The "scorched earth" tactic involves the complete destruction of any objects during the retreat, so that they do not go to the enemy. During the Great Patriotic War, it was used by both the Soviet and German sides.

Manstein was one of the proponents of this tactic. In 1942-1944 he commanded the Don and South Army Groups. In the autumn of 1943, during the retreat to the Left-Bank Ukraine, Manstein, following Goering's order, used this technique.

He wrote: “In the zone of 20-30 km in front of the Dnieper, everything that could help the enemy immediately continue his offensive on a wide front on the other side of the river was destroyed, destroyed or taken to the rear, that is, everything that could appear for him during the concentration of forces in front of our Dnieper positions, shelter or quartering, and everything that could facilitate his supply, especially the food supply of his troops.

According to the commander, stocks, household property and machines that could be used for military production were taken out of the abandoned areas. Non-ferrous metals, grain and industrial crops, as well as horses and cattle were also taken out.

At the same time, Manstein stipulates that "in the German army - in contrast to the rest - robbery was not allowed", "strict control was established to exclude the possibility of exporting any illegal cargo." According to the commander, the exported property and stocks were exclusively state property, not private property.

Manstein adds that a significant part of the local population then voluntarily followed the retreating units "in order to get away from the Soviets, which they feared." “Long columns were formed, which we later had to see also in eastern Germany,” the commander notes.

Few people were not amazed by the huge numbers of destroyed and destroyed material assets on the territory of the USSR during the Second World War: 38550 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were completely or partially destroyed (Note 11 *), 1710 cities, more than 70 thousand villages and villages, 65 thousand railway lines and about 100 thousand collective farms and state farms, which amounted to direct damage of 700 billion Soviet rubles in pre-war prices (Note 15 *), as a result of which 25 million people lost their homes. However, not many people know that the "scorched earth" strategy was carried out by the retreating Soviet troops, partisans, and underground fighters throughout the war. This is effective and completely fair in relation to the advancing enemy, but in none of the documents of the war period you will find data on the number of material values ​​destroyed in this way. Paradoxically, it turns out that everything that was destroyed in the USSR during the war years was destroyed exclusively by the Nazis. The orders and directives of the Soviet leadership directly speak of the opposite.

"The Germans found empty barns, blown up shipyards, burned factory buildings. Instead of houses, they fought for rubble and snowdrifts" I. Ehrenburg, 11/18/41 (Note 15 *)

The Amur bridge across the Dnieper River in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk in 1941 was blown up by the NKVD
- in October 1941, German sappers in Kyiv managed to clear the mines of the Opera House, the Pedagogical Museum, the State Bank, the University, St. Vladimir's Cathedral and other large buildings. The Soviet saboteurs managed to undermine the Khreshchatyk complex of buildings, and there is still no consensus on who blew up the Assumption Cathedral of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, although it was the laying of mines that was carried out by Soviet miners when they left the city in 1941
- The Catherine Palace in Tsarskoye Selo (Pushkin), as well as another, smaller palace here, as well as Peterhof (Petrodvorets) were burned by Soviet artillery (Note 18 *)
- "during the assault on Taganrog, we (the advancing Germans - ed. note) for the first time had the opportunity to observe the organized destruction of the city by Soviet troops. Factories and institutions took off one after another. ... When we broke into the city, we saw huge piles of burnt grain In Taganrog, we were shown in practice the policy of "scorched earth" (Note 17 *)
- in 1942, in the basements of the regional executive committee of Rostov-on-Don, the Wehrmacht discovered mines prepared for detonation of a collectively large explosive force, but the Red Army managed to blow up only the railway bridge across the Don, which was soon restored by the Germans (Note 16 *) - from those remaining on the territory of the Oryol region to By the end of the evacuation, 30450 tons of grain were burned on 25 2851. Not threshed bread in stacks was also burned. According to the information about the abandonment of the Red Army in the city of Liven, Oryol region, all valuable property was destroyed in the city, communications were blown up, Adam's mill, a rubber plant, a distillery, a water pump, soldiers and commanders of the Red Army broke the property of the townspeople. On 11/23/41, the last units of the Red Army, leaving the city, set fire to it in several places, even attempts were made to set fire to residential buildings. According to the report of the Secretary of the Trubchevsk Underground District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Burlyaev, before the occupation of Trubchevsk by the Germans, on the instructions of the district party committee, a dry plant, a hemp plant, a bakery were blown up, a water pump and a power plant were damaged. On the territory of the Smolensk region, during the retreat of the Red Army, all the MTS were destroyed, ... rendered unusable ... inventory and spare parts. On the territory of the Oryol region, almost all large and medium-sized enterprises were disabled, even those related to the food industry, which worked to meet the needs of the local population. When the Red Army left the town of Toropets in the Kalinin Region, 15 enterprises were destroyed, including a distillery, a waste plant, an oil plant, a flax plant, a brick, tile, turpentine plants, MTS, 6 artels, a fish farm (Note 15 *)

On 07/01/1942, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral F. Oktyabrsky and a member of the Military Council N. Kulakov, sent a report to Stalin in Moscow, in which, among other things, it is noted: "... 2.3 having captured Sevastopol, the enemy did not receive any trophies. The city as such was destroyed and represents a heap of ruins." (Note 14*)
- from the message of the Sovinformburo dated 11/21/41: "All plants and factories from the areas occupied by the Germans were evacuated to the Eastern regions of the Soviet Union ... The Germans really captured a small number of enterprises that could not be evacuated ... but captured in the form of ruins, blown up and destroyed by Soviet troops (Note 14 *)
- systematically destroying all locomotive depots, water pumping stations and other railway equipment (repair shops, stations, arrows, frost-resistant water tanks) during its retreat, the Red Army forced Hitler to issue an order dated 12/27/1941, according to which the restoration of Soviet railways was 30 thousand German construction workers and engineers were sent (Note 4 *)
- in August 1941 in Vyborg, out of 25 installed Soviet F-10 radio mines (each containing from 140 to 4500 kg of TNT), the Finns managed to neutralize 8, only partially preserving the historical development of the city
- according to the "Report on the measures taken to implement the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0428" of the Military Council of the Western Front on 11/29/1941 (12 days from the date of publication of this order): "... 398 Soviet settlements were burned and destroyed, most of which. ..teams of hunters from the military units of the front and sabotage groups of intelligence agencies of the special department "(Note 10 *)

In 1941, the NKVD officers laid 20 tons of tol in the dam of the Dneproges, the explosion of which destroyed part of the dam 165 meters long, causing a 20-meter wave. The wave washed away the coastal city strip and reached Marganets and Nikopol. Due to the fact that the NKVD did not warn anyone about the danger, according to approximate data, more than 100 thousand people died, of which about 20 thousand Red Army soldiers and about 80 thousand civilians and about 1.5 thousand Germans
- joint Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 06/27/1941 "On the procedure for the export and placement of human contingents and valuable property"
- "All valuable property, raw materials and food stocks, grain on the vine, which, if it is impossible to export and left in place ... must be immediately brought into complete disrepair, i.e. must be destroyed, destroyed and burned" (Note. 9*)

ORDER OF THE STATE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND No. 0428 dated 11/17/1941 "On the creation of special teams for the destruction of settlements in the rear of the fascist troops, 1941"
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ORDERS:
1. Destroy and burn to the ground all settlements in the rear of the German troops at a distance of 40-60 km in depth from the front line and 20-30 km to the right and left of the roads. To destroy settlements within the indicated radius of action, immediately drop aircraft, make extensive use of artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, skiers and guerrilla sabotage groups equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and explosives.
2. In each regiment, create teams of hunters of 20-30 people each to blow up and burn settlements in which enemy troops are stationed. To select the most courageous and politically and morally strong fighters, commanders and political workers in the hunting teams, carefully explaining to them the tasks and significance of this event for the defeat of the German army. Outstanding daredevils for courageous actions to destroy the settlements in which the German troops are located, to present to the government award.
3. In the event of a forced withdrawal of our units in one sector or another, take the Soviet population with them and be sure to destroy all settlements without exception so that the enemy cannot use them. First of all, for this purpose, use the teams of hunters allocated in the regiments.
4. The military councils of the fronts and individual armies systematically check how the tasks for the destruction of settlements in the radius indicated above from the front line are being carried out. Headquarters every 3 days to report in a separate summary how many and which settlements have been destroyed over the past days and by what means these results have been achieved.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin, B. Shaposhnikov (Note 13*)

DIRECTIVE OF THE USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "TO THE PARTY AND SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FRONT-FRONT REGIONS" 06/29/41 No. П509
4) In the event of a forced withdrawal of units of the Red Army, to steal a rolling stock, not to leave a single locomotive, not a single wagon to the enemy, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. Collective farmers must steal cattle, hand over grain for safety to state bodies for its removal to the rear areas. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be exported, must be unconditionally destroyed
5) In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to incite partisan war everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to warehouses, etc. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHT IN THE REAR OF THE GERMAN TROOPS" (Note 3 *)
- "When the units of the Red Army are forced to withdraw, it is necessary to steal the entire rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single wagon, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. The collective farmers must steal all the cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies all valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be taken out, must be unconditionally destroyed. enemy army, to incite guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, carts "(Note 5 *) (Compare with the previous one and find the differences)
- Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus dated 07/01/1941: "Destroy any communications behind enemy lines, blow up or damage bridges and roads, set fire to fuel and food depots, trucks and aircraft, arrange railway accidents ..." (Note 2 *)

Additional damage to the Soviet national economy was caused by local residents, who, in conditions of temporary anarchy, began to take away everything that they did not have time to destroy the retreating units of the Red Army and that was at least some value for them (Note 15 * and 16 *)
- you need to pay attention to the fact that during the hostilities many settlements passed several times from hand to hand and mercilessly, sometimes to the point of complete destruction, were destroyed by the opposing sides as a result of the fulfillment of the assigned combat missions
- as a result of the "scorched earth" tactics, the central historical part of Kyiv, the Dneproges, the Assumption Cathedral of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra were destroyed by the NKVD (Note 1 * and 12 *)
- by 1943, only 10% of industrial and 50% of agricultural products were produced in the Soviet territories occupied by the Germans from the level of 1940 (Note 1 *)
- only in 1943, as a result of the "rail" war, more than 350 thousand railway rails, a large number of bridges and stations in the territories of the USSR occupied by the Germans were blown up by Soviet partisans (Note 6 *)
- Vitebsk and Smolensk were almost completely destroyed in 1941 by the retreating Soviet troops (Note 12 *)
- resort coast of the Black Sea: Yalta, Gurzuf, Simeiz, Livadia, Alupka, Baidar gates and other places were destroyed and burned by Soviet partisans in accordance with Stalin's order "Leave nothing to the enemy"
- starting in the autumn of 1943, the Wehrmacht, in accordance with the order of the High Command, during its retreat purposefully began to destroy everything that the Red Army could use for its supply and deployment (Note 8 *)

NOTES:
(Note 1 *) - L. Semenenko "The Great Patriotic War. How it was"
(Note 2 *) - I. Hoffman "Stalin's war of extermination"
(Note 3 *) - D. Zhukov "Russian police"
(Note 4 *) - A. Speer "The Third Reich from the inside. Memoirs of the Reich Minister of War Industry"
(Note 5 *) - Stalin's speech on the radio on 07/03/1941
(Note 6 *) - Special issue 9\2010 Dossier-collection "Steam locomotives and armored trains of the USSR"
(Note 7 *) - I. Lutsky "Sea and captivity. The tragedy of Sevastopol"
(Note 8 *) - F. Mellenthin "Tank battles. Combat use of tanks in WW2"
(Note 9 *) - B. Belozerov "Front without borders 1941-1945."
(Note 10 *) - "Encyclopedia of delusions. War"
(Note 11 *) - I. Vernidub "Ammunition of Victory"
(Note 12 *) - C. Ailesby "Plan Barbarossa"
(Note 13 *) - M. Solonin "The False History of the Great War"
(Note 14 *) - O. Greig "Stalin could attack first"
(Note 15 *) - I. Ermolaev "Under the banner of Hitler"
(Note 16 *) - V. Smirnov "Rostov under the shadow of a swastika"
(Note 17 *) - K. Meyer "German grenadiers. Memoirs of an SS general"
(Note 18 *) - E. Manstein "Lost Victories"

Soviet scorched earth tactics include many aspects: military, economic, demographic, and many others. In "The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry" I touched only briefly on the subject of the demographic changes of Eastern European Jews. Here I want to focus on the economic side of the Second World War.

The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, provided for the following territorial redistribution: Estonia and Latvia were transferred to the Soviet sphere of interests, and Lithuania fell into the German one./1 After the defeat of Poland, the Soviet government immediately began to put strong pressure on Germany to revise the treaty . In order to keep the peace, Hitler agreed to a second treaty, the so-called friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939, Germany gave up its interests in most of Lithuania in exchange for the area between the Vistula and the Bug with a population of about 3.5 million people, including more than 300,000 Jews./2 This zone was occupied by the Soviets for a very short time, but the Red Army destroyed almost the entire agricultural system, taking livestock and agricultural equipment before retreating. As a result, the Germans had to bring food in large quantities to prevent starvation in this agricultural area. / 3 This episode was supposed to be a lesson for Germany, but, unfortunately, it did not.

While Germany was involved in the Western Campaign from May 10 to June 24, 1940, the Soviet Union occupied almost all of Lithuania between June 16 and 22 after the June 15 ultimatum - that is, including even the territory that was supposed to remain within the German borders. areas of interest according to the contract. This occupation is not only a gross violation of two Soviet-German treaties, but also of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaty (October 10, 1939). The German government was not notified of this action./4 Northern Bukovina, one of the areas of Romania that was outside the Soviet interests agreed to in the treaty, was similarly appropriated by the Soviets, although in this case the Soviets pressed Germany to give their "consent "in the ultimatum period of 24 hours before the start of the occupation. I mention these events only because they demonstrate the determination with which the USSR destroyed the German strategic advantage while acquiring their own. They also show that Germany had no definite military goals with regard to the Soviet Union, because otherwise it is impossible to imagine that she would have to put up with the Soviet usurpation of the strategically priceless Lithuanian route to Leningrad and Moscow.

Scorched earth

Faced with a massive build-up of Soviet military power along the border, and alerted by new Soviet demands for unrealistic territorial concessions in Europe, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Soviets immediately began to kill German prisoners of war immediately after being captured or after a short interrogation. Even seriously wounded soldiers were not spared. Ample evidence exists to this effect at the West German Research Institute of Military History (Militaergeschichtliche Forschungsamt), which is known for its not at all pro-German bias, it estimates the percentage of captured German soldiers who died in Soviet captivity in 1941-1942 at 90-95 percent. / 5A Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, the Central Committee issued an order in the Kremlin that the troops should leave only scorched earth to the enemy. All valuable property was ordered to be destroyed, regardless of the needs of the remaining civilian population. For this, specially created detachments for the destruction of property were used. The aforementioned military research institute commented: “From the very beginning of the war, Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union showed through these measures how much they were worried about this armed conflict with Germany, which for them was of a completely different character than just a “European war”. / 5 B

The measures taken by the Soviet Union during the period from 1940 to 1942 are aimed not only at further developing the Soviet war economy, but also at inflicting harm on the Germans, even at the cost of huge losses among Soviet citizens. The Soviet scorched earth strategy included the deportation of millions of men, women and children; moving thousands of factories; destruction of almost all railway rolling stock; the destruction of most of the agricultural machinery, livestock and grain stocks; systematic destruction, burning and undermining of immovable infrastructure, stocks of all kinds, factory buildings, mines, residential areas, public buildings, government archives, and even cultural monuments; deliberate starvation among the civilian population who remained in the occupied territories. This policy shamelessly used the civilian population as a pawn. This policy is confirmed by so many sources that there can be no different opinions. It is strange that this topic has not yet been covered in the scientific literature. So far, this scorched earth policy has not been explored to the extent it deserves.

Long before the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict, Stalin began to prepare for a future war in Europe, developing heavy industry in the Urals and Western Siberia, starting with the first five-year plan in 1928. His plans were long term. In the early 1930s, he had already announced his intention to overtake the most industrialized countries no later than June 1941 - the year when, according to numerous testimonies and statements by Soviet leaders, including Stalin's son, the Red Army will hit Germany in late summer./7 With the help of thousands of engineers and experts from Europe and North America, the core of the Soviet military industry was created in the region where Europe meets Asia. Millions of Soviet citizens were ruthlessly sacrificed in the quest to achieve military superiority of the USSR over Germany. The Ural industrial region was covered by an extensive network of power lines. In 1940, it was a rather sparsely populated area with only four percent of the Soviet population and produced 4 billion kWh of electricity, but the existing capacity was soon greatly enhanced./8 In other words, per capita electricity capacity in the Urals region became four times more. In preparation for the coming conflict, munitions factories were built all along the southern Urals and western Siberia. The railway network in this once sparsely populated area was greatly expanded by the start of the war./9

As soon as the Germans crossed the border, the Soviet Union set about implementing an economic mobilization plan. This plan also included the possibility that the enemy could occupy large areas of the country - as happened during the First World War. For this reason, detailed plans were made for where the dismantled plants were to be transported, and sequential instructions were made to destroy what could not be transported. The relationships between individual plants and their dependence on each other were also carefully considered./10 A carefully implemented plan included the dismantling and evacuation of equipment and people 8-10 days before the retreat of the Red Army from the territory where the plant or factory was located, then 24 hours were allotted for the destruction of the remaining valuable property with the help of special detachments. If necessary, the Soviet troops put up fierce resistance in order to provide sufficient time for the performance of their tasks by special detachments for the destruction of property.

Enterprises almost always moved towards the Ural industrial region, in particular to the area of ​​Sverdlovsk, Molotov, Ufa, Chkalov, and Magnitogorsk. This is a region where plants and factories were built a few years before the war and where dismantled and transported enterprises from the western regions of the Soviet Union began their work again./11

In just the first three months after the start of the war, more than 1,360 large industrial enterprises were moved to their new locations. Due to tight control, the evacuated enterprises began to work again in an incredibly short time: only three to four weeks passed before large factories and enterprises again began to provide the Red Army with products. Workers had to work 12-14 hours a day, seven days a week. Within three to four months, Soviet production again reached pre-war levels./12

The Soviet feat was only possible because millions of skilled workers, managers, engineers and specialists were brought to these areas along with their factories. As early as February 1940, German intelligence agents were reporting systematic deportations of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish populations from Western Ukraine./13 In June 1940, up to one million Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland, as well as many hundreds of thousands of Poles, were deported to Siberia. Then, in the weeks leading up to June 22, 1941, mass deportations of the civilian population took place along the entire border with Germany, Hungary and Romania. The Soviets, informed by spies, Allied intelligence, and German traitors, lost no time in deporting those civilians most needed in the Ural industrial region./14

Soviet historians admitted several years ago that the Soviet Union had plans to rebuild the entire railway system long before the war for military purposes in a very short time. The goal was to prevent the Germans from getting hold of strategically important equipment. The Soviet success in this endeavor was almost complete: despite the huge number of railway cars, locomotives, and special equipment, transport in the border areas, intended for the deployment of troops in preparation for an attack on Europe, most of the rolling stock was withdrawn before the Germans struck his lightning strike on June 22, 1941. During the first five weeks, when the German troops pushed the Soviet troops inland, only 577 locomotives, 270 passenger cars and 21,947 railway freight wagons fell to the Germans. In percentage terms, this amounted to only 2.3. 0.8 and 2.5 percent of the total./15

During the first few months of the war, one million railroad cars loaded with industrial equipment, raw materials, and people withdrew from the front lines./16 I will not go into the specifics of the scope of the Soviet civilian deportation program. This is what I did in detail in "The Dissolution". Suffice it to note here that before the war, more than 90 million people lived in the areas conquered by Germany during the Second World War. The Soviets deported about 25-30 million of them. They concentrated their efforts on the deportation of individual groups. A large percentage of the deportees were from cities located in Ukraine or Belarus, especially if they were located closer to the western border./17

The scorched earth policy was extremely well prepared by the Soviets. An extensive armaments program was launched 13 years before 1941, long before Adolf Hitler was a real contender for the leadership of Germany. Significant investments have been made in rather sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas in order to develop its transport networks, power plants and heavy industry. However, there was a particular lack of social infrastructure, such as housing and hospitals, to provide for the millions of civilians who were deported here between 1940 and 1941. As a result, 15-20 million civilians died from epidemics, starvation, overwork, lack of shelter, lack of clothing and the harsh Siberian winter.

The collapse of the economy in the occupied eastern territories

The picture for the advancing German troops was extremely unfavorable. The railroad system is destroyed. There was no rolling stock. Water pipes and power plants were destroyed. In order to organize the production of raw materials and petroleum products, the Germans created the so-called economic headquarters "Vostok".
The Soviet scorched earth strategy very quickly forced the economic headquarters to intensify work on the production of any type of product. Even the production of consumer goods was included in the program, because the industry in the occupied territories was unable to resume production after the Soviets had almost completely destroyed and dismantled and deported most of the management personnel and technicians.

Electricity production amounted to 2.57 million kW in the occupied territories - about one-fourth of all pre-war Soviet production in these territories - less than one-eighth (300,000 kW) remained intact. Soviet destruction efforts were so meticulous that by the end of March 1943, production had been increased to no more than 630,000 kW, which was still only a quarter of the pre-war level. /18 (See Table 1.)

However, differences across regions were significant. In the Reichskommissariat (RK) Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus), about half of the original capacity of 270,000 kW survived, and by the end of March 1943 almost 90 percent of the pre-war capacity had been returned to service. But in Ukraine, only 7 percent (145,000 kW) of electricity, with a capacity of 2.2 million kW, was still functioning. The thoroughness of the efforts of the Bolsheviks is evidenced by the fact that by the end of March 1943, it was possible to return to operation capacities of no more than 350,000 kW. This is only 16 percent of pre-war capacities. In practice, even these capacities rarely worked at full capacity due to the guerrilla threat and the almost complete lack of coal supplies. It is obvious that industrial production has been dealt a mortal blow. As already mentioned, electricity production before the war amounted to 10 billion kW / h annually in the occupied eastern territories. The German administration succeeded in generating only 750 million kWh of electricity from the time of the occupation until the end of 1942. For 1943, it was planned to increase them to 1.4 billion kW / h - which was still 86 percent below the pre-war level - which was never reached, since only 1 billion kW. hours were actually produced./19 It is significant that the planned increase in production and extraction of products for 1943 was realized only in isolated cases. Actual production of basic raw materials or energy supplies fell far short of the stated targets, despite the increased focus on retooling the economy.

The consequences of the planned destruction of industrial production by the Soviet army are shown in Table 2.

The main productions of coal, iron ore, steel, electricity, cement and other important ones were almost completely destroyed. Compared to pre-war levels, coal production averaged 2.4%, iron ore production 1.2%, steel production was non-existent, electricity production was 8.8%, and cement production was 11.6%!

Another indication of the deplorable state of the economy in the territory of occupied Russia was the amount of labor. In 1940, Soviet specialists and workers numbered 31.2 million./20 At the end of 1942, employment in industry (excluding the food industry) was only 750,000 people. If only industrial employment is considered, i.e. excluding handicrafts, the number of employees was only 600,000 (Table 3)

Six hundred thousand in an area where 75 million lived before the war is impossible! Even if we add an unknown number of people employed in the food industry, it is clear that industrial employment under the German administration was equivalent to one-tenth of the pre-war level. Worst of all, the productivity of this labor force was well below the pre-war norm. It is noteworthy that in the Baltic countries (the largest of which, Lithuania, had very little industry), only 8 percent of the population remained from the pre-war level, they nevertheless made up a quarter of the entire industrial workforce under German administration.

The Soviet deportations of skilled personnel led to such forced measures as the "posting" of about 10,000 civilian specialists from the Reich in order to overcome the severe shortage of personnel. / 21 Based on the available statistics, it can be argued that the Soviets deported at least 70 percent of workers before the German occupation. This means that the number of workers employed under the German administration (generally less skilled than the deported workers) was between 2 and 3 million. Not more than a million people were employed in production, despite the huge need for workers, unemployment reached enormous proportions (50-70 percent) at the height of the gigantic demand for literally any kind of product.
According to Soviet data, before the start of the war, in the areas occupied by the Germans by November 1941, 63% of coal, 68% of iron, 58% of steel, 60% of aluminum, 38% of grain and 84% of sugar were produced from all production in the Soviet Union. / 22 The documents of the German economic headquarters "Vostok" show, in fact, very similar figures. The Soviets, with help, fires, destruction, sabotage and deportation of workers and the population, made it impossible to use these industrial capacities. Instead of increasing German military and economic power, these areas became a huge burden and added cost to the German economy.

Hunger

The following secret report of the German Economic Headquarters for the period October 1-10, 1941, describes the situation:

Some food has been found... it appears that virtually all supplies and raw materials have either been systematically removed from these areas or rendered unusable. Thus, raw materials are still found in small quantities, slightly easing the needs of the Reich .... Raw materials have not been supplied to factories for some time now. / 23

The same situation is in the case of food, especially grains. Reading the same report:

Our experience shows that the Russians systematically remove or destroy all food supplies. The urban population of the conquered cities would thus have to be fed by the Wehrmacht or starve. Obviously, by forcing us to provide additional food for the population, the Soviet leadership intends to aggravate the already difficult situation with the food of the German Reich. As a matter of fact, the current food situation allows us to feed the Russian population from our own stocks only if we reduce the supply to the army or reduce the rations of our own population./24

At the very beginning of the war, all efforts to destroy property were carried out in the agricultural sector and were timed to coincide with the destruction of machine and tractor stations. As a rule, these stations were found empty or with equipment unusable. At first, the cattle population remained intact. But over the following weeks, things took a turn for the worse. As the German army moved from west to east, there was practically no livestock, no grain, no fuel. The Luftwaffe and POWs reported that the Soviets were harvesting crops from the fields before retreating. After the occupation of Ukraine, it became obvious that the food situation would be getting worse. In many cases, even the seeds needed for sowing were distributed to help starving Ukrainians. This, in turn, further reduced the area under crops. It is estimated that 43 million tons of grain were produced in the occupied eastern territories under Soviet rule in 1940. Under the German administration, it was possible to harvest in 1941 about 13 million tons. One reason was that the German offensive in Russia was most rapid in the northern and central sectors, thus giving the Soviets time to destroy or evacuate much of the harvest in Ukraine. In 1942, even less was harvested, only 11.7 million tons. According to Dallin, the German administration succeeded in sowing about three-quarters of the pre-war acreage. Fertilizer was virtually non-existent, and yields per acre were lower in 1942 than in previous years. Compared with an average yield per hectare of approximately 2,200 pounds (14 bushels/acre) in Ukraine in the late 1930s, the Germans managed to produce only 1,500 pounds (10 bushels/acre). : the use of seed grain to alleviate the difficult food situation in the cities, the growing guerrilla threat and the shortage of workers and equipment greatly reduced the yield.

German specialists were too dispersed to effectively ensure the supply of agricultural products. Of course, the Germans periodically tried to "comb" the area in order to find the accumulated supplies, but their efforts were not crowned with much success. In retreat, the Red Army also destroyed the entire agricultural distribution system, and the German administration was forced to create its own - not an easy task, given the wartime conditions. Not only too little time and difficult conditions did not allow to organize the distribution more successfully, but also the actions of the Bolsheviks who were putting up resistance in the occupied territories. All these difficulties arose not because of the "German mentality" or "German politics", which - contrary to the propaganda of the Soviets and the Allies, was aimed at seeking mutual understanding with the liberated Slavic peoples.

Far from the ruthlessness that allegedly characterizes the German occupation of Russia, it is worth saying that the Germans had never before encountered the inhuman concept of total war applied by the USSR. Even the Jewish historian Alexander Dallin admits: The Soviet harvest was, in practice, much more efficient (emphasis added) than the German one. As a result, German peasants were often able to keep larger stocks than before the war. .."/26

Between 1941 and 1943, fifteen thousand railway wagons with agricultural equipment and machinery were sent from Germany to the occupied eastern territories under the so-called Ostackerprogramm ("Eastern Agricultural Program"). It included 7,000 thousand tractors, 20,000 thousand generators, 250,000 thousand steel plows, and 3,000,000 million scythes. In addition, thousands of bulls, cows, pigs, and stallions were sent to these areas for breeding purposes. Available statistics indicate that German agricultural assistance between July 1941 and 1943 amounted to 445 million RM (Reichsmark) "/27

The pre-war Soviet harvest in 1940 amounted to 82 million tons of grain, of which about 30% was allocated for seeds and fodder purposes. Theoretically, the population of the USSR thus had access to 57 million tons, or slightly less than 800 grams per day per person. In practice, of course, this amount was less, since part of this amount was reserved in anticipation of the coming war with Germany./28 Of the thirteen million tons under the German administration in 1941, only 9 million tons were left for the indigenous population. Of this amount, 2 million tons were taken by the German troops. The amount requisitioned by the German army was indeed quite moderate. This is also evidenced by the fact that the Red Army used only 31.4 million tons of grain in 1940, the last year of peace! While another 350,000 tons were transported to Germany to provide for their civilian population./29 About 7 million tons remained for the population of the occupied territories.

On a per capita basis, this amounted to less than 400 grams per day (less than one pound) - two times lower than in 1940. Meat and fats were rarely available. But this average figure does not reflect the full picture. On the one hand, we noted that the yields were probably much higher than the German statistics show. This means that at least the rural population, which was in the majority, ate much better than the urban population. Also, many city dwellers were able to obtain food from peasants illegally, as it is difficult to control the black market. In this way, the cities received food from the peasants, which the German authorities were unable to trace, on the other hand, transport is often an insurmountable problem, so that even the minimum supply of food arrived in the cities either late or there was not enough for everyone. In addition, the guerrillas destroyed or confiscated large portions of the harvested grain. Finally, the German authorities often tried to give additional rations to factory workers. Of course, this was only possible at the expense of the rest of the population. The fact that the German authorities were unable to succeed in obtaining special rations for workers in important industries or for those engaged in hard manual labor shows how serious the situation was./30 Those urban dwellers who were unemployed or had no property to trade the peasants were really in trouble: famine was their fate.

The desperate situation with food in the cities is shown by regular secret reports of the East Economic Headquarters sent to Berlin:

November 11, 1941: Food shortages and lack of even the most essential consumer goods are the main reason why the morale of the Russian and Ukrainian population is becoming more and more depressed... Kyiv has not received any grain since its occupation on September 19, 1941. .. The guerrillas steal food from the civilian population at night. Food supplies are also burned by the partisans. Difficulties are especially great in the area of ​​Army Group South, where it is impossible to feed all the prisoners of war due to their huge numbers.... The authorities are constantly trying to find enough food for the prisoners, although even buckwheat porridge is available only in limited quantities.... We are very concerned our ability to feed the urban population in the south. /31

December 8, 1941: The food situation in the city of Kharkov is extremely critical. There is practically no food for the population. There is almost no bread. /32

January 22, 1942: The regular distribution of food to the urban civilian population in the "South" zone is limited more and more, and the situation will not change for the foreseeable future. /33

February 23, 1942: Food supplies for the civilian population of large cities are so small as to cause serious concern. /33
March 1, 1942: The mood of the population is low due to food problems .... In the densely populated Donetsk region, there is not enough food for the entire population. As a result, several thousand people died of starvation. In some cases, even highly qualified specialists and teachers were among the victims. /33

March 5, 1942: The food situation continues to be very serious and some cities are actually starving. In Pushkin, it was discovered that there was a sale of human flesh, passing it off as pork./33
March 16, 1942 (report of the commander of the military rear Central regions): in large cities (food situation) continues to be unsatisfactory, and in Kharkov it is catastrophic. Over time, all this becomes more and more difficult to feed the urban population... /33

June 3, 1942: The food situation in the cities is getting worse and worse, because part of the food stocks collected for the population and sowing are destroyed by the partisans. /33

The constant efforts of the German authorities to ensure a sufficient supply of food for the civilian population were hampered by horrendously poor harvests, a disastrous transport situation, guerrilla attacks, the destruction of food supplies by the Soviets, and the inability to conduct a regular exchange of goods between major cities and the countryside. While the food supply of the rural population and small towns was relatively sufficient, the civilian population from large cities and millions of prisoners were starving. Thus, the German reputation suffered for the actions of the Soviets.

German economic recovery efforts

Equipment worth one billion RM was imported from the Reich for the mining, energy and manufacturing industries in the occupied territories. To this must be added the significant costs for the transport sector, as well as for road construction equipment, which is estimated at more than one billion Reichsmarks. After deliveries of a significant amount of coal, which was used as a fuel for civilian rail freight transport, German aid for the reconstruction of industry and infrastructure amounted to over 2.5 billion RM./34 This amount does not include agricultural aid of about half a billion Reichsmarks. The scale of German assistance in the civilian sector can be better appreciated if one realizes that the total volume of industrial production in these areas from the beginning of the occupation until the end of 1943 amounted to approximately 5 billion RM. (This figure includes finished products, repairs, etc.) / 35 Although the exact figure is unknown, it can be assumed that the total assistance amounted to just over 2 billion RM. / 36 In other words, the amount of German economic assistance (except for agriculture) was more than the value of all industrial output during the occupation! The annual output per employee was RM 1,000 per year. For comparison: in Germany, a worker produced products worth 4,000 RM in 1936./37
Most of the production was absorbed by the German occupation army. Thus, the Soviet scorched earth strategy reduced the supply of consumer goods for its own population of about 50 million to negligible levels. The production of consumer goods was practically zero, because the destruction and evacuation of all industrial enterprises and raw materials, the deportation of personnel by the Soviets, as well as the impossibility of quickly correcting the situation, thanks to the actions of the partisans. Thus, the urban population could offer nothing to the peasants in exchange for their products. And since the peasant was not able to buy anything with the money he received, he did not want to part with his products, and the exchange was disrupted.
German economic assistance to the occupied Soviet territories amounted to approximately one percent of Germany's gross national product of those years./38 Even today, this figure is more than the assistance of industrialized countries to developing countries. West Germany, for example, has been helping about half a percent of GNP since 1960, a period of relative prosperity and low defense spending.

Indeed, the economic assistance of about 3 billion RM (including in the industrial and agricultural sector) to the occupied eastern territories is also equivalent to one fourth of the total gross capital investments in Germany in 1942 and 1943 (12 billion RM)./39

A comparison of traffic volumes between the Reich and the occupied eastern territories provides additional information.

If we take only the tonnage, then the Reich received about 20 percent more cargo from the eastern territories than from Germany to the East. Considering also about 2 million tons of grain delivered in 1943, /40 exchange for Germany was more profitable at first glance. However, shipments from the Eastern Territories were mainly various raw materials and raw ore of a rather low value in monetary terms, while products from Germany were of very high value and quality (with the exception of coal for railway transport). Since the finished product is worth much more than the various raw materials, on the other hand, this exchange was much more profitable for the occupied eastern territories, although, of course, the scarcity of available data does not allow us to make calculations over a longer period, even within a large error. The Eastern Territories supplied agricultural products worth 1.6 billion Reichsmarks./41 The cost of supplies of German cars, tractors, generators, equipment of all kinds for industry and agriculture amounted to approximately 3 billion Reichsmarks. From this sum we must subtract the supplies of raw materials and ore produced during the period of occupation, as well as the various services rendered to the German army. It is not known what values ​​should be used for these calculations. However, in view of the very small amount of raw materials and the extremely low level of industrial production, this figure should be about 25 percent of the relatively small amount of 2 billion dollars.

Thus, the occupied eastern territories, as such, gave practically nothing in economic terms in the struggle against Bolshevism. In fact, they received incredibly generous rebuilding assistance. This assistance was hardly made out of purely altruistic motives. However, this was a unique period in the history of relations between the occupying power and the conquered territories of the country. It would be wrong to attribute the German economic collapse in the eastern territories to the efforts of the Soviets alone. All the factors mentioned here are undoubtedly very important. However, there is another, no less important aspect. When Germany launched a preemptive strike against the USSR, it did so with an almost complete absence of data on the real Soviet military power, the size of Soviet weapons production and on the preparation of the USSR for total war. Worse, Germany was completely unprepared to overcome rough terrain, had no plans to manage the economy in the occupied territories, which could not work on its own, as it depended on directives and decrees from Moscow, since enterprises could not show private initiative, from where all administrative, managerial and technical personnel were deported. These additional problems made it impossible to establish an economy in the eastern territories. Chaos brought hunger, and starvation brought guerrilla support.

Thus various aid measures such as the Ostackerprogramm and the gigantic investments in agriculture in the occupied eastern territories were indeed doomed to failure because they did not address the cause of the problem.

Article Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences by Walter N. Sanning. Published with minor edits

Soviet men and women carry their modest possessions from burning houses on the outskirts of Leningrad, October 21, 1941. The Soviet people used scorched earth tactics, setting their own houses on fire. (AP Photo)

Scorched earth tactics- a method of warfare in which the retreating troops carry out the complete and large-scale destruction of all stocks vital for the enemy (food, fuel, etc.) and any industrial, agricultural, civilian facilities in order to prevent their use by the advancing enemy.

The term "scorched earth" applies only to combat operations, during which retreating troops destroy objects of paramount importance to the enemy.

"Scorched earth" tactics are prohibited by Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Convention.

Story [ | the code ]

This section contains far from all historical examples.

6th century BC e. [ | the code ]

The first known case in history of using this tactic is the war of the Scythians with the army of Darius I, around 512 BC. e. who invaded the Black Sea steppes (see Book IV of the History of Herodotus).

15th century [ | the code ]

At the end of 1474 during the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Moldavia. Numerous Ottoman troops led by the Rumelian Beylerbey Suleiman Pasha entered the territory of the Moldavian Principality. Using the tactics of "scorched earth", the Moldavian prince Stefan III defeated the enemy at Vaslui (January 10, 1475).

19th century [ | the code ]

Napoleonic Wars[ | the code ]

Pyrenean Wars[ | the code ]

During the (third) Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1810, as the Portuguese retreated to Lisbon, they were ordered to destroy all food supplies that the French could get. The order was given due to the marauding of the French troops and the mistreatment of citizens during previous invasions.

After Battles of Busaku Masséna's army marched on Coimbra, where much of the Old University and the city's library were sacked, houses and furniture were destroyed, and several civilians were killed. There were cases of looting by British soldiers, but such cases were usually investigated and the perpetrators punished. When the French troops reached the Torres-Vedras line near Lisbon, the French soldiers said that the city was more like a wasteland. When Massena reached the city of Viseu, wishing to replenish the dwindling food supplies of the army, the city was empty, and the only provisions left were grapes and lemons, the use of which in large quantities was more of a laxative than a source of calories. Low morale, hunger, disease, and indiscipline weakened the French army and forced it to retreat the following spring.

American Civil War[ | the code ]

This tactic was used extensively by Union forces under Sheridan and Sherman during the American Civil War. General Sherman used this tactic during his march to the Atlantic. Sherman's goal was to break the will and destroy enemy logistics by burning or destroying crops and other resources that could be used by Confederate sympathizers. During the campaign, his men burned all the court books in front of the courthouse so that the planters could not prove their ownership of the land. Another incident occurred when for thirty-six days Sherman's army moved through Georgia, meeting with little resistance, plundering the countryside and its inhabitants.

Other instances of the use of tactics during the civil war are also known.

20th century [ | the code ]

The Great Patriotic War[ | the code ]

Vietnam War[ | the code ]

One of the largest and most famous cases of the use of "scorched earth" tactics is Operation Ranch Hand, which was carried out by the US Army during the Vietnam War to destroy the jungle in Laos and South Vietnam.

Gulf War[ | the code ]

The current position of society[ | the code ]

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1977 prohibits the destruction of supplies and sources of food and drinking water for the civilian population in the course of hostilities.

It is prohibited to attack or destroy, remove or render unusable objects essential for the survival of the civilian population, such as food supplies, food-producing agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation installations, specifically in order to prevent their use by the civilian population or the adverse party as a means of subsistence, regardless of the motive, whether for the purpose of starving civilians, forcing them to leave, or for any other reason. Article 54, Amendments to Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Conventions

Nevertheless, cases of the use of "scorched earth" tactics are still noted.

Among the countries that have not yet ratified Protocol I are the USA, Israel, Iran, Pakistan.

see also [ | ]

Notes [ | the code ]

1. English version of the Supplement to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF(English)
2. Translation of the Addendum to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF
3. 516, 514 BC e .: there are different justifications for relatively close dates.

As the saying goes: "If you want peace, prepare for war." Here, dear friends, here is the thing. We often read catchy headlines in the media, they say - the militants agreed to surrender their weapons, 30 cities immediately passed under the control of Syria with the support of Russia, etc. All this is often taken for granted, but how often do we wonder - at what cost are these victories given to us?

It must be understood that the enemy will also not return an inch of land just like that. Here, you see, even in football, grown men cry because a couple of balls flew into their goal, and the team was defeated. But this is nothing compared to the defeats that Russia inflicts on the enemy in the Arab Republic. There, the stakes are much higher - these are not balls in the net, but human lives, at the cost of which the opponent held his positions for a long time.

Therefore, leaving a city, a settlement is a much greater defeat for them, one might say, a tragedy of a lifetime. Therefore, they fight to the death, to the last bullet, so as not to lose their possessions. Defeating such an opponent at the front, to put it mildly, is very difficult. In this article, we will use a specific example to describe what incredible efforts our military personnel are making to ensure that beautiful headlines appear in the media the next day.

So, let's recall the chronology of the events of the last week. Exactly a week ago, last weekend, our servicemen met with representatives of the rebels in the city of Busra al-Sham. Then we managed to push our position a little, and the armed groups agreed to surrender their positions. However, the problem is that illegal armed groups in the Arab Republic are like fleas on a stray dog. This is an endless Syrian wedding in Malinovka, where power changes every day. And it is not entirely clear with whom to negotiate. Thus, a few days after the deal on July 1, in the middle of the week, we again ran into a problem - part of the groups refused to make a peaceful decision. Here it is worth mentioning that Russia's actions are very tough, but the problem is being solved very quickly. When our servicemen once again faced the impenetrable intractability of the militants, we had to resort to drastic measures. But first, let's indicate on what points we could not agree?

Firstly, our side demanded the immediate surrender of all weapons and heavy equipment. The militants insisted on a phased surrender of weapons, hoping to "clean up the traces."

Secondly, the militants demanded the opportunity to freely leave the area of ​​hostilities. This was the case with Eastern Ghouta, when we provided the rebels with "green buses". But, apparently, this practice is rather tired of our military, since releasing the militants, later we have to fight with the same people in other parts of Syria. Therefore, the demand is simple - either go over to the side of the Syrian army, or be shot.

As a result, the rebels rejected our side's demands. Introducing himself as Alexander, the Russian officer threatened the militants that if they did not agree to the deal, then 40 aircraft would immediately leave the Khmeimim airbase to begin strikes against the positions of the rebels. This warning did not work, but the officer kept his words. On Wednesday, July 4, an operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, unprecedented in its scale, began in the southwest. Starting combat sorties on Wednesday, our pilots for 15 hours without a break attacked enemy positions, firing more than 600 missiles during this time. The operation ended only the next day - on Thursday 5 July. Think about the scale of the work done! This is about the price of our victories. But on the same day, Hussein Abazid, representing the interests of the southwestern militant group, said that the rebels were again ready for negotiations. And he also complained, they say - it's not fair, Russia is pursuing a "scorched earth" tactic. Negotiations took place again on Friday 6 July. As a result of the meeting, an agreement was reached that the Syrian troops and the Russian military police would occupy a number of settlements in the east of the province of Dar'a.

In addition, the most important settlement of Nasib, where the checkpoint of the same name is located on the border with Jordan, has passed under the control of government troops. In order to achieve local success, the strategically important city of Saida came under the control of the Syrian army earlier in this area. Thus, at the moment, the Syrian-Jordanian border is almost completely controlled by the soldiers of the Syrian army and the military personnel of the National Guard. As for the southern part, where clashes continue, 30 settlements there, on the terms of the Russian side, agreed to join the ceasefire regime. At the moment, the militants firmly hold their positions in the west of Dar'a - the city of Tafas is under their control. In general, the southwestern front of the militants is doomed to defeat, now it is only a matter of time. At the moment, more than 60% of the territory of southwestern Syria is already under the control of the Syrian army. I would like this to be over as soon as possible. It is also time to think about people - 320 thousand people have already left their homes. For some three weeks. Of these, approximately 60,000 are languishing near the Jordanian border.

The temperature outside is 45 degrees. So it's very difficult for people. Our guys, respectively, the service is also not sugar.