, in all countries bordering Germany, and in the territories occupied by German troops, anti-German sentiments were encouraged. The Soviet Chief of Staff offered Yugoslavia weapons against Germany. It was also blamed for the fact that the leading principle for Russia remained penetration into non-Bolshevik countries with the aim of demoralizing them, and, at the right time, crushing them. The warning given to Germany in connection with her occupation of Bulgaria was also clearly hostile.

The policy of the USSR, according to Hitlerite diplomats, was allegedly accompanied by an ever-increasing concentration of all available Russian troops on the entire front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Since the beginning of the year, the threat directly to the territory of the Reich has increased. "Thus, the Soviet government has violated the treaties with Germany and intends to attack Germany from the rear, while she is fighting for her existence. The Fuehrer therefore ordered the German armed forces to counter this threat with all the means at their disposal."

Thus, there was no doubt that the war was to begin. On the same day, Molotov again met with Schulenberg. At 01:17 on June 22, Schulenburg informed the German Foreign Ministry that Molotov had summoned him to his office on the evening of June 21 at 9:30. In a conversation, Molotov stated that, according to the document handed over to him, the German government was dissatisfied with the government of the USSR. Rumors circulate about an imminent war between Germany and the Soviet Union. In this regard, Molotov was asked to explain what led to the present state of affairs in German-Soviet relations.

Schulenberg replied: "I cannot give an answer to this question, since I have no relevant information; I will, however, pass on his message to Berlin."

At the very time when Molotov was talking to the German ambassador, on the evening of June 21, the "power and political bloc" of the country gathered in Stalin's office. Apparently, at this meeting, it was decided to put the troops on alert, sent by the commander of the troops of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies:

"I convey the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:

1. During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may start with provocative actions.
2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.

I ORDER:

a) during the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
b) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it;
c) put all units on combat readiness. Keep the troops dispersed and camouflaged;
d) put the air defense on alert without additional lifting of the assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
e) no other activities are to be carried out without special instructions.

Timoshenko. Zhukov. Pavlov. Fomins. Klimovskikh"

Less than an hour later, at 03:10, the UNKGB in the Lvov region transmitted a message to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR that the German corporal "Liskov Alfred Germanovich" who had crossed the border in the Sokal region said that tonight, after artillery preparation, their unit would begin crossing the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons.

The defector's message was confirmed; at 4 o'clock in the morning, German troops, after artillery preparation and massive bombardment, invaded the territory of the USSR.

On June 22, Goebbels read out Hitler's declaration on a German radio station. It reported that “at present, 162 Russian divisions are stationed on our border, Soviet pilots are flying over the Romanian border, making observation flights. On the night of June 17, Russian planes were flying over German territory. -Saxons. German troops, together with the Finnish, will ensure the protection of little Finland. The task is not only to protect these countries, but also to protect all of Europe. "

On June 22, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the mobilization of persons liable for military service in the Leningrad, Baltic special, Western special, Kyiv special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian and the Transcaucasian Military Districts" and the declaration of martial law in a number of regions of the USSR.

The Great Patriotic War began...

Date was unknown

So, was it possible for Stalin to know the exact date of the attack on the USSR? Taking into account the previously published intelligence documents and the materials presented in this article, we can draw an unambiguous conclusion - Stalin did not know the date of the attack of the Nazi troops on the USSR.

Everyone knew that war was inevitable. The state security agencies received information and reported to Stalin about Hitler's approval of the Barbarossa plan and the issuance of an order for direct preparations for war. But when this plan was to be implemented, it was not possible to find out. Hitler approved the date of the attack on the USSR on April 30, 1941, but the intelligence of the USSR was unable to obtain this information. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the German command conducted active disinformation measures, which, although for a short period of time, nevertheless misled our intelligence.

The timing of the attack on the USSR reported by the state security agencies changed many times. Naturally, after the fifth - sixth report on the next dates for the start of the war, Stalin ceased to trust this information. They annoyed him...

Despite the abundance of facts testifying to the preparation of the Germans for war, very cautious wording was prescribed in the memos sent to Stalin. They almost always ended with the words: "this information is fabricated for the purpose of intimidation", "the source of this information suggests the presence of a certain bias in it", "the information is biased", "I believe that the information is false".

It seems that the leadership of the state security agencies was afraid to take responsibility for the reliability of the information received. That is why they reported on the principle of "we inform, but are not sure", they tried to protect themselves. If the war starts, then Stalin was informed, if it does not start, then we reported that the source was unreliable.

The most plausible version for Stalin, most likely, was that Germany would begin to fight the Soviet Union only after the victory over England. No other development was expected.

Stalin understood that in order to wage war with England, Hitler needed bread and oil, which Germany received from the USSR. It was easier to continue to enjoy these material benefits in peace and not start hostilities that would definitely destabilize the situation and would not contribute to these supplies from the occupied territories. The settlement of relations with Japan, Germany's ally, was also reassuring. As you know, on April 13, 1941, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and the USSR signed a five-year neutrality pact in Moscow.

The political leadership of the Soviet Union tried to delay the beginning of the impending war as long as possible. This was due to the fact that on the territory of the European part of the USSR the Red Army did not have time to rearm, it was not combat-ready - which was clearly demonstrated by the Soviet-Finnish war. In this regard, there was a fear of any provocation from the Germans. Time was needed. Subsequently, Stalin would tell British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that six months of peace was not enough for the Soviet Union.

On the last evening before the start of the war, a decision was made to put the troops on alert. However, People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov did not show sufficient promptness: what they did on June 21, after leaving Stalin's office, is not clear. The commanders of the troops of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies were unable to take any action, since the directive quoted above was sent to them on June 22 at 2:30, and an hour and a half later the German offensive began. But that is another story…

The books of Viktor Rezun, who took the pseudonym "Suvorov", are well known to those who are interested in history. They are written in an interesting way, and if you don’t know the essence of what happened before the start of World War II, you can “peck” on Rezunov’s bait. The main task of his books is to lay the responsibility for the beginning of the world massacre on the USSR. That is what they were written for.

The biography of Viktor Rezun is less known - a career employee of the Soviet military intelligence was recruited by the British while abroad. Caught in the "honey trap" - a classic of the genre, recruitment through the bed. Blackmail, photos and his agreement to cooperate. He was taken by MI6 to the UK, where he “accidentally” became a writer. In the USSR, he was sentenced to death for treason. The order has not been cancelled...

It would not be an exaggeration to say that Rezun-Suvorov has a co-author of his books - these are British intelligence services.

This must be kept in mind if you decide to read his books.

But the recently appeared magazine "Historian", from the point of view of knowing the historical truth and dispelling myths and lies about our history, is not only possible, but necessary to read.

What are today the "pillar" directions of falsification of history and anti-Russian propaganda aimed at the past in order to change the future?

There are two of these directions:

1. Stalin = Hitler. The USSR is responsible for the Second World War along with the Third Reich.
2. The USSR won the war in spite of Stalin, Stalin is to blame for everything that is possible. But it has nothing to do with Victory.

Added to this is another Western propaganda trend, the meaning of which strikes in the same direction: the May Victory Day is not a holiday, but a day of bitterness, reconciliation and mourning. And the Victory Parade is saber-rattling and a distracting maneuver on the part of the authorities.

I am sure that everyone has read and heard such "verses" performed by the Fifth Column and Western politicians.

And now Viktor Rezun-Suvorov's interview with Voice of America, pay attention to what the "Russian writer" says

“The Nazis were defeated in spite of Stalin

... In an interview with the Voice of America Russian Service, which the writer gave after the completion of large-scale celebrations in Moscow in honor of the 70th anniversary of the victory over the Nazis, there was a conversation about what Viktor Suvorov thinks about these celebrations, as well as about the reasons for the huge losses of the Soviet people in that war.

Viktor Suvorov: I see the mass insanity of the people. I see some kind of explosion of vulgarity, absolutely monstrous vulgarity, and a monstrous level, as Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov said, "ignorance." Plus, some kind of savage jubilation, as if beads were given to savages, and they dance around the fire, on which cannibals roast their captives. No, I think that the holiday was once really "a holiday with tears in the eyes." Now he is without any tears, and I do not like it. And this Victory is turning into a tool to retain power, the criminal power of the people who robbed the country.

In many of your books, the idea is obvious that the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War in spite of, and not thanks to, Stalin. What do you think, to what extent in that war did people still have to overcome everything that the Soviet government hung on them, how it bent them?

Stalin was preparing to attack, and because of this, the Red Army suffered a terrible defeat in 1941. And yet the people reversed this situation and ended the war the way they ended it. The peoples of our country - Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Azerbaijanis, Tatars, Georgians - ended the war contrary to the plans prepared by Stalin, his General Staff, Zhukov and everyone else. The people achieved this victory in spite of the anti-people regime.”

Here is such a "historian", completely "independent" in his judgments and assessments ... Which began to coincide 100% with the anti-Russian propaganda of the West.

Here is another quote on the same subject. I agree with her completely, as well as completely disagree with the protégé of British intelligence, Rezun.

« Often can hear opinion, what Soviet people won war despite Stalin. How much fair such statement?

It's like saying that the Russian Empire won the Patriotic War of 1812 in spite of Alexander I or the Northern War with the Swedes - in spite of Peter the Great. It is foolish to assert that Stalin's orders only hindered and harmed. Contrary to command, the soldiers at the front cannot do anything at all. As well as the workers in the rear. There is simply no talk of any kind of self-organization of the people. The Stalinist system worked, which in the conditions of the most difficult war proved its effectiveness.

This is a fragment of an interview with the head of the scientific sector of the Russian Military Historical Society, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuri Nikiforov. Below is the full story of this interesting interview. And now a few words about the magazine and the resource that published this interview.

Some time ago, I got my hands on a new Russian magazine called “Istorik. Magazine about the current past. And I was pleasantly surprised by the quality of the material, excellent illustrations, and, most importantly, the level of their materials. I think that the journal "Istorik" is worthy of close attention. Both in paper form and for reading online.

I think that in the very near future I will publish more materials of the "Historian", which seemed interesting to me. And now, to understand the deceitfulness of Rezun-Suvorov - the promised interview of a Russian historian ...

Stalin and war

What was the contribution to the victory of the Supreme Commander? Yuri Nikiforov, head of the scientific sector of the Russian Military Historical Society, Candidate of Historical Sciences, shared his thoughts on this with the "Historian"

Photo by Ekaterina Koptelova

The role of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR Joseph Stalin in the defeat of Nazi Germany is still the topic of heated journalistic discussions. Some say that the Soviet Union won the war solely thanks to the military and organizational talents of the country's leader. Others, on the contrary, argue that the war was won not by Stalin, but by the people, and not thanks to, but in spite of the Supreme, whose numerous mistakes allegedly only increased the price of victory.

Of course, these are extremes. But it just so happened that for many decades the figure of Stalin has been evaluated according to the principle of "either-or": either a genius or a villain. Meanwhile, semitones are always important in history, assessments based on an analysis of sources and elementary common sense are important. And so we decided to talk about the role of Stalin in the war sine ira et studio - without anger and, if possible, without prejudice, figure out what his contribution to the Victory was.

- For many years there was an opinion that in the early days of the Great Patriotic War, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Joseph Stalin, was almost in prostration, could not lead the country. How true is this?

– This, like a number of other myths, has long been refuted by professional historians. As a result of the archival revolution of the early 1990s, previously inaccessible documents became known, in particular the Journal of Stalin's visits in his Kremlin office. This document has long been declassified, fully published, and allows us to draw an unambiguous conclusion: there can be no question of any prostration of Stalin. Every day during the first week of the war, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, people's commissars and military leaders came to his office, meetings were held there.

A few days after June 29 and until July 3, the head of the country spent in the country. What he did there is unknown. But it is known that he returned to the Kremlin with the developed draft resolutions of the State Defense Committee (GKO), the Council of People's Commissars and other departments, which were adopted immediately upon his return to the Kremlin. Apparently, at the dacha, Stalin worked on these documents and the text of his famous speech, which he addressed to the Soviet people on July 3. When you read it carefully, you understand that its preparation required time. It was clearly not composed in half an hour.

To what extent does Stalin bear responsibility for the failures of the first months of the war? What is his main mistake?

- This question is one of the most difficult. Even among historians who deal with it specifically, there is no single, canonical point of view.

I would emphasize that the Soviet Union (as well as the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War), not only in terms of economic, but also in terms of geographical and climatic conditions, was in a more difficult position than Germany. And above all from the point of view of the deployment of the armed forces in the future theater of operations. To see this, just look at the map. We always needed much more time to mobilize, and also to concentrate and deploy the army, which was to engage the enemy.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin faced the same problem that the Imperial General Staff struggled with before the First World War: how not to lose the “race to the border”, how to mobilize and deploy in time. In 1941, as in 1914, our conscript, having received a summons, had to get on a cart, drive to the military registration and enlistment office, which was often at a very remote distance, then get to the railway, and so on.

- In Germany, everything was easier with this ...

– Judge for yourself: it took several weeks to deploy and put on alert the multi-million army of 1941. And the main thing is that if the decision is made simultaneously in Moscow and Berlin, the Soviet Union, for objective reasons, loses this "race to the border". This problem, by the way, was recognized in the General Staff, as evidenced by the contents of the Note Georgy Zhukov dated May 15, 1941, with considerations for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, as well as a summary of the General Staff of June 22, where Zhukov, quite deliberately, in my opinion, inserted the phrase for Stalin: “The enemy, having forestalled us in the deployment ...” Unfortunately, an adequate response to this problem people's commissar of defense Semyon Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Zhukov, were not found.

It was much easier for the Nazis to organize the gradual concentration of their invasion group on the Soviet-German border in such a way that until the last moment the Kremlin remained in the dark about their plans. We know that the armored and motorized units of the Wehrmacht were the last to be transferred to the border.

Judging by the well-known documents, the understanding of the inevitability of an imminent German attack on the USSR came on June 10-12, when it was almost impossible to do anything, especially since the generals could not announce open mobilization or begin to accelerate the transfer of troops to the border without Stalin's permission. But Stalin did not give such a sanction. It turned out that the Red Army, being approximately equal in number to the invasion forces and surpassing them in tanks, aircraft and artillery, was not able to use its full potential in the first weeks of the war. Divisions and corps of the first, second and third echelons entered the battle in parts, at different times. Their defeat in this sense was programmed.

- What decisions were made to bring the troops to combat readiness?

- Back in the spring, a partial mobilization was carried out under the guise of Big Training Camps (BUS), the transfer of forces to the state border began. In the last week before the war, orders were given to move the divisions of the border districts to the areas of concentration, to mask airfields and other military installations. Literally on the eve of the war, there was an order to separate front-line departments from the district headquarters and move them to command posts. For the fact that many orders and orders of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff were executed late or remained only on paper, the commanders and headquarters of the border districts and the armies subordinate to them bear responsibility. Blame all the blame on Stalin for the delay in bringing the troops to combat readiness, as has been customary since Nikita Khrushchev, I think is wrong.

Nevertheless, as leader of the state, Stalin was obliged to delve deeper into the complexities of ensuring the timely mobilization of troops and bringing them to combat readiness and to encourage the military to act more vigorously. He does not appear to have been sure until the very last moment that the war would begin with a surprise attack by the Germans and that this would happen on the morning of June 22. Accordingly, no intelligible, unambiguous signal from the Kremlin on this matter has ever passed through the “vertical of power”. It was only on the night of June 21-22 that a corresponding decision was made and Directive No. 1 was sent to the troops. So the responsibility for the defeat of the first weeks and even months of the war cannot be removed from Stalin: he is to blame, and there is no getting away from it.

Seeing off to the front

- You can often hear: “But intelligence reported!”

- The assertions that Stalin had exact data on the date of the start of the war are incorrect. Soviet intelligence obtained a lot of information about Germany's preparations for an attack on the USSR, but it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draw unambiguous conclusions about the timing and nature of the attack. Many reports reflected German disinformation about the preparation by Germany of ultimatum demands to the Soviet Union, in particular regarding the rejection of Ukraine. The German secret services deliberately spread such rumors.

Probably, the Kremlin expected that the first shot would be preceded by some kind of diplomatic demarche on the part of Hitler, as was the case with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Receiving such an ultimatum made it possible to enter into negotiations, albeit obviously unsuccessful ones, and gain the time that the Red Army needed so much to complete the preparatory measures.

- What do you see as the main reasons for the failures of the first years of the war?

- The main reasons for the failures of 1941-1942 are "derivatives" of the catastrophe of the summer of 1941. Industry had to be hastily evacuated to the east. Hence the sharp drop in production. In the winter of 1941-1942, there was little equipment in the army, there was nothing to shoot with. Hence the high losses. This is first.

Secondly, when the cadre army died in encirclement, it was replaced by poorly trained people who had just been mobilized. They were hastily thrown to the front to close the gaps that had formed. Such divisions had less combat capability. So more were needed.

Thirdly, the huge losses in tanks and artillery in the first months of the war led to the fact that our command in the winter of 1941-1942 lacked the main tool for a successful offensive - mechanized units. You can't win a war by defense. I had to rebuild the cavalry. The infantry near Moscow went on a counteroffensive in the literal sense of the word ...

- ... on snow and off-road.

- Exactly! Large casualties were the result of systemic problems, and those arose as a result of a heavy defeat in border battles. Naturally, there were subjective reasons for our failures, connected with the adoption of a number of erroneous decisions (both at the front and in the rear), but they did not determine the general course of events.

The Germans are advancing

– What was the mechanism for making decisions on military issues?

- This mechanism is reconstructed according to the memories of people who participated in the discussion and decision-making. Everything was concentrated around the figure of Stalin as chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. All issues were resolved at meetings in his office, where people were invited in whose jurisdiction and responsibility these issues were. This approach allowed the Soviet leadership to successfully solve the problem of coordinating the needs of the front with the evacuation, the deployment of military production, construction, and, in general, with the life of the whole country.

– Did the approaches of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to decision-making change during the war? Was Stalin the model of the beginning of the war very different from Stalin, who signed the order “Not a step back!” in July 1942? How and in what way did Stalin in 1945 differ from Stalin in 1941?

- First of all, I would agree with the historian Mahmut Gareev, who has long drawn attention to the fallacy of depicting Stalin exclusively as a civilian. By the beginning of World War II, he had more military experience than Winston Churchill or Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Let me remind you that during the years of the Civil Joseph Stalin personally responsible for the defense of Tsaritsyn. He also participated in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks led the industrialization, the creation of the military-industrial complex of the country. That is, this aspect of the matter was well known to him.

Of course, from the point of view of operational art, which is required from the commander, he made mistakes. But we must not forget that Stalin looked at events from the point of view of grand strategy. His decision at the beginning of 1942 to go on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front is usually criticized. This is interpreted as a gross miscalculation by Stalin, who allegedly overestimated the successes achieved by the Red Army during the counter-offensive near Moscow. Critics do not take into account the fact that the dispute between Stalin and Zhukov was not about whether it was necessary to go over to the general offensive. Zhukov was also in favor of the offensive. But he wanted all the reserves to be thrown into the central direction - against Army Group Center. Zhukov hoped that this would bring down the German front here. But Stalin did not allow this to be done.

- Why?

- The fact is that Stalin, as the head of the country and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, had the entire Soviet-German front before his eyes. We must not forget that at that time there was a question about the survival of Leningrad. About 100,000 people died there every month. Not to allocate forces in order to try to break through the blockade ring would be a crime against the Leningraders. Therefore, the Luban operation begins, which then ended with the death of the 2nd shock army of General Andrey Vlasov. At the same time, Sevastopol was dying. Stalin tried, with the help of the landing force that landed in Feodosia, to pull off part of the enemy forces from Sevastopol. The defense of the city continued until July 1942.

Thus, the Supreme Commander in that situation could not give all the reserves to Zhukov. As a result, neither the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, nor the attempt to break the blockade of Leningrad were successful. And then Sevastopol had to be left. After the fact, Stalin's decision looks erroneous. But put yourself in his place when, in early 1942, he made the decision...

- It is unlikely that Stalin's critics would want to be in his place.

- We must also take into account the fact that the intelligence of the Germans was better than ours. The theater of military operations was worse for our command. The Kyiv “cauldron” of 1941 is a vivid confirmation of this. Not Stalin, but intelligence of the Southwestern Front overlooked the second, southern "claw" of the encirclement.

In addition, we must pay tribute to the Nazi generals. In many cases, they acted in such a way that they misled the command of the Red Army. And in 1941, they also owned the strategic initiative.

Stalin needed time to learn to listen to his subordinates and take into account objective circumstances. At the beginning of the war, he sometimes demanded the impossible from the troops, not always having a good idea of ​​how a decision made in the cabinet could be implemented directly in the troops and whether it could be executed at all within the specified time frame, in certain specific circumstances. According to those of our military leaders who most often communicated with him during the war years, Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, in 1941 and 1942 Stalin was often overly nervous, reacted sharply to failures and problems that arose. It was difficult to communicate with him.

– He crushed the burden of responsibility.

- Yes. Plus constant overload. It seems that at the beginning of the war he tried to take everything upon himself, he tried to delve into all the details to the smallest detail, he trusted very few people. The defeats of 1941 shocked him. He should have been tormented by the question: “Before the war, we invested so much money in strengthening the country's defense capability, the whole country expended so much effort ... Where is the result? Why are we retreating?"

- You touched on the relationship between Stalin and Zhukov. How was the hierarchy built in the relations between the leader of the country and the largest commander during the war years? Stalin listened to his words more often or ordered more often?

- Zhukov did not immediately become in the eyes of Stalin the person who can be unconditionally trusted. At the end of July 1941, after leaving Smolensk, he was removed from the post of chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. Stalin sent Zhukov to command the front. At the beginning of the war, he removed many, appointed many. Looking for people to rely on.

Fateful for Georgy Zhukov were two events. When he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front, there was a failure in the Barbarossa plan. Hitler then decided to transfer the tank divisions of the group Erich Hoepner near Moscow. Although the role of Zhukov in saving the city on the Neva cannot be denied. He forced the defenders of Leningrad to stand to the death. When the new commander arrived on the Leningrad front, he had to fight panic.

After Zhukov put things in order near Leningrad and the situation there stabilized, with the same task - to save the city - Stalin transferred him to Moscow. A portrait of Georgy Konstantinovich was published in the newspapers. During the Battle of Moscow, apparently, Zhukov managed to really win the respect and trust of Stalin.

Gradually, Zhukov turned into a person to whom the Supreme Commander began to entrust the solution of the most difficult and important tasks. So, when the Germans broke through to the Volga, he appointed Zhukov as his deputy and sent him to defend Stalingrad. And since Stalingrad also withstood, Zhukov's confidence increased even more.

If we talk about the hierarchy, then it has always been like this: Stalin ordered, and Zhukov executed. To say, like some, that Zhukov allegedly could evade the execution of orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief or act on his own initiative, spitting on the opinion from above, is stupid. Of course, in the course of the war, Stalin increasingly gave him the right to make independent decisions. Already during the Battle of Stalingrad, in the telegrams to Supreme Zhukov, the phrase “Make decisions on the spot” is found, including on the question of when exactly to go on the offensive. Trust was also expressed in the satisfaction of requests for the allocation of reserves and their distribution along the front.

- What was Stalin guided by in the selection of personnel in the first place?

- The decisive factor in the course of the war was the ability of leaders of all ranks - both at the front and in industry - to achieve the desired result. Generals who knew how to solve the tasks set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief made a career. People had to prove their professional suitability by deed, that's all. Such is the logic of war. In her conditions, Stalin was not up to paying attention to some purely personal moments. Even the denunciations of the political organs made no impression on him. Compromising evidence came into play when the war was won.

- You can often hear the opinion that the Soviet people won the war in spite of Stalin. How true is this statement?

- It's like saying that the Russian Empire won the Patriotic War of 1812 in spite of Alexander I or the Northern War with the Swedes - in spite of Peter the Great. It is foolish to assert that Stalin's orders only hindered and harmed. Contrary to command, the soldiers at the front cannot do anything at all. As well as the workers in the rear. There is simply no talk of any kind of self-organization of the people. The Stalinist system worked, which in the conditions of the most difficult war proved its effectiveness.

- And they often say that if it weren’t for Stalin’s mistakes, the war would have been won with “little bloodshed”.

- When they say that, they apparently assume that someone else in Stalin's place would have made different decisions. The question arises: what exactly are the solutions? Suggest an alternative! After all, the choice is made based on the available opportunities.

For example, offer a worthy alternative to an agreement signed Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939, which would have been more beneficial in those circumstances in terms of ensuring the national-state interests of the Soviet Union. I note that numerous critics of this step of the Soviet leadership have not been able to offer anything intelligible on this score.

Commanders of the Victory. Generalissimo of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin with marshals, generals and admirals. March 1946

The same can be said about 1941. After all, Stalin then, by the way, also thought that in the coming war with Germany, the United States should be on our side. And for this it was important not to give the Americans a reason to "believe" that Hitler was only defending himself against the aggression of the USSR and that Stalin, not Hitler, was to blame for starting the war.

– The favorite topic of liberal historians and journalists is the price of victory. It is argued that the USSR won at the expense of colossal human losses. How true is this statement and what explains the unprecedented losses of the Soviet Union?

- I have always been unpleasant to pose the question in such terminology - "price" and "quality of services provided." During the war, the question of the survival of the peoples of the USSR was decided. For the sake of saving their children and loved ones, Soviet people sacrificed their lives, it was the free choice of millions of people. Finally, the multimillion-dollar victims are not the price of victory, but the price of fascist aggression. Two-thirds of the human losses suffered by our country are the result of the extermination policy of the Nazi leadership to depopulate the occupied territories, these are victims of the Nazi genocide. Three out of five Soviet prisoners of war died.

The losses of the armed forces of the opposing sides are quite comparable. None of the serious historians sees any reason to criticize the data on losses in the armies given in the studies of the team led by Colonel General Grigory Krivosheev. Alternative methods of calculation lead to a larger error. So, according to these data, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to about 12 million people (killed, died from wounds, missing and captured). But not all of these people died: about 3 million of them remained in the occupied territory and, after liberation, were re-conscripted or survived in captivity and returned home after the war. As for the total losses of the Soviet Union of 26.6 million people, there are reasons to believe that they are somewhat exaggerated, but this issue requires further study.

- In the West, and among our liberals, it is customary to equate Stalin with Hitler. How do you feel about the figure of Stalin and the historical memory of him?

– The notorious “equalization” of Stalin and Hitler should be considered primarily in the context of propaganda technologies and activities designed to influence public consciousness. It has nothing to do with the search for historical truth, and indeed with science in general. Any Russian citizen who thinks about the future of his country must understand and accept the following: historical figures of this magnitude must be protected from insults and caricatures in public space. Discrediting in one way or another the outstanding figures of national history in the public mind, we will wittingly or unwittingly discredit an entire period of our history, the accomplishments of an entire generation of our ancestors. Stalin, as the leader of the country, remains a symbol of his era and those people who built and won under his leadership. The main business of Stalin's life was the defeat of fascism in the Great Patriotic War. This determines his contribution not only to the history of our country, but also to the history of mankind.

In the history of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there is a question, or rather, even a system of questions, to which no one can still give an unambiguous answer.

Why did the war start so unexpectedly for us?

Why did the Soviet defense fail in the first days of the war?

Why were the Soviet troops not ready to repulse the Wehrmacht, why were many officers on vacation, why did the advanced units lack fuel and ammunition, why were field intelligence reports about the concentration of German troops near the border seen as a provocation?

Why did Stalin, figuratively speaking, overslept the beginning of the war?

There is even a common myth that I.V. was so discouraged by Hitler's attack that he locked himself in his office and did not communicate with anyone for three days. In fact, this is precisely a myth, because the visit log for June 22 and 23 recorded more than a dozen meetings and conferences with Stalin. But this raises new questions rather than answers the ones above.

Soviet residents who worked in Germany reported in advance that Hitler planned the start of the operation to seize the USSR on June 22.

Field and air reconnaissance also reported concentrations of Wehrmacht troops along the border.

Why, then, on the night of June 22, the Soviet troops were not brought to full combat readiness, why were the officers not called back from vacations, why were the necessary supplies of fuel and ammunition not created?

Why was the reservists not mobilized in advance?

And why were talks about the imminent start of the war considered provocative, while intelligence reports were questioned?

There are several known versions of the answer to these questions:

1. Stalin relied too much on the Non-Aggression Pact and did not allow the thought that Hitler would violate the agreement signed with the Soviet Union. According to this version, Stalin considered intelligence reports as a provocation, disinformation and sabotage.

However, this version is rather weak, because Stalin was not so naive as to completely trust Hitler and believe in his decency more than in his own intelligence. Moreover, reports about Germany's preparations for war with the USSR and the concentration of Wehrmacht troops along the Soviet border came from a variety of sources, it would be too much to consider them all provocateurs.

Therefore, I consider this version unconvincing.

But there are others:

2. Hitler skillfully confused Stalin, repeatedly assigning incorrect dates for the offensive, which Soviet intelligence reported to I.V., but the indicated days came, and the Wehrmacht did not cross the border.

This version is more plausible. Indeed, Soviet intelligence began to report on the possible outbreak of war as early as May. Soviet residents even reported specific dates for May and early June, on which Hitler allegedly scheduled an offensive. But the indicated dates came, but the offensive did not begin.

This really could mislead Stalin and lead to the conclusion that June 22 is another false date.

But why was it impossible to prepare for this day "just in case"? But what if?

3. There is a version that the failure of defense in the first days of the war is the result of wrecking, betrayal and the work of saboteurs. There was allegedly an order to prepare for defense by Stalin, but it was poorly executed, and in some places was generally sabotaged.

This version also does not fully explain the failure of the defense. If problems with defense arose in some sections of the border, and most of the units were in full combat readiness, then yes, failures could be attributed to individual pests. But many units turned out to be unprepared for war. A significant part of the tanks was lost at the very beginning of the war due to the fact that they did not have enough fuel and ammunition, German aircraft bombed airfields from which the planes did not have time to rise, only half of the garrison was in the Brest Fortress, even the necessary supplies for defense were not made water.

So what is the true reason for the failure of the Soviet defense at the beginning of the war?

Which version is closer to the truth?

Or maybe all the reasons described worked together?

I think it's something else.

In I considered the Great Patriotic War as part of the global plan of the USA and Great Britain to destroy Russia and Germany by pushing them against each other.

And then, if you look at the events on a large scale, taking as a basis the hypothesis of the global plan of the United States and Great Britain to push Germany and Russia together, everything becomes clear, including Stalin's actions on the eve of the war, the low readiness of Soviet troops for defense and the announcement of all messages about a possible war provocative.

Look here:

The United States and Great Britain are going once again (the first time it was during the First World War) to push Germany and the USSR, achieve their mutual destruction and take control.

This plan exists for more than one day, Germany is specially "fed" for the implementation of this scenario, it is allowed to annex Austria and the Sudetenland, they turn a blind eye to the violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

Hitler must understand all this, and he most likely understands, which is why he attacks France and Great Britain.

The implementation of this plan is completely unprofitable for Germany, because the plan assumes that the winners in the end will be the United States and Great Britain, and Germany will eventually lie in ruins again. And the fact that the USSR (Russia) will lie in ruins along with Germany is unlikely to be a great consolation for the Germans in general and for Hitler in particular.

Mussolini also understands this, so he tries to convince his ally Hitler that the USSR should not be attacked until Great Britain is finished (there is evidence that Mussolini talked with Hitler on this topic).

It is logical that Germany, in order to avoid the final defeat from the United States and Great Britain, which is prescribed in the global plan, needs to violate this plan - that is, destroy Great Britain first, and then the USSR.

Stalin should have understood all this.

It was this understanding that it would be more profitable for Germany to deal with Great Britain first, and not the Non-Aggression Pact, that gave Stalin confidence that in the summer of 1941 Hitler would not attack.

Moreover, the war between Germany and Great Britain began in 1940. At the first stage, the war was sea and air, but after gaining air supremacy, it was planned to land on the British Isles, for which Hitler was going to transfer no more, no less - 80 land divisions from the eastern front.

By the end of 1940, it became clear that the Luftwaffe had failed to win air supremacy and that Germany was not ready for an amphibious landing. However, the war with Great Britain did not stop there.

It should not be forgotten that in addition to operations in Western Europe, Germany participated in military operations in the Balkans and the Middle East. There was an operation to capture Crete, where the German troops fought with the British. An operation was planned to seize Cyprus and the Suez Canal.

Germany was also preparing to move troops through Syria to Iraq to support the pro-German regime, but these plans were thwarted by British troops who entered Iraq first.

Logic suggested that it would be more profitable for Germany to first end the war against Great Britain and only then attack the USSR.

A war on two fronts is an extremely costly and risky business.

Hitler should have understood this. And Stalin should have understood that Hitler should have understood this. And he certainly understood.

Perhaps it was precisely this confidence that let Stalin down that Hitler would act as a cold-blooded pragmatist and would not fight on two fronts, spraying his forces, would not, figuratively speaking, turn his back or even sideways to the "British lion".

In this logic, Stalin could consider all intelligence reports about the impending war as disinformation, addressed not only and not so much to him, but to ... Great Britain.

Moreover, the offensive of the Wehrmacht against the USSR, which was scheduled first for May, and then for the beginning of June, turned out to be "misinformation" and it was logical to assume that there would be no more war with the USSR in 1941.

But why, then, were the troops not put on high alert "just in case"?

I'll try to answer this question too:

Stalin wanted to make it clear to Hitler that the USSR would not attack itself and would not open a second front to help Britain.

The active preparation of Soviet troops for defense could be perceived by Germany as preparation for war, for the opening of a second front, this could provoke Hitler.

Probably Stalin was trying to show that he was not preparing to fight Germany so that Hitler could calmly withdraw 80 land divisions from the eastern front and transfer them to Great Britain, as was originally planned.

This explains why the troops were not put on high alert in advance, why stockpiles of fuel and ammunition were not created in the border units.

Stalin believed that he and Hitler understood each other and would not arrange a war of mutual destruction for the benefit of the United States and Great Britain.

Perhaps there was another calculation that in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the British would quickly open a second front and a protracted confrontation would begin. And in order for the UK and the USA to open a second front, it was necessary to let the Wehrmacht enter the territory of the USSR, otherwise the successful reflection of the first Wehrmacht attack could lead to the fact that no second front would open at all, the UK and the USA would take more popcorn and sit down to watch, how the USSR and Germany are mutually exhausting each other in a protracted war on the territory of Eastern Europe - in strict accordance with the global plan.

It should be borne in mind that both Stalin and his generals were well aware of the scenario of the First World War and its consequences. And most likely it was this scenario that they tried to avoid.

The failures during the First World War led Russia, among other things, to the hasty entry into the war and hatred sentiment among soldiers, officers and generals.

The hasty entry into the First World War led to unjustified losses, and hatred moods soon turned into disappointment in the authorities and became one of the reasons for the fall of the monarchy.

And since the scenario and experience of the First World War was fresh in memory and the repetition of this scenario in a new war with the same Germany was the most unpleasant option for the USSR and, on the contrary, very pleasant for the USA and Great Britain - this is what Stalin was most likely trying to avoid.

At the same time, Stalin could believe that Hitler, who also wants to avoid repeating the scenario of the First World War, argues in exactly the same way.

Insured against repeating the scenario of the First World War, Stalin could simply play it safe. And this reinsurance, in combination with other factors and the erroneous assumption that Hitler would avoid a war on two fronts, led to the failure of the defense in the first stage of the war.

Perhaps there was also an underestimation by the Soviet commanders of the swiftness with which the Wehrmacht could advance through the territory of the USSR.

There is a saying that generals always prepare for past wars. Perhaps this factor also played a fatal role. The experience of the First World War, which took place in the trenches with minimal progress in either direction, played a cruel joke on the Soviet command and, possibly, on Stalin himself too.

Maybe Stalin thought that in the event of an attack, the Wehrmacht would still not be able to advance far, would get stuck in the Soviet defense, a trench war would begin along the lines of the First World War, and there Great Britain would open a second front, and so much the worse for Hitler if he decided to attack first.

Of course, the experience of France and Poland, which were rapidly captured by the Wehrmacht, should have shown that the new war would not be the same as the First World War, but it was someone else's experience, and people very rarely learn from the mistakes of others, preferring to learn from their own.

So I'll answer the original question like this:

Stalin did not "slept through" the beginning of the war.

He simply made a number of incorrect assumptions and apparently reinsured himself in some way, which led to the failure of the Soviet defense in the first days of the war.

Could these mistakes have been avoided?

Hard to say.

In fact, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, a "three-body system" arose from the USSR, Germany and Great Britain. But from astronomy we know that the problem of the motion of three bodies has no solution in the general case, there are only particular solutions.

Stalin proceeded from what he knew, namely:

1. Germany and Great Britain were already at war.
2. The repetition of the scenario of the First World War and its results is unprofitable for Germany itself.
3. A war on two fronts is an extremely costly and risky undertaking.

Based on this and not wanting to provoke Germany, Stalin evaluated intelligence reports and made decisions.

What was wrong with Stalin?

Apparently, he simply underestimated the level of Hitler's adventurism and his self-confidence. And the Soviet generals underestimated the speed with which the Wehrmacht could advance through Soviet territory. The generals, as often happens, relied too much on their experience of the last war.

But here's what's interesting:

It was Hitler's adventurism and self-confidence that ultimately destroyed the Third Reich. And the ability of the Wehrmacht to move quickly through Soviet territory did not help, rather, on the contrary, it led to the fact that the Wehrmacht went deep into the territory of the USSR and later faced supply problems and guerrilla warfare, which in the past killed Napoleon.

So who knows...

Maybe Stalin was not mistaken at all?

Maybe he deliberately "overslept" the beginning of the war?

"Budyonny's War Diary" - the key to unraveling the mystery of the beginning of the war

[“Arguments of the Week”, Nikolay DOBRUKHA]

70 years have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but irreconcilable disputes continue. Historians and politicians cannot agree in any way: did Stalin know or did not know when the war would begin, and why did he ignore intelligence warnings? We invite you to familiarize yourself with excerpts from a new study by the historian and publicist Nikolai Dobryukha, which makes you look at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War from an unexpected point of view, based on hitherto unknown documents of exceptional importance.

five documents

C Talin did not really trust intelligence. He saw them primarily as an opportunity for provocation. And then he suddenly received a message, which he believed so much that he immediately convened the top military leadership and, already on the evening of June 21, 1941, ordered the issuance of a "top-secret directive (without a number)" to bring the troops of the western border districts to full combat readiness.

It is hard to believe that such a cautious person as Stalin would ignore intelligence. That the war would begin, Stalin knew even without scouts. The whole question was about the exact date.

Nikolai Alekseevich Dobryukha (NAD) is a historian and publicist, the author of the book “How Stalin Was Killed”, an unexpected continuation of which - “Stalin and Christ” - is expected this fall. He helped shape the memoirs and political reflections of former KGB chairmen V. Semichastny and V. Kryuchkov. Author of numerous speeches on radio and TV and publications in national newspapers.

Recently, five documents fell into my hands. The most important of them is the Military Diary of the First Deputy People's Commissar for Defense, Marshal Budyonny, written in pencil, about the last pre-war hours in Moscow.

The next most important document indicates exactly when and who specifically from the top Soviet leadership received the data to which Stalin first responded with retaliatory measures.

It was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov.He received information through diplomatic channels and immediately ( at 6:27 p.m. June 21, 1941.) delivered it to the Kremlin to Stalin. It was at this time, according to the Visitor's Register of Stalin's office in the Kremlin, that an emergency meeting between Stalin and Molotov took place. For 38 minutes they discussed the information brought by Molotov, from which it followed that on June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans or their allies was expected.

This information became the basis for the already mentioned “top-secret directive without a number”, which was developed by other high-ranking leaders invited half an hour later: the chairman of the Defense Committee Voroshilov, People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria, first deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Voznesensky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Malenkov, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, Secretary of the Defense Committee I.A. Safonov. At 2050 hours the Chief of the General Staff joined them. Zhukov, first deputy people's commissar of defense Budyonny. And a little later, at 9:55 p.m., the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mehlis.

3rd document is a draft of the "Secret Politburo Decree" written by Malenkov on the organization of the Southern Front and the Second Line of Defense on June 21, 1941. "Tomorrow's war" already on June 21 is perceived as a fait accompli. Western military districts are urgently assigned the concept of "fronts". It was Budyonny, according to this draft, who was appointed commander of the Second Line of Defense.

4th document reflects the mood in Hitler's entourage and indicates that there will be no more delays in the war against the USSR. To continue the war against England, Germany is in dire need of oil, metal and bread. All this can be quickly obtained only in the East. And for this, it was necessary to start a war against the USSR no later than June 22-30, so that there would be time to collect the harvest that Germany needed so much.

In the intelligence report of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB dated March 24, 1941, it was said in this regard: “Among the officers of the aviation headquarters there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR is supposedly dated for the end of April or the beginning of May. These dates are associated with the intention of the Germans to keep the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops, during the retreat, will not be able to set fire to more green bread. Then, due to bad weather, there will be a serious adjustment of the dates towards summer ...

5th document received by me 20 years ago from the writer Ivan Stadnyuk, really "spoke" only now, when it was possible to put together the previous four documents. This is the revelation of Molotov, who informed Stadnyuk that, strictly speaking, Hitler did not start the war without an announcement, as is still believed. He announced it about an hour before the start of hostilities. More precisely, he was going to announce.

Here is how Stadnyuk himself told about it: “On the night of June 21-22, 1941, between two and three in the morning, a telephone rang at the dacha of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov. At the other end of the wire they introduced themselves: Count von Schulenburg, Ambassador of Germany. The ambassador asked to be received urgently in order to hand over the memorandum declaring war. Molotov makes an appointment at the People's Commissariat and immediately calls Stalin. After listening, Stalin says: “Go, but accept the ambassador only after the military report that the aggression has begun ...”

The German trick did not work. By receiving the memorandum after the outbreak of hostilities, Stalin wanted to show the whole world that, not only did Hitler violate the non-aggression pact, he also did it late at night, using the surprise factor.

A few hours later, in a radio address to the people, Molotov will say: “The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that ... the German government could never make a single claim to the USSR regarding the implementation of the Treaty.

... Already after the attack, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, at 5:30 in the morning made me, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, a statement on behalf of his government that the German government had decided to go to war against the USSR in connection with the concentration of Red Army units near Eastern German border...

Hitler was ready to declare war. But I was going to do it like a wolf, at night so that, without allowing the opposite side to come to its senses and, through negotiations, respond to the claims put forward, in an hour or two to start hostilities.

"Tales of Marshal Zhukov"

Many of Zhukov's memories are very approximate. The researchers found so many, to put it mildly, inaccuracies in his memoirs that they even began to be called "Tales of Marshal Zhukov."

And just recently another one came up...

“On the morning of June 22, People's Commissar S.K. Timoshenko, N.F. Vatutin and I were in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense. At 03:07 I received a call on HF from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky and said: “The VNOS system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of ​​a large number of unknown aircraft ... At 3 hours 30 minutes, the chief of staff of the Western District, General V.E. Klimovskikh reported on the German air raid on the cities of Belarus. Three minutes later, the chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General M.A. Purkaev reported on air raids on the cities of Ukraine.<...>The People's Commissar ordered me to call I.V. Stalin. I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I call continuously. Finally, I hear the sleepy voice of the guard general on duty.

Who is speaking?

Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Please urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.

What? Now? - the head of security was amazed. - Comrade Stalin is sleeping.

Wake up now: the Germans are bombing our cities!

... About three minutes later, I.V. approached the apparatus. Stalin. I reported the situation and asked for permission to start retaliatory hostilities ... "

So, according to Zhukov, he woke up Stalin after 3 hours and 40 minutes and informed him about the German attack. Meanwhile, as we remember, Stalin did not sleep at that time, since between two and three o'clock in the morning Molotov reported to him that German Ambassador Schulenburg was calling to convey a memorandum declaring war.

The leader’s driver, P. Mitrokhin, does not confirm Zhukov’s words: “At 3.30 on June 22, I gave the car to Stalin at the entrance to the dacha in Kuntsevo. Stalin came out accompanied by V. Rumyantsev ... "This, by the way, is the same" duty general of the security department, "who, according to the marshal, also had to sleep.

In short, Zhukov's memory failed him on all counts... So now we have every right, ignoring the "fairy tales of Marshal Zhukov", to complete our investigation and answer the main question: "Who could be that" source "who June 1941 at 18 hours 27 minutes accurately warned Stalin that the war would begin tomorrow?

Read about it in the next issue of AN.

Why Stalin did not trust the intelligence officers

C Talin really did not trust the scouts. Regarding one of them, he even wrote to the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov about five days before the war: “Maybe send your“ source ”from the headquarters of the German aviation to f ... mother. This is not a "source", but a "disinformer". I. St. Meanwhile, this "source" under the name " Foreman" reported: "All Germany's military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time."

The conclusion suggests itself: if Stalin did not react even to such a message, it means that he had a “source” much more significant. And he reacted properly to this "source" immediately, as soon as Molotov delivered breaking news from Berlin on the evening of June 21.

Each of the scouts indicated his own terms and versions of the development of military events. Therefore, Stalin involuntarily had to ask the question: “Whom to believe? "Corsican"? Sorge? "Foreman"? It was impossible to perceive normally all this extremely contradictory information, in which the dates and directions of hostilities changed all the time, even based on the same persons.

These data also changed with Hitler himself, depending on the prevailing circumstances and on the game played by the German counterintelligence and Goebbels propaganda. There was also a lulling of vigilance. The Soviet military gradually got used to the constant and numerous violations of the border by German aircraft and supposedly lost soldiers. And the border itself, moved in accordance with the secret protocol to the “friendly” Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, was not really equipped yet and provoked both sides to take such steps. On this account, Budyonny’s Military Diary contains the following damning confession, made a few hours before the start of the war: “The People’s Commissar of Defense makes a defensive line along the entire new border after 1939 and removed all weapons from the former fortified areas and dumped them in heaps along the border” ... A little later, Budyonny will write: "the weapons that were dumped ... fell into the hands of the Germans, and the former fortified areas remained disarmed."

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