The Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory. Organizationally, they were part of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Pacific Fleet, Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country. Land and sea borders were guarded by border troops.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the real danger of aggression from imperialist Japan, during almost the entire war was forced to keep in the Far East from 32 to 59 calculated divisions of the ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions and up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory with a total number of over 1 million soldiers and officers, 8 - 16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30 percent of the combat forces and means of all Soviet Armed Forces in different periods of the war (475) . Combat and strength of the Far Eastern grouping in 1941 - 1945. shown in tables 5 and 7.

Table 6. The combat composition of the Soviet troops in the Far East in 1941 - 1945 (476)

Associations, connections and separate parts	Availability on
rifle
cavalry
tank
aviation
rifle
tank
aviation
Fortified areas
							Personnel Guns and mortars Tanks and self-propelled guns combat aircraft warships In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Headquarters used 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions on the Soviet-German front - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks , over 12 thousand cars, 1500 tractors and tractors. The Japanese high command closely followed the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front and the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, trying to determine the most favorable moment for an attack on the USSR. This is evidenced by a document sent to the troops in the early days of December 1941, when the German fascists stood at the walls of Moscow: “To complete the continuous preparations for operations against the Soviet Union, not only the Kwantung Army, but also every army and first-line formations must make every effort efforts to ensure that, observing the gradually occurring changes in the military situation of the Soviet Union and Mongolia, to be able at any moment to establish the true situation. This applies especially to the present conditions, when it becomes more and more necessary to quickly establish the signs of a turning point in the situation” (481). Considering the threat of attack, the Headquarters used the Far Eastern forces and means on the Soviet-German front only in the most minimal quantities. From December 5, 1941 to April 30, 1942, only two rifle divisions were transferred there from the Trans-Baikal Front, and a cavalry regiment from the Far East. In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the Wehrmacht fiercely rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command again prepared to strike at the Soviet Far Eastern border. It was during that period that the military operations of his armed forces were not active either in the Pacific Ocean or in China. Meanwhile, the offensive of the Nazi troops required new reserves. From May 1 to November 19, the Headquarters transferred 10 rifle divisions from the Far East to the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts, to the Bryansk Front - 4 rifle brigades with a total strength of about 150 thousand people, over 1600 guns and mortars, a large number of other weapons and combat technology. In the winter of 1942/43, only 1 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 howitzer artillery brigades and 3 mortar regiments with a total number of about 35 thousand people, 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks and other weapons were transferred from the Far East to the Stavka reserve. In 1943, only 8 howitzer artillery brigades, formed in March-May, with a total number of about 9 thousand people, more than 230 large-caliber field guns, were transferred from the Far East to the Soviet-German front. The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East was carried out during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. These were an airborne brigade and four high-capacity howitzer artillery regiments. During the war years, 39 divisions, 21 brigades and 10 regiments were redeployed to the Headquarters reserve from the ground forces of this group. Their total number was about 402 thousand people, over 5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks (482). An important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany belongs to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. In 1941, 12 naval rifle brigades were formed from their composition. More than 140,000 Pacific sailors fought in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front (483). In 1941 - 1944 the active Northern and Black Sea fleets were replenished with warships, as well as well-trained sailors and pilots of the Pacific Fleet (484). Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command, constantly taking care of strengthening the borders in the Far East, practically during the first three years of the war used the Far Eastern grouping as one of the sources of replenishment of the troops operating against Nazi Germany, creating new units and formations. During the war years, the transfer of combat forces and means, weapons and military equipment from one theater of operations to another clearly testifies to the great contribution of the Far Eastern troops to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. The main part of these forces and means was sent by the Headquarters to the Soviet-German front in the most difficult and crucial moments of the war against Germany. In the second half of 1943, when a radical change took place on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Soviet Union, and Italy fell out of the fascist bloc, it became clear to the whole world that sooner or later Germany and Japan would fall after her. The successes of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces changed the course of the entire Second World War and enabled the United States and Great Britain to intensify operations in the Pacific. From that time on, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command almost did not attract the combat forces and means of the Far Eastern grouping to the Soviet-German front and began to carry out measures for its development. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was formed as part of the Far Eastern Front (1st and 25th combined arms armies, all formations and units located in Primorye, as well as the 9th Air Army, operationally subordinate to it). Gradually, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern group increased, the troops were saturated with automatic and conventional small arms. Artillery, tank and aircraft fleets were replenished with new types of guns and vehicles, their logistics improved. In 1944, 11 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps headquarters, a mechanized brigade, several mechanically driven artillery regiments, and a field-type fortified area (485) were deployed. In February 1945, the General Staff, the central and main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were intensively working to prepare plans for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, as well as to concentrate the necessary amount of material and technical means there (486) . Calculations have shown that military-political goals can be achieved in a short time only if there are three powerful offensive groupings in the Far Eastern theater of operations and a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment. To do this, it was necessary to sharply increase the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern formations. The strategic deployment of troops in the Far East differed from the preparation of offensive operations in Europe in that it was carried out in advance and had two stages (initial and final), each of which solved different tasks. The initial stage, completed in the main in the autumn of 1941, was carried out in order to reliably secure the state border from possible Japanese aggression. On the territory of the two former border military districts, deployed in fronts, only covering troops were concentrated, but also forces and means capable of delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Throughout the war with fascist Germany, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command systematically improved the defensive power of the Far Eastern group, almost doubling the number of its personnel. The final stage of the strategic deployment, in which both the troops stationed in this theater and those concentrated as a result of the regrouping, took part during the immediate preparation of the offensive campaign against Japan. Its goal was to create a new strategic front of armed struggle in a new theater of operations. Such important problems as ensuring the secrecy of the regrouping and concentration of troops in the corresponding strategic directions, covering their deployment, command and control of troops, and their comprehensive material and technical support were solved. At the end of February - March 1945, the General Staff approved plans for the deployment of troops in the Far East and their logistics (487) . On March 14, the State Defense Committee decided to strengthen the air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia (488) . By a directive of March 19, the Stavka detached from the Far Eastern Front and subjugated the Primorsky Group of Forces, creating a third strategic direction for the deployment of troops (489). On March 26, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned new tasks to the Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Group of Forces to cover the deployment of troops (490). Considering the important role of the armored forces in the upcoming campaign, in March 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to upgrade the equipment of the tank formations of the Far East, which were armed only with obsolete T-26 and BT light slippers throughout the war. In all tank brigades, the first battalions were armed with T-34 tanks. The first tank regiments of the 61st and 111th tank divisions were transferred to the same armament. In total, it was planned to send 670 T-34 tanks (491) to the Far East. At the same time, a list of measures for the medical support of the Far Eastern campaign was approved. It was necessary to transfer 348 different medical units and institutions, create a reserve of personnel, supplies of materials and funds for medical care (492). In view of the fact that the main part of the troops and cargo was planned to be transported by rail, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Railways to prepare the eastern and Far Eastern railways for mass transportation. In February 1945, a check was made of the mobilization readiness of a number of highways of the Far East to ensure a wide flow of military traffic, and measures were outlined to increase their throughput (493) . At the beginning of 1945, the operational and technical condition of the eastern railways did not fully meet the requirements of the situation. There were many rotten sleepers on the Trans-Siberian Railway, more than 11 thousand pieces of worn or burst rails, which significantly limited the throughput of many sections. The subgrade on some lines needed to be strengthened, especially in the section along the shore of Lake Baikal, where even before the war work had begun, but not completed, on the construction of retaining walls and the repair of emergency tunnels (494) . Meanwhile, in the difficult days of the war, all stocks of rails, sleepers, turnouts, a significant part of the locomotive fleet were sent to the western roads. There was also a shortage of skilled workers who were mobilized into the military operational departments and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat for Service to service the western roads. Despite the measures taken to return specialists, by the beginning of hostilities against militaristic Japan, about 20 thousand of them were missing on the railway lines of the Far East (495) . In the spring of 1945, the capacity of the Tomsk and Omsk railways and some lines of the Far East was increased. On April 13, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On measures to improve the operation of the railways of the Far East (Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Far Eastern and Primorskaya)". In order to improve the management of the activities of these highways, the Special District of the Far East Railways was created, headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Railways V. A. Garnyk. General A.V. Dobryakov became the authorized representative of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the BOSO under the district. For some sections, it was necessary to increase the capacity from 12 to 38 pairs of trains. The People's Commissariat of Communications was charged with increasing the number of locomotives on the railways of the Far East: by May 1, 1945 - up to 2708, by July 1 - up to 2947, and by September 1 - up to 3107. To replenish the locomotive fleet of these roads from other highways and from the reserve 800 locomotives (496) were distilled. Of the 240 steam locomotives of the GKO reserve and 360 steam locomotives of the NKPS reserve, it was required to form 20 locomotive columns. The GKO resolution provided for the creation of significant coal reserves by reserving reserves, as well as replenishing the railways of Siberia and the Far East with qualified personnel. During the second quarter of 1945, it was planned to increase the number of skilled workers by 30 thousand people, including machinists by 2373, assistant machinists by 2916, locomotive mechanics by 3155, conductors by 2074, track workers by 8816 people (497). From April, units of three operational railway regiments and three operational departments from Poland and Romania began to enter the Special District of the Far East Railways; all special forces were returning from the southwestern highways. In total, there were over 14 thousand people (498) in these parts. At the disposal of the NKPS came 8,000 conscripts, recognized for health reasons as limited fit for military service. Two railway brigades and several special formations were sent for restoration work (499) . These works demanded enormous effort from the railroad workers. The main military transportation, both centralized and interfrontal, was carried out by rail in May - July, but they were most intensive in June. By August 9, their total volume amounted to 222,331 wagons (in terms of two-axle), including 127,126 wagons arrived in the Far East from the central regions of the country. Of this number, 74,345 wagons were received for the Trans-Baikal Front. 1st Far East - 31,100, 2nd Far East - 17,916, and 81,538 wagons were used to deliver military units and formations (operational transportation) (500). According to the types of troops, transportation was distributed as follows: 29.8 percent - for rifle troops, 30.5 percent - for artillery and armored vehicles, 39.7 percent - for aviation, engineering and other formations and units. The following facts testify to the intensity of the work of the railway: on average, in June - July, from 13 to 22 railway echelons arrived daily. Significant intra- and inter-front transportation was carried out through internal railway, water and highway-unpaved communications. The transfer of troops along them was carried out in a combined way: by transport and on foot. In May-August, 95,205 wagons passed by rail, about 700,000 tons of cargo were transported by water, 513,000 tons were transported along dirt roads, and 4,222 tons were transported by air. The main task of the railway units of the Trans-Baikal Front was the preparation of the main communications of the front - the single-track line Karymskaya - Borzya - Bayan-Tumen (Choibalsan). To do this, only in the weakest section of Borzya - Bayan-Tumen in June 1945, 13 sidings were built by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, the BOSO and railway workers. This made it possible to increase the capacity of the section from 7 to 18 pairs of trains per day (501) . The 3rd railway brigade arrived at the disposal of the 1st Far Eastern Front from Czechoslovakia, which launched work on the Primorskaya Railway to develop stations, a water supply system and strengthen the upper structure of the track. In the 2nd Far Eastern Front, the 25th railway brigade increased the capacity of the Amur and Far Eastern railways from 25 to 30 pairs of trains per day by the start of hostilities. Since the arriving forces were not enough, about 80 different recovery trains and flyers were formed, serviced by brigades of railway workers on the Amur, Primorskaya and Far Eastern roads (502). In total, in the spring and summer months of 1945, up to a million Soviet soldiers and officers (503), tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, vehicles and many thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms were on the communications routes of Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East and other cargo. Throughout the entire length from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian Railway was transferred to the operational group of the Logistics Directorate of the Soviet Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. The fronts, on the other hand, used branches from the main highway leading to the borders of Manchuria and Korea. Their total length was 2700 km. The Trans-Baikal Front had 12 railway sections (504) for basing, the 2nd Far East - 9 and the 1st Far East - 8. In addition, more than 800 km of narrow gauge railways built before the war on the territory of the MPR were used. Borzya station with a branch at Bayan-Tumen station (for the Trans-Baikal Front), Svobodny station with a branch in Khabarovsk (for the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Guberovo and Voroshilov stations (Ussuriysk) with a branch at Manzovka station ( for the 1st Far Eastern Front). The greatest load was planned for the line in the Trans-Baikal Front. Meanwhile, the capacity of the railway sections Karymskaya - Borzya, Borzya - Bayan-Tumen could not provide the required speed of movement. In this regard, the front command decided to send motorized units and mechanized artillery from the Karymskaya station under its own power. To do this, special groups of officers arrived in Irkutsk and Karymskaya, who distributed units on the spot to follow on their own and by rail (505) . Troops were delivered to Primorye by the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway, passing in separate sections 3-6 km from the state border. Therefore, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front attached particular importance to the secrecy of transportation. Here, more often than on other fronts, in order to misinform the enemy, false transports of troops were carried out and false concentration areas were equipped. A huge volume of transportation could not be carried out only by railroads: it was necessary to build and repair unpaved highways. As a result, by August 9, the length of only military highways in the Far East exceeded 4.2 thousand km, of which it reached 2279 km on the Trans-Baikal Front, 1509 km on the 1st Far East, and 485 km on the 2nd Far East ( 506) . This greatly increased the ability to maneuver manpower and military equipment at the beginning of hostilities. In the prewar period, aviation in the Far East was not widely developed. During the war years, the length of overhead lines increased from 12 thousand km in 1941 to 18 thousand km in 1945, that is, 1.5 times; from July 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, over 66 thousand passengers, 7 thousand tons of cargo and about 2 thousand tons of mail were transported. During the period of hostilities, the crews of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration made 439 sorties and transported more than 360 tons of defense cargo, as well as a significant number of passengers (507) . In preparation for the war with Japan, a large proportion of traffic fell on the Far Eastern Shipping Company. The tasks of the fleet were determined by the GKO decree of April 30, 1945. The People's Commissariat of the Navy needed to ensure the transportation of 123 thousand tons of cargo in May through the Far Eastern water basin, including coal - 40.6 thousand tons, fish - 10.3 thousand tons, salt - 10.7 thousand tons from Sakhalin Island, imported cargo from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok - 18 thousand tons and various cargoes of Dalstroy - 17 thousand tons (508). The implementation of measures to ensure the concentration and deployment of troops in the Far East allowed the Soviet command to proceed with a direct regrouping of troops. Although the State Defense Committee decided on a broad transfer of units only on June 3, 1945 (509), in fact, it began even before the end of the final campaign in Europe. In April, the reserve front department of the former Karelian Front arrived in the Far East, which was entrusted with the command of the Primorsky Group of Forces (510). Until May 9, two field-type fortified areas (511) were sent from the Stavka reserve. From May 9 to May 31, the field administration of the 5th Army arrived there, three directorates of rifle corps with four rifle divisions (512). As a source of strategic deployment in the Far East, the Headquarters used the troops of four fronts that had completed combat operations on the Soviet-German front. The bulk of the regrouped troops were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front: the directorate of the 5th and 39th combined arms armies, 6 directorates of rifle corps, 18 rifle and 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 artillery and 2 rocket artillery brigades, or 60 percent of the total number formations of ground forces that arrived in the Far East. Frontal and 2 army directorates, 6 directorates of rifle, tank and mechanized corps, 10 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 15 brigades of the main military branches were sent from the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from the Leningrad Front came the management of the breakthrough artillery corps and the mechanized corps, 6 divisions and 17 brigades of various branches of the ground forces. The rest of the formations came from the 1st Belorussian Front (three rocket artillery brigades), the Moscow Military District (two tank brigades) and directly from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (reserve front management, three brigades and two fortified areas) (513) . A large number of rear units and institutions arrived in the Far East from other military districts. Such formations and formations were sent to the Far East that could successfully solve offensive tasks in the specific conditions of a theater of military operations. Determination of the expediency of using one or another connection depended on the experience and combat qualities accumulated in battles on the Soviet-German front. Thus, formations and units of the 5th and 39th armies, which participated in breaking through the fortified defensive zones in East Prussia, were intended to break through in the main directions of the border fortified areas. The first - in the offensive zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the second - on the Trans-Baikal Front. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had extensive experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front for an offensive in the wide desert expanses and mountainous wooded massifs of Manchuria. The regrouping of such significant forces and means in a short time and over vast distances required its careful organization both on the part of higher authorities and directly at the places of deployment of troops. Since the Japanese held large forces on the border with the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures in advance to reliably cover the lines of communication, areas of concentration and deployment of troops from possible strikes (514) . To ensure the secrecy of mass rail transportation, the admission of persons to their planning, control and accounting both in the General Staff and in the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Army was limited; it was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the redeployment of troops, the stations for unloading and servicing echelons were numbered; the transmission of reports on the movement of echelons was strictly controlled by the VOSO officers. Military equipment on railway platforms was camouflaged (515) . The troops were unloaded, as a rule, at night, after which they were immediately withdrawn to the area of ​​concentration. The deployment of strike groups was carried out so covertly that at the beginning of the Manchurian operation, complete surprise was achieved. The command of the Kwantung Army knew about the movements of Soviet troops that began in the spring, but they did not expect that the Soviet Union would complete this major regrouping of the Armed Forces so soon (516) . Data on the number of forces and means of the ground forces that arrived in the Far East from May to August 8, 1945, are shown in Table 8. The table shows that the strategic regrouping of troops reached its highest limit in July, when 51.1 percent of the ground forces, 52.2 percent of artillery and 58 percent of armored weapons arrived in the Far East from the ground forces. In three months, the number of settlement divisions increased from 59.5 to 87.5, that is, 1.5 times, and the number of personnel of the entire group of troops - from 1,185,000 to 1,747,000 people. Table 8. The number of ground forces regrouped from the west during the period of strategic deployment in the Far East (517) Forces and means Personnel Rifles and carbines Submachine guns Machine guns and light machine guns Guns and mortars Tanks and self-propelled guns Trucks Tractors and tractors horse composition In total, during the period of strategic deployment, 2 front and 4 army directorates, 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped, which amounted to a total complexity of 30 settlement divisions. In addition, the management of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions arrived. The air defense of the Far East received 3 air defense corps of the country's territory. The average staffing of units and formations was about 80 percent (518). The troops that joined the Far Eastern group were armed with more than 600 rocket launchers, as well as 900 heavy, medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The importance and expediency of the regrouping carried out to achieve victory in the war in the Far East in 1945 is evidenced by a well-known historical example. One of the reasons for the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. was the inability of the Russian command to transfer in a short time to the Far East the necessary human reserves, weapons, ammunition and other types of materiel. The growth of combat forces and assets in the Far East, as well as the remoteness of this theater of operations, required the improvement of the strategic organs of the military leadership of the Far Eastern grouping of troops. In order to coordinate the actions of the troops and the navy, as early as May 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to create the High Command in the Far East, the Military Council and headquarters under it. At the end of June, a group of generals and officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky left for the Far East. This group launched work in Chita (519). By a decision of July 30, the Headquarters formalized the creation of a special body of higher command - the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by a directive of August 2 - the headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, which actually operated from the beginning of July. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief, General I.V. Shikin was appointed a member of the Military Council, and General S.P. Ivanov (520) was appointed chief of staff. The coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. The actions of aviation were led by the commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov. Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, an operational logistics group was created, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General V. I. Vinogradov. It included a group of rear headquarters officers, representatives of the Central Directorate of Military Communications, the Main Automobile Directorate, the Main Road Directorate, the fuel supply, food and clothing supply departments, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate and the Main Trophy Directorate (521). On August 5, 1945, the Supreme Command Headquarters renamed the Primorsky Group of Forces into the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front into the 2nd Far Eastern (522). At the same time, the coastal and Far Eastern directions (523) that existed as part of the operational department of the General Staff were also renamed. By August 9, 1945, the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts were deployed in the Far East, with the troops of which the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, were to interact. Air defense was carried out by the Primorsky, Amur and Trans-Baikal air defense armies of the country's territory. Border Troops of Primorsky. For the first time in their history, the Khabarovsk and Trans-Baikal border districts were supposed to perform tasks unusual for them: participating in front-line operations, liquidate enemy border cordons and posts, destroy its fortified strongholds, and subsequently take an active part in the pursuit of enemy troops and protect communications, headquarters, important facilities and rear areas. The Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, member of the Military Council General A. N. Tevchenkov, chief of staff General M. V. Zakharov, consisted of the 17th, 36th, 39th and 53rd combined arms (commander generals L I. Danilov, A. A. Luchinsky, I. I. Lyudnikov, I. M. Managarov), 6th Guards Tank (commanded by General A. G. Kravchenko), 12th Air (commanded by General S. A. Khudyakov) of the armies and the horse-mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander General I. A. Pliev, his deputy for the Mongolian troops, General Zh. Lkhagvasuren). The anti-aircraft cover of the troops of the front was carried out by army and divisional anti-aircraft artillery, as well as the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commander General P. F. Rozhkov). By the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front consisted of 13 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 39 divisions and 45 brigades (rifle, airborne, cavalry, artillery, mortar, rocket artillery, tank, mechanized, anti-aircraft and self-propelled artillery), 2 fortified areas and 54 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 2 directorates of bomber aviation corps, 6 bomber divisions, 2 assault, 3 fighter, 2 transport and 7 separate aviation regiments. Horse-mechanized formations and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army consisted of 4 cavalry and aviation divisions, a motorized armored brigade, tank, artillery regiments and a communications regiment with a total strength of about 16 thousand people, 128 guns and mortars and 32 light tanks (524). The Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country had 3 air defense divisions, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery air defense regiments of railway echelons and a fighter aviation division. In total, the Trans-Baikal grouping of troops consisted of 648 thousand people, or 37.1 percent of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was armed with 9668 guns and mortars, 2359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 369 rocket launchers and 1324 combat aircraft (525). The total length of the Trans-Baikal Front along the state border was 2300 km (526). The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council General T. F. Shtykov, chief of staff General A. N. Krutikov, included the 1st Red Banner, 5th, 25th and 35th combined-arms armies (commanded by Generals A.P. Beloborodov, N.I. Krylov, I.M. Chistyakov, N.D. Zakhvataev), the Chuguev task force (commanded by General V.A. Zaitsev), the 10th mechanized corps (commander General I. D. Vasiliev) and the 9th Air Army (commanded by General I. M. Sokolov). The troops of the Primorsky Air Defense Army of the country's territory were stationed on the territory of the front (commander General A.V. Gerasimov). By August 9, the front command had control of 10 rifle and mechanized corps, 34 divisions, 47 brigades and 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 14 fortified areas, a bomber aviation corps, 3 bomber, 3 fighter, 2 assault air divisions and 6 separate aviation regiments. The coastal air defense army of the country's territory included the directorate of the air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, and an anti-aircraft artillery brigade. 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. In total, the coastal grouping had about 589 thousand people (33.7 percent), 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 rocket launchers, 1974 slippers and self-propelled guns and 1137 combat aircraft (527). The length of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 700 km (528). The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General M.A. Purkaev, a member of the Military Council, General D.S. Leonov, the chief of staff, General F.I. Shevchenko, included the 2nd Red Banner, 15th and 16th combined arms ( Commanding Generals M. F. Terekhin, S. K. Mamonov, L. G. Cheremisov) and the 10th Air Army (commander General P. F. Zhigarev), the 5th Separate Rifle Corps (commander General I. Z. Pashkov ). The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commanded by General Ya. K. Polyakov) was also located within the front. The front included the directorates of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 4 rifle, 9 tank and 2 anti-tank brigades, 5 fortified areas, 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, the command of the mixed aviation corps, bomber, 2 assault , 3 fighter and 2 mixed aviation divisions, 9 separate aviation regiments. The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory consisted of directorates of 2 air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, 2 anti-aircraft artillery brigades, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. This grouping included 333,000 people (19.1 percent), 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat aircraft. The length of the 2nd Far Eastern Front reached 2130 km (529). The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, a member of the Military Council, General S. E. Zakharov, and the chief of staff, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, had 2 cruisers, a leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 78 submarines, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine chasers, 204 torpedo boats (530). The aviation of the fleet consisted of 1618 aircraft, of which 1382 were combat. The number of personnel is about 165 thousand people, the fleet had 2550 guns and mortars, as well as other weapons (531). The Pacific Fleet was based at Vladivostok, as well as Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk. The Red Banner Amur Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov, a member of the Military Council Rear Admiral M.G. Yakovenko, the chief of staff Captain 1st Rank A.M. Gushchin, had in service 8 monitors, 11 gunboats, 7 mine boats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers and a number of support vessels (532). Its aviation consisted of 68 combat aircraft. In addition, all patrol boats of the border guard on the Amur and Ussuri, as well as ships of the civil river shipping company, were subordinate to the commander of the flotilla. The flotilla included 12.5 thousand people, 199 anti-aircraft guns and mortars (533). The Red Banner Amur military flotilla was based at Khabarovsk, Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya River, Sretensk on the Shilka River and Lake Khanka. So, by August 9, 1945, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies, 3 air defense armies of the country's territory, a fleet and a flotilla were deployed against the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. They included directorates of 33 corps, 131 divisions and 117 brigades of the main branches of service. The land border of the USSR was covered by 21 fortified areas. The total strength of the Soviet Far Eastern group and its weapons are shown in Table 9. Table 9. The number of personnel, weapons and military equipment of the Soviet group of forces in the Far East at the beginning of the war against Japan (534) Forces and means Ground troops Air defense forces of the country Personnel Rifles and carbines Submachine guns Machine guns and light machine guns Guns and mortars Tanks and self-propelled guns combat aircraft Warships of the main classes The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was a force capable of crushing Japanese troops in Manchuria in a short time. It was based on soldiers and officers of formations and units who were in the Far East during the war, but were well trained in the course of lengthy combat training and knew the theater of operations, the nature of the enemy’s defense and the characteristics of the Japanese army. The personnel of the armies transferred from the west had extensive experience in operating against a strong enemy. The skillful use of these features significantly increased the striking power of the grouping and in many respects predetermined the success of the entire campaign.

Balance of power (1938-1940)

If you look at the historical literature of the Soviet period, you can find an interesting pattern. Both the official multi-volume publications and author's publications speak of the Japanese threat. An increase in the size of the Kwantung Army, an increase in tanks, aircraft, guns in Manchuria, the construction of fortified areas (Urov) near the Soviet borders, the construction of airfields also near the Soviet borders, intensive railway and highway construction directed to the Soviet borders. The list of such events can be continued for a long time, and everything said will be correct. And as a conclusion from all that has been said, Japan is developing plans for aggression, preparing an attack, and the vast Soviet territory from Baikal to Vladivostok is under constant threat. Therefore, residents of this region, be vigilant, keep your gunpowder dry and grip your rifle tighter.

For the late 1930s, when everything and everything had to be hidden, such statements made sense. But half a century later, in the late 1980s, when many secrets were gone and some archives were opened, it is very difficult to explain such statements. If we analyze the already declassified documents, it becomes clear that the same thing was done on the other side of the Amur on Soviet territory. The number of OKDVA and ZabVO troops increased, the number of tanks, aircraft and guns increased. Against the Japanese fortified areas near the Soviet borders, similar URs were built near the Manchurian borders in Transbaikalia and especially in Primorye. Intensive railway and highway construction was also carried out on Soviet territory, directed to the Manchurian border. Airfields for heavy bomber brigades were built in the Vladivostok region. And if Japanese bombers from the Manchurian airfields could fly to Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, then the Soviet TB-3s could bomb over the capital of the empire and return back - there was enough range margin. And after all bombed, however, on paper. Those who wish can read Nikolai Pavlenko's novel In the East, published in 1937. This very colorfully shows the flaming Tokyo, destroyed by Soviet aircraft during the future Japanese-Soviet war. The list of such events on the Soviet side can also be continued for a long time, and everything will be right here as well. On Soviet territory there was a mirror image of everything that was done in Manchuria. And as a conclusion from all that has been said, the Soviet Union also developed plans for aggression, also prepared an attack.

And in order to understand all these contradictory statements and give a final answer as to who was going to attack whom, it is necessary to start counting forces and means, comparing facts and intentions. Who will be stronger, he is preparing an attack. A weaker country will never prepare aggression against its stronger neighbor. In other words, we need a balance of power in the Far East on the eve of World War II. Dry figures and facts taken from archival documents will give a more accurate and truthful answer than the arguments of Soviet historians about the "aggressiveness" of Japan and the "defensive" measures of the Soviet Union.

When the Soviet military leadership planned to increase the Red Army in the Far East, it, of course, did not have documents from the Japanese General Staff or the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. The only reliable, verified and re-verified data were military intelligence data on the size and armament of the Kwantung Army. The General Staff relied on them in the current planning of strengthening the Soviet troops in the Far East and in long-term planning, when operational plans were developed in case of a war with Japan. Of course, military intelligence data could not be considered one hundred percent true. Perhaps, after comparing our intelligence reports with the documents of the Japanese General Staff published in Japan in recent years, discrepancies in figures may appear, and Japanese documents will be the ultimate truth. But in the late 1930s, our General Staff had nothing else. Therefore, modern researchers, when assessing the situation of that period, have to use intelligence reports.

On December 20, 1938, the deputy head of the Intelligence Department, Divisional Commander Orlov, sent a certificate to the General Staff about the transfer of Japanese troops from Japan and their regrouping to Manchuria in October-December 1938. During this time, 250 thousand people were transferred from Japan to the mainland. 57 thousand, 100 guns, 35 tanks and 55 aircraft were transferred to Manchuria. Taking into account these replenishments and the return of old-timers to Japan, the Intelligence Agency determined the strength of the Kwantung Army on December 15, 1938 at 347,000 people. According to military intelligence estimates, this grouping was armed with: guns - 1368, tanks - 684 and aircraft - 475. To this was added the size of the Korean army of 54,000 people with 248 guns, 33 tanks and 120 aircraft. It can be assumed that these troops were concentrated at the Soviet Far Eastern borders by January 1, 1939.

On January 15, 1939, Orlov sent the Chief of the General Staff, Commander of the 1st Rank Shaposhnikov, a new report on the transfer of Japanese troops on January 15. The report noted that, according to the information available in the Intelligence Agency, "for the second half of December and for the first ten days of January 1939, the Japanese troops in Manchuria increased by one infantry division ..." According to reliable information, by this time the organization of the headquarters of army groups had been carried out in Manchuria . In the main operational areas (Primorskoye, Blagoveshchenskoye, Zabaikalskoye), for the convenience of managing numerous infantry divisions, the formation of army structures with their own headquarters began. At the same time, the central command structure of the Kwantung Army with its headquarters was preserved. With such an organization, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army began to perform the functions of the headquarters of the front. The Japanese military leadership repeated the Soviet experience when, before the Khasan events, the Far Eastern Front was organized, in the structure of which two armies were formed. But if such an event of the Soviet command, and even pepper by Khasan, and not after, was issued by Soviet historians after the war as peaceful and defensive, then the same event of the Japanese command was regarded by the Intelligence Industry in 1939 in a different way: “Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that that the Japanese command is transferring the Kwantung Army to a martial law, as evidenced by the following facts: 1) Reorganization of command and control using the forms and methods of command characteristic of wartime ... "

That's such a double standard. The creation of army command and control units in the Far East and the creation of a front in the summer of 1938 as defensive and peaceful, and the creation of the same structures in Manchuria as preparations for war. For the reader's information: on September 4, 1938, on the basis of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0040, in order to improve the leadership of the troops of the Far East and increase the level of combat training, the front department was disbanded, and Separate Red Banner armies were organized from the front troops - the 1st OKA and the 2nd OKA. Commander of the 2nd OKA was appointed commander of the 2nd rank Konev. The army headquarters was stationed in Khabarovsk. The 1st OKA united the troops located in Primorye, the headquarters was located in the city of Voroshilov. Commander of the army commander of the 2nd rank Stern. It can also be noted that even in the five-year plan for the development of the armed forces (1938-1942), prepared at the end of 1937, it was indicated that the development of the plan was based on the requirements: to be able to repel the attack of enemies simultaneously in the West and East and transfer the fight to enemy territory.

What forces were concentrated in the Far East by 1939? After the elimination of the Hassan conflict, the reinforcement of troops in the area continued. Military equipment was transferred from the central regions of the country: guns, tanks, and especially aircraft. Separate military units were also transferred. The Trans-Siberian Railway was packed with military trains. Military equipment, weapons, ammunition and various property necessary for the formation of new units in the event of a war were transferred. By 1939, there were 450 thousand personnel, 5748 guns and 4716 tanks in this region. In terms of guns, our troops outnumbered the Kwantung and Korean armies four times, in tanks - 6.6 times. As for combat aircraft, already on January 1, 1938, there were 24 aviation brigades in the East (of which 6 were heavy bombers, 4 medium bombers, and 5 fighters) with a total number of combat aircraft - 2623. The superiority of the Soviet troops in both total numbers and especially in the means of suppression was explicit. And the Japanese General Staff, of course, knew about it. In the intelligence department there were specialists who knew how to extract information, and to count, and analyze.

Of course, with such a balance of power, it was possible to develop various versions of the OCU plan - paper will endure everything. But in determining the aggressiveness and threat of war on the part of Japan, one must proceed not from paperwork, but from the real number of troops and military equipment. And it, of course, was in favor of the Red Army. It should also be noted that none of the options for capturing the "OTsU" was obtained by military intelligence. And in determining the threat of war, both the Intelligence Agency and the General Staff could only use the total strength of the Kwantung Army and assessments of the military-political situation in the area. It may be objected that Japan was located next to Manchuria and Korea and, with the absolute dominance of its navy in the Japanese and South China Seas, could quickly transfer, if necessary, any number of troops and equipment to the mainland. And this would have been possible if not for the “Chinese factor”. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in August 1937, the Chinese front absorbed all the human and material resources of the empire. Japan is bogged down in a war with China for a long time. And there was no point in talking about a simultaneous war with China and the Soviet Union - there was not enough strength for this.

On November 15, 1938, Orlov reported to Shaposhnikov a certificate on the possibilities of the mobilization deployment of the Japanese army and "The combat schedule of the Japanese army and its territorial distribution as of November 15, 1938." Intelligence analysts collected, systematized and analyzed all the intelligence information on Japan, and a curious document came out. In China, 28 infantry divisions and one brigade were concentrated; two cavalry, four artillery and two motorized brigades, two tank and four anti-aircraft regiments. A total of 700 thousand people, 2000 guns, 930 tanks and 1346 aircraft. In Manchuria, there were 10 infantry divisions, three cavalry, four security and two motorized brigades, as well as garrisons of URs, two artillery brigades, three heavy artillery regiments, two anti-aircraft and nine artillery regiments. In total, the Kwantung Army had 320 thousand people, 1268 guns, 648 tanks and 420 aircraft. To this was added the grouping of the Korean Army consisting of two divisions with reinforcement units totaling 54,000 people. In the remainder, that is, in Japan, on Sakhalin and Formosa, there were only three infantry divisions with reinforcement units and rear units with a total strength of 333 thousand people with 914 guns, 120 tanks and 300 aircraft. A little in case of a proposed war with the Soviet Union. Stubborn battles were going on in China, and it was impossible to transfer a certain number of divisions from there to Manchuria. And the transfer of the remaining three divisions from the islands to the mainland did not make the weather.

During the war in China, the Japanese army increased from 380 to 1677 thousand people, and the number of divisions increased from 21 to 44. Still, there was nothing to fight with the Soviet Union. The Chinese front "ate" half of the Japanese army. It was ridiculous to start a war with seven hundred tanks and six hundred aircraft. Not to mention the fact that the quality of tank and aircraft equipment of the Japanese army was much worse than the quality of the same equipment in the Red Army. So all plans for an attack on the Soviet Union could not be taken out of the safes until better times.

Intelligence information and the balance of forces were taken into account by the General Staff when developing plans for strategic deployment. A report on this plan was written on March 24, 1938 by Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff. The document was so secret that it was not entrusted to typists, and Shaposhnikov wrote all 40 pages of the report himself. So in one handwritten copy, this document ended up in the archive. The main task in developing the foundations of strategic deployment in the East was to prevent the invasion of Japanese troops into the Soviet Far East, inflict a decisive defeat on them in Northern Manchuria and hold the Pacific coast, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The retention of Primorye was considered mandatory under any circumstances, therefore, the weakening of the grouping of the Red Army troops was not allowed here.

The General Staff believed that the offensive in the Sungeri direction could only be of an auxiliary nature, as an operation that connected the Primorsky and Blagoveshchensk directions. A strike from the Blagoveshchensk direction was hampered by crossing the Amur, and then overcoming the Lesser Khingan Range. But, despite the difficulties, a strike in this direction was envisaged because it could help the advance of Soviet troops from Transbaikalia with the task of reaching the Tsitsikar area. It was assumed that with the appearance of our large forces in the Sungari Plain south of Tsitsikar, in combination with the offensive from Blagoveshchensk, the most advantageous position would be created, which could force the Japanese command to abandon the offensive in the coastal direction. The plan for the war in Manchuria was offensive, no defense on the border behind the structures of the URs was envisaged.

Mongolia was given particular importance in the report. This theater of military operations was assessed as a springboard covering the railway communication of the Far East with Eastern Siberia and therefore of particular importance. The same bridgehead was advantageous for an offensive bypassing the Greater Khingan Range from the south to the Manchurian Plain. Consequently, the territory of the MPR had to be held by the Soviet troops stationed there together with units of the MPR. Shaposhnikov’s report stated: “To solve problems in the Far East, Transbaikalia and the Mongolian People’s Republic, it is necessary to deploy 40 rifle divisions, one mountain rifle division on Sakhalin, 8 separate rifle regiments, 5 cavalry divisions, 7 tank brigades, 3 armored brigades in the Mongolian People’s Republic, 3748 guns, 3525 tanks, 2998 aircraft (together with the fleet), including: bombers - 1524, fighters - 958, scouts - 457.

The report also provided a breakdown of forces and assets by operational areas. The concentration of such forces ensured a significant superiority over the forces of the Kwantung Army and ensured successful operations on the territory of Manchuria. Here is what this concentration looked like in Shaposhnikov's plan:

In the East, it is planned to create the following grouping of troops:

- on the territory of the MPR - the 57th special corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, one cavalry brigade, one tank and three motorized armored brigades and 100 aircraft.

- in the Trans-Baikal direction - 14 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, two tank brigades and 682 aircraft.

- in the Blagoveshchensk direction - 7 rifle divisions and one tank brigade, and in the Sungarian direction - 4 rifle divisions and one tank brigade, in these two directions to have 1012 aircraft.

- in the coastal direction - 10 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, 2 tank brigades and 515 aircraft.

It is believed that with the end of the concentration of these forces, we will have superiority over the Japanese troops in infantry and equipment (by 900 guns, 2100 tanks, and more than twice in aircraft).

It was assumed that the concentration of troops would take 35-45 days. However, the report stipulated that if we entered the war before the final concentration of the Japanese army, then our superiority in aviation and tanks would allow us, not limited to active defense, to conduct small offensives in the Trans-Baikal and Blagoveshchensk directions. The main provisions of Shaposhnikov's report were used by the General Staff in the development of a plan for the defeat of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1945. The report was considered on November 13, 1938 at a meeting of the Main Military Council and approved by it. But as early as May 26, on the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, Blucher was fully acquainted with the deployment plan and wrote down the tasks of the troops in the Far East. In addition, he was given all the other calculated data.

The year 1939 began with disturbing reports from Japan. On January 23, Sorge reported information received from Major Scholl about the growing support in the Japanese General Staff for actions in the north direction and the acceleration of the organization of army groups in Manchuria. The military attache believed that "this indicates new preparations against the USSR ..." Many foreign observers who were in Tokyo had the same opinion. But Sorge and the members of his group had a different point of view. In his telegram, he wrote: “But I and others think that this does not mean preparing for war with the USSR, since the Japanese are not in a position to start a war now, when they are hardly kept in China. I believe that the Japanese will resort to military provocations in the spring, which will lead to private incidents. As subsequent events showed, Sorge's information was correct and arrived in Moscow in a timely manner. But it obviously did not reach Ulaanbaatar, where the headquarters of the 57th Special Corps was located, and if it did, it was not taken into account. Neither the command of the corps, nor the headquarters, nor the troops stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic were ready for the start of hostilities.

Why, this time, was the territory of the republic chosen as a target for a new provocation and major incidents? In the register of victims of the Japanese military, the turn of Mongolia followed Manchuria. The Japanese General Staff has long understood the importance of the geographical and strategic position of Outer Mongolia (MPR). The official Japanese press repeatedly accused the USSR of intending to use the territory of the MPR as a springboard for the "Bolshevization" of Inner Mongolia, Manchukuo and China. In the ruling circles of Japan, it was believed that the removal or at least partial weakening of this "threat" would be the first step towards the implementation of the "continental policy" of the empire. With the capture of Manchuria, the idea of ​​creating "buffer zones" within Outer Mongolia and Northern China appeared. The separatist movements of Outer Mongolia, which was officially considered an integral part of China, were encouraged in every possible way.

The ruling circles of Japan dreamed of the Mongolian People's Republic joining "Great Mongolia" as an integral honor, which should be in the "sphere of co-prosperity of great East Asia" under the auspices of Japan. The Japanese military believed that if the MPR was in the sphere of Japanese-Manchu influence, then the security of the Soviet Far East would be fundamentally undermined, and in the event of a war, a situation could arise that would force the USSR to leave the territory of all of Siberia without any struggle. In Japanese operational plans, the Mongolian People's Republic was called the key to the Far East, a shield covering the very vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railway, and a base for extensive operations on the territory of North China. In this regard, after Manchuria, Japanese troops invaded the Chinese provinces of Rehe, Chakhar and Suiyuan, which occupied an enveloping position in relation to the southeastern part of the MPR, as well as the beginning of the extensive construction of strategic railways in these provinces.

Here is an assessment of the plans of the Japanese command, given in a report on the company in the Khalkhin Gol region, compiled by the Headquarters of the 1st Army Group immediately after the end of the conflict:

“Lacking the opportunity and strength, in connection with the actions in China, to organize broader actions to seize the MPR - this most important military base for Japan, in 1939 the Japanese set themselves a more limited task - to seize the territory of the MPR up to the Khalkhin Gol River. For the next period, for the Japanese, the territory up to Khalkhin Gol was extremely necessary and important for the following reasons:

First, the Japanese launched the construction of the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway, building it around the Greater Khingan. According to their plan, the road was supposed to pass near the height of Nomonkhan Burd Obo - at a distance from the border of the MPR no further than 2 - 3 kilometers, that is, under real enemy machine-gun fire.

Secondly, Khalkhin-Gol and the sandy heights along the eastern bank of the river, if captured by the Japanese and fortified, created a very strong cover for the approaches to Hailar and Khalun-Arshan, which are currently very weakly protected by the MPR.

The initiator of the invasion of the territory of the MPR was the command of the Kwantung Army, which had high hopes for the support of the internal counter-revolution from among the feudal nobility and the highest lamaist clergy, who made up the "fifth column", as well as for the disorganization of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA), bled white by repression 1937-1938, when the absolute majority of the top and senior command staff of the MNRA was arrested and destroyed. It was also taken into account that the repressions, begun following the example of Yezhov's "purges" in the USSR, continued in the MNRA at the beginning of 1939. The Japanese command counted on the fact that the continued repressions in parts of the 57th Corps would further weaken the grouping of Soviet troops in the MPR.

Already during the Khalkhingol battles, the NKVD special officers continued to detect "Japanese agents", which allegedly existed at the headquarters of the corps. Among the Japanese spies and "enemies of the people" were the chief of staff of the corps Kushchev, the assistant chief of staff Tretyakov, the head of the operations department of the headquarters Ivenkov. For greater solidity, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the MPR Lupsandanaya and a number of other prominent employees of the Plenipotentiary Mission and the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of the MPR were added to them.

There were many shortcomings in the combat training of the troops and in the preparation of the theater of operations. The inexperience of the commanding staff, negligence and, perhaps, some kind of complacency, the hope that nothing serious would happen, had an effect. Here is how the situation before the start of the fighting was assessed in the report of the headquarters:

“The command of the 57th OK (special corps), represented by division commander Feklenko, advisers of the MNRA, the headquarters of the 57th OK and the MNRA showed criminal negligence in preparing the eastern direction for the deployment of hostilities.

Neither the Command of the 57th OK and the MNRA, nor their headquarters knew this area at all and had never been there. The commanders of formations and their headquarters have also never been in any direction and have not conducted exercises. Communications and control in this direction were also not completely prepared, and everything was based on only one wire to Tamtsak-Bulak. No communication centers were prepared. There were no operational calculations, worked out ideas and documents for the concentration of Soviet-Mongolian units, in the event of the deployment of hostilities, either at the headquarters of the 57 OK, or at the headquarters of the MNRA. Parts of the 57th OK and parts of the MNRA turned out to be very poorly prepared, the headquarters of the 57th OK was especially poorly prepared ... "

The assessment in the report was tough. Of course, if the chief of staff of the corps is a Japanese spy, then the assessment of the work of the headquarters in such a report, which was intended for the high command, can only be negative. But if, after half a century, all false accusations are discarded, then it must still be admitted that the corps command was not ready for possible large-scale conflicts with units of the Kwantung Army in 1939. And the point here is not that the fighting began in the eastern ledge. Had they started anywhere else on the Mongolian-Manchurian border, the result of the first clashes would have been exactly the same. We were not ready for a serious conflict, and we had to correct miscalculations and mistakes already during the battles.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol are described in detail, with the involvement of new archival documents, in biographical books about Marshal Zhukov, and there is no point in repeating what has already been written. It should only be noted that immediately after the start of the May battles, a new reinforcement of Soviet troops began in the Far East region. The units of the 57th Corps, reorganized into the 1st Army Group, were replenished with people and military equipment, the troops and military equipment of the Trans-Baikal Military District and units of the 1st and 2nd Separate Red Banner Armies were replenished. During the summer months, many people, tanks and guns were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway. All this made it possible to significantly increase the power of the Far Eastern grouping and achieve even greater superiority over units of the Kwantung Army.

As a result of these measures, several rifle divisions and many other units (brigades, regiments, battalions) were transferred to the Far East. The total number of the group increased by 135 thousand people and amounted to 582 thousand people. The number of guns and mortars during these months increased by 3,000 barrels and amounted to 8,738 against 3,700 on the other side of the border. The tank grouping increased by 1300 vehicles and amounted to 6088 tanks against 650 on the other side of the border. Such is the arithmetic and such a balance of power, if we move from phrases about the threat of Japanese aggression to bookkeeping.

The events of 1939 and early 1940 radically changed the strategic situation on the country's western and eastern borders. Troops moved from different regions to the borders. As a result of the deployment of the Red Army in the autumn of 1939 and in the winter of 1940, the combat composition of the border military districts changed. Therefore, on November 21, 1939, the Main Military Council considered the composition of the Red Army, which had changed after the covert mobilization begun in September. The question of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of the Second World War and in the Far East in connection with the events at Khalkhin Gol was also considered. Under the new conditions, the five-year plan for the construction of the armed forces, developed earlier, was revised. Significant changes were made to the plan, and this led to the fact that the old strategic deployment plan of 1937 was no longer valid. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1940, the General Staff began to develop a new strategic deployment plan. In the summer, the first version was developed.

By this time, serious organizational changes had been carried out in the Far East. Improvisation in the summer of 1939, when a front group with headquarters in Chita was created to coordinate the actions of the disparate forces of the Trans-Baikal Military District, the 57th OKA, the 1st and 2nd OKA, no longer corresponded to the current situation. In the event of a new conflict, and such an option was not ruled out in the summer of 1940, it was impossible to control troops near Vladivostok from Chita several thousand kilometers away. Therefore, in Moscow they decided to return to the old method of command and control - to recreate the Far Eastern Front (FEF). The Directorate of the Far East Fleet was formed on July 1, 1940 on the basis of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0029 in connection with the general reorganization of the command and control of troops located in the Far East. The front's administration was located in Khabarovsk and had a structure in common with the typical structure of military districts. The front included both Red Banner armies, the newly formed 15th Sungarian army and the Special Rifle Corps, whose troops covered the mouth of the Amur, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. At the same time, the 1st Army Group was renamed the 17th Army without increasing its strength, and a new 16th Army was formed in Transbaikalia.

Negotiations between Germany, Italy and Japan on the conclusion of a military alliance were in full swing, and the foreign policy situation in terms of strategic deployment was assessed as very alarming: “An armed clash can be limited only to our western borders, but the possibility of an attack from Japan on our Far Eastern borders is not ruled out” . The plan noted that Japan could put up to 39 infantry divisions, 2500 aircraft, 1200 tanks and up to 4000 guns against the Soviet Union. The bulk of the ground forces will be concentrated against Primorye, and a strong Japanese navy will operate off the Soviet coast. The plan stated: “In this period, if it is necessary to strategically deploy the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on two fronts, it is necessary to consider the Western Front as the main front. This is where our main forces should be concentrated. In the East, given the likelihood of the appearance of significant Japanese forces against us, it is necessary to appoint such forces that would fully guarantee us a stable position.

What is meant by the phrase "sustainable position"? The 17th Army, having covered itself on the southern and southeastern borders of the MPR and interacting with part of its forces with the 16th Army, was supposed to strike with the main forces on Solun, defeat the Japanese units and, bypassing the Great Khingan Range from the south, reach the Manchurian Plain. The main forces of the army consist of three motorized rifle divisions, two tank and three motorized armored brigades, and four cavalry divisions of the MNRA. The 16th Army, relying on the fortifications of the Trans-Baikal UR and interacting with units of the 17th Army, was supposed to defeat the Japanese honors on the Hailar Plateau. In the future, acting along the western branch of the CER, reach the Manchurian plain to Qiqihar. Such plans were in the Trans-Baikal direction. There was nothing defensive in them - immediately defeat the Japanese troops and forward to the Manchurian plain, to the rear of the seaside grouping of the Kwantung Army.

The main tasks of the Far Eastern Front were also offensive. The front, having concentrated its troops, went over “to a decisive offensive with the aim of defeating the main enemy grouping against Primorye, meaning a further offensive in the general direction of Harbin. To provide the coast of the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, Sakhalin, Kamchatka from possible attempts by Japanese troops to land troops ... "The armies of the front also had offensive tasks: the 2nd Red Banner Army was supposed to, relying on our Urs, defeat the Japanese forces and force the Amur flotilla with ships . The 15th Army was also supposed to, relying on our Urs, together with the ships of the Amur flotilla, cross the Amur and Ussuri and defeat the Japanese units. The 1st Red Banner Army, temporarily actively defending in the Iman direction and on the Poltavka front - the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River, was supposed to deliver the main blow north of Grodekovo. The Pacific Fleet had defensive missions. This is understandable - with his weakness and small numbers, it was impossible to demand activity from him. On the other hand, the air forces of the front were required to be active from the very first day of the war: to destroy enemy aircraft and from the first days of the war to ensure air supremacy, to disrupt and delay the concentration of Japanese troops with powerful air strikes on the railway junctions of Harbin, Mukden, Changchun, to destroy railway bridges across Sungari at Harbin, destroy the Korean ports of Yuki, Racine, Seishin. And, on special instructions from the High Command, to carry out raids on the Japanese islands. So there were no defensive tasks, and there could not have been any with such a superiority in strength. The Red Army did not sit on its territory behind the concrete structures of the URs, but was preparing for offensive battles on the territory of Manchuria.

But the situation in the world, in Europe and in the East, compared with the beginning of the year, when the first version of the plan was drawn up, has changed dramatically. France and its neighbors capitulated and disappeared from the map of Europe. The same fate befell the Scandinavian countries. After the disaster at Dunkirk, England was discounted as a land power, and the Wehrmacht was in charge of all of Europe. In the East, too, there was no clarity. The question of where Japan would turn, to the North or to the South, was not yet clear even to the military-political leadership of the empire. Therefore, a new strategic deployment plan was urgently needed to meet the realities of the autumn of 1940.

In September 1940, the General Staff completed the development of the second version of the strategic deployment plan. The report "On the Fundamentals of the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East in 1940 and 1941" was signed by the new People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko and the new Chief of the General Staff Meretskov. The document itself was written in one copy personally by Vasilevsky, Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. In this form, it was presented on September 18, 1940 for consideration by Stalin and Molotov. The report considered our probable adversaries, who were evaluated in the same way as in the first version of the 1940 plan. Just as in the first version, the report emphasized that the General Staff did not have documentary data on the operational plans of potential adversaries both in the West and in the East.

As conclusions from the assessment of potential opponents, the report indicated: “The Soviet Union needs to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the West - against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland, and in the East - against Japan as an open enemy, taking a position armed neutrality, which can always turn into an open clash. It was believed that in the Far East, the immediate goal of the Japanese troops would be the capture of Primorye. This was confirmed by the presence of four Japanese army departments against Primorye, 7 infantry divisions and intensive work to prepare the theater of operations. It was noted in the plan that "actions against our eastern shores and ports of the strong Japanese navy" must be taken into account. When determining the foundations of our strategic deployment, it was indicated that in the conditions of "deployment of the armed forces on two fronts, it is necessary to consider the Western theater as the main theater, and our main forces should be concentrated here." In the East, it was proposed to appoint forces that would fully guarantee the stability of the situation.

The basic wording "stability of the situation" was the same as in the first version of the plan, and in order to achieve this "stability", it was proposed to allocate 24 rifle, four motorized, two tank and four cavalry divisions, three rifle, three airborne and eight tank brigades - a total of 5740 tanks. The number of aviation was determined in 44 air regiments. This amounted to 3347 aircraft, including 692 aircraft of the Pacific Fleet.

The basics of strategic deployment in the East provided for, under all circumstances, to prevent the invasion of Japanese troops in Primorye and to secure the coast from possible landing attempts. Taking advantage of the superiority of forces at the beginning of the war and the opportunity to defeat the Japanese in parts, it was planned immediately after the completion of the mobilization and concentration of troops to go on a general offensive and defeat the first echelon of Japanese troops. In the future, it was supposed to keep in mind the actions to defeat the main forces of the Japanese army and to capture Northern Manchuria. In the event of a military conflict in the East, two fronts were to operate - the Trans-Baikal and the Far East.

The tasks of both fronts have not changed in this version of the plan. The main task of the Transbaikal Front is to destroy the Thessalonica and Hailar groupings of Japanese troops by decisive actions in the directions of Solun, Taonan and Hailar-Qiqihar, to reach the Taonan-Qiqihar region (on the Manchurian Plain), and also to reliably cover the southern borders of the MPR. For the Far Eastern Front, the main task was to defeat the Japanese units in the Sungarian and coastal directions and ensure further successful operations in Northern Manchuria, as well as to hold Primorye and secure the coast from possible attempts to land troops.

General conclusion from what has been said. The Far Eastern grouping in the second half of the 1930s was not defensive. Its total strength, including the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 57th OK, was one and a half to two times the strength of the Kwantung Army. By means of suppression: aviation, artillery and tanks, the superiority was overwhelming. The qualitative superiority of military equipment was also on the side of the Red Army. In this alignment of forces, the strategy of action in the East was only offensive. And this was fully reflected in all the plans of the General Staff. Defense in its purest form, that is, holding the border, relying on its URs, was not envisaged.

The Japanese General Staff also developed their own plans. Launched into operation in the late 1920s, the staff car worked at full capacity, without slowing down. One version of the OCU plan was replaced by another, the directions of strikes changed, but the idea of ​​all plans remained the same - forward to the North. In Tokyo, just like in Moscow, they did not think about defense. And even after such serious defeats as Khalkhingol, they continued to stubbornly plan the same thing. What was more here - common sense or samurai self-confidence? Let Japanese historians try to answer this question.

Planning for a new war against the Soviet Union began immediately after the signing of the armistice on September 15, 1939. The Japanese General Staff worked with the precision of a well-oiled clockwork in close contact with the Ministry of War, the Kwantung Army Command, the Command of the Expeditionary Army in China, and the Naval General Staff. The main goal of all these developments was the same - "The defeat of the Russian army stationed in the Far East, and the seizure of territories east of the Greater Khingan."

According to the version of the plan developed for 1940, the Japanese troops were to concentrate on three operational directions: eastern, northern and western. The main direction was considered eastern - against the Soviet Primorye. It provided for the formation of the 1st Eastern Front, consisting of 19 divisions, fully equipped and deployed in wartime states. The front command was given tank and artillery regiments, cavalry brigades, as well as five regiments of bomber aviation. In the Amur direction, against Blagoveshchensk, it was planned to deploy the 4th Japanese Army, consisting of three divisions, and in the western part of Manchuria, in the Greater Khingan region, the 6th Army, consisting of four divisions. The commander of the Kwantung Army, who was to carry out the overall direction of the combat operations of the Japanese troops, had four more divisions in reserve.

In general, by the beginning of hostilities against the Soviet troops in the Far East, 30 infantry divisions should have been concentrated, the Manchurian bridgehead was fully prepared to receive and deploy such a number of troops. By 1941, the capacity of the barracks fund in Manchuria was about 39 infantry divisions. After the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese command provided for the transfer to Manchuria of five divisions from the Japanese islands and 10 divisions from the expeditionary army in China. These troops already constituted the second strategic echelon, and it was planned to "introduce them into the battle in areas outside of Manchuria", that is, already on Soviet territory.

Military operations, according to the plan of 1940, were planned to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, it was planned to defeat the Soviet troops in Primorye, capture Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. Then it was planned to defeat the Soviet units in the northern and western directions, the capture of northern Sakhalin and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. Six months after the start of hostilities, it was planned to occupy the entire Far East and go to Baikal. In general, this was a mirror image of the Soviet plans for waging war in the Far East. The defeat of the enemy troops in parts and the rapid, in just six months, access to Baikal, when it was possible to put a winning point in the war and begin the "development" of the lands annexed to the empire.

After developing this version of the plan for the war with the Soviet Union, the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Keoji Tominaga, reported its contents to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Prince Kanin. Then, following the already established tradition, the general and the marshal visited the "son of heaven" and familiarized him with the document. In March 1940, Emperor Hirohito approved the war plan.

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Fulfilling the allied obligations taken to the USA and Great Britain, as well as in order to ensure the security of its Far Eastern borders, the USSR entered the war against Japan on the night of August 9, 1945, which was a logical continuation of the Great Patriotic War.

With the defeat of Germany and its allies in Europe, the Japanese did not consider themselves defeated, their stubbornness caused an increase in pessimistic assessments of the American command. It was believed, in particular, that the war would not end before the end of 1946, and the loss of allied troops during the landing on the Japanese islands would amount to more than 1 million people.

The most important element of the Japanese defense was the fortified areas of the Kwantung Army stationed in the territory of occupied Manchuria (Northeast China). On the one hand, this army served as a guarantee of the unimpeded supply of Japan with strategic raw materials from China and Korea, and on the other hand, it performed the task of pulling Soviet forces out of the European theater of war, thereby helping the German Wehrmacht.

Back in April 1941, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was concluded, which somewhat reduced tension between Japan and the USSR, but, simultaneously with the preparation of a strike against the Anglo-American troops in the Pacific, the Japanese command was developing a plan of military operations against the Red Army under the code called "Kantokuen" (Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army). The danger of war on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR persisted throughout the subsequent time. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty.

By the summer of 1945, the Japanese had 17 fortified areas in Manchuria, 4.5 thousand pillboxes and bunkers, numerous airfields and landing sites. The Kwantung Army had 1 million men, 1.2 thousand tanks, 1.9 thousand aircraft, and 6.6 thousand guns. To overcome strong fortifications, not only courageous, but also experienced troops were needed. By the beginning of the war in the Far East, the Soviet command had transferred here additional forces that had been released in the west after the victory over Nazi Germany. By the beginning of August, the total number of Red Army formations in the Far Eastern theater of operations reached 1.7 million people, 30 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks, more than 5 thousand aircraft, 93 ships. In July 1945, the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was formed, it was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky.

On August 8, 1945, in Moscow, the Soviet government handed over to the Japanese ambassador a statement stating that in connection with Japan's refusal to stop hostilities against the USA, Great Britain and China, the Soviet Union considers itself in a state of war with Japan from August 9, 1945. On that day, the offensive of the Red Army in Manchuria began in all directions almost simultaneously.

The high rate of advance of the Soviet and Mongolian troops in the central part of Manchuria put the Japanese command in a hopeless situation. In connection with the success in Manchuria, the 2nd Far Eastern Front part of its forces went over to the offensive on Sakhalin. The final stage of the war against Japan was the Kuril landing operation, carried out by part of the forces of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts and the Pacific Fleet.

The Soviet Union won a victory in the Far East in the shortest possible time. In total, the enemy lost over 700 thousand soldiers and officers, of which 84 thousand were killed and more than 640 thousand were captured. Soviet losses amounted to 36.5 thousand people, of which 12 thousand were killed and missing.

On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on board the American battleship Missouri, the Japanese rulers, in the presence of plenipotentiaries of the USSR, the USA, China, Great Britain, France and other allied states, signed the Act of Japan's unconditional surrender. Thus ended World War II, which had lasted six long years.

YALTA SECRET AGREEMENT OF THE THREE GREAT POWERS ON THE FAR EAST, February 11, 1945

The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain—agreed that two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on the condition that:

1. Maintaining the status quo of Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic).

2. Restoration of the rights belonging to Russia, violated by the perfidious attack of Japan in 1904, namely:

a) the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of about. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands,

b) the internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union in this port and the restoration of the lease on Port Arthur, as a naval base of the USSR,

c) joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, which gives access to Dairen, on the basis of organizing a mixed Soviet-Chinese Society with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union, while it is understood that China retains full sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Kuril Islands. It is assumed that an agreement regarding Outer Mongolia and the aforementioned ports and railways will require the consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On the advice of the Marshal, the President will arrange for such consent to be obtained.

The heads of the governments of the Three Great Powers agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unconditionally satisfied after the victory over Japan.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China with the National Chinese Government for rendering assistance to it with its armed forces in order to liberate China from the Japanese yoke.

Franklin Roosevelt

Winston Churchill

Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. T. 3. M., 1947.

JAPANESE SURRENDER ACT, September 2, 1945

(extract)

1. We, acting on the orders and in the name of the Emperor, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff, hereby accept the terms of the Declaration issued on July 26 at Potsdam by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain, subsequently acceded to by the Soviet Union, which four Powers shall later known as the Allied Powers.

2. We hereby declare the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Imperial Japanese General Staff, all Japanese military forces and all military forces under Japanese control, no matter where they are located.

3. We hereby order all Japanese troops, wherever located, and the Japanese people to immediately cease hostilities, preserve and prevent damage to all ships, aircraft and other military and civilian property, and comply with all demands that may be made by the supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or organs of the Japanese government on his instructions.

4. We hereby order the Japanese Imperial General Staff to immediately issue orders to the commanders of all Japanese troops and troops under Japanese control, wherever they may be, to surrender unconditionally in person, and also to secure the unconditional surrender of all troops under their command.

6. We hereby undertake that the Japanese Government and its successors will faithfully carry out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, issue such orders and take such actions as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers or any other representative appointed by the Allied Powers, in order to implement this declaration, requires.

8. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to govern the state shall be subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who shall take such steps as he deems necessary to carry out these terms of surrender.

Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War. M., 1947. T. 3.

On August 9, 1945, Soviet troops launched an offensive simultaneously along the entire front with a length of more than 5 thousand km from Erlian on the southern border of Mongolia to Posyet Bay in Primorye. Together with them, the 80,000-strong army of the Mongolian People's Republic acted.

The troops of the Trans-Baikal Front had to overcome the wild, hard-to-reach mountains of the Greater Khingan Range, the approaches to which in the Qiqikar and Changchun directions were blocked by the powerful Manchu-Chzhalainor, Khailar and Khalun-Arshan fortified regions. Relying on them and defensive lines prepared in advance on mountain passes, the Japanese command hoped to detain the Red Army in the border area.

But Soviet troops, with the support of aviation, stormed the Manchu-Chzhalaynor and Khalun-Arshan regions, bypassed and blocked the Hailar fortifications. Without stopping to destroy the blocked pockets of resistance, they soon reached the western slopes of the Greater Khingan in the Qiqihar direction.

The troops of the front's main grouping crossed the Great Khingan and, advancing 250-400 km in five days, reached the rear of the main forces of the Kwantung Army on the Central Manchurian Plain.

Having overcome the Great Khingan, Soviet and Mongolian formations moved to the most important centers of Northeast China: Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), Chengde (Rehe), Mukden (Shenyang), Changchun, Qiqihar.

Simultaneously with the Trans-Baikal Front, the 1st Far Eastern Front launched an offensive from Primorye. Within a few days, his troops overcame the long-term and field fortifications of the enemy and, advancing in difficult terrain, reached the approaches to the Central Manchurian Plain.

Meanwhile, on the extreme left wing of the front, the advancing troops, together with the landing detachments of the sailors of the Pacific Fleet, captured the ports of Ungi (Yuki), Najin (Racin), Chongjin (Seishin) in North Korea, depriving the Japanese fleet of the bases it needed.

The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, advancing from the north, also operated in a no less difficult situation. They had not only to break into strong fortifications, but also to force the high-water rivers Amur and Ussuri.

Already on August 9, the troops of the front, having launched an offensive, captured a number of bridgeheads on the Manchurian banks of these rivers. For two days there were fierce battles for the Fugdinsky defense center, located in the swampy floodplain of the river. Songhua.

After its capture, Soviet troops moved southwest to the exits to Central Manchuria. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was greatly assisted by the Amur river flotilla, which ensured the crossing of the Amur, made a heroic campaign along the river. Sungari from the border to Harbin.

The 2nd Red Banner Army, advancing from the Blagoveshchensk region, crossed the Amur, overcame the Lesser Khingan Range and reached the last strongholds that covered Qiqihar from the north and northeast.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops and the surrender of Japan (August 9-September 2, 1945).

On August 11, the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front began fighting for South Sakhalin. Using the features of the terrain, the enemy created here a solid system of permanent structures. The road to the south of the island was covered by the Koton fortified area, which was a complex engineering structure.

However, already on August 13, Soviet troops managed to capture its center - the city of Coton and create favorable conditions for further advance to the south.

Thus, during the first week of the offensive, the enemy's resistance was broken in all main directions. Soviet troops advanced hundreds of kilometers, dismembering the Kwantung Army into separate groups in the areas of Qiqihar, Harbin, Jilin (Jilin), Changchun, and Mukden.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war deprived the Japanese militarists of the last chances for a successful outcome of the war and put before them with all acuteness the question of unconditional surrender.

On the morning of August 9, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War was hurriedly convened in Tokyo. The Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Main Naval Staff demanded four conditions: the preservation of the existing state system, the punishment of war criminals by the Japanese themselves, independent disarmament, and the prevention of the occupation of Japan by the Allies (in extreme cases, the occupation should be short and not affect the capitals).

A group of statesmen, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed that only the first condition should be put forward.

The Supreme Council did not make an agreed decision. The meeting of the Council of Ministers turned out to be just as useless. And only on the night of August 10, at a secondary meeting of the Supreme Council for the leadership of the war in the presence of the emperor, it was decided to capitulate.

On August 10, the Japanese government handed over to the Allied Powers a declaration of acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. In this statement, in particular, it was said that "the Japanese government understands that this declaration does not contain requirements that infringe on the prerogatives of the emperor as the sovereign ruler of Japan."

In the response of the four Allied Powers to the Japanese Declaration, it was stated that from the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and the form of government would ultimately be established in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

However, the military group actually continued to insist on their demands. Moreover, on August 10, the newspapers published an appeal by the Minister of War "To all generals, officers and soldiers of the army," which spoke of the need to "bring the holy war to an end."

The command of the armies outside of Japan spoke out resolutely in favor of continuing the war.

The supporters of the war were ready, through a conspiracy, to eliminate the leaders who demanded immediate surrender.

To overcome serious disagreements in the government, on August 14 at 10 am, the emperor convened a joint meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and the Cabinet of Ministers.

Such a joint meeting had previously been held only once, on December 1, 1941, when the decision to start the war was made. Supporters of the war were forced to agree with the decision to surrender, formalized as the imperial will.

On August 14, the Japanese government informed the governments of the four powers that the Japanese emperor had issued a rescript on Japan's acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and was ready to give orders on his behalf to all the military, naval and air authorities of Japan and all armed forces under their control, wherever they were cease hostilities and surrender weapons, and give such other orders as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armed Forces may require.

Japanese troops capitulated to the armies of the United States, England and Kuomintang China. Only individual groups of the Kwantung Army continued to resist the Red Army until August 19.

In view of this, the Soviet command issued an explanation in which it stated that since "there is no real surrender of the armed forces of Japan yet", the Soviet troops will "continue their offensive operations against Japan."

True to its tactics of provocation and treachery, the Japanese command in every possible way delayed the surrender, continuing to resist. Soviet troops in Manchuria and Korea, in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Much more effort had to be expended to force the Kwantung Army to lay down its arms.

The offensive of the Red Army took place in conditions when the rear fell behind and an acute shortage of fuel and ammunition began to be felt. Nevertheless, it continued non-stop both in Manchuria and South Sakhalin.

On August 19, Soviet troops captured Chengde and reached the Liaodong Gulf, completely isolating the Kwantung Army from other Japanese troops in China.

The next day, units of the Red Army entered Harbin, Kirin, Changchun and Mukden, where airborne assault forces had been landed the day before. On August 21, an amphibious assault landed in the North Korean port of Wonsan (Genzan), and the city's garrison capitulated.

Strong blows were required in order to drive the Japanese invaders from the fortified Kuril Islands. The northernmost islands of the Kuril chain, Syumsyu and Paramushir, where naval bases were located, were especially fortified.

Early in the morning of August 17, Soviet landing craft and warships withdrew from the coast of Kamchatka and headed for the island of Syumsu. There was a thick fog in the sea, under the cover of which ships on August 18 secretly approached the island and began to land.

When the landing advanced into the interior of the island, the Japanese discovered it and opened fire. Fierce fighting continued until August 22, when the enemy laid down their arms.

The occupation of the remaining islands did not cause much difficulty. On August 22, airborne assault forces landed in Far (Dalian) and Port Arthur (Luishun), and a day later tank and infantry troops entered there.

The strikes of the Soviet ground forces, the bold actions of air and sea landings completely disorganized the Kwantung Army and broke its resistance.

On August 19, its command announced its readiness to capitulate to the Soviet troops. Japanese soldiers and officers began to surrender. Only in some places the resistance continued until the beginning of September.

On August 23, Moscow honored the valiant Soviet troops, sailors of the Pacific Fleet and fighters of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army with a solemn salute, who defeated the Japanese aggressors in a short time.

During fierce fighting, the enemy lost 83,737 people killed. 594 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Large trophies were captured.

Only the troops of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts took 1565 guns, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, as well as many other weapons and military equipment. The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla captured all the ships of the Sungarian military river flotilla.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army, carried out in fact within 10 days, was a vivid manifestation of the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, an indicator of the further growth of Soviet military art.

Just as in the battles against the Nazi invaders, Soviet soldiers showed examples of high military skill, valor and heroism in operations in the Far East.

Lieutenant-General Shimizu Noritsune, commander of the Japanese 5th Army who surrendered, said: “We did not think that the Russian army would pass through the difficult areas of the taiga. Such a lightning offensive by the Russians was unexpected for us.”

The Japanese generals considered the direction leading to Manchuria through the Great Khingan inaccessible for the actions of large military masses, especially for tank formations.

The combat successes of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East were highly appreciated. A number of formations and units of the fronts that distinguished themselves in battles with the Japanese troops received the honorary names Khingan, Amur, Sakhalin, Ussuri, Harbin, Mukden, Kuril, Port Arthur. Many units, formations and ships were awarded orders of the Soviet Union.

In battles with the Japanese militarists, the guards of the Pacific Fleet were born. For the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command, six Heroes of the Soviet Union were awarded the second Gold Star medal, and 85 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

A large number of generals, officers, sergeants, soldiers and sailors were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. In memory of the victory, the medal "For the Victory over Japan" was established, which was awarded to participants in this war.

Together with the Red Army, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army fought heroically. Her role was highly appreciated by the government and peoples of the Soviet Union.

In the order dated August 23, 1945, on the occasion of the final victory over Japan, along with the distinguished troops of the heroic Red Army, units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army were also mentioned.

By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 8, 1945, a group of Mongolian generals and officers who showed courage and heroism in battles with the Japanese imperialists were awarded orders of the USSR. About 2 thousand people were awarded military orders and medals of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Soviet-Japanese War (August-September 1945) can be conditionally divided into two stages. The main Manchurian strategic operation provided for the simultaneous infliction of two main attacks on the Japanese Kwantung Army, located in Manchuria and Korea - from the territory of Mongolia by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front (Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky).

And from the side of Primorye, troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front (Marshal K.A. Meretskov). It was supposed to surround the enemy, dismember and destroy.

Depending on the fulfillment of this main task, the liberation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was set at the second stage of the war with Japan.

From August 1 to August 19, 1945, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East was located in Chita, and from August 20 to September 3, 1945 - in Khabarovsk.

And although the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Far East, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky does not use the term "Stavka", nevertheless, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.A. Meretskov in his memoirs uses the name "Stavka" to refer to the High Command of the Soviet troops in the Far East .

The Headquarters can include a group of generals of the General Staff of the country, the Directorate and headquarters of the High Command with all the units that ensured their work. The group of major military workers included Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A. Novikov, Marshal of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov, Colonel General of the Signal Corps N.D. V.I. Vinogradov and other generals and officers.

Lieutenant General I.V. Shikin was a member of the Military Council of the High Command. Chief of Staff - Colonel General S.P. Ivanov. The main command had its own command post, its own lines and means of communication.

Early in the morning of August 15, Japanese Emperor Hirohito made a statement on Tokyo radio that Japan accepts all the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration, that is, it ceases hostilities on all fronts. Neither Hirohito nor his generals tried to use the word "surrender", referring to the fact that there is no such term in Japanese. Everything seems to be much simpler - the Emperor announced to the troops his decision to end the war.

On August 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada from Changchun, addressed the Soviet command by radio with a request to cease hostilities. Diplomatic maneuvers of the Japanese government, attempts to buy time. It was understandable to prevent the occupation of the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido by Soviet troops. Therefore, our command transmitted the following radiogram to Yamada:

“The headquarters of the Japanese Kwantung Army turned over the radio to the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the Far East with a proposal to stop hostilities, and there was no mention of the surrender of the Japanese armed forces of Manchuria.

At the same time, Japanese troops launched a counteroffensive on a number of sectors of the Soviet-Japanese front.

I propose to the commander of the troops of the Kwantung Army from 1200 hours on August 20 to stop all military operations against the Soviet troops on the entire front, to lay down their arms and surrender.

The time period indicated above is given so that the headquarters of the Kwantung Army can communicate the order to cease resistance and surrender to all its troops.

As soon as the Japanese troops begin to hand over their weapons, the Soviet troops will cease hostilities.

Since neither on the 17th nor in the first half of August 18, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, did not give an answer to Vasilevsky's radiogram, the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, K.A. with General G.A.Shelahvym. ???

120 paratroopers captured the Harbin airfield, and after negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, General H. Khata, they came to an agreement that Khata would go by plane to the command post of the 1st Far Eastern Front to resolve all issues of cessation of hostilities. On August 19, Vasilevsky met with Khata and gave him clear instructions for surrender.

After negotiations, the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, Marshal K.A. Meretskov, hastened to report to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the surrender of the Kwantung Army, without agreeing this with Vasilevsky,

- Comrade Vasilevsky, who is in command of the troops of the Far East? The commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front sent a report on military operations to the Headquarters. Do you know about it?

- Not - answered A.M. Vasilevsky.

On August 20, while in Khabarovsk, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East, A.M. Vasilevsky, invited the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts to the headquarters of the Far Eastern Front on Serysheva Street. Issues were resolved on the liberation of South Sakhalin and the occupation of the Kuril Islands, as well as on the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese army on the island of Hokkaido in accordance with the agreement previously reached with the United States and Great Britain.

In his memoirs “The Matter of All Life”, A.M. Vasilevsky writes: “I knew K.A. Meretskov well and did not attach any importance to his report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. But when he arrived at my headquarters in Khabarovsk, I could see from his face that he was worried about his haste with the report.

Since on August 19 the Japanese troops stationed in Manchuria began to capitulate, Vasilevsky decided to organize the forces of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts in order to accept surrender in remote areas. Landings were successfully carried out in Kirin, Changchun, Mukden, Dalniy and Port Arthur, as well as in Pyongyang and Konko (Korea). On August 20, units of the 15th Army arrived in Harbin on the ships of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla.

It is quite understandable that the command of the fronts paid special attention to the combat and moral-psychological training of participants in airborne operations. Detachment commanders were appointed from among the most experienced, brave and enterprising officers.

For example, the detachment that landed in Girin was led by Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Krutskikh is an experienced paratrooper who more than once flew behind enemy lines during the Great Patriotic War. The soldiers who landed in Changchun were commanded by the deputy commander of the 30th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major P.N. Avramenko. It was he who captured the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada.

The main role in the capture of the most important strategic center of Manchuria, the city of Mukden (Shenyang), fell to the airborne troops from the 6th Guards Tank Army. 225 guardsmen were selected for the airborne assault. The landing force was headed by the authorized officer of the military council, the head of the political department of the Trans-Baikal Front, Major General A.D. Pritula. In Mukden, General Pritula immediately met with the commander of the 3rd Japanese Front, General Ushiroku Jun, and demanded unconditional surrender.

Among the Japanese military in khaki uniforms, a tall Chinese man in a dark blue English suit and round horn-rimmed glasses stood out sharply. The Chinese immediately separated from the Japanese generals and quickly headed towards Prytula. He said that he was the Emperor of Manchukuo and his name was Henry Pu Yi.

It turned out that Pu Yi was preparing to fly to Japan, and a plane had already been allocated for him, but he did not have time. Pritula ordered Pu Yi to be put on his plane and handed over to the crew. On the same day, Pu Yi was taken to Chita.

The special representative of the Soviet command in Port Arthur was Lieutenant General V.D. Ivanov. 200 paratroopers on nine transport aircraft landed on August 23 in Port Arthur, and on August 24 they arrived at the port of Dalniy for the surrender of the troops of the Japanese garrisons in these cities.

And although the Japanese Kwantung Army was defeated and officially capitulated, however, individual units and garrisons continued to resist. By the end of August 1945, the entire territory of Manchuria, with an area of ​​more than 1.3 million square kilometers and a population of over 40 million people, was completely liberated from the Japanese invaders.

Already on August 20 in Khabarovsk, Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky told the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts that now the center of gravity in the war had shifted from Manchuria to the Pacific Ocean. It was necessary to liberate South Sakhalin, occupy all the Kuril Islands and accept the surrender of Japanese troops on the island of Hokkaido.

It is clear that the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts cannot be compared with the Transbaikal Front in terms of the number of divisions, corps, armies, and weapons. Compare yourself. The Trans-Baikal Front had five armies, including the 6th Guards Tank, plus a cavalry-mechanized group, plus the 12th Air Army and a number of front-line formations. There are 55 divisions in total, including 24 purely rifle divisions.

The 1st Far Eastern Front included four combined arms armies and the 9th Air Army. There are 35 divisions in total.

And the 2nd Far Eastern Front had only three combined arms armies and one 10th air army. In total, there were 12 divisions in the army. Moreover, the 2nd Red Banner Army, stationed in the Amur Region, and the 15th Army, advancing along the Songhua across the territory of the Jewish Autonomous Region, solved problems in Manchuria.

The 16th Army, which was located in the Lower Amur Region and Northern Sakhalin, was intended to conduct combat operations on Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and land troops on Hokkaido. The 16th Army had only one 56th Corps, and the Corps had only one 79th Rifle Division. The 16th Army interacted with the North Pacific Flotilla.

For the landing of amphibious assault forces on the northern part of the Kuril Islands, the forces and means of the Kamchatka defensive region and the Petropavlovsk naval base were aimed.

Therefore, A.M. Vasilevsky decided to transfer to the 2nd Far Eastern Front from the 1st Far Eastern Front the 87th Rifle Corps, which included two rifle divisions (342nd and 345th).

At 4 o'clock on August 19, a cipher message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East was received at the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet:

“Commander of the 1st Far Eastern Fleet, Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Based on the task assigned to the Soviet troops in the Far East, I order:

1. The First Far Eastern Front, in the period from August 19 to September 1, to occupy half of the island of Hokkaido north of the line running from the city of Rumoe, and the island of the southern part of the Kuril ridge to the island of Simushiro-To, inclusive.

For this purpose, with the help of ships of the Pacific Fleet and partly of the Navy, from August 19 to September 1, 1945, transfer two rifle divisions of the 87th SC.

No. 10, Vasilevsky.

However, at 5:05 pm on August 22, the second cipher message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East was received at the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet:

“To Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov, Admiral Yumashev.

2. It is necessary to refrain from the operation of landing our troops on the island of Hokkaido until further instructions from the Headquarters. The transfer of 87 SC to Sakhalin Island should be continued.

3. In connection with the announcement of the Japanese readiness to capitulate in the Kuril Islands, I ask you to consider the possibility of transferring the lead division of the 87th SC from Sakhalin Island to the South Kuril Islands (Kunashir and Iturup), bypassing the island of Hokkaido.

Please let me know your thoughts on this issue no later than the morning of August 23 of this year.

No. 677, Vasilevsky.

On August 11, the commander of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, General of the Army M.A. Purkaev, ordered the commander of the 16th Army, Major General L.G. Cheremisov to launch an offensive against the Japanese troops on Sakhalin in the morning of August 11 and, in cooperation with the North Pacific Flotilla, by August 25, liberate the southern part of the island from the enemy.

In South Sakhalin, Japanese troops had 20,000 soldiers and officers and about 10,000 reservists. The light forces of the Japanese fleet were based in the ports of Otomari, Maoka and Esutoru (Korsakov, Kholmsk and Uglegorsk). The airfield network of South Sakhalin was able to receive up to a thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops in Northern Sakhalin included one rifle division - 79 SD and one air division - 255 vehicles. Naturally, this was not enough, so it was decided to land amphibious and airborne assault forces.

On August 16, an amphibious assault was landed from Sovgavan to the port of Toro (Shakhtyorsk) as part of the 113th Infantry Brigade and the 365th Separate Marine Battalion. The fighting continued for two days. On August 17, another amphibious assault was landed in this area, south of Toro, in the port of Esutoru (Uglegorsk).

On August 20, an amphibious assault was landed from Sovgavan to the port of Maoka (Kholmsk). It included troops of the 113th Infantry Brigade and marines of the Pacific Fleet. Pacific Fleet paratroopers from the Vladimir naval base also arrived here. The fighting continued until 23 August.

On August 24, Soviet troops were transferred from Mooko to the port of Honto (Nevelsk), and on August 25, to the port and naval base of Otomari (Korsakov). The Japanese laid down their arms without offering resistance.

Thus, the order of the commander of the 2nd Far Eastern Front was carried out on time. On August 25, an airborne assault occupied the administrative center of South Sakhalin, the city of Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk).

Before the troops of the Far Eastern Front, the task of occupying all the islands of the Kuril ridge remained unresolved. For this, a separate Kuril landing operation had to be carried out, which was planned for the period from August 18 to September 1, 1945.

The key position of Japan was the northernmost island of Shumshu, the defense of which consisted of long-term structures, covered by field and anti-aircraft artillery. The islands of Shumshu and neighboring Paramushir were defended by a garrison reinforced with 60 tanks. For landing on Shumshu Island, two rifle regiments from the 101st Rifle Division, a howitzer artillery regiment, a marine battalion, an anti-tank battalion, which were part of the Kamchatka defensive region and the Petropavlovsk naval base, were allocated. Major General P.I. Dyakov was appointed commander of the landing, and Captain 1st Rank D.G. Ponomarev was appointed commander of the landing. The landing force was provided by up to 60 ships, air support was assigned to the 128th mixed air division (78 aircraft) and the 2nd separate bomber regiment of naval aviation of the Pacific Fleet.

On the morning of August 18, an advanced detachment was landed on the island of Shumshu. The fighting took on a fierce character. Japanese aircraft bombed ships and troops. Overcoming the strong resistance of the enemy, the landing units captured a small bridgehead, on which the main forces were landed by evening. The landing troops launched an offensive deep into the island.

The next day, the commander of the Japanese troops in the Kuril Islands announced his surrender. However, only on August 22, the Japanese garrison of Shumshu Island capitulated. The next day, the island was occupied by troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Fleet.

On August 24, the island of Paramushir was liberated, and then our troops occupied other islands, namely: on August 25 - Onekotan, Shiashkotan, Matua; August 27 - Simushir; August 28 - Urup. The Kuril Islands were liberated from August 28 to September 5, 1945. Japanese units from the 89th Infantry Division were stationed on these islands.

The ciphergram of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yumashev, to the commander of the North Pacific Flotilla, Vice Admiral Andreev, No. 12146 dated August 28, 1945:

“Together with the commander of the 16th Army of the 2DVF, liberate the islands of Iturup and Kunasiri, creating a bridgehead on them for the occupation of the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge. Transport the 355th rifle division of the 87th SC of the 1DVF, the 113th rifle brigade and a cannon regiment to the islands. Loading of parts to be carried out in the port of Otomari. From the composition of the 355 SD, two regiments should be landed on the island of Iturup, one regiment on the island of Kunasiri. After the occupation of these islands by units of the 113th RRF, inspect and occupy the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge: Susko-Shima, Taraku-Shima, Akiyuri-Sima, Yuru-Sima, Harakaru-Sima and Todo-Shima. For the operation, additionally allocated: TFR type "F" No. 6, TSC type "AM" No. 273, 274, two landing ships for infantry, three tank landing ships, transports "Vsevolod Sibirtsev", "Stalingrad", "Nakhodka", Novorossiysk.

Japanese Major General Jio-Doi, head of the garrison, said that he received the order to surrender six hours before the arrival of the Soviet troops on the islands. The Japanese behaved approximately the same way on other islands, in particular, on Iturup.

The chiefs of the island garrisons knew about the statement of their emperor and about the surrender of Japanese troops in Manchuria and Sakhalin. But they were waiting for the order of the commander in the Kuril Islands, ordering the surrender of the garrisons. But there was no such order for a very long time.

On the morning of September 2, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, using code number 7071, handed over to the commander of the landing on the South Kuril Islands, Captain 1st Rank I.S.

Taking into account the availability of forces and means on Kunashir Island, where at that time people and equipment were being disembarked from the transports that were part of the landing detachment, Leonov handed over to the detachment commander, Captain 3rd Rank P.A. Chicherin, the order of the commander of the Pacific Fleet to proceed with the occupation of the islands of the Lesser Kuril ridge .

At 9 o'clock on September 3, we received a combat order with a detailed plan of action and the final task - to complete the cleansing of the islands by 18.00.

However, it was not possible to complete the operation on September 3. Only on September 4, troops landed on Taraku-Sima, where 92 Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. The cleansing of the islands continued until 8 September. More than 900 Japanese were taken prisoner on the two islands these days: 221 on the island of Shibotsu Shima and 700 on the island of Taraku Shima.

By September 8, about 20,000 Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. The total number of prisoners on all the islands of the Kuril chain amounted to 50,442 people (the number is equal to the composition of a full-blooded army of ground forces). As a result, our country received free access to the Pacific Ocean.

In his memoirs “The Work of All Life”, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky noted: “The landing of amphibious assault forces on the islands of Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan was amazing in terms of speed, dexterity and courage.”

For successful military operations, many participants in the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, military orders and medals.

On September 14, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky became twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov, Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, General of the Army I.I. Maslennikov, as well as commanders of armies and groups of troops A.R. Gnechko became heroes of the Soviet Union , M.V. Zakharov, F.G. Katkov, A.G. Kravchenko, N.I. Krylov, I.A. Pliev.

There was a war and there was our victory, the result of which cannot be overestimated. History has preserved the facts of this not simple, albeit short-lived war, well planned and brilliantly carried out.

Merezhko, captain of the 2nd rank, retired,

military historian.

On photos:

1. A.G. Merezhko, retired captain P rank, military historian - author of the article.

2. A.M. Vasilevsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

3. N.G. Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet.

4. A.A. Novikov, Air Chief Marshal.

5. S.P. Ivanov, Colonel General.

6. I.I. Maslennikov, General of the Army.