Strategic bombing during World War II took on a larger scale than ever before. Strategic bombing by Nazi Germany, Britain, the US, and Japan used conventional weapons, firebombs, and nuclear weapons.

"Carpet bombing" is an expression denoting non-aimed bombing of areas. In this case, a large number of bombs are used (often in combination with incendiary bombs) to completely destroy the selected area, or to destroy the enemy personnel and materiel, or to demoralize him. During the Spanish Civil War in 1937, the city of Guernica was bombed when at least 100 civilians were killed during the raids of the Condor Legion. Nazi Germany resorted to bombing civilian targets from the early days of World War II. The British government ordered its RAF to strictly adhere to the Amsterdam Draft International Rules, which forbade attacks on civilian infrastructure outside the war zone, but abandoned it on May 15, 1940, the day after the bombing of Rotterdam. On August 24, 1940, German aircraft launched the first bombing of London. A period of mutual bombing of cities followed, the main target of which was the industrial urban zones. In February 1942, the RAF abandoned its attempts at high-precision strategic bombing, and switched to the practice of carpet bombing, the main goal of which was "the morale of the enemy's civilian population." It was clarified that "the target of the bombing should be residential areas, and not, for example, docks or aircraft factories."

The United States entered the war with the intention of using high-precision strategic bombing, which was used with varying degrees of success in Europe. However, in the case of Japan, due to the presence of high-altitude jet streams, high-precision strategic bombing proved ineffective and was abandoned in favor of carpet bombing. The British were deeply impressed by the German strategic bombing of the First World War. For the first time in hundreds of years, London was successfully attacked by the enemy. When the war began in 1939, the RAF had only 488 bombers of all types, mostly obsolete, of which only about 60 were new Vickers. Most of the rest did not have sufficient range to strike even on the Ruhr (not to mention Berlin), had insignificant weapons, and could not carry a significant bomb load. There were no effective sights for bombing, very few bombs that could cause significant damage to the enemy, and even such obvious things as maps of Europe to determine the course to the target and back were in great short supply. Moreover, the difficulty of targeting bombers, at night, at long ranges to accurately attack small targets, was greatly underestimated.

Germany by that time had abandoned plans for the production of strategic bombers. In view of the fact that German technical resources were already largely used to meet other needs. The doctrine of the Luftwaffe assumed active support of the army, and taking into account the practical experience of Spain, the German command concentrated on the use of tactical bombers as aerial artillery in support of army operations, and fighters as a means of protecting bombers from enemy fighters. With the outbreak of hostilities in Western Europe, all three main players (Great Britain, Germany and France) concentrated on tactical daylight bombing. The RAF found that bravery in combat could not make up for the lack of necessary aircrew training and aircraft armament; the losses of the British bombers during the defense of France were catastrophic, and the results of their action were minimal. As a result, following the results of the first year of the war, few people remembered the strategic bombing.

Due to mounting losses during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe began to resort to night bombing tactics. During the week that began on 12 August, less than a quarter of the Luftwaffe's flights were made at night, while in the last week of August, more than half. On 19 August Göring ordered a major night attack on Liverpool, and gave his subordinates the freedom to choose targets for the bombing. London was bombed on 15, 18/19, 22/23, 24/25, 25/26 and 28/29 August. In general, during the bombing of British cities in August 1940, more than 1,000 people died.

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In response, the RAF made its first raid on Berlin on 25/26 August. This was politically embarrassing for Göring, who argued that the Luftwaffe could protect major German cities from air raids. Under pressure from his superiors, Kesselring in particular, and believing that the RAF was much weaker than it really was, Göring ordered that the bombing of London be concentrated on, in the hope that the "last remaining" RAF fighters would be drawn into dogfights in which the Luftwaffe will be able to win due to numerical superiority. The massive bombing of London began on 7 September, with over 300 bombers attacking in the evening and another 250 at night. By the morning of September 8, 430 Londoners had been killed, and the Luftwaffe issued a press release stating that over one thousand tons of bombs had been dropped on London within 24 hours. Over the next 9 months, many English cities were bombed, including Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Belfast, Cardiff and Coventry. The stated goal of the bombings was strategic - the destruction of port and industrial infrastructure; but it is also beyond doubt that breaking the will of the common English to resist was an important, if not the chief, aim of this campaign.

Civilian casualties were significant. The expected decline in the will to resist, however, did not occur; moreover, according to popular belief, the bombings had the opposite effect. During 1941, the air forces of the parties were drawn into the radio navigation war. German scientists developed a range of radio-navigation devices designed to assist Luftwaffe pilots in targeting at night over British territory, while the British worked on countermeasures (of which the development of airborne radar, decoy beacons and jammers deserves special mention). Despite the significant damage inflicted by the German bombing and significant loss of life among the civilian population, Britain's air defense gradually improved, and the need to transfer all possible parts of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front led to the gradual transformation of the bombing from massive to rare harassing raids.

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Britain launched its own strategic night bombing campaign in 1940 and built it up to impressive proportions by the end of the war. The impact of strategic bombing on the enemy was poorly understood at the time and greatly exaggerated. Especially in the first two years of the campaign, very few people realized how little the damage was and how quickly the Germans made up for lost production, despite the obvious lessons that Britain could learn from its own experience of surviving German air attacks earlier.

Arthur Harris, head of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, said that "for lack of a rapier, they had to resort to a club." In his perception, although pinpoint strikes against specific targets would be much more preferable, it was not physically possible to do this, and since war is war, it is necessary to attack with what is at hand. He supported the idea of ​​bombing cities. Knowing that it would result in civilian casualties, because it was a choice between bombing cities and no bombing at all. And also, because the bombing of cities meant dropping large numbers of bombs on areas full of economic activity, in which industrial plants were located, making a significant contribution to German military production.

A very significant part of British industry was occupied with the task of creating a huge fleet of heavy bombers. Up until 1944, the effect on German war production remained extremely small and raised doubts as to whether the result was worth the effort. The usual counter-argument to this was that, in any event, this was the only direction in which British war production could be directed. The impact of strategic bombing on German resource allocation, however, became significant over time, as Germany eventually had to devote up to a quarter of its military production to air defense and bombing relief. The damage done to the German transport system was also very significant. In addition, the Luftwaffe was weakened and by mid-1944 the Allies had gained air supremacy over Germany during the daytime, which was absolutely necessary for successful preparations for the Allied landings in Normandy.

In August 1942, the first crews of the US 8th Air Force began to arrive in England, armed with Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress strategic bombers. The first test raid was made on August 17, 1942 on a railway junction in Rouen Sotteville in northwestern France. In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, it was decided to begin strategic bombing of Germany by joint Anglo-American forces. The targets of the bombing were to be both objects of the military industry and the cities of Germany. The operation was codenamed Point Blank. Large-scale round-the-clock bombing - by the US Air Force during the day, by the British - at night - many industrial areas of Germany, mainly the Ruhr, were subjected to. This was followed by attacks directly on cities such as Hamburg, Kassel, Pforzheim, Mainz and the often criticized raid on Dresden. The tonnage dropped by the US Air Force in Europe was much less than the RAF, as the latter had larger bombers and bombed over a longer period. Despite their popularity among the military and politicians, strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds, since it did not always give a reliable result, and on moral grounds, due to significant civilian casualties.

In Germany, the will to resist was not broken by strategic bombing, which was carried out on a larger scale than the German bombing of Great Britain. In Germany, as well as in Japan, there were no surrender riots, and the German workers, with sullen stoicism, maintained war production at the highest possible level; the morale of German civilians also, although affected by the bombing, survived until the end of the war. Most of the German civilians, mostly women and children, were evacuated from the cities in the later stages of the war. Workers in some, but not all, factories were replaced by German concentration camp prisoners with low labor motivation who were severely repressed by their SS guards if their productivity declined; most of the surviving German workers, however, continued to work and remained in their posts.

to be continued…

strategic bombing

Of all aspects of the use of air power, strategic bombing seems to have been the subject of the most heated debate. The beginning of these discussions dates back to 1920, when the Italian aviation specialist Douai suggested that victory in the war could only be won by long-range bombardment from the air; the ground forces and the navy are "only auxiliary means used for transport purposes and the occupation of territory." This view existed before, after the war, some senior American officers suggested that strategic atomic bombing, carried out on a large scale, could go a long way towards winning the war. The point of departure for this point of view was Clausewitz's position that war is a continuation of politics. This view suggests that the devastating bombing of Germany and Japan created fertile ground for the growth of communist sentiment in those countries and made them more hostile to the Anglo-Saxon democracies that destroyed their cities. Let's try to look into the future. Let us assume that the European continent or any part of Europe was captured by the Red Army. Will they ever be able to reunite politically with the West if their release is linked to the atomic bombing? There are many other contentious issues regarding strategic bombing. Should strategic bomber aviation be independent of the army and navy, and even of the rest of the air force? Should it report directly to the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or should it be an integral part of the air force, regardless of its form of organization? What is the best way to plan the sequence of bombardment of targets? When is it better to carry out daytime bombardment and when - at night? Etc.

Aviation strategists up until 1950 were widely divided on the significance of strategic bombing. The advent of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and modern strategic bombers, with a range of up to 8,000 km, increased by air refueling, made the governments and commanders of every country clearly understand that strategic bombing could be the main means of achieving victory in a war or stabilizing an international politicians. At present, bombers from their bases can reach and attack targets anywhere in the world, delivering bombing strikes of unprecedented force.

The devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo and Berlin was horrendous, but it is nothing compared to what can be produced by concentrated repeated bombardments of ever-increasingly powerful atomic bombs. This is now so real that governments and air defense commands cannot ignore it. Now the claim that strategic bombing can be the main way to win a war or keep the peace is not an empty idea. Alexander Seversky in the second chapter of his book "Air Power - the Key to Salvation" noted this provision. There are two states, Russia and the United States, that must keep the peace, and in the volatile atmosphere of the Cold War, the Soviets' fear of United States bomber power is the main deterrent to war. Russia does not need to be afraid of the American navy, since it is not afraid of a naval blockade and does not depend on sea communications. The territories owned and controlled by Russia are vast expanses.

Russia also has nothing to fear from the ground armies of America and its allies, since the number of communist divisions will always greatly outnumber those of its opponents. These divisions will receive good weapons and will fight well. The air power of the Americans, and especially its strategic air forces, which can easily be used for offensive operations against the USSR, without being constrained by any limiting conditions, inspires the greatest fear. One should not judge by such facts as the events in Korea and Malaya, where wars can be waged on unfavorable terms dictated or supported by the Kremlin. The technical and scientific achievements of the West can be most advantageously demonstrated by the example of strategic aviation. In addition, Russia has relatively little experience in the use of strategic aviation. Winston Churchill often emphasized in his speeches that the American atomic bombers helped bring about stabilization during the volatile Cold War period of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Few on this side of the Iron Curtain would disagree with him. There is every reason to believe that the fears of the "Soviets" for their strategic air defense confirm Churchill's assessment of the situation in the five years since the end of the Second World War.

In the period between the two world wars, the role of strategic bombing was repeatedly evaluated and re-evaluated in the aviation headquarters of various countries. Probably the most significant, fundamental change occurred in the Soviet air force in the thirties. Although the Russians initially viewed aviation as a means to serve the tactical requirements of the army and navy, the USSR was the first state in history to begin building a large air fleet of four-engine bombers. These were TB-3 bombers designed by Tupolev. By 1935, there were already several hundred of them in the Soviet air force. However, the need to build transport aircraft to transport airborne troops, the failure to prototype four-, six-, and eight-engine bomber transport aircraft in the thirties, the need for a rapid expansion of fighter aircraft to counter the potential threat from Japan and Germany, all delayed construction of the Soviet strategic bomber aviation. The origin of the Russian heavy bomber dates back to the period of World War I, when Russia temporarily pioneered the use of a four-engine heavy bomber, which even then had almost the same wingspan as the Flying Fortress bomber of the Second World War.

In 1942 there was a new change in the Soviet air force. Stalin was concerned about the heavy losses of tactical aviation in the first months of the war with Germany. He wanted, like the British, to strike back directly at Germany at a time when the Red Army was retreating and did not set as its immediate task the return of the vast territories captured by the Germans in the Baltic republics, Eastern Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. That is why Stalin instructed General (later Marshal) Golovanov to reorganize heavy bomber aviation and unite it into an independent organizational unit subordinate to the State Defense Committee. This new organization, called ADD (long-range aviation), was militarily weak. Most of the aircraft were twin-engine American B-25 Mitchell aircraft supplied under Lend-Lease, and Soviet IL-4 aircraft. Later, several squadrons of Soviet-made four-engine PE-8 aircraft appeared. These aircraft, however, had insufficient range and carrying capacity, and lacked radar for navigation and blind bombing. The operations of these aircraft against the oil fields in Rumania, as well as the several raids they carried out on Berlin, Budapest and Warsaw, caused very little concern to the German air defense. In the German air force, however, a night fighter aircraft was created to deal with Soviet bombers, but it never had much significance.

However, since 1945, the Soviet air force has done everything possible to create a strong strategic bomber aviation. In the West, many were struck by the speed with which aircraft were built, which are an exact copy of the American B-29 Superfortres bombers that made an emergency landing on the territory of the USSR in the period 1946-1947. By 1950, the Soviet Air Force had several hundred Tupolev-designed four-engine bombers. Engine power, bomb load and range have been significantly increased. Ilyushin, the leading designer of tactical bombers, was switched to designing a heavy jet bomber. The Ilyushin-16 four-engine jet bomber was not accepted into service, but Ilyushin was involved in the construction of another heavy four-engine jet bomber currently in service with the Soviet air force. In 1949, the first atomic bomb was detonated in the USSR. At present stockpiles of atomic bombs are being created there, hydrogen bombs are being produced.

In a published report on air power in the Pacific, Major Alexander Seversky, one of the leading proponents of strategic bombing, stated that the United States, like Japan, had no intention of using air power at the start of the war except in the interest of providing close air support. This statement fully applies to the Japanese, who intended to subordinate their air force to the tactical requirements of the army and navy. The Americans were different. Mitchell was not the only person to point out the need for a heavy bomber force independent of the US military. He was simply the most popular of the "prophets". Generals Arnold and Spaatz believed in the future of strategic bomber aircraft, but they were in the US Army Air Forces and were baffled by the ever-increasing demands and primacy of the ground forces. It is significant that the budget of the US Army in 1940 provided for appropriations that were insufficient even to create one squadron of Flying Fortress bombers. In Bomber Offensives (p. 53), Lord Harris pointed out that the United States had adopted "the basic idea of ​​the strategic use of air power from the British Air Force." Many US Air Force officers, as well as British Air Force officers, will disagree with Seversky's assertion that the tactical use of air power was "the only goal that the military leaders of all belligerent states initially envisioned."

Britain's priority in developing a general concept of strategic bombing is generally recognized. Before the end of the First World War, General Smuts presented a serious report to the military cabinet, in which he suggested that military aviation would soon be used for strategic purposes. The reason for this assumption was the daytime raids of German aircraft on London in June - July 1917. These raids caused great concern, since the air defense was unprepared to deal with them. In his report, Smuts made an unusual statement for that time, which has become common truth in our time. He wrote: “The day is not far off when actions from the air, entailing the devastation of enemy territory and the destruction of industrial and administrative centers on a large scale, can become the main ones, and the actions of the army and navy - auxiliary and subordinate.” He also stated in his report that he "sees no limits for the independent use of military aviation."

Perhaps it is appropriate here to try to explain the concept of independent air forces. There are many known cases of poor planning for long-range bombardment due to the fact that the concept of independent bomber aircraft was the subject of disputes between the branches of the armed forces. The organization of the air force, which exists only on paper, does not matter for the effectiveness of air operations and is only a secondary factor. Göring's air force during the Second World War was independent only on paper, but in reality it was not used independently in the sense that General Smuts had in mind in 1917. This was mainly because the command of the German air force, in view of the existing economic policy in the pre-war period, did not develop its four-engine long-range bombers of the Junkers-90 and Focke-Wulf-200 types, but followed the trend towards the development of twin-engine Heinkel bombers, " Dornier and Junkers. When in 1942 the command of the German air force wanted to change this situation, the harsh combat situation, the unbridled and ignorant commander Hitler, as well as the inability of industry to produce a sufficient number of heavy bombers - all this actually did not allow the creation of an effective strategic aviation force. At the same time, the example of the United States Army Air Force showed that the organization scheme is not a barrier to independent action. The American Flying Fortress and Superfortress bomber squadrons were theoretically an integral part of General Marshall's armed forces and, despite this, they operated almost as effectively as if they were an independent bomber command, like that of the British air force. The personal fighting qualities of US Air Force Generals Arnold, Spaatz, Kenya, Andersen, and Doolittle played a greater role than the Pentagon's decision.

When in 1942 the heavy bomber aviation of the Soviet Union was singled out as an independent branch of the armed forces, it did not become a more effective means of this. In the past, too much attention has been paid to the organizational structure of the air force and too little to the necessary flexibility in its use. Talk about independent bomber aircraft is, in a sense, completely absurd and even dangerous. Even more dangerous is the assignment of bomber aviation missions that do not meet the requirements of the land army and navy. The purpose of long-range bombing is to help achieve victory in the war. The best way for the air force to win the war is to gain air superiority, then use heavy bomber aircraft to cripple the enemy's industrial capability, destroy lines of communication, undermine the morale of the people, and assist in the transportation of troops destined to occupy enemy territory. At the same time, it is assumed that the enemy air defense can be suppressed and deprived of the ability to resist for a long time.

However, most aviation experts believed that in the summer of 1943 the American strategic bombing program against Nazi Germany was in danger of being disrupted. This was because the US 8th Air Force had no long-range escort fighters, and the German Air Force had reinforced day fighter aircraft to such an extent that they could inflict almost irreparable losses on US bomber squadrons participating in the raids. At that time, Regensburg and Schweinfurt were too costly bombing targets for the Americans. The bombing of Japan and the subsequent bombing of Germany in 1944 and 1945 was a relatively easy task, since the enemy's air defenses were weakened. When B-29 bombers began bombing Japan in 1944, the latter had hundreds of heavily armed anti-aircraft fighters that were faster than the American Super Fortresses. Due to the insufficient interaction between parts of the fighter aviation of the army and the navy, as well as the imperfection of the radar stations, the Japanese were not able to effectively use fighters with a speed of 640 km / h (such as the Frank). It is believed that if Japan had had a fighter force equal in strength to the British Air Force Fighter Command in 1940, it is not known whether American heavy bombers would have been able to show the classic model of achieving victory through air power. Despite the presence of atomic bombs, in any war of the near future, effective means of defense will be found that can neutralize the effect of weapons of attack. Under conditions of warfare by means of strategic aviation, the advantage can sometimes be on the side of the defenders, since they have an early detection system that provides data on the number of enemy aircraft participating in the raid, the height and direction of their flight; because supersonic fighters are faster than supersonic bombers and, finally, because radio-controlled rockets, launched from the ground or from the air, can be more effective at short range, that is, in strategic defense than in strategic offensive, as already called Lord Trenchard. In raids on the Soviet Union, American strategic bombers will not enjoy the same freedom of action that they enjoyed in the raids on Japan in 1945. Russia faces difficult defense problems. However, it remains doubtful: who (defense or attack forces) will win complete air superiority over the entire territory of the Soviet Union? American bombers can be successful operating under heavy fighter cover against ports and secondary targets, but over inland heavily protected target areas such as Irkutsk and Moscow, they will encounter strong opposition both on their way to the target area and on the return route.

It is hard to believe that some proponents of strategic bombing have a complete understanding of the strategic defensive potential. Seversky, for example, states that “the whole strategy of the Second World War was determined by the insufficient range of the air force. Aircraft possessed destructive power sufficient to upset the military production of the enemy country, but the range of the aircraft was insufficient for such strikes.

Bloody battles during the war were fought in the final analysis for the advancement of airfields of bomber aviation” (Seversky's italics). Of course, the main problem was the shortage of aircraft, not their range, as Air Chief Marshal Harris complains about in his book Bomber Offensives. He asked for 4,000 heavy bombers to carry out air raids on Europe and did not receive them. And it is not known what caused the limited operations of the US 8th Air Force in Europe in 1942 and 1943: the insufficient range of the bombers, their insufficient number, or the strong air defense of the Germans? Moreover, the Red Army on the Eastern Front and the Americans in France and Germany in 1944-1945 fought bloody battles, the purpose of which was by no means to capture advanced airfields for bomber aircraft. The importance of strategic aviation will not diminish if we say that strategic defense can negate the full power of a strategic attack, especially when fighter units and anti-aircraft artillery units can be easily and quickly switched from performing tactical tasks to ensure offensive operations of ground forces to combat strategic bombers. The emergence of guided missiles, launched from the ground, from an aircraft or from other guided projectiles, once again underlines the high flexibility of air defense systems in this regard. In assessing the power of strategic bombing, one must constantly consider how many serviceable, manned and ready to fly bombers there are, how strong the enemy's air defenses are, and how accurate and effective bombing can be. In the heat of debate, these important points are often overlooked or ignored. The choice of targets for strategic bombing will always be influenced by such factors as the state of the enemy's air defenses, the importance of the objects of attack, and the amount of intelligence available about the enemy. Meteorological conditions are no longer as important a factor as they were, for example, during US Air Force operations against Germany in 1943 and 1944. At present, bombers can fly at high altitudes, well above the area of ​​bad meteorological conditions. Radar bombers have become more advanced, and the presence of heavier and more powerful aerial bombs means that point bombing in good visibility is relatively less important. With the advent of the atomic bomb, area bombing has become such a natural method that it is unlikely that in the future it will be possible to separate the strategic bombing of civilians from the bombing of military installations.

One of the most important lessons of strategic bombing, which has yet to be fully explored, is that the order in which objects are bombed according to their importance cannot play any role until the latest intelligence on the target is obtained. During the Second World War, most of the bomber force was wasted and many civilians were killed simply because the objects of attack were chosen incorrectly. One can recall, for example, how cities in neutral countries - Eyre and Switzerland - were accidentally bombarded. This was not so much due to errors in aeronautical calculations, which also happened quite often, but due to ignorance of one's target of bombardment. If the Allied intelligence data on oil production in Germany, on the productivity of oil refineries were accurate enough, then the Anglo-American strategic bombing of oil industry facilities would have begun much earlier than May 1944. If the Allies had been more aware of the enemy aircraft industry, there would have been no need for intensive bombardment of aircraft airframe factories, aircraft engine factories and aircraft assembly plants. There are many ways to kill a cat, but one way for one cat is enough. Intelligence and strategic bombing, like Darby and John, are inseparable from each other, but it is very difficult to achieve full recognition of this need in peacetime and wartime. Moreover, during the Second World War, Allied air reconnaissance was often unable to assist in assessing the results of the bombing of targets. If the commander of a strategic bomber does not know exactly to what extent his bombs destroyed the target, then how can he tell which targets he should attack next.

During the Second World War, bomber aviation was often tasked with attacking targets for which there was virtually no fresh reliable information that could be relied upon. Why did we seek to destroy Monte Cassino by continuous bombing raids that had no military effect? Why, in June, July and August 1940, very small groups of British bombers were sent to bomb German aluminum plants, while Germany had just captured France with all its bauxite stocks and aluminum plants? Unfortunately, there are many such examples.

Apparently, when strategic bombing becomes the basis of strategy, the air command feels the need to carry out the bombing of a certain complex of objects, but often has little idea of ​​the purpose of such an event. Air Marshal Harris, in a sense, justifies such actions when he writes: “If the task was to check the strength of the enemy’s defenses, then it was necessary to immediately attack, albeit with small forces. The policy of keeping our fighting forces as long as they could be used on a large scale would mean that we would deprive ourselves of the opportunity to keep up with the enemy's countermeasures. This seems to be the main reason for the error. Reconnaissance bombers can do a lot in terms of probing enemy air defenses, but they can also help make them more solid by giving the defender the opportunity to test their defenses in practice. Of course, strategic bomber aviation must be kept in reserve only until the military value of the objects is known. What is the use of studying the problems of the bombing of Baku or Berlin and wasting money and effort in vain? At the same time that the bombers are trying to find the weak points of the air defense, the latter is studying ways to deal with the bombers. Getting a brief briefing before taking off on a mission does not mean being well prepared to launch an attack with the appropriate forces. As Harris himself wrote, “The Dortmund-Ems Canal would never have been blocked for long if it had not been for accurate, often repeated attacks that did not allow the destruction to be restored.” An English Air Force pilot was awarded the Victoria Cross for hitting this target. Harris adds with regret: "A feat worthy of the Victoria Cross is of such a nature that it cannot be repeated often."

The question of selecting the forces appropriate to the assigned task, as well as providing intelligence data of an economic nature, cannot be fully resolved. In the future, it will play an even more important role than in the past. The use of the atomic bomb requires more careful reconnaissance of targets than before. This is due to two main reasons. First, the atomic bomb is terribly expensive: a large caliber bomb costs almost a million dollars. Secondly, it cannot be used with the same effect against any military target, and no one will risk throwing away such a huge amount of public money. If at one time crews and aircraft were the most expensive means of strategic aviation, now, in the atomic age, atomic bombs have become such means. The main direction of the economics of using the air force has changed; atomic bombs are becoming more important than crews, which requires increased intelligence and better planning. The atomic bomb did not change the strategy of air power or the principles of strategic bombing. The atomic bomb did not increase its destructive power to the incredible proportions that were discussed in the first days after the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Strategic Bombing Research Department has calculated that for such destruction as was done with the atomic bomb in Nagasaki, it would take 120 Superfortres bombers carrying 10 tons of conventional bombs each, and for such destruction as in Hiroshima - 210 bombers. Seversky points out: "It is true that Berlin, Dresden, Cologne, Hamburg, Bremen and many other large German cities received the same heavy destruction and on the same scale as Hiroshima and Nagasaki." It is also true that the suffering of the population, the loss of property and the destruction of industries as a result of firebombing was enormous in Tokyo and other cities in Japan. The use of the atomic bomb inevitably caused emotional experiences that do not contribute to a correct military analysis. The mikado's entourage deliberately exaggerated the destructive power of the atomic bomb in order to convince the Japanese people that it was a new supernatural weapon. This was done to preserve the prestige of the Mikado and to justify Japan's surrender to General MacArthur. In the name of humanity, not in the name of military strategy, John Hersey wrote his horrifying account of the devastation and tragedy in Hiroshima. American readers are more familiar with this document than they are with the more reliable data from the Atomic Energy Commission and reports from the Office of the Study of the Results of Strategic Bombing. It is not easy to overcome the influence of the flood of sensational reports about the atomic bombing that flooded the pages of the press for two or three years after the end of the Second World War. “The greatest tectonic force that has ever hit the earth ... a catastrophe, a world revolution, a flood, a rout and a disaster merged into one,” journalists wrote about this event. It was said that in Hiroshima, on soil contaminated by the atomic bomb, it was possible to grow cucumbers the size of a skyscraper, as well as a large number of other vegetables of gigantic size, which overshadowed all achievements in the field of horticulture. In fact, it turned out that one Japanese farmer applied more fertilizer than his neighbor, and harvested more. Most military commentators now understand that the atomic bomb is not the universal air weapon that was once believed. It may be appropriate to enumerate some of the limitations in the use of the atomic bomb, without diminishing, however, its power and significance as a deterrent.

It is unwise to use the atomic bomb against strong defensive fortifications. Dropping one large-caliber atomic bomb means risking too much at once. There are small-caliber atomic bombs for fighter planes, but their cost is high. In a future war, jet fighters will have almost the same range and strike power as any heavy bomber of the Second World War. The creation of smaller atomic bombs and the increase in the rate of their production will reduce the cost of the bomb, but will not make it cheap. If we set ourselves the goal of using atomic bombs economically, then we must strive to ensure that the goal is reached by the largest possible number of aircraft carrying them. The high cost of atomic bombs does not allow making big miscalculations when using them. The successful conduct of an attack with the help of atomic bombs urgently requires special care in the planning of the operation and the best support for it in terms of reconnaissance. It is necessary to take special diversionary actions, create radio interference and organize fighter cover. If the atomic bombers are to penetrate inland beyond the range of the escort fighters, then they must take advantage of the darkness of the night or poor weather conditions, which means that the accuracy of the bombing will be reduced. If the target cannot be detected visually, then it can be identified using radar bombsights; but at present the defender has the ability to create radar interference that can distort the image of the target on the radar screen or mislead the scorer into identifying a ghost town somewhere far away from the real target. There are many different objects against which the effect of an atomic explosion will be much less effective than against the light wooden dwellings of the Japanese. An analysis of the destruction caused by the use of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as well as during the post-war tests at Bikini and in New Mexico, showed that against some concrete and steel structures, the atomic bomb may be less effective than a series of rocket projectiles or armor-piercing bombs. The use of atomic bombs against reinforced concrete submarine bases, as well as against underground aviation or other factories, is wasteful. Modern cities with their steel and reinforced concrete structures will not suffer to the same extent as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, especially if there is a well-organized anti-nuclear defense ready to eliminate the consequences of an attack. The use of an atomic bomb against airfields is tantamount to firing a cannon at sparrows. For the same reasons, it is unprofitable to use the atomic bomb against many railway objects, for example, against small stations and road junctions. The cost of atomic bombing such targets would be unacceptably high. The consequences of an atomic raid will be effective for about a day. The experience of using the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other data lead to the conclusion that the main restoration work can be carried out in most cases only after a few days. Of course, some modern atomic bombs are more powerful than the 1945 atomic bombs, but this does not change the essence of the matter. It may take one or two days to eliminate the consequences of an atomic bombing. The zone of continuous destruction now seems to be about one square mile, and not a quarter of a square mile, as was the case in Hiroshima. Finally, most of the shock wave strength and thermal effect is lost because the atomic bomb is detonated at high altitude, or because the bulk of the atomic bomb's energy is expended over a limited area.

The above may seem to be the result of an underestimation of the atomic bomb as a military weapon. The atomic bomb is undoubtedly the most terrifying weapon of destruction ever used in war. But the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot serve as a typical example that could be used to assess the effect of the atomic bomb on the future. The press, politicians, and even some military leaders of the period 1946-1948 were inclined to draw historical conclusions about the role of the atomic bomb. It was a big political mistake that the atomic bomb became the main subject of disagreement on the issue of disarmament between the USSR and the West at that time. This suggests that both in Moscow and Washington, the importance of the atomic bomb for winning or losing the war was exaggerated. Japan's surrender was prepared many months before the first atomic bomb was dropped (editor's emphasis).

But the main task of the air headquarters of NATO and Moscow is to conduct atomic and non-nuclear bombing in the future, not in the past. What questions arise in the higher planning bodies? First of all, what is the ratio of American and Russian strike power in relation to atomic and other strategic bombing, and how can this ratio change? At present (1954-1955), the US has a clear advantage. Its B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers can reach any target on the globe and return to their air base. In order to reach some targets on US soil, Russian long-range bombers designed by Tupolev and Ilyushin will be forced to undertake suicidal non-return flights or perform risky mid-air refueling in combat. Although the range advantage of the US bombers over the next few years may diminish as the USSR further develops long-range jet bombers, the US stockpiles of atomic bombs will be significantly larger than the USSR. This means that US Air Force squadrons, until the end of the fifties, and possibly beyond, will be able to drop more destructive weapons at greater distances from their bases. American bomber squadrons have more experience in strategic bombing (including some experience in Korea) than Soviet ones. American means of air navigation and radar bombing are superior to similar equipment used on long-range bomber squadrons of the Soviet Union. The American aircraft industry, assisted in part by British jet specialists, has more experience in producing the required types of long-range jet bombers. American air bases, located in all parts of the globe, have a better location for conducting raids on the USSR than Soviet bases for raids on the United States.

After the Second World War, a lot of effort was made in the area of ​​military and civil aviation to find the possibility of carrying out regular flights from Europe to North America and back through the Arctic regions. The Soviet Union has been conducting research flights in the polar regions for more than twenty years in order to study arctic currents, winds and magnetic fluctuations. It is now clear that both the US and the USSR have solved almost all the problems associated with flying in arctic conditions. Alternate landing sites have been organized along the entire length of the polar route and special meteorological stations have been set up. New types of compasses have been installed on airplanes, which provide navigation near the Earth's magnetic poles, and anti-icing devices have also been significantly improved. Canada and the United States clearly understand the need to repulse possible long-range Soviet bomber raids through the Arctic regions and jointly carry out defensive measures. These activities include the construction of three concentric radar detection lines, supplemented by the means of naval surveillance units that patrol far out at sea, and reinforced with fighter and anti-aircraft units in critical areas. United States and Canadian civil defense exercises are also being held. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Air Force has established airbases for bombers in the Arctic. Successful flights along the polar route by aircraft of the Scandinavian Aviation Company in 1954 further strengthened confidence in the possibility and necessity of polar flights. Over the past ten years, the strategic importance of the polar route has been repeatedly pointed out. This route will certainly save many hours of flying time for the new jet bombers that are coming into service with Soviet aviation units. In view of the highly skilled flight crews required for flights along the polar route, and the fact that ground support personnel must work under high stress conditions, it is unlikely that large forces will ever be used on this route. But in the age of the H-bomb, that doesn't matter. The successful development of this route is of greater strategic importance for the USSR than for the United States, since American strategic bomber aviation has a large number of bases located in milder climates. Therefore, it can be assumed that over the next years the USSR will strengthen strategic bomber aviation in the Arctic.

But the US will get a lot of help in conducting strategic bombing from its allies. The command of the British Air Force in the post-war period strongly spoke out in favor of the development of long-range bomber aircraft. This may not be the wisest policy. However, such aircraft will be an important addition to NATO's global strike power. The English four-engine jet bombers "Valient", "Volcano" and "Victor" by the end of the fifties will be able to reach targets in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, they are inaccessible to all facilities on the territory of the USSR, and, in modern terms, they are mainly medium bombers, but these bombers will be able to fly more than 1500 km with atomic bombs, which are currently being manufactured in England. These bombers will help curb the Kremlin's military ambitions.

There is no doubt that at the present time strategic bombardment must be carried out both day and night. First, the current range of American bombers is 8,000 km, and the average speed of many of them is unlikely to exceed 800 km/h in the near future. This means that they will need about ten hours of flying time to reach some areas in the USSR. In Europe, at certain times of the year, they will be forced to operate at night. The round-the-clock operations of Anglo-American aviation against Germany proved the expediency of combining daytime raids with night ones. Such actions forced the Germans to split their fighter aircraft into two parts and divert a large number of squadrons of single-engine and twin-engine fighters from carrying out tasks in support of the German army. There was a need to have two types of fighters: single-engine - with a short range of the Messerschmit and Focke-Wulf types, for operations during the day and in good meteorological conditions, and twin-engine - of the Junkers and Messerschmit types - for operations at night and in bad meteorological conditions. Of course, sometimes both performed the same tasks. Most of the American bomber raids on Japan were carried out during the daytime, so the defense of Japan was carried out by single-engine day fighters. It would be very instructive to see what would happen to the air defense of Japan if the daytime operations of the American Air Force were supplemented by the nighttime raids of the British Air Force. If Japan had not capitulated, then the Lancaster bomber squadrons would have begun to conduct combat raids from about. Okinawa. Then the population of the cities of Japan would have been forced to suffer from round-the-clock devastating bombardments, as was the case in Hamburg, Leipzig and other German cities. The Japanese fighters would have to work with great tension, and, most importantly, this would affect the composition of the kamikaze air units. It would have been much better in 1944 and 1945 to destroy Japanese fighters during dangerous night battles than to allow them to be used in large numbers against American and British naval vessels. In July 1944, seventeen squadrons were armed with "Zero" (Zeke-52) fighters equipped for use by suicide pilots. Fourteen of these squadrons operated against the American fleet in the fall of that year during the fighting off the Philippines. In addition to transports and cruisers, three American aircraft carriers were damaged: Hornet, Franklin and Hancock. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, it had 5,000 suicide bomber planes ready, mostly fighters. One of the most effective countermeasures against the suicide bombers who threatened the US Navy in the last year of the Pacific War would have been intensive round-the-clock strategic air operations against Japan.

There is no doubt that those who prepare NATO operational plans will take into account the importance of strategic air operations around the clock when they plan to block the maximum number of Soviet fighters, forcing them to play a passive role in the defense of the USSR. A heavy bombardment of enemy artillery firing positions will give good results regardless of whether it is light or heavy guns, unguided rockets or guided missiles. At the end of World War II, about two-thirds of all German guns were used for the defense of Germany proper. This came at the cost of reducing the amount of artillery needed to directly support ground forces in battle. The threat of strategic bombing compels the defenders to create a communications service in the air defense system with the involvement of highly qualified specialists in radio and telephone communications. This measure will weaken the composition of the front-line radio engineering units that provide aviation combat operations. Finally, passive defense, diverting masses of people to build structures to protect against enemy air raids and eliminate the consequences of air raids, can significantly affect the production of a country even before serious damage is caused by bombardment. There is sufficient evidence of this proposition in German documents from the period of the war. Albert Speer, who was then in charge of the German war industry, pointed out that in 1945 over a million Germans were employed in work related to the elimination of the consequences of the bombing.

Chapter 23

The strategic situation in the Western Pacific at the beginning of 1945. The militaristic system of power in Japan was a kind of military dictatorship. All democratic organizations in the interwar period were liquidated. The ruling circles of Japan assured their

Chapter I Strategic Bombing Of all aspects of the use of air power, strategic bombing seems to have been the subject of the most heated debate. The beginning of these discussions dates back to 1920, when the Italian aviation specialist Douai expressed