Planning for German aggression against the Soviet Union began long before the war. Back in the mid-1930s, as can be seen from the documents, the political and military leadership of Germany, in resolving a number of internal issues, proceeded from option "A", which meant a war against the USSR. At that time, the Nazi command was already accumulating information about the Soviet Army, studying the main operational directions of the eastern campaign and outlining possible options for military operations.
The outbreak of the war against Poland, and then campaigns in Northern and Western Europe, temporarily switched the German staff thought to other problems. But even at that time, the preparation of the war against the USSR did not go out of sight of the Nazis. The planning of the war, concrete and comprehensive, was resumed by the German General Staff after the defeat of France, when, in the opinion of the fascist leadership, the rear of the future war was provided and Germany had enough resources at its disposal to wage it.
Already on June 25, 1940, on the third day after the signing of the armistice in Compiègne, the option of "strike force in the East" (648) was being discussed. On June 28, "new tasks" were considered. On June 30, Halder wrote in his official diary: "The main focus is on the East" (649).
On July 21, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, received an order to start developing a detailed plan for the war in the east.
The strategic views on the conduct of the war against the USSR among the Nazi leadership developed gradually and were specified in all details in the highest military instances: at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht's supreme command, at the general staffs of the ground forces, the air force and at the headquarters of the navy.
On July 22, Brauchitsch instructed the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, to thoroughly think over various options "concerning the operation against Russia."
Halder energetically took up the execution of the received order. He was convinced that "an offensive launched from the concentration area in East Prussia and northern Poland in the general direction of Moscow would have the greatest chance of success" (650). Halder saw the advantage of this strategic plan in that, in addition to the direct threat posed to Moscow, an offensive from these directions puts Soviet troops in the Ukraine at a disadvantage, forcing them to fight defensive battles with a front turned to the north.
For the specific development of the plan for the eastern campaign, the chief of staff of the 18th Army, General E. Marx, who was considered an expert on the Soviet Union and enjoyed Hitler's special confidence, was seconded to the General Staff of the Ground Forces. On July 29, Halder informed him in detail about the essence of the planned campaign against Russia, and the general immediately began planning it.
This stage of developing the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union ended on July 31, 1940. On that day, a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces of fascist Germany was held in the Berghof, at which the goals and plan of the war were clarified, and its terms were outlined. Speaking at the meeting, Hitler justified the need for a military defeat of the Soviet Union by the desire to gain dominance in Europe. “According to this...,” he declared, “Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941 "(651) .
The fascist military leadership considered this period of attack on the USSR as the most favorable, counting that by the spring of 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces would not have time to complete the reorganization and would not be ready to repel the invasion. The duration of the war against the USSR was determined in a few weeks. It was planned to complete it by the autumn of 1941.
It was supposed to inflict two powerful blows on the Soviet Union: the southern one - against Kyiv and into the bend of the Dnieper with a deep bypass of the Odessa region, and the northern one - through the Baltic states to Moscow. In addition, it was envisaged to carry out independent operations in the south to capture Baku, and in the north - an attack by German troops concentrated in Norway in the direction of Murmansk.
The Hitlerite leadership, preparing for war with the Soviet Union, attached great importance to the political and operational-strategic camouflage of aggression. It was supposed to hold a series of major events that were supposed to give the impression of the preparations of the Wehrmacht for operations in Gibraltar, North Africa and England. A very limited circle of people knew about the idea and plan of the war against the USSR.
At a meeting in the Berghof on July 31, it was decided to find out whether Finland and Turkey would be allies in the war against the USSR. In order to draw these countries into the war, it was planned to give them some territories of the Soviet Union after the successful completion of the campaign. Considerations were immediately considered on the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian relations and guarantees to Romania (652).
On August 1, Halder again discussed with General Marx a plan for a war against the USSR, and already on August 5 he received the first version of this plan.
According to the fascist leadership, by August 1940 the Soviet Army had 151 rifle and 32 cavalry divisions, 38 mechanized brigades, of which 119 divisions and 28 brigades were located in the west and were divided by Polissya approximately into equal parts; reserves were located in the Moscow area. By the spring of 1941, no increase in the Soviet Armed Forces was expected. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would conduct defensive operations along the entire western border, with the exception of the Soviet-Romanian sector, where the Soviet Army was expected to go on the offensive in order to capture the Romanian oil fields. It was believed that the Soviet troops would not evade decisive battles in the border areas, would not be able to immediately retreat deep into their territory and repeat the maneuver of the Russian army in 1812 (653) .
Based on this assessment, the Nazi command planned to deliver the main blow of the ground forces from Northern Poland and East Prussia in the direction of Moscow. Since the concentration of German troops in Romania at that time was impossible, the southern direction was not taken into account. The maneuver north of the Moscow direction was also ruled out, which lengthened the lines of communication of the troops and ultimately led them to an impenetrable wooded area northwest of Moscow.
The main grouping was tasked with destroying the main forces of the Soviet Army in the western direction, capturing Moscow and the northern part of the Soviet Union; in the future - to turn the front to the south in order to occupy Ukraine in cooperation with the southern grouping. As a result, it was supposed to reach the line of Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk.
To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create an army group "North" of three armies (68 divisions in total, of which 15 were tank and 2 motorized). The northern flank of the strike force was to be covered by one of the armies, which at the first stage was to, having gone on the offensive, force the Western Dvina in its lower reaches and advance in the direction of Pskov, Leningrad.
It was planned to deliver an auxiliary strike south of the Pripyat swamps by the Army Group "South" consisting of two armies (35 divisions in total, including 5 tank and 6 motorized) with the aim of capturing Kyiv and crossings on the Dnieper in its middle reaches. 44 divisions were allocated to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces, which were to advance, behind Army Group North (654).
The German Air Force was tasked with destroying Soviet aviation, gaining air supremacy, disrupting rail and road traffic, preventing the concentration of Soviet ground forces in forested areas, supporting German mobile formations with dive bomber attacks, preparing and carrying out airborne operations and providing cover from air concentrations of German troops and transport.
The navy was to neutralize the Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea, guard iron ore transports coming from Sweden, and provide maritime transport in the Baltic to supply active German formations.
The most favorable time of the year for waging war against the Soviet Union was considered the period from mid-May to mid-October (655).
The main idea of the war plan against the USSR in this version was to carry out operations in two strategic directions, which cut into the territory in wedges, which then, after forcing the Dnieper, grew into giant pincers to cover the Soviet troops in the central regions of the country.
There were serious flaws in the plan. As the fascist German command concluded, the plan in this version underestimated the strength of the resistance of the Soviet Army in the border zone and, moreover, was difficult to implement because of the complexity of the planned maneuver and its support. Therefore, the Nazi leadership found it necessary to improve the first version of the plan for the war against the USSR. Its development was continued at the General Staff of the Ground Forces under the leadership of Lieutenant General F. Paulus, and in parallel - at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command, headed by General of Artillery A. Jodl.
By September 15, 1940, Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg, head of the OKW headquarters group, presented General Jodl with a new version of the war plan against the USSR. Lossberg borrowed many ideas from the OKH plan: the same forms of strategic maneuver were proposed - inflicting powerful cutting blows followed by dismemberment, encirclement and destruction of Soviet Army troops in giant cauldrons, reaching the line of the lower reaches of the Don and Volga (from Stalingrad to Gorky), then the Northern Dvina (to Arkhangelsk) (656) .
The new version of the war plan against the USSR had some peculiarities. He allowed for the possibility of an organized withdrawal of Soviet troops from the western defensive lines deep into the country and inflicting counterattacks on the German groups stretched out during the offensive. It was believed that the most favorable situation for the successful completion of the campaign against the USSR would develop if the Soviet troops with their main forces put up stubborn resistance in the border zone. It was assumed that with such a development of events, the German formations, due to their superiority in forces, means and maneuverability, would easily defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the border areas, after which the Soviet command would not be able to organize a planned retreat of its armed forces (657) .
According to the Lossberg project, it was planned to conduct military operations in three strategic directions: Kiev (Ukrainian), Moscow and Leningrad. On each of them it was planned to deploy: from the ground forces - an army group and from the air force - an air fleet. It was assumed that the main blow would be delivered by the southern group of armies (as it “was called in the project) from the region of Warsaw and Southeast Prussia in the general direction of Minsk, Moscow. She was given the bulk of tank and motorized formations. “The southern group of armies,” the project said, “going on the offensive, will direct the main blow into the gap between the Dnieper and the Dvina against the Russian forces in the Minsk region, and then lead the attack on Moscow.” The Northern Army Group was to advance from East Prussia through the lower reaches of the Western Dvina in the general direction of Leningrad. It was assumed that during the offensive, the southern army group would be able, depending on the situation, to turn part of its forces from the line east of the Western Dvina to the north for some time in order to prevent the retreat of the Soviet Army to the east.
To conduct operations south of the Pripyat marshes, Lossberg proposed to concentrate a third army group, the combat strength of which would be equal to a third of the German troops intended for operations north of Polesie. This group was tasked with a double enveloping strike (from the Lublin region and from the line north of the mouth of the Danube) to defeat the troops of the Soviet Army in the south and capture Ukraine (658).
Germany's allies, Finland and Romania, were involved in the war against the USSR. Finnish troops, together with German troops transferred from Norway, were to form a separate task force and advance with part of the forces on Murmansk, and with the main forces - north of Lake Ladoga - on Leningrad. The Romanian army had to cover the German troops operating from the territory of Romania (659).
The German Air Force, under the Lossberg project, provided suppression and destruction of Soviet aviation at airfields, air support for the offensive of German troops in selected strategic directions. The project took into account that the nature of the coastal strip of the Baltic Sea precludes the use of large German surface forces against the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Therefore, the German navy was assigned limited tasks: to ensure the protection of its own coastal strip and close the exits to Soviet ships in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was emphasized that the threat to German communications in the Baltic Sea from the Soviet surface and submarine fleet “will be eliminated only if the Russian naval bases, including Leningrad, are captured during land operations. Then it will be possible to use the sea route to supply the northern wing. Previously, it was impossible to count on a reliable connection by sea between the ports of the Baltic and Finland ”(660) .
The version of the war plan proposed by Lossberg was repeatedly refined. There were also new developments, until in mid-November 1940 the OKH presented a detailed plan for the war, which initially received the code name "Otto". On November 19, Halder reported him to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch. He did not make any significant changes to it. The plan provided for the creation of three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South", which were to advance on Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The main attention was paid to the Moscow direction, where the main forces were concentrated (661).
On December 5, the Otto plan was presented to Hitler. The Führer approved it, emphasizing at the same time that it was important to prevent the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops and achieve the complete destruction of the military potential of the USSR. Hitler demanded that the war be waged in such a way as to destroy the maximum number of Soviet Army forces in the border areas. He instructed to provide for the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Baltic. Army Group South, according to Hitler, should have launched an offensive somewhat later than Army Groups Center and North. It was planned to complete the campaign before the onset of winter cold. “I will not repeat the mistakes of Napoleon. When I go to Moscow, - said the self-confident Fuhrer, - I will act early enough to reach it before winter.
According to the Otto plan, from November 29 to December 7, a war game was held under the leadership of General Paulus. On December 13 and 14, 1940, a discussion took place at the headquarters of the OKH, which, according to Halder, contributed to the development of a common point of view on the main issues of waging war against the USSR. The participants of the discussion came to the conclusion that it would take no more than 8-10 weeks to defeat the Soviet Union.
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR
DIRECTIVE OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES DATED DECEMBER 18, 1940 No. 21 ON THE ATTACK ON THE USSR (PLAN "BARBAROSSA")
[Document 446-PS, US-31]
Directive No. 21 Option "Barbarossa"
The German armed forces must be prepared for the fact that even before the end of the war with England defeat Soviet Russia through a fleeting military operation(option "Barbarossa").
For this army will have to provide all the connections at its disposal, with the only restriction that the occupied areas must be protected from any surprises.
Task air force will consist in releasing for the eastern front the forces necessary to support the army so that a quick ground operation can be counted on, and also that the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft would be the least significant.
The main demand is that the areas of combat operations and combat support under our control be completely protected from enemy air attack and that offensive operations against England and especially against her supply routes should by no means be weakened.
Application center of gravity navy remains during the eastern campaign directed mainly against England.
Order about the offensive on Soviet Russia, I will give, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled start of the operation.
Preparations that require more time should be started (if they have not already started) now and completed by 15-5-41.
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the intention to carry out an attack is not unraveled.
The preparations of the Supreme High Command must be carried out on the basis of the following basic provisions:
common goal
The masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with a deep advance of tank units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the expanses of Russian territory should be prevented.
Then, by rapid pursuit, a line must be reached from which Russian aviation will no longer be in a position to carry out attacks on the German regions. The ultimate goal of the operation is to isolate itself from Asian Russia along the common line Arkhangelsk - Volga. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial area remaining in Russia in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation.
In the course of these operations, the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its strongholds and thus cease to be combat-ready.
Already at the beginning of the operation, the possibility of effective interference by Russian aviation should be prevented by powerful strikes.
Proposed allies and their tasks
1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count on the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
The High Command of the German Army shall timely coordinate and establish in what form the armed forces of both countries will be subordinated to the German command upon their entry into the war.
2. The task of Rumania will be to, together with the group of armed forces advancing there, pin down the enemy forces located against it, and in the rest - to carry out auxiliary service in the rear area.
3. Finland will have to cover the offensive of the German landing northern group (part of the XXI group), which will arrive from Norway, and then operate jointly with it. In addition, Finland will have to liquidate (Russian forces) in Hanko.
4. It can be expected that no later than the operation begins, the Swedish railways and highways will be made available for the advance of the German northern group.
Operation
Army in accordance with the above goals:
In the area of military operations, divided by the swamps of the Pripyat River into northern and southern halves, the center of gravity of the operation should be identified to the north of this area. Two army groups should be provided here.
The southern of these two groups, which forms the center of the common front, will have the task of advancing from the Warsaw area and to the north with the help of specially reinforced tank and motorized units and destroying the Russian armed forces in Belarus. Thus, a prerequisite should be created for the penetration of large forces of mobile troops to the north so that, in cooperation with the northern army group advancing from East Prussia in the direction of Leningrad, destroy the enemy troops fighting in the Baltic. Only after ensuring this urgent task, which should end with the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should offensive operations be continued to capture the most important center of communications and the defense industry - Moscow.
Only the unexpectedly rapid destruction of the resistance of the Russian army could make it possible to strive for the simultaneous completion of both stages of the operation.
The main task of the XXI group during the eastern operation remains the defense of Norway. The forces available in excess of this should be directed in the north (mountain corps) primarily to provide for the Petsamo region and its ore mines, as well as the Arctic Ocean route, and then, together with the Finnish armed forces, advance to the Murmansk railway in order to interrupt the supply of the Murmansk railway by dry route. areas.
Whether such an operation can be carried out with the help of more powerful German armed forces (2-3 divisions) from the Rovaniemi region and to the south of it depends on the readiness of Sweden to provide its railways for this offensive.
The main forces of the Finnish army will be tasked, in accordance with the successes of the German northern flank, to pin down as many Russian forces as possible by attacking to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and also to capture Hanko.
The main task of the army group, located south of the Pripyat swamps, is an offensive from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv, in order to quickly advance with powerful tank forces to the flank and rear of the Russian forces and then attack them as they retreat to the Dnieper.
The German-Romanian army group on the right flank will have the task of:
a) defend Romanian territory and thus the southern flank of the entire operation;
b) during the attack on the northern flank of the southern army group, to tie down the enemy forces against it, and in the event of a successful development of events, through pursuit, in cooperation with the air forces, to prevent the organized withdrawal of the Russians across the Dniester.
In the north - the rapid achievement of Moscow. The capture of this city means both political and economic success, not to mention the fact that the Russians are deprived of the most important railway junction.
Air Armed Forces:
Their task will be, as far as possible, to paralyze and eliminate the influence of Russian aviation, and also to support the operations of the army in its decisive directions, namely: the central army group and - in the decisive flank direction - the southern army group. Russian railways should be cut, depending on their importance for the operation, mainly on their most important nearest objects (bridges over rivers) by capturing them by a bold landing of parachute and airborne units.
In order to concentrate all forces for the fight against enemy aircraft and direct support of the army, attacks on the defense industry should not be made during the main operations. Only after the end of the operation against the means of communication will such attacks become the order of the day and, first of all, against the Ural region.
Navy:
The navy in the war against Soviet Russia will have the task of protecting its own coast and preventing the exit of enemy naval forces from the Baltic Sea. In view of the fact that, upon reaching Leningrad, the Russian Baltic Fleet will lose its last stronghold and will find itself in a hopeless situation, more significant naval operations should be avoided before that.
After the elimination of the Russian fleet, the task will be to fully ensure the supply of the northern flank of the army by sea (clearing mines!).
All orders that will be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this instruction must absolutely definitely proceed from the fact that it is about precautions in case Russia changes its attitude towards us, which it has adhered to until now.
The number of officers called for preliminary training should be as limited as possible, further staff should be brought in as late as possible, and initiated only to the extent necessary for the direct activity of each individual. Otherwise, there is a danger that due to the publicity of our preparations, the implementation of which has not yet been decided at all, grave political and military consequences may arise.
I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief about their further intentions, based on this instruction.
On the planned preparations and their progress in all military units, report to me through the Supreme High Command (OKW).
Approved: Jodl, Keitel.
Signed: Hitler .
Sent out:
To the Supreme High Command of the Ground Forces of the Army (operational department)
-"- fleet (SKl)
copy. #1 -"- №2 -"- №3
-"- №4 -"- №5-9
-"- air force okv:
PCS. hands Armed Forces Department L
FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF COLONEL GENERAL OF THE GERMAN ARMY WALTER WARLIMONT
[Document USSR-263]
On this day, Colonel-General Jodl arrived in a special train to the Reichengalle station, where department "L" of the headquarters of the operational leadership was located ... This immediately caught my eye, because General Jodl had probably not come to us before.
In addition to me, he also ordered three other senior officers to appear ... I cannot repeat his expressions verbatim, but the meaning was as follows: Jodl announced that the Fuhrer had decided to prepare a war against Russia. The Fuhrer substantiated this by saying that the war must take place one way or another, so it would be better if this war were carried out in connection with the already ongoing war and, in any case, begin the necessary preparations for it ... At the same time, or somewhat later, Jodl declared that Hitler intended to start a war against the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1940. However, he later abandoned this plan. The reason for this was that the strategic concentration of the army by this time could not be completed. For this, the necessary prerequisites were missing in Poland: railways, premises for the troops, bridges were not prepared ..., communications, airfields were still not organized ... Therefore, an order was issued that was supposed to provide all the prerequisites for to prepare such a trip and make it happen ...
PAULUS STATEMENT TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
[Document USSR-156]
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR
Moscow
On August 8, 1944, I addressed the German people with an appeal to overthrow Hitler and stop the now senseless war.
Today, when the crimes of Hitler and his accomplices are brought to the judgment of the peoples, I consider it my duty to provide the Soviet Government with everything known to me from my activities that can serve as material in the Nuremberg trials to prove the guilt of war criminals.
From September 3, 1940 to January 18, 1942, I held the position of quartermaster in the general staff of the ground forces. My tasks included replacing the chief of the general staff and carrying out his special assignments. It was only in the autumn of 1941 that I began to lead the departments of the General Staff. Of these, the training department and the organizational department were subordinate to me.
During the specified period of time, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces was Colonel-General Halder.
When I entered the service in the OKH on September 3, 1940, among other plans, I found there a still unfinished preliminary operational plan for an attack on the Soviet Union, known under the symbol “Barbarossa”. The plan was developed by Major General Marks. Marx was the chief of staff of the 18th Army (Field Marshal von Küchler) and was temporarily sent to the OKH to develop this plan.
This plan, which was developed on the orders of the OKW, was given to me by Colonel General Halder with the task of analyzing the possibilities of offensive operations, taking into account the conditions of the terrain, the use of forces, the required strength, etc. in the presence of 130-140 divisions.
According to the plan of the OKW, the operational task was: first - the capture of Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine, later - the North Caucasus with its oil sources. The ultimate goal was to reach approximately the line Astrakhan - Arkhangelsk.
The goal set by itself characterizes this plan as the preparation of the purest aggression; this is also clear from the fact that the plan did not provide for defensive measures at all ...
This thereby debunks the false allegations about a preventive war against a threatening danger, which were spread by the OKW in a similar way to the rabid Goebbels propaganda.
Preparations are also beginning in advance with the future partner in aggression - Romania, which, in the preliminary plan of Barbarossa, was envisaged from the very beginning as a springboard for the offensive.
In September 1940, by order of the OKW, a military mission and the 13th Panzer Division were sent to Romania as an exemplary unit.
General of the cavalry Hansen was placed at the head of the military mission. Major General Gauffe was appointed chief of his staff, Major Merck was appointed chief quartermaster, Major General von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.
The task of the military mission was to reorganize the Romanian army and prepare it for an attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of the Barbarossa plan. General Hansen and his chief of staff received a preliminary orientation in this task from me, an assignment from Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
General Hansen received directives from two places: in the line of the military mission - from the OKW, on ground forces - from the OKH, directives of a military-political nature only from the OKW. Communication between the German General Staff and the Romanian General Staff was carried out through the military mission.
While there was a secret alliance with Romania already in September 1940, ties with the other two satellites during this period of preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union were weaker, or rather, more cautious.
So, for example, the establishment of communication with the Finnish General Staff to clarify offensive capabilities in the Murmansk direction was allowed to the chief of staff of the army grouping (Norway), Colonel Buschenhagen, only at the end of February 1941.
The question of cooperation with Hungary under the Barbarossa plan remained unanswered for months. However, Finland always remained a theater of operations directly subordinate to the OKW. It was significant, however, that the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant-General Heinrichs, came to the OKW and OKH in mid-December 1940. Taking advantage of this opportunity, he made a report to the General Staff officers from the OKH about the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. and about his experience of the war. The report clearly expressed the general interest in a military clash with the Red Army. Heinrichs assessed the Red Army as a serious enemy.
The visit in the second half of December 1940 by Colonel Laszlo, Chief of the Task Force of the Hungarian General Staff, was limited to purely organizational matters.
Meanwhile, the preparatory measures for the Barbarossa plan by the end of 1940 had moved forward significantly.
Started in August 1940, the development of the preliminary plan for Barbarossa ended with two war games under my direction at the OKH headquarters in Zossen.
The games were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and senior specially invited staff officers from the OKH.
The result of the games, taken as the basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line - a distant target of the OKW - should have led to the complete defeat of the Soviet state, which, in fact, was achieved by OKW and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country.
During the games, Colonel Kinzel, head of the Vostok department of foreign armies, gave an assessment of the Soviet Union.
The speaker's conclusions were based on the assumptions that the Red Army was a noteworthy adversary, that there were no reports of special military preparations, and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed.
Decisive in the further preparatory work for the Barbarossa plan was that the OKW directive of December 18, 1940, set the start of the offensive at approximately mid-May 1941. The appointed time was due to Russian climatic conditions.
At the same time, the circle of employees was expanded with the involvement of the commanders of the three planned army groups, who, at a meeting in the OKH in Zossen, were privy to all the details of this plan.
These commanders were: General of the Infantry von Zodenstern for the future army group "Süd"; infantry general von Salmuth for the Center group; Lieutenant General Brenneke for the Nord grouping.
At the same time, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, approved the planned OKH operations reported to him by Brauchitsch and Halder and ordered the development of final directives for the strategic deployment of forces.
With this, the military command finally decided on the violation of the treaty, on the attack and on the war of conquest against the Soviet Union.
Further development of the plan was taken over by the head of the operations department, Colonel Heusinger, who was directly subordinate to the chief of the general staff.
On February 3, 1941, in Berchtesgaden, following a report by Brauchitsch, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, approved the first directive for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces.
The head of the operations department, Colonel Heusinger, the quartermaster general Wagner, the chief of transport, General Gercke, and myself, as deputy chief of the general staff, who was on vacation, were also present, who were accompanying Brauchitsch.
Hitler gave permission to the OKW, regarding it as an important political decision, to negotiate with the Romanian and Finnish General Staffs. He forbade negotiations with Hungary until further notice.
In general, Hitler in military matters was engaged in trifles, such as, for example, the introduction of individual long-range guns.
In matters relating to the Soviet Union, he did not express his position either politically or militarily.
During the aforementioned meeting with Hitler, Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg of the OKW told me about the following expression by Jodl:
“Three weeks after our offensive, this house of cards will fall apart.”
This statement, as presumptuous as it is frivolous, characterizes the entire spiritual baseness of the Nazi leadership and its authoritative advisers, Keitel and Jodl.
This remark also testifies to the absence of any embarrassment regarding the planned war of conquest and betrays their true opinion, covered with a conscious lie, about the threat from Russia as the reason for the planned attack.
On the way to attack the Soviet Union, these dangerous peace breakers had to remove one more obstacle - the threat to the flank from Yugoslavia.
For this purpose, in April 1941, an attack was made on this country as well.
On March 27, 1941, I met in the Imperial Chancellery all three - Hitler, Keitel and Jodl, who had gathered just after this decision had been made and the tasks assigned by Brauchitsch and Halder for its implementation.
By virtue of this idea, the OKW was compelled to give the order to postpone the implementation of the Barbarossa plan to the second half of June.
Due to the close connection of the Yugoslav question with the offensive against Russia, on March 30, 1941, I was sent by Halder to Budapest, to the chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General of the Infantry Werth, in order to come to an agreement with the Hungarians, who also wanted to tear off a piece of this booty for themselves, regarding the implementation of the Yugoslav operation both with regard to the participation of the Hungarians themselves, and on the question of the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory.
The attack on Yugoslavia led to a change in the directive on the strategic deployment of forces under the Barbarossa plan, since there were not enough troops for the offensive from Romania, which were connected in the Balkans.
All the commanders-in-chief of the troops, navy and aviation report to Hitler, Keitel and Jodl on the tasks ahead of them in carrying out the German invasion of Soviet Russia.
In Stalingrad on the Volga, this course reached its climax with the concentration of all the phenomena that accompanied the Nazi war of conquest.
In view of the weighty fact that the 6th Army came to Stalingrad as a result of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, all the sacrifices and sorrows that the Soviet people suffered in their just struggle receive an exalted significance in the light of guilt and responsibility.
1. The war criminals Keitel and Jodl are guilty of the fact that, due to the refusal of my repeated urgent demands for a breakthrough from the closed ring, telegrams dated November 22, 23, 25, 1942 and beyond, almost daily from December 8 to the end of December, - Stalingrad has become a zone of extermination for the Russian civilian population located there.
2. They bear, moreover, the responsibility for the fundamental prohibition of the surrender of troops in a hopeless situation, and especially for the refusal of my urgent request of 01/20/43 for permission to surrender.
The consequence of the refusal was the death and severe suffering of Russian prisoners of war and the local population.
3. The war criminals Keitel, Jodl and Goering are guilty of not fulfilling their solemn promises to deliver supplies by air to the 6th Army encircled in Stalingrad.
The accused Göring still bears particular blame for the fact that he not only failed to fulfill his promise to deliver the missing foodstuffs, medicines and dressings by air, but even for his frivolous promise to take over the supply by air, which prompted Hitler and Keitel to provide the 6th army to your destiny.
The consequences were: starvation and death from exhaustion of many Russian prisoners of war and the Russian civilian population.
4. The accused Keitel, Jodl and Goering bear significant guilt for not drawing the necessary conclusions of political and military significance from the Stalingrad catastrophe.
Therefore, as well as for the further conduct of the war, they are especially guilty for all the losses, mainly for the losses of the Soviet people.
I myself bear a heavy responsibility for the fact that at that time, near Stalingrad, I quite conscientiously carried out the orders of military leaders who acted deliberately criminally.
I am also responsible for the fact that I did not control the fulfillment of my order of 01/14/1943 on the transfer of all prisoners of war to the Russian side, which led to deaths among them, and for not taking care of them anymore.
As a survivor of Stalingrad, I consider myself obliged to give satisfaction to the Russian people.
Paulus, Field Marshal.
POW camp 9.1.1946
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF THE FORMER GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL OF THE GERMAN ARMY FRIEDRICH PAULUS IN THE COURT SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL ON FEBRUARY 11, 1946
On September 3, 1940, I began to work in the High Command of the Ground Forces as quartermaster on the general staff. As such, I had to replace the Chief of the General Staff, and otherwise I had to carry out individual operational tasks that were assigned to me. At the time of my appointment, in the area in which I was supposed to work, I also found an operational plan that was not yet ready, which concerned an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan was then worked out by Major General Marx, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose was temporarily at the disposal of the High Command of the Ground Forces. The chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel-General Halder, entrusted me with the further development of this plan, begun on the basis of the directive of the OKW, and, in particular, I had to carry out this on the following basis. It was necessary to analyze the possibilities of an offensive against Soviet Russia. This check had to be made in relation to the analysis of the terrain, in relation to the use of forces, capabilities and force requirements, etc., while it was indicated that I should proceed from 130 to 140 divisions that would be available for this operation. .
Further, from the very beginning it was necessary to take into account the use of Romanian territory as a springboard for the southern grouping of German troops. On the northern flank, Finland's participation in the war was envisaged, but this moment was not taken into account during the development of preliminary operational plans.
As a basis for the measures taken, the objectives of the operation were taken into account: first, the intention of the OKW to destroy the Russian troops stationed in Western Russia and prevent the possibility of retreat of military units into the depths of Russia; secondly, to reach a line that would make it impossible for Russian air forces to carry out effective raids on the territory of the German Empire. The ultimate goal was to reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line.
The development which I have now outlined was completed at the beginning of November and ended with two war games, which I supervised on behalf of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. This was attended by senior officers of the General Staff. As a basis for these military games, the use of forces was envisaged in this way: in the southern region, an army grouping from the region of southern Poland and Romania, which was supposed to reach the Dnieper and Kyiv. From the north - the army grouping in the Pripyat region, the strongest, was to advance from the Warsaw region and to the north, in the direction of the main attack on Minsk and Smolensk, with the final intention to subsequently strike Moscow, then another group from the East Prussian space, which was across the Baltic to Leningrad.
The results obtained from these games boiled down to reaching the Dnieper-Minsk-Leningrad line. Further operations were to develop in connection with the situation that would be established as a result of these actions. At the end of these games, a meeting was held with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, which used the theoretical results of these military games with the involvement of the heads of individual headquarters of army groups that were responsible for operations in the East. At the end of this meeting, a report was made by the head of the department of the armies of the East, who made a report on the economy and geographical characteristics of the Soviet Union, as well as in relation to the characteristics of the troops of the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that at that time nothing was known about any preparations on the part of Russia. These war games and meetings, which I have just spoken about, were, so to speak, the theoretical part and the planning of a future aggressive war, were, so to speak, the completion of this planning.
Immediately afterwards, on December 18, 1940, the High Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive No. 21 (this directive was the basis for all military and economic preparations for war). Based on this directive, it was necessary to carry out all actions related to the war. With regard to the high command of the ground forces, this was expressed in the fact that it was necessary to take care of the development of the strategic deployment of forces. These first directives concerning the deployment of forces were approved by Hitler on February 3, 1941, after the report at Obersalzberg. They were then released to the troops. Subsequently, various additions were made to them. The beginning of the war was dated for the time that would be most expedient for the advancement of large military units on the territory of Russia. Opportunities for such a promotion were expected in mid-May. And accordingly all preparations were made. This plan, however, was changed, since at the end of March Hitler decided, on the basis of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack Yugoslavia.
As a result of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, Hitler changed the timing of the offensive. The offensive was to be delayed by about five weeks, i.e. the offensive was scheduled for the second half of June. And, indeed, this offensive took place in the second half, namely, on June 22, 1941.
In conclusion, I want to establish that all preparations for this attack on the USSR, which took place on June 22, were already underway in the autumn of 1940 ...
Approximately in September 1940, just when I was occupied with the operational development of an attack on the Soviet Union, it was already then envisaged that the Romanian territory would be used as a springboard for attacks by the right, i.e. southern grouping of German troops. A military mission was sent under the leadership of the cavalry general Hansen to Romania. Further, a tank division was sent as a model division to Romania. It was clear to all those who were privy to these plans that this event could only serve to alert future military partners. Next, regarding Hungary. In December 1940, the head of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, arrived at the main command of the ground forces in Zossen and asked for advice on organizational issues. The Hungarian troops were engaged just at that time in the reorganization of brigades and divisions and the deployment of motorized and tank units. The head of the organizational department of the general staff, Major General Boulet, and I gave Colonel Laszlo some advice on this matter. At the same time, a number of Hungarian military missions were sent to Berlin, including the Hungarian Minister of War, who entered into negotiations with the relevant military authorities in Germany regarding the supply of weapons for the war.
It was clear to all of us who were privy to these plans that all these measures relating to the transfer of weapons to other armies were conceivable only if and clearly boiled down to the fact that military operations were coming in the future and that these weapons would be used in these future military operations. actions in the interests of Germany.
With regard to Hungary, one could say the following. As a result of developments in Yugoslavia, Hitler at the end of March 1940 decided to attack Yugoslavia. On March 27 or 28 I was called to the Imperial Chancellery in Berlin, where at that time a conference was held between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl. This meeting was also attended by the commander of the ground forces and the chief of the general staff of the ground forces. On my arrival, General Halder - Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - informed me that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and thereby remove the threat from the flank for future operations in the Greek area, and in order to seize the railway line from Belgrade to Nis, and for in order to further ensure the implementation of the Barbarossa plan in the sense of freeing their right flank. I was instructed to enlist a number of appropriate officers of the general staff of the ground forces and travel with them to Vienna in order to explain and convey the relevant orders to the German commanders who took part in these operations. I was then to go to Budapest, to the Hungarian General Staff, to discuss and come to an agreement on the use of Austria as a springboard for the German troops, and also to agree on the participation of the Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.
On March 30, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and negotiated with the Chief of the General Staff of Hungary, Infantry General Werther, then with the Chief of the Task Force of the General Staff of Hungary, Colonel Laszlo. The meeting proceeded without any friction and led to the desired result. This result was recorded on the map. On the map, which was handed over to me by the Hungarian General Staff, not only the actions of the groups advancing against Yugoslavia were plotted, but also the alignment of all forces that were located on the border of Transcarpathian Ukraine. This arrangement was envisaged as a cover from the Soviet Union.
The fact that such a grouping existed is proof that there was also a conviction on the part of Hungary that a German attack on Yugoslavia would be regarded by the Soviet Union as an act of aggression. As regards the principal position regarding Hungary's position in terms of participating in such preparations, I knew Hitler's opinion that Hungary was striving with the help of Germany to regain and expand the territories that Hungary had lost in 1918. In addition, Hungary fears the strengthening of another ally of Germany - Romania.
From this point of view, Hitler considered the participation of Hungary in his political course. Hitler, as far as I could see from a number of other examples, treated Hungary very reservedly. First, he sought to hide from Hungary future plans for the offensive, as he feared her connections with states hostile to Germany. Secondly, Hitler did not seek to make premature promises to Hungary in terms of territorial acquisitions.
I can give an example in relation to the area of oil sources - Drohobych. Subsequently, when the offensive against the Soviet Union began, the German 17th Army, which fought in this area, received strict instructions under all conditions to occupy the oil region of Drohobych before the approach of the Hungarian troops.
With regard to this future military partner, according to my observations, Hitler behaved as if, on the one hand, he definitely counted on the participation of Hungary and therefore supplied Hungary with weapons and helped her in training troops, but still did not set a date when he informs this partner about his final plans.
Next, a question concerning Finland. In December 1940, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, Chief of the Finnish General Staff, made his first visit to the main headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs conferred with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces. I no longer remember the content of this conversation, but he made a report there concerning the Russian-Finnish war of 1939-1940. This report was made for the officers of the General Staff of the OKH. This report was also addressed to those chiefs of staff of the army groupings who participated in the military games. This report for the General Staff officers was of great importance at that time, since it was made when Directive No. 21 of December 18 was issued. This report was of great importance because it was an exchange of experience of the war with the Soviet Union.
The second visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff to Zossen took place approximately in the second half of March 1941. The Finnish Chief of the General Staff then arrived from Salzburg, where he had a conference with the High Command of the German Armed Forces. The subject of discussion in Zossen was the coordination of the actions of the Finnish southern group for Operation Barbarossa, the coordination of the actions of this group with the German army group North, which was supposed to move from East Prussia in the direction of Leningrad. Then it was agreed that the action of the Finnish southern grouping should have been coordinated with the action of the German northern grouping. Coordinated actions against Leningrad of these groups were stipulated, and the actions of the Finnish grouping had to depend on the actions of the German one and had to develop depending on the situation ...
The attack on the Soviet Union took place, as I have already said, after lengthy preparations and according to a strictly thought-out plan. The troops that were to carry out the attack were first deployed in the appropriate bridgehead. Only by special order were they partially withdrawn to their original positions and then simultaneously marched along the entire front line - from Romania to East Prussia. The Finnish theater of operations should be excluded from this. Just as the operational plan was thought out and analyzed, so was the analysis of the offensive at the headquarters of army groups, corps and divisions in a whole series of military games. The results of this analysis were recorded long before the start of the war in the relevant orders, which dealt with all the details of the offensive. A very complex deception was organized, which was carried out from Norway and also from the French coast. These operations were supposed to create the appearance of operations planned against England, and were thereby supposed to divert Russia's attention. However, not only operational surprises were foreseen. All tactical possibilities to mislead the enemy were also provided. This meant that, by prohibiting clear reconnaissance on the border, they allowed for possible losses in order to achieve a surprise attack. But this also meant that there was no fear that the enemy would suddenly try to cross the border ...
The ultimate goal of the attack, which was to advance to the Volga, exceeded the strength and ability of the German army. And this goal characterizes the aggressive policy of Hitler and the Nazi state that knew no limits.
From a strategic point of view, the achievement of this goal would mean the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The capture of this line would mean the capture and subjugation of the main regions of Soviet Russia, including the capital of Moscow, and thus the political and economic centers of Soviet Russia.
The economic capture of this Volga-Arkhangelsk line would mean the possession of the most important sources of food, the most important minerals, including the oil sources of the Caucasus, as well as the most important industrial centers of Russia and further the central transport network of the European part of Russia. How much this corresponded to Hitler's aspirations, corresponded to his economic interest in this war, this can be judged by the example that I personally know. On June 1, 1942, at a meeting of commanders of the southern army grouping in the Poltava region, Hitler declared that if he did not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, then he would have to end this war. For the exploitation and administration of the occupied territories, all economic and administrative organizations and institutions were created even before the start of the war. In conclusion, I would like to say: these goals meant the conquest for the purpose of colonization of Russian territories, the exploitation of which and the resources of which were to make it possible to end the war in the West with the aim of finally establishing German domination in Europe ...
FROM THE WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE FIRST DEPARTMENT OF THE GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL HANS PIKKENBROK DATED DECEMBER 12, 1945
[Document USSR-228]
For the first time I learned about the impending war of Germany against the Soviet Union under the following circumstances.
At the end of December 1940 or at the beginning of January 1941, I don’t remember exactly, I, together with Admiral Canaris, was at the next report from Field Marshal Keitel in Berchtesgaden. This report was also attended by General Jodl. When we finished the report, General Jodl invited Canaris and me to his office, saying that he had something to tell us. The conversation lasted only a few minutes. Jodl told us that in our work we must count on the fact that in the summer of 1941 Germany would go to war with the Soviet Union.
Speaking about the upcoming war with Russia as a finally resolved issue, Jodl said that the German General Staff was no longer interested in certain information about the Red Army and, in connection with this, he set only one task - to monitor what was happening with the Russians on Soviet-German border. Jodl also told us that Hitler was of the opinion that after the first successful battles with the Red Army units on the border, the Soviet Union would burst like a soap bubble, and victory over Russia would be assured. With this, Jodl's conversation with us was over.
Before Jodl's message, no one told us about preparing for a war against Russia.
However, I must say that as early as August-September 1940, reconnaissance missions for the Abwehr in the USSR began to increase significantly from the Foreign Armies Department of the General Staff. These tasks, of course, were connected with the preparation of the war against Russia.
I became aware of the more precise timing of the German attack on the Soviet Union in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he informed me that the attack on the Soviet Union was scheduled for May 15th.
At the same time, Canaris told me that all the preparations for this attack would be conditionally called the "Plan Barbarossa."
In March 1941, I witnessed a conversation between Canaris and the head of the sabotage and sabotage department of the Abwehr-2, Colonel Lahousen, about the measures under the "Barbarossa plan", while they all the time referred to Lahousen's written order on this matter.
I personally, as the head of the Abwehr-1, from February 1941 until June 22, 1941, repeatedly conducted business negotiations with Oberkvartmeister IV Lieutenant-General Tippelskirch and Colonel Kinzel, head of the Foreign Armies - East department. These conversations concerned the clarification of various tasks for the Abwehr in the Soviet Union and, in particular, the re-checking of old intelligence data about the Red Army, as well as the clarification of the deployment of Soviet troops during the preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.
To carry out these tasks, I sent a significant number of agents to the areas of the demarcation line between the Soviet and German troops. For intelligence purposes, we also used some of the German nationals who traveled to the USSR on various issues, and also interviewed people who had previously been to the USSR.
In addition, all the peripheral intelligence departments of the Abwehrshtelle, which were working against Russia, were given the task of intensifying the sending of agents to the USSR. The same task - strengthening undercover work against the USSR, was given to all intelligence agencies that were available in the armies and army groups. For more successful leadership of all these bodies of the Abwehr, in May 1941, a special intelligence headquarters was created, which bore the code name "Valli-1". This headquarters was stationed near Warsaw in the town of Sulievek.
Major Bown was appointed as the head of "Vally-1" as the best specialist in work against Russia. Later, when, following our example, the Abwehr-2 and Abwehr-1 also created the Wally-2 and Wally-3 headquarters, the body as a whole was called the Wally headquarters and directed all intelligence, counterintelligence and sabotage work against the USSR. Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschleger was at the head of the Wally headquarters.
From the repeated reports of Colonel Lahousen to Canaris, which I also attended, I know that through this department a lot of preparatory work was carried out for the war with the Soviet Union during the period February - May 1941, there were repeated meetings of the leading workers of the Abwehr-2 with Deputy Jodl General Warlimont. These meetings were held at the cavalry school in the town of Krampnitz. In particular, at these meetings, in accordance with the requirements of the war with Russia, the issue of increasing the Brandenburg-800 special-purpose units and distributing the contingent of these units to separate military formations was resolved.
I wrote down my own testimony. pickenbrock
FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE III DEPARTMENT OF THE GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANZ VON BENTIVENI DATED DECEMBER 28, 1945
[Document USSR-230]
I first learned about Germany's preparations for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940 from the head of German intelligence and counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris. In an informal conversation that took place in Canaris's office, he informed me that Hitler had begun to carry out measures for the implementation of the campaign to the East, which he announced back in 1938 in his speech at the Berlin meeting of Gauleiters.
Canaris further told me that now these designs of Hitler began to take shape. This can be seen at least from the fact that the divisions of the German army are being transferred in large numbers from the west to the eastern borders and, according to Hitler's special order, are placed at the starting positions of the upcoming invasion of Russia.
At the end of our conversation, Canaris warned me about the extreme secrecy of his communication about plans to prepare an attack on the Soviet Union.
Further, around October 1940, Canaris also told me in an informal conversation that Field Marshal Brauchitsch and General Halder, on Hitler's orders, developed a general plan for preparing for war against the Soviet Union.
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The Land of the Soviets was for German imperialism the main obstacle on the way to the establishment of world domination. German fascism, acting as the shock fist of international reaction, in the war against the USSR sought to destroy the Soviet social system, and not only to seize its territory, that is, pursued class goals. This was the fundamental difference between the war of fascist Germany against the USSR and the wars it waged against the capitalist countries.
By destroying the world's first socialist state - the main force of social progress - the Nazis hoped to deliver a mortal blow to the international workers' and national liberation movement, to reverse the social development of mankind. Hitler admitted to M. Bormann that the purpose of his whole life and the meaning of the existence of National Socialism was the destruction of Bolshevism ( Le testament politique de Hitler. Paris, 1959, p. 61.).
The war against the USSR was considered by the fascists as a special war in which they staked on the physical extermination of the majority of Soviet people - the bearers of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. At a meeting of the leadership of the Wehrmacht on March 30, 1941, the head of the fascist state, as evidenced by the diary of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, summarized: “We are talking about the struggle for annihilation ... In the East, cruelty itself is good for the future” ( F. Halder. Military diary, vol. 2, pp. 430 - 431.). The Nazi leadership demanded the merciless destruction of not only the fighters of the Soviet Army, but also the civilian population of the USSR.
The documents of the fascist Reich testify that the Soviet state was subject to dismemberment and complete liquidation. It was supposed to form four Reichskommissariats on its territory - German colonial provinces: "Ostland", "Ukraine", "Moscow" and "Caucasus", which were to be managed by a special "Eastern Ministry" headed by A. Rosenberg ( V. Dashichev. The Bankruptcy of the Strategy of German Fascism, vol. 2, p. 18.).
According to the "Instructions on Special Areas", signed by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal W. Keitel, the commander of the occupying armed forces was appointed the highest representative of the armed forces on the territory of the Reichskommissariats. He was endowed with dictatorial powers.
The criminal goals of the German imperialists in relation to the peoples of Eastern Europe, and especially to the peoples of the Land of Soviets, are convincingly shown by the so-called General Plan "Ost", the directive "On Special Jurisdiction in the Barbarossa Area and Special Measures for the Troops", instructions on the attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war and other documents.
Although the master plan "Ost" has not yet been found in the original, the materials at the disposal of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal give a clear idea of \u200b\u200bit ( The plan was developed by the main department of imperial security. On May 25, 4940, the considerations for this plan were presented to Hitler, who approved them as a directive. Subsequently, additions and changes were made to the general plan "Ost" aimed at implementing the predatory goals of German fascism on the territory of the USSR (The defeat of German imperialism in the Second World War. Articles in documents. M., 1960, pp. 225 - 236).). This plan provided for the colonization of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the destruction of millions of people, the transformation into slaves of the Reich of the surviving Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, as well as Poles, Czechs and other peoples of Eastern Europe. It was planned to evict within 30 years 65 percent of the population of Western Ukraine, 75 percent of the population of Belarus, 80-85 percent of the Poles from the territory of Poland, a significant part of the population of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - about 31 million people in total. Later, the German leadership increased the number of persons to be evicted from Eastern Europe to 46-51 million people. It was planned to resettle 10 million Germans on the "liberated" lands, and gradually "Germanize" the remaining local residents (according to the calculations of the Nazis, about 14 million people) ( The Defeat of German Imperialism in the Second World War, pp. 227 - 232.).
In the occupied territory of the Soviet Union, the Nazis provided for the destruction of higher and secondary schools. They believed that the education of the enslaved peoples should be the most elementary - it is enough for a person to be able to sign and count to 500 at the most. The main goal of education, in their opinion, was to inspire the Soviet population with the need for unquestioning obedience to the Germans ( Ibid., pp. 226 - 227.).
The fascist invaders intended to "defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them." At the same time, the leaders of the "Eastern policy" planned to divide the territory of the Soviet Union, "inhabited by Russians, into various political regions with their own governing bodies" and "to ensure separate national development in each of them" ( "Top secret! Only for command!”, p. 101.). The general plan "Ost" planned the extermination of the Russian intelligentsia as the bearer of the culture of the people, their scientific and technical knowledge, as well as an artificial reduction in the birth rate.
The program for the mass extermination of Soviet people was the directive “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region and special measures of the troops”, signed by the chief of staff of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command on May 13, 1941. It relieved Wehrmacht soldiers and officers of responsibility for future crimes in the occupied territory of the USSR, demanding to be ruthless towards Soviet citizens, carry out mass repressions and shoot on the spot without trial anyone who shows even the slightest resistance or sympathizes with the partisans.
For Soviet people who were in captivity, it was prescribed to create a regime of inhuman conditions and terror: to set up camps in the open, fencing them only with barbed wire; use prisoners only for hard, exhausting work and keep them on half-starvation rations, and if they try to escape, they are shot without warning.
The bestial appearance of fascism is revealed by the "Instruction on the treatment of political commissars" dated June 6, 1941, which demanded the extermination of all political workers of the Soviet Army ( Fall Barbarassa, S. 321-323.).
Thus, fascist Germany was preparing to destroy the Land of Soviets, turn it into its colony, exterminate most of the Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves.
The economic goals of the aggression included the robbery of the Soviet state, the depletion of its material resources, the use of the public and personal wealth of the Soviet people for the needs of the "Third Reich". “According to the orders of the Fuhrer,” one of the directives of the fascist German command said, “it is necessary to take all measures for the immediate and complete use of the occupied regions in the interests of Germany ... To get Germany as much food and oil as possible is the main economic goal of the campaign” ( Ibid., S. 365.).
The initiators of the economic robbery of the USSR were the German military-industrial concerns that brought Hitler to power. Specific proposals and directives on the use of the economic resources of the USSR during the war were developed by the department of the military economy and armaments, which was part of the Design Bureau. This department was headed by General of the Infantry G. Thomas, a member of the supervisory board of the Goering and Bergman-Borsig concerns and a member of the arms council, which included such representatives of the German monopolies as Zengen, Vogler, Pensgen ( G. Rozanov. Plan Barbarossa. Ideas and ending. M., 1970, p. 65.).
In November 1940, Thomas's administration began developing proposals for the use of economic resources for the needs of the Wehrmacht already in the first months of the war against the USSR throughout its European part up to the Ural Mountains. The proposals noted that it was necessary to prevent the destruction by the Soviet Army during the retreat of food supplies, raw materials and industrial goods, the destruction of defense industry plants, mines and railway lines. Particular attention was paid to the importance of capturing the Caucasian oil-bearing region. The mastery of the Caucasus, as well as the region of the mouth of the Volga, was proposed to be included among the most important tasks of the eastern campaign ( The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940 - 1942). Washington, 1955, p. 20 - 21.).
In order to obtain and study detailed data on the Soviet military industry, on the sources of raw materials and fuel, at the beginning of 1941, a department of the military-economic headquarters for special purposes was formed in Thomas’s administration under the code name “Oldenburg” ( Fall Barbarossa, S. 356.). For the high command and industrial circles of Germany, Thomas's department compiled a certificate containing an assessment of the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union as of March 1941. A card index was attached to it listing the most important factories of the USSR ( Ibid., S. 89-108.). Based on these and other documents, plans were developed for the economic robbery of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. On February 12, 1941, under the chairmanship of Goering, a meeting was held on the "Eastern Question", at which the goals of the economic robbery of the USSR were explained. “The supreme goal of all activities carried out in the east,” Goering said at this meeting, “should be to strengthen the military potential of the Reich. The task is to withdraw from the new eastern regions the largest quantity of agricultural products, raw materials, labor power" ( D. Projector. Aggression and disaster. M., 1972, p. 178.).
On April 29, 1941, the Nazi leadership clarified the functions of the Oldenburg headquarters and expanded its structure. With the outbreak of hostilities against the Soviet Union, the headquarters was entrusted with the management of the economy of the occupied territory of the USSR. 5 economic inspections, 23 economic teams and 12 of their branches were subordinate to the local headquarters. In the rear of each of the army groups, an economic inspectorate was to operate, the task of which was the "economic use" of this territory.
The organizational structures of the Oldenburg headquarters, economic inspections and commands were identical. In each link, the following were established: "Group M", which was responsible for supplying and arming the troops and for organizing transportation; "Group L", which was in charge of food supply and agriculture; "group B", responsible for the state of trade and industry, as well as dealing with forestry, financial and banking problems, the exchange of goods and the distribution of labor ( Anatomy of war. New documents on the role of German monopoly capital in the preparation and conduct of the Second World War (hereinafter referred to as the Anatomy of War). Translation from German. M., 1971, pp. 319, 320.).
The headquarters of "Oldenburg" developed instructions and directives for managing the economy of the occupied regions of the USSR. These documents were brought together in the so-called "Green folder" ( "Top secret! Only for command!”, p. 100.). They detailed the goals and sequence of the economic robbery of the Soviet Union. The documents of the "Green Folder" provided for the immediate export to Germany of stocks of valuable raw materials (platinum, magnesite, rubber, etc.) and equipment. Other important types of raw materials were to be preserved until the moment when “the economic teams following the troops decide whether these raw materials will be processed in the occupied regions or exported to Germany” ( Fall Barbarossa. S. 395.). Most of the Soviet industrial enterprises that produced peaceful products were planned to be destroyed. Which branch of industrial production was to be preserved, restored or organized again in the occupied regions of the USSR, the fascist leadership determined, based only on the needs of the German military machine ( Ibid., S. 365.).
The Nazi invaders expected to provide their armed forces with food by robbing the occupied regions of the USSR, which doomed the local population to starvation. “Undoubtedly,” it was said at one of the meetings on economic issues on May 2, 1941, “if we manage to pump out everything that we need from the country, then tens of millions of people will die of starvation” ( Ibid., S. 362.).
The military goals of Nazi Germany's aggression against the USSR were to defeat the Soviet Armed Forces and occupy most of the European territory of the Soviet Union up to the Volga and the Northern Dvina in the course of a fleeting summer campaign even before the end of the war with England. The achievement of these goals was the central link in the fascist plans for the conquest of world domination. The geopolitical theory of K. Gaushofer, which was one of the foundations of the fascist ideology and German military doctrine, said: whoever owns Eastern Europe from the Elbe to the Volga, he owns all of Europe and, ultimately, the whole world ( "Zeitschrift fur Militargeschichte", 1964, No. 6, S. 932.).
The political, economic and military goals of Germany in the war against the USSR were closely interconnected and reflected the combined interests of the German monopolies, the fascist leadership and the command of the Wehrmacht.
Western military experts in their assessment of the combat power of the Red Army were divided into optimists and pessimists. Optimists believed that the Red Army would hold out against the Germans for four months; pessimists gave her no more than four weeks. Thus, US Secretary of the Navy Franklin William Knox wrote to President Roosevelt that "Hitler will need from six weeks to three months to deal with Russia." British and German military experts had broadly similar assessments.
By the end of October 1941 - at the end of the fourth month of the war - everything looked in favor of the opinion of the optimists, and the USSR (this "clay colossus without a head", as the hundred "Fuhrer" called it) was on the verge of complete disaster. The cadre Red Army, which entered the war on June 22, 1941, was completely destroyed. Only the Germans captured by that time up to 3 million Red Army soldiers. Almost all the huge stocks of weapons and military equipment that the Soviets had at the start of the war were destroyed or captured (for example, from July to December 1941, the Red Army lost 20.5 thousand tanks and 18 thousand aircraft).
By the end of October, after the monstrous defeat near Vyazma, the Soviet command had nothing to defend Moscow - from Podolsk to the defenseless capital of the Soviet Union there was a giant German tank column, and there were no Soviet military units in its path, except for the Podolsk military school. The panic that seized Moscow at that time seemed to be a harbinger of an imminent end.
Two months later, however, for the first time since the outbreak of World War II, the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht was put to flight. German troops
were thrown back from the Soviet capital, having suffered great damage. Only at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices did the German command manage to achieve stabilization of the Eastern Front by the spring of 1942, but the blitzkrieg had to be forgotten. Germany again, as during the First World War, faced the nightmare of a protracted war on two fronts.
The beginning of the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition.
The unexpected resilience shown by the Soviet Union served as the basis for the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition. During the first months of the war, Western politicians could be convinced that the USSR would not become easy prey for the Wehrmacht, and that therefore it makes sense to help the Soviet Union.
On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was concluded, according to which the parties pledged to provide each other with assistance and support in the war against Nazi Germany, and not to conduct separate negotiations and not to conclude a separate peace. The first practical consequence of this agreement was the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Northern and Southern Iran (August 25, 1941), which was of tremendous importance in terms of ensuring Anglo-Soviet interests in the region and supplying the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease through Iran. On August 16, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was concluded on mutual deliveries, credit and payment procedures.
However, with regard to practical assistance to the Russian front - both in the form of supplies and in the form of opening a second front - in London and Washington they were inclined to wait until the summer-autumn campaign in Russia was completed and its results were finally clear. Such, in particular, were the instructions received by the personal representative of President F. D. Roosevelt Harry Hopkins before his visit to the USSR in July - August 1941.
During the Moscow Conference of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (September 29 - October 1, 1941), in which the USA was represented by Averell Harriman, and England by William Aigken, Baron Beaverbrook, a decision was made on monthly US-British deliveries to the USSR in the amount of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks. To finance supplies to the Soviet Union, the American lend-lease law was extended to it. The USSR was granted an interest-free loan of $1 billion.
However, a month after the Moscow Conference, the Soviet leadership had serious questions for its Western allies:
- 1) the volume of Western aid to the Soviet Union turned out to be less than the Kremlin expected (and after the summer-autumn campaign, the army had to be created, in fact, anew, and all these Western supplies were urgently needed in conditions when Stalin distributed tanks and aircraft on the fronts by the piece);
- 2) uncertainty remained about the goals of the war and the post-war world order;
- 3) in Moscow they did not receive a definite answer regarding the opening of a second front (and this, perhaps, is the main thing).
The visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the USSR in December 1941 was aimed, in the words of E. Eden himself, "to disperse
mistrust of the Soviet Union and, without assuming certain obligations, give Stalin maximum satisfaction.
During the talks in Moscow, the British representative offered to conclude an Anglo-Soviet agreement, drawn up in very general terms, on accession to the Atlantic Charter, but refused to recognize the Soviet western borders.
However, Moscow's victory allowed Stalin to speak to his Anglo-Saxon allies in a much firmer tone. The latter were forced to admit during the American-British summit in Washington in December 1941 January 1942 that it was the Soviet-German front that played the main role in the war. The most important outcome of this summit was the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, signed in Washington by representatives of 26 countries, including the USSR. The declaration stated that the signatory countries would use all their resources to fight the Tripartite Pact and would not conclude a separate peace with the enemy.
war barbaross domestic soviet
Since April 1938, the Soviet side has embarked on negotiations with Finland "on ensuring mutual security", but soon began to be more and more inclined towards a forceful solution of the issue. Stalin was not embarrassed that on July 27, 1932, the USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Finland, and General K. G. Mannerheim, who returned to the army in 1931, built a defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus for 8 years because of fear of aggression from the southern neighbor.
In the summer of 1939, the head of the artillery of the Red Army, G. Kulik, in a conversation with General N. Voronov, assured that victory over the Finnish army could be achieved in 10-20 days. Having guessed the intentions of the Soviet leadership, the Finnish side began to strengthen the border line, and since October, civilians have been taken inland from the border regions. On October 2, the Finnish government tried to regulate relations with the USSR through the mediation of Germany. However, Ribbentrop made it clear that Hitler did not intend to interfere in Russo-Finnish relations.
As early as March 5, 1939, M. Litvinov proposed to the Finnish government that four islands in the Gulf of Finland be transferred to the USSR for the establishment of Baltic Fleet observation posts there, promising a favorable trade agreement in return.
The secret protocol allowed the USSR to take a tougher line towards Finland. At the talks held in October 1939, the Soviet government offered Finland to move the border away from Leningrad, lease the port of Hanko to the USSR for 30 years, and transfer some territories in Karelia and the Arctic. In exchange, Finland was offered more than 5,000 square kilometers in Karelia. But the Finnish delegation did not agree with any of these proposals and left Moscow on 13 November. On November 30, Soviet troops crossed the Finnish border.
During October-November 1939, Soviet aircraft violated Finnish airspace 52 times. But Stalin's calculation did not materialize. The Finns fought steadfastly, and the war dragged on for 105 days. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but in February 1940 was able to crush the Finnish defenses and capture Vyborg. The bet on new Soviet-German relations was fully justified: Germany did not interfere in the conflict. As a result, the Finnish government agreed to all the demands of the USSR. But Stalin's plans were much more ambitious. Not without reason, on March 31, 1940, the Karelian Autonomous Republic was transformed into the federal Karelian-Finnish Republic: Finland was to become its integral part. The weakness of the Red Army forced these plans to be abandoned.
As the war continued, the Soviet Union became increasingly isolated. 8,000 volunteers from Sweden arrived in Finland, Norwegian, Danish, British volunteers were going to go. A detachment of 50 volunteers was assembled by a cousin of F. Roosevelt, but he got to Helsinki already at the end of the war. There was also material assistance: 10 million dollars from the United States (but with the condition that they would be used to purchase food), although the government promised 60 million; 300 thousand pounds sterling of donations were sent by the British; money even came from Abyssinia.
From the second half of December 1939, the army of the French General M. Weygand was concentrated in the Middle East as a counterbalance to the Soviet Caucasian front. On February 5, 1940, in Paris, at a meeting of the British and French military, it was decided to send 50,000 volunteers from France and two British divisions to help Finland. However, neither Sweden nor Norway agreed to their transit through their territory.
In early March 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result of its signing on March 12, Finland lost more than 35 thousand square meters. km of territory, 11% of the inhabitants became refugees, and Stalin also demanded the payment of reparations. In addition, during the second half of March, the NKVD evicted more than 450,000 Finns from the Soviet part of the Karelian Isthmus. Characteristically, on the morning of March 14, the Finnish troops, who were informed of the truce, began to withdraw from the front line inland. And suddenly at 11.45 Soviet artillery opened heavy fire on the unsuspecting Finns, inflicting significant losses on their troops and civilians.
The Finnish war was of great importance for the further development of events. The shortcomings of the Red Army appeared, and the Soviet military leaders did everything to eliminate them. At the same time, the obvious weakness shown by the Soviet armed forces in the war with Finland led the German command to underestimate their true power.
Having received carte blanche from Germany for freedom of action in the Baltic states, Stalin, as his conversations with G. Dimitrov testify, until the summer of 1940 believed that the Sovietization of these regions would happen by itself. However, the negative or skeptical attitude of the peoples, the Baltic states towards the prospect of a communist dictatorship soon left no doubt about a different outcome of events. As you know, on the night of June 15, 1940, the Soviet government presented Lithuania, and on June 16 - Latvia and Estonia, ultimatums demanding the formation of government offices that would take positions friendly to the USSR. Already on June 17, ships of the Baltic Fleet blocked the Estonian coast, and by July 67,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were brought into the Baltic states (in the presence of a 65,000-strong contingent in the three Baltic armies).
When units of the 2nd Army of the Belarusian Military District entered Lithuania on June 15, the commander of the Lithuanian armed forces, Division General V. Vitkauskas, issued an order in which it was ordered to meet them as friendly. Earlier, the Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, K. Epucas, even forbade telling jokes about the Red Army, whose garrisons had already been in Lithuania since October 1939.
- June 26 V.M. Molotov, using the current situation in Europe, presented an ultimatum to Romania, handing it to the Ambassador to the USSR G. Davidescu. In it, the government in Bucharest was ordered to withdraw its military units from the territory of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia within two days. Without waiting for the expiration of the ultimatum, on June 28 the Red Army crossed the Dniester, entering these territories. The Romanians had no choice but to hastily evacuate the most valuable property and move away from the advancing Soviet troops. After all, all calls for help sent to Berlin, Rome, Istanbul, Belgrade remained unheeded.
- On October 22, 1940, Cripps (British Ambassador to the USSR), with the consent of Churchill, suggested to Stalin that the process of improving Anglo-Soviet relations be opened. At the same time, London undertook to recognize the annexation of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and Bukovina by the Soviet Union, demanding neutrality from Stalin in a possible Anglo-German conflict. However, the Moscow leaders refused to make such a promise. This greatly upset Churchill, who hoped in Cripps' ability to draw Stalin into the big alliance against Hitler, which he had been dreaming of since the mid-1930s.
Cripps' goal was to sign such an agreement that would copy Stalin's pact with Hitler. Cripps did not think about the behind-the-scenes maneuvers of the Soviet government in relations with Germany, the reasons for the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1939, the hostility between London and Moscow during the Soviet-Finnish war, due to the left-wing romantic position of a true friend of the USSR. On his own initiative, he flew to Ankara, establishing Soviet-Turkish relations; he achieved the expulsion from England to the USSR in the autumn of 1940 of 350 Baltic sailors, whose fate, most likely, was deplorable.
May 1940 was a turning point in relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany. After Germany started a big war in the West, the Soviet Union decided to make full use of the possibilities inherent in the secret protocols. In June 1940, the Soviet government accused the Baltic countries of violating mutual assistance treaties and demanded an increase in the Soviet military presence there and the creation of "people's governments" in these countries. The Baltic states were unable to resist. Additional units of the Red Army were introduced there, "people's governments" were created, and new elections were held, in which only candidates from local communist parties participated. The new parliaments immediately applied for joining the USSR. In early August 1940, the Soviet Union was replenished with three more republics. As in the Polish lands captured in the fall of 1939, repressions immediately began there. Tens of thousands of "unreliable" were deported to Siberia or sent to camps. In the same summer, a similar operation was carried out with Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which belonged to Romania.
All this could not but alert Germany, which was then engaged in the conquest of France. Although the plan for the war against the Soviet Union was developed by Hitler in the spring of 1940, its implementation was postponed indefinitely. Even speaking to the military, Hitler said that the treaty with the USSR would be respected as long as it was expedient. In Moscow, they looked at it in much the same way. And a big and long war in Western Europe seemed the most successful way out, because it delayed a possible conflict with Germany. But France surrendered unexpectedly quickly - already in June 1940, German troops entered Paris without a fight. In fact, from that moment preparations began for an attack on the USSR according to the Barbarossa plan.
It would seem that Stalin sufficiently fully demonstrated his devotion to the treaty with Germany: he severed relations with the governments of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Norway, which, after the occupation of their territories, were in exile. In June 1941, on his orders, a Yugoslav mission headed by M. Gavrilovich was sent to Turkey. But in April-May 1941, the USSR established diplomatic relations with the puppet regimes of Denmark, Belgium, Norway, the anti-Hitler government of Iraq, and on December 6, 1940, an agreement on trade and mutual payments was signed with "independent" Slovakia. But even after that, Hitler, in a conversation with Mussolini, stubbornly repeated: "My attitude towards Stalin does not exceed his distrust of me." But Hitler did not yet know that Stalin ordered all aluminum smelted to be sent to mobilization reserves. It was this measure, together with supplies from the United States, that helped the Soviet industry produce 20,000 combat aircraft in the first 12 months of the war. However, the Fuhrer knew something else: the content of the conversation between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ambassador of Yugoslavia on July 14-18, 1940, Molotov, in particular, said: the plans outlined by Hitler in the book "My Struggle" will not be implemented, and if he intends to occupy Ukraine , then the Red Army will occupy Berlin.
From September 1940, the German secret services carried out a series of measures to mask the upcoming attack on the USSR. In order to more subtly hide the truth, rumors about just such an action were deliberately spread, so that the impression was created of a false leak of provocative information. At this time, V. Keitl repeated: a war with the Soviet Union is unlikely, but since the autumn of 1940, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces has been taking preventive measures in the event of an attack by the USSR, while speeding up preparations for a war with it. And Hitler, in turn, kept repeating: in July 1941, we will present decisive demands to Stalin on the terms of cooperation (calming down Italy and Japan). But the high command of the German army and navy saw that the question of war with the Soviet Union was practically resolved and its options were only being debated. So, on July 28, 1940, the head of the operational department of the fleet, Vice-Admiral K. Fricke, proposed the following plan: to occupy the Soviet Union along the Ladoga-Smolensk-Crimea line, and then dictate German peace conditions.
The war of nerves did not subside: in May 1941, Goebbels, at the request of the Fuhrer, ordered the composers to write music for a song dedicated to the invasion of England. Apparently, he did not know that in February 1941, Stalin was ahead of him with such an event (meaning the "Holy War").
Spreading rumors about a possible invasion of Ukraine, Goebbels denied them by others - about the arrival of Stalin himself in Berlin. For this purpose, in deep secrecy (but in such a way that it became known), red flags were sewn, so that even Nazi bosses believed in the reality of the visit of the owner of the Kremlin. And it is not surprising: the specific place of his negotiations with the Fuhrer was secretly called - Berlin or Koenigsberg, after which Stalin should go on vacation to Baden-Baden.
Goering organized the "leakage" of the "list of demands" to the Soviet Union: the demobilization of the Red Army, the control of German firms over Baku oil, the creation of a separate government in Ukraine, the guarantee of the German fleet entering the Pacific Ocean. Roman radio in mid-June 1941 even reported that the signing of an agreement on a military alliance between Germany and the USSR was being prepared.
Starting from March 24, sapper units of the Wehrmacht have been building fortifications along the Soviet-German border - as it turned out, fake ones.
Goebbels also distinguished himself by publishing the article "The Cross as an Example" in the newspaper (June 13, 1941). It contained undisguised threats against the UK. On the same day, by order of the Wehrmacht command, the issue was confiscated, and Goebbels publicly condemned his "shameful act." After all, he knew that 800,000 copies of Hitler’s appeal to the troops had long been in the printing houses, urging them to fight bravely against the Bolshevik empire…
... It is known that on November 10, 1940, a Soviet government delegation headed by Molotov left Moscow for Berlin. It consisted of 60 people, including 17 employees of the NKVD. They settled in Bellevue Castle in the Tiergarten. Molotov's talks on November 12-13 were aimed at one thing: to probe Hitler's intentions. If the Soviet people's commissar succeeded in this, the Nazi dictator only finally became convinced of a deep distrust of Stalin's promises. Mutual compliments (Hitler called the USSR the “Russian Empire”, and Molotov qualified the Bosporus and Dardanelles as “historic gates of England to attack the Soviet Union”) did not save the situation. Perhaps Hitler knew that a month ago, Stalin and Molotov considered a possible option for a war on two fronts: against Germany and the German allies - Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and in the east with Japan. Hitler tried to direct the interests of the USSR to East Asia and the Middle East. However, in a conversation with the Fuhrer, Molotov stubbornly repeated the interest of the Soviet Union in Finland, Romania, Turkey and the straits, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and recalled Germany's previous obligations. The Soviet prime minister did not deviate a single step from Stalin's instructions, repeating: we need bases in Bulgaria and an entrance to the Black Sea from the south, and not the Indian Ocean. Let Bulgaria take the Greek islands in the Aegean as a payment for providing the Navy of the Soviet Union with bases.
Hitler was indignant even without these claims: first, Stalin demanded Bessarabia for himself, then Bukovina, as if not noticing the services that Germany provided him during the Soviet-Finnish war. The pleasant in many respects conversation with R. Hess, in fact, the General Secretary of the NSDAP, did not smooth out the rough edges. Even though Molotov assured him: the parties and state institutions of both countries are similar phenomena of a new type.
Hitler was so sure of a future victory over the USSR that on November 15, 1940, he signed a decree on the preparation of a German housing program after the war. It provided that 80% of the apartments will be 4-room (with an area of at least 62 sq. m), 10% - 5-room (86 sq. m and more).
By the end of November 1940, the USSR was ready to sign five more secret protocols with Germany: on the withdrawal of German military units from Finland; Soviet fleet of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. On November 26, at 8.50 am, the text of a document from Moscow under No. 2362 was handed over to the Reich Chancellery, which actually set out the conditions under which the Soviet Union entered the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo bloc. Stalin never received an answer to it. However, Hitler was wrong, repeating the thesis of the German liberals in 1848 about Russia - a colossus with feet of clay.
Four months after the signing of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler, the Central Bureau was created in Berlin to prepare a solution to the issue of the Eastern space (later the Eastern Ministry), headed by A. Rosenberg. With the participation, plans were developed for the development of Soviet territories: the Crimea and the Baltic states would be turned into German colonies, Belarus, Little Russia and Turkestan - into buffer powers (with the expansion of their territory), a federation would arise in the Caucasus under the auspices of Germany, and Russia would turn into an object of German policy. G. Himmler expected to increase the birth rate in Ukraine, while simultaneously reducing it in Russia (for the latter, 2.9 million km 2 of territory with 60 million inhabitants would be left). However, Hitler considered such outlines too soft, ordering to focus on the eviction of the Slavs, Germanization and colonization.
Hitler, of course, wanted to destroy the "Bolshevik danger", but his main goal was to destroy the British Empire. It was this brilliant prospect that the Fuhrer drew to Molotov at the negotiations in Berlin in November 1940. He claimed that he wanted to create a world coalition of interested countries (with the participation of the Soviet Union), whose interests would be satisfied "at the expense of the British bankruptcy estate." But the negotiations showed that the division of spheres of influence on a global scale was hardly possible, and Hitler confirmed his decision to start a war against the USSR. The Fuhrer believed that the victory over the only possible ally of England in the east would not allow her to resist the onslaught of the Wehrmacht for a long time, and in the event of a protracted war, Germany would use the resources of Eastern Europe. Hitler spoke about this to the highest German military leaders as early as July 1940.
It should be noted that those German diplomats who did not want the outbreak of war deliberately embellished in their reports the readiness of the USSR to repulse the enemy, but in fact strengthened Hitler's distrust.
It was easy to get confused in the intricacies of various concepts. After all, Hitler was persuaded to be friends with Russia, and not to fight, F. Halder and W. Brauchitsch, and Goering, not remembering the difficulties of the economy, developed the idea of drawing the USSR into a war with Britain. Admiral E. Raeder, General E. Rommel, B. Mussolini called for the 12 divisions to seize the Suez Canal no later than the autumn of 1941 and thereby bring England to its knees. Having visited Field Marshal T. von Bock in the hospital on December 3, 1940, Hitler heard from him a warning about the "factor of 1812" - the danger of a war with the Soviet Union, not knowing exactly its potential.
So, Hitler was ready at any convenient moment to violate the non-aggression pact. But until the last moment, both the Soviet Union and Germany pretended to be on good terms. This was caused not only by the desire to mislead a potential enemy. The Treaty of Friendship was beneficial to both countries from an economic point of view and therefore respected. When, at the end of 1940, the USSR agreed to increase grain supplies to Germany by 10 percent, Germany was forced in return to increase the supply of aluminum and cobalt to the USSR, in which the Soviet industry was then short of. The USSR also received cars, machine tools and weapons. Within two years, taking into account the experience of conflicts in the Far East and the war with Finland, the USSR was able to significantly improve the combat capability of its armed forces, create new types of weapons and begin military production in the east of the country and in the Urals.
However, in general, the USSR was not ready for war. In the spring of 1941, Germany was objectively in a winning position. She had a battle-tested army, an established production of the most modern weapons and all the resources of Europe. In the West, no one, except England, offered resistance, and the United States took an indefinite position.
In the USSR, the political leadership was convinced that there was still time before the war. The personnel of the Soviet armed forces suffered serious losses due to repressions. The mass production of the latest weapons was not mastered. There was no clear concept of warfare: even after the Finnish company, the command staff of the Red Army was convinced that the enemy would be beaten on its territory. Finally, Soviet propaganda obviously went too far, demonstrating confidence that there would be no war with Germany. On June 14, 1941, TASS was still officially denying rumors of a possible war, and those who tried to talk about it risked their freedom. However, some measures have been taken. In June 1940, a six-day working week and an eight-hour working day were introduced in the USSR (since August 1929, the working week was five days, the working day was seven hours long), and absenteeism could be brought to court. Workers have lost the right to freely change jobs. At the beginning of 1941, changes were made to the five-year plan in order to speed up the implementation of military programs. Soviet diplomacy achieved great success: on April 13, 1941, an agreement was concluded with Japan on neutrality, and at least for a while the danger of a war on two fronts was over.
Stalin continued to believe that Germany would not violate the non-aggression pact. Messages about the inevitability of Hitler's aggression against the USSR, and in the very near future, received both through the channels of foreign intelligence and from some Western leaders, he regarded as a provocation. Even in the military units stationed in the western regions, many commanders went on scheduled vacations in June 1941. No one in the country, from a great leader to an ordinary border guard, was seriously prepared for the fact that in the early morning of June 22, 1941, German troops crossed the Soviet border.
Stalin seemed to be confused. So much so that he even ordered V.M. Molotov. The leader himself decided to address the people only on July 3. "Brothers and sisters ..." - so he called his listeners.
