Socio-economic and political system of North-Eastern Russia during the period of feudal fragmentation (mid-XIII - mid-XV centuries). Northwestern Russia

1. Termination of the activities of city councils.

The Tatar invasion, with all the consequences that accompanied it, also accelerated the very process of life that led to the decline in significance, and then to the final cessation of the activity of city councils in northeastern Russia.

Already in the second half of the XII century, in the era of intensive settlement of the region by colonists from the south, the princes of northeastern Russia showed a tendency to become the masters of the country, its masters as its creators and organizers. Let us recall that Andrei Bogolyubsky was already an autocrat in the Suzdal land and did not want to know either his boyars or the people's council. Andrei, as you know, became a victim of his domestic politics and died from a conspiracy of those dissatisfied with his autocracy. After his death, the old veche cities - Rostov and Suzdal - tried to become masters in the country, to plant princes of their own free will and on their own. But they failed to achieve this, because they did not have strong, ancient ties with the rest of the population, who had recently arrived, planted on the land by the princes-colonizers, and above all with the suburbs of Suzdal land. Vladimirians refused to recognize the princes nominated by the Rostov and Suzdal people. In the internecine struggle that followed, the old veche towns suffered a complete defeat. In the Rostov-Suzdal land, therefore, already before the Tatars, the prince became the master of the situation, and the veche receded into the background. The very composition of the population in the Rostov-Suzdal land should have favored the strengthening of the prince at the expense of the veche. This population consisted of inhabitants of small villages and hamlets scattered over vast distances. There were few crowded, large settlements, commercial and industrial cities, and therefore the veche of the main cities could not acquire the dominance that they received in other regions of the Russian land. The Tatars completed this political evolution of northeastern Russia. Cities during their invasion were subjected to terrible ruin, impoverished and impoverished. Due to the decline of crafts and trade, they could not recover for a long time to any significant extent. Under such conditions, their inhabitants had to think more about their daily bread, about tomorrow, and not about politics. With the assertion of Tatar dominion over Russia, the appointment and change of princes began to depend on the will of the khan. Therefore, the most important function of the vecha, the calling and expulsion of princes, also fell by itself. If a vecha was to be held, it was only in cases of emergency, and, moreover, in the form of a mutiny. “God save,” writes, for example, a chronicler under 1262, “from the fierce languor of the Basurman people of the Rostov land: put fury into the hearts of the peasants, who do not tolerate the violence of the filthy, deigning forever and driving them out of the cities, from Rostov, from Volodimer, from Suzdal, from Yaroslavl; Or under the year 1289: “Prince Dmitry Borisovich is sitting in Rostov. Multiply then the Tatars in Rostov, and the citizens created a veche and drove them out, and plundered their property ”(Voskres.), etc. So, of the two forces that led society in Kievan Rus, in the northeastern specific era, one remained - prince.

2. The dependence of the princes on the Tatar Khan; order of princely possession.

But this political force, for all that, did not become independent. In 1243, Grand Duke Yaroslav Vsevolodovich went to Batu, who, according to the chronicle, received him with honor and said to him: “Yaroslav! Be older than all the prince in the Russian language. The following year, other princes went to Batu “about their fatherland”: “I honored Batu ace with a worthy honor and let me go, judging them, someone to my fatherland” (Lavrent.). The same order continued after. As a rule, the khans approved as both the great and the local prince the one who had the right to do so on ancestral or patrimonial grounds that were in force in the then customary princely law. As a result of this, in the 13th century, the seniority of the princes sat in turn on the Grand Duchy of Vladimir: Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, his brother Svyatoslav, son Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky, another son - Yaroslav of Tverskoy and the third - Vasily Kostroma, then the eldest grandson Dimitry Alexandrovich, the next Andrei Alexandrovich, then Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tverskoy. Thus, in the succession of the senior grand-ducal table, approximately the old Kievan custom was observed. But in replacing all other princely tables, as was already indicated in due time, a new, patrimonial order was established - the transition from fathers to sons, and in the absence of such, to the closest relatives. Thus, for example, in Rostov, after Konstantin Vsevolodovich, his eldest son Vasilko reigned, who was succeeded by his son Boris, etc., in Ryazan, after Ingvar Igorevich, his son Oleg reigned, then his grandson Roman Olgovich, great-grandson Fedor Romanovich, who had no offspring, why his brother Konstantin Romanovich began to reign in Ryazan, etc. The khans for the most part approved the reign of the one to whom it followed according to custom. But with all that, the khan's sovereignty had not a formal, but a purely real meaning. The princes paid the khan an exit from their principalities and gifts for shortcuts to reign. Therefore, in the XIV century, the khans began to give the great princedom of Vladimir not to those princes to whom it followed in order of seniority, but to those who knew how to ask them again, to give them more gifts. Thus, for example, in 1341, the sixteen-year-old Moscow prince Semyon Ivanovich left the Horde for a great reign, “and all the Russian princes were given under his hand, and gray-haired on the table in Volodimer” (Resurrection). In 1359, the Khan gave the label for the great reign to the young Dimitry Ivanovich Donskoy, whose boyars managed to outbid this label, which was also begging for the prince of Suzdal Dimitry Konstantinovich. At the end of the 14th century, labels began to be bought from the khan not only for the great reign of Vladimir, but also for destinies. Thus, for example. The Moscow prince Vasily Dmitrievich bought the label for the principality of Nizhny Novgorod, which had been given to his stepfather, Boris Konstantinovich. In this case, the khan in relation to the princes began to play the same role that the councils of the main cities in Kievan Rus played, planting the princes all the time without paying attention to their family accounts.

3. The power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir until the end of the XIV century.

What mutual relations were established under the Tatars between the princes of northeastern Russia? Until the end of the 14th century, the great princes of Vladimir had a certain power over all other princes, although neither the content of this power nor its extent is quite definite from the sources. Chronicles muffledly say that other princes were "at hand" of the great princes. Above, evidence from the annals was cited that all the Russian princes were "under the arms" of the Grand Duke Semyon. It is written about Dimitri Donskoy that he “summoned all the princes of the Russian lands, which exist under his authority” (Voskres.). The subjugation of the princes can be traced in the facts only in the fact that the specific princes during the all-Russian campaigns became under the banner of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Grand Duke of Vladimir, by all indications, was the representative of all Russian princes before the Khan, was originally the only prince who knew the Horde, that is, he went to petition the Khan for the interests of the Russian land, received orders from him, etc. All these special rights and advantages in connection with the possession of the Vladimir district were the reason for the struggle of the princes of different lines for the great reign of Vladimir.

The last struggle for the great reign of Vladimir took place under Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy. In 1367, Prince Dimitri Ivanovich laid a stone Kremlin in Moscow and began to bring all the princes under his will, among other things, Prince Mikhail Alexandrevich of Tverskoy. Michael, not wanting to obey, turned for help to his son-in-law Olgerd, the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Several times, Lithuanian troops entered the Moscow possessions, subjected them to devastation. Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich launched against them not only the regiments of the princes of the Moscow appanages, but also the Ryazan regiments of Oleg Ivanovich, the Pronsky prince Vladimir Dmitrievich. Not having time in his business with Lithuanian help, Mikhail in 1371 went to the Horde and returned from there with a label for the great reign of Vladimir and the khan's ambassador Sarykhozha. But Demetrius did not let Michael into the great reign, gave Sarykhozh as a gift and then went to the Horde himself, gave the Khan, the Khansh and all the princes there, and again received a label for the great reign. Mikhail, for his part, again went to Lithuania and incited Olgerd against Moscow. In the struggle that followed, Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich took his father-in-law Dimitri Konstantinovich of Suzdal with him to the battle field with his two brothers and son, cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, three princes of Rostov, the prince of Smolensk, two princes of Yaroslavl, prince Belozersky, Kashinsky, Molozhsky, Starodubsky, Bryansk, Novosilsky, Obolensky and Tarussky. The struggle ended with the fact that Mikhail Alexandrovich recognized himself as the "younger brother" of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, undertook not to look for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir under Dimitri, to mount a horse and go to war when the Grand Duke himself or his brother Vladimir Andreevich mounted a horse, or to send their governors if they send a governor: he undertook to jointly determine his relations with the Tatars, to give them tribute or not to give them, to fight with them if it comes to war, to fight together against Lithuania, to live with Veliky Novgorod and Torzhok like old times.

All these details of the struggle for the Grand Duke of Vladimir, as well as the agreement between Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich and Mikhail of Tver, which ensures his obedience to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, show what the power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir consisted of. This power was military-political. Local princes were obliged to go to war at the call of the Grand Duke, not to conduct any independent foreign policy. The significance of the Grand Duke of Vladimir then appears quite clearly in the ensuing struggle of Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy with the Tatars and Ryazan. In 1380, Demetrius gathered a huge army of 150 thousand people against Mamai. This rati included regiments not only of Moscow appanages, but also of assistant princes of Rostov, Yaroslavl, Belozersky; and the prince of Tver sent his troops with his nephew, Ivan Vsevolodovich Kholmsky. Oleg Ryazansky, out of fear of the Tatars, did not join the Grand Duke, after the Kulikovo defeat of the Tatars, had to flee to Lithuania for fear of reprisals, and Dimitri Ivanovich took Ryazan from him for disobeying Oleg. When they then reconciled and concluded an agreement, Oleg recognized himself as the “younger brother” of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, pledged to be at the same time against Lithuania, and is in the same relationship with the Horde as the Moscow prince. So, Oleg became to Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy in the same subordinate position as Mikhail Tverskoy. To characterize this situation, one can cite some data from the agreement with Dmitry Ivanovich of his cousin, Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, to which princes Oleg and Mikhail were equated: “You, my younger brother, Prince Vladimir, keep my great prince under me honestly and menacingly; you, my younger brother, to serve without disobedience,” etc.

4. Emancipation of Ryazan and Tver from submission to the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir.

In the 15th century, the princes of Tver and Ryazan were emancipated from submission to the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Grand Duchy of Vladimir could hold on menacingly and honestly only when the Grand Dukes were representatives of the Khan in Russia, enjoyed his authority and military assistance. But by the middle of the XIV century, the Horde had weakened, and the Grand Duke not only did not receive support from there, but was already in frequent conflict with the Tatar khans, acted as a leader in the struggle for liberation from Tatar domination. Under such conditions, he was forced to consolidate his power and authority by agreements with the princes. Treaties are valid only when they can be backed up by force at any time. But the Grand Duke of Moscow, although he appropriated the great reign of Vladimir, was not yet in such a position at the end of the XIV and the first quarter of the XV century. His forces were paralyzed not only by the Horde, which at times acted hostilely against him, but also by Lithuania, which at any moment was ready to support local princes against him. Under such conditions, the princes of Ryazan and Tver gradually began to occupy an independent position relative to the Grand Duke of All Russia. In an agreement concluded with Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich in 1402. The Ryazan prince Fedor Olgovich, although he recognized himself as a younger brother and undertook not to pester the Tatars, but for all that he negotiated for himself the right to send an ambassador (kilichei) with gifts to the Horde, the right to receive a Tatar ambassador for the good of a Christian with honor, notifying only about to everyone and about all the Horde news of Grand Duke Vasily. Even more significant is the agreement concluded with Vasily Dmitrievich of Tver by Prince Mikhail around 1398. In it, Mikhail is no longer called a younger brother, but simply a brother, and gives obligations equivalent to the obligations of his counterparty - to be one for the Tatars, Lithuania, Germans and Poles. This mutual obligation is developed in the agreement in the following way: if the tsar himself, or the Tatar army, or Lithuania, or the Germans, or the Poles, and the Grand Duke of Moscow and his brothers mount horses, go to the Moscow princes, then Mikhail will send two of his sons, and two brothers, leaving one son with him; if the Tatars, Lithuanians or Germans attack the Principality of Tver, then the Moscow prince is obliged to mount his horse himself and with his brothers. The Grand Duke, obliging the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren not to take love, that is, not to enter into agreements with Vitovt and Lithuania, at the same time, for himself and his brothers, undertook not to conclude agreements without the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren . The prince of Tver was given complete freedom in relations with the Horde: "And to the Horde, brother, and to the king, the path is clear, and your children, and your grandchildren, and your people." The strife that ensued in the family of the Moscow princes further contributed to the liberation from subjugation to them of the princes of Tver and Ryazan, who during this time were closely adjacent to the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

5. Subordination to the Grand Dukes of Moscow, Tver and Ryazan specific princes.

Thus, from the end of the 14th century and during the first half of the 15th century, in northeastern Russia there was already not one great reign, but three - Moscow, Tver and Ryazan. The great princedom of Vladimir was inextricably linked with the Moscow Grand Duke, as a result of which not only his relatives, but also the princes of other destinies, for example, Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, etc. were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Moscow. Only their relatives were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Tver and Ryazan. This subordination of relatives to the elder or grand prince is evidenced both by the agreements of these great princes with other great princes, and by the agreements of the great princes with younger relatives. Above, the obligation of the Grand Duke of Tver to Moscow, to send his sons and brothers to help, has already been given. This means that the younger appanage princes had to go to war on the orders of the elder. The Tver prince Boris Alexandrovich, concluding an agreement with Vitovt in 1427, directly stipulated: “To my uncles, brothers and my tribe - princes, be in obedience to me: I, the great prince Boris Alexandrovich, am free, whom I favor, whom I execute, and my Mr. grandfather, Grand Duke Vitovt, do not intervene; if any of them wants to surrender to the service of my master grandfather with a father, then my master grandfather with a father is not accepted; whoever of them goes to Lithuania will lose his fatherland - in his fatherland I am free, Grand Duke Boris Alexandrovich. It can be seen from the agreements of the grand dukes with specific appanages that the obedience of the latter was expressed in their obligation to mount horses and go to war when the grand duke himself mounted a horse or sent his sons or other younger brothers, and in the obligation to send a governor if the grand duke sent his governor The great princes received from the khans labels for the whole land, including the destinies of younger relatives. In 1412, the Grand Duke of Tverskoy Ivan Mikhailovich, to whom the appanage prince Yuri did not want to obey, said: “The label of the tsar is given over the whole land of Tver, and Yuri himself is the tsar of the given in the label.” Because of this, the specific princes could not surrender with their fatherlands into submission to other princes, they were obliged, collecting tribute according to the apportionment, to pay this tribute to the Grand Duke, and the Grand Duke was already taken to the Horde. Therefore, Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich the Dark and punished in his spiritual testament: “As soon as my children begin to live according to their destinies, then my princess and children will send scribes who will describe their destinies by kissing the cross, impose tribute on the plows and on the people, and according to this salary the princess and my children will give way to my son Ivan.

So, the specific princes of northeastern Russia in military and political terms were subordinate until the end of the XIV century to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, and from the end of the XIV century to the three Grand Dukes - Moscow-Vladimir, Tver and Ryazan, who were independent of each other and determined their relations contracts that vary depending on the circumstances of their conclusion. Some researchers, especially Sergeevich, are inclined to look in exactly the same way at the relationship of junior appanage princes to local great ones. They admit that the subordination of junior princes to elders was not any kind of order, state-legal custom, that de jure princes were all equal, and relations of subordination were established between them only by virtue of agreements, depending on the circumstances of each given moment. But such a concept of inter-princely relations of a specific era can hardly be accepted. If you delve into the content of the agreements between the senior princes and the junior ones, it is easy to see that the agreements are trying to guarantee such relations between them, which were considered normal, to confirm the state-legal antiquity.

6. Internal independence of destinies.

The subordination of the junior princes to the great ones was limited to an obligatory alliance against enemies, military assistance, and the contribution of the Tatar output to the grand duke's treasury, which in turn was due to the fact that the junior princes did not have the right to independent relations with the Horde. But in all other respects the younger princes were free and independent. The treaties guaranteed them the inviolability of their possessions and the full right to dispose of them, without breaking only their ties with the great reign. “You know your fatherland, and I know mine” - this is a common article in these agreements. The contracting parties usually pledged not to buy villages in each other's allotments, not to allow their own boyars to do this, not to give letters of commendation for possession in someone else's allotment, not to hold mortgages and quitrents, to give court and justice to their subjects at the suits of other princes or their subjects, not to send bailiffs to each other and not to judge courts. In these agreements, the boyars and free servants were usually provided with freedom of transition from one prince to another, and they also retained their estates in the inheritance of the abandoned prince. The princes pledged not to accept written or numerical people, as well as servants “under the court”, who owned lands: whoever of these servants transferred to the service of another prince, he lost his lands in the inheritance of the former prince. The junior appanage princes thus enjoyed complete independence in the internal administration of their principalities. They divided these principalities among their children, allocated “oprichnina” from them for living after their death to their princesses, bequeathed these principalities to relatives or foreign princes, etc.

7. Rapprochement of principalities with private estates.

We examined the mutual relations of the princes of northeastern Russia in a specific era. Let us now look at their relationship to their possessions, to the territories of the principalities and the population living on them. The princes, as we have seen, remained in northeastern Russia the only masters, masters in their principalities. As a result of the general impoverishment of the country and the impossibility of living on income from government, the princes took over a lot of land and fishing grounds in their principalities and developed their palace economy on a vast scale, for which they attracted a significant part of the rural population to various jobs and duties. The income from this farm became the main means of their maintenance, and the income from management was only a certain help. Having become a major master, the prince began to consider his entire principality as a huge economic institution, as an patrimony, and therefore began to dispose of it like all votchinniks, divide it among his heirs, allocate parts of it for a living to his wife and daughters, sometimes transfer it to sons-in-law, as it was, for example, in Yaroslavl, where Prince Vasily Vsevolodovich transferred the inheritance to his son-in-law Fyodor Rostislavich Smolensky. As a result of the multiplication of some branches of the princely family and the numerous redistributions of their possessions, in the course of time such microscopic principalities were obtained that were no larger than any boyar patrimony. Klyuchevsky, on the basis of evidence from the life of one saint who labored on Lake Kubenskoye, draws one of these principalities - Zaozerskoye in this form: its capital consisted of one princely court, located at the confluence of the Kubena River into Kubenskoye Lake, and not far from it stood "the whole of Chirkov" . You see in front of you, therefore, an ordinary landowner's estate, nothing more. Many of the principalities that formed in the Rostov region included villages and villages spread along small rivers, such as Ukhtoma, Kem, Andoga, Sit, Kurba, Yukhot, etc.

Numerous appanage princes began to look like votchinniki-landowners not only in terms of the size of their possessions, but also in terms of the nature of their activities. It was not the court and the administration as such that now began to fill their time, but economic concerns, economic affairs; and their usual employees and advisers were not the boyars, thinking about military affairs and the zemstvo system, but their clerks, to whom they entrusted certain branches of their vast economy. These were: the courtier, or butler, who was subordinate to all the arable lands of the prince with the entire population working on them, and then worthy boyars, administrators of roads, or aggregates of one or another category of economic lands, which are: the stolnik, who was in charge of all fishing and fishermen, a hunter, who was in charge of the animal "paths" and trappers, a beaver, a bowler, who was in charge of all the onboard lands and beekeepers, a stableman, a falconer. Since all these lands were not concentrated in one place, but were scattered throughout the principality, the departments of the worthy boyars were not territorial districts, but precisely the paths that cut the principalities in different directions. All these clerks of the prince constituted his usual council or council, with which he conferred not only on the economic affairs of his principality, but also on those that could be called state affairs. Both private owners and princes had not only freemen, but also slaves in their positions. Treasurers, keykeepers, courtiers, ambassadors, tyuns were very often from serfs, as can be seen from the spiritual letters of the princes, in which these persons were set free. Even in the management of the population, not involved in the work of the palace economy, the princes began to dominate purely possessory, economic interest. The territories of the specific principalities were administratively divided into counties, with central cities, and counties into volosts. For court and management, the princes sent governors to the districts, to the volosts of the volosts or their tiuns. The governor, who sat in the central city of the county, repaired the court and the council in all cases in the suburban volost, and in cases of murder, robbery and red-handed tatba - within the entire county; volostels or tiuns repaired the court and administration in the volosts in all cases, with the exception of those that were subject to the court of the governor. Under the governors and volosts, there were executive officials - right-handers and closers, bailiffs, podvoisky. The main goal of this administration was not so much to ensure public order and individual rights, but to extract income and maintain servants. The viceroys and volostels repaired the court quite formally, without entering into an internal assessment of the evidence. The court was created, so to speak, by itself, according to the established rules of old, the observance of which was monitored by the court men from the local society, and the judges sat and looked at their profit, that is, from whom and how much to take court fines and fees. Half of these incomes were usually received by princes, and half went to judges. The governors and volostels, in addition, received fodder in kind and money from the population - entry, Christmas, Great and Peter's. The princes sent their boyars and servants to these positions to feed themselves, and therefore did not allow them to stay in their positions for a long time in order to enable all their servants to stay in these profitable places. Looking at the position of governors and volosts mainly from a financial point of view, the princes, therefore, easily issued the so-called non-conviction letters that freed the population of boyar and church estates from the court of governors and volosts and subordinated it to the court of the owners. It was the same material favor to the owners, as well as sending boyars and servants for feeding. The owners of such privileged estates themselves were usually exempted from the court of governors and volosts. They were judged by the prince himself or his introduced boyar, i.e. specifically authorized to do so.

8. Elements of statehood in specific order.

Combining into one whole the features that characterize the relationship of the princes to each other, to the territory and the population, some researchers, especially Chicherin in "Experiments in the History of Russian Law", come to the denial of state principles in specific order. According to Chicherin, only private law, and not state law, dominated in specific life. The princes in their destinies did not distinguish between the grounds on which they owned the cities and the entire territory of the appanage, on the one hand, and some small item of their use, on the other hand, like utensils and clothing, and in their spiritual testaments indifferently blessed their sons with cities and volosts, icons, chains, hats and fur coats. Inter-princely relations were governed by treaties, and the treaty was a fact of private law. Therefore, neither in individual destinies, nor in the entire Russian land, there was either state power, or state concepts and relations among the princes. They were not in the relationship of the princes to the population: the princes were the owners of the land, and they were connected with free residents only by contractual relations: these residents remained in the principalities as long as they wanted, and the prince could not force them to stay, and their departure was not considered as treason. But such a characteristic of the specific system, for all its brightness, suffers from one-sidedness. Gradovsky in his "History of Local Government in Russia" rightly pointed out that the princes in their wills, placing cities, volosts, their villages and movables next to each other, transfer various items of possession to their heirs. Villages, for example, and things they transfer entirely as full property, and in volosts only income and management rights. This serves as proof for Gradovsky that in the specific period, there were concepts that came out of the sphere of civil law and had the character of state concepts. In addition to this, it can be added that the princes were not connected with all the free population of the appanages by contractual relations. This applied only to the boyars and free servants, for whom the princes negotiated the right of free passage in contracts. But the peasants, written or numerical people who paid tribute to the Tatars and carried various duties to the princes, the princes kept in their destinies and pledged not to call them back from each other. In view of this, it is still better to recognize the destinies of the northeastern princes as hereditary property as political rulers, and not private ones, although it cannot be denied that in terms of the type of administration and life, in terms of prevailing interests, this property came close to a simple estate. Then, in the relations of the princes to each other, one can notice the beginning of subordination due to the well-known political right of the elders in relation to the younger ones. The treaties of the princes did not always re-establish relations between them, but quite often only sanctioned customary law already in force. This political right determined princely relations beyond treaties. All this in total allows us to speak only about a certain mixture of state and private law in a specific era, and not about the replacement of state law by private law.

9. Features of feudalism in the specific system of northeastern Russia in the XIII-XV centuries; fragmentation of state power.

So, the specific principalities, both in size and in the nature of their possession and use, came close to the large estates of private owners and church institutions, and on the other hand, large possessory estates came close to the principalities, because their owners acquired political rights over the population of their estates. Thus, in the political system of northeastern Russia, the most characteristic features of medieval feudalism appeared - the fragmentation of state power and its combination with land ownership. In addition to this, it can be pointed out that in our country, as in the West, with the division of state power, a whole hierarchy of sovereigns was formed, differing from each other in the number of their supreme rights. The highest sovereign of Russia, from whom the Russian princes received their investiture, corresponding to the emperors, western and eastern, was the Tsar of the Horde, who considered the entire Russian land as his ulus, as one of his possessions. Below him were the great princes - Vladimir-Moscow, Tver and Ryazan, corresponding to the Western European kings, who received from him labels for great reigns with all their territories; under the great princes were the appanage princes, corresponding to the Western European dukes, subordinate to the great ones in some respects, and even lower were the landowning boyars and church institutions, who, as we have seen, enjoyed state rights of court and taxation in their estates. However, those rights that constitute sovereignty - are independent, not derivative - had only the first three categories of sovereigns. Sovereignty was divided between the khan and the great and specific princes. Only these sovereigns had the right to diplomatic relations (specific - limited), the right to beat coins, etc. Even the smallest princes used the right to beat coins. The Tver Museum keeps coins with the inscriptions: Denga Gorodesk., Gorodetsko, Gorodensko. This Gorodensky or Gorodetsky money was believed to have been minted by some of the most insignificant Tver specific princes, namely the princes of Staritsky or Gorodensky. Other non-grand princely silver and copper money (pools) are also known: Kashinsky, Mikulinsky, Spassky and others. As for private landowners and church institutions, they have not achieved sovereign rights in Russia, which their Western brethren acquired for themselves. As you know, in the West, many feudal lords usurped sovereign rights for themselves, called sovereigns by the grace of God, minted coins, conducted diplomatic relations, etc. e. The latest researcher of the Russian appanage system Pavlov-Silvansky gave the following explanation to this difference between our orders and the orders of the West: “In our country, just as in the West, the earth had to uncontrollably disintegrate, be divided into small independent worlds. But at the time of the imminent division of the country, we had a lot of princes-pretenders with hereditary sovereign rights. They have replaced in our country the western feudal lords who seized sovereign rights: division from above prevented division from below; the reign of the earth warned her charisma. In this explanation, the named historian, in my opinion, correctly noted the essence of the matter, although he did not finish it, because this did not agree with his other views. The princes became territorial sovereigns in Russia before the boyar landownership was created, which developed already under the protection and dependence of the princely power. Meanwhile, Pavlov-Silvansky, sharing the theory of "zemstvo boyars", thinks that boyar landownership was created in our country earlier, or in any case independently of princely power.

10. The origin of feudal relations in Russia.

How, then, was created in Russia, too, an order close to Western European feudalism? In the previous lecture, one of the main reasons that gave rise to this order was noted, the dominance of natural agriculture, which was established in Russia with the arrival of the Tatars, in connection with the depletion of people's capital. This circumstance, as we have seen, forced the princes to deal mainly with the business that the landowners - rural owners are engaged in, because otherwise the princes had nothing to live on; the princes thus approached the private landowners. On the other hand, having no money to distribute salaries to their servants and church institutions, the princes willingly sacrificed their rights over the population of their estates in their favor, granted them immunities, various benefits and exemptions, thus bringing them closer to the sovereigns. But is it possible to dwell on this reason alone in explaining the origin of Russian feudalism? Economic historians tend to be content with this one reason and ignore others that have been put forward by historians of law and culture. We cannot ignore these reasons of an internal, spiritual nature. What forced the princes to divide the territory of the state into appanages? Economic needs, the need for intensive agricultural labor, the economists will answer us. But for this, let us tell them, it was not at all necessary to divide the state power itself. It was enough for the eldest prince to place himself on the destinies of the younger ones, retaining all his state rights over the population of the destinies and giving the younger princes only the economic exploitation of the land, in extreme cases, governorship in the destinies. If the princes divided the state power itself, then this was nevertheless due to their political underdevelopment, from their lack of the view that the highest state power, in its essence, cannot be the subject of a family division. Dividing state power, the princes obviously looked at it as a subject of private ownership. This partly explains the fact that they shared it with their boyars. To welcome the boyar for his service, there was no need to give him immunity without fail. In order to grant what gave immunity, in essence, it was enough to make the boyar a governor or volost in his estate, grant him princely income and provide some benefits to the population of his estate. But the princes usually went further and forever renounced their rights in relation to the population of such estates, obviously not appreciating these rights not only from an economic, but also from a political and legal point of view. Therefore, the opinion of those historians who deduced feudalism from the general state of culture of a certain era, not only economic, material, but also political, legal, and spiritual, seems more correct.

11. Pawning and patronage.

On the basis of the above-described order and in connection with the general conditions of culture in Russia, phenomena developed that have an analogy in the phenomena of the feudal era in the West. To such phenomena it is necessary, first of all, to attribute staking. Since the difference between the sovereign and the private owner in his state was obscured in practice and in the public consciousness, then naturally the concept of the subject should have become muddied. Free persons began to consider themselves entitled to give themselves into citizenship not only to numerous princes, but also to private individuals and institutions, to pledge, as it was said then, not only for different princes, but also for boyars, lords and monasteries, if this promised them any benefit. . And this benefit seemed all the time, because the princely power, weakened by division and specific fragmentation, was often unable to provide the individual with the necessary protection and means of subsistence. In Russia, therefore, the same thing began to happen as in Western Europe in the era of the weakening of royal power, when the weak sought protection by commanding powerful landowners and church institutions. The analogy in this respect went so far that in Russia, as well as in the West, they began to be mortgaged with estates.

It was said above that the boyar estates were under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, and not the one whom their owner served at that time, they were dragged by court and tribute by land and water. But this rule has been broken over time. The owners began to mortgage for the princes, to whom they entered the service with estates, just as in the West the owners acted with their fiefs, which were once also under the rule of territorial sovereigns. This created a terrible confusion of relations, which the princes tried to counteract with treaties. In these treaties, they confirmed that the boyar patrimonies should remain under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, pull court and tribute over land and water, that the princes should not keep villages in other people's destinies, buy and accept for free, should not give letters of commendation to someone else's lot, judge there, and take tribute and in general "do not intervene in someone else's lot with any deeds." But by all indications, the princes did not succeed in eradicating this phenomenon, and the transfers of owners with estates to the citizenship of other princes continued. Such transitions are ascertained from sources even at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century. So, in 1487, a certain Ivashko Maksimovich, the son of Looking, beat Grand Duchess Sofya with his brow "and with his patrimony, with half the village of Looking, which is in Murom in the Kuzemsky camp, with everything that was drawn to his half." Bearing in mind such cases, Ivan III wrote in his spiritual letter of 1504: “and the boyars and children of the boyars of Yaroslavl with their estates and with purchases from my son Vasily cannot leave anyone anywhere.” In 1507, the well-known abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, Joseph Sanin, who founded his monastery in the estate of Prince Boris Vasilyevich of Volotsk and with his assistance, quarreled with his prince, “refused his sovereign to a great state”, under the high hand of Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich. When Joseph was reproached for this, he cited precedent. “In our years,” he said, “Prince Vasily Yaroslavich had a Sergius monastery in his patrimony, and Prince Alexander, Fedorovich, Yaroslavsky had a Kamensky monastery in his patrimony, and the princes of the Zasekinskys had a monastery in their patrimony of the Most Pure Ones on Tolza”; and so the abbots of these monasteries browed Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich, and he "took those monasteries into his state, but did not order those princes to intercede in those monasteries for nothing." And in ancient times, - remarks on this occasion the compiler of the life of St. Joseph, - "from lesser offenses to greater resorted." Individuals were pledged not only for the princes, but also for the boyars, for the lord and monasteries. Thanks to this, the rich boyars had entire detachments of servants who served them at court and in war, and who thus represent a complete analogy with the Western European subvassals. Boyarin Rodion Nestorovich, having come from Kyiv to serve the Grand Duke Ivan Danilovich Kalita, brought with him 1,600 men of the squad. Then the noble Moscow boyar Akinf Gavrilovich Shuba, offended by the honor given to the visiting boyar and not wanting to be under Rodion in the smaller ones, went to the service of Mikhail Tverskoy and took 1,300 servants with him. Ivan III, having taken Novgorod, first of all dissolved the large princely and boyar courts in Novgorod and distributed estates to the princely and boyar servants. But in the Principality of Tver, servants who served with their estates to the boyars existed even under Grozny. As in the West, many service people in a special era were pledged to us for the clergy - the metropolitan, bishops and monasteries. The metropolitan and the bishops had boyar children in the later era of the Muscovite state, until the very beginning of the 18th century.

If in specific time, therefore, there was no idea of ​​allegiance, in our sense of the word, then there is nothing surprising if individuals were given under the protection of the prince of the territory where they lived - to their own sovereign. This fact is impossible at the present time, in the present state, where it is assumed that the sovereign is the same patron for everyone. But at that time they did not think so, and therefore many persons were given under the special protection of the prince, in munde-burdium regis, as they said in the West, they received the right to sue only before him, etc.

12. Transfers of boyars and servants; salaries and food.

Due to the obscurity of the idea of ​​allegiance between the princes and their boyars and servants, the same contractual relations that were established between them at a time when the princes were not territorial owners and the boyars were not landowners continued to be preserved. This or that boyar and servant served the prince, not because he was obliged to serve him as the sovereign of the country, but because he "ordered" him to serve, finding it profitable for himself. And this is true both with respect to the boyars and servants, and with respect to the settled ones, for the latter could always leave their prince. The right of the boyars and servants to freely move was undoubtedly a legacy of the former retinue life of Kievan Rus. But if it lasted so long in the specific era, already when the boyars were settled, it was only because the idea of ​​allegiance did not become clear in this era.

On the basis of contractual relations between princes and boyars and servants, phenomena developed that corresponded to the Western European distribution of beneficiaries. Boyars and servants came to one or another prince to serve, beat him with a forehead (Western European homagium), and he gave them a salary, beneficium, which they received as long as they served. In the west, most of the land was distributed as benefices. And among us, the princes distributed palace lands to some servants, plots of their domains, which were in charge of the court, corresponding to the western majordoms, palatine counts, etc. In the spiritual charter of 1388, “villages and suburbs” are listed for the servants. Another charter mentions "villages - the prince's salary", the time of the award of which dates back to the beginning of the 15th century. And just as in the west, the princes took these lands from their servants if they drove away from them. About one of these servants, who conditionally owned the village granted to him, about Boris Vorkov, Ivan Kalita says in his spiritual 1328: “even if my son whom I serve, the village will be after him; if you don’t have to serve, the village will be taken away. In agreements between themselves, the princes agreed on these servants: and whoever leaves their inheritances ... is deprived of the land. But due to the peculiarities of our country, land was not the main object of distribution of beneficiaries for a long time. There was plenty of land everywhere, it had little value for the princes, and the boyars and servants borrowed a lot of it without any conditions, according to the tacit or public recognition of the princes. The developed patrimonial boyar land tenure for a long time excluded the need for the distribution of land as a beneficiary or, as we said, estates. In Russia, at a specific time, another form of beneficiation was predominantly developed - the distribution of posts as a salary for service, feeding, that is, not fief-terre, but fief-office. Therefore, in the letters of our princes we meet such expressions: “I granted you to the nursery for feeding for their departure to us,” that is, for entering the service; or: “I granted Ivan Grigoryevich Ryla ... the parish of Luza (that is, the volost to Luza) for their departure to us in feeding. And you, all the people of that volost, honor them and listen, and they know you, and judge and go to order your tyun with you, and have income according to the mandate list. Feeding in the volosts became a common sign of free boyars and servants. "And the free servants will, who was in feeding and argument with our father and with us." These feedings in the west, as we know, became hereditary fiefs: there the dukes, our governors, counts, our governors, vice-graphs or viscounts, our volosts, became hereditary owners of their posts and the income associated with them. But in our country, feedings did not become not only hereditary, but even lifelong, they were usually given for years and generally for short periods. The reason for this was the poverty of our princes, who did not have the opportunity to feed all their servants at once, but had to observe a certain queue in this regard, and, moreover, the lack of connection between official feeding and land ownership. In the west, in addition to income, feeders received a certain allotment of land for the position, and this allotment, becoming, like all fiefs, over time, hereditary, dragged along the position itself. In our specific era, as already mentioned, the boyars and servants needed little land, provided with patrimonial land tenure, and therefore we did not develop phenomena similar to the above.

13. Features of feudalism in the views, language and life of a specific era.

From all that has been said, it can be seen that in Russian antiquity of specific time there were many features that made it related to Western European feudalism. We meet here the same institutions, the same attitudes and views as in the feudal West, sometimes in full development, sometimes in less definite features. In our letters there are phrases that are, as it were, a literal translation of the corresponding Latin texts. For the most important feudal institutions in Russian antiquity, there were special terms corresponding to Western European ones. Commandants were called mortgages among us; to designate a feudal commendation, the words were used to set, to be laid. The Russian warrior, like the German one, was called a husband; the boyar, just like the vassal, is the servant of the master of the grand duke. We had a special word for beneficiation, salary; this word was as widespread among us as in the West the word benefice, flax. The land granted to conditional possession (estate), and the position, and immunity benefits were also called salaries. With the similarity of the socio-political system, the similarity of life is also noticed. The spirit of discord, singularity, freedom and independence hovers in Russian society of the specific era, as well as in Western feudal society. Feudal freedom and independence led us, just as in the West, to violence and arbitrariness, especially on the part of the boyars, who often undertook robbery raids on each other. A characteristic feature of the Western feudal lords was their military profession, their military spirit. This trait was expressed in chivalry. Our boyars and princes have largely lost the chivalrous features that were characteristic of their predecessors and so vividly depicted in the Tale of Igor's Campaign. However, they were all warriors. During the constant appanage civil strife, all of them often had to fight at the head of detachments of their servants and people. Spiritual lords did not go on a campaign themselves, but in return for themselves they sent their governors who led their servants. One of the typical features of Western feudalism is, in the usual view, a fortified castle with loopholes, ditches, and drawbridges. In specific Russia there were no stone castles. But stone castles were replaced by fortified towns on the hills, on the elevated bank of the river, or on the ancient Meryan barrows. These princely towns and kremls satisfied the same need as the western feudal castles. Our spiritual masters also erected fortifications. Monasteries were built in the same way as princely kremlins, usually near a lake or a river. Both were surrounded by walls of uniform architecture with towers, loopholes, and gates. The boyars of the 14th-15th centuries did not have such fortifications, but each boyar estate, even in later times, in the 17th century, was an armed camp surrounded by a palisade. So, in this case, the difference between Russia and Western Europe was not so much qualitative as quantitative.

Western European feudalism generally went much further in its development than Russian feudalism. Russia did not develop that feudal system, those strictly defined legal institutions, customs, concepts, that everyday ritual that can be observed in Western countries in the Middle Ages. Russian feudalism in its development did not go beyond the primary, rudimentary forms, which failed to harden and consolidate. The reason for this is the unsteady social ground on which it was created, the mobility of the population in a continuously colonizing country, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, intense pressure from outside, which awakened the instincts of national self-preservation and called to life and creativity the state principle in the real, true sense of this the words.

Literature.

    V. I. Sergeevich. Veche and prince (Russian legal antiquities. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1893).

    B. N. CHICHERIN Experiments on the history of Russian law. M., 1858.

    V. O. Klyuchevsky. Boyar Duma of ancient Russia. M., 1909. Ed. 4th.

    N. P. Pavlov-Silvansky. Feudalism in ancient Russia. SPb., 1907. Works. T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1910.

Termination of the activities of city councils. The dependence of the princes on the Tatar Khan; order of princely possession. The power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir until the end of the XIV century. Emancipation of Ryazan and Tver from submission to the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir.

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SUMMARY ON THE TOPICPOLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF NORTH-EASTERN RUSSIAIN A SPECIFIC EPOCHPlan 1. Termination of the activity of city councils.2. The dependence of the princes on the Tatar Khan; order of princely possession.3. The power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir until the end of the XIV century.4. Emancipation of Ryazan and Tver from submission to the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir.5. Subordination to the Grand Dukes of Moscow, Tver and Ryazan specific princes.6. Internal independence of appanages.7. Rapprochement of principalities with private estates.8. Elements of statehood in specific order.9. Features of feudalism in the specific system of northeastern Russia in the XIII-XV centuries; fragmentation of state power.10. The origin of feudal relations in Russia.11. Mortgage and patronage.12. Transitions of boyars and servants; salaries and feeding.13. Features of feudalism in the views, language and way of life of specific era.14. Literature. 1. Termination of the activities of city councils. The Tatar invasion, with all the consequences that accompanied it, accelerated the very process life, which led to a decline in significance, and then to the final cessation of the activities of city councils in northeastern Russia. Already in the second half of the XII century, in the era of intensive settlement of the region by colonists from the south, the princes of northeastern Russia showed a tendency to become the masters of the country, its masters as its creators and organizers. Let us recall that Andrei Bogolyubsky was already an autocrat in the Suzdal land and did not want to know either his boyars or the people's council. Andrei, as you know, became a victim of his domestic politics and died from a conspiracy of those dissatisfied with his autocracy. After his death, the old veche cities - Rostov and Suzdal - tried to become masters in the country, to plant princes of their own free will and on their own. But they failed to achieve this, because they did not have strong, ancient ties with the rest of the population, who had recently arrived, planted on the land by the princes-colonizers, and above all with the suburbs of Suzdal land. Vladimirians refused to recognize the princes nominated by the Rostov and Suzdal people. In the internecine struggle that followed, the old veche towns suffered a complete defeat. In the Rostov-Suzdal land, therefore, already before the Tatars, the prince became the master of the situation, and the veche receded into the background. The very composition of the population in the Rostov-Suzdal land should have favored the strengthening of the prince at the expense of the veche. This population consisted of inhabitants of small villages and villages scattered over great distances. There were few crowded, large settlements, commercial and industrial cities, and therefore the veche of the main cities could not acquire the dominance that they received in other regions of the Russian land. The Tatars completed this political evolution of northeastern Russia. Cities during their invasion were subjected to terrible ruin, impoverished and impoverished. Due to the decline of crafts and trade, they could not recover for a long time to any significant extent. Under such conditions, their inhabitants had to think more about their daily bread, about tomorrow, and not about politics. With the assertion of Tatar dominion over Russia, the appointment and change of princes began to depend on the will of the khan. Therefore, the most important function of the vecha, the calling and expulsion of princes, also fell by itself. If a vecha was to be held, it was only in cases of emergency, and, moreover, in the form of a mutiny. “God deliver,” writes, for example, a chronicler under the year 1262, “from the fierce languor of the Basurman people of the Rostov land: put fury into the hearts of the peasants, who do not tolerate the violence of the filthy, deigning forever and driving them out of the cities, from Rostov, from Volodimer, from Suzdal, from Yaroslavl, they are okupahuting the repentance of the unruly tribute ”(Lavrent. ). Or under the year 1289: “Prince Dmitry Borisovich is sitting in Rostov. Multiply then the Tatars in Rostov, and the citizens created a veche and drove them out, and plundered their property ”(Voskres.), etc. So, of the two forces that led society in Kievan Rus, in the northeastern specific era, one remained - prince. 2. The dependence of the princes on the Tatar Khan; order of princely possession. But this political force, for all that, did not become independent. In 1243, Grand Duke Yaroslav Vsevolodovich went to Batu, who, according to the chronicle, received him with honor and said to him: “Yaroslav! Be older than all the prince in the Russian language. The following year, other princes went to Batu “about their fatherland”: “I honored Batu ace with a worthy honor and let me go, judging them, someone to my fatherland” (Lavrent.). The same order continued after. As a rule, the khans approved as both the great and the local prince the one who had the right to do so on ancestral or patrimonial grounds that were in force in the then customary princely law. As a result of this, in the 13th century, the seniority of the princes sat in turn on the Grand Duchess of Vladimir: Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, his brother Svyatoslav, son Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky, another son - Yaroslav of Tverskoy and the third - Vasily Kostroma, then the eldest grandson Dimitri Alexandrovich, the next Andrey Alexandrovich, then Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tverskoy. Thus, in the succession of the senior grand-ducal table, approximately the old Kievan custom was observed. But in replacing all other princely tables, as was already indicated in due time, a new, patrimonial order was established - the transition from fathers to sons, and in the absence of such, to the closest relatives. Thus, for example, in Rostov, after Konstantin Vsevolodovich, his eldest son Vasilko reigned, who was succeeded by his son Boris, etc., in Ryazan, after Ingvar Igorevich, his son Oleg reigned, then his grandson Roman Olgovich, great-grandson Fedor Romanovich, from whom no offspring remained, why his brother Konstantin Romanovich began to reign in Ryazan, etc. The khans for the most part approved the reign of the one who followed it according to custom. But with all that, the khan's sovereignty had not a formal, but a purely real meaning. The princes paid the khan an exit from their principalities and gifts for shortcuts to reign. Therefore, in the XIV century, the khans began to give the great reign of Vladimir not to those princes to whom it followed in order of seniority, but to those who knew how to ask them again, to give them more gifts. Thus, for example, in 1341, the sixteen-year-old Moscow prince Semyon Ivanovich left the Horde for a great reign, “and all the Russian princes were given under his hand, and gray-haired on the table in Volodimer” (Resurrection). In 1359, the Khan gave the label for the great reign to the young Dimitry Ivanovich Donskoy, whose boyars managed to outbid this label, which was also begging for the prince of Suzdal Dimitry Konstantinovich. At the end of the 14th century, labels began to be bought from the khan not only for the great reign of Vladimir, but also for destinies. Thus, for example. The Moscow prince Vasily Dmitrievich bought the label for the principality of Nizhny Novgorod, which had been given to his stepfather, Boris Konstantinovich. In this case, the khan in relation to the princes began to play the same role that the councils of the main cities in Kievan Rus played, planting the princes all the time without paying attention to their family accounts.3. The power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir until the end of the XIV century. What mutual relations were established under the Tatars between the princes of northeastern Russia? Until the end of the 14th century, the great princes of Vladimir had a certain power over all other princes, although neither the content of this power nor its extent is quite definite from the sources. Chronicles muffledly say that other princes were "at hand" of the great princes. Above, evidence from the annals was cited that all the Russian princes were "under the arms" of the Grand Duke Semyon. It is written about Dimitri Donskoy that he “summoned all the princes of the Russian lands, which exist under his authority” (Voskres.). The subjugation of the princes can be traced in the facts only in the fact that the specific princes during the all-Russian campaigns became under the banner of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Grand Duke of Vladimir, by all indications, was a representative of all Russian princes before the khan, was originally the only prince who knew the Horde, that is, he went to petition the khan for the interests of the Russian land, received orders from him, etc. All these special rights and advantages in connection with the possession of the Vladimir district were the reason for the struggle of the princes of different lines for the great reign of Vladimir. The last struggle for the great reign of Vladimir took place under Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy. In 1367, Prince Dimitri Ivanovich laid a stone Kremlin in Moscow and began to bring all the princes under his will, among other things, Prince Mikhail Alexandrevich of Tverskoy. Michael, not wanting to obey, turned for help to his son-in-law Olgerd, the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Several times, Lithuanian troops entered the Moscow possessions, subjected them to devastation. Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich launched against them not only the regiments of the princes of the Moscow appanages, but also the Ryazan regiments of Oleg Ivanovich, the Pronsky prince Vladimir Dmitrievich. Not having time in his business with Lithuanian help, Mikhail in 1371 went to the Horde and returned from there with a label for the great reign of Vladimir and the khan's ambassador Sarykhozha. But Demetrius did not let Michael into the great reign, gave Sarykhozh as a gift and then went to the Horde himself, gave the Khan, the Khansh and all the princes there, and again received a label for the great reign. Mikhail, for his part, again went to Lithuania and incited Olgerd against Moscow. In the struggle that followed, Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich took his father-in-law Dimitri Konstantinovich of Suzdal with him to the battle field with his two brothers and son, cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, three princes of Rostov, the prince of Smolensk, two princes of Yaroslavl, prince Belozersky, Kashinsky, Molozhsky, Starodubsky, Bryansk, Novosilsky, Obolensky and Tarussky. The struggle ended with Mikhail Alexandrovich pleading himself the “younger brother” of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, undertaking not to look for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir under Dimitri, to mount a horse and go to war when the Grand Duke himself or his brother Vladimir Andreevich mounts, or to send their governors if they send a governor: he undertook to jointly determine his relations with the Tatars, to give them tribute or not to give them, to fight with them if it comes to war, to fight together against Lithuania, to live with Veliky Novgorod and Torzhok like old times. All these the details of the struggle for the Grand Duke of Vladimir, as well as the agreement between Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich and Mikhail of Tver, which ensured his obedience to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, show what the power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir consisted of. This power was military-political. Local princes were obliged to go to war at the call of the Grand Duke, not to conduct any independent foreign policy. The significance of the Grand Duke of Vladimir then appears quite clearly in the ensuing struggle of Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy with the Tatars and Ryazan. In 1380, Demetrius gathered a huge army of 150 thousand people against Mamai. This rati included regiments not only of Moscow appanages, but also of assistant princes of Rostov, Yaroslavl, Belozersky; and the prince of Tver sent his troops with his nephew, Ivan Vsevolodovich Kholmsky. Oleg Ryazansky, out of fear of the Tatars, did not join the Grand Duke, after the Kulikovo defeat of the Tatars, had to flee to Lithuania for fear of reprisals, and Dimitri Ivanovich took Ryazan from him for disobeying Oleg. When they then reconciled and concluded an agreement, Oleg recognized himself as the “younger brother” of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, pledged to be at the same time against Lithuania, and is in the same relationship with the Horde as the Moscow prince. So, Oleg became to Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy in the same subordinate position as Mikhail Tverskoy. To characterize this situation, one can cite some data from the agreement with Dmitry Ivanovich of his cousin, Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, to which princes Oleg and Mikhail were equated: “You, my younger brother, Prince Vladimir, keep my great prince under me honestly and menacingly; you, my younger brother, to serve without disobedience,” etc. 4. Emancipation of Ryazan and Tver from submission to the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir. In the 15th century, the princes of Tver and Ryazan were emancipated from submission to the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The great princedom of Vladimir could hold on menacingly and honestly only when the grand dukes were representatives of the khan in Russia, used his authority and military assistance. But by the middle of the XIV century, the Horde had weakened, and the Grand Duke not only did not receive support from there, but was already in frequent conflict with the Tatar khans, acted as a leader in the struggle for liberation from Tatar domination. Under such conditions, he was forced to consolidate his power and authority by agreements with the princes. Treaties are valid only when they can be backed up by force at any time. But the Grand Duke of Moscow, although he appropriated the great reign of Vladimir, was not yet in such a position at the end of the XIV and the first quarter of the XV century. His forces were paralyzed not only by the Horde, which at times acted hostilely against him, but also by Lithuania, which at any moment was ready to support local princes against him. Under such conditions, the princes of Ryazan and Tver gradually began to occupy an independent position relative to the Grand Duke of All Russia. In an agreement concluded with Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich in 1402. The Ryazan prince Fedor Olgovich, although he recognized himself as a younger brother and undertook not to pester the Tatars, but for all that he negotiated for himself the right to send an ambassador (kilichei) with gifts to the Horde, the right to receive a Tatar ambassador for the good of a Christian with honor, notifying only about to everyone and about all the Horde news of Grand Duke Vasily. Even more significant is the agreement concluded with Vasily Dmitrievich of Tver by Prince Mikhail around 1398. In it, Mikhail is no longer called a younger brother, but simply a brother, and gives obligations equivalent to the obligations of his counterparty - to be for one against the Tatars, Lithuania, Germans and Poles. This mutual obligation is developed in the agreement in the following way: if the tsar himself, or the Tatar army, or Lithuania, or the Germans, or the Poles, and the Grand Duke of Moscow and his brothers mount horses, go to the Moscow princes, then Mikhail will send two of his sons, and two brothers, leaving one son with him; if the Tatars, Lithuanians or Germans attack the Principality of Tver, then the Moscow prince is obliged to mount his horse himself and with his brothers. The Grand Duke, obliging the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren not to take love, that is, not to enter into agreements with Vitovt and Lithuania, at the same time, for himself and his brothers, undertook not to conclude agreements without the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren . The prince of Tver was given complete freedom in relations with the Horde: "And to the Horde, brother, and to the king, the path is clear, and your children, and your grandchildren, and your people." The strife that ensued in the family of the Moscow princes further contributed to the liberation from subjugation to them of the princes of Tver and Ryazan, who during this time were closely adjacent to the Grand Duke of Lithuania. 5. Subordination to the Grand Dukes of Moscow, Tver and Ryazan specific princes Thus, from the end of the 14th century and during the first half of the 15th century, in northeastern Russia there was already not one great reign, but three - Moscow, Tver and Ryazan. The great princedom of Vladimir was inextricably linked with the Moscow Grand Duke, as a result of which not only his relatives, but also the princes of other destinies, for example, Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, etc. were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Moscow. Only their relatives were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Tver and Ryazan. This subordination of relatives to the elder or grand prince is evidenced both by the agreements of these great princes with other great princes, and by the agreements of the great princes with younger relatives. Above, the obligation of the Grand Duke of Tver to Moscow, to send his sons and brothers to help, has already been given. This means that the younger appanage princes had to go to war on the orders of the elder. Prince Boris Alexandrovich of Tver, concluding an agreement with Vitovt in 1427, directly stipulated: “To my uncles, brothers and my tribe - princes, be in obedience to me: I, the great prince Boris Alexandrovich, am free, whom I favor, whom I execute, and my master grandfather, Grand Duke Vitovt, do not intervene; if any of them wants to surrender to the service of my master grandfather with a father, then my master grandfather with a father is not accepted; whoever of them goes to Lithuania will lose his fatherland, - in his fatherland I am free, Grand Duke Boris Alexandrovich. It can be seen from the agreements of the grand dukes with specific appanages that the obedience of the latter was expressed in their obligation to mount horses and go to war when the grand duke himself mounted a horse or sent his sons or other younger brothers, and in the obligation to send a governor if the grand duke will send his commanders. The great princes received from the khans labels for the whole land, including the destinies of younger relatives. In 1412, the Grand Duke of Tverskoy Ivan Mikhailovich, to whom the appanage prince Yuri did not want to obey, said: “The label of the tsar is given over the whole land of Tver, and Yuri himself is the tsar of the given in the label.” Because of this, the specific princes could not surrender with their fatherlands into submission to other princes, they were obliged, collecting tribute according to the apportionment, to pay this tribute to the Grand Duke, and the Grand Duke was already taken to the Horde. Therefore, Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich the Dark and punished in his spiritual testament: “As soon as my children begin to live according to their destinies, then my princess and children will send scribes who will describe their destinies by kissing the cross, impose tribute on the plows and on the people, and according to this salary the princess and my children will give way to my son Ivan. So, the specific princes of northeastern Russia in military and political terms were subordinate until the end of the XIV century to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, and from the end of the XIV century to the three Grand Dukes - Moscow-Vladimir, Tver and Ryazan, who were independent of each other and determined their relations with contracts that varied depending on the circumstances of their conclusion. Some researchers, especially Sergeevich, are inclined to look in exactly the same way at the relationship of junior appanage princes to local great ones. They admit that the subordination of junior princes to elders was not any kind of order, state-legal custom, that de jure princes were all equal, and relations of subordination were established between them only by virtue of agreements, depending on the circumstances of each given moment. But such a concept of inter-princely relations of a specific era can hardly be accepted. If you delve into the content of the agreements between the senior princes and the junior ones, it is easy to see that the agreements are trying to guarantee such relations between them, which were considered normal, to confirm the state-legal antiquity. 6. Internal independence of destinies. The subordination of the junior princes to the great ones was limited to an obligatory alliance against enemies, military assistance, and the contribution of the Tatar output to the grand duke's treasury, which in turn was due to the fact that the junior princes did not have the right to independent relations with the Horde. But in all other respects the younger princes were free and independent. The treaties guaranteed them the inviolability of their possessions and the full right to dispose of them, without breaking only their ties with the great reign. “You know your fatherland, and I know mine” - this is the usual article in these agreements. The contracting parties usually pledged not to buy villages in each other’s destinies, not to allow their own boyars to do this, not to give letters of commendation for possession in someone else’s inheritance, not to hold mortgages and quitrents, to give court and justice to their subjects at the suits of other princes or their subjects, not to send bailiffs to each other and not to judge courts. In these agreements, the boyars and free servants were usually provided with freedom of transition from one prince to another, and they also retained their estates in the inheritance of the abandoned prince. The princes pledged not to accept written or numerical people, as well as servants “under the court”, who owned lands: whoever of these servants transferred to the service of another prince, he lost his lands in the inheritance of the former prince. The junior appanage princes thus enjoyed complete independence in the internal administration of their principalities. They divided these principalities among their children, allocated “oprichnina” from them for living after their death to their princesses, bequeathed these principalities to relatives or foreign princes, etc.7. Rapprochement of principalities with private estates. We examined the mutual relations of the princes of northeastern Russia in a specific era. Let us now look at their relationship to their possessions, to the territories of the principalities and the population living on them. The princes, as we have seen, remained in northeastern Russia the only masters, masters in their principalities. Due to the general impoverishment of the country and the impossibility of living on income from government, the princes occupied many lands and fishing grounds in their principalities and developed their palace economy on a vast scale, for which they attracted a significant part of the rural population to various jobs and duties. The income from this farm became the main means of their maintenance, and the income from management was only a certain help. Having become a major master, the prince began to consider his entire principality as a huge economic institution, as an patrimony, and therefore began to dispose of it like all votchinniks, divide it among his heirs, allocate parts of it for a living to his wife and daughters, sometimes transfer it to sons-in-law, as it was, for example, in Yaroslavl, where Prince Vasily Vsevolodovich transferred the inheritance to his son-in-law Fyodor Rostislavich Smolensky. As a result of the multiplication of some branches of the princely family and the numerous redistribution of their possessions, over time such microscopic principalities were obtained that were no larger than any boyar patrimony. Klyuchevsky, on the basis of evidence from the life of one saint who labored on Lake Kubenskoye, draws one of these principalities - Zaozerskoye in this form: its capital consisted of one princely court, located at the confluence of the Kubena River into Kubenskoye Lake, and not far from it stood "the whole Chirkovo ". You see in front of you, therefore, an ordinary landowner's estate, nothing more. Many of the principalities that formed in the Rostov Territory included villages and villages spread along small rivers, such as Ukhtoma, Kem, Andoga, Sit, Kurba, Yukhot, etc. Numerous appanage princes began to look like landowners. not only by the size of their possessions, but also by the nature of their activities. It was not the court and the administration as such that now began to fill their time, but economic concerns, economic affairs; and their usual employees and advisers were not the boyars, thinking about military affairs and the zemstvo system, but their clerks, to whom they entrusted certain branches of their vast economy. These were: the courtier, or butler, who was subordinate to all the arable lands of the prince with the entire population working on them, and then worthy boyars, administrators of roads, or aggregates of one or another category of economic lands, which are: the stolnik, who was in charge of all fishing and fishermen, a hunter, who was in charge of the animal "paths" and trappers, a beaver, a bowler, who was in charge of all the onboard lands and beekeepers, a stableman, a falconer. Since all these lands were not concentrated in one place, but were scattered throughout the principality, the departments of the worthy boyars were not territorial districts, but precisely the paths that cut the principalities in different directions. All these clerks of the prince constituted his usual council or council, with which he conferred not only on the economic affairs of his principality, but also on those that could be called state affairs. Both private owners and princes had not only freemen, but also slaves in their positions. Treasurers, keykeepers, courtiers, ambassadors, tyuns were very often from serfs, as can be seen from the spiritual letters of the princes, in which these persons were set free. Even in the management of the population, not involved in the work of the palace economy, the princes began to dominate purely possessory, economic interest. The territories of the specific principalities were administratively divided into counties, with central cities, and counties into volosts. For court and management, the princes sent governors to the districts, to the volosts of the volosts or their tiuns. The viceroy, who was sitting in the central city of the county, repaired the court and the council in all cases in the suburban volost, and in cases of murder, robbery and red-handed crime - within the entire county; volostels or tiuns repaired the court and administration in the volosts in all cases, with the exception of those that were subject to the court of the governor. Under the governors and volostels there were executive officials - right-handers and closers, bailiffs, podvoisky. The main goal of this administration was not so much to ensure public order and individual rights, but to extract income and maintain servants. The viceroys and volostels repaired the court quite formally, without entering into an internal assessment of the evidence. The court was created, so to speak, by itself, according to the established rules of old, the observance of which was monitored by the court men from the local society, and the judges sat and looked at their profit, that is, from whom and how much to take court fines and fees. Half of these incomes were usually received by princes, and half went to judges. The governors and volostels, in addition, received fodder in kind and money from the population - entry, Christmas, Great and Peter's. The princes sent their boyars and servants to these positions to feed themselves, and therefore did not allow them to stay in their positions for a long time in order to enable all their servants to stay in these profitable places. Looking at the position of governors and volosts mainly from a financial point of view, the princes, therefore, easily issued the so-called non-conviction letters that freed the population of boyar and church estates from the court of governors and volosts and subordinated it to the court of the owners. It was the same material favor to the owners, as well as sending boyars and servants for feeding. The owners of such privileged estates themselves were usually exempted from the court of governors and volosts. They were judged by the prince himself or his introduced boyar, i.e. specifically authorized to do so. 8. Elements of statehood in specific order. Combining into one whole the features that characterize the relationship of the princes to each other, to the territory and population, some researchers, especially Chicherin in "Experiments in the History of Russian Law", come to the denial of state principles in a specific order. According to Chicherin, only private law, and not state law, dominated in specific life. The princes in their destinies did not distinguish between the grounds on which they owned the cities and the entire territory of the appanage, on the one hand, and some small item of their use, on the other hand, like utensils and clothes, and in their spiritual testaments indifferently blessed their sons cities and townships, icons, chains, hats and fur coats. Inter-princely relations were regulated by treaties, and the treaty was a fact of private law. It became to be, neither in individual destinies, nor in the entire Russian land, there was either state power, or state concepts and relations among the princes. They were not in the relationship of the princes to the population: the princes were the owners of the land, and they were connected with free residents only by contractual relations: these residents remained in the principalities as long as they wanted, and the prince could not force them to stay, and their departure was not considered as treason. But such a characteristic of the specific system, for all its brightness, suffers from one-sidedness. Gradovsky in his "History of Local Government in Russia" rightly pointed out that the princes in their wills, placing cities, volosts, their villages and movables next to each other, transfer various items of possession to their heirs. Villages, for example, and things they transfer entirely as full property, and in volosts only income and management rights. This serves as proof for Gradovsky that in the specific period, there were concepts that came out of the sphere of civil law and had the character of state concepts. In addition to this, it can be added that the princes were not connected with all the free population of the appanages by contractual relations. This applied only to the boyars and free servants, for whom the princes negotiated the right of free passage in contracts. But the peasants, written or numerical people who paid tribute to the Tatars and carried various duties to the princes, the princes kept in their destinies and pledged not to call them back from each other. In view of this, it is still better to recognize the destinies of the northeastern princes as their hereditary property as political rulers, and not private ones, although it cannot be denied that in terms of the type of administration and life, according to the prevailing interests, this property came close to a simple estate. Then, in the relations of the princes to each other, one can notice the beginning of subordination due to the well-known political right of the elders in relation to the younger ones. The treaties of the princes did not always re-establish relations between them, but quite often only sanctioned customary law already in force. This political right determined princely relations beyond treaties. All this in total allows us to speak only about a certain mixture of state and private law in a specific era, and not about replacing state law with private law. 9. Features of feudalism in the specific system of northeastern Russia in the XIII-XV centuries; fragmentation of state power .So, the specific principalities, both in size and in the nature of their possession and use, came close to the large estates of private owners and church institutions, and on the other hand, large possessory estates came close to the principalities, because their owners acquired political rights over the population of their estates . Thus, in the political system of northeastern Russia, the most characteristic features of medieval feudalism appeared - the fragmentation of state power and its combination with land ownership. In addition to this, it can be pointed out that in our country, as in the West, with the division of state power, a whole hierarchy of sovereigns was formed, differing from each other in the number of their supreme rights. The highest sovereign of Russia, from whom the Russian princes received their investiture, corresponding to the emperors, western and eastern, was the Tsar of the Horde, who considered the entire Russian land as his ulus, as one of his possessions. Below him were the great princes - Vladimir-Moscow, Tver and Ryazan, corresponding to the Western European kings, who received from him labels for great reigns with all their territories; under the great princes were the appanage princes, corresponding to the Western European dukes, subordinate to the great ones in some respects, and even lower were the landowning boyars and church institutions, who, as we have seen, enjoyed state rights of court and taxation in their estates. However, those rights that constitute sovereignty - are independent, not derivative - had only the first three categories of sovereigns. Sovereignty was divided between the khan and the great and specific princes. Only these sovereigns had the right to diplomatic relations (specific - limited), the right to beat coins, etc. Even the smallest princes used the right to beat coins. The Tver Museum keeps coins with the inscriptions: Denga Gorodesk., Gorodetsko, Gorodensko. This Gorodensky or Gorodetsky money was believed to have been minted by some of the most insignificant Tver specific princes, namely the princes of Staritsky or Gorodensky. Other non-grand princely silver and copper money (pools) are also known: Kashinsky, Mikulinsky, Spassky and others. As for private landowners and church institutions, they have not achieved sovereign rights in Russia, which their Western brethren acquired for themselves. As is known, in the West, many feudal lords usurped sovereign rights for themselves, magnified sovereigns by the grace of God, minted coins, conducted diplomatic relations, etc. e. The latest researcher of the Russian appanage system Pavlov-Silvansky gave the following explanation to this difference between our orders and the orders of the West: “In our country, just as in the West, the earth had to uncontrollably disintegrate, be divided into small independent worlds. But at the time of the imminent division of the country, we had a lot of princes-pretenders with hereditary sovereign rights. They have replaced in our country the western feudal lords who seized sovereign rights: division from above prevented division from below; the reign of the earth warned her charisma. In this explanation, the named historian, in my opinion, correctly noted the essence of the matter, although he did not finish it, because this did not agree with his other views. The princes became territorial sovereigns in Russia before the boyar landownership was created, which developed already under the protection and dependence of the princely power. Meanwhile, Pavlov-Silvansky, sharing the theory of "zemstvo boyars", thinks that boyar landownership was created in our country earlier, or in any case independently of princely power. 10. The origin of feudal relations in Russia. How, then, was created in Russia, too, an order close to Western European feudalism? In the previous lecture, one of the main reasons that gave rise to this order was noted, the dominance of natural agriculture, which was established in Russia with the arrival of the Tatars, in connection with the depletion of people's capital. This circumstance, as we have seen, forced the princes to engage mainly in the business that the landowners, the rural owners, are engaged in, because otherwise the princes had nothing to live on; the princes thus approached the private landowners. On the other hand, having no money to distribute salaries to their servants and church institutions, the princes willingly sacrificed their rights over the population of their estates in their favor, granted them immunities, various benefits and exemptions, thus bringing them closer to the sovereigns. But is it possible to dwell on this reason alone in explaining the origin of Russian feudalism? Economic historians tend to be content with this one reason and ignore others that have been put forward by historians of law and culture. We cannot ignore these reasons of an internal, spiritual nature. What forced the princes to divide the territory of the state into appanages? Economic needs, the need for intensive agricultural labor, the economists will answer us. But for this, let us tell them, it was not at all necessary to divide the state power itself. It was enough for the eldest prince to place himself on the destinies of the younger ones, retaining all his state rights over the population of the destinies and giving the younger princes only the economic exploitation of the land, in extreme cases, governorship in the destinies. If the princes divided the state power itself, then this was nevertheless due to their political underdevelopment, from their lack of the view that the highest state power, in its essence, cannot be the subject of a family division. Dividing state power, the princes obviously looked at it as a subject of private ownership. This partly explains the fact that they shared it with their boyars. To welcome the boyar for his service, there was no need to give him immunity without fail. For the award of what gave immunity, in in essence, it was enough to make the boyar a governor or volost in his estate, grant him princely income and provide some benefits to the population of his estate. But the princes usually went further and forever renounced their rights in relation to the population of such estates, obviously not appreciating these rights not only from an economic, but also from a political and legal point of view. Therefore, the opinion of those historians who deduced feudalism from the general state of culture of a certain era, not only economic, material, but also political, legal, and spiritual, seems more correct. 11. Pawning and patronage. On the basis of the above-described order and in connection with the general conditions of culture in Russia, phenomena developed that have an analogy in the phenomena of the feudal era in the West. To such events it is necessary, first of all, to carry the pledge. Since the difference between the sovereign and the private owner in his state was obscured in practice and in the public consciousness, then naturally the concept of the subject should have become muddied. Free persons began to consider themselves entitled to give themselves into citizenship not only to numerous princes, but also to private individuals and institutions, to pledge, as it was said then, not only for different princes, but also for boyars, lords and monasteries, if this promised them any benefit. . And this benefit seemed all the time, because the princely power, weakened by division and specific fragmentation, was often unable to provide the individual with the necessary protection and means of subsistence. In Russia, therefore, the same thing began to happen as in Western Europe in the era of the weakening of royal power, when the weak sought protection by commanding powerful landowners and church institutions. The analogy in this regard went so far that in Russia, as well as in the West, they began to be mortgaged with estates. It was said above that the boyar estates were under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, and not the one who was currently served by their owner, dragged court and tribute on land and water. But this rule has been broken over time. The owners began to mortgage for the princes, to whom they entered the service with estates, just as in the West the owners acted with their fiefs, which were once also under the rule of territorial sovereigns. This created a terrible confusion of relations, which the princes tried to counteract with treaties. In these treaties, they confirmed that the boyar patrimonies should remain under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, pull court and tribute over land and water, that the princes should not keep villages in other people's destinies, buy and accept for free, should not give letters of commendation to someone else's lot, judge there, and take tribute and in general "do not intervene in someone else's lot with any deeds." But by all indications, the princes did not succeed in eradicating this phenomenon, and the transfers of owners with estates to the citizenship of other princes continued. Such transitions are ascertained from sources even at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century. So, in 1487, a certain Ivashko Maksimovich, the son of Looking, beat Grand Duchess Sofya with his brow "and with his patrimony, with half the village of Looking, which is in Murom in the Kuzemsky camp, with everything that was drawn to his half." Bearing in mind such cases, Ivan III wrote in his spiritual letter of 1504: “and the boyars and children of the boyars of Yaroslavl with their estates and with purchases from my son Vasily cannot leave anyone anywhere.” In 1507, the well-known abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, Joseph Sanin, who founded his monastery in the estate of the Volotsky prince Boris Vasilyevich and with his assistance, having quarreled with his prince, “renounced his sovereign to a great state”, under the high hand of Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich. When Joseph was reproached for this, he cited precedent. “In our years,” he said, “Prince Vasily Yaroslavich had a Sergius monastery in his patrimony, and Prince Alexander, Fedorovich, Yaroslavsky had a Kamensky monastery in his patrimony, and the princes of the Zasekinskys had a monastery in the patrimony of the Most Pure Ones on Tolza »; and so the abbots of these monasteries browed Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich, and he "took those monasteries into his state, but did not order those princes to intercede in those monasteries for nothing." And in ancient times, - remarks on this occasion the compiler of the life of St. Joseph, - "from lesser offenses to greater resorted." Individuals were pledged not only for the princes, but also for the boyars, for the lord and monasteries. Thanks to this, the rich boyars had entire detachments of servants who served them at court and in war, and who thus represent a complete analogy with the Western European subvassals. Boyarin Rodion Nestorovich, having come from Kyiv to serve the Grand Duke Ivan Danilovich Kalita, brought with him 1,600 men of the squad. Then the noble Moscow boyar Akinf Gavrilovich Shuba, offended by the honor given to the visiting boyar and not wanting to be under Rodion in the smaller ones, went to the service of Mikhail Tverskoy and took 1,300 servants with him. Ivan III, having taken Novgorod, first of all dissolved the large princely and boyar courts in Novgorod and distributed estates to the princely and boyar servants. But in the Principality of Tver, servants who served with their estates to the boyars existed even under Grozny. As in the West, many service people in the specific epoch were mortgaged in our country for the clergy - the metropolitan, bishops and monasteries. The metropolitan and the bishops had boyar children in the later era of the Muscovite state, until the very beginning of the 18th century. If, therefore, at a specific time there was no idea of ​​allegiance, in our sense of the word, then there is nothing surprising if private individuals were given under the protection of the prince the territory where they lived, to their own sovereign. This fact is impossible today, in the present state, where it is assumed that the sovereign is the same patron for everyone. But at that time they did not think so, and therefore many persons were given under the special protection of the prince, in munde-burdium regis, as they said in the West, they received the right to sue only before him, etc. d. 12. Transfers of boyars and servants; salaries and food. Due to the obscurity of the idea of ​​allegiance between the princes and their boyars and servants, the same contractual relations that were established between them at a time when the princes were not territorial owners and the boyars were not landowners continued to be preserved. This or that boyar and servant served the prince not because he was obliged to serve him as a sovereign country, but because he "ordered" to serve him, finding it profitable for himself. And this is true both with respect to the boyars and servants, and with respect to the settled ones, for the latter could always leave their prince. The right of the boyars and servants to freely move was undoubtedly a legacy of the former retinue life of Kievan Rus. But if it lasted so long in the appanage era, already when the boyars were settled, it was only because the idea of ​​citizenship did not become clear in this era. On the basis of contractual relations between princes and boyars and servants, phenomena developed that corresponded to the Western European distribution of beneficiaries. Boyars and servants came to one or another prince to serve, beat him with a forehead (Western European homagium), and he gave them a salary, beneficium, which they received as long as they served. In the west, most of the land was distributed as benefices. And among us, the princes gave some servants palace lands, plots of their domains, which were in charge of the court, corresponding to the western majordomes, palatine counts, etc. Another charter mentions "villages - the prince's salary", the time of the award of which dates back to the beginning of the 15th century. And just as in the west, the princes took these lands from their servants if they drove away from them. About one of these servants, who conditionally owned the village granted to him, about Boris Vorkov, Ivan Kalita says in his spiritual 1328: “even if my son whom I serve, the village will be after him; if you don’t have to serve, the village will be taken away. In agreements between themselves, the princes agreed on these servants: and whoever leaves their inheritances ... is deprived of the land. But due to the peculiarities of our country, land was not the main object of distribution of beneficiaries for a long time. There was plenty of land everywhere, it had little value for the princes, and the boyars and servants borrowed a lot of it without any conditions, according to the tacit or public recognition of the princes. The developed patrimonial boyar land tenure for a long time excluded the need for the distribution of land as a beneficiary or, as we said, estates. In Russia, at a particular time, another form of beneficiation developed predominantly - the distribution of posts as a salary for service, feeding, that is, not fief-terre, but fief-office. Therefore, in the letters of our princes we meet such expressions: “I granted you to the nursery for feeding for their departure to us,” that is, for entering the service; or: “I granted Ivan Grigoryevich Ryla ... the parish of Luza (that is, the volost to Luza) for their departure to us in feeding. And you, all the people of that volost, honor them and listen, and they know you, and judge and go to order your tyun with you, and have income according to the mandate list. Feeding in the volosts became a common sign of free boyars and servants. "And the free servants will, who was in feeding and argument with our father and with us." These feedings in the west, as we know, became hereditary fiefs: there the dukes, our governors, counts, our governors, vice-graphs or viscounts, our volosts, became hereditary owners of their posts and the income associated with them. But in our country, feedings did not become not only hereditary, but even lifelong, they were usually given for years and generally for short periods. The reason for this was the poverty of our princes, who did not have the opportunity to feed all their servants at once, but had to observe a certain queue in this regard, and, moreover, the lack of connection between official feeding and land ownership. In the west, in addition to income, feeders received a certain allotment of land for the position, and this allotment, becoming, like all fiefs, over time, hereditary, dragged along the position itself. In our specific era, as already mentioned, the boyars and servants needed little land, provided with patrimonial land tenure, and therefore we did not develop phenomena similar to the above. 13. Features of feudalism in the views, language and life of a specific era. From all that has been said, it can be seen that in Russian antiquity of specific time there were many features that made it related to Western European feudalism. We meet here the same institutions, the same attitudes and views as in the feudal West, sometimes in full development, sometimes in less definite features. In our letters there are phrases that are, as it were, a literal translation of the corresponding Latin texts. For the most important feudal institutions in Russian antiquity, there were special terms corresponding to Western European ones. Commandants were called mortgages among us; to designate a feudal commendation, the words were used to ask, to lay. The Russian warrior, like the German one, was called a husband; the boyar, just like the vassal, is a servant of the master of the grand duke. We had a special word for beneficiation, salary; this word was as widespread among us as in the West the word benefice, flax. The land granted to conditional possession (estate), and the position, and immunity benefits were also called salaries. With the similarity of the socio-political system, the similarity of life is also noticed. The spirit of discord, singularity, freedom and independence hovers in Russian society of the specific era, as well as in Western feudal society. Feudal freedom and independence led us, just as in the West, to violence and arbitrariness, especially on the part of the boyars, who often undertook robbery raids on each other. A characteristic feature of the Western feudal lords was their military profession, their military spirit. This trait was expressed in chivalry. Our boyars and princes have largely lost the chivalrous features that were characteristic of their predecessors and so vividly depicted in the Tale of Igor's Campaign. However less, and they were all warriors. During the constant appanage civil strife, all of them often had to fight at the head of detachments of their servants and people. Spiritual lords did not go on a campaign themselves, but in return for themselves they sent their governors who led their servants. One of the typical features of Western feudalism is, in the usual view, a fortified castle with loopholes, ditches, and drawbridges. In specific Russia there were no stone castles. But stone castles were replaced by fortified towns on the hills, on the elevated bank of the river, or on the ancient Meryan barrows. These princely towns and kremls satisfied the same need as the western feudal castles. Our spiritual masters also erected fortifications. Monasteries were built in the same way as princely kremlins, usually near a lake or a river. Both were surrounded by walls of uniform architecture with towers, loopholes, and gates. The boyars of the 14th-15th centuries did not have such fortifications, but each boyar estate, even in later times, in the 17th century, was an armed camp surrounded by a palisade. This means that in this case the difference between Russia and Western Europe was not so much qualitative as quantitative. Western European feudalism generally went much further in its development than Russian feudalism. Russia did not develop that feudal system, those strictly defined legal institutions, customs, concepts, that everyday ritual that can be observed in Western countries in the Middle Ages. Russian feudalism in its development did not go beyond the primary, rudimentary forms, which failed to harden and consolidate. The reason for this is the unsteady social ground on which it was created, the mobility of the population in a continuously colonizing country, on the one hand, and on the other hand, intense pressure from outside, which awakened the instincts of national self-preservation and called to life and creativity the state principle in the present, true sense of this word. Literature. 1. V. I. Sergeevich. Veche and prince (Russian legal antiquities. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1893) .2. B. N. CHICHERIN Experiments on the history of Russian law. M., 1858.3. V. O. Klyuchevsky. Boyar Duma of ancient Russia. M., 1909. Ed. 4th.4. N. P. Pavlov-Silvansky. Feudalism in ancient Russia. SPb., 1907. Works. T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1910.

As the Great Russian state took shape, the central and local administrations began to take shape.

The central power in the country was exercised by the Grand Duke, the Boyar Duma, palace institutions and the clerical apparatus. The Grand Duke had the highest legislative power (he approved the Sudebnik - a set of laws, issued statutory and decree letters), appointed him to the highest government posts. The Grand Duke's court was the highest court, the Grand Duke was, as it were, the supreme commander in chief.

Ivan III understood the importance of a strong army, which he created and provided with land. It was he who began to distribute land with peasants to service people (place them on land, hence the term "estate") on the condition that they perform military service and only for a period of service and without the right to be inherited, as well as without the right to sell and contribute to the monastery. Thus, an army was created that was completely dependent on the sovereign, whose well-being directly depended on the power of the monarch and the state as a whole.

Ivan III's entourage played an important role in governing the state, primarily the Boyar Duma - the council of the feudal nobility under the Grand Duke. The Boyar Duma at that time consisted of two higher ranks - the boyars and the roundabouts, and was still not numerous: 5-12 boyars and no more than 12 roundabouts. The boyars were formed from the old Moscow untitled boyar families and princes, the boyars were appointed to the Duma according to the principle of seniority, according to the local account, which was determined by the service of their ancestors.

The boyars occupied commanding positions in the armed forces of the country and the state apparatus. The boyars led regiments on campaigns, judged land disputes, and carried out diplomatic missions. With the allocation of the grand-ducal lands and economy from the state, their management was formed, headed by butlers.

The functions of the grand ducal office were performed by the Treasury. As the territory of the state grew, the tasks of the Treasury became more complicated, the functions of the treasurer began to be allocated to a special position, to which people were appointed, especially those close to the Grand Duke, who knew finances and diplomacy well. Gradually, a hierarchy of palace positions was formed - bedkeepers, nurseries, hunters, falconers, etc. As the last independent and semi-independent principalities are included in the single state, central governing bodies of these territories are formed, headed by special butlers.

At the turn of the XV-XVI centuries. clerks - officials of the grand duke's chancellery (treasury) - began to play an increasingly important role in government. The clerks were in charge of embassy affairs, conducted office work on military affairs (“ranks”). They were the real executors of the sovereign's will, they constituted the apparatus of the Boyar Duma. Treasury and palace institutions. Specializing in the performance of certain functions (financial, diplomatic, military, yama, etc.), they gradually prepared the creation of government bodies with a new, functional, rather than territorial distribution of affairs. By social origin, the clerks did not belong to the nobility, but came from the clergy and "simple nationwide", which made them completely dependent on the Grand Duke. Their well-being was based solely on public service, like that of the landowners.

Administration and court in the localities were carried out by governors and volostels with a staff of tiuns, closers and righteous people. The governors were the highest judicial-administrative officials and chiefs of local troops. Governors and volostels were provided with a feeding system, which gave them the right to collect various requisitions in their favor ("fodder").

The feeders came from both the feudal aristocracy and the rank and file of service people. The power of the governors and volostels in the field was limited and regulated by the Sudebnik of 1497, charters issued by the Grand Duke to the local population, and income lists received by feeders.

After the unification of all the northeastern Russian lands and the liberation from the Tatar yoke, the army was not reduced. It increased further: artillery appeared, and with it the cannon collection. The state apparatus was still being formed, its heyday was still ahead, but its numbers were steadily growing. The self-government of the estates was still preserved - communities of peasants, townspeople, noble fraternities, church and merchant corporations, etc.

The central state power was not yet able to control everyone and everything, management was carried out through these primary social communities, which thus received significant political weight in society, which weakened the influence of the state and its officials. Thus, according to the Sudebnik of 1497, the principle of the obligatory participation of representatives of the local population in the activities of governors sent from Moscow was fixed.

But the heavy burden of the growing state, its army, judicial-administrative and economic apparatus affects the position of the peasantry, destroys the sprouts of free enterprise and spiritual free-thinking. The strengthening of the state, the strengthening of the central government is always accompanied by the growth of its apparatus - the army, courts, police, bureaucracy, the maintenance of which requires significant funds. And the stronger the state, the larger its apparatus, the greater the taxes and other fees from the population become, the less opportunities for the growth of the peasant and handicraft economy.

On the question of the peculiarities of the social and political system in this part of Russia, two points of view were basically outlined. V. I. Sergeevich generally denied the existence of significant local features in the political system of the lands into which the Kievan state began to disintegrate.

He believed that new features in their political structure, primarily in the relationship of the prince to the population, appeared only after the Tatar invasion. According to another view, developed with the greatest force by V. O. Klyuchevsky, the features of individual lands were undeniable, and in particular, the main feature of Rostov-Suzdal Rus was the exclusive role of the prince, due to his colonial activity. Since colonization brought mainly an increase in the rural masses, the population had to become much more rural in composition than it was in South Russia.

When raising the question of the peculiarities in the process of feudalization in the Rostov-Suzdal land, it seems to us, we must proceed from the following points.

First of all, we have to admit that North-Eastern Russia consisted of three main parts: 1) a relatively small territory, long since colonized by Novgorod immigrants, the center of which was Suzdal and then Rostov, 2) the most significant part, occupied by the settlements of Golyadi, Meri and Vesi other Finnish tribes and colonized in the 20th century, 3) the territory occupied by the Vyatichi - a Slavic tribe that is much behind in its socio-economic development compared to other Slavic tribes.

Being ethnically heterogeneous, North-Eastern Russia was also socially heterogeneous. If that part of North-Eastern Russia, which stretched to Rostov and Suzdal, can be considered more or less at the level of development of the Dnieper principalities (hereinafter we will call it the Rostov-Suzdal Territory), then other parts (inhabited by Golyad, Vesyu, Merya, Muroma and Meshchera , Vyatichi) hardly by the beginning of the XII century. left the stage of tribal relations. Thus, by the time of the collapse of the Kievan state, the most significant part of North-Eastern Russia had not yet undergone the process of feudalization. We can only talk about the established feudal groups in the Rostov-Suzdal Territory. Suffice it to point out that it was in this area that two uprisings took place - in 1024 and in 1071.

A characteristic moment in the development of North-Eastern Russia was that the capture of the local Finnish, Lithuanian and Slavic population, no doubt, played the largest role since the beginning of the intensive colonization of this territory. Local princes, relying on their combatants, were very active in the development of land from the indigenous population, in protecting the colonists from the indigenous population, and finally, in the construction of cities.

Another feature in the feudal development of North-Eastern Russia was the absence of large trading centers here, close in importance to Novgorod or Kiev. The commercial importance of the old centers - Suzdal and Rostov - began to decline long before their political importance fell. With the change of trade routes, they began to turn into an economic backwater. On the other hand, Vladimir, even in its best era, was not a first-class shopping center. And all other cities in North-Eastern Russia were founded by princes, these were primarily military colonization centers. And, consequently, the influence of the princes in these newly founded cities (Pereyaslavl, Yaroslavl, Moscow, etc.) was very great, and the urban population was under the strong influence of princely ortsanizing power.

If we take into account all these points, it becomes clear why the princes were able to quickly defeat the local feudal nobility that had developed in the Rostov-Suzdal Territory. In order to prevent her from regaining her political influence, they moved the capital to Vladimir, a city that grew rapidly, mainly due to the influx of colonists.

Naturally, the princes had the opportunity to seize such large land areas that the princes in other principalities did not possess, and to organize a very significant domain, which probably had no equal in other lands. They distributed some of these lands to combatants and church institutions and thus managed to create a broad economic and social base for themselves. The number of land holdings belonging to the landowners, who grew up in the bowels of the decaying rural communities, was small.

The squad participated in the colonization activities of the princes. Engaged in this activity, the squad elements probably began to settle on the ground relatively late. The main part of the feudal estates in North-Eastern Russia belonged to the retinue elements. Only in the Rostov-Suzdal Territory the nests of the old feudal nobility remained for some time.

One of the main features of the social structure of the Vladimir land was that the class of feudal lords for the most part, after the defeat of the Rostov-Suzdal old feudal nobility, consisted of elements that were part of the princely squad. It is characteristic that the chronicle, which tells about the events of North-Eastern Russia, constantly uses retinue terminology that has already become obsolete in other places. Naturally, these elements supported the first Rostov-Suzdal and then Vladimir princes in their organizational activities and did not attempt, as was the case in the Galician land, to oppose their interests to the interests of the princes.

The process of feudalization went on in North-Eastern Russia in typical forms. But a feature of the social structure of the Vladimir land was that here the name "boyar" was not assigned to all feudal lords. Only the tops of this class began to be called boyars. The bulk of the feudal lords were called "servants of the free." Both the boyars and the free servants were typical vassals of their princes: their service was to come to war with their militias at the call of the princes. Since druzhina relations were strong, vassalage here did not go beyond primitive norms.

It can be assumed that there was a principle according to which the service of the boyars and servants of the freemen did not depend on the location of their land holdings (“And whoever serves the prince, wherever he lives, but go with the prince whom he serves,” it was written in princely agreements) . Consequently, the boyars could freely transfer from one prince to another, without losing their rights to the estates that belonged to them.

Over time, the monuments began to mention another category of feudal landowners - the children of the boyars. The question of the origin of this group was solved in different ways in the historical literature. Some historians understood the boyar children as the descendants of the boyar families that had been crushed (which is most plausible), others associated the origin of this category with “children's” and “adolescents”, i.e. junior princely and boyar combatants.

In Vladimir land, another category of princely servants, the nobles, finally took shape. This category was formed from the so-called “servants under the court”, or noble people who performed various duties in managing the princely economy. Over time, they began to be involved in military service. These servants or nobles, unlike OT boyars and free servants, did not have the right to freely move from one prince to another. To the extent that for their service the nobles began to receive land plots from the princes and exploit the peasants and serfs, they turned into one of the categories of the feudal class.

The higher clergy - the metropolitan and bishops - also began to have their own vassals: boyars, boyar children and free servants who were supposed to perform military service.

As for the class of the feudally dependent rural population, first of all it should be noted that in the Vladimir land the names of individual categories of the dependent rural population that had developed in the Kiev state (smerds, purchases, outcasts, etc.) soon ceased to be used. The term "smerd", widely used in the XI and the beginning of the XII centuries. to refer to the rural population of the Rostov-Suzdal Territory (the so-called "Suzdal smerds") quickly fell into disuse. This disappearance of the term is very revealing. Probably, the princes, in order to attract the colonists, gave the new settlers benefits and relative freedom.

Since the process of feudalization in the northeast could not be compared in its intensity, breadth and depth with this process in other lands, the class of the feudal-dependent peasantry was not consolidated here. This explains the absence of the term used to designate the feudal-dependent peasantry. The term "smerd", as already indicated, has disappeared, and a new term has not been developed. The terms "orphans", "Christians" and then peasants began to be a common name for the entire mass of the rural population. The rapid disappearance of old terms testifies to the disappearance of these categories of the rural population. It can be assumed that the forms of exploitation of the rural population have become monotonous here. The main duties during this period were various natural quitrents.

In the feudal estates of this period, the labor of serfs was also exploited. It can be assumed that already in the period under review, a term was formed for serfs planted on the ground: they began to be called suffering people, or sufferers.

The legal status of the urban population, apparently, differed little from that of the urban population of the Kievan state.

More on the topic Social development of North-Eastern Russia:

  1. 3. DECAY OF ANCIENT GENERAL RELATIONS IN NORTH-EAST RUSSIA XIV-XVII BB.
  2. S. B. VESELOVSKY. FEUDAL LAND OWNERSHIP IN NORTH-EAST RUSSIA Volume I. PRIVATE LAND OWNERSHIP. LAND OWNERSHIP OF THE METROPOLIC HOUSE. Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR 1926, 1926

The Tatar invasion, with all the consequences that accompanied it, also accelerated the very process of life that led to the decline in significance, and then to the final cessation of the activity of city councils in northeastern Russia.

Already in the second half of the XII century, in the era of intensive settlement of the region by colonists from the south, the princes of northeastern Russia showed a tendency to become the masters of the country, its masters as its creators and organizers. Let us recall that Andrei Bogolyubsky was already an autocrat in the Suzdal land and did not want to know either his boyars or the people's council. Andrei, as you know, became a victim of his domestic politics and died from a conspiracy of those dissatisfied with his autocracy. After his death, the old veche cities - Rostov and Suzdal - tried to become masters in the country, to plant princes of their own free will and on their own. But they failed to achieve this, because they did not have strong, ancient ties with the rest of the population, who had recently arrived, planted on the land by the princes-colonizers, and above all with the suburbs of Suzdal land. Vladimirians refused to recognize the princes nominated by the Rostov and Suzdal people. In the internecine struggle that followed, the old veche towns suffered a complete defeat. In the Rostov-Suzdal land, therefore, already before the Tatars, the prince became the master of the situation, and the veche receded into the background. The very composition of the population in the Rostov-Suzdal land should have favored the strengthening of the prince at the expense of the veche. This population consisted of inhabitants of small villages and hamlets scattered over vast distances. There were few crowded, large settlements, commercial and industrial cities, and therefore the veche of the main cities could not acquire the dominance that they received in other regions of the Russian land. The Tatars completed this political evolution of northeastern Russia. Cities during their invasion were subjected to terrible ruin, impoverished and impoverished. Due to the decline of crafts and trade, they could not recover for a long time to any significant extent. Under such conditions, their inhabitants had to think more about their daily bread, about tomorrow, and not about politics. With the assertion of Tatar dominion over Russia, the appointment and change of princes began to depend on the will of the khan. Therefore, the most important function of the vecha, the calling and expulsion of princes, also fell by itself. If a vecha was to be held, it was only in cases of emergency, and, moreover, in the form of a mutiny. “God save,” writes, for example, a chronicler under 1262, “from the fierce languor of the Basurman people of the Rostov land: put fury into the hearts of the peasants, who do not tolerate the violence of the filthy, deigning forever and driving them out of the cities, from Rostov, from Volodimer, from Suzdal, from Yaroslavl; Or under the year 1289: “Prince Dmitry Borisovich is sitting in Rostov. Multiply then the Tatars in Rostov, and the citizens created a veche and drove them out, and plundered their property ”(Voskres.), etc. So, of the two forces that led society in Kievan Rus, in the northeastern specific era, one remained - prince.

2. The dependence of the princes on the Tatar Khan; order of princely possession.

But this political force, for all that, did not become independent. In 1243, Grand Duke Yaroslav Vsevolodovich went to Batu, who, according to the chronicle, received him with honor and said to him: “Yaroslav! Be older than all the prince in the Russian language. The following year, other princes went to Batu “about their fatherland”: “I honored Batu ace with a worthy honor and let me go, judging them, someone to my fatherland” (Lavrent.). The same order continued after. As a rule, the khans approved as both the great and the local prince the one who had the right to do so on ancestral or patrimonial grounds that were in force in the then customary princely law. As a result of this, in the 13th century, the seniority of the princes sat in turn on the Grand Duchy of Vladimir: Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, his brother Svyatoslav, son Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky, another son - Yaroslav of Tverskoy and the third - Vasily Kostroma, then the eldest grandson Dimitry Alexandrovich, the next Andrei Alexandrovich, then Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tverskoy. Thus, in the succession of the senior grand-ducal table, approximately the old Kievan custom was observed. But in replacing all other princely tables, as was already indicated in due time, a new, patrimonial order was established - the transition from fathers to sons, and in the absence of such, to the closest relatives. Thus, for example, in Rostov, after Konstantin Vsevolodovich, his eldest son Vasilko reigned, who was succeeded by his son Boris, etc., in Ryazan, after Ingvar Igorevich, his son Oleg reigned, then his grandson Roman Olgovich, great-grandson Fedor Romanovich, who had no offspring, why his brother Konstantin Romanovich began to reign in Ryazan, etc. The khans for the most part approved the reign of the one who followed it according to custom. But with all that, the khan's sovereignty had not a formal, but a purely real meaning. The princes paid the khan an exit from their principalities and gifts for shortcuts to reign. Therefore, in the XIV century, the khans began to give the great princedom of Vladimir not to those princes to whom it followed in order of seniority, but to those who knew how to ask them again, to give them more gifts. Thus, for example, in 1341, the sixteen-year-old Moscow prince Semyon Ivanovich left the Horde for a great reign, “and all the Russian princes were given under his hand, and gray-haired on the table in Volodimer” (Resurrection). In 1359, the Khan gave the label for the great reign to the young Dimitry Ivanovich Donskoy, whose boyars managed to outbid this label, which was also begging for the prince of Suzdal Dimitry Konstantinovich. At the end of the 14th century, labels began to be bought from the khan not only for the great reign of Vladimir, but also for destinies. Thus, for example. The Moscow prince Vasily Dmitrievich bought the label for the principality of Nizhny Novgorod, which had been given to his stepfather, Boris Konstantinovich. In this case, the khan in relation to the princes began to play the same role that the councils of the main cities in Kievan Rus played, planting the princes all the time without paying attention to their family accounts.

3. The power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir until the end of the XIV century.

What mutual relations were established under the Tatars between the princes of northeastern Russia? Until the end of the 14th century, the great princes of Vladimir had a certain power over all other princes, although neither the content of this power nor its extent is quite definite from the sources. Chronicles muffledly say that other princes were "at hand" of the great princes. Above, evidence from the annals was cited that all the Russian princes were "under the arms" of the Grand Duke Semyon. It is written about Dimitri Donskoy that he “summoned all the princes of the Russian lands, which exist under his authority” (Voskres.). The subjugation of the princes can be traced in the facts only in the fact that the specific princes during the all-Russian campaigns became under the banner of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Grand Duke of Vladimir, by all indications, was the representative of all Russian princes before the Khan, was originally the only prince who knew the Horde, that is, he went to petition the Khan for the interests of the Russian land, received orders from him, etc. All these special rights and advantages in connection with the possession of the Vladimir district were the reason for the struggle of the princes of different lines for the great reign of Vladimir.

The last struggle for the great reign of Vladimir took place under Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy. In 1367, Prince Dimitri Ivanovich laid a stone Kremlin in Moscow and began to bring all the princes under his will, among other things, Prince Mikhail Alexandrevich of Tverskoy. Michael, not wanting to obey, turned for help to his son-in-law Olgerd, the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Several times, Lithuanian troops entered the Moscow possessions, subjected them to devastation. Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich launched against them not only the regiments of the princes of the Moscow appanages, but also the Ryazan regiments of Oleg Ivanovich, the Pronsky prince Vladimir Dmitrievich. Not having time in his business with Lithuanian help, Mikhail in 1371 went to the Horde and returned from there with a label for the great reign of Vladimir and the khan's ambassador Sarykhozha. But Demetrius did not let Michael into the great reign, gave Sarykhozh as a gift and then went to the Horde himself, gave the Khan, the Khansh and all the princes there, and again received a label for the great reign. Mikhail, for his part, again went to Lithuania and incited Olgerd against Moscow. In the struggle that followed, Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich took his father-in-law Dimitri Konstantinovich of Suzdal with him to the battle field with his two brothers and son, cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, three princes of Rostov, the prince of Smolensk, two princes of Yaroslavl, prince Belozersky, Kashinsky, Molozhsky, Starodubsky, Bryansk, Novosilsky, Obolensky and Tarussky. The struggle ended with the fact that Mikhail Alexandrovich recognized himself as the "younger brother" of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, undertook not to look for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir under Dimitri, to mount a horse and go to war when the Grand Duke himself or his brother Vladimir Andreevich mounted a horse, or to send their governors if they send a governor: he undertook to jointly determine his relations with the Tatars, to give them tribute or not to give them, to fight with them if it comes to war, to fight together against Lithuania, to live with Veliky Novgorod and Torzhok like old times.

All these details of the struggle for the Grand Duke of Vladimir, as well as the agreement between Grand Duke Dimitri Ivanovich and Mikhail of Tver, which ensures his obedience to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, show what the power of the Grand Duke of Vladimir consisted of. This power was military-political. Local princes were obliged to go to war at the call of the Grand Duke, not to conduct any independent foreign policy. The significance of the Grand Duke of Vladimir then appears quite clearly in the ensuing struggle of Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy with the Tatars and Ryazan. In 1380, Demetrius gathered a huge army of 150 thousand people against Mamai. This rati included regiments not only of Moscow appanages, but also of assistant princes of Rostov, Yaroslavl, Belozersky; and the prince of Tver sent his troops with his nephew, Ivan Vsevolodovich Kholmsky. Oleg Ryazansky, out of fear of the Tatars, did not join the Grand Duke, after the Kulikovo defeat of the Tatars, had to flee to Lithuania for fear of reprisals, and Dimitri Ivanovich took Ryazan from him for disobeying Oleg. When they reconciled and then concluded an agreement, Oleg recognized himself as the “younger brother” of Dimitri, equal to Vladimir Andreevich, pledged to be at the same time against Lithuania, and is in the same relationship with the Horde as the Moscow prince. So, Oleg became to Dimitri Ivanovich Donskoy in the same subordinate position as Mikhail Tverskoy. To characterize this situation, one can cite some data from the agreement with Dmitry Ivanovich of his cousin, Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, to which princes Oleg and Mikhail were equated: “You, my younger brother, Prince Vladimir, keep my great prince under me honestly and menacingly; you, my younger brother, to serve without disobedience,” etc.

4. Emancipation of Ryazan and Tver from submission to the Grand Duke of Moscow and Vladimir.

In the 15th century, the princes of Tver and Ryazan were emancipated from submission to the Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Grand Duchy of Vladimir could hold on menacingly and honestly only when the Grand Dukes were representatives of the Khan in Russia, enjoyed his authority and military assistance. But by the middle of the XIV century, the Horde had weakened, and the Grand Duke not only did not receive support from there, but was already in frequent conflict with the Tatar khans, acted as a leader in the struggle for liberation from Tatar domination. Under such conditions, he was forced to consolidate his power and authority by agreements with the princes. Treaties are valid only when they can be backed up by force at any time. But the Grand Duke of Moscow, although he appropriated the great reign of Vladimir, was not yet in such a position at the end of the XIV and the first quarter of the XV century. His forces were paralyzed not only by the Horde, which at times acted hostilely against him, but also by Lithuania, which at any moment was ready to support local princes against him. Under such conditions, the princes of Ryazan and Tver gradually began to occupy an independent position relative to the Grand Duke of All Russia. In an agreement concluded with Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich in 1402. The Ryazan prince Fedor Olgovich, although he recognized himself as a younger brother and undertook not to pester the Tatars, but for all that he negotiated for himself the right to send an ambassador (kilichei) with gifts to the Horde, the right to receive a Tatar ambassador for the good of a Christian with honor, notifying only about to everyone and about all the Horde news of Grand Duke Vasily. Even more significant is the agreement concluded with Vasily Dmitrievich of Tver by Prince Mikhail around 1398. In it, Mikhail is no longer called a younger brother, but simply a brother, and gives obligations equivalent to the obligations of his counterparty - to be one for the Tatars, Lithuania, Germans and Poles. This mutual obligation is developed in the agreement in the following way: if the tsar himself, or the Tatar army, or Lithuania, or the Germans, or the Poles, and the Grand Duke of Moscow and his brothers mount horses, go to the Moscow princes, then Mikhail will send two of his sons, and two brothers, leaving one son with him; if the Tatars, Lithuanians or Germans attack the Principality of Tver, then the Moscow prince is obliged to mount his horse himself and with his brothers. The Grand Duke, obliging the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren not to take love, that is, not to enter into agreements with Vitovt and Lithuania, at the same time, for himself and his brothers, undertook not to conclude agreements without the Prince of Tver, his children and grandchildren . The prince of Tver was given complete freedom in relations with the Horde: "And to the Horde, brother, and to the king, the path is clear, and your children, and your grandchildren, and your people." The strife that ensued in the family of the Moscow princes further contributed to the liberation from subjugation to them of the princes of Tver and Ryazan, who during this time were closely adjacent to the Grand Duke of Lithuania.

5. Subordination to the Grand Dukes of Moscow, Tver and Ryazan specific princes.

Thus, from the end of the 14th century and during the first half of the 15th century, in northeastern Russia there was already not one great reign, but three - Moscow, Tver and Ryazan. The great princedom of Vladimir was inextricably linked with the Moscow Grand Duke, as a result of which not only his relatives, but also the princes of other destinies, for example, Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, etc. were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Moscow. Only their relatives were subordinate to the Grand Duke of Tver and Ryazan. This subordination of relatives to the elder or grand prince is evidenced both by the agreements of these great princes with other great princes, and by the agreements of the great princes with younger relatives. Above, the obligation of the Grand Duke of Tver to Moscow, to send his sons and brothers to help, has already been given. This means that the younger appanage princes had to go to war on the orders of the elder. The Tver prince Boris Alexandrovich, concluding an agreement with Vitovt in 1427, directly stipulated: “To my uncles, brothers and my tribe - princes, be in obedience to me: I, the great prince Boris Alexandrovich, am free, whom I favor, whom I execute, and my Mr. grandfather, Grand Duke Vitovt, do not intervene; if any of them wants to surrender to the service of my master grandfather with a father, then my master grandfather with a father is not accepted; whoever of them goes to Lithuania will lose his fatherland - in his fatherland I am free, Grand Duke Boris Alexandrovich. It can be seen from the agreements of the grand dukes with specific appanages that the obedience of the latter was expressed in their obligation to mount horses and go to war when the grand duke himself mounted a horse or sent his sons or other younger brothers, and in the obligation to send a governor if the grand duke sent his governor The great princes received from the khans labels for the whole land, including the destinies of younger relatives. In 1412, the Grand Duke of Tverskoy Ivan Mikhailovich, to whom the appanage prince Yuri did not want to obey, said: “The label of the tsar is given over the whole land of Tver, and Yuri himself is the tsar of the given in the label.” Because of this, the specific princes could not surrender with their fatherlands into submission to other princes, they were obliged, collecting tribute according to the apportionment, to pay this tribute to the Grand Duke, and the Grand Duke was already taken to the Horde. Therefore, Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich the Dark and punished in his spiritual testament: “As soon as my children begin to live according to their destinies, then my princess and children will send scribes who will describe their destinies by kissing the cross, impose tribute on the plows and on the people, and according to this salary the princess and my children will give way to my son Ivan.

So, the specific princes of northeastern Russia in military and political terms were subordinate until the end of the XIV century to the Grand Duke of Vladimir, and from the end of the XIV century to the three Grand Dukes - Moscow-Vladimir, Tver and Ryazan, who were independent of each other and determined their relations contracts that vary depending on the circumstances of their conclusion. Some researchers, especially Sergeevich, are inclined to look in exactly the same way at the relationship of junior appanage princes to local great ones. They admit that the subordination of junior princes to elders was not any kind of order, state-legal custom, that de jure princes were all equal, and relations of subordination were established between them only by virtue of agreements, depending on the circumstances of each given moment. But such a concept of inter-princely relations of a specific era can hardly be accepted. If you delve into the content of the agreements between the senior princes and the junior ones, it is easy to see that the agreements are trying to guarantee such relations between them, which were considered normal, to confirm the state-legal antiquity.

6. Internal independence of destinies.

The subordination of the junior princes to the great ones was limited to an obligatory alliance against enemies, military assistance, and the contribution of the Tatar output to the grand duke's treasury, which in turn was due to the fact that the junior princes did not have the right to independent relations with the Horde. But in all other respects the younger princes were free and independent. The treaties guaranteed them the inviolability of their possessions and the full right to dispose of them, without breaking only their ties with the great reign. “You know your fatherland, and I know mine” - this is a common article in these agreements. The contracting parties usually pledged not to buy villages in each other's destinies, not to allow their own boyars to do this, not to give letters of commendation for possession in someone else's inheritance, not to hold mortgages and quitrents, to give court and justice to their subjects at the suits of other princes or their subjects, not to send bailiffs to each other and not to judge courts. In these agreements, the boyars and free servants were usually provided with freedom of transition from one prince to another, and they also retained their estates in the inheritance of the abandoned prince. The princes pledged not to accept written or numerical people, as well as servants “under the court”, who owned lands: whoever of these servants transferred to the service of another prince, he lost his lands in the inheritance of the former prince. The junior appanage princes thus enjoyed complete independence in the internal administration of their principalities. They divided these principalities among their children, allocated “oprichnina” from them for living after their death to their princesses, bequeathed these principalities to relatives or foreign princes, etc.

7. Rapprochement of principalities with private estates.

We examined the mutual relations of the princes of northeastern Russia in a specific era. Let us now look at their relationship to their possessions, to the territories of the principalities and the population living on them. The princes, as we have seen, remained in northeastern Russia the only masters, masters in their principalities. As a result of the general impoverishment of the country and the impossibility of living on income from government, the princes took over a lot of land and fishing grounds in their principalities and developed their palace economy on a vast scale, for which they attracted a significant part of the rural population to various jobs and duties. The income from this farm became the main means of their maintenance, and the income from management was only a certain help. Having become a major master, the prince began to consider his entire principality as a huge economic institution, as a patrimony, and therefore began to dispose of it like all votchinniks, divide it among his heirs, allocate parts of it for a living to his wife and daughters, sometimes transfer it to sons-in-law, as it was, for example, in Yaroslavl, where Prince Vasily Vsevolodovich transferred the inheritance to his son-in-law Fyodor Rostislavich Smolensky. As a result of the multiplication of some branches of the princely family and the numerous redistributions of their possessions, in the course of time such microscopic principalities were obtained that were no larger than any boyar patrimony. Klyuchevsky, on the basis of evidence from the life of one saint who labored on Lake Kubenskoye, draws one of these principalities - Zaozerskoye in this form: its capital consisted of one princely court, located at the confluence of the Kubena River into Kubenskoye Lake, and not far from it stood "the whole of Chirkov" . You see in front of you, therefore, an ordinary landowner's estate, nothing more. Many of the principalities that formed in the Rostov region included villages and villages spread along small rivers, such as Ukhtoma, Kem, Andoga, Sit, Kurba, Yukhot, etc.

Numerous appanage princes began to look like votchinniki-landowners not only in terms of the size of their possessions, but also in terms of the nature of their activities. It was not the court and the administration as such that now began to fill their time, but economic concerns, economic affairs; and their usual employees and advisers were not the boyars, thinking about military affairs and the zemstvo system, but their clerks, to whom they entrusted certain branches of their vast economy. These were: the courtier, or butler, who was subordinate to all the arable lands of the prince with the entire population working on them, and then worthy boyars, administrators of roads, or aggregates of one or another category of economic lands, which are: the stolnik, who was in charge of all fishing and fishermen, a hunter, who was in charge of the animal "paths" and trappers, a beaver, a bowler, who was in charge of all the onboard lands and beekeepers, a stableman, a falconer. Since all these lands were not concentrated in one place, but were scattered throughout the principality, the departments of the worthy boyars were not territorial districts, but precisely the paths that cut the principalities in different directions. All these clerks of the prince constituted his usual council or council, with which he conferred not only on the economic affairs of his principality, but also on those that could be called state affairs. Both private owners and princes had not only freemen, but also slaves in their positions. Treasurers, keykeepers, courtiers, ambassadors, tyuns were very often from serfs, as can be seen from the spiritual letters of the princes, in which these persons were set free. Even in the management of the population, not involved in the work of the palace economy, the princes began to dominate purely possessory, economic interest. The territories of the specific principalities were administratively divided into counties, with central cities, and counties into volosts. For court and management, the princes sent governors to the districts, to the volosts of the volosts or their tiuns. The governor, who sat in the central city of the county, repaired the court and the council in all cases in the suburban volost, and in cases of murder, robbery and red-handed tatba - within the entire county; volostels or tiuns repaired the court and administration in the volosts in all cases, with the exception of those that were subject to the court of the governor. Under the governors and volosts, there were executive officials - right-handers and closers, bailiffs, podvoisky. The main goal of this administration was not so much to ensure public order and individual rights, but to extract income and maintain servants. The viceroys and volostels repaired the court quite formally, without entering into an internal assessment of the evidence. The court was created, so to speak, by itself, according to the established rules of old, the observance of which was monitored by the court men from the local society, and the judges sat and looked at their profit, that is, from whom and how much to take court fines and fees. Half of these incomes were usually received by princes, and half went to judges. The governors and volostels, in addition, received fodder in kind and money from the population - entry, Christmas, Great and Peter's. The princes sent their boyars and servants to these positions to feed themselves, and therefore did not allow them to stay in their positions for a long time in order to enable all their servants to stay in these profitable places. Looking at the position of governors and volosts mainly from a financial point of view, the princes, therefore, easily issued the so-called non-conviction letters that freed the population of boyar and church estates from the court of governors and volosts and subordinated it to the court of the owners. It was the same material favor to the owners, as well as sending boyars and servants for feeding. The owners of such privileged estates themselves were usually exempted from the court of governors and volosts. They were judged by the prince himself or his introduced boyar, i.e. specifically authorized to do so.

8. Elements of statehood in specific order.

Combining into one whole the features that characterize the relationship of the princes to each other, to the territory and the population, some researchers, especially Chicherin in "Experiments in the History of Russian Law", come to the denial of state principles in specific order. According to Chicherin, only private law, and not state law, dominated in specific life. The princes in their destinies did not distinguish between the grounds on which they owned the cities and the entire territory of the appanage, on the one hand, and some small item of their use, on the other hand, like utensils and clothing, and in their spiritual testaments indifferently blessed their sons with cities and volosts, icons, chains, hats and fur coats. Inter-princely relations were governed by treaties, and the treaty was a fact of private law. Therefore, neither in individual destinies, nor in the entire Russian land, there was either state power, or state concepts and relations among the princes. They were not in the relationship of the princes to the population: the princes were the owners of the land, and they were connected with free residents only by contractual relations: these residents remained in the principalities as long as they wanted, and the prince could not force them to stay, and their departure was not considered as treason. But such a characteristic of the specific system, for all its brightness, suffers from one-sidedness. Gradovsky in his "History of Local Government in Russia" rightly pointed out that the princes in their wills, placing cities, volosts, their villages and movables next to each other, transfer various items of possession to their heirs. Villages, for example, and things they transfer entirely as full property, and in volosts only income and management rights. This serves as proof for Gradovsky that in the specific period, there were concepts that came out of the sphere of civil law and had the character of state concepts. In addition to this, it can be added that the princes were not connected with all the free population of the appanages by contractual relations. This applied only to the boyars and free servants, for whom the princes negotiated the right of free passage in contracts. But the peasants, written or numerical people who paid tribute to the Tatars and carried various duties to the princes, the princes kept in their destinies and pledged not to call them back from each other. In view of this, it is still better to recognize the destinies of the northeastern princes as hereditary property as political rulers, and not private ones, although it cannot be denied that in terms of the type of administration and life, in terms of prevailing interests, this property came close to a simple estate. Then, in the relations of the princes to each other, one can notice the beginning of subordination due to the well-known political right of the elders in relation to the younger ones. The treaties of the princes did not always re-establish relations between them, but quite often only sanctioned customary law already in force. This political right determined princely relations beyond treaties. All this in total allows us to speak only of a certain mixture of state and private law in a specific era, and not of the replacement of state law by private law.

9. Features of feudalism in the specific system of northeastern Russia in the XIII-XV centuries; fragmentation of state power.

So, the specific principalities, both in size and in the nature of their possession and use, came close to the large estates of private owners and church institutions, and on the other hand, large possessory estates came close to the principalities, because their owners acquired political rights over the population of their estates. Thus, in the political system of northeastern Russia, the most characteristic features of medieval feudalism appeared - the fragmentation of state power and its combination with land ownership. In addition to this, it can be pointed out that in our country, as in the West, with the division of state power, a whole hierarchy of sovereigns was formed, differing from each other in the number of their supreme rights. The highest sovereign of Russia, from whom the Russian princes received their investiture, corresponding to the emperors, western and eastern, was the Tsar of the Horde, who considered the entire Russian land as his ulus, as one of his possessions. Below him were the great princes - Vladimir-Moscow, Tver and Ryazan, corresponding to the Western European kings, who received from him labels for great reigns with all their territories; under the great princes were the appanage princes, corresponding to the Western European dukes, subordinate to the great ones in some respects, and even lower were the landowning boyars and church institutions, who, as we have seen, enjoyed state rights of court and taxation in their estates. However, those rights that constitute sovereignty - are independent, not derivative - had only the first three categories of sovereigns. Sovereignty was divided between the khan and the great and specific princes. Only these sovereigns had the right to diplomatic relations (specific - limited), the right to beat coins, etc. Even the smallest princes used the right to beat coins. The Tver Museum keeps coins with the inscriptions: Denga Gorodesk., Gorodetsko, Gorodensko. This Gorodensky or Gorodetsky money was believed to have been minted by some of the most insignificant Tver specific princes, namely the princes of Staritsky or Gorodensky. Other non-grand princely silver and copper money (pools) are also known: Kashinsky, Mikulinsky, Spassky and others. As for private landowners and church institutions, they have not achieved sovereign rights in Russia, which their Western brethren acquired for themselves. As is known, in the West, many feudal lords usurped sovereign rights for themselves, called sovereigns by the grace of God, minted coins, conducted diplomatic relations, etc. e. The latest researcher of the Russian appanage system Pavlov-Silvansky gave the following explanation to this difference between our orders and the orders of the West: “In our country, just as in the West, the earth had to uncontrollably disintegrate, be divided into small independent worlds. But at the time of the imminent division of the country, we had a lot of princes-pretenders with hereditary sovereign rights. They have replaced in our country the western feudal lords who had seized sovereign rights: division from above prevented division from below; the reign of the earth warned her charisma. In this explanation, the named historian, in my opinion, correctly noted the essence of the matter, although he did not finish it, because this did not agree with his other views. The princes became territorial sovereigns in Russia before the boyar landownership was created, which developed already under the protection and dependence of the princely power. Meanwhile, Pavlov-Silvansky, sharing the theory of "zemstvo boyars", thinks that boyar landownership was created in our country earlier, or in any case independently of princely power.

10. The origin of feudal relations in Russia.

How, then, was created in Russia, too, an order close to Western European feudalism? In the previous lecture, one of the main reasons that gave rise to this order was noted, the dominance of natural agriculture, which was established in Russia with the arrival of the Tatars, in connection with the depletion of people's capital. This circumstance, as we have seen, forced the princes to engage mainly in the business that the landowners - rural owners are engaged in, because otherwise the princes had nothing to live on; the princes thus approached the private landowners. On the other hand, having no money to distribute salaries to their servants and church institutions, the princes willingly sacrificed their rights over the population of their estates in their favor, granted them immunities, various benefits and exemptions, thus bringing them closer to the sovereigns. But is it possible to dwell on this reason alone in explaining the origin of Russian feudalism? Economic historians tend to be content with this one reason and ignore others that have been put forward by historians of law and culture. We cannot ignore these reasons of an internal, spiritual nature. What forced the princes to divide the territory of the state into appanages? Economic needs, the need for intensive agricultural labor, the economists will answer us. But for this, let us tell them, it was not at all necessary to divide the state power itself. It was enough for the eldest prince to place himself on the destinies of the younger ones, retaining all his state rights over the population of the destinies and giving the younger princes only the economic exploitation of the land, in extreme cases, governorship in the destinies. If the princes divided the state power itself, then this was nevertheless due to their political underdevelopment, from their lack of the view that the highest state power, in its essence, cannot be the subject of a family division. Dividing state power, the princes obviously looked at it as a subject of private ownership. This partly explains the fact that they shared it with their boyars. To welcome the boyar for his service, there was no need to give him immunity without fail. In order to grant what gave immunity, in essence, it was enough to make the boyar a governor or volost in his estate, grant him princely income and provide some benefits to the population of his estate. But the princes usually went further and forever renounced their rights in relation to the population of such estates, obviously not appreciating these rights not only from an economic, but also from a political and legal point of view. Therefore, the opinion of those historians who deduced feudalism from the general state of culture of a certain era, not only economic, material, but also political, legal, and spiritual, seems more correct.

11. Pawning and patronage.

On the basis of the above-described order and in connection with the general conditions of culture in Russia, phenomena developed that have an analogy in the phenomena of the feudal era in the West. To such phenomena it is necessary, first of all, to attribute staking. Since the difference between the sovereign and the private owner in his state was obscured in practice and in the public consciousness, then naturally the concept of the subject should have become muddied. Free persons began to consider themselves entitled to give themselves into citizenship not only to numerous princes, but also to private individuals and institutions, to pledge, as it was said then, not only for different princes, but also for boyars, lords and monasteries, if this promised them any benefit. . And this benefit seemed all the time, because the princely power, weakened by division and specific fragmentation, was often unable to provide the individual with the necessary protection and means of subsistence. In Russia, therefore, the same thing began to happen as in Western Europe in the era of the weakening of royal power, when the weak sought protection by commanding powerful landowners and church institutions. The analogy in this respect went so far that in Russia, as well as in the West, they began to be mortgaged with estates.

It was said above that the boyar estates were under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, and not the one whom their owner served at that time, they were dragged by court and tribute by land and water. But this rule has been broken over time. The owners began to mortgage for the princes, to whom they entered the service with estates, just as in the West the owners acted with their fiefs, which were once also under the rule of territorial sovereigns. This created a terrible confusion of relations, which the princes tried to counteract with treaties. In these treaties, they confirmed that the boyar patrimonies should remain under the sovereignty of the territorial prince, pull court and tribute over land and water, that the princes should not keep villages in other people's destinies, buy and accept for free, should not give letters of commendation to someone else's lot, judge there, and take tribute and in general "do not intervene in someone else's lot with any deeds." But by all indications, the princes did not succeed in eradicating this phenomenon, and the transfers of owners with estates to the citizenship of other princes continued. Such transitions are ascertained from sources even at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century. So, in 1487, a certain Ivashko Maksimovich, the son of Looking, beat Grand Duchess Sofya with his brow "and with his patrimony, with half the village of Looking, which is in Murom in the Kuzemsky camp, with everything that was drawn to his half." Bearing in mind such cases, Ivan III wrote in his spiritual letter of 1504: “and the boyars and children of the boyars of Yaroslavl with their estates and with purchases from my son Vasily cannot leave anyone anywhere.” In 1507, the well-known abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, Joseph Sanin, who founded his monastery in the estate of Prince Boris Vasilyevich of Volotsk and with his assistance, quarreled with his prince, “refused his sovereign to a great state”, under the high hand of Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich. When Joseph was reproached for this, he cited precedent. “In our years,” he said, “Prince Vasily Yaroslavich had a Sergius monastery in his patrimony, and Prince Alexander, Fedorovich, Yaroslavsky had a Kamensky monastery in his patrimony, and the princes of the Zasekinskys had a monastery in their patrimony of the Most Pure Ones on Tolza”; and so the abbots of these monasteries browed Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich, and he "took those monasteries into his state, but did not order those princes to intercede in those monasteries for nothing." And in ancient times, - remarks on this occasion the compiler of the life of St. Joseph, - "from lesser offenses to greater resorted." Individuals were pledged not only for the princes, but also for the boyars, for the lord and monasteries. Thanks to this, the rich boyars had entire detachments of servants who served them at court and in war, and who thus represent a complete analogy with the Western European subvassals. Boyarin Rodion Nestorovich, having come from Kyiv to serve the Grand Duke Ivan Danilovich Kalita, brought with him 1,600 men of the squad. Then the noble Moscow boyar Akinf Gavrilovich Shuba, offended by the honor given to the visiting boyar and not wanting to be under Rodion in the smaller ones, went to the service of Mikhail Tverskoy and took 1,300 servants with him. Ivan III, having taken Novgorod, first of all dissolved the large princely and boyar courts in Novgorod and distributed estates to the princely and boyar servants. But in the Principality of Tver, servants who served with their estates to the boyars existed even under Grozny. As in the West, many service people in a special era were pledged to us for the clergy - the metropolitan, bishops and monasteries. The metropolitan and the bishops had boyar children in the later era of the Muscovite state, until the very beginning of the 18th century.

If in specific time, therefore, there was no idea of ​​allegiance, in our sense of the word, then there is nothing surprising if individuals were given under the protection of the prince of the territory where they lived - to their own sovereign. This fact is impossible at the present time, in the present state, where it is assumed that the sovereign is the same patron for everyone. But at that time they did not think so, and therefore many persons were given under the special protection of the prince, in munde-burdium regis, as they said in the West, they received the right to sue only before him, etc.

12. Transfers of boyars and servants; salaries and food.

Due to the obscurity of the idea of ​​allegiance between the princes and their boyars and servants, the same contractual relations that were established between them at a time when the princes were not territorial owners and the boyars were not landowners continued to be preserved. This or that boyar and servant served the prince, not because he was obliged to serve him as the sovereign of the country, but because he "ordered" him to serve, finding it profitable for himself. And this is true both with respect to the boyars and servants, and with respect to the settled ones, for the latter could always leave their prince. The right of the boyars and servants to freely move was undoubtedly a legacy of the former retinue life of Kievan Rus. But if it lasted so long in the specific era, already when the boyars were settled, it was only because the idea of ​​allegiance did not become clear in this era.

On the basis of contractual relations between princes and boyars and servants, phenomena developed that corresponded to the Western European distribution of beneficiaries. Boyars and servants came to one or another prince to serve, beat him with a forehead (Western European homagium), and he gave them a salary, beneficium, which they received as long as they served. In the west, most of the land was distributed as benefices. And among us, the princes distributed palace lands to some servants, plots of their domains, which were in charge of the court, corresponding to the western majordoms, palatine counts, etc. Another charter mentions "villages - the prince's salary", the time of the award of which dates back to the beginning of the 15th century. And just as in the west, the princes took these lands from their servants if they drove away from them. About one of these servants, who conditionally owned the village granted to him, about Boris Vorkov, Ivan Kalita says in his spiritual 1328: “even if my son whom I serve, the village will be after him; if you don’t have to serve, the village will be taken away. In agreements between themselves, the princes agreed on these servants: and whoever leaves their inheritances ... is deprived of the land. But due to the peculiarities of our country, land was not the main object of distribution of beneficiaries for a long time. There was plenty of land everywhere, it had little value for the princes, and the boyars and servants borrowed a lot of it without any conditions, according to the tacit or public recognition of the princes. The developed patrimonial boyar land tenure for a long time excluded the need for the distribution of land as a beneficiary or, as we said, estates. In Russia, at a specific time, another form of beneficiation was predominantly developed - the distribution of posts as a salary for service, feeding, that is, not fief-terre, but fief-office. Therefore, in the letters of our princes we meet such expressions: “I granted you to the nursery for feeding for their departure to us,” that is, for entering the service; or: “I granted Ivan Grigoryevich Ryla ... the parish of Luza (that is, the volost to Luza) for their departure to us in feeding. And you, all the people of that volost, honor them and listen, and they know you, and judge and go to order your tyun with you, and have income according to the mandate list. Feeding in the volosts became a common sign of free boyars and servants. "And the free servants will, who was in feeding and argument with our father and with us." These feedings in the west, as we know, became hereditary fiefs: there the dukes, our governors, counts, our governors, vice-graphs or viscounts, our volosts, became hereditary owners of their posts and the income associated with them. But in our country, feedings did not become not only hereditary, but even lifelong, they were usually given for years and generally for short periods. The reason for this was the poverty of our princes, who did not have the opportunity to feed all their servants at once, but had to observe a certain queue in this regard, and, moreover, the absence of a connection between official feeding and land ownership. In the west, in addition to income, feeders received a certain allotment of land for the position, and this allotment, becoming, like all fiefs, over time, hereditary, dragged along the position itself. In our specific era, as already mentioned, the boyars and servants needed little land, provided with patrimonial land tenure, and therefore we did not develop phenomena similar to the above.

13. Features of feudalism in the views, language and life of a specific era.

From all that has been said, it can be seen that in Russian antiquity of specific time there were many features that made it related to Western European feudalism. We meet here the same institutions, the same attitudes and views as in the feudal West, sometimes in full development, sometimes in less definite features. In our letters there are phrases that are, as it were, a literal translation of the corresponding Latin texts. For the most important feudal institutions in Russian antiquity, there were special terms corresponding to Western European ones. Commandants were called mortgages among us; to designate a feudal commendation, the words set, pledged were used. The Russian warrior, like the German one, was called a husband; the boyar, just like the vassal, is the servant of the master of the grand duke. We had a special word for beneficiation, salary; this word was as widespread among us as in the West the word benefice, flax. The land granted to conditional possession (estate), and the position, and immunity benefits were also called salaries. With the similarity of the socio-political system, the similarity of life is also noticed. The spirit of discord, singularity, freedom and independence hovers in Russian society of the specific era, as well as in Western feudal society. Feudal freedom and independence led us, just as in the West, to violence and arbitrariness, especially on the part of the boyars, who often undertook robbery raids on each other. A characteristic feature of the Western feudal lords was their military profession, their military spirit. This trait was expressed in chivalry. Our boyars and princes have largely lost the chivalrous features that were characteristic of their predecessors and so vividly depicted in the Tale of Igor's Campaign. However, they were all warriors. During the constant appanage civil strife, all of them often had to fight at the head of detachments of their servants and people. Spiritual lords did not go on a campaign themselves, but in return for themselves they sent their governors who led their servants. One of the typical features of Western feudalism is, in the usual view, a fortified castle with loopholes, ditches, and drawbridges. In specific Russia there were no stone castles. But stone castles were replaced by fortified towns on the hills, on the elevated bank of the river, or on the ancient Meryan barrows. These princely towns and kremls satisfied the same need as the western feudal castles. Our spiritual masters also erected fortifications. Monasteries were built in the same way as princely kremlins, usually near a lake or a river. Both were surrounded by walls of uniform architecture with towers, loopholes, and gates. The boyars of the 14th-15th centuries did not have such fortifications, but each boyar estate, even in later times, in the 17th century, was an armed camp surrounded by a palisade. So, in this case, the difference between Russia and Western Europe was not so much qualitative as quantitative.

Western European feudalism generally went much further in its development than Russian feudalism. Russia did not develop that feudal system, those strictly defined legal institutions, customs, concepts, that everyday ritual that can be observed in Western countries in the Middle Ages. Russian feudalism in its development did not go beyond the primary, rudimentary forms, which failed to harden and consolidate. The reason for this is the unsteady social ground on which it was created, the mobility of the population in a continuously colonizing country, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, intense pressure from outside, which awakened the instincts of national self-preservation and called to life and creativity the state principle in the real, true sense of this the words.


Literature.

1. V. I. Sergeevich. Veche and prince (Russian legal antiquities. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1893).

2. B. N. Chicherin. Experiments on the history of Russian law. M., 1858.

3. V. O. Klyuchevsky. Boyar Duma of ancient Russia. M., 1909. Ed. 4th.

4. N. P. Pavlov-Silvansky. Feudalism in ancient Russia. SPb., 1907. Works. T. 3. St. Petersburg, 1910.