The Sino-Soviet split was only the most obvious indication of the communist bloc's internal crisis. A number of other situations, primarily in Eastern Europe, showed that the Soviet Union, for more than twenty years after the end of the Second World War, failed to consolidate its control over these countries and, first of all, to ensure that its presence was perceived not as something imposed from outside, but as a real structural factor.
Unlike East Germany, ruled with an iron fist by Ulbricht and dependent on the evolution of relations with Federal Germany, and Bulgaria, traditionally close to the Russians, in states such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, this failed consolidation of control was particularly evident.
However, in Hungary, the regime of Janos Kadar, established in 1956, pursued a moderately reformist policy aimed at increasing the well-being of the population, thereby removing the threat of new political and economic crises. This reformist policy culminated in the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in early 1968, which loosened bureaucratic centralization by allowing enterprises and cooperatives to base their production plans on their own perceptions of local markets. This made the planning system and the overall pricing system more flexible, and made the consumer goods supply system more efficient, which correlated with the growth in per capita income. It was about intervention in the existing structure, which was indirectly aimed at restoring political consensus, although the government felt the limits of its influence. They could
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expand only as a result of political concessions, which, on the other hand, could only become acceptable within the framework of a certain tolerance for illegal dissent. The same thing happened in Poland. After the enthusiasm that followed Gomułka's rise to power in 1956 and the first reforms he introduced, democratization gradually faded away. In parallel with the bodies created in 1956, party institutions began to operate, absorbing a significant part of the competence that the workers' councils had achieved. Parliament, on the contrary, awoke from years of lethargic sleep, and in 1957 some representatives of the Znak group, a Catholic circle, were elected to it for the first time, in exchange for Gomułka's support, the right to represent candidates for elections. It was an autonomous group, not associated with the Catholic Pax movement of governmental orientation and therefore capable of expressing in parliament an opinion that did not fully fit into the traditions of unanimity characteristic of "people's" parliaments. These concessions were balanced, however, by a series of restrictions on political freedoms, most notably the resumption of censorship, followed by a tightening of the screws on the activities of independent press organs and student and intellectual political circles.
Gradually in the 60s. repression intensified, which gave rise in 1968 to a new chain of responses that foreshadowed danger. The ban on a theatrical performance based on the work of Adam Mickiewicz, a poet who embodied Polish patriotism in the period 1830-1848, caused a wave of protests from students and the Writers' Union. It swept across the country and lasted almost the entire March 1968 in Warsaw, Poznan, Lublin, Gdansk and Wroclaw. Order was, however, gradually restored, without any concessions, through careful individual police work and the use of repressive measures. Gomułka's popularity, already cracked by the massive price hike imposed in 1967, waned further. The figure who saved the regime in 1956 has already exhausted his possibilities. A wave of strikes in December 1970-January 1971 again increased tension to a dangerous level.
The growing indignation in society compelled the party to once again show speed of reaction and caution. Gomułka was removed from power and replaced by Edvard Gierek, a communist who represented the labor tradition. In January 1971, he was able to resist a new wave of strikes that began in Szczecin, and to take a number of measures related to the wage system. These measures made it possible to overcome the crisis, although at the same time
Chapter 11. The system of international relations after 1956 1117
my time they first made the workers aware of their power in negotiations with the government in the party. Throughout the 1970s, Terek managed to retain power in his hands, despite economic difficulties and unrest among the workers, who were increasingly aware of the importance of the strike weapon and the emerging consolidation with part of the intellectual movement and, in particular, with the Catholic world, in order to form the ability to fight.
The crisis in Czechoslovakia was much more fraught with consequences. She almost painlessly passed the stage of de-Stalinization. Under the leadership of Antonin Novotny, who was imposed by the Russians in 1953 as Gottwald's successor, the Communist Party maintained a hardline and sectarian political course until 1963. Echoes of dissent were strong, and his target for criticism of modern "tyrants" was the "cult of personality" of the post-Stalin period. Nevertheless, it found a way to manifest itself on a larger scale after the economic crisis of 1962, associated with the failure of the Third Five-Year Plan. Indeed, the crisis emboldened the opposition and forced (or prompted) Novotny to agree to start an internal discussion on economic issues that brought to the fore a group of young economists, critics of the "cult of planning" and supporters of a revision of the economic program aimed at introducing the principles of market pricing and self-financing enterprises. This economic program was perceived with apprehension and began to be implemented only from 1966. However, it became an indicator of a changing atmosphere. Now it seemed that Novotny was disposed to a dialogue not only on economic issues, but also on politics and culture.
From 1963 to 1968 the life of Czechoslovakia was marked by the emergence of a revival current into which countless streams, often compatible with the system, but often potentially dangerous to it, joined. The world of intellectuals and writers united around certain groups and magazines, veritable "factories" of reformist discussions, such as Legatu Shutu ("Literary Magazine"), a magazine of Czech writers, or Kyshtu 2gto1 ("Literary Life"), a magazine of Slovak writers. Over the years, discussions have taken on a much sharper and freer character.
The national question again came to the fore, that is, the protest of the Slovaks about the unequal position in which they continued to be also within the framework of the people's republic. In 1963, one of the
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active participants in the anti-fascist liberation uprising of 1944 Alexander Dubcek. Gradually, an opposition developed around this figure, directed against the slow pace of Novotny's actions and the difficulties on the way of implementing renovationist impulses. By the end of 1967, the situation became even more aggravated as a result of clashes between the police and groups of Prague students. In December 1967 - January 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party discussed the possible voluntary resignation of Novotny. On January 3, given the broad support for Dubcek's candidacy, Novotny decided to step down from the leadership of the party, also in order not to aggravate relations with representatives of the Slovak people.
In a tumultuous atmosphere made dramatic by the mass rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism, Dubcek's election accelerated the pace of change. In March, Novotny resigned as President of the Republic (which he retained in January) and was replaced by General Ludwik Svoboda, a highly respected, politically neutral figure. Since April, the democratic ferment has taken on a feverish pace. These were the weeks later remembered as the "Prague Spring", weeks of renewal and catharsis. Dubcek, Svoboda, the chairman of the National Assembly, Josef Smrkovsky, the head of government, Oldrich Czernik, developed projects that outlined a grandiose ideal, expressed in an eloquent slogan - the creation of "socialism with a human face." It was a slogan that fully reflected the awareness of the limitations of existing experience and the hope that it would be possible to build a new, free society without abandoning the main gains of socialism.
Confirmation of the change in course was to take place at the emergency congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, scheduled for July-August, and prepared in an atmosphere of increasingly lively discussion, the tone of which was set by the manifesto "Two Thousand Words" by Ludwik Vaculik. It appeared on June 27 in the weekly Literary Lists and became an almost iconic text, drawing a distinction between the forces of renewal, conservative forces, and those inclined to compromise.
News from other Warsaw Pact countries also called for caution and compromise. In June, the exercises of the Soviet army had already prompted the fear of military intervention. From the beginning of July, Czechoslovakia's five European allies (USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary) began to put pressure on a collective discussion of the situation.
Chapter 11. The system of international relations after 1956 1119
tions1. Dubcek did not accept the proposal, considering it untimely and refusing to share the Allies' anxiety. The situation, he believed, remained under control, and there was no reason to discuss it. On July 14, the leaders of the five allies met in Warsaw and sent an ultimatum invitation to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to participate in the discussion. The proposal was rejected, the accusation of undermining the strength of the socialist system was regarded as unfounded, the existence of a counter-revolutionary danger was rejected. As an alternative, it was proposed that a bilateral meeting of Czechoslovak and Soviet representatives take place on July 29-August 1 in Cierna nad Tisou, on the border between the USSR and Slovakia.
The meeting in Čierna, followed by a meeting of representatives of the five countries with the Czechoslovak leaders in Bratislava on August 3, was a kind of dialogue of the deaf. However, the final document of the Bratislava meeting already contained expressions of concern, as it affirmed the need for solidarity in the international communist movement. Dubcek's opponents, who underestimated popular enthusiasm, launched behind-the-scenes activities to turn things around. Dubcek, who counted on the help of Tito and Ceausescu, then found himself in the same position as Imre Nagy in 1956.
On the night of August 20, 1968, during a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, it became known that the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact had launched an invasion.
On August 21 they were already in Prague. Members of the Soviet security service infiltrated the premises of the Central Committee, took Dubcek and his main associates and took them to Moscow.
On August 22, at the time when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was holding its extraordinary congress (in the absence of Slovak delegates due to their own unwillingness to participate or because of the impossibility of getting to Prague) and strongly reaffirmed its unity and loyalty to Dubcek's policy, the champions of the new course were humiliated in Moscow through exhausting discussions and threats regarding the future of them personally and the country as a whole.
Since the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armed forces did not cause massive armed resistance in Czechoslovakia, but only provoked sporadic clashes with a few dozen victims and impressive, but ineffective
In Dresden, a meeting was held between the leaders of the parties and governments of six socialist countries - the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The development of the situation in Czechoslovakia was discussed at the meeting. - Approx. editions.
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demonstrations, the initiators and leaders of the new course had not so much to accept bloody repressions as to accept the conditions put forward by the Soviet leadership. They were forced to agree to normalization, that is, to the abandonment of their hopes, to the renunciation of the decisions taken by the congress of the HRC on August 22, and also to the return to the past.
The leadership of the party was to be handed over to Gustav Husak, the Czechoslovakian Kadar, a man of practice and an adherent of continuity with the past. Dubcek's interlude was sought to be crossed out, but the Soviet rulers wanted everything to happen without unexpected twists and without bloodshed.
For the good of their country, Dubcek, Svoboda, Chernik and Smrkovsky were forced to return to their homeland in order to lead the "normalization" - almost as if nothing had happened during this time. However, the situation changed dramatically after the signing on August 26 of a protocol confirming their defeat and the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Outwardly, power remained in their hands, but now they acted in the opposite direction. They disorientated their supporters, clearing the way for successors and for purges that became inevitable a few months later, when the tensions subsided somewhat. Only in April 1969 was Dubcek replaced by Husak. Within a few months, a purge was carried out in the party and it was "brained". A new wave of emigration to Western Europe began, consisting almost entirely of very influential intellectuals. Dubcek was in a diplomatic post for some time, then was recalled to his homeland, expelled from the party and doomed to a life of solitude in the Bratislava region, where he worked as a simple worker. He later returned to the political scene, but his image was clouded by a sensation no less than that associated with Nagy in 1956 - reports that he hesitated whether to oppose the intervention. This is probably true, as records of his last telephone conversations with Brezhnev before the invasion show. However, it also reflects the personal tragedy of a political figure torn by obligations, who was dominated by the desire to prevent his fellow citizens from experiencing a fate comparable to that which befell the Hungarians in 1956.
The significance of the Czechoslovak crisis for international life can only be understood if one takes into account certain circumstances due to which these dramatic events played their role not only in the history of Czechoslovakia as a member of the Warsaw Pact, but also in the history of the Soviet political order.
Chapter 11. The system of international relations after 1956 1121
tics within the communist bloc. The consequences of the crisis affected the image of the USSR in the world and within the international communist movement, and in particular - the growing mistrust of the Chinese.
As regards the consequences of the crisis for the rest of Eastern Europe, documents published in 1992 show that anxiety was felt primarily in Poland and East Germany. The consequences of the "Prague Spring" were especially feared by Gomulka and Ulbricht. It was they, and above all the German leader, who put pressure on Brezhnev to intervene. Their activities were also greatly facilitated by some conservative representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia itself. Five of them, including Alois Indra and Vasil Bilyak, a few days before the armed intervention, handed over to Brezhnev two letters (the existence of which was known, although their text was published only in 1992) expressing regret over the mistakes, committed by friends of Dubcek, and asking for "help and support with all the means at his disposal" in order to save the Czechoslovak Republic "from the danger of imminent counter-revolution." This was not an easy step, they wrote, but in conditions when the possibility of resisting the counter-revolutionary wave was exhausted, their call should be seen as "an urgent request calling for full intervention." In the appropriate context, both letters make one circumstance clear: at that moment, the pro-Soviet elements viewed the situation as already lost to the counter-revolutionary elements ("The very existence of socialism in our country is under threat," they wrote), and the intervention of the Soviet Union as inevitable. Proletarian internationalism, that is, loyalty to the USSR, therefore prevailed over loyalty to the nation. The call gave the Soviet intervention some degree of legitimacy, as it confirmed to Brezhnev that it would meet with the support of people who were ready to cooperate.
Internationally, Brezhnev justified the action with the help of the so-called "doctrine of limited sovereignty". In essence, it was about an embellished version of the protectorate regime, that is, delegating to the Soviet Union in certain cases the right to maintain order in all countries of the communist system. Zdenek Mlynar, one of the members of the Czechoslovak delegation at the "negotiations" in Moscow in August 1968, recalls in his memoirs that Brezhnev in that situation did not hide his
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opinion. The sacrifices of the Soviet Union for the sake of liberating the countries of Europe from Nazism during the war justified the constant guardianship of them by the Red Army. It was not about a formal position (although some time later, Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated similar concepts at a meeting of the UN General Assembly), but about the meaning of this statement, which predetermined relations of the colonial type.
Although outwardly the "Brezhnev Doctrine" showed a desire for absolute dominance, in reality it reflected a deep uncertainty. Among other things, since 1948, that is, from the conflict with Tito's Yugoslavia, and thereafter, the Soviet Union had to confront almost continuous attempts at uprisings, either restrained by the provision of some timely concessions, or suppressed by violence, the role of which has not yet been explored. fully. This meant that the Soviet Union failed to take root in the social life of the countries where it dominated, and also that the concept of the camp of "real socialism" took on real content only when the boundaries of this camp were determined by force. Nearly a quarter of a century after the end of the war, the Soviet Union still faced the threat of instability in Eastern Europe. Therefore, he persistently sought to start a large-scale dialogue with the West with the aim of convening a conference on security in Europe. Indeed, six months after the events in Prague, the Russians offered to start negotiations that in 1972 marked the beginning of the Helsinki process, culminating in 1975 with the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia also set in motion the mechanisms that subsequently made it possible to identify new problems that the Soviet regime had to face. Until 1956, those who disagreed with Soviet policy expressed their opinion, gradually separating from the Communist Party of their country. In 1968, opposition took on a different character. The communist parties of Western Europe, embedded in a pluralistic political system, were accused of being supporters of a regime that suppressed civil liberties. They began to distance themselves from the system of "real socialism". All (or almost all) Western Communist Parties expressed their disagreement with the actions of the Moscow government. It was then that the concept of “Eurocommunism” arose, a theoretical project that had a short life, but left a deep mark. The project clearly
Chapter 11. The system of international relations after 1956 1123
It was stated that the Italian, French and Spanish communist parties do not consider the socio-political models offered by the Soviet Union suitable for themselves, and oppose real socialism to “ideal socialism” with uncertain characteristics, but compatible with the democratic and pluralistic society that has developed in the West. Many saw this distancing as an opportunist position. In fact, the opportunistic approach and real differences were mixed, leading to differences in positions, which over time became more and more deepened, turning into insurmountable ones. The differences no longer concerned ideological norms, but correlations with real models. The Soviet model was imposed with such categoricalness that it seemed less and less acceptable.
Another phenomenon that arose during the Prague crisis and developed after it was dissidence as a factor that was no longer episodic, but capable of involving ever wider circles of the intellectual world of Eastern Europe and the USSR. In 1965, G. Ionescu, a Romanian historian in exile in London, published a book with the prophetic title "The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe" (that is, "The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe"). This was the first significant signal that appeared against the backdrop of critical journalism of Western authors, more than Ionescu, who belonged to Western culture. Less than two years after the invasion of Prague, the Soviet author Andrey Amalrik managed to get his manuscript published in New York in 1970 under what was then considered science fiction title Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984 to the West. ? (“Will the Soviet Union exist in 1984?”). The Book of Amalric was just one of a much wider range of illegal voices. Dissidence found adherents throughout the Soviet Union. Its authors distributed their works in typewritten manuscripts, which enlivened the illegal, but more than ever active, intellectual life. In 1967 Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote a new novel about life in Stalin's camps, The Cancer Ward, whose title was translated into Italian as Department C (C = cancro, meaning cancer). Solzhenitsyn asked for its publication, but the book was rejected by the Union of Writers, and then it began to spread throughout the USSR. Nevertheless, the manuscript that found its way to the West was published in 1969, albeit without Solzhenitsyn's consent. The following year, Solzhenitsyn received
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Nobel Prize in Literature, but he could not go to receive it, because, as he wrote, the authorities of his country did not guarantee him the opportunity to return to his homeland after granting an exit visa. The Solzhenitsyn case was the most famous of a long list of cases. Many of the dissidents managed to emigrate (in 1974, Solzhenitsyn also did); others, like the physicist Andrey Sakharov, academician and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, preferred to fight against the bureaucratic regime at home, using loopholes left by official norms or allowed by the state security agencies, without fear of prison and concentration camps. However, his case was no longer an isolated phenomenon. In the late sixties, dissidence became a characteristic feature of Soviet life. This form of opposition became more widespread and therefore more difficult to suppress. When the question of the protection of "human rights", the main champions of which were dissidents, became the subject of discussion at the negotiations within the framework of the Helsinki meeting, dissidence became an international problem.
Less than two months had passed since the appearance of the Nazi troops in Vienna, as Europe was again seized with anxiety: the threat of a German invasion hung over Czechoslovakia.
Hitler's "fifth column" was active in the Sudetenland, where many Germans lived. Fueled by the success of the Anschluss, the Sudeten fascists openly declared that the arrival of German troops should be expected from day to day. The situation became even more tense in connection with the fascist provocation on May 21 in the city of Cheb near the German border. During the attack on the Czech police, two Sudeten Germans were killed. Around this incident, the fascist German press launched a furious anti-Czech campaign (249).
Czechoslovakia attracted the Nazis with its advantageous strategic position in the center of Europe, the presence of rich natural resources and highly developed industry. In addition, having a first-class, well-armed army, Czechoslovakia was a serious obstacle to the implementation of German aggression, especially thanks to the treaties with the Soviet Union and France on mutual assistance. Therefore, after the capture of Austria, Czechoslovakia became the main object in the aggressive plans of the fascist rulers. “The task of the German armed forces,” said the plan of attack on this country, coded under the name “Grun”, “is to conduct preparations in such a way that the bulk of the armed forces can quickly and unexpectedly break into Czechoslovakia, while in the West there were minimum forces would be left ... "(250)
On March 11, 1938, Hitler ordered that the Grün plan be revised to take into account the new strategic possibilities created by the capture of Austria (251). On April 21, Keitel, in a report to the Fuhrer, spoke in favor of a surprise attack on Czechoslovakia. But, according to Hitler, the German army was not yet ready to wage war against a group of countries bound by mutual assistance treaties. Considering the favor of the Western powers, he decided to repeat in Czechoslovakia something similar to what had so easily been achieved in Austria.
Relying on the Sudeten-German party of Henlein, acting together with its leaders, German intelligence penetrated into the most important links of the Czechoslovak state apparatus. Through her agents and Sudeten fascists who worked in government offices, she received information of a political, economic, defense and other nature. According to the chief of German military intelligence, Nikolai, there were no secrets for him in Czechoslovakia at all.
The German special services systematically threw their employees and agents into Czechoslovakia. In 1936 alone, 40 specially trained personnel intelligence officers were abandoned through Switzerland and Austria. They created spy residencies, collected various kinds of information, carried out fascist agitation and propaganda.
The Nazis actively helped the Sudeten-German Party in subversive work against the Czechoslovak state. Their plan included annexing the Sudetenland to Germany and then taking over all of Czechoslovakia.
The Sudeten fascists, following Hitler's instructions, with the help of German intelligence agencies, created in Czechoslovakia, modeled on Hitler's assault and security detachments, the so-called "free corps" of Henlein, numbering about 15 thousand people. Weapons, ammunition and equipment for the corps were supplied by Nazi intelligence. The "Free Corps" was intended to seize power in Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, and then to perform police functions.
To help the leaders of the Sudeten Germans, fascist intelligence transferred specially trained armed detachments from Germany - four SS "Dead Head" battalions, which were intended for joint operations with detachments of the "free corps". At the same time, sabotage and terrorist groups (Einsatz groups) were sent to Czechoslovakia, which, at the time of the German attack, were supposed to disorganize the rear of the Czechoslovak army, destroy communication centers, bridges and tunnels, and destroy defense enterprises.
Under the influence of Nazi intelligence, anti-government activities in Czechoslovakia were launched by Slovak, Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian fascist elements. Having established contact with them, the Nazi secret services organized them into a single bloc headed by the Sudeten German Party.
Initially, Hitler tried to apply the method of personal pressure against the Czechoslovak president, as was the case with Schuschnigg. In March, a certain Ward-Price appeared in Prague, a correspondent for the English newspaper The Daily Mail, known for his sympathies for the Nazis and closeness to the Hitlerite elite. He "confidentially" reported through one of the employees of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry the so-called claims of the Fuhrer to her government, in which the granting of autonomy to the German minority was a minimum requirement. “If Czechoslovakia does not accept Hitler’s demands,” the Nazi emissary declared, “it will be destroyed within a week by concentrated attacks from the north, west and south, especially from the south, in which Hungary will unite with Germany to liberate Slovakia ... The Czechs are given the last opportunity save ourselves and Europe both from the nightmare of a world European war and from the nightmare of Bolshevism” (252). It would be best, Ward-Price argued, if Beneš or the Czechoslovak premier Goja got on a plane and, after visiting Hitler, expressed their proposals to him (253).
At the end of March, Henlein, the head of the Nazis living in Czechoslovakia, was instructed to come to Berlin for a briefing. Declaring his intention to "solve" the Sudeten-German problem in the near future, the Fuhrer instructed him to provoke a political crisis in the country by raising the question of the rights of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. “The essence of the instructions that Hitler gave to Henlein,” notes the recording of the conversation, “was that the Sudeten German Party must put forward demands unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government ...” (254) However, if Prague had agreed to them, the instruction provided for the advancement of new claims, so that the crisis was by no means settled.
Following the instructions received, the Sudeten German Party, at its congress at the end of April in Karlsbad, put forward a provocative program for establishing complete control of the Nazi agents over the border region of Czechoslovakia. In mid-May, the Henleinites began to distribute appeals to the soldiers in the country. The situation is hopeless, they said, any resistance of the German army is senseless (255). The Henlein press demanded a referendum (256); municipal elections scheduled for May 22, the Sudeten German Party announced a plebiscite on the question of joining the Sudetenland to Germany.
The actions of the Henleinites and the hidden concentration of Nazi troops on the Czechoslovak borders gave reason to believe that on the election day - May 22 - the Nazis were planning a fascist putsch in the border areas and an armed invasion.
In preparing for aggression against Czechoslovakia, Berlin expected to use the ruling nationalist circles of Poland, their desire for territorial seizures. An agreement on this issue was reached during the visit of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin in January 1938 (257). In an effort to distract Beck from the idea that after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the turn will follow Poland, Hitler in negotiations with him especially zealously proved the need to fight against the "threat of communism." “... Never, perhaps, in another case, was the Chancellor of the Reich more categorical regarding the guarantees given to him that neither direct nor indirect interests of Poland would be violated. He also never expressed his hostility to Russia with such force ... ”(258) - Beck wrote in his memoirs, hushing up, of course, his shameful collusion with the Fuhrer. In May 1938, the Polish government, following Hitler's lead, concentrated in the Teszyn region, near the Czech border, several formations (three divisions and one brigade of border troops) (259) . In addition, on May 21, the Polish ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, who had returned from Warsaw the day before, assured the American ambassador to France, Bullitt, that Poland would immediately declare war on the Soviet Union if he tried to send troops through Polish territory to help Czechoslovakia, and that Soviet aircraft, if they appear over Poland on the way to Czechoslovakia, they will immediately be attacked by Polish aircraft (260).
Meanwhile, the calculations of the Nazis did not materialize. Having learned about the hidden concentration of German troops on the borders of Czechoslovakia, the Benes government, under pressure from public opinion, urgently carried out a partial mobilization. Under the gun were called: one age of reservists (80 thousand people), five ages of technical troops and police - a total of about 180 thousand people (261). The troops occupied the border fortifications, preventing the danger of a fascist putsch in the Sudetes and a sudden invasion of the armed forces of the Reich. The determination of the Czechoslovak people to defend their country frustrated the aggressor's plan.
Of great importance for the outcome of the May events was the firm confidence of the Czechs and Slovaks in the assistance of the Soviet Union, whose government, from the moment the crisis in German-Czechoslovak relations arose, resolutely came out in support of Czechoslovakia. As early as March 15, when asked by American journalists what the USSR intended to do if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs said: our country will fulfill its allied obligations (262). In the second half of April, the Czechoslovak envoy in Moscow, Z. Firlinger, informed Prague about the official position of the Soviet government: “The USSR, if asked, is ready, together with France and Czechoslovakia, to take all measures to ensure the security of Czechoslovakia. To do this, he has all the necessary means. The state of the army and aviation allows this to be done... The desire to provide effective assistance will always be here until Czechoslovakia renounces the pursuit of a democratic policy” (263) . Taking into account the aggravation of the situation, the government of the Soviet Union proposed to start negotiations between the general staffs of the armed forces of the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia.
Under the terms of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, the obligation of the USSR to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia came into force only if Czechoslovakia, which had undergone aggression, received assistance from France. Thus, the refusal of France to defend Czechoslovakia completely released the Soviet Union from its obligation. However, even in this case the Soviet government did not intend to leave the Czechoslovak people in trouble. On April 26, 1938, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M. I. Kalinin, outlining the wording of the treaty, which determined the conditions under which the USSR and Czechoslovakia were obliged to provide each other with assistance, made an extremely important clarification: “Of course, the pact does not prohibit each of the parties from coming help without waiting for France" (264) .
Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia Kroft and her envoy to the USSR Fierlinger, in conversations with Soviet representatives, repeatedly expressed gratitude for the firm support of the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia. “The confidence that the USSR quite seriously and without any hesitation intends and is preparing to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia, in case of real need,” Kroft noted on May 30, 1938, “has a very calming and encouraging effect on Czechoslovakia” (265) .
The position of the Western powers was different. Outlining the statement of the British Minister of War to American correspondents on April 28, the Czechoslovak envoy in London wrote: “He spoke very pessimistically about Czechoslovakia. Nothing allegedly can save Czechoslovakia from German domination, which can be achieved without a direct attack. Literally, he said: the fate of Czechoslovakia is sealed" (266). Such a statement in an environment of rapidly growing pressure and threat of the fascist Reich against Czechoslovakia encouraged both the right-wing forces within the country and the aggressor.
Contrary to the hopes of the international democratic community, the British Prime Minister rejected the proposal of the Soviet government for immediate collective measures to prevent further actions of the invaders. As early as March 24, 1938, Chamberlain, speaking in Parliament, declared that the British government could not assume any obligations in advance in an area where its interests "are not affected to the same extent as is the case with respect to France and Belgium" (267) . The prime minister's words sounded obvious satisfaction: the German fascist expansion was developing in a direction that was beneficial for the ruling circles of England.
The position of the French government in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis was based on the same political calculations, but had its own specifics. The problem of relations with Germany has always been more acute for France than for England. In addition, the ruling circles of France had to reckon with the opinion of their people, who were seriously concerned about the growing threat of a new war. The spring of 1938 was marked by mass protests by workers demanding active foreign policy actions from the government, strengthening ties with other states, primarily with the Soviet Union, in order to ensure the country's security and strengthen European peace. The meaning of the policy of condoning aggression was clear not only to the broad masses of the working people, but also to the most far-sighted bourgeois leaders. The well-known French journalist Pertinax wrote in those days that France and England must firmly declare their intention to defend Czechoslovakia, otherwise "the establishment of German hegemony will be completed in the shortest possible time" (268) .
The French government headed by Daladier, which came to power in April 1938, declared that the country would be "faithful to all the pacts and treaties that it had concluded" (269) . This was an official confirmation of France's obligations, including those under the 1924 Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance and Friendship and the 1925 Pact on Mutual Guarantees.
However, the true intentions of the French cabinet were far from its public declarations. The most influential circles of the bourgeoisie sought to somehow get rid of the obligation to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia. Among the supporters of this course was the former Prime Minister Flandin, who, according to Churchill, was "firmly convinced that France had no other way out than an agreement with Germany" (270) . The implementation of this "delicate" mission was entrusted to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bonnet, who enjoyed the full confidence of "two hundred families."
Daladier's first step in foreign policy was his visit to London at the end of April. Both the French Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister Bonnet, in negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax, declared with unexpected firmness that they were determined to fulfill their obligations with respect to Czechoslovakia. They subtly played on the fears of the British prime minister: if a Franco-German conflict broke out, England would also be involved in the war, and this would mean the complete collapse of Chamberlain's plans. England saw the only way to release France from her obligations under the treaty in forcing Prague to capitulate. The French ministers were not averse to carrying out this unseemly deed with "English gloves." Proving the "hopelessness" of their situation, Daladier and Bonnet encouraged the British to put pressure on the Czechoslovak government. "We are bound by honor towards Czechoslovakia ... You must act!" (271) - Daladier told English correspondents.
And the Western powers stepped up pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia, recommending an agreement with Henlein. On May 7, the British and French envoys in Prague visited the Foreign Minister and demanded that Czechoslovakia go "as far as possible" in meeting the demands of the Sudeten Germans, warning that if an armed conflict arose because of her "intransigence", the Western powers would not provide assistance. Czechoslovakia (272) . How disastrous this "friendly" advice was, reveals Daladier's statement in a conversation with Bullitt on May 9th. To the question of the latter whether the "reorganization" of the Czechoslovak state proposed by the Western powers would not be the beginning of its dismemberment, the French prime minister replied that it would be so, and in general he considers the position of Czechoslovakia after the seizure of Austria by Germany "completely hopeless" (273) .
Already on the threshold of the May crisis, the essence of the shameful deal, concluded a few months later in Munich, was clearly visible. At the same time, the Western powers hurried to prove to Berlin and Rome their desire to force Prague to capitulate, seeing in this the only way to reach an agreement with the fascist powers that would guarantee the interests of the governments of England and France (274).
A typical example that reveals the intentions of Anglo-French diplomacy is the conversation in Berlin on May 10, 1938, between Kirkpatrick, an adviser to the British embassy, and Bismarck, a senior official at the German Foreign Ministry. Kirkpatrick believed that the Czechoslovak question could be resolved by England and Germany. For this it will be sufficient for the German side to formulate its program precisely, and for England to undertake its implementation in Prague. At the same time, the British diplomat noted that such cooperation in solving the Czechoslovak problem could open the way to reaching a long-term Anglo-German agreement on a wide range of issues relating to the future of Europe (275) .
The American ambassador to Germany, Wilson, reported to Washington on April 28, 1938, that it was important "to conclude an agreement with Berlin ... which, so to speak, would channel Germany's aspirations and even her unshakable intentions in such a way as to ensure general peace" (276 ) .
The US government was well informed about the plans of England and France. Avoiding official statements, Washington actually sided with Anglo-French diplomacy. Ambassador Bullitt reported in those days that, in the opinion of the leadership of the United States, it was impossible to prevent Hitler from annexing the border regions of Czechoslovakia (277). The dangerous impact of such assessments is easy to understand, given the influence that the United States enjoyed in the capitalist world.
At this time, in Czechoslovakia itself, disagreements began between various groups of the bourgeoisie. The most right-wing circles, represented by the agrarian party, to which, in particular, Prime Minister Goja belonged, saw the possibility of maintaining their social positions in the establishment of “strong power” in the country, considering it possible to rely on the help of the Reich. Even before the May crisis, they made it clear to the Nazis that they were ready to make concessions to Henlein and agreed to terminate the mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union (278).
Another tactical line was pursued by President Beneš and the grouping of the big bourgeoisie he represented. Throughout the interwar period, they focused on the Western powers, primarily France. Interested in preserving the Czechoslovak state, which provided it with a dominant political and economic position within the country, this part of the bourgeoisie believed that more could be achieved from Hitler by following in the wake of the Anglo-French policy.
With his extensive personal connections in the West and his intimate knowledge of the League of Nations' diplomacy, Beneš had a clear idea of the kind of collusion that was being prepared between the "Western democracies" and the Axis powers. Reactionary circles, he later wrote, wished to direct the development of events in such a way that, if war broke out, it would be "a war between Nazism and Bolshevism" (279). The activity of Beneš shows that he fully shared these views.
The President of Czechoslovakia considered the treaty with the Soviet Union not as an effective means of ensuring the independence of the country, but only as an advantageous trump card in the upcoming risky diplomatic game. “The relations of Czechoslovakia with Russia,” Beneš explained to the British envoy Newton on May 18, 1938, “have always been and will be a secondary factor depending on the position of France and England ... If Western Europe loses interest in Russia, Czechoslovakia will also lose interest in it” (280) . Even the idea of admitting Soviet troops to the territory of Czechoslovakia for the joint defense of the country, Benes considered "stupidity" and unimaginable stupidity (281). He carefully listened to the advice of London and Paris and was ready to make significant concessions in negotiations with Henlein.
The governments of England and France advised Beneš to cancel the mobilization and agree to new concessions to the Henleinists (282). The British ambassador in Berlin informed the German government that Chamberlain's cabinet was exerting pressure on Prague to reach a "just" solution of the question, and that she promised to do everything possible to this end. Further, the British diplomat asked Germany to show patience, because her desires could be satisfied peacefully. If, nevertheless, a military conflict broke out, he warned, and France, by virtue of her obligations, was forced to intervene in it, then England "would not be able to guarantee that she would not be involved in the conflict" (283).
According to the calculations of the ruling circles of Britain, France and their overseas partners, reaching an agreement with Germany prevented the outbreak of an armed conflict within the capitalist system, fraught with dangerous social upheavals. At the same time, the prospect of directing the "dynamism" of the Reich towards the Soviet Union seemed tempting to them.
In an effort to undermine the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as a pillar of the independence of Czechoslovakia, the Nazis launched a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign. They argued that the government of Czechoslovakia, having concluded an agreement with Moscow, turned the country into a hotbed of "red danger", an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the Bolsheviks. Nazi propaganda centers outside of Germany tried to intimidate the layman in the West with the threat of "communist aggression."
The general direction of Hitler's propaganda corresponded to the aspirations of the political leaders of England, France and the USA. The statement of the Reich diplomats that, as a result of an agreement with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia would become a springboard "for an attack on Germany" (284) met with understanding and sympathy in London and Paris. The Western powers put forward the thesis of "neutralization" of Czechoslovakia, that is, the annulment of its treaties with the Soviet Union and France (285).
Sharing the anti-Soviet statements of the Nazis, who made no secret of their intention to start a "campaign to the East" in the very near future, Anglo-French diplomacy encouraged them in every way to do so. In conversations with German representatives, British and French officials emphasized the "economic difficulties" allegedly experienced by the USSR, the "inability" of its army to conduct offensive operations.
Such was the political situation against which the Czechoslovak tragedy unfolded. London and Paris exerted strong pressure on Prague, forcing them to make maximum concessions. On May 25, the German ambassador in London, Dirksen, referring to Masaryk's envoy, reported to Berlin that the Czechoslovak government intended to negotiate on all issues, including Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. “He emphasized again and again,” wrote the German ambassador, referring to Masaryk, “that his government was ready to accept all demands, if they were in any way compatible with the preservation of the independence of Czechoslovakia. It is clear that Halifax put a lot of pressure on him" (286).
Halifax and Bonnet hastened to inform the Nazis about their demarches in Prague (287), making it clear that the Czechoslovak question is best resolved at the negotiating table between Germany and the Western powers, because this cooperation will open the way to an agreement between them on other issues as well (288) . The persistence with which the British government acted in this was striking to the Nazi diplomats. The Chamberlain-Halifax government, Dirksen emphasized, "shows as much understanding towards Germany as any of the possible combinations of British politicians can show" (289).
Hitler's personal adjutant, Captain Wiedemann, who arrived in London in mid-July, said in a conversation with Halifax that the Fuhrer intended to start negotiations with Great Britain only after the settlement of the problems of Central Europe, primarily the Sudetenland, which he was going to resolve in the near future (290) . The head of the Foreign Office replied: “Tell him that I hope to live to see the main goal of all my efforts come true: to see Hitler with the King of England on the balcony of Buckingham Palace ...” (291)
Britain's position was finally clarified after the statement of the British Ambassador in Berlin Henderson to the Deputy German Foreign Minister Weizsacker that the British government did not intend to "sacrifice at least one soldier" for the Czechs, and if they agreed to aggravate relations with Germany, England would not support them (292 ) .
Of great importance was the position of the French government, which, together with the Soviet Union, could prevent the impending catastrophe. But it made the main bet on an agreement with Germany. On May 23, Daladier invited the German ambassador Welchek to his apartment and, discarding diplomatic conventions, shared his fears about the terrible consequences of a new war, as a result of which, the French prime minister claimed, “European civilization” would be completely destroyed, and “Cossacks” would appear in the territories devastated by battles. ' and 'Mongols'. Such a war, in his opinion, must be prevented, "even if it requires heavy sacrifices" (293) . The role of the victim for slaughter, was assigned, of course, to Czechoslovakia. Two days later, Bonnet, in a conversation with Velczek, announced that France did not intend to fulfill its obligations under the treaty with Czechoslovakia. If her government maintains an "uncompromising" stance, France "will be forced to renegotiate its obligations under the treaty" (294). It was an act of open betrayal.
Demanding from the Czechoslovak government "compliance" in negotiations with the Henleinites, whose role as agents of the Reich was well known, Bonnet knew perfectly well the real plans of the Nazis. This is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that in a conversation with the Polish Ambassador Lukasiewicz on May 27, 1938, he said: "Goering's plan for the division of Czechoslovakia between Germany and Hungary with the transfer of Cieszyn Silesia to Poland is not a secret" (295) . The French Foreign Minister used various channels to convey assurances to Berlin that "the French will not fight."
Despite the direct support of the British and French governments in May 1938, Hitler failed to "swallow" Czechoslovakia. He was stopped by the manifest determination of the Czechoslovak people to come out in defense of their independence. But preparations for the capture of Czechoslovakia continued at full speed.
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Introduction
Chapter I Causes of the 1968 Crisis in Czechoslovakia
Chapter II. Entry of allied forces into Czechoslovakia
A) Preparation for entry
B) The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia
Chapter III. Results of the Prague Spring in 1968
Conclusion
Literature
Introduction
In the eventful Czech history of the 20th century, 1968 is one of the most difficult to interpret. The process of political and economic liberalization of Czechoslovak society, called the "Prague Spring", the invasion of the troops of the five states of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent capitulation of the reformers to the dictates of Moscow predetermined not only the nature of the political regime, but also the spiritual climate in the country for many years to come.
The reform process launched by the communists, the ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the country and enthusiastically supported by the broad masses of the population, was soon, after 8 months, suppressed by military force, also by the communists who were in power in the neighboring allied states of Czechoslovakia under the Warsaw Pact. The ideas of the "Prague Spring" were seemingly crushed by tanks and consigned to oblivion, but, as it turned out, they to a large extent influenced the emergence, already at a new stage in history, of the ideas of anti-totalitarian mass movements and revolutions, which led to a peaceful change in the late 80s. social order in the former socialist countries.
Relevance of the issue is that the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 is one of the most difficult events of the 20th century to interpret. More than 40 years later, this problem continues to excite the minds of Russian society, and therefore it is of interest to analyze the content of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 and give a detailed description of the positions and actions of foreign countries and the USSR in the situation of 1968.
The purpose of the course work- to study the causes and course of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968.
Research objectives in this course work are:
To study the causes of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia;
Determine the positions of the leading countries in the "Prague Spring"; - to analyze the results of the "Prague Spring".
Sourcebase course work are a collection of documents "On the events in Czechoslovakia." The collection contains facts, documents, eyewitness accounts. To the events in Czechoslovakia. M., 1968.
Historiography. There are a large number of works by Soviet and Russian historians on the problem under study in historiography.
When writing the paper, we addressed the following:
In the work of I. Valens "The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968", the main attention is paid to the analysis of the process of development and decision-making by the Soviet leadership in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The author examines in detail the dynamics of the balance of power when this decision is made in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU, showing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, Valenta reveals the motives and personal interests of the leaders of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Valenta I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968. M., 1991.
The work of Milos Marko "Black on White" is dedicated to the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969. Here is a deep analysis of these events, their causes and consequences. Milos Marko. Black on white. M., 1974.
ChapterI. Reasons forcrisis of 1968 in Czechoslovakia
crisis czechoslovakia prague spring
In the history of the second half of the XX century. The Prague Spring occupies an exceptional place. This event caused a great resonance, having a significant impact both on the international situation as a whole and on the internal processes taking place in other countries.
In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic experienced a period of profound change, unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were the natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. “The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, for a number of years went almost unnoticed by most analysts and political figures in the West and East, including the Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, A. Novotny, Valens I. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 / Trans. from Czech. M., 1991.-S.138. . A conspiracy of more progressive forces formed against him, and all groups in the Central Committee united. Moscow was aware of the situation, but decided to remain neutral, which meant, of course, a free hand for Novotny's critics.
On January 5, 1968, A. Dubcek was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who had previously headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia and advocated updating the party's policy. For the first time, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was headed by a Slovak. It was a kind of sensation, but in essence it was a compromise of various forces within the Central Committee. A. Novotny remained the President of Czechoslovakia.
In Moscow, this choice was treated calmly. A. Dubchek was a famous person who spent many years of his life in the USSR, was a graduate of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Apparently, they hoped that he would be a manageable figure because of his gentle nature and complaisance.
In February-early March, the political situation in Czechoslovakia became much more complicated. Censorship has practically ceased to operate in the country. Z. Mlynarz, a well-known activist of the “Prague Spring”, noted: “Open criticism began ... of the working methods of the HRC, trade unions, state security and justice agencies. And, as a result, a number of secretaries of the Central Committee, heads of the central council of trade unions, the minister of internal affairs and the prosecutor general were removed from their posts. The situation was further complicated by contradictions in the leadership of the HRC. Numerous opponents of Novotny had already sought his resignation from the presidency of Czechoslovakia. In this case, diverse political forces united against Novotny. His resignation has already been demanded at mass rallies.
At the end of March 1968, A. Novotny resigned as president of Czechoslovakia. General Ludovic Svoboda became the new president, which satisfied the Kremlin leadership.
The fall of Novotny was not just the result of a struggle for power within the Czechoslovak leadership, but happened for a number of reasons, including:
1. The economic crisis of 1962-1963, which aroused the desire for economic reforms.
2. The slow pace of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed.
3. Open dissent of writers and students.
4. The awakening of the reformist-minded intellectual strata in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.
In January 1968, the leadership of the party decided to prepare a "Program of Action for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", and it was drawn up at the end of February, but its adoption was delayed until early April.
On April 4, 1968, the HRC approved the Program of Action. This was the program of the so-called reform forces. It met the interests of broad sections of the Czechoslovak party and state elite. It is no coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, V. Bilyak, who was not shy in his assessments, told his Soviet interlocutor: “Whoever is in favor of the program of action is with us, and whoever does not agree with it is against us.” * * Pikhoya R. G. Decree . op. S. 13.
The "Program of Action" in many respects only legalized and approved the processes that were taking place in Czechoslovak society. Here, the activities of the parties of the National Front, which previously existed only formally, began to revive. The rehabilitation of many thousands of people who suffered during the years of Stalinist terror continued. The party was joined by tens of thousands of new members, mostly from the youth. Public opinion polls showed that the authority of the party as a whole and the renewed party leadership is growing rapidly. At the same time, the authority of the new head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, grew especially rapidly, and within a few months he turned into a national hero.
The Program proclaimed a course towards the democratic renewal of socialism and provided for limited economic reforms. A. Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of political clubs and abolished censorship. New press organs and public associations appeared, including KAN - the Club of Non-Party People.
Representatives of other parties and movements began to be involved in government, and the right to exist for the opposition was recognized. More than 70 political organizations applied for registration in June. A committee was set up to rebuild the Social Democratic Party. Former bourgeois parties became more active, their numbers grew. The non-party opposition put forward the demand for the creation of a multi-party parliamentary system. At the end of June, the famous manifesto "Two Thousand Words" was published, compiled by the writer Ludwik Vaculik and signed by many well-known public figures, including communists. This document, liberal in spirit, criticized the totalitarian system, the conservative activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and proclaimed the ideas of democratization of the political system, the introduction of political pluralism.
On April 4, 1968, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected a new composition of the presidium and secretariat of the Central Committee, O. Chernik became the chairman of the government of Czechoslovakia, and J. Smrkovsky was elected chairman of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia.
Although the Soviet leaders were undeniably united in their negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, they were not inclined to military intervention for a long time. Some of them engaged in an intensive search for a non-military solution to the problem. This became apparent after March 1968, when the Soviet leadership began to use a number of means of political and psychological pressure in order to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the Prague Spring.
The Soviet side exerted political pressure on Dubcek's leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Moscow and May, and at unprecedented negotiations at the highest level between the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee CPC in Cierna nad Tisou in July 1968. Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: near the borders of Czechoslovakia, military maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact troops were carried out with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of Warsaw Pact troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July.
The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction, and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to deploy a Soviet military contingent on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The prospect of Czechoslovakia withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which would inevitably undermine the Eastern European military security system, was unacceptable for the USSR.
However, it should be noted that the option of a military invasion of the territory of Czechoslovakia was considered only as the most extreme step, in case all other means of influence - political and economic pressure, covert operations and military maneuvers - did not give the desired result.
ChapterII. Introductionalliedtroopsto Czechoslovakia
A) Preparationtoentry
In the spring of 1968, the Soviet leadership decided that it was necessary to take measures to prepare their armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
April 8, 1968 commander of the airborne troops, General V.F. Margelov received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive stated: "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger looming over it" Latysh M.V. "Prague Spring" of 1968 and the reaction of the Kremlin. M., 1998.-S. 56. . The document also emphasized: “... if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army treat the appearance of Soviet troops with understanding, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the ChNA troops are hostile to the paratroopers and support the conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them, liberalize them within the country” Ibid. - P.57. .
On the eve of the entry of troops into Prague and Brno, officers of the Airborne Forces and military transport aviation arrived, dressed in the uniform of civilian pilots of the USSR. They quickly reconnoitered the objects and returned safely. By the end of the day, intelligence was transferred to Moscow. Under the cover of night from 29 to 30 July, airborne units on the territory of the USSR, under the guise of exercises, unexpectedly left their barracks and concentrated in the so-called "waiting places". Until August 18, they were really engaged in combat training: they practiced combat in urban conditions, running in tanks and throwing live grenades.
There were also peculiarities in the mechanism for creating a grouping of troops. Along with the Soviet formations, it included formations of the Warsaw Pact countries - the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the NRB. Formations and units from the end of May 1968 were concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, primarily in Poland, East Germany and the USSR. The concentration of troops on the borders of Czechoslovakia was carried out covertly. To this end, a number of exercises were carried out. In mid-May, the troops received an order that in the near future a joint exercise of the troops of the Warsaw Pact member states would take place on the territory of Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Initially, it was planned as a military one with the involvement of significant military contingents, but at the insistence of the Czechoslovak side, it was carried out as a command and staff. The field administrations of the armies, communications units and service units were involved in it. The armies included new formations, some of them were replenished with personnel called up from the reserve.
On May 12, 1968, the advanced units of the army of General A.M. Mayorova went to the area of the state border of Czechoslovakia, and early in the morning on July 18 it was crossed by the operational group of the field command of the army of the Carpathian military district. She was instructed to go to the designated area in advance and begin preparing a regimental tactical exercise with live fire. Three days later, the main forces of the army, allocated to participate in the exercise, crossed the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.
On the night of June 23, Soviet troops concentrated in the Libava training center, 400 km from the state border with the USSR. Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact Marshal of the Soviet Union I.I. Yakubovsky and headquarters were located in Milovice. The commander of the army, General A.M., was summoned here. Mayorov received a task for a command-staff exercise (codenamed "Shumava"). Together with the army, the headquarters and troops of Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary acted in the exercise. In total, 16 thousand people were introduced to conduct the exercise in Czechoslovakia. personnel of the allied armies. By July 1, the Shumava command and staff exercise was over. In addition to the command of the Allied Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia - L. Svoboda, A. Dubcek, O. Chernik, I. Smrkovsky, Minister of National Defense M. Dzur, and military attachés of the socialist countries arrived for its analysis.
Summing up the results of the command and staff exercise, Marshal I.I. Yakubovsky assessed the state of combat training of the Czechoslovak army as unsatisfactory and offered to continue the exercises, without specifying a deadline for their completion. After the protest of the Czechoslovak side, the exercises were nevertheless completed, however, the withdrawal of allied troops, and primarily Soviet ones, from the area where they were held was delayed. Only on July 24 was it allowed to begin the withdrawal of units and formations, about which the representatives of Czechoslovakia were also informed. Under the pretext of the poor technical condition of a large number of military equipment that made many kilometers of marches, the pace of the reverse advance was set low. The physical and moral fatigue of the troops was felt.
From July 23 to August 10, another rear exercises were held - "Neman", covering the entire western territory of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. For these purposes, a significant number of reservists were mobilized and a large number of civilian vehicles were involved. On August 18, military maneuvers were extended to the territory of Hungary, and the Hungarian army and the Southern Group of Soviet Forces took part in them. On August 11, large-scale exercises of air defense troops began under the code name "Heavenly Shield" and exercises of signal troops on the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the GDR.
In general, the exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, held from May to mid-August on the territory of Czechoslovakia and along its borders, were used as a political and psychological influence on the leaders of Czechoslovakia. In addition, they made it possible to hide the signs of the impending entry into the territory of Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously with these exercises and under their cover, issues of logistical and logistical support for the group of troops being created were resolved.
The final decision on the introduction of troops was made at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 16 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18. One of the decisive factors in the choice of the time of the invasion was the date set for September 9, 1968, for the congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, where, according to forecasts, the reformers were to win in the Czechoslovak leadership.
The official reason for the intensification of action was a letter of appeal from a group of party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact with a request for international assistance. It was supposed to change the political leadership of the country.
On the eve of the entry of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko informed the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia M. Dzur about the upcoming action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.
Direct training of troops began on 17-18 August. First of all, equipment was preparing for long marches, stocks of material resources were replenished, work cards were worked out, and other events were held. Thus, by August 20, a grouping of troops was ready, the first echelon of which numbered up to 250 thousand, and the total number - up to 500 thousand people, about 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers. Soviet troops were represented in them by formations and units of the 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms, 16th Air Armies (GSVG), 11th Guards Combined Arms Army (PribVO), 13th and 38th Combined Arms Armies ( PrikVO) and the 14th Air Army (OdVO).
In accordance with the plan of the command, the Carpathian and Central fronts were formed. The Carpathian Front was created on the basis of the administration and troops of the Carpathian Military District and several Polish divisions. It included four armies: the 13th, 38th combined arms, 8th Guards Tank and 57th Air. At the same time, the 8th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 13th Army began to move to the southern regions of Poland, where Polish divisions were additionally included in their composition. The Central Front was formed on the basis of the administration of the Baltic Military District with the inclusion of the troops of the Baltic Military District, the GSVG and the SGV, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the GDR and Poland. The Central Front included the 11th and 20th Guards Combined Arms and the 37th Air Armies.
One front (Southern) to cover the active group was also deployed in Hungary. In addition to this front, the operational group "Balaton" was deployed on its territory to enter Czechoslovakia.
It included two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units. The date for the introduction of troops was set for the evening of August 20, when a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held. The time remaining before the entry was used to draw up prearranged signals, final briefings, refueling vehicles and applying white paint stripes on the turrets and hulls of tanks and armored personnel carriers so that they could be distinguished from Czechoslovak ones.
Although armed resistance was not expected, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was instructed to take the necessary precautions to avoid conflict with units of the Czechoslovak army. During the summer, the ATS command reduced the stocks of fuel and equipment in Czechoslovakia, sending supplies of these materials to East Germany for additional "exercises."
B) Introductiontroops in Czechoslovakia.
On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read to the officers on the formation of the Danube High Command. General of the Army I.G. was appointed commander-in-chief. Pavlovsky, whose headquarters was deployed in the southern part of Poland. Both fronts (Central and Carpathian) and the Balaton task force, as well as two guards airborne divisions, were subordinate to him. On the first day of the operation, to ensure the landing of airborne divisions, five divisions of military transport aviation were allocated at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief "Danube".
The combat alert was announced at 23.00. Through closed communication channels, all fronts, armies, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions were given a signal to advance. At this signal, all commanders were to open one of the five secret packages they kept, and burn the four remaining in the presence of the chiefs of staff without opening. The opened packets contained an order to start operation "Danube" and to continue hostilities in accordance with the plans "Danube-Canal" and "Danube-Canal-Globus".
"Orders on interaction for the Danube operation" were developed in advance. All military equipment of Soviet and allied production without white stripes was subject to "neutralization", preferably without firing. In case of resistance, stripless tanks and other military equipment were to be destroyed without warning and without commands from above. When meeting with NATO troops, it was ordered to stop immediately and not to shoot without a command.To carry out the operation, 26 divisions were involved, of which 18 were Soviet, not counting aviation.
On the night of August 21, the troops of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border in radio silence from four directions at twenty points from Zvikov to German. From the southern part of Poland, a Soviet-Polish contingent of troops was introduced in the directions: Jablonec-Kralove, Ostrava, Olomouc and Zilina. From the southern part of the GDR, a Soviet-East German contingent of troops was introduced in the directions: Prague, Chomutov, Pilsen, Karlovy Vary. From the northern regions of Hungary, the Soviet-Hungarian-Bulgarian grouping was included in the directions: Bratislava, Trencin, Banska Bystrica, and others. The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously with the introduction of ground forces to the airfields of Vodokhodi (Czech Republic), Turokani and Namesht (Slovakia), as well as to airfields near Prague, airborne troops were transferred from the territory of the USSR.
Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a predetermined plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia.
The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army offered practically no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of the events in the country. Among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. The protest of the public was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of advancement of tank columns, the actions of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. In some cases, there were armed attacks on military personnel of the contingent of troops introduced into Czechoslovakia, throwing tanks and other armored vehicles with bottles of combustible mixture, attempts to disable communications and transport, destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.
The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and after them the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Party, already on August 21, condemned the introduction of allied troops. Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the HRC.
On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The governments of the countries of socialist orientation - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China - condemned the military intervention of the five states. Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of the situation. Negotiations began in Moscow (August 23-26) between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation appeared. The result was the withdrawal of the troops of the participating countries from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Aviation was concentrated on dedicated airfields.
The reason for extending the stay of the contingent of troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia was not only the continued internal political instability, but also the increased activity of NATO near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the FRG in close proximity to the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in conducting various kinds of exercises .
On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the treaty was one of the main military-political results of the introduction of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
Despite the fact that when the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries were brought in, there were no military operations, there were losses. Thus, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), as a result of the actions of hostile persons, 11 military personnel, including one officer, were killed; 87 Soviet servicemen were wounded and injured, including 19 officers. In addition, 87 people died in catastrophes, accidents, careless handling of weapons and military equipment, as a result of other incidents, and also died of diseases.
As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted.
In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began.
In the "Statement of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union" of December 4, 1989 and in the "Statement of the Soviet government" of December 5, 1989, the decision to send allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous as unreasonable interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state .
ChapterIII. Results of the Prague Spring in 1968
The entry of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 slowed down the disintegration processes that were clearly defined by the summer of 1968. It can be stated, regardless of the will of the leadership of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, the events of August 1968 to a certain extent slowed down the collapse of Czechoslovakia. “The constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation, adopted on October 27, 1968, was based on the national principle, which could turn the Czechoslovak federation into a dualistic one. Article 142 provided for the development and adoption of the constitutions of each of the national republics ”Valens I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 / Trans. from Czech. M., 1991.-S.85. . However, in the coming era of normalization in the country, the formation of a federal state from above, the personal merger of federal and national executive bodies, political dirigisme, which modified the entire process of economic reforms and building a federation, meant a return to a unitary scheme of government. For the Czech society, the main thing was the implementation of the principles of democratization, and in Slovakia the issues of a federal state-legal structure were put forward.
“It seems that there were two Prague Springs - Czech and separately Slovak. The Slovaks aspired to a state-legal structure, which is characterized by strong national state authorities and the delegation of certain powers to the federal authorities, allowing them to represent the Czechoslovak state abroad. The Czechs, on the other hand, did not want to make changes to the state-legal structure, since they completely identified themselves with the unitary Czechoslovak state” E.G. Zadorozhnyuk, V.V. Maryina, E.P. "Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 20th century". M., 2005.-p.64. . The Czechs, focusing on the implementation of democratic principles, put the task of liberation from the hegemony of the Soviet Union at the forefront. For the Slovaks, the most significant problem was to fully restore their statehood, which would inevitably lead to the disintegration of a united Czechoslovakia.
The Prague Spring represented a different kind of protest than the one that Soviet leaders faced in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the foundations of ensuring the interests of the national security of the USSR, it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. The retention of membership in the Department of Internal Affairs and the CMEA was not questioned.
As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak was elected the first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons from Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,” which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his entourage.
In the early 60s. In Czechoslovakia, a contradictory situation developed. We can talk about a certain liberalization of the political regime, primarily due to the “Khrushchev thaw”. It opened up an opportunity for criticism of various aspects of society, including the political elite, and representatives of the post-war generations put forward new ideas and did not want, as it was already in the 50s, to follow the instructions of the official regime. When assessing the historical processes that took place in those days in Czechoslovakia, it should be borne in mind that initially the events were in the nature of an institutional crisis that spread to the highest levels of the political structure of Czechoslovakia. Along with the demands for democratization and economic reforms, the demand for a revision of the Constitution became essential.
The democratic movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had deep historical roots. The process of its formation was influenced by the humanistic traditions of the interwar period: the democratic ideas of T. Masaryk, as well as the concepts of “classless Czechoslovak society”, “Masaryk socialism”, “specific Czechoslovak path to socialism”, which fundamentally differed from the dogmas of Soviet-style socialism. As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak was elected the first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons from Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,” which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his entourage.
Literature
Valenta I. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 / Trans. from Czech. M.: Nauka, 1991.-182.
Latvian M.V. "Prague Spring" of 1968 and the reaction of the Kremlin. M.: Nauka, 1998.-195.
Orlik I. I. The policy of the Western powers towards the Eastern European socialist states (1965-1975). M.: Nauka, 1979.-271.
Zadorozhnyuk E.G., Maryina V.V., Serapionova E.P., Musatov V.L. "Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 20th century". M.: Enlightenment., 2005.-p.153.
Vorontsov A. N. Prague Autumn: Myths and Reality: On the Entry of Soviet Troops into the Territory of Czechoslovakia 21 Aug. 1968. // Our contemporary. - 2003. - No. 8.
Latvian M.V. Legitimization of the presence of Soviet troops and the growth of external factors in Czechoslovak politics in the initial stages of "normalization" in 1968 // Voprosy istorii. - 1998. - No. 12.
Musatov V. About the Prague Spring. 1968 // Spiritual heritage. - 1998. - No. 12.
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The economic reform undertaken in 1965 produced some positive results. Differences between the city and the countryside were gradually smoothed out, and the standard of living of various segments of the population was raised. Managed to keep prices down. However, the pace of change was still slow. Supporters of A. Novotny, who since 1954 held the post of head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the president of the republic, feared that the new style of managing the economy would weaken the position of the party in the state. A heated discussion on these issues resulted in a political conflict, in which the followers of the transformations in the economy faced A. Novotny and his entourage.
An important role in the political development of Czechoslovakia after 1956 was played by the Slovak question, the severity of which increased with the growth of the national self-consciousness of the Slovaks and some liberalization of the regime. The national-political aspirations of the Slovaks came into conflict with the nationalist position of the Czech party leadership. Slovak communists who spoke in the 40s. for the implementation of the principle of equality in relations between Czechs and Slovaks, in the early 50s. were accused of bourgeois nationalism and then convicted. The 1960 constitution strengthened Prague centralism. The rights of the Slovak authorities were significantly limited, and the highest body of executive power in Slovakia - the Corps of Commissioners was liquidated. These changes were demagogically presented as evidence of the success of the process of mutual rapprochement and merging of the two peoples, which allegedly fully met the interests of the Slovak people. A storm of indignation was caused by the statement of party leaders in 1963 that there was no point in even thinking about the annulment of the verdict on "Slovak bourgeois nationalists." Then G. Husak and L. Novomesky, Slovak victims of the trials of the 50s, were released from prison, V. Clementis was posthumously rehabilitated. The problem of the constitutional position of Slovakia in the Czechoslovak state was actively discussed in the Slovak party press. Some actions of A. Novotny were regarded as an insult to the national dignity of the Slovaks.
In this situation, the leadership of the Slovak communists, headed by Alexander Dubcek (1921-1992), openly opposed A. Novotny's group. The need for a significant correction of the course in the field of national relations between the Czechs and Slovaks and overcoming the Czechoslovakist views, which had their tradition from the interwar period, became quite obvious. Prague, on the other hand, believed that in order to solve the Slovak problem, it would be enough to raise the level of development of Slovakia to the level of the Czech lands. The Slovak opposition in the party and society contributed to the weakening of the positions of A. Novotny, who regarded the justified demands of the Slovaks as manifestations of nationalism and separatism.
In the 60s. noticeable signs of a thaw were also observed in social and cultural life. The feeling of fear left people, new magazines of a liberal orientation appeared. Many theaters, such as, for example, Semaphore, popular with Prague audiences, responded vividly to the topic of the day. In the first half of the 60s. in Czech and Slovak culture, figures of a new generation come to the fore, whose work did not fit into the framework of the previous schemes prescribed by the official ideology. The most important factor in social development during this period was public opinion, held back for many years. At that time, the reform efforts were mainly based on it. It was possible to cope with individual manifestations of nonconformity, but in general, the former methods of influence were no longer conceivable. The rostrum of the emerging opposition to the regime was such publications as Literarni Novyny (Literary Newspaper) and Kulturny Zhizvo (Cultural Life). In October 1967 there was an open conflict with the authorities of the Prague students. Force was used to suppress the demonstration organized by them, which caused sharp condemnation of the public and a number of party functionaries.
An important milestone in the development of the crisis can be considered the IV Congress of Writers in June 1967, which resulted in open criticism of the existing regime. This was followed by the confiscation of the publication of Literary Novina and the persecution of the boldest of critics.
In the context of a clear crisis of the political system, the task of actively searching for a way out of it became a priority. The authority and influence of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by this time had noticeably fallen, which its leaders could not fail to see. In the party ranks there was a tense reflection on everything done after 1948. At the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in October 1967, A. Dubchek, unexpectedly for A. Novotny, made accusations against him for the first time. Dubcek was supported by a number of members of the Central Committee, who criticized the concentration of the functions of the head of the party and the president of the republic in one hand. Novotny chose the tactics of delay and tried to enlist the support of Moscow.
At the December plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1967, A. Novotny's criticism intensified. The Central Committee practically split into two camps. For the first time, a proposal was put forward to remove Novotny from his post in the party. But the final decision was not made, the work of the plenum was interrupted without any concrete results. The solution of all the burning questions of the life of the state and the party was postponed until January 1968.
The January Plenum of 1968 was an important step in resolving the crisis in the party. A.Dubchek was elected its new leader. A. Novotny, who retained the post of president, and his supporters still retained considerable power and influence and did not lose hope that the changes would be limited only to questions of inner-party life.
However, representatives of the reformist wing believed that the essence of the changes should be the elimination of the deformations of socialism and the democratization of not only the party, but also public life. The solution of the Slovak question, the change in the party's attitude towards the intelligentsia, and, above all, the consistent rehabilitation of all those who suffered during the political trials were named as urgent measures.
To solve all these problems, a path was chosen that took into account the internal conditions of the development of Czechoslovakia. After the January plenum, the reformers had the opportunity to go on an organized offensive against the conservatives in the party with the help of pressure both “from above” and “from below”, using the available media. At the beginning of March 1968, censorship was practically abolished, and a stream of criticism and revelations of the recent socialist past fell upon society. All this contributed to the gradual formation of civil society in Czechoslovakia. A number of new public organizations appeared: the Club of Active Non-Party People (KAN), K-231 - an organization of victims of political trials (under the article of the corresponding paragraph of the criminal code), the reconstruction of the Social Democratic Party was being prepared.
During the campaign of reporting party conferences, reformist forces gained the upper hand in the leadership of many district party organizations. The Prague City Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which carried out organizational, political and ideological coordination of their activities, became the true center of the reformist forces. By the time the April 1968 plenum of the Central Committee was convened, the reformers occupied decisive positions in the presidium and secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in the localities. In March 1968, General L. Svoboda, the organizer of Czechoslovak military units in the USSR during the war years, who also suffered during the period of repressions, was elected president of the republic. J. Smrkovsky became the chairman of the parliament, and O. Chernik became the prime minister. By the spring of 1968, a mass movement had taken shape in the country, speaking under the slogans of the socialist renewal of the country.
Undermining the position of conservatives in society was accompanied by a desire to restore the principles of democracy in the political system. The contours of the renewal of the political system were outlined in the “Program of Action” of the Communist Party. It formulated the task of creating a pluralistic model of socialism, emphasized the need for an autonomous position in the society of science and culture. devices of the republic.
But the core of social consolidation was another document - the Manifesto of 2,000 Words. It appeared on June 27, 1968 and reflected public dissatisfaction with the lack of rebuff to the conservative forces on the part of the reformers. Its author was the writer L. Vaculik. The manifesto directly called on the citizens of the republic to remove all obstacles to reforms on the ground. Party and state bodies rejected the manifesto as a document calling for the destruction of the existing political system. But he made an unusually strong impression on society. Almost half of the district party conferences of the Czech Republic and Moravia voted in favor of a manifesto during the election of delegates to the party congress. Much has been done by the reformers to win the majority of delegates at the forthcoming congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
By the summer of 1968, it was already difficult to talk about the leading role of the CPC in the country. The public advocated the democratization of the National Front, for the practical implementation of the principles of pluralism and parliamentary democracy, for the free competition of all political forces. There were demands to rebuild the National Front on the principles of partnerships, to allow the activities of opposition parties to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
Cardinal transformations began in mass public organizations. Trade union organizations of a new type were created in the course of the elections to factory trade union committees. A new draft trade union program has been published. There was an unprecedented activation of the youth movement. In March 1968, the unified Czechoslovak Youth Union was dissolved, and about 20 independent youth organizations, hundreds of different interest clubs, appeared in its place.
The political transformations unfolding in Czechoslovakia aroused the alertness of partners in the Soviet bloc. A number of meetings of party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were held in Prague, Dresden, Sofia, Moscow, Warsaw, where the question of abandoning the course chosen by the Czechoslovak leaders was raised. But the reformers, led by A. Dubcek, could not be broken, although the latter was accused of compromise tactics, delays in fulfilling promises, and even distorting the results of negotiations with the allied states. Public opinion in Czechoslovakia supported the reformist course, and outside pressure only led to an increase in anti-Soviet sentiment.
In the face of serious disagreements between Czechoslovakia and partners in the Soviet bloc, the main task of Czechoslovakia's domestic policy was to protect the sovereignty of the country. A significant part of the society helped A. Dubcek and his supporters in this. The movement of mass support reached its peak during the negotiations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak delegations in Cierna nad Tisou in late July-early August 1968.
But at the same time, the pressure of the partners of Czechoslovakia under the Warsaw Pact, especially the leaders of the GDR, was growing, demanding a decisive struggle against the "anti-socialist forces." Trying to weaken this onslaught, A. Dubcek, at a meeting in Bratislava in August 1968, agreed to confirm the declaration on the unity of the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism and recognized that the protection of general socialist values is a common international duty of all states, but this did not satisfy the allies. On this basis, in order to prevent a possible withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Soviet bloc, it was decided to send troops of a number of Warsaw Pact states into the republic.
A. Dubcek's course of building "socialism with a human face" ran into some resistance in the ranks of the CPC itself. On August 20, 1968, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held, at which members of the party leadership who disagreed with the political line being pursued made an unsuccessful attempt to seize power in the country.
On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the troops of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the GDR began the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which marked the beginning of the curtailment of the democratization process. They did not meet armed resistance and quickly occupied the whole country. Early in the morning of August 21, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A.Dubchek, the chairman of the government O.Chernik, the chairman of the National Assembly A.Smrkovsky, the chairman of the National Front F.Kriegel, the secretary of the city committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Prague B.Szymon and the secretary of the Brno regional committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia J.Spachek were arrested and then were taken to the USSR.
The invasion caused a wave of discontent among the Czechoslovak public. Street signs and traffic signs have vanished, and cities have been filled with posters and graffiti on house walls protesting brutal violence and ridiculing “brotherly allies.” After the troops occupied the buildings of the editorial offices of radio, television and newspapers, the supporters of reforms managed to establish transmissions from other places, and even publish newspapers. During meetings and demonstrations, the public expressed its full support for the leadership of the country and condemned the intervention.
Attempts, with the support of the Soviet side, to create a so-called "workers' and peasants'" government headed by A. Indra failed. It was not possible to achieve approval of the action of the Warsaw Pact countries by the authorities. Already on August 21, 1968, the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the parliament, and the government spoke out against it in a statement. Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia A. Gaek condemned the introduction of troops in his speech at the UN Security Council. In Prague, hastily, under illegal conditions, the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was convened, which received the name "Vysochansky" at the venue, although without the participation of Slovak delegates. About 1,200 previously elected congress delegates approved the protest of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia against the occupation. A new Central Committee was also elected. Despite the resistance of part of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under the influence of events in Prague, an extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia was convened in Bratislava.
From 23 to 26 August 1968, negotiations were held in Moscow with Czechoslovak leaders forcibly deported to the USSR. In their course, a protocol was imposed on the Czechoslovak side, which recorded the desire of the parties to normalize the situation in Czechoslovakia by curtailing the initiated political and economic reforms. After that, the Czech and Slovak leaders returned to the country and took up their duties.
G. Husak, a participant in the Moscow talks, succeeded in making the Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia adopt a decision to consider the “Vysochansky” Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia invalid due to the absence of a Slovak delegation at it. The Congress of the CPS also strongly demanded the reorganization of Czechoslovakia on a federal basis.
The decision on the federal structure of Czechoslovakia was adopted on August 28, 1968. It entered into force on January 1, 1969. Until the early 1990s, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic consisted of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics.
In connection with the change in the structure of the state from unitary to federal, there was a reorganization of the highest bodies of state power. Instead of the National Assembly, the Federal Assembly was created, which structurally consisted of two chambers: the House of the People and the House of Nationalities. The bearer of legislative power in the Czech Republic was the Czech National Council, and in Slovakia - the Slovak National Council. The Communist Party remained united.
The solution of the Slovak question marked the beginning of serious changes in the national policy in Czechoslovakia. Until 1968, national problems, as a rule, were not posed or resolved. During the "Prague Spring" the principle prevailed - first democratization, then federalization. The subsequent course of events forced us to abandon this approach and come to grips with the normalization of interethnic relations in the country. Already in October 1968, an important law was adopted on the status of nationalities in Czechoslovakia, which significantly changed their status. For the first time, the law officially recognized the existence of national minorities and their rights, guaranteed the freedom of national development. Based on it since the late 60s. cultural associations and societies of citizens of German, Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish nationality began to be created. The most numerous was the Hungarian minority (according to 1983 data - more than 580 thousand people, which accounted for about 4% of the total population of Czechoslovakia), living compactly mainly in southern Slovakia. Despite the decision taken in 1945 to deport Germans and Hungarians, the latter, for the most part, remained in Czechoslovakia.
crisis czechoslovakia prague spring
In the history of the second half of the XX century. The Prague Spring occupies an exceptional place. This event caused a great resonance, having a significant impact both on the international situation as a whole and on the internal processes taking place in other countries.
In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic experienced a period of profound change, unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were the natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. “The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, for a number of years went almost unnoticed by most analysts and political figures in the West and East, including the Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, A. Novotny, Valens I. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1968 / Trans. from Czech. M., 1991.-S.138.. A conspiracy of more progressive forces formed against him, all groups in the Central Committee united. Moscow was aware of the situation, but decided to remain neutral, which meant, of course, a free hand for Novotny's critics.
On January 5, 1968, A. Dubcek was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who had previously headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia and advocated updating the party's policy. For the first time, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was headed by a Slovak. It was a kind of sensation, but in essence it was a compromise of various forces within the Central Committee. A. Novotny remained the President of Czechoslovakia.
In Moscow, this choice was treated calmly. A. Dubchek was a famous person who spent many years of his life in the USSR, was a graduate of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Apparently, they hoped that he would be a manageable figure because of his gentle nature and complaisance.
In February-early March, the political situation in Czechoslovakia became much more complicated. Censorship has practically ceased to operate in the country. Z. Mlynarz, a well-known activist of the “Prague Spring”, noted: “Open criticism began ... of the working methods of the HRC, trade unions, state security and justice agencies. And, as a result, a number of secretaries of the Central Committee, heads of the central council of trade unions, the minister of internal affairs and the prosecutor general were removed from their posts. The situation was further complicated by contradictions in the leadership of the HRC. Numerous opponents of Novotny had already sought his resignation from the presidency of Czechoslovakia. In this case, diverse political forces united against Novotny. His resignation has already been demanded at mass rallies.
At the end of March 1968, A. Novotny resigned as president of Czechoslovakia. General Ludovic Svoboda became the new president, which satisfied the Kremlin leadership.
The fall of Novotny was not just the result of a struggle for power within the Czechoslovak leadership, but happened for a number of reasons, including:
- 1. The economic crisis of 1962-1963, which aroused the desire for economic reforms.
- 2. The slow pace of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed.
- 3. Open dissent of writers and students.
- 4. The awakening of the reformist-minded intellectual strata in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.
In January 1968, the leadership of the party decided to prepare a "Program of Action for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", and it was drawn up at the end of February, but its adoption was delayed until early April.
On April 4, 1968, the HRC approved the Program of Action. This was the program of the so-called reform forces. It met the interests of broad sections of the Czechoslovak party and state elite. It is no coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, V. Bilyak, who was not shy in his assessments, told his Soviet interlocutor: “Whoever is in favor of the program of action is with us, and whoever does not agree with it is against us.” * * Pikhoya R. G. Decree . op. S. 13.
The "Program of Action" in many respects only legalized and approved the processes that were taking place in Czechoslovak society. Here, the activities of the parties of the National Front, which previously existed only formally, began to revive. The rehabilitation of many thousands of people who suffered during the years of Stalinist terror continued. The party was joined by tens of thousands of new members, mostly from the youth. Public opinion polls showed that the authority of the party as a whole and the renewed party leadership is growing rapidly. At the same time, the authority of the new head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, grew especially rapidly, and within a few months he turned into a national hero.
The Program proclaimed a course towards the democratic renewal of socialism and provided for limited economic reforms. A. Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of political clubs and abolished censorship. New press organs and public associations appeared, including KAN - the Club of Non-Party People.
Representatives of other parties and movements began to be involved in government, and the right to exist for the opposition was recognized. More than 70 political organizations applied for registration in June. A committee was set up to rebuild the Social Democratic Party. Former bourgeois parties became more active, their numbers grew. The non-party opposition put forward the demand for the creation of a multi-party parliamentary system. At the end of June, the famous manifesto "Two Thousand Words" was published, compiled by the writer Ludwik Vaculik and signed by many well-known public figures, including communists. This document, liberal in spirit, criticized the totalitarian system, the conservative activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and proclaimed the ideas of democratization of the political system, the introduction of political pluralism.
On April 4, 1968, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected a new composition of the presidium and secretariat of the Central Committee, O. Chernik became the chairman of the government of Czechoslovakia, and J. Smrkovsky was elected chairman of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia.
Although the Soviet leaders were undeniably united in their negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, they were not inclined to military intervention for a long time. Some of them engaged in an intensive search for a non-military solution to the problem. This became apparent after March 1968, when the Soviet leadership began to use a number of means of political and psychological pressure in order to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the Prague Spring.
The Soviet side exerted political pressure on Dubcek's leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Moscow and May, and at unprecedented negotiations at the highest level between the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee CPC in Cierna nad Tisou in July 1968. Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: near the borders of Czechoslovakia, military maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact troops were carried out with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of Warsaw Pact troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July.
The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction, and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to deploy a Soviet military contingent on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The prospect of Czechoslovakia withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which would inevitably undermine the Eastern European military security system, was unacceptable for the USSR.
However, it should be noted that the option of a military invasion of the territory of Czechoslovakia was considered only as the most extreme step, in case all other means of influence - political and economic pressure, covert operations and military maneuvers - did not give the desired result.
