P-219, a British S-type submarine, left the stocks at Barrowin Furness in October 1941. She was destined to become famous for performing a secret mission under the name of HMS Seraph under the command of Captain 3rd Rank M.L.A. Jewella. In this covert operation, it was probably not only about landing saboteurs ashore, as, for example, the German submarines U-202 and U-548 did on the coast near Jacksonville. P-219s landed key officers, and the successful conduct of the operation was decisive for the entire course of the war.

Commander Seraph was a thin young man, pleasant and not without a sense of humor. One day in the second half of October in Gibraltar, the Navy command entrusted him with the "simple, interesting and not too dangerous task" - to take on board the general and several American officers: General Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Lyman L. Lemnisten, Colonel Hamblen, Captain Gerald Wright and Colonel Julius Holmes . He was supposed to land them from his Seraph boat on the coast near Sherchel, 113 kilometers west of Algiers, on land, where the Americans wanted to meet with the leaders of the French Resistance movement in North Africa in order to coordinate the landing of the Allied units.

US Commando Commander Courtney and his men were to take part in the landing and provide security for the Americans on land. Seraph went to sea with her passengers and arrived at the appointed place on October 20 at 1 am. In the dead of night it was too late to land; waited until the next day and then disembarked with 4 small boats led by Courtney's men.

The meeting of the Americans with the French - they were led by General Mast - took place in a villa near the coast. The participation of the French based in North Africa, their support for the landings, as well as the date - the ships were already ready for landing were discussed, there was also talk about General Giraud, who had recently escaped from the German fortress.

A French general who had fled to the unoccupied part of France wanted to take command of the Allied military forces. It was decided that the submarine should pick up the general at a certain point on the coast in the province, but this task, at the request of the general, was to be performed by the Americans, not the British!

After the arrival of a French police officer who sounded the alarm, the Americans withdrew and, not without difficulty, came back on board. Strong surf overturned light boats. Thanks to the experience and dexterity of the commandos, the Americans, with the help of the French, were able to get on board the Seraph again ... and allowed themselves a well-deserved whiskey!

The submarine left the same way. The next day, she met with the Catalina flying boat that splashed down nearby to transfer the Americans on board and return them to Gibraltar.

The berth aboard the Seraph, abandoned by General Clark, was soon to receive the General again!

The problem for the submarine commander, for Courtney, who was on board, for US Air Force Colonel Brad Gaylord, who spoke French, and for Captain Gerald Wright, was not to board General Girauds, who was known as a martinet, but to present submarine like an American ship. Could the general distinguish between Oxford English and American slang? Captain Courtney was forced to behave like an exemplary submarine commander, while Captain 3rd Rank Jewell - aka Bill - had to play the role of a young officer who was always there, silent and even a little in the way. The American flag was also prepared to be raised, prompting Jewell to remark, "I'll stay on the bridge with a bottle of smelling salt in my hand in case two of my signalmen pass out."

Seraph approached Cape Negro on the night of 4 November. On this moonless, but nevertheless bright night, she lay on the ground under water 80 kilometers from the sea coast and waited for a message from her headquarters. Finally, the order came, and the submarine lay down on the ground less than 800 meters from the Lafandou pier. It was a bright day, you could watch the movement in the coastal village. However, unfortunately, a real storm arose at the scheduled time for boarding the ship, and General Giraud, waiting with his son André at Villa Negro, Captain André Beauffre and another staff officer, was afraid that he would not be able to get on board, because they did not have a single fishing boat at their disposal. Although there was one reliable person, he refused to transport them in such stormy weather. Suddenly the wind died down, as often happens in the Mediterranean; It was the right moment to board the ship. The general jumped onto the deck of the submarine, and at the same moment the wave threw the boat back. The general, dressed in civilian clothes - in a coat and a gray bowler hat - almost fell into the sea between the boats. The sailors helped him out of a piquant situation, and shortly after that Seraph sank again.

The next day they were still walking underwater. The Americans listened to the story of the general's escape from Köningstein. The same one bombarded them with questions about the upcoming landing, but they could not and did not want to tell anything. They cracked jokes... Unfortunately, several cabin crews the next day, in the presence of the general, blabbed about the deceptive maneuver of the boat. An hour later, the General began a conversation with Courtney in excellent English, without making a single hint of his knowledge.

However, another incident occurred. Eisenhover on the radio asked Giraud to allow the publication of the statement, the literal text of which he immediately quoted.

“I am a soldier,” said Giraud, “not a politician. I cannot approve the release of this statement." At the same time, a small screw accidentally fell into the inside of the transmitter and caused a short circuit; the transmitter has failed. General Giraud was unable to answer. The flying boat appeared and splashed down near the submarine. The command prepared 3 boats that were supposed to transport Giraud, 3 other Frenchmen, Brad Gaylord and Gerald Wright to the flying boat. But just as they were about to transfer, a German plane appeared. It was already too late to dive, but the plane did not attack, but disappeared again. Now Giraud and his companions were taken to the flying boat. The Catalina took off, and Giraud himself was able to see the Allied ships approaching Algiers and Oran at sea. He arrived too late to take part in the landing...

Operation Torch was prepared by the Anglo-Americans in strict secrecy. It was planned to transfer by sea and land in the area of ​​Oran, Algiers and Fedal the first 6 convoys (advancing convoys) and 4 shock convoys (attacking convoys) British, a total of 340 ships and vessels, as well as 3 American convoys of 221 ships, which transported a total of about 23,000 British and 84,000 Americans with all military equipment. The armada of military transports, tankers, auxiliary ships of various types was covered by battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and 10 submarines of the British Navy. The air cover was so strong that it was in principle capable of sinking any submarine: 15 Squadron Coastal Air Command escorted the British convoys as far as possible, while 19 Squadron supported the advance of Bomber Command in Bay of Biscay. The 8th formation of the US Air Force also took part in the operation.

The landing date, previously set for October 30, was repeatedly postponed: the Americans were not yet ready. On October 26, the corpse of an officer was found in Cadiz with the Catalina flying boat shot down by the Germans off the Spanish sea coast. This man was carrying with him a document in which the date of landing was November 4th. As a result, the landing was scheduled for November 8th.

The British Admiralty, first of all, feared that the convoys loaded with troops would be discovered by submarines and this information would be reported to the command of the German submarine forces. The British expected that at the end of October 50 submarines would participate in combat use, and later, under certain conditions, another 25 boats.

It was practically impossible to transfer almost 600 ships and vessels unnoticed. On October 26, Rodney was discovered by a submarine, which mistook him for an American cruiser. The main attacking convoy of the KMF was discovered on November 2 at 38 degrees north latitude and 22 degrees west longitude. Dönitz was informed by his patrolling submarines of these large convoys at sea, yet he believed that the attack would be in the direction of Dakar, and ordered about 60 boats, German and a few Italian, to go to the coast of Senegal.

On October 20, in the west of the Bay of Biscay, the first submarine (U-216) was sunk by an aircraft of the 224th squadron. On the 24th, the Liberator of the same group sank U-559 further south.

On November 8, at 1 a.m., the landings in North Africa began; Dönitz learned of this only at 6:30 a.m. and immediately dispatched nearby U-boats to the landing area. True, they could no longer interfere with her, but at least they had to interfere with the supply of the landed units. It was already too late: the U-boats hunted by Allied aircraft and destroyers could only sink a relatively small number of their vessels, given the heavy shipping off the Moroccan and Algerian coasts, as well as the large number of Allied ships that arrived along the route from Gibraltar.

In reality, not only were the Allied forces hunting submarines, they were also hampered by the shallows off the Moroccan coast that stretched for about 25 miles.

The first attacked U-173 (Oberleutnant Schweichel) on the evening of November 11th. She managed to penetrate the Fedal roadstead, where she torpedoed a transport, a tanker and the American destroyer Hambleton. Due to the quick counterattack, she did not have time to determine the results of her launches. The torpedoed ships were not sunk, but only damaged.

The next day, U-150 (Cpt. Lieutenant Kals) tried to overcome the barriers.

“4.00 pm. Now I know that there are about 20 transports in the roadstead, an aircraft carrier in the south, a cruiser with a tripod mast directly at the seashore, 2 tankers and transport and landing craft. Several guard ships to the west of the sea coast and close to warships. I am forced to walk very carefully along the sea, which is smooth as a mirror, I must constantly look around. You need to choose only the nearest ships within reach ...

19.15. Above the water. Connection of cruisers in the line of sight. 2 Birmingham and Frobisher-class cruisers, plus 3 K-class destroyers on an easterly course of 15 nautical miles. I exert all my strength for 5 hours, but the destroyer constantly pushes me back. From time to time I determine the location of the ship with a radar at a frequency of 139 centimeters.

00.15. He approached the Birmingham-class cruiser behind him. From a fan salvo with four torpedoes, 2 torpedoes went along the surface and in a circle (due to a malfunction); one after 70 seconds of travel enters the engine room. The ship is drifting, 3 destroyers are guarding it. The second cruiser leaves at high speed to the east.

One hour later, the defense was broken. I release on the final torpedo at 1.28 and at 1.48. The first hole in the center of the hull. The cruiser lays down with a strong list to starboard. At 0201 I pierce the end ship along the side of a K-class destroyer. A large explosion with a large blast wave and detonation of depth charges under the stern.

AT 2.06 more holes in the cruiser. The ship is still not sinking. I'm being pursued by a destroyer with its illuminating shells, lost steering control, a fire at the switchboard. Bombardment with depth charges at a depth of 120 and 160 meters. Recharge.

AT 4.30 ascent. I approached a cruiser sitting deep in the water, which is being slowly towed by a destroyer going in reverse. Sudden shelling by the destroyer of guards and from the front tower of the cruiser. Again anxiety! Numerous depth charges, the noise of British sonar stations.

6.13. Ascent again. Went to the cruiser. Artillery fire from a destroyer. At 6.50, a double launch of torpedoes from I and 11 vehicles at a pre-empted rendezvous point with the target. The target received another hole. Deep again, depth charges and sonar pursuit. "Bold" 1 was successfully used.

The next day, hundreds of depth charges were dropped, aircraft and groups of hunters were recorded from the periscope depth ... "2

On 14 November U-155 (Ltd. Pining) sank the escort aircraft carrier Avenger (13,785 tons) and the transport Ettrick (11,272 GRT) west of Gibraltar; U-413 destroyed a large troop transport Warwick Castle with a tonnage of 20,107 GRT.

6 submarines passed Gibraltar and joined the Italian submarines cruising near Oran and Algiers. The boats remaining in the South Atlantic sank 13 ships of convoy SL-125.

German U-boat losses were enormous, with U-660, U-605, U-595, U-411, U-259, U-28 and U-3313 sunk in the Mediterranean between 10 and 12 November.

The end of U-595 was especially dramatic. This submarine of the VII series with a displacement of 500 tons, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Jurgen Quest-Faslem, passed on the surface of the route from Gibraltar on the night of November 7th. She spotted and missed the British carrier, then ran into the 29th Flotilla at La Spezia.

On November 14 at 0745 U-595 was on the surface off Cape Tenes when she was attacked by a British aircraft, dropping four bombs - one of them hit the deck, bounced into the water and exploded; Quest-Faslem immediately ordered the dive. There were numerous and severe damages: no lighting, a fire in the electric motor, a leak in the stern, food boxes opened, their contents scattered across the deck.

Quest Faslem decides to surface; one of the electric motors, however, is back in service, but its speed is too small to keep the boat submerged, and U-595 is getting heavier.

After discussing the situation with chief engineer Mirbach, the commander decides to suddenly surface and go to the sea coast in order to land most of the crew on land. Several people had to stay on board to flood the boat.

Barely surfacing, U-595 was attacked first by 4 and then by 14 aircraft. Despite constant attacks, at 4 o'clock the boat reached the shore. The Germans waited until the aircraft approached 200 meters, then opened fire with a 20 mm cannon. Suddenly the echo sounder showed 8 meters! The boat runs aground off Cape Khamis, 70 miles northwest of Oran.

Quest-Faslem goes to his cabin, wraps the flag of the ship around his neck, hangs on his chest the Iron Cross, which Dönitz gave him on October 12 after his second patrol in the North Atlantic, and orders everyone to leave the boat.

Von Mirbach sets up seven explosive charges while the crew jumps into the water; the submarine is sinking fast. Several sailors climb into an inflatable boat, others swim to the shore. Air attacks have ceased. One of the British destroyers was catching sailors. 44 people got out on land and went deep into the country. British aviation discovered them and dropped leaflets in which it was written in German and Italian: “Stop, or I will machine-gun you all!”

The Germans did not heed the warning and dispersed. The English aircraft fired, but, however, did not hit anyone.

On the road in the vicinity of the village of Picardy, the Germans met a division of French soldiers under the command of an officer. Quest-Faslem thought they were allies and surrendered...

The Italians lost 7 submarines in the same way: Antonio Sciensa on November 7 near Tobruk, Granito on the 9th northwest of Sicily, Eno on the 10th near Algiers, Dessie on the 28th near Bonnet, Porfido on December 6, torpedoed by the English submarine Tigris, Corallo On the 13th off Bog and Uarscieck on December 15 off Malta, sunk by the Greek destroyer Queen Olga.

By and large, Operation Torch cost the German and Italian submarine fleets heavy losses that could not compensate for the successes achieved.

Mass destruction of French submarines

French submarines based in North Africa could not conduct training raids at sea, as they did not have enough fuel. Some were taken out of service due to the need for repairs. When word arrived that an Anglo-American fleet was off the Moroccan coast, all available boats were ordered to prevent the landing.

Five ships of the "600 tons" type, Meduse (Captain Lieutenant Roy), La Sybille (Captain 2nd Rank Kraut), Antiope (Captain Lieutenant Millet), Amazone (Captain Lieutenant Ferdafaine), Orphee (Captain 3rd rank Le Gall), left the base of Casablanca. La Sybille was sunk along with the crew aboard Fedal, Amazone and Antiope reached Dakar not without difficulty, Orphee returned to Casablanca. Several ineffective torpedo attacks on Allied ships were carried out by Mёduse, Antiope and Amazone; a torpedo salvo of Mёduse fanned out very close to the battleship Massachusetts.

Three other "600-ton" boats, Psyche, Oreade and Amphitrite, fell victim to air raids off the Casablanca pier; several officers and sailors died. The fate of the "1500-ton" boats was just as tragic: Sidi Ferruch stood at the pier during the first air raid. Its commander, captain of the 3rd rank Larotse, was seriously wounded, six of his officers and sailors were killed. Despite being hit by an aerial bomb, Sidi-Ferruch left under the command of the second officer, Lieutenant Commander David. She was bombed, but sank after the kingstones of the quick sink tanks were opened. David surfaced 120 miles from Safi next to a Spanish merchant ship, handed him two seriously wounded and left. Nobody ever saw Sidi-Ferruch again. The boat was probably destroyed by an aircraft from the American escort aircraft carrier Suwanne.

The commander of Tonnant, Captain 1st Rank Paumier fell victim to the first air raid on land. There were also casualties on board: 2 dead, 19 wounded and damaged diving tanks. After the repair, Tonnant nevertheless left with a crew of 45 people, while her regular crew consisted of 61 people. On November 10, she met the escort carrier Avenger and attacked her, although she was surrounded by numerous ships. The boat had only four torpedoes on board and fired all of them at the Avenger; they, without hitting, passed behind the American ship. On November 15, the crew sank the Tonnant after a 24-hour stay on the high seas in front of the port of Cadiz and was rescued by Spanish fishermen.

Conquerant, which was under repair in a floating dock, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Lefebvre, managed to escape without torpedoes and with a damaged peroscope, her goal was Dakar. On November 11, she was sunk by American aircraft near Villa Quisneros.

The incapacitated submarines Diane, Ceres, Pallas, Danae and Ariane, standing at the pier in Oran, were scuttled by their own crews. Caiman and Marsouin, which were anchored off the northern breakwater of Algiers, were machine-gunned by British aircraft; both boats were ready to leave, the crews cut the cables, left the port and went under water. The British destroyers pursued them and dropped depth charges. The attacks continued for 24 hours, and the officers and crews asked themselves if their submarines would not be sunk by those people whom they still considered - despite the Mersel-^bier, despite the explosions of depth charges - as their friends ... And they went to Toulon, which had not yet been occupied by the Germans. November 11 they were in Toulon. On the 13th they were joined by Fresnel, who from 8 to 10 November, leaving Oran from the persecution of the British and Americans with their depth charges, counted 250 explosions. Acteon (Lieutenant Commander Clavier) and Argonaute (Lieutenant Commander Veron), who left Oran with Fresnel, were sunk by the Allies.

Marsouin immediately upon arrival in Toulon began to repair her diesels and tried to dive in the roadstead.

However, the tragedy of French submarines has not yet ended.

Annual balance in 1942

Dönitz expressed his concerns to the Fuhrer when, on December 16, he received an order to replace the boats lost in the Mediterranean with new ones and to keep 20 of them in constant readiness for use west of Gibraltar. “Given the current situation, I consider with a high degree of probability that the continued use of submarines to prevent the supply of Africa can bring only the most insignificant results ...,” the commander of the submarine forces wrote on November 18. - However, this use of submarines will have a particularly negative impact on the course of the war against transports in the Atlantic, in which I still see the main task of submarines. The destruction of transports is probably the decisive contribution of submarines to the course of the war. The enemy understood this well ... "

Admiral Dönitz was right. On January 14, 1943, a meeting began in Casablanca, in which Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Admirals E. J. King and Sir Dudley Pound, Marshal of the Air Force Sir C. Portal took part. The critical situation in the North Atlantic that had developed due to torpedo attacks during the past months was discussed. In September there were 98 ships (tonnage 485,413 gross tons), in October 94 ships (tonnage 619,417 gross tons), in November a record number of 119 ships (tonnage 729,160 gross tons), in December 61 ships (tonnage 330,816 gross tons).

“We had in mid-December,” Captain Roskill was later forced to write, “only about 300,000 tons of liquid fuel, while our monthly consumption was 130,000 tons ... British supplies fell to less than 34,000 tons, this was less one-third of the deliveries of 1939 ... The Admiralty believed that the struggle on the convoy routes was still not decisive enough, that the enemy was using more forces than before, and that the crisis resulting from this long struggle did not allow any more delay. The lack of fuel forced the Allied convoys to take the shortest route, and this made it easier for the submarines.

The U-boat successes over the past 3 months had to be attributed to the weakening of the North Atlantic convoy guards, as approximately 100 escort ships were brought in to participate in Operation Torch.

Nevertheless, the British and Americans noted with satisfaction that the tonnage sunk in November corresponded in size to the newly built, which could only grow later. They had all the possibilities that the strong industrial potential of the United States and Canada offered.

Despite the success of the submarines, Dönitz noted that the Allies seized the initiative in waging war. He wrote about the suspense in which the German leadership was about the expected goal of the Allied offensive, and the favorable position of the Allies emphasized their importance as maritime powers. The sea, with its extraordinary transport capacity, given the considerable length of the sea coast of the continent, made it possible to carry out an offensive in the least protected place. As a result, the maritime power, they believed, had the initiative.

At the end of the year, the Germans used every opportunity and all their means to pursue every ship. As a result of this, things came to the accumulation of submarines at the mouth of the Orinoco, west of Trinidad as far as the island of Aruba and in front of Freetown. The results did not always match Dönitz's hopes. The Allies spread rumors about landings on the coast, where nothing was supposed to happen, and German agents passed on false information. For example, two submarines of the Eisbar group, U-68 (captain 3rd rank K.F. Merten) and U-172 (lieutenant commander Emmermann), which did not participate in the Laconia scam, appeared at the point where they should have been about 50 allied ships. The raid was empty! Then Dönitz said: "We hunt butterflies."

The first boat of the IXD2 series, U-179 (captain 2nd rank Zobe), entered the Eisbar group. Finally, the operation was successful as 27 ships of 161,121 GRT were torpedoed, in particular very large vessels: on October 9, the Italian submarine Archimede (Saccardo) sank the Oronsay of 20,043 GRT and finally U-178 (Ibbeken) torpedo destroyed a Duchess of Atholl with a tonnage of 20,119 brt. The Germans lost 6 submarines in November and 5 in December, respectively 6.3 percent and 5.1 percent of the total combat power at sea. In the course of 1942, German and Italian submarines sank a total of 1,160 ships with a tonnage of 6,236,215 GRT. German U-boat losses were negligible, 3.9 percent in the first half and 8.9 percent in the second half. Dönitz received only 17 new boats in the last quarter instead of the 20 provided.

Management changes

On 19 November, Admiral Sir Max Horton, who had commanded British-based submarines since the start of the war, took over from Sir Percy Noble the overall command of the "western approaches" (the western fairways of the English Channel, south of Cornwall). Highly capable, a good organizer and a former submariner, he was the right person to organize a tough fight against Dönitz's submarines.

He reorganized the convoys, established communication between surface ships and aircraft of the coastal aviation command. He understood that the battle in the Atlantic had to be fought not only with the use of raw materials and supplies.

On December 31, 1942, a naval battle took place in the Arctic Ocean for convoy JW-51B. The heavy cruiser Hipper, the flagship from Admiral Kummetz, the cruiser Lutzow and 6 destroyers attacked this large convoy, despite the importance of the guard. Then British Admiral Burnett damaged Hipper with artillery fire and sank Eckholdt. Hitler at that time was on the Berghof in Berch-tesgaden and learned about this unpleasant incident from a BBC report; followed by an outburst of rage directed at the navy and its chief, Grand Admiral Raeder, who objected to the disarmament of large surface ships, which the Führer considered useless scrap iron; several thousand team members and hundreds of heavy guns were removed from them, which, in the opinion of the Fuhrer, should have been more useful on the Russian front.

Hitler trusted Dönitz, who led decisively, vigorously and flexibly. On January 31, 1943, Hitler appointed Dönitz Grand Admiral; he took command of the navy in place of Raeder. Dönitz immediately studied the documents received from his predecessor and on February 26 at a meeting reported on the constantly increasing military and political losses from the disarmament of "purposeless" ships. Hitler was angry, nevertheless, he continued to trust him. “He couldn’t appoint a new Grand Admiral every six months!” Dönitz said later.

Dönitz, who was now closer to Groben Manitu - he arrived in Berlin and stayed at the hotel Am Steinplatz - was now "on horseback" and could ensure the expansion of submarines he desired: an increase in the number of classic submarines, the production of new types of boats.

At the end of 1942 there were 383 submarines; Dönitz allocated 53 boats for the training of new crews, 47 were in raids, 100 were in ports, 119 were on trials. The admiral believed that too many boats were under repair, that the tests were taking too long. 64 submarines out of 383 were in combat use, this was too little! He took steps to speed up work at the shipyards and increase the number of serviceable submarines.

Outcome Allied victory Opponents USA
Great Britain
Free France Vichy mode Commanders Dwight Eisenhower
Andrew Cunningame François Darlan Side forces 73,500 60,000 Military casualties 479+ dead
720 wounded 1,346+ dead
1,997 wounded

Operation Torch(English) Operation Torch listen)) was a British-American invasion of North Africa that began on November 8, 1942, during the North African Campaign of World War II. The Soviet Union demanded that the United States and Great Britain begin military operations in Europe and open a second front to reduce the burden on the armed forces of the USSR on the eastern front of hostilities. In this regard, the American military leaders planned to conduct Operation Sledgehammer, which provided for a landing in occupied Europe as soon as possible. However, their British counterparts believed that such a scenario of action would lead to disastrous consequences. Instead, a landing in French North Africa was proposed, citing the liberation of North Africa from Axis forces, improved control of the Mediterranean, and preparations for an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943 as possible outcomes. Despite US President Franklin Roosevelt's suspicions that that an operation in Africa ruled out a landing in Europe in 1943, the US supported the British plan.

Before the battle

The Allies' plans for the anti-Hitler coalition included an invasion of northwestern Africa - Algeria and Morocco, that is, the territory of Vichy France, which had approximately 60,000 soldiers stationed in Morocco, batteries of coastal artillery, a small number of tanks and aircraft, as well as order 10 surface ships and 11 submarines. The Allies believed that the forces of Vichy France would avoid combat, including information received from the American consul in Algiers. However, there was a danger that the Vichy navy might try to retaliate for the 1940 British attack on Mers el Kebir, which made research into the mood of the French forces in North Africa crucial. Plans were made to secure their assistance.

The Allies intended to make a swift breakthrough into Tunisia to the south, followed by an attack by German forces from the rear. General Dwight Eisenhower was placed in command of the operation, with his headquarters in Gibraltar. Andrew Cunningham was appointed naval commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force; his second-in-command, Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, was tasked with planning the landing.

The American consul in Algiers succeeded in establishing tentative contacts with French officers, including the commander-in-chief of the Vichy forces in Algiers, General Charles Emmanuel Mast. They agreed to cooperate with the Allies on the condition that they negotiate secretly with one of the senior Allied generals in Algiers. Negotiations were successfully held on October 21, 1942 (Major General Mark Clark participated from the Allied side).

The Allies also succeeded in winning over Vichy General Henri Giraud by offering him the position of Commander-in-Chief of the French armed forces in North Africa after the invasion. Giraud, however, agreed only to the position of commander-in-chief of all the invasion forces, that is, to the place of Eisenhower. Having been refused, Giraud decided to remain "in the role of a spectator".

Battle

Map of Operation Torch

The Allies planned to carry out the simultaneous capture of all the key ports and airports of Morocco and Algeria, attacking Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

The western task force (aimed at Casablanca) consisted of American units - the 2nd Armored, as well as the 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions (a total of 35,000 soldiers). She was commanded by Major General George Patton, with Rear Admiral Henry Hewitt in charge of the naval part of the operation.

The Central Task Force, whose strike was aimed at Oran, consisted of the 509th Airborne Battalion, 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions (18,500 soldiers in total). They were sent from Britain and were under the command of Major General Lloyd Fredendall. The naval part of the operation was led by Commodore Thomas Troubridge.

The Eastern Task Force (target - the city of Algiers) was under the command of Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th and American 34th Infantry Divisions (20,000 soldiers). The naval forces were led by Vice Admiral Harold Barrow.

The air part of the operation was divided into two directions - east and south of Cape Tenez in Algeria, respectively. The first operated British aviation under the command of Marshal William Welch, the second - the American under the command of Major General Jimmy Doolittle.

Casablanca

The Western Operations Group landed before dawn on 8 November 1942 at three locations: Safi, Morocco (Operation Blackstone), Fedale, Morocco (Operation Brushwood) and Mehdia, Morocco (Operation Goalpost). No artillery preparation was carried out, since it was assumed that the French would not resist.

The previous night there had been an attempted coup by the French General Bethoir. He surrounded the villa of the pro-Vischist General Auguste Nog, but Nog managed to escape capture. Betuar's actions led Nog to the idea of ​​an impending Allied landing, in connection with which he put the coastal defense forces on alert.

The most successful was the invasion of Safi. No artillery preparation was carried out here either, however, as soon as the intruders came under fire from the Vichy coastal artillery, return fire was opened from the ships. Safi was taken by noon on 8 November. By November 10, the last pockets of resistance in the city were extinguished, after which the bulk of the forces under the command of General Harmon headed for Casablanca.

Casablanca was surrounded by November 10 and surrendered to the Allies an hour before the planned final assault. Patton's troops entered the city unopposed.

In general, the resistance of the Vichy troops in Morocco was irregular. An attempt by a squadron of the Vichy Navy, which included the unfinished battleship Jean Bart, to prevent the landing was unsuccessful. As a result, many ships were lost, the rest joined the Allies.

Oran

The Central Task Force's strike was divided into three stretches of coast to the west and north of Oran. Due to insufficiently thorough reconnaissance, some attacking ships received damage due to the unexpectedly shallow depth of the sea. This served as a valuable lesson in the planning of Operation Overlord (the Normandy landings).

Coastal artillery worked both on 8 and 9 November. The Vichy troops defended themselves very stubbornly, but were forced to surrender under incessant shelling from British battleships on November 9th.

Algeria

British and American troops on the coast near Algiers

According to agreements with the Allies, a group of 400 members of the French Resistance under the command of Henri D "Astir and José Abulker carried out a military coup in the city of Algiers before the landing on the night of November 8. They occupied key targets in the city, including a telephone exchange, a radio station, the governor's house and headquarters 19th Corps During the day, the defenders spent a lot of time regaining control of the positions lost during the coup, which allowed the Allies to surround the city with almost no resistance.

The invasion was distributed among three sections of the coast. Not all landing troops ended up in the areas allotted to them, which, however, was insignificant, because. they met with virtually no resistance. The coastal artillery batteries were put out of action by the insurgents in advance. One of the French generals openly greeted the Allies.

The only clashes took place in the city of Algiers itself, which was surrendered to the Allies at 18:00.

Effects

Political implications

It soon became clear that Henri Giraud did not have sufficient authority to command the French forces; all the more, he decided to wait for the results of the landing, while in Gibraltar. Therefore, Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, offered the Algerian-based Admiral François Darlan control of North Africa if he defected to the Allies, effectively leaving the Vichy regime intact. An angry reaction followed from both Charles de Gaulle, the French Resistance, and war correspondents. Despite it, this idea was carried out. After the assassination of Darlan by a local anti-fascist on December 24, 1942, Giraud was put in his place, who soon arrested the leaders of the November 8 uprising with the full connivance of the Allies.

Having learned about the cooperation of Darlan and Giraud with the Allies, Hitler ordered the occupation of Vichy France, as well as the strengthening of the German presence in North Africa (the French protectorate in Tunisia was occupied).

Be that as it may, the use by the Allies of such figures as Darlan and Giraud made it possible to convert influential leaders of the Vichy regime to their side, bring them closer to the French National Committee in London and ultimately form a single French government recognized by the United States and Great Britain.

Military implications

After the occupation of Vichy France by the Germans, as well as their failed attempt to capture the French fleet at Toulon, French forces in Africa sided with the Allies. With the support of the French Tunisian army, the Allies invaded Tunisia and almost reached its capital, the city of Tunis, but were driven back by a German counterattack. A series of retreats followed under pressure from Erwin Rommel's German Afrika Korps in early 1943. However, the Allies, having received the necessary reinforcements, managed to stop the Germans and on May 6, 1943, take the cities of Tunis and Bizerte. Deprived of the support of the naval and air forces operating from Sicily, the Axis forces in Tunisia capitulated on May 13, 1943.

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Operation "Torch" World War II, North African Campaign Allied troops landed on the coast of Algeria. Date November 8, 1942 ... Wikipedia

Operation Ultra Fred Winterbotham

Operation Torch

Operation Torch

Before November 8, 1942, I flew to Gibraltar to make sure no one got lost and to keep in touch with Eisenhower until he left for Algiers. Eisenhower's SPS was located in a cave carved into the rock. It was cold and damp there. Quite unexpectedly, all our plans became a reality. The Ultra was now to be tested in a large Allied amphibious assault. Strange as it may seem, Ultra's greatest value in those days, just before the landings in North Africa, was in obtaining information of a negative nature.

About a month earlier, Kesselring and Berlin exchanged radio messages in which each side informed the other of intelligence reports regarding the upcoming Allied landings in the western Mediterranean. Kesselring admitted that he did not know where the landings would take place, but in early November he indicated in an Ultra radiogram that he expected landings either in North Africa, or in Sicily, or in Sardinia. This was a particularly important message at the time, for if Kesselring had been fully aware of our intentions, he could probably have used the French in Algiers to resist us, which would have had fatal consequences. Nevertheless, he asked Hitler for reinforcements to concentrate troops in Sicily and southern Italy as a precautionary measure. Twice briefly rebuffed by Hitler, Kesselring ordered the concentration of troops and transport aircraft at his disposal in southern Italy. After that, except for a radio message to Berlin that convoys had been sighted off the Spanish coast, he remained silent. Eisenhower was in high spirits; it was our first experience with anti-ultra, and it gave us strong hope that we would eventually achieve the most valuable element of surprise.

Kesselring is known to have been an aviation commander. We already knew through Ultra that he was gradually strengthening his position in the Mediterranean and after the defeat of Rommel at El Alamein, he would not waste time as soon as he learned about our intentions.

Traditionally, German military leaders thought like this: "Why land on the other side of the Mediterranean when your clear goal is Europe?" The Americans thought the same way when they wanted to headlong into France, until Churchill finally persuaded them to try the North African operation first. I think that's why Kesselring didn't do anything, just waited and watched, while we also waited in Gibraltar. We were still in Gibraltar when Rommel informed Kesselring that, given the possibility of an Allied landing in North Africa, he intended to withdraw as far as El Agheila on the Tripolitan frontier. At the moment, this message was perhaps of greater interest to Montgomery, but at the same time, the possibility arose, if Kesselring could hold Tunis, that his troops could join Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps.

It didn't take long for Rommel to learn about our target, and Kesselring didn't hesitate when he found out about it too. In the radiogram "Ultra" of the German commission in Tunisia, he ordered that the consent of the French be immediately obtained for the occupation by the Germans of airfields and port facilities in Tunisia and Bizerte. Shortly after sending this radiogram, a radiogram was received from Hitler, in which he allowed Kesselring to capture these areas and prepare troops to be sent to Tunisia. But, since Hitler had recently refused to send him reinforcements, Kesselring had to act with the forces available to him. We knew through Ultra the composition of these forces, but we did not know how quickly he could airlift them into North Africa. Unfortunately, although perhaps for obvious reasons, the political and military position of the French in Algiers was, to put it mildly, unclear. The commander of the British 1st Army and the American troops, General Anderson, arrived with his SPS in Algeria a day after the landing. That evening we read Hitler's radio messages to the German army command in Paris with orders to occupy the rest of France. This radio message set off a chain reaction in London, which was concerned about the fate of the French fleet in Toulon. Naturally, we did not want him to fall into the hands of the Germans. We approached the French in London to see if any arrangements could be made to get the ships out of port and join our fleet in the Mediterranean. In the end, the issue was decided by the French themselves. They scuttled the fleet.

At this time, we learned through Ultra that the German High Command promised Kesselring large reinforcements, but this promise was treated critically, mindful of Rommel's experience. Nevertheless, by the end of November, Kesselring was able to report to Berlin that about 15,000 German soldiers with a hundred tanks had landed in Tunisia, and that about 8,000 more Italian soldiers had been sent to the area. There were reasons to believe that the Germans would now be able to organize the defense, skillfully using the rough terrain.

From the end of November onwards, Ultra provided information not only about the German forces in Tunisia, commanded by Walter Nehring, but also about Rommel's Afrika Korps retreating from Cyrenaica in the east. Hitler, according to Ultra, took over the "remote control" of the Afrika Korps and ordered Rommel to organize the defense at El Agheila. This radio message prompted Montgomery to dispatch the 2nd New Zealand Division with the task of trying to cut off Rommel's escape route. Rommel eventually had to abandon his position. He duly radioed to Rome and Berlin his intention to withdraw to the Homs line in Tunisia, but as we learned from Ultra, Hitler ordered Rommel to take up positions as far east as possible and defend them. So Rommel decided, probably against his own judgment, to dig in at Buerat. He informed Hitler about this. Based on this information, Montgomery decided to send the 7th Armored Division across the desert with the task of attacking Rommel's positions from the west.

From Rommel's radiogram, we learned about the number and composition of his troops after the withdrawal from El Agheila. Experiencing great difficulties with fuel and other supplies, he still had a fairly significant number of tanks.

In January 1943, Churchill went to a conference in Casablanca, which meant that SPS had to be sent from Algiers to keep the Prime Minister informed. At this time, a radiogram from Rommel to the German High Command was intercepted, in which he reported that he was forced to leave the Buerat line and retreat to Homs. This time, the 8th Army did not give him time to dig in, and almost immediately, in another radiogram, Rommel informed Hitler that he was withdrawing to the Maret line in Tunisian territory. General Alexander arrived from Egypt and in February assumed command of the 18th Army Group, formed from the British 1st Army, American troops and the 8th Army. By February, as the allied armies drew closer, the Americans also began to threaten the Afrika Korps from the flank and rear.

We noticed that the tone of the Ultra radio messages exchanged between Kesselring and Rommel became far from friendly.

Almost at the same time, a radio message from Kesselring to Rommel was intercepted, repeating Hitler's order to defend the Maret line and not retreat. The Maret Line was a well-fortified, strong position, originally equipped by the French. Now followed, perhaps, one of the most detailed reports of Rommel. Maybe he wanted to make Hitler calm down at least for a while. The report contained, in essence, a complete plan of the Maret line, indicating the positions of each unit and its defensive structures. Now Montgomery knew exactly what he was facing. Whatever the reasons for the Eighth Army's inability to surround the Afrika Korps in the open, Montgomery now faced a heavily defended fortified position. Kesselring's radiogram to Rommel ordering him to hold the position at all costs was followed by Hitler's order to counterattack the enemy in the 8th Army's zone of operations in order to hold back its advance. Kesselring had to convey Hitler's order, although he assessed the situation differently. This order provoked a sharp response from a visibly disappointed Rommel, who by then had studied the enemy well enough to understand the futility of such an operation. He replied to Kesselring that a counter-offensive in the 8th Army zone could only have an insignificant deterrent effect, and since an Allied advance to the Maret line was still to be expected, he suggested a further withdrawal from Maret in order to combine the forces of the army group on a narrower front. Kesselring immediately replied that Rommel's proposal was being rejected. At that time it was impossible not to sympathize with this man. Rommel proved to be a brilliant military leader during the fighting in the desert: three times he doomed Montgomery's attempts to surround his tank army, constantly experiencing a severe shortage of supplies. Now he probably saw the beginning of the end of the entire North African operation, and it was clear that Hitler's attention was so occupied with the deteriorating situation in Russia that he had absolutely no idea of ​​the situation in Tunisia. True, as we learned from Ultra, more supplies were finally coming into Tunisia, but by early March it became clear that there was nothing more the Axis could do. Churchill sensed prey in North Africa and again politely asked for more radio messages to be sent to him.

I think Rommel considered himself to some extent obligated to carry out Hitler's orders, and in the operation he now undertook, "Ultra" was to play an important role, since his radio messages let Montgomery know what kind of Axis forces would be used. during the counteroffensive in the 8th Army zone near Medenin, 15 miles southwest of the Maret line. Rommel managed to muster three German armored and two Italian infantry divisions for the operation. It is very important that from Rommel's intercepted radio messages we were able to find out exactly where the tank strikes would be made. On February 20, the counteroffensive of Rommel's troops ended in failure. Montgomery had excellent information, and the 8th Army repulsed the tank attack with concentrated anti-tank artillery fire. For Rommel, this meant the end of his activities in Africa. Even before the start of the counter-offensive, he exchanged irritated radio messages with Kesselring; he has now taken sick leave and gone to Germany.

Having repulsed Rommel's counteroffensive at Medenin, Montgomery dealt the main blow to the enemy's positions on the very line of Maret, whose weak points he now knew well.

In his radiograms, Kesselring had already prepared the Supreme High Command for the surrender of Tunisia. He received bad news from Tunisia and from Berlin and asked the Supreme Command for help and instructions on what he should do in case of the next move of the Allies, whatever it might be. The end came quickly - after the final Allied offensive on 6 May. From the intercepted German radio messages, it was possible to learn and communicate to all Allied air forces in North Africa the content of the orders on the procedure for the evacuation of German troops from Tunisia on 10-52 transport aircraft and ME-323 gliders. The SPS told me how difficult it was to keep the Allied aircraft from acting too hastily. However, most of the German transport aircraft were shot down. The same fate befell the last German destroyer in the Mediterranean Sea "Hermes", as well as the convoy with the evacuated troops "Belino". Some senior German officers managed to escape on a hospital ship. The Ultra radio messages did not arrive until May 13, the day when Kesselring briefly reported to Berlin for the second time data on the total losses of troops in Tunisia and in Army Group Africa.

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From the book World War II author Liddell Garth Basil Henry

CHAPTER 21 Operation Torch - A New Wave from the Atlantic

author Churchill Winston Spencer

CHAPTER TWO Decision on Operation Torch During July, when my position was particularly weak politically and when there was not a glimmer of military success, I had to get a decision from the United States that, for better or worse, was decisive

From the book World War II. (Part II, volumes 3-4) author Churchill Winston Spencer

CHAPTER SEVEN Final preparations for Operation Torch When I left London on my mission to Cairo and Moscow, the commander of Operation Torch had not yet been elected. On July 31, I suggested that in the event that General Marshall should be appointed Supreme

From the book World War II. (Part II, volumes 3-4) author Churchill Winston Spencer

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE TORCH IS LIGHTED President Roosevelt's prejudice against General de Gaulle, the contact he maintained through Admiral Lehi with Vichy, and our memories of the Dakar leak two years ago all made us decide

author Hattori Takushiro

3. Operation "I" From March 1943, the danger posed by enemy aircraft became more and more serious; the transport of our troops and war materiel to eastern New Guinea and to the central and northern parts of the Solomon Islands has faced

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Chapter Seven Peter's Military Talent. - The operation of the conquest of Ingria. - Grodno operation of 1706. 1708 and Poltava The idea of ​​creating a coalition against the Turkish-Tatar world suffered a complete collapse in Europe. Peter cooled down to her. He brought other plans from the West.

author Hattori Takushiro

3. The first operation at Akyab and the operation to destroy the remnants of the enemy in Northern Burma

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From the book Myths and mysteries of our history author Malyshev Vladimir

KGB operation? Some believe that all these questions cannot be answered unless one assumes that the hijacking of an American military aircraft from Greece was nothing more than ... a pre-arranged KGB operation! That is probably why the intruder was so warmly welcomed.

From the book Encyclopedia of Slavic Culture, Writing and Mythology author Kononenko Alexey Anatolievich

Torch Round shield, in the center of which was fixed an iron hand with a sword. Therefore, such a shield is more of a stabbing weapon than a protective one. The torch (tarch) included the left hand of the warrior, and he himself was tied to the body with belts and cords, since he was very heavy. Torch

On July 9, 1972, three kilometers from the village of Krestishche in the Kharkov region, the first industrial nuclear explosion was carried out with the release of energy of almost 4 kilotons. The operation was carried out in secrecy, and the document for its implementation was signed personally by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Cause of the explosion

In the 60-70s of the 20th century, geological surveys were carried out on the territory of the Kharkov and Poltava regions of the Ukrainian SSR, the purpose of which was to search for new deposits of natural gas. A deposit with a volume of 300 billion cubic meters was discovered in the vicinity of the village of Krestische. In 1971, active development of the fifth largest gas field in Europe began.

Engineers installed 17 oil rigs, but the emergency situation prevented the continuation of work. On July 17, while drilling on one of the rigs, gas condensate was released with a pressure of 400 atmospheres. Two workers died, and in order to prevent an explosion, a gas stream 200 meters high was set on fire.

Residents of the surrounding villages of Krestishche and Pervomaisky recalled that it was difficult to live next to a huge fiery torch. There was a constant strong rumble, the ground around the towers turned out to be scorched, many birds and animals died, the fire emitted so much light that there was an effect of “white nights”. For a whole year, engineers tried to remedy the situation, but neither pouring concrete into the well nor filling it with slabs worked.

Then the authorities took a risky step and decided to carry out an underground nuclear explosion, after which the gas stream would be trapped in layers of rock. A similar operation has already been carried out in Uzbekistan, but that is sparsely populated Asia, and the implementation of such a plan in Europe is a risky undertaking. However, there was no other way out - the column of fire that had been beating out of the ground for almost a year had to be extinguished.

Operation Torch

After the approval of the highest duck breeding of the country, scientists began to carry out the operation, which they called "Torch". The territory around the deposit was divided into three zones, and their protection was entrusted to the KGB troops and the Interior Ministry detachments brought from Moscow. The space of the inner 400-meter ring was covered with a layer of sand, and experimental livestock and hives with bees were specially left at the border of the zones.

They tried not to involve local specialists in the work, and all participants in the operation signed a non-disclosure document for a period of 15 years. A well 2,400 meters deep was drilled near the fire pillar. A nuclear device was lowered to its bottom. Residents of the village of Pervomaiskoye were evacuated. The cloisters of the village of Krestishch were taken out of their houses into open space. Previously, locals were asked to remove glass, chandeliers, mirrors, dishes and other containers.

On July 9, 1972 at 10:00 am, an underground nuclear explosion occurred. After 20 seconds, a kilometer-long gas column with rock struck from the well, and a characteristic nuclear mushroom appeared a minute later. The locals felt only the tremors of the earth and remembered that before the impact itself, cows mooed loudly and dogs barked. At that time, the villagers did not even suspect that a nuclear explosion had occurred near their homes.

Consequences of a nuclear explosion near Krestishchi

All experimental animals died. The locals recalled that smokers were blown away from all the houses, the walls of many buildings were cracked, and the water in the wells turned white as milk. The authorities did not achieve the desired result. 20 seconds after the explosion, the gas fountain reappeared. It was possible to completely block the gas crater only by the summer of 1973, for which a quarry 400 meters wide and 20 meters deep was dug.

The first harvest after the explosion was very weak, and the chickens stopped laying eggs, and subsequently many villagers developed cancer. The level of radiation in the air, water and soil after an underground impact was not checked, and how radiation affects people's health was not clear at that time. Residents of the villages of Krestishche and Pervomaiskoye also did not receive compensation for material damage and benefits.

Commando [Formation, training, outstanding operations of special forces] Don Miller

Operation Torch

Operation Torch

Rommel began the withdrawal of troops to Tunisia on November 4, 1942. On November 8, the Allies launched Operation Torch. It was supposed to land air and sea assault on the coast of North Africa, controlled by the collaborationist French government of Vichy and arrange a trap for the retreating Germans. The commandos and rangers were given a task similar to the one they had not completed during the operation in Dieppe. However, this time they had much more success, the 1st Ranger Battalion attacked an artillery battery defending the beach in the city of Arzev in western Algiers (this city is one of the targets of the operation). Meanwhile, 2 groups of commandos landed in the Gulf of Algiers and destroyed coastal fortifications.

In contrast to the fierce resistance at Dieppe, the French defenses in North Africa were rather weak and scattered. In Operation Torch, paratroopers performed a very important task; they were supposed to capture the French air bases, the main communications centers and help the Allied forces in the attack on Tunisia, the 509th paratrooper battalion was delivered directly to the air force base in Senia, near Oran, using 39 C-47 aircraft. The commander of this risky operation, Lieutenant Colonel Raff, received information from Allied intelligence that the French would not resist. Therefore, he decided to land directly on the airstrips. As in the case of the localization of Rommel's headquarters (during Operation Crusader), intelligence made a mistake, which led to disaster. The French met the attackers with such heavy fire that Raff and his men were forced to crash-land on a nearby salt lake. Therefore, the merit of capturing Senia belongs to the ground forces. Then the situation improved, on November 8, the 3rd paratrooper battalion landed in Beaune, 250 km west of Tunisia. Three days later, the 509th battalion, having come to its senses after a “friendly meeting” in Senia, landed at the airfield in Tebes (200 km from Beaune), on the border between Tunisia and Libya. Here the allies were accepted as liberators.

The 1st paratrooper battalion, which landed on November 16 in Souq el Arba (120 km west of Tunisia), was received much less favorably. Fortunately, the British officers managed to take control of the situation in time. They convinced the commander of the French garrison (3,000 soldiers) that they were the forward units of the two panzer divisions that were nearby.

On November 29, the 2nd Paratrooper Battalion, under the command of John Frost (who had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel since the raid on Bruneville), landed near Oudna air base, 15 km from the city. Although the Germans had already left the base, it was not only the white minarets that could be seen from the nearby mountain range. Tunisia and its environs were literally packed with mechanized and tank formations of the Axis troops. Threatened by the advancing Germans and Italians, the 2nd paratrooper battalion began to retreat on November 30th. The retreat of the British units did not resemble the stampede of a gazelle pursued by a herd of lions. It was the retreat of a wounded lion in front of a herd of hyenas. Leading stubborn battles, on December 3rd, the 2nd battalion of paratroopers reached the positions of the allies. He lost 266 men, but his line of retreat was literally littered with destroyed Axis tanks and hundreds of Italian and German corpses. For the first time, but not the last time, the 2nd Paratrooper Battalion stood up to the seemingly inexorable logic of war.

By the beginning of December 1942, it became clear that despite the efforts of the paratroopers, the Allies had no chance of capturing Tunisia on the move. The command stated with regret that the war in Africa would not end in the near future. However, the strategic position was not bad. The Axis forces, squeezed into a small space (430 km from north to south), no longer had a chance to carry out large-scale counteroffensives.

Now the British commandos and paratroopers had to fight on the front lines, like ordinary infantry. This situation was repeated many times over the next two years. On March 7, 1943, the first clash took place between a battalion of German paratroopers under the command of the legendary Major Witzig and the 1st paratrooper battalion. At first, German soldiers inflicted losses on the British, but the latter launched a successful counterattack and forced the Germans to retreat.

Allied commandos and paratroopers fought on the front lines until April 1943, with a total loss of 1,700 men. Soldiers in red berets showed outstanding courage, and perhaps that is why the enemy called them "red devils". English paratroopers are still proud of this nickname.

While the British were operating on the front lines, their American counterparts were conducting very dangerous reconnaissance and sabotage raids. Each attack could end tragically, since many thousands of Axis soldiers were concentrated in a small area, willingly supported by Tunisian Arabs who were hostile to the Allies.

On December 21, 1942, a platoon of soldiers from the 509th battalion landed in the El Jem region, in southern Tunisia, with the task of blowing up a railway bridge. The bridge was blown up, but the return was a nightmare. The soldiers had to go through 170 km of mountainous terrain and desert. Of the 44 soldiers participating in the raid, only eight survived.

Trouble experienced even the most experienced "pirates of the desert", attached to the 8th British army advancing from the southeast. So, the SAS patrol under the command of David Stirling himself, who went on reconnaissance to the Gabes Gap region in southern Tunisia, was discovered by the Germans and captured. True, Stirling managed to escape, but he was captured after 36 hours.

The LRDH patrols were more fortunate. One of them, consisting of New Zealanders under the command of Captain Nick Wilder, found an easy passage between the hills west of the Maret line. Soon the passage received the name of the captain. On March 20, 1943, Wilder led 27,000 soldiers and 200 tanks (mostly from the 2nd New Zealand Mechanized Division) through it. These formations surrounded the Maret line from the west, which was the beginning of the end of the Axis forces in Tunisia and all of North Africa.

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"Torch" will burn in Africa Shortly before midnight on June 17, 1942, a Boeing flying boat - British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chief of the Imperial General Staff Allan Brooke were on board - took off from the English airfield of Stramrare, heading for Washington.

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"Torch" blazed in Africa Instead of opening a second front in Europe, England and the United States in early November 1942 landed their troops, numbering about 500 thousand people (a total of 13 divisions), in North Africa - in Algeria and Morocco. The Allies occupied the ports of Algeria , Oran, Casablanca and started