Valery Zamulin

Prokhorovka. Unknown battle of the Great War

The Battle of Kursk became the most important stage on the way to the victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. It consolidated the strategic initiative in the hands of the command of the Red Army and finally undermined the power of fascist Germany. After the defeat in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct a single strategic offensive operation.

One of the key moments of the first stage of the Battle of the Fire Bulge was the victory of our troops in the battles in the area of ​​the small railway station Prokhorovka, which went down in history as the Prokhorovka tank battle. Unfortunately, like most battles and battles of the past war, the Russian reader knows about the events near Prokhorovka only from thoroughly “cleaned up” and “varnished”, in fact, superficial memoirs and historical literature. It is not surprising that for more than half a century historians have been arguing and cannot come to a consensus on a number of important issues: when and on what territory did this battle take place, how many armored vehicles participated in it, what were the losses of the parties, etc. There is no unequivocal answer to the main question: who won at Prokhorovka? A number of foreign researchers still claim that the victory went to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the armies of the Soviet Voronezh Front. It was impossible to understand these issues without studying the primary sources - combat documents of the formations of the warring parties. Unfortunately, while some of the materials were published abroad, although not in full, in our country, after the events of 1943, for many years access to the funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO RF), where documents of the Red Army are stored, was very limited. And this greatly complicates the work of researchers.

Much of the situation changed in the early 1990s. In 1993, the secrecy stamp was removed from most of the operational and reporting documents of units of formations and associations of the Red Army that took part in the Battle of Kursk. From 1997 to 2002, I happened to work at the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to identify and systematize sources for the battle of Prokhorov. During this time, more than 60 thousand pages of archival files of the 69.5 and 6th Guards were studied. armies, 5th Guards. and the 1st tank armies, the 2nd air army, six rifle, eight tank, three air corps, 12 rifle and airborne divisions, 25 tank, mechanized, motorized rifle and anti-tank brigades, several dozen separate units and subunits. As a result, a documentary base on the history of the battle was formed. The result of the analysis of the collected material was a study that was first published in 2002 in the book Prokhorovka - a look through decades. However, the research work did not end there. There was an opportunity to get acquainted with foreign and previously closed sources, which made it possible to return to a more detailed consideration of both key moments and individual episodes of the battle. As a result, the previous work was significantly supplemented and corrected.

In the proposed study, for the first time, an attempt was made to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Prokhorov battle, to determine its place in the Battle of Kursk, to build a daily course of hostilities, to tell about the tragedy of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps, the encirclement of which on July 6, 1943, to a large extent predetermined the enemy’s exit to the third defensive line in the Prokhorovka direction, as well as more accurately identify the territory on which it passed. And, finally, to re-evaluate the results of the battle, their influence on the outcome of the entire defensive operation of the Voronezh Front.

The presentation of the course of hostilities is the basis of the book, however, unlike earlier editions, the framework for describing events that were traditionally attributed to the battle is expanded here. Previously, the authors focused only on the study of the battle on July 12, 1943 on the “tank field”, in this book the defense by the troops of the 69th Army, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin in cooperation with the formations of the 5th Guards. Tank Army Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards. Army Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov of the forty-kilometer section of the rear defensive line in the area of ​​​​Prokhorovka station from July 5 to 16, 1943, a connection is traced between the 2nd SS TC of the 4th Panzer Army advancing on the station from the south-west and the 3rd TC of the Kempf Army Group attacking from the south.

Undoubtedly, the reader's special attention will be attracted by the data published in the book on the number of tanks and self-propelled guns that were used in the battle. For a long time, legends about 1500 and even 2000 tanks colliding head-on on the field near Prokhorovka roam the pages of various publications. In this book, for the first time, documents of the army of General P.A. were collected and systematized. Rotmistrov, as well as the corps assigned to her command for operational subordination, which made it possible to determine with greater certainty the number of armored vehicles that participated in the battle from our side, as well as the losses suffered by the Soviet troops not only during the famous battle on July 12 on the "tank field" ( 1.5 km southwest of the station), but also during the localization of the breakthrough of defense line 69A (south of Prokhorovka), as well as in the battle as a whole, which lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943.

Current page: 1 (total book has 51 pages) [available reading excerpt: 34 pages]

Valery Zamulin
Prokhorovka. Unknown battle of the Great War

From the author

The Battle of Kursk became the most important stage on the way to the victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. It consolidated the strategic initiative in the hands of the command of the Red Army and finally undermined the power of fascist Germany. After the defeat in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct a single strategic offensive operation.

One of the key moments of the first stage of the Battle of the Fire Bulge was the victory of our troops in the battles in the area of ​​the small railway station Prokhorovka, which went down in history as the Prokhorovka tank battle. Unfortunately, like most battles and battles of the past war, the Russian reader knows about the events near Prokhorovka only from thoroughly “cleaned up” and “varnished”, in fact, superficial memoirs and historical literature. It is not surprising that for more than half a century historians have been arguing and cannot come to a consensus on a number of important issues: when and on what territory did this battle take place, how many armored vehicles participated in it, what were the losses of the parties, etc. There is no unequivocal answer to the main question: who won at Prokhorovka? A number of foreign researchers still claim that the victory went to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the armies of the Soviet Voronezh Front. It was impossible to understand these issues without studying the primary sources - combat documents of the formations of the warring parties. Unfortunately, while some of the materials were published abroad, although not in full, in our country, after the events of 1943, for many years access to the funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO RF), where documents of the Red Army are stored, was very limited. And this greatly complicates the work of researchers.

Much of the situation changed in the early 1990s. In 1993, the secrecy stamp was removed from most of the operational and reporting documents of units of formations and associations of the Red Army that took part in the Battle of Kursk. From 1997 to 2002, I happened to work at the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to identify and systematize sources for the battle of Prokhorov. During this time, more than 60 thousand pages of archival files of the 69.5 and 6th Guards were studied. armies, 5th Guards. and the 1st tank armies, the 2nd air army, six rifle, eight tank, three air corps, 12 rifle and airborne divisions, 25 tank, mechanized, motorized rifle and anti-tank brigades, several dozen separate units and subunits. As a result, a documentary base on the history of the battle was formed. The result of the analysis of the collected material was a study that was first published in 2002 in the book "Prokhorovka - a look through decades" 1
Battle of Prokhorovka (Military Historical Essay) / Prokhorovka - a look through decades. Book of Memory of those who died in the Battle of Prokhorovka in 1943. Part two. M.: Fond "People's Memory", 2002.

However, the research work did not end there. There was an opportunity to get acquainted with foreign and previously closed sources, which made it possible to return to a more detailed consideration of both key moments and individual episodes of the battle. As a result, the previous work was significantly supplemented and corrected.

In the proposed study, for the first time, an attempt was made to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Prokhorov battle, to determine its place in the Battle of Kursk, to build a daily course of hostilities, to tell about the tragedy of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps, the encirclement of which on July 6, 1943, to a large extent predetermined the enemy’s exit to the third defensive line in the Prokhorovka direction, as well as more accurately identify the territory on which it passed. And, finally, to re-evaluate the results of the battle, their influence on the outcome of the entire defensive operation of the Voronezh Front.

The presentation of the course of hostilities is the basis of the book, however, unlike earlier editions, the framework for describing events that were traditionally attributed to the battle is expanded here. Previously, the authors focused only on the study of the battle on July 12, 1943 on the “tank field”, in this book the defense by the troops of the 69th Army, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin in cooperation with the formations of the 5th Guards. Tank Army Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards. Army Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov of the forty-kilometer section of the rear defensive line in the area of ​​​​Prokhorovka station from July 5 to 16, 1943, a connection is traced between the 2nd SS TC of the 4th Panzer Army advancing on the station from the south-west and the 3rd TC of the Kempf Army Group attacking from the south.

Undoubtedly, the reader's special attention will be attracted by the data published in the book on the number of tanks and self-propelled guns that were used in the battle. For a long time, legends about 1500 and even 2000 tanks colliding head-on on the field near Prokhorovka roam the pages of various publications. In this book, for the first time, documents of the army of General P.A. were collected and systematized. Rotmistrov, as well as the corps assigned to her command for operational subordination, which made it possible to determine with greater certainty the number of armored vehicles that participated in the battle from our side, as well as the losses suffered by the Soviet troops not only during the famous battle on July 12 on the "tank field" ( 1.5 km southwest of the station), but also during the localization of the breakthrough of defense line 69A (south of Prokhorovka), as well as in the battle as a whole, which lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943.

A comprehensive analysis of such a large-scale event of the war is impossible without studying the personnel composition of the troops. The real creators of the victory in the battle of Prokhorovka are the soldiers and officers of the Red Army. A special responsibility lay with the command staff. Not only the outcome of the battles, but, no less important, the price of success - in other words, the level of losses, largely depended on the knowledge, experience, strong-willed qualities of the character of these people. On the basis of service records, the author compiled detailed characteristics of the command of the brigade, divisional, corps and army level of our troops. The level of training of the personnel of enemy formations has not been ignored.

To understand the real capabilities of our tank and mechanized formations in the summer of 1943, it is necessary to know the structure, performance characteristics of the combat vehicles with which they were equipped, the strengths and weaknesses of the "workhorse" of the Red Army - the T-34-76 medium tank, and also the armored vehicles of the enemy opposing him. This information is given in the book, including the memoirs of tankers, senior corps officers, data from reports, award lists - all this will allow the reader to take a different look at the unprecedented tension, bloody tank battles that unfolded on the southern wing of the Fiery Arc.

When working on the book, extensive scientific material was used, a significant part of which is not yet known to a wide range of readers and researchers. These are declassified documents from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Federal Security Service of Russia, unpublished memoirs of the participants in the battle, stored in the funds of the Prokhorovskoye Field State Military Historical Museum-Reserve. In addition, for the purpose of a more objective and comprehensive analysis, relevant foreign publications were also studied, including a collection of combat documents of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps published in Germany in 1998. The information about the battle found in these sources is also placed in the book.

Due to the complexity and poor knowledge of the topic, the author considered it necessary to include in the study, in part or in full, orders, combat reports, operational reports, transcripts of negotiations between the command of the Voronezh Front and the leadership of the armies. All documents are compiled extremely concisely and are purely official in nature. This somewhat “weights” the narrative, but at the same time gives credibility to the description, brings additional colors to the picture of the battle, allows not only to understand in detail the course of hostilities, but also to feel the sharpness, and sometimes the drama of the situation, to feel the tension and emotional intensity of the participants. events.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that documents written in the hot pursuit of events, reports prepared immediately after the end of the battle, may include technical inaccuracies or the description of hostilities is deliberately distorted in order to hide their own mistakes and miscalculations. Often there are documents in which the command of units and formations, sometimes even associations, trying to shift the blame for heavy losses, for failure to comply with an order to a neighbor or to a higher headquarters, distorted the combat episodes of a defensive operation beyond recognition. Examples of such "creativity" are given in the book. Both sides were guilty of this to varying degrees. Sources that caused distrust, as a rule, were used for analysis only after verification. However, it is hardly possible to completely eliminate such shortcomings.

The defensive operation of the Voronezh Front in the summer of 1943, despite the long period of preparation and successful completion, cannot be called exemplary. In the course of its implementation, a large number of shortcomings were noted in the command and control of troops and in the organization of counterattacks. It was not without mistakes in the use of tank armies of a homogeneous composition - at that time a new form of organization of tank troops. Poor interaction between our units and formations led to unjustified sacrifices, failure to fulfill the assigned tasks. The book is very frank about this. All these shortcomings by no means diminish the significance of our victory at Prokhorovka. Despite all the difficulties, mistakes and omissions, thanks to courage and perseverance, in many cases the sacrifice of the soldiers of the 5th Guards, 5th Guards. tank and 69th armies during the battle, the enemy’s plan to defeat the troops of the Voronezh Front was finally thwarted, thereby predetermined the failure of the entire summer campaign of the German army.

The basis for this book was prepared back in 2002, but before it took on a finished form, it took several more years of painstaking search and research work. In its implementation, the state budgetary institution of higher professional education "Kursk State University" provided great comprehensive assistance. I express my sincere gratitude to his leadership for this support.

The history of the Battle of Prokhorov is by no means exhausted by this study. This is only the first step towards a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the still not fully studied event of that great war. Ahead of future historians is laborious and very painstaking work. I hope that my work will arouse interest among both lovers of Russian history and professional researchers.

July 2016

Valery Zamulin

Chapter 1
In anticipation of a fracture

The situation in the Kursk direction by July 1943

The goals and plans of the parties (Scheme No. 1)

The winter campaign ended at the end of March 1943. The troops went on the defensive, and a kind of pause came on the Soviet-German front, which both sides sought to use to make up for losses in personnel, weapons and military equipment.

During the winter offensive of the Soviet troops in the Kursk region, a ledge was formed, which went deep into the enemy's disposition. Such a configuration of the Soviet-German front line made it possible to deliver powerful blows to the flanks of large enemy groupings in the area of ​​Orel and Bryansk, as well as Belgorod and Kharkov, with subsequent access to their rear. The general balance of forces and means of the parties on the entire Soviet-German front by the beginning of April was in favor of the Soviet troops, which outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 1.1 times, in tanks - by 1.4 times, in artillery - by 1.7 times , in combat aircraft - 2 times.

Such superiority could be used to continue the offensive in one of the strategic directions. Some military commanders and front commanders proposed to preempt the enemy in going over to the offensive and, using the enveloping position of the Soviet troops, to crush his flank groupings. However, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (VGK), given the fatigue of the troops, the understaffing of formations and the difficulties in transporting material and technical means during the spring thaw, refused to attack. At the same time, undoubtedly, the lessons of the unsuccessful outcome of the Kharkov offensive operation of 1942, which began with the Barvenkovsky ledge, were taken into account. Then the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, deeply wedged into the enemy's defenses, were themselves exposed to the danger of strikes from his flank groupings.

On April 12, 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command made a preliminary decision on a deliberate defense in the Kursk direction. Subsequent events at the front showed that this was the most expedient decision in the current situation.

The Hitlerite command also sought to use the advantageous position of its troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient to carry out a major offensive operation, the purpose of which was to seize the strategic initiative and thereby turn the course of the war in their favor. The plan for the general offensive on the Eastern Front in 1943 went a long and winding path through the corridors of the highest state power of the Reich and military headquarters at various levels from the first general intentions to a clearly formulated order in laconic language for the implementation of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", which became for German Army's last strategic offensive operation of World War II.

I must say that from the moment the question arose of planning the Wehrmacht's summer campaign of 1943 on the Eastern Front (approximately February), and until the second half of June, Hitler could not finally decide on the best option for the offensive plan. More precisely, he was unable to moderate his ambitions and correlate them with the capabilities of Germany and its armed forces. The spring of 1943 in the Nazi elite was marked by disputes about the further course of the war. Moreover, every month it was felt that the sharpness of the Stalingrad catastrophe at the Nazi elite was blunted and adventurist tendencies increased both in assessing their own potential and in the capabilities of the USSR. In these disputes, the question of the advisability of an attack on Kursk became a key one.

In the political and military leadership of Germany, two groups formed that had diametrically opposed points of view on this issue. Opponents of the transition to a large-scale offensive were primarily high-ranking military men, including the General Inspector of the Tank Forces, Colonel-General G. Guderian, the commander of the 4th Tank Army (4 TA), Colonel-General G. Goth, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, General Colonel A. Jodl, by the end of spring this point of view was shared by the commander of Army Group (GA) South, Field Marshal E. von Manstein. They believed that the Wehrmacht was not ready for large-scale offensive operations, including in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, against the Red Army, which had grown stronger in battles. They can lead to the complete depletion of Germany's resources and bleed her armed forces. In addition, A. Jodl drew attention to the danger of opening a second front by the British and Americans, he considered it inappropriate to use the reserves that were gathered with great difficulty for the offensive and proposed to go on the defensive on the Soviet-German front, and send part of the forces to strengthen the coast of France and the Mediterranean basin .

In early April, German reconnaissance data began to arrive, primarily aerial, which testified that the Soviet troops in the Kursk Bulge region were creating a strong and deep defense, and the most extensive work was being carried out precisely in the directions of the intended strikes. This could lead to a slow "gnawing through" the defense and, ultimately, to the disruption of the entire operation. However, Hitler still hoped for the penetrating power of the tank divisions, which received new heavy tanks and assault guns (self-propelled guns), as well as modernized T-IV tanks. The calculation was based on creating a significant superiority over the defending Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack and on their rapid defeat before the reserves approached. The experience of the battles of 1941 and 1942 was also taken into account, when the defense of the Soviet troops suffered from concentrated attacks by tanks and infantry supported by aircraft. Moreover, the tasks of the strike groups were much more modest than in previous operations. At the same time, the political aspect of the future operation had a very important influence on the Fuhrer's point of view.

On April 12, 1943, a ready-made draft of the plan of operation fell on the table to Hitler, which was approved by him on that day. And three days later, on April 15, it was embodied in Operational Order No. 6, outlining both the goals and objectives of the summer campaign in the East, and the fundamental algorithm of actions of Army Groups South and Center. The essence of the operation, called the "Citadel", was to cut the defenses of two Soviet fronts - Voronezh (General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) and Central (General of the Army K.K. . Rokossovsky) and encircle their troops. The author of this idea was the commander of the 9th Army (A), General V. Model. The operation was planned as a "single throw", ensuring a quick and decisive success, for which the troops advancing from the north and south were tasked on the fourth day of the offensive to connect east of the city and close the encirclement. The flanks of the shock groups from the east needed to create an outer front of the encirclement along the river line as quickly as possible. Korocha, Skorodnoye, Tim, having in their rear the important Belgorod-Kursk-Orel railway. To cover the offensive from the west, it was planned to use part of the forces, which at the same time were supposed to strike at the encircled main forces of the Soviet troops. In the event of a planned development of the operation, it was envisaged to strike at the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. Here is an excerpt from that document:

“I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is of decisive importance. It must end with a quick and decisive success. The offensive must give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year.

In this regard, all preparatory measures must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. On the direction of the main attacks, the best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must be imbued with the consciousness of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory near Kursk should become a torch for the whole world.

3. GA "South" strikes with concentrated forces from the Belgorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the line of Prilepa - Oboyan, connects at Kursk and to the east of it with the advancing army of Army Group Center. To provide cover for the offensive from the east, reach the line of Nezhega - r. Korocha - Skorodnoye - Tim, however, at the same time, do not allow the weakening of the massing of forces in the direction of Prilepa, Oboyan. To cover the offensive from the west, use part of the forces, which at the same time set the task of striking at the encircled enemy grouping.

4. GA "Center" inflicts a massive blow by the advancing army from the line of Trosna - the area north of Maloarkhangelsk, breaks through the front in the Fatezh, Veretinovo sector, concentrating the main efforts on its eastern flank, I connect with the shock army of Army Group "South" near Kursk and to the east. To cover the advancing grouping from the east, it is necessary to reach the Tim line - east of the Shchigr - river in the shortest possible time. Pine, while not allowing the weakening of forces in the direction of the main blow. To cover the advancing grouping from the west, use part of the available forces.

Parts of the GA "Center", introduced into battle in the area west of the river. Trosna to the demarcation line with the Yug GA, they have the task of pinning down the enemy with the start of the offensive by conducting local attacks by specially created strike groups and in a timely manner to deliver strikes against the encircled enemy grouping. Continuous observation and aerial reconnaissance to ensure the timely opening of the enemy's withdrawal. In this case, you should immediately go on the offensive along the entire front.2
Battle of Kursk (edited by I.V. Porodko). M.: Nauka, 1970. S. 520, 521.

To conduct the Citadel, out of the 12 armies and 5 operational groups available on the Eastern Front, it was supposed to attract three armies (4TA, 2 and 9 A) and one operational group - AG Kempf. The offensive was planned to be carried out in rather narrow areas, which in total amounted to less than 14% of the entire Soviet-German front.

Of the two groups, the GA "South" was the main one, it was given more complex and large-scale tasks. Before the proposed meeting point in the Kursk area, the troops of Field Marshal G. von Kluge had to go about 75 km, and E. von Manstein - almost twice as much - 125. Therefore, slightly more forces were allocated directly to break through the Soviet defense in its zone - 9 tank and motorized divisions against 7 GA "Center". And, importantly, it had to be strengthened with new models of tanks.

GA "South" consisted of 4TA Colonel General G. Goth and the army group of General of Tank Forces V. Kempf 3
Werner Kempf, general of tank troops. Born on March 9, 1886 in Königsberg. As an officer participated in the First World War, the last rank is captain. In the interwar period, he served in staff positions, including in the inspection of motorized units. After receiving the rank of colonel on April 1, 1935, he was appointed commander of the 4th tank brigade. At the beginning of 1939, he was assigned the first general rank - major general, he became the commander of the Kempf division (later transformed into the 10th tank division), and on 10/10/1939 - the commander of the 6th tank division (TD). On 07/31/1940 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general, and on 04/01/1941 - general of tank troops. 01/06/1941 - took command of the 48th TC, participated in battles on the Soviet-German front. During the preparation and conduct of the Citadel operation, he commanded the Kempf AG, in mid-August 1943, during the battles for Kharkov, Hitler was removed from this position and transferred to the commander of the Wehrmacht troops in Eastern European countries (as part of the Sever GA). He was awarded the "Knight's Cross" (1940) and "Oak Leaves" (1942). Died in West Germany in 1964.

Denoted by his last name - AG "Kempf". Both associations had a total of 11 infantry, 9 tank and motorized divisions. By the end of April, the Gotha army had the following formations: the 52nd Army Corps (AK) (57th, 167th, 255th and 322nd Infantry Divisions (PD), 2nd Panzer Corps (TK) SS (motorized divisions of the SS "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Dead Head" 4
Further, with the reduction: "LAG", "P" and "MG".

) and 48 shopping malls (md "Great Germany" and 11 td). After some time, 3 TD was transferred to its composition from 1 TA, which at the end of June will be subordinate to 48 TC. AG "Kempf" was a weaker association than the Gotha army, although it also had three corps: 42 ak, 11 ak and 3 tk. The latter, instead of the Great Germany MD transferred to 48 TC, received 19 TD.

In addition, the GA "South" included the 4th Air Fleet (VF) under the command of General of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Otto Dessloh. The 1st, 4th and 8th air corps (AVK) were subordinate to him. The latter, during the offensive on Kursk, was aimed specifically to support 4 TA and AG Kempf. This formation was commanded by General of Aviation Hans von Seidemann, who replaced General von Richthofen, Hitler's favorite, in this post in the spring of 1943. By the beginning of the fighting, 8 AVK had 1556 aircraft, of which 1200 were in service. 5
Newton S. Battle of Kursk. German look. M.: Yauza, EKSMO, 2006. S. 239, 240.

As already noted, Colonel General G. Goth 6
Herman Goth was born on April 12, 1885 in Neuruppen. At the age of 19, he entered the service in the Kaiser's army and a year later, in 1905, he received his first officer rank - lieutenant. Participated in the First World War, after its completion he remained to serve in the infantry. On February 1, 1932, he received the rank of colonel and first commanded the 17th Infantry Regiment, then was the military commander of the city of Lübeck. Noticeable career growth began after the Nazis came to power. In October 1934, he received the first general rank and was appointed commander of the 18th Infantry Division. Two years later, on October 1, 1936, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general, and in November 1938 - infantry general, and he took command of the 15th ac. In this position, he participated in his first campaign of the Second World War - the capture of Poland. His unit, subordinate to 10 A, managed to defeat the Polish troops and capture Warsaw, for which he received the Knight's Cross from Hitler. Then his corps participated in the occupation by France. During the German attack on the USSR, Colonel-General G. Goth commanded the 3rd Panzer Group (TG) (later becoming the 3rd Panzer Army) of the Center GA. Already 28.06. In 1941, his troops entered Minsk and continued to successfully advance on Polotsk. For the encirclement of significant forces of the Red Army near Smolensk, he was awarded the Oak Leaves. In October 1941, he was transferred to the post of commander of 17 A, and from 06/01/1942 - commander of 4TA. During the Battle of Stalingrad, part of her forces, along with the Paulus group, were surrounded. During the Battle of Kursk, the army of Goth was the strike force of the GA "South", but was not successful. For the battles in Ukraine on September 15, 1943, he was awarded the Crossed Swords, and two weeks later, on September 30, he was dismissed by Hitler. A number of Western researchers attribute him to the group of such undeniably talented tank generals of the Wehrmacht as Guderian and Rommel. He was a tough and purposeful commander. He had the ability to soberly assess the operational situation, persistently defend his views on the conduct of hostilities before the higher command, and then consistently translate his plan into reality. At the same time, he made a number of serious miscalculations. At the Nuremberg Trials, Goth was charged with war crimes and sentenced to 15 years. Released early by the Allies in April 1954. Died in West Germany in 1970.

I did not believe that the Wehrmacht was able to encircle the troops of the two Soviet fronts. But, not being able to radically influence this decision, he persistently tried to defend the most realistic, in his opinion, task of his army in this operation: the destruction of the reserves of the Red Army. He believed that the Soviet command had already managed to accumulate large forces by May - it had prepared up to 10 tank formations. Therefore, he sought to ensure that this goal was recognized by the command of the group as paramount, at least at the first stage of the Citadel, and included in the operational planning process. He was looking for an opportunity to discuss this problem in detail with the field marshal, and such a meeting took place on May 10-11 at the headquarters of the 4th TA in the city of Bogodukhov in Ukraine.

In the course of the discussion, Hoth obtained Manstein's consent to substantially correct the previous version of the army's offensive plan. Firstly, the line of demarcation between 4TA and AG Kempf was moved. Secondly, 48 mk has been significantly strengthened. Up to this point, it was planned that 48 TC and 2 TC SS would advance from Belgorod to Oboyan in a straight line across the river. Psel, without deviating east in the direction of st. Prokhorovka. And 3 TC AG "Kempf" was supposed to cover the right flank of the SS corps, creating an internal front of encirclement, and during the offensive to seize this railway station and the area adjacent to it.

Now, after Goth's insistent request, the area west and northeast of Prokhorovka was transferred from the AG "Kempf" 4 TA. Already on May 31, this moment was reflected in the order of the commander of the 2nd SS TC Obergruppenführer P. Hausser for the corps. In it, for the first time, he indicated that, in addition to breaking through the second zone of the Russians, the 2nd SS TC should deliver the main blow "East of Psyol, in the direction of Prokhorovka"7
Newton S. Decree. op. S. 458.

The essence of all these changes was that Goth expected to conduct a decisive battle with Soviet reserves in the Prokhorovka area by July 7–9, the results of which were to determine the future fate of the Citadel. Moreover, he hoped that, even if then it was necessary to curtail the operation, the Germans would still win. His calculation was based on the following. The chief of staff of the 4th TA, General F. Fangor, recalled:

“Goth came to the conclusion that perhaps the Russians are aware of our plans and that is why they have moved their strategic reserves to the east to keep them on alert.

On the basis of this assessment, General Goth decided that the order to advance straight north along the straight line through Oboyan was not to be taken literally. According to Hoth, the terrain and position of the enemy would significantly hinder such an advance. In the area 20 km south of Oboyan, the terrain sloped gently in the direction of the north-east and north to the river. Psyol. And gradually rose again on its other bank, giving the opportunity for an excellent view for the Russians. The area crossed by the river Psel around Oboyan was too narrow due to the large number of reservoirs, and the direction of the river did not make it possible to bypass them. Any Russian division thrown back from Belgorod, nevertheless, could hold on to a new natural line of defense beyond the river. Psyol, on both sides of Oboyan and in the south-east of the city and inflict great damage on the attackers.

General Goth understood that the Soviet strategic reserve included several tank corps, would quickly enter the battle, squeezing through the narrow passage between the Donets and Psyol rivers in the Prokhorovka region (about 15 km northeast of Belgorod). If the forward units of the 4TA enter into a heavy battle with them in the area crossed by the river. Psel near Oboyan, then Russian tanks can deliver a strong blow to our right flank and be successful, precisely because our tank divisions will be limited in maneuver by the Psyol River. Since this situation could quickly turn into a catastrophe, Goth knew that an engagement with the Soviet armored reserve near Prokhorovka had to be planned before the attack directly on Kursk. He considered it vital to bring into such a battle the most powerful of the available formations, so that we could first force the enemy to engage us in battle on the territory we had chosen, not crossed by the river. Psyol, on which our panzer divisions could make full use of their superior mobility and strength. Consequently, after breaking through the line of defense of the enemy, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps should not move directly north along the river. Psyol, but turn sharply to the northeast towards Prokhorovka to destroy the Russian tank forces, which we hoped to find there. The advantage of such a maneuver was that it brought us closer to the 3rd Panzer Corps, Army Group Kempf and increased the possibility of coordinating forces on the inner flanks of the corps in this combat area. This plan required General Hoth to also change the tasks of the 48th TC, which was to operate on the left flank. Immediately after the breakthrough on both sides of the Cherkasy Corps, it was not supposed to quickly move north to the river. Psyol, but also, not lagging behind, go next to the 2nd shopping mall of the SS as it turns to the northeast. Such a maneuver would cover the flank of Obergruppenführer Hausser's corps as it moved towards the decisive battle and potentially provide additional reinforcement in the battle. Of course, so far we could not determine how the 48th Tank Corps would be used at Prokhorovka, but in no case did we plan to bring into battle the formation of General von Knobelsdorff to the west of this settlement. It was impossible to prepare a further plan of operations after the victory at Prokhorovka, but as a result of such a success we would be in the watershed between the rivers Oskol, Donets, Psel and Seim, from where we could attack in any direction.

General Goth also drew the attention of Field Marshal von Manstein to the fact that breaking through the Russian defensive system would be difficult, costly and time consuming. He did not hope that 4TA would have freedom of action until we had broken through the defensive line Teterevino - Novenkoe, about 27-30 km southeast of Oboyan, where the third and last Soviet defensive line was located.8
Newton S. Kursk. The german view. DA CARO PRESS. A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2000, pp. 71–73

Thus, agreeing with Goth's ideas, Manstein also came to the conclusion that one of the culminating moments of the first stage of the future battle should have been the events at Prokhorovka.

The second decision turned out to be no less important. The colonel-general did not believe that the 2nd GA "Center", located on the left flank of the GA "South", would be able to pull the Soviet troops over if they, during the advance of his army to Kursk, tried to hit the right flank of the 48th mk, the length of which is likely to increase significantly. Probably, for this purpose, according to his data, the Russians are already accumulating significant reserves south of Kursk. These fears made Manstein agree with Goth and hand over exactly 48 mk a new powerful tank unit - the 10th Panther Tank Brigade (10 brigade).

On June 27, a number of important questions were adopted regarding the upcoming events at Prokhorovka. In fact, it was on this day that Colonel General G. Goth finally agreed on the 4TA action plan at the first stage with the leadership of the South Civil Aviation Administration and set the final tactical tasks for the command of the two corps. To solve the main task of the first stage of the operation - the destruction of Soviet mobile reserves at the station. Prokhorovka - it was decided to use 2 shopping malls of the SS. During the movement to the station, its right flank was to be covered by the 6 TD 3 TC Kempf advancing from the south, and the left wing - MD "Great Germany" 48 TC. Goth expected that the decisive battle would begin between July 7 and 9. It was expected that by this moment 48 mk would have time to force the river. Psyol south of Oboyan and, having put up a barrier, will turn part of his armored forces, it was supposed to be partially 10 tank brigade, to help 2 SS TCs to fight Russian tanks. I emphasize that Goth was expecting the approach of significant forces of the Red Army, therefore, the troops of the 48th TC and the AG "Kempf" should certainly have participated in the battle near Prokhorovka. However, General W. Kempf did not have such significant forces as Goth, and only a very big optimist could expect that his group would be able to move forward at the same speed as the 4TA troops.

Valery Zamulin

Prokhorovka. Unknown battle of the Great War

The Battle of Kursk became the most important stage on the way to the victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. It consolidated the strategic initiative in the hands of the command of the Red Army and finally undermined the power of fascist Germany. After the defeat in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct a single strategic offensive operation.

One of the key moments of the first stage of the Battle of the Fire Bulge was the victory of our troops in the battles in the area of ​​the small railway station Prokhorovka, which went down in history as the Prokhorovka tank battle. Unfortunately, like most battles and battles of the past war, the Russian reader knows about the events near Prokhorovka only from thoroughly “cleaned up” and “varnished”, in fact, superficial memoirs and historical literature. It is not surprising that for more than half a century historians have been arguing and cannot come to a consensus on a number of important issues: when and on what territory did this battle take place, how many armored vehicles participated in it, what were the losses of the parties, etc. There is no unequivocal answer to the main question: who won at Prokhorovka? A number of foreign researchers still claim that the victory went to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the armies of the Soviet Voronezh Front. It was impossible to understand these issues without studying the primary sources - combat documents of the formations of the warring parties. Unfortunately, while some of the materials were published abroad, although not in full, in our country, after the events of 1943, for many years access to the funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO RF), where documents of the Red Army are stored, was very limited. And this greatly complicates the work of researchers.

Much of the situation changed in the early 1990s. In 1993, the secrecy stamp was removed from most of the operational and reporting documents of units of formations and associations of the Red Army that took part in the Battle of Kursk. From 1997 to 2002, I happened to work at the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to identify and systematize sources for the battle of Prokhorov. During this time, more than 60 thousand pages of archival files of the 69.5 and 6th Guards were studied. armies, 5th Guards. and the 1st tank armies, the 2nd air army, six rifle, eight tank, three air corps, 12 rifle and airborne divisions, 25 tank, mechanized, motorized rifle and anti-tank brigades, several dozen separate units and subunits. As a result, a documentary base on the history of the battle was formed. The result of the analysis of the collected material was a study that was first published in 2002 in the book "Prokhorovka - a look through decades." However, the research work did not end there. There was an opportunity to get acquainted with foreign and previously closed sources, which made it possible to return to a more detailed consideration of both key moments and individual episodes of the battle. As a result, the previous work was significantly supplemented and corrected.

In the proposed study, for the first time, an attempt was made to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Prokhorov battle, to determine its place in the Battle of Kursk, to build a daily course of hostilities, to tell about the tragedy of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps, the encirclement of which on July 6, 1943, to a large extent predetermined the enemy’s exit to the third defensive line in the Prokhorovka direction, as well as more accurately identify the territory on which it passed. And, finally, to re-evaluate the results of the battle, their influence on the outcome of the entire defensive operation of the Voronezh Front.

The presentation of the course of hostilities is the basis of the book, however, unlike earlier editions, the framework for describing events that were traditionally attributed to the battle is expanded here. Previously, the authors focused only on the study of the battle on July 12, 1943 on the “tank field”, in this book the defense by the troops of the 69th Army, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin in cooperation with the formations of the 5th Guards. Tank Army Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards. Army Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov of the forty-kilometer section of the rear defensive line in the area of ​​​​Prokhorovka station from July 5 to 16, 1943, a connection is traced between the 2nd SS TC of the 4th Panzer Army advancing on the station from the south-west and the 3rd TC of the Kempf Army Group attacking from the south.

Valery Zamulin

Prokhorovka. Unknown battle of the Great War

The Battle of Kursk became the most important stage on the way to the victory of our people in the Great Patriotic War. It consolidated the strategic initiative in the hands of the command of the Red Army and finally undermined the power of fascist Germany. After the defeat in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct a single strategic offensive operation.

One of the key moments of the first stage of the Battle of the Fire Bulge was the victory of our troops in the battles in the area of ​​the small railway station Prokhorovka, which went down in history as the Prokhorovka tank battle. Unfortunately, like most battles and battles of the past war, the Russian reader knows about the events near Prokhorovka only from thoroughly “cleaned up” and “varnished”, in fact, superficial memoirs and historical literature. It is not surprising that for more than half a century historians have been arguing and cannot come to a consensus on a number of important issues: when and on what territory did this battle take place, how many armored vehicles participated in it, what were the losses of the parties, etc. There is no unequivocal answer to the main question: who won at Prokhorovka? A number of foreign researchers still claim that the victory went to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the armies of the Soviet Voronezh Front. It was impossible to understand these issues without studying the primary sources - combat documents of the formations of the warring parties. Unfortunately, while some of the materials were published abroad, although not in full, in our country, after the events of 1943, for many years access to the funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO RF), where documents of the Red Army are stored, was very limited. And this greatly complicates the work of researchers.

Much of the situation changed in the early 1990s. In 1993, the secrecy stamp was removed from most of the operational and reporting documents of units of formations and associations of the Red Army that took part in the Battle of Kursk. From 1997 to 2002, I happened to work at the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, to identify and systematize sources for the battle of Prokhorov. During this time, more than 60 thousand pages of archival files of the 69.5 and 6th Guards were studied. armies, 5th Guards. and the 1st tank armies, the 2nd air army, six rifle, eight tank, three air corps, 12 rifle and airborne divisions, 25 tank, mechanized, motorized rifle and anti-tank brigades, several dozen separate units and subunits. As a result, a documentary base on the history of the battle was formed. The result of the analysis of the collected material was a study that was first published in 2002 in the book "Prokhorovka - a look through decades." However, the research work did not end there. There was an opportunity to get acquainted with foreign and previously closed sources, which made it possible to return to a more detailed consideration of both key moments and individual episodes of the battle. As a result, the previous work was significantly supplemented and corrected.

In the proposed study, for the first time, an attempt was made to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Prokhorov battle, to determine its place in the Battle of Kursk, to build a daily course of hostilities, to tell about the tragedy of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps, the encirclement of which on July 6, 1943, to a large extent predetermined the enemy’s exit to the third defensive line in the Prokhorovka direction, as well as more accurately identify the territory on which it passed. And, finally, to re-evaluate the results of the battle, their influence on the outcome of the entire defensive operation of the Voronezh Front.

The presentation of the course of hostilities is the basis of the book, however, unlike earlier editions, the framework for describing events that were traditionally attributed to the battle is expanded here. Previously, the authors focused only on the study of the battle on July 12, 1943 on the “tank field”, in this book the defense by the troops of the 69th Army, Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin in cooperation with the formations of the 5th Guards. Tank Army Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards. Army Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov of the forty-kilometer section of the rear defensive line in the area of ​​​​Prokhorovka station from July 5 to 16, 1943, a connection is traced between the 2nd SS TC of the 4th Panzer Army advancing on the station from the south-west and the 3rd TC of the Kempf Army Group attacking from the south.

Undoubtedly, the reader's special attention will be attracted by the data published in the book on the number of tanks and self-propelled guns that were used in the battle. For a long time, legends about 1500 and even 2000 tanks colliding head-on on the field near Prokhorovka roam the pages of various publications. In this book, for the first time, documents of the army of General P.A. were collected and systematized. Rotmistrov, as well as the corps assigned to her command for operational subordination, which made it possible to determine with greater certainty the number of armored vehicles that participated in the battle from our side, as well as the losses suffered by the Soviet troops not only during the famous battle on July 12 on the "tank field" ( 1.5 km southwest of the station), but also during the localization of the breakthrough of defense line 69A (south of Prokhorovka), as well as in the battle as a whole, which lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943.

A comprehensive analysis of such a large-scale event of the war is impossible without studying the personnel composition of the troops. The real creators of the victory in the battle of Prokhorovka are the soldiers and officers of the Red Army. A special responsibility lay with the command staff. Not only the outcome of the battles, but, no less important, the price of success - in other words, the level of losses, largely depended on the knowledge, experience, strong-willed qualities of the character of these people. On the basis of service records, the author compiled detailed characteristics of the command of the brigade, divisional, corps and army level of our troops. The level of training of the personnel of enemy formations has not been ignored.

To understand the real capabilities of our tank and mechanized formations in the summer of 1943, it is necessary to know the structure, performance characteristics of the combat vehicles with which they were equipped, the strengths and weaknesses of the "workhorse" of the Red Army - the T-34-76 medium tank, and also the armored vehicles of the enemy opposing him. This information is given in the book, including the memoirs of tankers, senior corps officers, data from reports, award lists - all this will allow the reader to take a different look at the unprecedented tension, bloody tank battles that unfolded on the southern wing of the Fiery Arc.

When working on the book, extensive scientific material was used, a significant part of which is not yet known to a wide range of readers and researchers. These are declassified documents from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Federal Security Service of Russia, unpublished memoirs of the participants in the battle, stored in the funds of the Prokhorovskoye Field State Military Historical Museum-Reserve. In addition, for the purpose of a more objective and comprehensive analysis, relevant foreign publications were also studied, including a collection of combat documents of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps published in Germany in 1998. The information about the battle found in these sources is also placed in the book.

Due to the complexity and poor knowledge of the topic, the author considered it necessary to include in the study, in part or in full, orders, combat reports, operational reports, transcripts of negotiations between the command of the Voronezh Front and the leadership of the armies. All documents are compiled extremely concisely and are purely official in nature. This somewhat “weights” the narrative, but at the same time gives credibility to the description, brings additional colors to the picture of the battle, allows not only to understand in detail the course of hostilities, but also to feel the sharpness, and sometimes the drama of the situation, to feel the tension and emotional intensity of the participants. events.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that documents written in the hot pursuit of events, reports prepared immediately after the end of the battle, may include technical inaccuracies or the description of hostilities is deliberately distorted in order to hide their own mistakes and miscalculations. Often there are documents in which the command of units and formations, sometimes even associations, trying to shift the blame for heavy losses, for failure to comply with an order to a neighbor or to a higher headquarters, distorted the combat episodes of a defensive operation beyond recognition. Examples of such "creativity" are given in the book. Both sides were guilty of this to varying degrees. Sources that caused distrust, as a rule, were used for analysis only after verification. However, it is hardly possible to completely eliminate such shortcomings.

V. DYMARSKY: Good evening, dear listeners. On the air of "Echo of Moscow" the program "The Price of Victory" and we, its presenters Dmitry Zakharov ...

D. ZAKHAROV: And Vitaly Dymarsky. Good evening.

V. DYMARSKY: Today we continue the topic that we started in one of our previous programs, this is the Battle of Kursk. If you remember, Valery Zamulin, Deputy Director for Research at the Prokhorovskoye Pole Military Historical Museum-Reserve, was our guest, and now Valery is our guest again. Hello Valery.

D. ZAKHAROV: Hello.

V. ZAMULIN: Good evening.

V. DYMARSKY: And, accordingly, we continue the theme of the Battle of Kursk. And if in the first program, as you remember, we analyzed and discussed the prerequisites for the Battle of Kursk itself, in general, the entire period from the Battle of Stalingrad to the Battle of Kursk in a short review, and the beginning of the actual operation "Citadel" on July 5, conceived by the Wehrmacht and reflected by the Soviet troops, then Today we will probably deal with, perhaps, the central event of all those operations that are called the Battle of Kursk. This is Prokhorovka, the Prokhorovka battle - the famous battle, tank, as he wrote in all textbooks, including for schoolchildren, the largest tank battle of World War II. So, Prokhorovka is already a week after the start of the entire operation, approximately on July 12th. So, Valery?

V. DYMARSKY: This is the topic of our today's program.

D. ZAKHAROV: As far as I understand, Valery, we must start from July 9, after all, from such a turning point that predetermined that events developed in this way and not otherwise. Could you tell us more about what happened on that particular day?

V. ZAMULIN: The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and until the 9th, the main strikes of the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth, aimed at Kursk, delivered strictly to the north and partly to the northeast along the Oboyanskoe highway, Belgorod-Oboyan, and from Prokhorovsky direction. Until the 9th, two tank corps - the 48th and 2nd SS tank corps - they broke through the main and second army defensive lines. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps stopped in front of the third in the Prokhorovka direction, behind which the Prokhorovka station was immediately located, and the 48th tried to break through the third defensive line along the Oboyanskoe highway in the direction of Oboyan and fought the hardest, stubborn battles with the 1st Panzer Army of General Katukov and General Chistyakov of the 6th Guards Army. On the 9th, the situation was as follows. Approaching the middle of the third defensive line, the enemy captured a number of settlements, but there was a threat to the stretched left wing of the 4th Panzer Army, and Goth, with the consent of Manstein, deployed the grouping of the 48th Corps from north to west to solve no longer a strategic, but a tactical task - left wing covers. This wing stretched for 60 kilometers, it was covered by the 120th Infantry Division and another part of the 255th. And in the bend of Pena on the left wing, there is a bend of the river, there was our powerful grouping, the Hetman group ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Which was surrounded.

V. ZAMULIN: A little later. A little later, she will be surrounded. This is the 6th Panzer Corps. Several mechanized brigades of the 3rd mechanized corps and rifle divisions. This grouping hung on the left wing of the 4th Panzer, it was necessary, if not to destroy it, then at least to push it further to the west. On the 9th, in the afternoon, the 48th Corps began to solve this particular problem - not to break through to Oboyan, which was the task throughout the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th ...

V. DYMARSKY: It was originally staged.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, initially. And for the destruction of our forces, which hung on the left wing. At the same time, having not achieved significant results, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps also received the task of regrouping forces on the 10th, and turning from the north, strike to the northeast, to the bend, and strictly to Prokhorovka. On the 10th, the commander of the SS corps, Hauser, set the task of one of his divisions, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, to take the Prokhorovka station and the heights adjacent to it.

D. ZAKHAROV: In your book The Secret Battle of Kursk, you write that Hauser outplayed our generals. What was it?

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that when planning the Citadel, the German generals were well aware that it would be very difficult to solve the task - the capture of Kursk - and some believed that it was impossible to do at all. Therefore, this offensive was, as it were, divided into two parts. The task of the first phase of the offensive is to break through the defensive lines and reach a point southwest of Prokhorovka, and at this point - in the Luchka area, the Komsomolets state farm - at this point, according to the plans of the Nazis, large mobile reserves should come up in two or three days , and here a battle with these Soviet tank reserves should take place, and after the destruction of these reserves, Goth intended to decide whether it was possible to attack Kursk at all, would it be realistic to attack after this battle or not?

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Will there be anything.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes. That is, we can say with confidence that the enemy planned a tank battle near Prokhorovka on May 11 at the headquarters of the 4th Tank Army in Ukraine in Bogodukhovo. Then a meeting was held between Goth and the commander of Army Group South, Manstein. And Manstein gave the go-ahead. Moreover, the battle near Prokhorovka involved the involvement of part of the forces of the 48th corps, which by this time, as Goth planned, would destroy Katukov’s 1st tank army and deploy, in particular, the Panthers to Prokhorovka and from the south to Prokhorovka should have approached 3- th Panzer Corps on the 5th, from Belgorod to Prokhorovka.

D. ZAKHAROV: Stuck.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes. All these plans, of course, were very good on paper, but as a result, a significantly battered SS corps came out to Prokhorovka. The 48th was distracted by heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction and the 3rd Panzer Corps suffered significant losses and got stuck in front of the Seversky Donets. And almost from the 10th, only one corps entered the battle with mobile tank mechanized units and formations of the Red Army near Prokhorovka - the SS corps of Obergruppenführer Hauser. The battle near Prokhorovka thus began on the 10th, July 10th.

D. ZAKHAROV: Here, I must probably say that, again, as you note in your book, if the role of Katukov is not underestimated, then for some reason he faded into the background, although, in general, he had to accept the most a significant part of the impact in the first stage.

V. ZAMULIN: The situation developed in such a way that by the end of the day on July 6, the 6th Guards Army of General Chistyakov was cut into two parts, his rifle divisions suffered significant losses. The 52nd Guards Nekrasov was generally dispersed. The 67th, too, which took the brunt of the 48th Corps upon itself, was in a difficult position. Part of the divisions, the 51st division - in general, our command had no idea where it was. And on the evening of the 6th, on the night of the 7th, both practically and formally, the headquarters of Katukov's 1st Panzer Army took over the defense of the Oboyansky and Prokhorovsky direction. And here are the 7th, 8th, 9th inclusive - the most difficult fights. It was Mikhail Efimovich Katukov and his fighters who held the defense in front of two powerful tank groups. And I must say, as a commander, as a military leader, he showed himself from the best side.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, then the question arises why they forgot about Katukov, but always it is only about Rotmistrov's group?

V. DYMARSKY: Strictly speaking, the entire Prokhorov battle, according to the most common historical data, is all Rotmistrov against Hauser.

V. ZAMULIN: Firstly, the history of the Battle of Kursk has not been written, it has not been written. In all the books that were published in Soviet times, these are books based on a scheme invented for ideological work. If historians were allowed to work with authentic documents, they said, please write how it really happened, then the main thing that would be revealed is our huge losses in the Battle of Kursk and how not always skillfully our commanders managed their troops. That is, historians would reveal a lot of things that under Soviet rule ...

D. ZAKHAROV: It was ideologically incorrect.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes. Although the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front, the way it was carried out, especially up to the 9th, inclusive, the command of the Voronezh Front, I must say, it was very well planned and brilliantly carried out.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, it appears that a chain of errors started on the 9th. What was it?

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that on the 9th, Vatutin clearly recorded the turn of the 48th Corps to the west. And on the basis of other intelligence data, which testified to the exhaustion of the enemy troops - well, for example, battle formations began to advance on the left wing, veterinarians began to advance. They captured one machine gunner, who was, in fact, a veterinarian. Then they recorded that on the right and left wings they began to build defensive lines: the troops that were advancing - but began to build defensive lines. Another very important thing: before the 9th, the command of the Voronezh Front succeeded in something very important. Thanks to, firstly, the precisely planned actions of the enemy, the stubbornness of the troops of the 69th Army, the strike force of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were separated, that is, the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army was not covered. This led to dissipation of forces. This moment is very important for understanding why the enemy could not advance further - there were simply not enough troops. And this was originally planned and carried out by the command of the Voronezh Front.

D. ZAKHAROV: And what happened after the 9th?

V. ZAMULIN: After analyzing the situation and intelligence, the command of the Voronezh Front assumed that although the enemy was delivering strong blows at the tip of the wedge of the 4th Panzer Army, he was taking these forces on the flanks, that is, his reserves had already been exhausted. Although our reconnaissance reported that the reserves were approaching, but at the forefront of these reserves it was not recorded either by prisoners, or by observation, or by documents collected. Therefore, Vatutin decided to launch a front-line counterattack on the 12th, assuming that by this moment the enemy was already exhausted and it was necessary to split his strike force. At the request of Vatutin and the support of Vasilevsky, formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army began to approach Prokhorovka in the second half of the 9th. A little later, the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army of General Zhadov also approached here. Almost by the 12th, as assumed by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, a group of more than 100 thousand people and about 1 thousand tanks was supposed to concentrate near Prokhorovka. This hammer was supposed to split the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in half.

V. DYMARSKY: Nevertheless, after all, Dima asked the question, what were our mistakes? After all, until July 17, the Germans actually controlled Prokhorovka.

V. ZAMULIN: No.

V. DYMARSKY: No? In any case, there are such historical ...

V. ZAMULIN: No, no.

V. DYMARSKY: Do you disagree with those historians who believed that they captured and controlled Prokhorovka?

V. ZAMULIN: Prokhorovka was liberated on February 6, 1943, and the enemy has never captured it since.

V. DYMARSKY: But in my opinion - this is not my invention, this is Boris Sokolov - he wrote that they captured and controlled it until July 17, and then they left it themselves.

V. ZAMULIN: These are the legends that have come, the legends of the new time.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, this is probably an important question - the transfer of Rotmistrov's army. In general, a phenomenal phenomenon, when more than 700 tanks made a march at such a distance that the Germans missed them, did not bomb them, because, in general, tanks on the march are a very profitable target. And here is how many cars failed, how many came by the 12th - could you tell us more about this?

V. ZAMULIN: In addition to the 5th Guards Tank Army, there were two tank corps near Prokhorovka, and when Rotmistrov approached, these 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps were promptly subordinated to him. In total, as of July 12, according to the state, these corps and Rotmistrov's army had approximately 960 armored vehicles. In reality, there were fewer of them - some were still on the march, some were under repair, and so on. The transfer of the 5th Panzer Army was carried out, firstly, for the first time at such a distance of 280-350 kilometers, depending on the location of the corps in the Voronezh region. The transfer of these three corps - the 18th, 29th, 5th mechanized - and army units to such a distance was carried out for the first time, and it was carried out quite well. Losses of armored vehicles along the road - they were, but they were insignificant. By the 12th, all three buildings ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, it wasn't just losses, they just went out of order.

V. ZAMULIN: Quite right.

D. ZAKHAROV: But someone lost more than half of the tanks there, that is, not lost, but left.

V. ZAMULIN: So, the 29th corps of General Krichenko was the most successful in the march, for which the military council of the armies thanked him, declared gratitude, and the most difficult situation was in the 18th tank corps of General Bakharov, but this corps was included in the army already before the march, he was not as a separate corps. And the mechanized corps suffered significant losses, equipment broke down, I mean. But by the beginning of the fighting, the 18th Corps had practically restored its combat capability completely due to repair units. The 5th mechanized pulled up the tails, as the documents often say, until the 15th. But the mechanized corps is larger in number. There was, as it were, a subjective moment - the 18th Corps was alien. We must pay tribute, the command of the corps, as it were, approached the organization of the march through the sleeves, this must be clearly recognized.

D. ZAKHAROV: Is this Bakharovsky?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, Bakharovsky. This must be clearly recognized. But the way the repairmen - we must pay tribute, they repaired very well.

V. DYMARSKY: I beg your pardon, Valery, we will break for a news release, after which we will continue our conversation.

NEWS

V. DYMARSKY: Good evening again. We continue the program "Price of Victory". We continue our conversation about the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, we stopped before the news that the tank group had moved up to Prokhorovka. De jure, there were about 960 cars in it. De facto how much was ready at that time?

V. ZAMULIN: According to the data that I managed to collect from combat documents, by the 12th, the army had the opportunity to deploy and practically committed 642 units into battle.

V. DYMARSKY: Is this the 5th army of Rotmistrov?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, 5th Guards Tank.

V. DYMARSKY: I have different data on pieces of equipment. What I saw - 850 tanks.

V. ZAMULIN: This figure fluctuates - 830-852. This is the number of three corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. In addition, there were two more corps that I spoke about - General Popov and Colonel Burdeinov, minus those remaining on the way, under repair, and so on.

V. DYMARSKY: In general, this is one of, perhaps, the most controversial moments of the Prokhorov battle - in terms of the numbers of military equipment involved, because, according to Soviet sources, there was an equality of forces. We have about 850, and Hauser has about 750.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, but as a result, one and a half thousand.

V. DYMARSKY: And in the end, how much, according to your data, what was the balance of power? How many who had?

V. ZAMULIN: The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which received the order to capture Prokhorovka and the heights adjacent to it, planned its actions for the 12th as follows. The division "Leibstandarte", which pulled ahead and fell, as it were, into a semi-circle, into such a bag, was supposed to be on the defensive in the morning of the 12th and in readiness for the offensive after the neighbors on the left, the "Dead Head" division, and on the right " Das Reich" will level the front. Only after that the corps was supposed to capture Prokhorovka and the adjacent heights with a throw. But Hauser, thanks to air reconnaissance, recorded the approach of significant tank formations to the Prokhorovka area. The area in the Prokhorovka area is not wooded, it is impossible to hide several hundred combat vehicles, especially at dawn, Rotmistrov’s brigades advanced to the front line from about 0 to 1 am on July 12 and remained in these combat positions until half past eight in the morning, that is, almost 3.5 hours during daylight hours. It is impossible not to notice 400 in front of the front - there were 368 tanks directly under Prokhorovka - vehicles that stood on the field and waited.

V. DYMARSKY: 368 of our tanks?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, yes, these are two buildings that were supposed to ...

V. DYMARSKY: I see, but how many Germans were there?

V. ZAMULIN: Directly in the direction of the main attack of the two corps of the 5th Guards Army on the Tank field, that is, the area that we now call the Tank field, the 18th and 29th corps were to be introduced; in the direction of the main attack of these two corps was the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, it had about 60 vehicles, there, 77 of all armored vehicles. But besides this, in the morning a number of tanks arrived from repair, and so on. But the main thing was not the number of tanks that she had in a tank regiment. The main thing is that this division moved ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Excuse me, here it must be said that the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler is a motorized division, it is not a tank division, which is why they had only 60 tanks. I'm just explaining to the audience.

V. ZAMULIN: No, all SS divisions were equipped as tank divisions, that is, they were supposed to have 132 tanks in 1943 plus two infantry regiments. 60 tanks, 77 tanks in total - and T-2, and T-3, and so on - they came up with such numbers, because they lost.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, of course. During the battles.

V. ZAMULIN: But here's the thing, division...

D. ZAKHAROV: Excuse me, Valery, here is a clarification. Did they actually have Tigers?

V. ZAMULIN: Four Tigers.

V. DYMARSKY: I saw 15 Tigers.

V. ZAMULIN: No, the division had the 13th heavy company, which, according to the state, should have 15 Tigers. But, approaching Prokhorovka on the 12th, she lost a significant part of the armored vehicles and there are only four ...

V. DYMARSKY: It is clear, that is, there were 15 initially.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, yes, according to the state.

D. ZAKHAROV: Out of 70 light and medium tanks, the Leibstandarte had four Tigers at the beginning of the Battle of Prokhorov.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, yes.

V. DYMARSKY: And in total, is it possible to say that approximately ...

V. ZAMULIN: The corps had a total of approximately 296 armored vehicles.

V. DYMARSKY: German?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes. in three divisions.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, but there was one division there.

V. DYMARSKY: That is, our 800 with something against about 300 ...

V. ZAMULIN: In the two buildings that I mentioned - the 18th and 29th - the next morning there were 368 combat vehicles ready for battle, against 77 German ones.

D. ZAKHAROV: Yes, that is, the superiority was at least fivefold.

V. ZAMULIN: Well, for tanks, yes. The main thing is that I want to focus attention so that both the audience and you and I understand that the division of Brigadeführer Wisch "Leibstandarte" has gone on the defensive. She used engineering structures, that is, trenches, dugouts, anti-tank ditches, and she quickly managed to create a strong ...

D. ZAKHAROV: Burrow.

V. ZAMULIN: Burrow. On a sector of about 6 kilometers, the enemy concentrated, depending on where the flanks were counted, more than 300 guns against two corps.

D. ZAKHAROV: That is, there were 50 barrels per kilometer, that is, every 200 meters - a barrel. Moreover, as far as I know from your own book, there was quite such a serious artillery. In addition to small-caliber, there were 105 and even more caliber howitzers.

V. ZAMULIN: And mortars. That is, it applies to all trunks. And mortars, including anti-aircraft guns. Even anti-aircraft divisions were put forward to the forefront to fight directly with tanks. This is very important - the transition of the German division to the defense.

D. ZAKHAROV: An advantage.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, an advantage, because they were preparing.

V. DYMARSKY: This happened after, if I understand correctly, how German intelligence discovered the approach of mobile reserves. And Houser decided not to risk it...

V. ZAMULIN: Quite right.

V. DYMARSKY: And how to lure the Soviet troops into the field...

V. ZAMULIN: And strike them. Quite right. Destroy and then move on...

V. DYMARSKY: Well, yes, and then go to Prokhorovka.

D. ZAKHAROV: Moreover, as far as I understand, he had a rather advantageous position. Here is the famous height 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm, also a hill.

V. ZAMULIN: Quite right.

D. ZAKHAROV: He controlled the terrain, as it were, from above, which gave him additional advantages in firing.

V. DYMARSKY: And this is where the famous battle of Prokhorov took place...

V. ZAMULIN: The battle of two corps ...

V. DYMARSKY: With one tank division, in fact.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, from your book I learned something that turned my idea of ​​the Prokhorov battle completely upside down, because I remember the Ozerovsky film "Liberation" - 800 of our tanks are driving across the field, 800 German. There is simply nowhere to spit. If you spit, you will definitely hit the tank. I read from you that these two of our corps went through rather narrow corridors in our minefields, laid by sappers on the morning of the 12th. Well, objectively, you can’t remove all the mines so that they pass. In addition, they had to go through the regimental formations of the infantry without passing it all to hell, as they say. And thus, separate groups were introduced into the battle at intervals and at intervals from 30 minutes to 1 hour 20, as you write. That is, in fact, instead of inflicting a massive canonical blow, which appears in the cinema and an endless amount of literature, how the paste was squeezed out of a tube - these small groups of tanks came under fire, as we found out, 50 barrels per kilometer of the front line. In general, a fairly predictable result.

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that when the front-line counterattack was planned, because the events near Prokhorovka are an element of the front-line counterattack, all the armies of the front took part in it, with the exception of the 38th, even the 40th partially participated, including the army reserves - 5- I am a tank guards and 5th combined arms. This counterattack was planned, the tip of this counterattack was planned to be delivered from the Prokhorovka area, but not where it actually took place. It was planned to deploy a tank army, two corps and the 3rd mechanized, directly in front of the third rear line, there was an opportunity to deploy a large number of equipment, but on the 10th and 11th, having received information that a significant part of the tanks, Russians, were approaching Prokhorovka, Hauser set his divisions the task of closing the passage to deployment at all costs ...

V. DYMARSKY: It’s clear, that is, if we go back to what we said already a sufficient number of minutes ago, this was Hauser’s trick, this was where he outplayed ours ...

V. ZAMULIN: Quite right. He put himself in Vatutin's place and suggested what he could do in this situation, and having determined what Vatutin would do...

D. ZAKHAROV: Deprived him of the possibility of maneuver.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, he used his own means, seized territory where a significant number of armored vehicles could be deployed. That is, the main trump card of the Soviet side was the number of equipment. If these two corps - Krichenko and Bakharov - deployed, as planned, two or three echelons and simultaneously hit the Leibstandarte division, no 300 barrels would have held. But these corps were unable to use their power and numbers. They didn't take the terrain into account.

V. DYMARSKY: What happened in the end? There, again, different figures appear everywhere in terms of equipment losses.

D. ZAKHAROV: Actually, here is the book, there are tables.

V. DYMARSKY: Let Valery tell us orally.

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that when we talk about the losses of the 5th Guards Tank Army, it must be borne in mind that it fought on July 12 not only southwest of Prokhorovka on the Tank Field. She was still fighting stubbornly, her part of the forces fought further south.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, in total there are more than 300 tanks, right?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, 359 vehicles were lost.

V. DYMARSKY: And from the German side?

V. ZAMULIN: From the German side, the situation is very interesting, because, firstly, the Germans had a different accounting system than ours. Secondly, whether you like it or not, I proceed from my own experience of communicating with German historian colleagues and veterans, for them the Second World War, as, indeed, for many of us, is not ashes. These are coals. And they are very sensitive to what happened in that war and how their Wehrmacht fought. We must pay tribute, this is their history, this is their position. Therefore, it is very difficult to say exactly how much the enemy lost. I cite, from my books, data on approximately losses, and these data are similar to those of other researchers. On July 12, the SS corps lost about 153-165 vehicles irretrievable or wrecked, that is, subject to restoration.

D. ZAKHAROV: Valery, there is a discrepancy here. You say that at the beginning of the battle, ours had, these two corps, approximately the 350th, and the Germans had about 70 tanks.

V. DYMARSKY: Probably reinforcements were coming there?

V. ZAMULIN: No, no. The fact is that two tank corps, the 18th and 29th, were supposed to strike southwest of Prokhorovka, breaking through the corridor, and Skvortsov’s 5th mechanized corps, more than 200 tanks, was supposed to enter this corridor. But these two corps - the 18th and 29th - could not solve this problem. In the morning, before the start of the battle, the 3rd Panzer Corps broke through the rear line south of Prokhorovka, and half of the 5th Mechanized Corps was sent to the south. Therefore, when I talk about the losses of the 5th Panzer Army, these are the losses of two corps - the 18th, 29th in the Tank Field and in the south. When I talk about 158 ​​German tanks, these are the losses of three divisions: the “Dead Head” in the bend of Psel ...

V. DYMARSKY: And there were only 70…

V. ZAMULIN: Only the Leibstandarte.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, on the Tank Field, how many of these 150 Germans lost, so to speak, in defense?

V. ZAMULIN: The tragedy of Rotmistrov’s tank army lies in the fact that two corps suffered, especially the 29th corps, suffered enormous losses and advanced, really advanced, recaptured a territory of about 2-2.5 kilometers ...

V. DYMARSKY: At the cost of these tanks. I can tell you more, there is evidence from Rotmistrov himself. I don't know if you've met or not. Rotmistrov, when I found out about the losses of his army after the battle, I’ll just quote you now, he later said that “The Supreme Commander,” referring to Stalin, “decided to remove me from my post and almost put me on trial.” These are the words of Rotmistrov himself following the results of the Prokhorov battle.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, as I understand by ear, you quoted an excerpt from the book of Fyodor Davydovich Sverdlov, the deceased, the kingdom of heaven. It was he who first published his conversation with Rotmistrov in his book Unknown about Soviet Generals, and it was to him that Pavel Alekseevich told what had happened.

V. DYMARSKY: And, by the way, since we started talking about it, which seems to be, but here I don’t really believe that Rotmistrov himself could create this myth that the Prokhorov battle was, as it were, decisive in order to stop the German offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, I do not think that Rotmistrov was able to create this myth himself, but in any case he spoke about it for self-justification, if you like.

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that it is important to understand that the battle of Prokhorov lasted from July 10 to July 16. The military does not have divisions during a defensive operation. This has already been shared by historians. The Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front was going on, it lasted from July 5 to July 23, 1943. Here, during this operation, several battles were fought in the Oboyanskoye Highway strip, in the south, and so on. That was the battle of Prokhorov. The main task in the battle of Prokhorovka of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps is to break through the 3rd rear line, capture Prokhorovka and the heights and create conditions for striking northeast of Oboyan and encircling the 48th Corps of the 69th Army with the forces of two divisions 2 SS Panzer Corps and 3rd SS Panzer Corps. Accordingly, the tasks of the Soviet side are to hold the site and prevent ...

V. DYMARSKY: I see. Then, if you follow this logic, what did you say that, at the cost of huge losses, Rotmistrov advanced only 2,5 kilometers, he completed the task, since these were defensive, from our point of view, actions, that is, he didn’t have to win there territory, move forward, attack. His task was to defend what is, he defended and even advanced 2.5 kilometers. I'm trying to be logical.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, absolutely right. It was necessary for the Soviet troops to hold and they held.

V. DYMARSKY: Another thing is at what cost.

D. ZAKHAROV: Still, I still have a question about the Tank Field. How many tanks did Hauser lose in that battle?

V. ZAMULIN: There are no exact data.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, half? Third?

V. ZAMULIN: I guess...

V. DYMARSKY: May I give the figures that I have, the German historian Frieser, if you have heard.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, I know him in absentia.

V. DYMARSKY: The irretrievable losses of the SS Panzer Corps amounted to no more than 5 tanks from 11 to 13 July. In 2003, Frizer came to the conclusion that the irretrievable losses of the Germans near Prokhorovka amounted to only 3 tanks.

D. ZAKHAROV: Well, irrevocable means something that cannot be restored. There were also damaged during the battle.

V. DYMARSKY: Yes, 38 tanks and 12 assault guns were damaged. This is the data of a German historian. By the way, Frizer wrote that the Germans still controlled Prokhorovka.

V. ZAMULIN: No, not Prokhorovka.

V. DYMARSKY: Prokhorovka.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes? I have not met.

V. ZAMULIN: The fact is that given that a small area that was recaptured by two tank corps, although the 18th corps advanced almost to the crossings of the "Dead Head", but in reality our two tank corps recaptured an insignificant area, captured the height and the state farm, and they controlled the rest of the battlefield, including those areas where our combat vehicles broke through. And all the German tanks, even wrecked, they were in the territory controlled by the SS.

D. ZAKHAROV: So they could have evacuated them?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, they evacuated and repaired, so to say exactly how much the Leibstandarte lost...

V. DYMARSKY: Well, have you seen this document - Khrushchev's report to Stalin? He was a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front, Khrushchev. From 24 July. I’m just quoting: “When retreating, the enemy, by specially created teams, evacuates his wrecked tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including our tanks and our materiel, is burned and blown up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future. This is a report from a member of the military council Khrushchev to the Supreme Commander Stalin.

V. ZAMULIN: The command wrote about the same thing - Khrushchev, as a member of the military council, wrote - but there was also a combat report from the command of the Voronezh Front, its meaning is as follows: the Death Head division had the greatest losses in tanks. Despite the fact that she was advancing from the bend into the villages against two, in fact two, rifle divisions - the 95th Guards and the 52nd Guards, and on that day, according to some reports, she suffered losses of up to 50 combat vehicles from artillery fire .

V. DYMARSKY: But if we talk about our losses, do you agree with what many historians write, again, that one of the reasons was Stalin’s order of September 19, 1942, when he ordered tankers to fire mainly from move and equip tanks with additional tanks on the armor, why did they flare up like lighters even from bullets and shrapnel? And secondly, this is about radio, radio communications, which only commanders had, and the Germans easily calculated the commander. And as the commander’s tank was knocked out, operational control was completely lost.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, it was. And as for the order to shoot on the move - no, the terrain had an impact on huge losses, first of all.

D. ZAKHAROV: Tank unsuitability.

V. ZAMULIN: Yes.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, since we have very little time, you tell me - again, we, by the way, and our marshals, generals, politicians in their memories, although in my school representation of Prokhorovka it can be said , the victory of Soviet weapons, maybe it was so, nevertheless, as for Prokhorovka, it all comes down to the fact that the match, sorry for such a cynical comparison, ended in a draw?

V. ZAMULIN: No, we won, that's for sure. The troops defending the rear sector in the Prokhorovka area did not allow the enemy ...

V. DYMARSKY: That is, from the point of view that they have fulfilled their task?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes. Price…

V. DYMARSKY: The price was huge.

V. ZAMULIN: The price - the second question - was huge.

D. ZAKHAROV: If, again, to draw this parallel, then our team won, but only one captain remained in its composition.

V. DYMARSKY: One last question, very briefly, I just want to take this opportunity and ask you something completely different. Valery, you are the deputy director of the military-historical museum-reserve "Prokhorovka field". Do a lot of people go to you, to your museum?

V. ZAMULIN: Yes, a lot. A lot of. And what pleases, young and middle age.

V. DYMARSKY: I tell our radio listeners who cannot see you, Valery is a very young man, and yet he is interested, competently interested in military history and is the deputy director for scientific work, I emphasize, of this museum-reserve ...

V. ZAMULIN: We have wonderful expositions, wonderful monuments. Come, we will be glad.

V. DYMARSKY: But do you see your visitors, do people want to get to the truth in general, or do they still prefer to stay in that system of myths that was created there, 60 years ago and is still alive?

V. ZAMULIN: I'll tell you that if people are told the truth, and it's interesting, their eyes light up, and they really want to know what happened. And, interestingly, they want to understand - to understand those people who defended freedom and independence, who did it, what they felt. This, of course, many seek to understand.

V. DYMARSKY: We also want our listeners to think about the war in general, about the Price of Victory, remember these people...

V. ZAMULIN: We remembered veterans and paid tribute.

V. DYMARSKY: Thank you. It was Valery Zamulin, Deputy Director for Research at the Prokhorovskoye Pole Military Historical Museum-Reserve, and program hosts Dmitry Zakharov…

D. ZAKHAROV: And Vitaly Dymarsky.

V. DYMARSKY: See you in a week.

D. ZAKHAROV: All the best.

V. ZAMULIN: All the best.