Confrontation legislative and executive power in Russia ended in bloody events in October 1993. One of the main causes of the conflict was a fundamental divergence of views on the issue of socio-economic and political the course of Russia. The government headed by B.N. Yeltsin and E.T. Gaidar acted as a defender of radical market reforms, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR headed by R.I. Khasbulatov and Vice-President of Russia A.B. Rutskoi resisted reforms, opposing the market regulated economy.
In December 1992 V.S. Chernomyrdin
V.S.Chernomyrdinreplaced E.T. Gaidar as head of government. But the expected change of course did not happen, only some adjustments were made to the monetary course, which caused even more indignation of the legislators. The political situation in Russia in 1993 became more and more tense.
An important reason for the growing antagonism between the two branches of power was their lack of experience in interaction within the framework of the system of separation of powers, which Russia practically did not know.
The Russian president was the first to strike at a political opponent. In a TV appearance September 21 he announced termination of powers of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, the presidential decree “On a phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation” came into force. He actually introduced temporary presidential rule and meant a radical break in the entire existing state-political and constitutional system.
The Supreme Council, located in the White House, refused to obey the presidential decree and equated it with a coup d'état. On the night of September 21-22, the Supreme Council was sworn in as President of the Russian Federation Vice President A. Rutskoy. On September 22, the Supreme Council decided to supplement the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with an article punishing anti-constitutional activities, non-fulfilment of its and the Congress's decisions and obstruction of its activities "up to execution." On the same day, the White House security service began distributing weapons to civilians.
Within 10 days, the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of power developed on the rise. September 27 – 28 the blockade of the White House began, surrounded by police and riot police. On the night of October 3-4, bloody skirmishes took place near the television buildings and in them, television broadcasts were interrupted, but the attacks of the Supreme Soviet detachments were repulsed. Decree B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow was introduced state of emergency, the entry of government troops into the capital began. Yeltsin declared the actions of the White House "an armed fascist-communist rebellion."
Introduction to the capital of troops in 1993
On the morning of October 4 government troops started siege and tank shelling of the White House. By the evening of the same day, he was taken, and his leadership, headed by R. Khasbulatov and A. Rutsky, was arrested.
As a result of the storming of the White House, there were casualties on both sides, and, undoubtedly, October 1993 became a tragic page in Russian history. The blame for this tragedy lies on the shoulders of Russian politicians, who clashed in the autumn of 1993 not only in fight for their political goals, but also, to a lesser extent, power struggle.
In September 1993 B.N. Yeltsin issued a Decree, according to which, for July 1994, appointed early presidential elections. In the statement of the President of the Russian Federation of October 8, i.e. already after the defeat of the opposition, it was confirmed that elections to the supreme legislative body would be held in December.
The book is dedicated to the main strike power of the ground forces - tank troops. The author reconstructed the main tank battles of World War II, spoke in detail about the background of the creation and post-war development of armored vehicles, gave a description of various types and types of tanks, paying great attention to armor protection and the parameters of tank guns, their maneuverability in specific landscapes. The publication is supplied with maps, diagrams and photographs.
Principles of warfare
Principles of warfare
An accurate and objective description of a specific battle, even the main course of historical events, is rare. Military records can be overly emotional. Memoirs are sometimes presented biasedly - in order to present their authors (or one of the parties) in the most favorable light. The history of a particular military unit often does not reflect the time, place and location of the troops. National pride and politics can influence the accounts of events, which are embellished, and personal memories are limited, though often adding additional and necessary color to the picture of events.
Even in the calmer atmosphere of civil life, there is a scatter of opinion after an event as to its cause and effect, as well as time and place. How much more likely it is that the description of the events of the battle, when people are tense, exhausted and afraid of an imminent and terrible death, suffers from subjectivity and is not always true. It is amazing that in battle people are able to act as intelligently as they always did, and remember everything as clearly as in ordinary life. The basis for this is morale or pride, and partly training and discipline.
Therefore, to synthesize descriptions of hostilities, it is necessary to reduce often conflicting sources to a common denominator, accepting the point of view of the majority or the most plausible of several descriptions of events. Historians can always be blamed for failing to provide their readers with the fullness of the events described so that the reader can appreciate the significance of these events. Therefore, in preparing this book, it seemed that the descriptions of the various battles would benefit from a revision of the principles of land warfare that have existed since time immemorial, and the tactics used to implement them, after tanks and aircraft were established on the battlefields.
The nine principles of successful warfare have been known for centuries. These principles are formulated differently in different countries; in the United States they are known as the principles of purpose, concentration, maneuver, unified command, simplicity, economy of force, security, surprise, and advance. Although it is well known that the principles of warfare are often ignored or misinterpreted.
It is these principles of warfare that are taken as the basis of tactics and the art of combat. Like the principles of warfare, the principles of tactics have not changed much throughout history. Weapons, means of communication and other equipment changed, but the principles of their use remained largely the same. But as these principles are applied in the most diverse geographic settings and with soldiers armed in various ways, ranging from spearman, swordsman, archer, and cavalryman to machine gunner, marksman, tanker, paratrooper, or airman, an almost infinite variety of military operations can be observed. To this variety of conditions, armaments and personnel must be added elements of the human factor - fear, fatigue, morale, discipline, preparedness and experience, hidden dislike and envy, misunderstanding, false pride, anger at the opposition to the intended plans, despair, betrayal and politics, as well as panic, the accumulation of civilian refugees, the effectiveness of supplies (or lack thereof), friction between the High Command and troops at the front, the vagaries of the weather, etc. The conduct of combat operations is influenced by the nature of the terrain (primarily relief), the contours of the coast, low tides, irrigation and drainage systems, vegetation, soils, climate and weather, as well as man-made features such as the transportation network and various settlements, and many other details. Thus, one can see that seemingly well-understood principles of warfare are often implemented unpredictably in practice.
Most operations in terms of military tactics consist of a general offensive, specific attacks, pursuit, defense, containment and withdrawal. The attack may be by breakthrough, or by a frontal assault, or by infiltration. The Germans are credited with developing a system of infiltration attack by small groups of soldiers breaking through enemy positions undetected in order to later link up and gather forces. The Russians became masters of such actions twenty-five years later, during World War II, when the Germans discovered that almost every Russian offensive was preceded by an infiltration of individual fighters and small units.
Since a frontal attack obviously comes at a high price, the offensive is often carried out by a roundabout maneuver or encirclement of one or both flanks of the enemy. Any form of attack may be a variation or may exist in combinations. Sweeps are usually carried out on the surface of the earth, but there are many examples of other kinds of sweeps in history. One of them, which can be called "underground coverage", involves undermining or digging a tunnel. Other examples closer to ours are air and water coverage.
There are two fundamental forms of defense - active and passive. Active defense consists of a series of holding actions of small mobile units or a number of strong points rather than of disrupting an enemy advance along a continuous line of defense. Mobile reserves are used flexibly, as they are needed to support defensive strongholds or gaps between them, or to counterattack. This type of defense was developed during the First World War by the same Germans, and since then it has been adopted almost everywhere. Such a defense develops in depth and is conceived as a twisted spring, which, straightening or contracting, builds up tension for a counterattack. Passive defense is of two types - frontal and circular (or perimeter defense), it is sometimes called "the defense of the cornered rat".
Deterrent defensive actions are a means to buy time for a withdrawal. To retreat, it is important to be able to get out of the battle. For the advancing side, it is important to pursue in order to disorganize the stunned enemy, who is trying to conduct deterrent hostilities or make an orderly withdrawal.
The threat from the reserve or special forces means that the enemy must similarly keep a counter-reserve ready. If one does not know about its existence, size or location, the reserve becomes an even more significant force. Communication and supply lines must be protected. The degree of protection varies and depends on whether they are located on their own or on enemy territory.
In modern warfare there is no continuous line of fighting. An infantry battalion of eight hundred to a thousand soldiers can defend the main line of about 2400 meters with a distance of about 400-500 meters between strong points. However, in an attack, the density is different and the battalion can cover the front only to a width of 500 to 1000 meters. Losses naturally shorten these distances or result in areas being defended by more rare forces.
A formal system of dividing lines was adopted in World War I to mark areas of responsibility between small and large units and formations because it was considered desirable in the close combat positions and trench lines that existed at the time. Dividing lines of responsibility have continued to be used ever since, although in a rapidly developing type of mobile warfare their value is questionable.
Tactics is said to consist essentially of firing and maneuvering, using the element of surprise or, conversely, avoiding it, the latter being known as "security." In order to be able to use the element of surprise, imagination and resourcefulness are required. The prevention of surprise consists in taking both precautionary measures of a technical nature and deception of the enemy. It also includes the identification of enemy positions on the ground, information about him, about his material and physical capabilities and a possible course of action. It is considered unforgivable to be taken by surprise by the enemy. A successful tactician must prevent this from happening (while at the same time trying to do so against the enemy).
Artillery is used to fire (direct fire and from indirect positions) against enemy artillery, infantry, tanks and other troops or against his supply depots and other rear objects. But the outcome of a battle is almost always determined by the resourcefulness of each individual infantryman with his rifle, machine gun or machine gun, because only he can hold a position once taken. All other types of troops and services complement such a fighter, allowing him to wage a successful fight against the enemy.
At the dawn of the history of wars, warriors fought shoulder to shoulder. With the continuous improvement of weapons, the distance between them gradually increased. Eventually this led to the adoption of certain dispersal formations and to take advantage of terrain and cover. Such formations are also designed to maintain control in such conditions as fighting in the forest, in fog, in smoke, at night, in the river and at the crossing, during landings from the sea, and in many others. These formations and the basic tactics employed are the same for both small and large units. All this can vary in detail and depends on the situation and the weapons used.
A twelve-man infantry squad can flank, hop, or infiltrate. As the size of the unit increases, each individual unit can continue to operate in accordance with the basic principles of tactics on the ground or according to the evolving situation. Meanwhile, a larger unit (or several units) can similarly perform various tactical maneuvers. In larger units and units, additional weapons are used - mortars, artillery, armored vehicles, as well as units of engineering troops and communications, artillery and technical support and repair, aerial photography and topography services, medical services, naval forces, partisans, propaganda tools and many other units. , each of which contributes to the achievement of the main tactical goal.
Subdivisions and units of various strengths can attack (including with fire) each enemy unit on its way or bypass it in order not to lose the pace of the attack, leaving the clearing of bypassed enemy points and areas of resistance to waves of friendly troops moving after it. These are also the fundamentals of seepage tactics.
While smaller units such as squads usually don't do this, larger units leave some of their forces in combat as support or reserves. Support forces are used to follow the attacking forward units in order to ensure the speed of the attack, maintain its pace and power. The reserve is an additional force held as a last resort for the final completion of the attack or introduced in order to repulse the enemy's counterattack at the moment when it is clear that the attack has bogged down. Thus, in the study of combat operations, the existence of such support and such a reserve must be kept in mind, even if they are not specifically mentioned.
As a rule, the side that achieves a decisive superiority in any type of armed forces and uses it wisely has a better chance of winning. As Napoleon once said: "God is on the side better than armed battalions." This is true, but only with skillful use of them. There are many examples in history of victorious actions of troops that were inferior in numbers - because they were competently controlled or they correctly and effectively used the weapons given to them. Battle of Cowpens in South Carolina (1781 - Ed.) during the American Revolutionary War, a little classic example of what might be called passive outreach. In the course of it, the American commander, General Daniel Morgan, flanked the inexperienced British troops with a small number of battle-hardened American troops in such a way that, when the ill-prepared American troops in the center were broken by the British attack, the experienced US troops on the flanks were held in such a way that the natural course of battle led to their victory through the envelopment of enemy troops in the center. The American commander correctly assessed his forces and acted accordingly.
The usual standard offensive tactical formation consists of two parts of the first echelon and one part of the support. But sometimes for a frontal attack (assault), where maximum effort is needed, only one attacking unit and two (or more. - Ed.) units advancing after it in order to maintain the onslaught on the enemy. An attack through the forest, or at night, or against an enemy whose position is unclear, may be made in column formation. In any case, the following waves of attackers may repeat the formations of the original wave in order to support the initial attack, or may advance in some other formation.
The number of troops (our own and the enemy), the terrain and the general situation are usually of paramount importance, but sometimes the train of thought and the personality of the commander matter. Many attacks fail due to underestimating the enemy's strength or morale, or failing to capitalize on success, or even committing all available forces into battle just because they were on hand (and so there were no reserves left when the enemy counterattacked. All these are elementary truths that have existed since time immemorial, and as a result, one had to pay dearly at the cost of wasted lives in vain).
A common shortcoming of military commanders is that they have memorized established rules and patterns of tactics and always use them in exactly the same way, regardless of specific circumstances. This often happened during both world wars of the twentieth century. Such commanders stubbornly insist on a certain course of hostilities when their failure is already obvious. Tactics textbooks are full of the technical details of “approved” formations and cliches in the form of rules (and notes to them) for all occasions. Precision plotting charts for use in given conditions are interesting and can be learned by heart. Too often in combat, troops are guided by textbook methods, instead of common sense and the principles of warfare. It is no secret that the Communist Chinese army operating in Korea in 1951 published a document stating that the methods of the Americans always differed in that they provided for a certain day of attack and a single sequence of aerial bombardments, artillery shelling, bringing armored vehicles into battle, and, finally, infantry attacks. With such methods, there was no room for the element of surprise, and the result was unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, not to mention the fact that troops operating according to the template were in danger of being defeated.
Rules and "approved solutions" to peacetime planning problems are important, and knowledge of weapons and technology is essential. But there are times when the textbook must be forgotten, and the situation facing the commander must be reassessed and the only correct remedy applied. Resourcefulness and, more importantly, knowledge of human nature must come into play.
One of the problems that commanders face in combat is how to control the situation. It goes without saying that intelligence or other information about the enemy should be sent to the rear - for the high command, while the oncoming flow of information should follow from the rear to the front. If the commander of any military unit or unit, large or small, does not constantly receive the necessary information and is not aware of what is happening, he will not be able to make the right decision at the right time. The theater of operations in modern warfare is very large, and the time has passed when the commander of any, even the smallest, unit could determine what turn the battle was taking.
However, a commander cannot do without some intelligence at his level, but he must rely on larger assets to obtain more detailed intelligence. They include reconnaissance conducted by reconnaissance detachments of a few to many soldiers, or even reconnaissance in combat by the combined efforts of various branches of the military. Aerial reconnaissance, of course, is of the greatest importance, replacing the horse patrols of past years.
The problems of control and security are especially difficult in the case of night operations, when the pace and depth of the operation decreases. Experience shows that casualties are usually higher in night operations, although the end often justifies the means. In the US Army, after the start of the Korean War, combat training focused on night operations, and this took a third of the time of all combat training. But later, like many of the training sessions that were proven necessary by World War II and the Korean War, such sessions faded away.
Security measures for an offensive on the road or off-road require that reconnaissance detachments or forward guards move ahead of the main body, and also that reconnaissance detachments and combat guards move ahead of the main body and parallel to them. This is done in order to prevent a surprise attack by the enemy, and also in order to give the main body time to deploy from marching to battle formation, if necessary. Today, helicopters are sometimes used in this role. At a halt for the same reason, posts are posted. In combat, each unit maintains contact with neighboring units on each side. If it is a flank unit, it must also have considerable forces at the ready in order to prevent or frustrate the envelopment of its flank by the enemy or his enveloping maneuver. In the battle area where the opposing forces have come into combat contact, both sides resort to reconnaissance in order to identify and determine the location of the enemy, recognize the opposing units, and capture and interrogate prisoners. As already mentioned, only a small number of people can be involved in reconnaissance or, under certain conditions, it can be reconnaissance in force. In this case, it may be a small coordinated operation involving units from all branches of the military. Or, as during the First World War in the conditions of trench warfare, both sides could resort to raids into the enemy's trench, which took minimal time (with coordinated intelligence-gathering operations).
Even a brief discussion of the question of tactics would be incomplete without reference to guerrilla warfare. While guerrilla tactics are far from new, they have been used more and more frequently in recent times, either alone or in conjunction with conventional warfare. One of the best descriptions of this type of warfare is found in Mao Zedong's Yu Chi Chan (Swift and Devastating War), which is partly based on the teachings of the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu (6th-5th century BC).
Mao writes: “The strategy of guerrilla warfare is clearly different from that used in traditional military operations. In guerrilla warfare there is no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the immobile passive defense that distinguishes traditional warfare. The main distinguishing features of intelligence, the basic principle of deployment and the development of an attack ... have nothing to do with guerrilla warfare. Mao continues: “Choose tactics that give the impression of an attack from the east and from the west; avoid large forces, attack weak ones; attack and retreat; deliver a lightning strike; look for an instant solution. When the guerrillas are fighting a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; one must disturb him when he stops; to strike him when he is weak; chase him when he moves away. In guerrilla strategy, the flanks and rear of the enemy are his vital places, and he must be exhausted, dispersed, exhausted and destroyed ... The main thing in the attack is its furious onslaught and deceitful nature. Mao also noted that in any guerrilla war with the West, Eastern patience would prevail over Western impatience in the absence of a solution. The hysteria in the United States in 1970 and 1971 over demands for an "end to the war" in Vietnam is proof of how correct the above assessment is.
The Finns in the war with Russia (November 30, 1939 - March 13, 1940) developed guerrilla warfare tactics that suited their country of lakes, swamps, dense forests and harsh winters. One of its varieties was called "motti". It consisted in an operation against columns of advancing Soviet troops stretched out and tied to the road. There were three stages in this operation. The first stage (it continued during subsequent stages) consisted of reconnaissance and blocking. Small Finnish detachments harassed the enemy, usually at night, using attack and retreat tactics, setting up explosions and laying mines, attacking and quickly disengaging from the battle. The second stage consisted of several sudden, powerful flank attacks with the aim of splitting the enemy column into several small parts isolated from each other. This could have been done at night or during a snow storm, when separate attacks were carried out simultaneously. The idea was to cut the enemy column into small groups, which would then fizzle out in an attempt to break through. Each of these groups eventually broke up into ever smaller handfuls, which were then destroyed.
During World War II, the Yugoslavs and Russians made extensive use of partisans who harassed the rear of the Germans in order to hinder their actions, for propaganda purposes, in cooperation with regular forces and as a kind of "Ku Klux Klan" to punish every inhabitant of the occupied territories, who collaborated with the Germans. The Americans and South Vietnamese faced exactly the same kind of guerrilla warfare in Asia.
History is rich in examples of types of warfare and even more ideas about it. In all of them the principles of warfare are obvious. They are not always balanced, and sometimes a brave commander ignores one or more of these principles in an emergency. But no commander and no nation can ignore them without risking defeat.
Vlad Tepes and the scorched earth tactics.
In 1453, the Turkish Sultan Mehmed II ordered Wallachia to pay tribute. Wallachia - one of the three principalities that make up modern Romania - has always been a kind of "buffer zone" between the Ottoman Empire (in the south) and the Kingdom of Hungary (in the north) and was forced to pay tribute to one or the other neighbor. But in 1461, Vlad Tepes decided to stop this practice and refused to pay tribute to the Turkish Sultan.
Mehmed could not tolerate this and, in order to overthrow the rebellious Tepes, he gathered a huge army, exceeding the forces of Tepes several, or even tens of times. Vlad Tepes decided to retreat deep into the country, using the tactics of "scorched earth", that is, leaving nothing to his opponent. Turkish troops marched through the devastated lands, finding food with difficulty. The subjects of Tepes not only destroyed all the villages, hiding with their cattle in the mountains, but also poisoned the water in the wells. The exhausted troops of Mehmed approached Targovishte, the capital of Wallachia. But near the city that they planned to take, they saw Turkish prisoners impaled (yes, we are talking about Dracula). This sight stopped Mehmed: he ordered to set up camp near the city walls. Then Vlad Tepes, who knew both the language and the customs of the enemy, disguised himself and entered the camp. Having reconnoitered the situation, his troops broke into the camp of the enemy. Tepes failed to kill the Sultan, but the losses of the Ottoman army were so great that they were forced to retreat.
Sassy lies of Fritz Klingenberg and the capture of Belgrade.
Sometimes the success of operations depends not so much on well-thought-out tactics as on the stubbornness and ambitions of one person. So, the Balkan campaign of the Nazi army, April 1941, 28-year-old Fritz Klingenberg commands a company of a reconnaissance motorcycle battalion. His task is to scout the territory leading to Belgrade. But having reached the Danube, instead of turning back, Commander Klingenberg, along with several soldiers, crossed the Danube and entered the city without hindrance. He hijacked a bus full of Serbian soldiers, dressed in local uniforms, walked through a checkpoint, and hung a Nazi flag instead of a Yugoslav one on Belgrade's main street. A rumor spread around Belgrade that the city had been taken by the Nazis. Literally at the same hour, Klingenberg met with the mayor of Belgrade and, bluffing desperately, forced him to sign an act of surrender: he threatened the mayor with brutal bombardments, shelling and a ruthless assault on the tank divisions that allegedly surrounded the city. Yugoslav soldiers laid down their arms.
True, then Klingenberg had difficulties with the Nazi command: the story of such an “assault” sounded too fantastic, and he was suspected of treason and disinformation. To the accusations of the regiment commander, Fritz Klingenberg boldly replied: “I took the city. What should I do, give it back?"
The royal feast of Teferi in Ethiopia.
Haile Selassie, the last emperor of Ethiopia, who bore the name Teferi Makonnin before his coronation, was appointed regent in 1916 and actively took up reforms. Teferi became the leader of the so-called Young Ethiopian movement. Like any reformer, he immediately had conservative enemies in power. One of them was Balcha Safo, governor of the province of Sidamo, a representative of the old Ethiopian circles. Balcha Sappho not only organized a conspiracy against the progressive regent, but also tried to raise an armed uprising.
To get rid of the dangerous governor, the regent Teferi threw a grand celebration in the palace in honor of Balchi Sappho. The cautious Balcha arrived in the capital not alone, but took with him several thousand soldiers who accompanied his cities and waited for the end of the event. While Balcha enjoyed his greatness in the palace, the cunning regent made two secret passages. First, he sent his man outside the city, to the camp where the Balchi soldiers were staying, in order to bribe them against his commander. Second, behind Balchi's back, Sappho replaced him as governor with another politician. Such changes tied the hands and feet of the old Ethiopian, and he was forced to "voluntarily" go to the monastery, where he stayed until the start of the Italo-Ethiopian war.
Wounded Zopyrus and the conquest of Babylon.
This page in the history of the Ancient World remains debatable: someone considers it a legend, and someone completely trusts Herodotus. According to the ancient historian, around 500 BC. Babylon rebelled against Darius I. In order to bring the city back under his influence, Darius gathered a large army and approached the gates of Babylon, but was rebuffed. The emperor spent a year and a half besieging the city until the commander Zopyrus came to his aid. He self-mutilated himself to look like a man who had been abused, and then entered the territory of Babylon. He told the inhabitants of the city that Darius had so cruelly mutilated him for military failures, and that he was looking for refuge in Babylon and years to join the rebels. They immediately believed him. Having won not only trust, but also respect, Zopyrus was soon appointed the chief military leader of Babylon. In his post, he weakened the city's defenses and helped Darius' troops capture Babylon. True, during the next uprising, already under Xerxes, the Babylonians killed Zopyrus: perhaps in order not to tempt fate, having the famous “double agent” at hand.
Sun Bin and the destructive inscription on the tree.
The fate of Chinese strategist Sun Bin is like a movie script, with twists and turns and the laws of the genre. According to legend, while still studying with the legendary philosopher, Sun Lin had a passionate envious person, Pang Juan, who, in a fit of ignoble feelings, slandered the talented Sun Bin. Because of the accusation of treason, Sun Bin was subjected to terrible torture: his kneecaps were cut out and his face was tattooed. Sun Bin fled from the principalities of Wei, where life had treated him so unfairly, to the principality of Qi.
After years of successful service in the kingdom of Qi, our hero had a chance to take revenge. The troops of the kingdom of Wei, led by the offender Pang Juan, attacked the neighbors, the kingdom of Han. The Han rulers turned to the Qi kingdom for help, and they, having agreed, appointed Sun Bin as an assistant commander of the army. By order of Sun Bin, his advancing troops, approaching the territory of the enemy, lit 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the second, and only 30 on the third. All this looked like a retreat. Pang Juan recklessly decided that the Qi wars had chickened out and decided to "pursue" them. Sun Bin predicted the enemy's route and organized an ambush. Spreading his forces along the road, the strategist ordered that a large tree be cut down, stripped of its bark, laid across the road and inscribed on it: "Pang Juan will die under this tree." By order, the troops were to begin shelling as soon as they saw the fire. Pang Juan got to this tree, wanted to read the inscription in the dark, lit a torch and… read it. At the same moment, thousands of archers fired at him and his soldiers. Pang Juan's army was defeated, and Sun Bin was avenged.
Operation Berezino was proposed by I. Stalin himself in the summer of 1944. Alexander Demyanov, a Soviet intelligence agent under the pseudonym "Heine", embedded in the Abwehr (the military intelligence agency of the Third Reich), transmitted false data to Berlin. In particular, in August 1944, he reported that a German unit was hiding near the Berezina River in Belarus, which had lost contact with the command and was in dire need of weapons and food. The non-existent part was represented by German prisoners of war who collaborated with the Soviet Union, including Lieutenant Colonel of the German Army Heinrich Sherhorn. Berlin decided not to leave its soldiers behind enemy lines and sent them the necessary assistance. Moreover, he directed until the end of the war - weapons, money, food and people were constantly at the disposal of the mythical part of Sherhorn. People were immediately arrested, some of them began to cooperate with the Soviet Union, thereby continuing the game. Sherhorn regularly reported on his guerrilla successes so convincingly that he was known among the Nazis as a national hero, leading courageous activities behind enemy lines.
Cannon of William Washington. Another story from the American Revolution. In December 1780, Colonel William Washington and about 80 cavalrymen under his leadership surrounded the enemy, outnumbering them. The Loyalists, along with their colonel, took refuge in the "fortress", which in fact was just a barn, fortified with a moat. Washington's cavalrymen fired on the barn-fortress to no avail, and the loyalists were already feeling their superiority, when William Washington himself appeared before them: he appeared with a huge cannon, and threatening to destroy their entire fortification, offered to surrender. Seeing no other choice, the loyalists surrendered. And only after complete disarmament did they discover an offensive deception: instead of a cannon (which Washington did not have), they saw only a painted log on wheels, which from afar seemed to them a formidable weapon. This wooden dummy was called the "Quaker cannon".
Superstitious Egyptians and Cambyses II.
As always, speaking about the events that took place more than 500 years BC, it is worth making allowances for the possible mythologization of what happened. However, this is not a reason not to tell all the versions that exist. So, according to one of the stories, the Persian king Cambyses II, captured the ancient Egyptian fortress city of Pelusium, using "forbidden tricks." Knowing about the piety and superstitions of the Egyptians, he put in front of his army animals sacred to the Egyptians: cats, ibises, dogs. The Egyptians, fearing to hurt them, were forced to surrender.
Tet offensive in Vietnam significant in that it turned not so much the course of military events as the attitude of the public to the war in Vietnam. 1968 The guerrilla war in South Vietnam has been going on for almost 10 years, the full-scale intervention of the United States is the third year. In the United States, anti-war sentiment begins to prevail, which is why the government is forced to make statements that the enemy is almost broken and the end of the war is near. And then comes the Tet Offensive.
Tet is the main holiday of the year in Vietnam, during which the two sides used to conclude a truce. But this time it was broken by the offensive of the North Vietnamese army. The large-scale offensive lasted several months, during the hostilities thousands of civilians were killed. The sudden indiscriminate massacre and violent clashes against the backdrop of government statements in the spirit of "everything is under control" created a sensation in society. US citizens had decisively lost their former faith in the need for military action in Vietnam, and over time, the Americans withdrew their troops. In terms of military terminology, the Tet Offensive was a major defeat for the North Vietnamese forces. However, the public outcry that changed attitudes towards the war ultimately led North Vietnam to victory, and America to military failure.
3. Whatever specific actions, whatever measures we take, we always have a choice between the most daring and the most cautious decision. Some think that the theory of war always recommends caution. This is not true. If theory advises anything at all, then in the nature of war the most resolute, that is, the most daring, actions are necessary. The theory, however, leaves the military commander to act according to his own courage, enterprise and self-confidence. Therefore, make your choice according to this inner strength, but never forget that a military leader without courage never became great.
Chapter 2
Tactics, or combat theory
War is a combination of many individual battles. This combination may or may not be reasonable, and success depends to a large extent on this. And yet the most important moment is the outcome of the battle. After all, only a combination of successful fights can lead to good results. The most important thing in warfare will always be the art of defeating the enemy in combat. All the attention of Your Imperial Highness should be directed to this matter. I consider the following principles to be the most important:
General principles of defense
1. Keep your troops hidden from the enemy as long as possible. Since the probability of attack by the enemy is great, except when we attack ourselves, we should always be on our guard and keep the troops hidden from the enemy as long as possible.
2. Do not send all your troops into battle at once. Such actions testify to the lack of wisdom needed to fight a battle. Only if you have reserves of troops at your disposal can you turn the tide of battle at a decisive moment.
3. Worry less or not at all about the length of our front. This in itself is not important, but the length of the front limits the depth of our formation (i.e., the number of corps standing one after the other). The troops left in the rear must always be ready for battle. They can be used either to restart the battle in the same area, or to bring into battle in other areas located nearby. This principle is a consequence of the previous one.
4. When attacking, the enemy often seeks to outflank and surround us at the same time. The army corps in the rear can repulse this attempt and thus provide the support for the main front, which is usually provided by natural obstacles on the ground. This arrangement of troops is better than stretching the front line, since in this case it is more difficult for the enemy to outflank us. This principle is again a closer definition of the second.
5. If we have many troops in reserve, only a part of them should stand directly in front of the front. The remaining troops should be hidden behind.
From this position, they, in turn, can attack enemy columns seeking to surround us from the flanks.
6. The main principle is to never remain completely passive, but to attack the enemy from the front and from the flanks, even when he attacks. Therefore, we should defend on this front simply in order to force the enemy to deploy his forces in the offensive on this front. Then we, in turn, attack with those of our troops that were held in the rear. The art of building fortifications, as Your Royal Highness once so admirably remarked, is needed by the defender, not in order to defend himself safely in a trench, but in order to more successfully attack the enemy. This idea should be applied to any passive defense. Such a defense is nothing more than a means by which the enemy can be most effectively attacked on a pre-selected and suitably equipped area where we have deployed our troops.
7. An attack from a defensive position may be launched while the enemy is advancing or while he is still on the march. At the moment when you need to attack, you can pull your troops back, lure the enemy into unknown territory and attack him from both sides. The echelon order of battle, that is, the order in which only two-thirds, half, or even less of the army is brought forward, and the rest of the troops, if possible, directly or indirectly hidden, is very suitable for all movements. Therefore, the type of combat formation is of great importance.
8. If, for example, I had two divisions, I would prefer to keep one in the rear. If I had three, I would keep at least one in the rear, and if I had four, then probably two. If I had five, I would keep at least two in reserve, and in many cases even three, etc.
9. Where we remain passive, we must use the art of building fortifications. This will require carrying out numerous works in compliance with strict rules for the construction of such structures.
10. When creating a battle plan, we must set ourselves a major goal, such as attacking a significant enemy column or completely destroying it. If our aim is small and the enemy's is large, we will naturally suffer a severe defeat, because we will show pettiness and extravagance.
11. Having set ourselves a high goal in our defense plan (destruction of the enemy column, etc.), we must direct all our energy and forces to its fulfillment. In most cases, the attacker will pursue his own target somewhere else. While we attack, for example, his right wing, he will try to win decisive advantages on the left. If we weaken before the enemy, if we pursue our goal with less energy than he, he will gain the full advantage, while we will achieve only half the advantage. In this way, he will receive the preponderance of forces; victory will be his, and we will have to surrender even partly gained advantages. If Your Royal Highness carefully read the history of the battles of Ratisbon and Wagram, all this will seem to you true and important.
12. Let me reiterate the last two principles. Their combination gives us a principle that should take first place among all cases of victory in modern military art: "Pursue the one great decisive goal with strength and perseverance."
13. True, in this case, if we are defeated, the danger will be even greater. But to increase caution at the expense of the result achieved is not a military art. This is false caution, which, as I said in my Principles of War in General, is contrary to the nature of war. For the sake of great goals, we must do bold deeds. When we are engaged in an audacious undertaking, proper caution is not to neglect, out of laziness, indolence, or carelessness, those measures that will help us to achieve our goal. An example is Napoleon, who never, out of caution, pursued large goals timidly or hesitantly.
If you remember, most merciful lord, the few defensive battles that have ever been won, you will find that the best of them have been fought in the spirit of the principles set forth here. After all, it was the study of the history of war that gave us these principles.
At Minden, Duke Ferdinand suddenly appeared when the enemy did not expect him and went on the offensive, while at Tannhausen he passively defended himself behind earthen fortifications. Under Rosbach, the army of Frederick II attacked the enemy in an unexpected place and at an unexpected moment.
At Liegnitz, the Austrians found the king at night in a position completely different from the one in which they had seen him the day before. He attacked the enemy column with his whole army and routed it before the rest could start the fight.
At Ratisbon (Regensburg), Marshal Davout defended himself passively, while Napoleon attacked the V and VI army corps with his right wing and completely defeated them.
Although the Austrians at Wagram were mostly on the defensive, on the second day they attacked the French with most of their forces. Therefore, Napoleon could also be considered a defender. However, then the right wing of the French (Davout) was successful against the left wing of the Austrians. At the same time, the Austrians were active against Napoleon's left wing and advanced as far as Esling, but the strong French reserves were driven back by a counterattack. Then MacDonald's strike force, advancing to the left of the center, forced the Austrians into a general retreat, including from positions on the Rusbach River.
Not all of the principles mentioned earlier are clearly seen in each of these battles, but they are all examples of active defense.
The mobility of the Prussian army under Frederick II was a means of achieving victory that we can no longer count on, because other armies are at least as mobile as ours. On the other hand, encirclement from the flanks was less common at that time, and a deep battle formation was therefore less necessary.
General offensive principles
1. We must choose to attack one place of the enemy’s position (i.e. one part of his troops - division, corps) and attack him with a huge advantage, leaving the rest of his army in uncertainty and keeping it under control. This is the only way that we can use an equal or smaller force to fight with an advantage and thus a chance of success. The weaker we are, the fewer troops we must use to distract the enemy by fighting in non-essential sectors in order to save as many forces as possible for the battle in the decisive sector. Frederick II undoubtedly won the battle of Leuthen only because he concentrated his small army in one place, and his army turned out to be more concentrated than the enemy's.
2. We must direct our main attack against the enemy's wing, attacking it from the front and flank, or completely surrounding it and attacking from the rear. Only when we have cut off the enemy's retreat are we sure of a major success and victory.
3. Even though we are strong, we still need to direct the main attack against only one area. Only in this way can we throw more forces into this area. After all, it is possible to completely surround an army only in rare cases, and this requires incredible physical and moral superiority. However, to cut off the enemy's retreat in a separate section of his flank and thus achieve great success is an easier task.
4. In general, the main goal is confidence (high probability) in victory, that is, confidence that the enemy will be knocked out of the battlefield. The security of success must form the basis of the battle plan, for a won, though not decisive, battle can easily be turned into a decisive victory by vigorously pursuing the enemy.
5. Suppose the enemy has enough troops on one wing to deploy a front in all directions. Our main body should try to encircle this wing by attacking from all sides. Surrounded troops will lose courage much faster; tested, they will be upset, and it will be easier for us to put them to flight.
6. The encirclement of the enemy requires more deployment of forces on the front line from the attacker than from the defender.
Rice. one
If the corps a, b and in attack the formation d enemy army in order to encircle it (see Fig. 1), they, of course, should stick together. But we should never commit all our troops into battle, necessarily providing for a reserve. Lack of it will be a huge mistake, which will lead to defeat if the enemy is ready to be surrounded.
Rice. 2
If the buildings a, b and in to attack the formation of the enemy d, corps e and and should be kept in reserve. With such a deep battle formation, we are able to constantly disturb the same area. In the same case, if our troops are defeated at the opposite end of the line, we do not have to immediately stop hostilities there, since we have reserves capable of withstanding the enemy. This is what the French did at the Battle of Wagram. Their left wing, which opposed the right wing of the Austrians, which deployed closer to the Danube, was relatively weak and suffered a crushing defeat. Even the French center at Adercles was not very strong, and the Austrians forced them to retreat on the first day of the battle. But all this did not matter, because Napoleon had a huge reserve of troops on his right wing, which he threw on the left wing of the Austrians. And then, having entered into battle a huge column of MacDonald (infantry, cavalry, artillery), Napoleon threw back the Austrians on his left wing. Although he failed to defeat the Archduke Charles, he at least achieved his goal by winning the battle.
7. Taking up a defensive position, we must choose as an object of attack that section of the enemy army, the defeat of which will bring us decisive advantages.
8. On the defensive, as long as some resources remain, we must not give up until we reach our goal. If the defender remains active, if he attacks us from other sides, we will only be able to win the victory if we surpass him in energy and courage. On the other hand, if he is passive, we are not in serious danger.
9. Long and continuous lines of troops are to be completely avoided. They will only lead to parallel attacks, which are unacceptable today.
Each division attacks separately, under instructions from the high command, and therefore in concert with each other. And yet one division (from 8,000 to 10,000 men) never lines up in one line, but forms two, three, or even four lines. It follows from this that a long and continuous line is no longer possible.
10. The coordination of attacks by divisions and army corps must be achieved not by controlling their actions from one point and not by maintaining contacts with each other. After all, they can be far from each other or even be separated by parts of the enemy. This is a false method of interaction, subject to a thousand accidents. With this method of control, one should not expect high results, but rather defeat from a strong, energetic enemy.
The correct method is to indicate to each commander of an army corps or division the main direction of his movement, to set the enemy as the goal of action, and victory over him as the task.
Each commander of the column, therefore, has the order to attack the enemy with all his forces where he meets. He should not be held responsible for the success of the attack, because that would lead to indecision. But he is responsible for ensuring that his corps takes part in the battle with all its might, without stopping at any sacrifice.
11. A well-organized separate corps can withstand a strong attack for some time (several hours) and therefore cannot be destroyed in one moment. Thus, even if he prematurely engages in battle with the enemy and is defeated, this will not be in vain for the common cause. In the battle against this one corps, the enemy will spend his material and physical strength, giving the rest of our forces a good chance to counterattack him.
How the corps should be organized for this purpose will be discussed later.
So, we ensure the interaction of all forces, giving each corps a certain degree of independence, but taking care that each finds the enemy and attacks him with all possible self-sacrifice.
12. One of the most important principles of offensive warfare is to strike the enemy with surprise. The more sudden the attack, the more successful it will be. To the surprise that the defender can create by the secrecy of his measures and the concealed disposition of troops, the attacker can only respond by the surprise of his appearance.
However, this phenomenon is extremely rare in modern wars, which depends partly on the improvement of the security measures currently being taken, and partly on the speed of warfare. There is now rarely a long pause in hostilities, during which the vigilance of one side could be weakened, which would give the other side an opportunity to launch a surprise attack.
Under such circumstances, apart from night attacks, which are always possible (as at Hochkirch in 1758), one can take the enemy by surprise only by moving the troops to one flank or to the rear, and then unexpectedly turning them again and throwing them forward. Or, if we are far from the enemy, with the help of incredible energy and activity, we can appear in the right place faster than he expects us (as, for example, Suvorov at Rymnik in 1789, when he walked 100 km in 2.5 days on roads washed out by autumn rains, after which he defeated the Turks who did not expect him to appear (Turks out of 100 thousand lost 10 thousand killed and up to 10 thousand wounded, captured and drowned, Russians and Austrians out of 25 thousand approx. 1 thousand killed and wounded ); Suvorov, in Italy, having overcome 60 km in 38 hours, immediately entered into battle with the French (MacDonald) and smaller forces (30 thousand versus 35 thousand for the French) over the next two days defeated them on the river Trebbia. The French lost 16 thousand, Russians and Austrians - 6 thousand - Ed.).
13. Proper surprise attack (at night, as in Hochkirch) is the best way to get the effect with a small army. But the attacker, who is not as familiar with the terrain as the defender, takes a lot of risks. The less you know the terrain and preparation of the enemy, the greater the risk becomes. Therefore, such actions should be used only in extreme cases.
14. This kind of attack requires more preparation and more concentration of our troops than in the daytime.
Command and control principles
1. If firearms cannot be dispensed with (and if so, why promote their development?), they must be used in open combat. The cavalry must not be used before the enemy has suffered much from infantry and artillery. Therefore:
a) the cavalry must be placed behind the infantry. You should not easily get involved in an open fight. Only when the confusion in the enemy's ranks or his hasty retreat gives hope of success should we use our cavalry for a daring charge. .
2. Artillery fire is much more effective than infantry. A battery of eight six-pounder (90 mm) guns occupies less than a third of the front line occupied by an infantry battalion; there are eight times fewer people in it than in a battalion, but at the same time its fire is two or even three times more effective. On the other hand, artillery has a disadvantage: it is less mobile than infantry. This applies even to the lightest horse artillery, because it cannot, like infantry, be used on rough terrain. Therefore, from the very beginning of the battle, it is necessary to send artillery to the most important areas, since it cannot, like infantry, quickly regroup during the battle. A large battery of 20 to 30 guns usually decides the outcome of the battle in those areas where it is located.(for example, in the battle of Preisshi-Eylau in 1807, 2 cavalry artillery companies (36 guns), transferred by General Kutaisov from the right wing to the left, stopped the French advancing here with shotgun volleys, after which the Russian infantry counterattacked and drove the enemy back, turning the course of the battle. Ed.).
3. From these and other visible characteristics follow the following rules for the use of various weapons:
a) the battle should begin with a powerful artillery preparation. Only when we have a large number of troops at our disposal should we keep both horse and heavy artillery in reserve. Artillery should be used in large batteries concentrated against one area. From 20 to 30 guns, which make up one battery, protect an important part of our positions or bombard the part of the enemy positions that we are going to attack;
b) after that we use light infantry - shooters - but in no case can we immediately bring too many forces into battle. First we need to understand what lies ahead for us (because it is rarely possible to detect this in advance), how the battle will turn, etc.
If such a line of fire is sufficient to counter the enemy forces, and if there is no need to hurry, it would be a mistake to use our remaining forces early. We must try, as far as possible, to weaken the enemy by this preliminary skirmish;
in) if the enemy commits such a number of troops that our forces in the line of fire are about to retreat, or if for some other reason we have no doubts about the correctness of our actions, we should deploy the entire line of infantry. She will be 100–200 paces from the enemy and will fire or load, as the case may be;
G) this is the main objective of the infantry. If, at the same time, the battle formation is deep enough, and we have another line of infantry (formed in columns) as a reserve, we will have a fairly good command of the situation in this sector. To win this second line of infantry, if possible, should be used by columns only;
e) the cavalry behind the fighting units should, during the battle, be as close to them as possible without great losses; that is, it must be out of range of enemy buckshot or rifle fire. On the other hand, it must be close enough to quickly take advantage of any favorable turn in the course of the battle..
4. In more or less exact obedience to these rules, we must never lose sight of the following principle, the importance of which cannot be overestimated:
one should never put all forces into action at random and at the same time, thus losing all means of combat, but, if possible, weaken the enemy with small forces in order to save most of their troops for a critical moment, and, having put into action, use with the greatest courage.
5. We must establish one order of battle (disposition of troops before and during battle) for the entire campaign or for the entire war. This order will serve us in all cases where there is no time for a special disposition of troops. This order, first of all, should be calculated for defense. It will give the fighting of the armies a certain uniformity which will be useful and advantageous. For inevitably the greater part of the lower generals and other officers commanding small contingents have no special knowledge of tactics and, probably, no outstanding ability in the conduct of war..
Thus, instead of the art of warfare, when there is none, a kind of Methodism arises. In my opinion, this largely applies to the French army.
6. After what I have said about the use of weapons, this order of battle, as applied to the brigade, looks something like this (Fig. 3): a - b is the line of light infantry that begins the battle and which, in rough terrain, to some extent serves as the vanguard . Then comes the artillery, in - g, which should be placed in advantageous positions. If this is not possible, it should be placed behind the first line of infantry e - e (in this case, four battalions). The task of this line is to line up and open fire, and f - z - these are several regiments of cavalry. The second line of infantry and - l is kept in reserve for the decisive stage of the battle, and m - n is the cavalry. A strong body is built according to the same principles and in the same manner. At the same time, the order of battle does not have to be just that. It may differ slightly, provided that the above principles are followed. So, for example, in the usual order of battle, the first line of cavalry w - h can remain with the second line of cavalry m - n. It should be promoted only in special cases, when this position is too remote..
Rice. 3
7. The army consists of several independent corps, each with its own general and headquarters. They are lined up and one behind the other, as described in the general rules of combat. It should be noted here that if we do not experience a shortage of cavalry, a special cavalry reserve should be created, which, of course, should be kept in the rear. The purpose of this is the following :
a) attack the enemy when he retreats from the battlefield, and attack the cavalry with which he covers his retreat. If we break the enemy cavalry, we are guaranteed a huge success, if the enemy infantry does not show miracles of courage. Small units of cavalry will not accomplish this task;
b) how fast one can pursue the enemy if he retreats undefeated or continues to retreat the next day after a lost battle. Cavalry moves faster than infantry and has a greater demoralizing effect on retreating troops. After victory, pursuit is the most important thing in war;
in) making a great (strategic) turn, we must have, because of the need to move troops along detour routes, units that advance faster than the infantry.
In order to make such a corps more independent in its actions, we should give it a significant amount of artillery - the combination of several branches of the armed forces will only give it additional strength..
8. The order of battle of the troops described so far was intended for combat; it was a battle formation.
The order of travel is usually as follows:
a) each independent corps (brigade, division) has its own vanguard and rearguard and forms its own column. This, however, does not prevent some corps from following one another along the same road and thus forming one column;
b) the corps move according to their position in the general order of battle. They walk side by side or behind each other, as they would stand on a battlefield;
c) in the corps themselves, the following order is invariably observed: light infantry with one regiment of cavalry, forming the vanguard and rearguard, infantry, artillery, and finally the rest of the cavalry.
This order remains if we move towards the enemy or behind him, or in parallel with him - then this is called the natural order. In the latter case, it can be assumed that those units that were in battle order one behind the other will go side by side. But when we have to line up the troops for battle, there will always be enough time to move the cavalry and the second line of infantry to the right or left..
Principles of using the terrain
1. Terrain creates two advantages in war.
The first is the creation of obstacles for the approaching enemy. These obstacles either make it impossible for him to advance in that place, or make him move more slowly and keep his columns in order, etc.
The second advantage is that by using the features of the landscape, we can protect our troops.
Although both advantages are very important, it seems to me that the second is more important than the first. In any case, we will certainly benefit from it, since in most cases even the simplest terrain is more or less a defense to us. Previously, only the first of these advantages was used more often. Today, the greater mobility of all armies forces us to use the former less often and the latter more frequently. The first of these two advantages is useful only for defense, the second for both attack and defense.
2. The terrain, as an obstacle to the advance of the enemy, serves mainly to reinforce our flanks and strengthen our positions.
3. In order to strengthen our positions, this obstacle must be completely insurmountable, such as a wide river, a lake, a swampy swamp. However, such obstacles are very rare, and therefore a complete defense of our flanks is difficult to achieve. Today this is less common than before, because we do not stay in one position for a long time, but move energetically, finding new positions in the theater of operations.
The obstacle, which is difficult, but still surmountable, is not really a point d "appui for our flank, but reinforcements. In this case, the troops should be located behind it. But for them, in turn, it becomes an obstacle.
Still, it is always advantageous to secure our flank with such an obstacle, for in this case we will need fewer troops in this place. However, two dangers must be avoided: first, relying on this protection so much as not to keep a strong reserve in the rear; secondly, to surround ourselves on both flanks with similar obstacles, since they do not completely protect us, and therefore do not always prevent a battle on our both flanks. Consequently, they are extremely detrimental to our defense, because they do not allow us to easily move to an active defense on one of the wings. We will have to defend ourselves under the most unfavorable conditions, when both flanks, a - d and c - b, are thrown back (Fig. 4).
Rice. four
4. As a result of observations, only new arguments in favor of deep construction have emerged. The fewer obstacles on the ground that provide reliable reinforcement of our flanks, the more corps we must have in the rear in order to surround the enemy troops surrounding us.
5. All types of terrain impassable to marching troops, all villages, all fenced-off and ditted areas, swampy meadows, and, finally, all mountains that are overcome only with difficulty, are such obstacles. We can overcome them, but only slowly and with effort. Therefore, they increase the strength of the resistance of the enemy troops located behind them. Forests may also be included in this list, only if they are very dense or marshy. Ordinary timber can be traversed just as easily as a plain. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the enemy can hide in the forest. If we also decide to hide in it, then both sides will be in a dangerous position. Therefore, it is a serious mistake to leave forests not occupied by us on our front or flank. Barricades built as obstacles are of little help, as they are easy to tear down.
6. It follows from all this that we must use such obstacles on one flank to put up a relatively strong resistance with few troops, and on the other flank in the meantime carry out the planned offensive. It is very advantageous to combine the use of fortifications with natural obstacles, because then, if the enemy overcomes the obstacle, the fire from these fortifications will protect our weak troops from an enemy with too much advantage and a major defeat.
7. When we are on the defensive, any obstacle on our front is of great value.
The mountains are occupied by troops only for this purpose. After all, a high position rarely has a significant impact on the effectiveness of our weapons, and often does not. But if we stand on a height, the enemy, in order to approach us, must climb it, climb it with difficulty. He will advance slowly, his battle formation will be out of order, his soldiers will enter close combat exhausted. With equal courage and strength, these advantages can be decisive. In no case should the moral effect of a swift onslaught be overlooked (and the onslaught from above will be swift). It boosts morale, while a soldier standing in one place loses his presence of mind. Therefore, it is always very advantageous to place our first line of infantry or artillery on a mountain.(in the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon, having occupied the dominant Pratzensky heights, abandoned due to the erroneous decision of the allies (royal persons), with a swift onslaught from above cut and crushed the allied army. The allies lost 27 thousand killed, wounded and captured (including 21 thousand Russians) out of 86 thousand, Napoleon 12 thousand out of 73 thousand - Ed.).
Often the mountain is so steep, or the slope so undulating and uneven, that shelling becomes ineffective. In such a case, we should not place our first line on the crest of the mountain, and in extreme cases only our snipers. We must place the whole line in such a way as to expose the enemy to effective fire at the moment when he reaches the top and gathers all his strength.
All other obstacles, such as small rivers, streams, ravines, and the like, serve to disrupt the enemy's front. He would have to rearrange his battle formation to overcome them, and that would be a reprieve. Therefore, approaches to such obstacles must be effectively fired. large buckshot (from 400 to 600 steps), if we have little artillery in this place.
8. The fundamental law is the effective bombardment of any obstacles that strengthen our front. But it is important to note that we should never completely limit our resistance to such fire, but it is necessary to prepare for a bayonet attack a significant part of our troops (from 1/3 to?), built in columns. If we are very weak, we should organize only a firing line of shooters and artillery at a distance from which it is convenient to conduct an effective shelling of an obstacle. The rest of the troops, arranged in columns, must be kept at a distance of 600 to 800 paces and, if possible, under the protection of terrain folds, etc.
9. Another way to use these obstacles to protect our front is to leave them a little ahead. This way they will be within the effective range of our artillery (1000 to 2000 paces) and we can attack the enemy columns from all sides as they appear. Something similar was done by Duke Ferdinand at Minden in 1759. Thus, the obstacle contributes to the implementation of our active defense plan, and this active defense, of which we spoke earlier, will be carried out on our front.
10. Obstacles such as land and terrain, we have hitherto considered, first of all, obstacles in extended positions. Still, something needs to be said about individual, isolated areas.
In general, it is possible to protect individual, isolated areas only with the help of fortifications or such powerful obstacles as terrain. We will not discuss the former here. The only obstacles that can persist on their own are:
a) isolated steep heights. Here fortifications are also necessary, since the enemy can always move against the defender in a more or less extended battle formation. And in the end, the defender will always be attacked and overwhelmed from the rear, because we rarely have enough power to hold the front on both sides;
b) gorges. By this word, we mean any narrow path that is the only way for the enemy to pass. They also include bridges, dams (dams) and narrow gorges.
It should be noted that these obstacles are divided into two categories: those that the attacker can by no means avoid, such as bridges over wide rivers. In this case, the defender can safely position all his forces in such a way as to fire as efficiently as possible at the crossing point. And those that the enemy can bypass, such as bridges over small rivers and most mountain gorges. In this case, it is necessary to have significant forces in reserve (from 1/3 to?) for an attack in close formation;
c) settlements, villages, small towns and the like.
If the troops fight bravely and with enthusiasm, the houses provide a unique defense for the few against the many. But if we are not sure of every soldier, it is preferable to occupy houses, gardens, etc. only with snipers and enter villages with artillery. Most of our troops (from? to?) should be built in close columns and sheltered in a populated area or behind him to attack the opponent when he attacks.
11. These isolated positions in large operations serve in part as outposts, in which case they are not an absolute defense, but only a way to distract the enemy. In addition, they help to hold points important to the operations that we have planned for our army. It is also often necessary to set up such positions in a remote location to buy time for the active defensive measures we may have planned. But if the place is remote, it is ipso facto isolated.
12. Two more remarks need to be made regarding individual obstacles. First, troops should be positioned behind them, ready to receive the units driven back. Secondly, whoever includes such individual obstacles in his plan of defense must not count too much on them, however strong these obstacles may be. On the other hand, the commander who is entrusted with the defense of such an obstacle must always, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, try to hold out to the end. To do this, he must have the determination and the spirit of self-sacrifice that come only from ambition and enthusiasm. Therefore, for this mission, people should be chosen who have these noble qualities.
13. The use of terrain to cover the disposition and advance of troops does not require a detailed interpretation.
We should not occupy the crest of the mountain we are about to defend (as was often done in the past), but position ourselves behind it. One should take a position not in front of the forest, but inside it or behind it; the latter only if the forest is visible. We must keep our troops in columns so that it is easier to find cover.. Troops can be hidden in villages, small forests and hilly areas. To advance, you should choose the most unexpected terrain, etc.
On terrain that has been changed by economic activity, on which it is easy to conduct reconnaissance, there are almost no places where a significant part of the enemy troops could not hide if they wisely took advantage of such terrain. Here it is more difficult to stop the advance of the attacker, since he will follow the roads.
When using the terrain to hide troops, the objective and intended operations must never be lost sight of. First of all, one should not completely break the order of battle, one can only slightly deviate from it.
14. Summing up all of the above, the following is important for the defender when choosing a position:
a) support of one of its flanks;
b) open view in front of the front and on the flanks;
c) obstacles in front of the front of defense of their troops;
d) disguised disposition of troops;
e) rugged terrain in the rear, so that in the event of a defeat, pursuit by the enemy would be difficult. When choosing a location, one should beware of close river valleys (as in Friedland), as they cause a delay in the retreat and confusion.
15. It would be a mistake to believe that all these advantages can be found in any position that we take during the war. Not all positions are equally important: the most important are those that are most suitable for attacking us. It is here that we should have all these advantages, while on the rest we need only a part of them.
16. When choosing a terrain, the attacker must take into account two main points: the terrain should not be too difficult to attack and, on the other hand, difficult enough for the enemy to observe the advance of our troops.
17. I end these observations with a principle of great importance, and which may be regarded as the cornerstone of all defense theory:
never rely on the strength of the terrain and, therefore, never let this advantageous terrain tempt us with the possibility of passive defense.
After all, if the terrain is really so convenient that the attacker cannot drive us out of it, the enemy can bypass it, rendering the most impregnable territory useless. We will be forced to fight on a different terrain in a radically changed situation, as if the advantage of convenient terrain was not taken into account in drawing up our plans. But if the terrain is not very advantageous and an attack within it is still possible, then the advantageous terrain will never balance the disadvantages of passive defense. Consequently, all the obstacles provided by the terrain should be used only for partial defense, in order to offer strong resistance with a relatively small force and gain time to prepare for the offensive, with the help of which it is necessary to try to win a real victory in other areas.
Chapter 3
Strategy
This term refers to the combination of individual battles to achieve the goal of a campaign or war.
If we know how to fight and win, great knowledge is not required. After all, it is easy to combine positive results. This is only a matter of experienced reflection and does not depend on the special knowledge needed to direct the battle.
Hence, the few principles that can be established in strategy and which rest on the organizational foundations of the state and the army can be reduced essentially to very brief propositions.
Main principles
1. War has three main goals:
a) the conquest and destruction of the armed forces of the enemy;
b) mastery of material and other sources of power;
c) winning public opinion.
2. To achieve the first goal, the main forces are always directed - against the main forces of the enemy army, or at least against a significant part of the enemy forces. After all, only by defeating them, you can consistently implement the other two goals.
3. To capture the material forces of the enemy, military operations are directed against those places where most of these resources are concentrated: large cities, warehouses and large fortresses. On the way to them, meetings with the main enemy forces, or at least a significant part of them, are possible.
4. Public opinion is won by major victories and the occupation of the enemy capital.
5. The first and most important rule necessary for the fulfillment of these purposes is to use all our forces with the greatest energy. Any moderation moves us away from the ultimate goal. Even under very favorable circumstances, it is unwise to refuse to make every effort to achieve the intended goals. Such efforts never lead to negative results. Let them lay a heavy burden on the whole country, but this will not cause much damage, because the sooner this burden will be removed from her shoulders.
Of infinite importance is the morale generated by such actions. It gives confidence in success, and this is the best way to boost the morale of the nation.
6. The second rule is to concentrate as many forces as possible in the area where the main blow is to be delivered. To increase the chances of winning the decisive section, you may have to weaken other sections and suffer losses there, but the victory compensates for them.
7. The third rule is never to waste time. If important advantages cannot be achieved by waiting, decisive action must be taken. Quickness can nip in the bud many of the enemy's measures and win public opinion over to one's side.
Surprise plays a much greater role in strategy than in tactics. This is the most important element of our victory. Napoleon, Frederick II, Gustav II Adolf, Caesar, Hannibal and Alexander the Great owe the brightest rays of their glory to surprise.
8. Finally, the fourth rule is to use the successes we have achieved with the greatest energy.
Only the pursuit of a defeated enemy will bring us the fruits of victory.
9. The first of these principles is the foundation of the other three. By following it, we can, without putting everything at stake, apply the rest with the greatest boldness. He gives us the means to constantly form new forces in the rear, and with them we can make up for any failure that has befallen us.
This is where true caution lies, and not in moving forward with timid steps.
10. Small states today cannot wage aggressive wars, but for a defensive war they have great potentialities. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that whoever devotes all his strength to the constant replenishment of his army, who takes every measure to improve training, who concentrates his troops on the main line and, armed in this way, pursues a major goal with determination and energy, he will do everything , which is achievable with strategic leadership of the war. And if combat happiness does not change, then in the end he will invariably turn out to be the winner, since his opponent will lag behind him in the tension of strength and energy.
11. Subject to these principles, the form of transactions is ultimately irrelevant. However, I will try to clarify the most important thing in a few words.
In tactics, they always try to surround the enemy, and, moreover, that part of him against which the main blow is directed. This is done partly because the action of forces along concentric directions is more advantageous than with straight parallel fronts, and partly because only in this way can we cut off the enemy's path of retreat.
If this question regarding the enemy and the position is transferred from the field of tactics to strategy, to the theater of operations, and consequently, taking into account the supply of the enemy, then it turns out that individual columns or armies directed to encircle the enemy will in most cases defend each other so far. from a friend that they will not be able to take part in the same battle. The enemy, on the other hand, being in the center, will have the opportunity to turn against each individual corps and defeat them one by one with the same army. The campaigns of Frederick II are examples of this, especially in 1757 and 1758.
And since the battle is the most important and decisive action, then those who carry out operations along the outer lines, without having a decisive superiority of forces, will lose in battles all the advantages that the enemy’s encirclement should have given him, because the impact on the supply manifests itself extremely slowly, and victory, won in battle - extremely quickly.
Therefore, in strategy, the side surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side that surrounds its opponent, especially when forces are equal or weaker.
Jomini was right about this, and if von Bülow demonstrated the opposite so plausibly, it was only because he attached too much importance to temporary delays in food supplies and completely denied the inevitable success of the war.
Of course, in order to cut off the enemy's lines of retreat, strategic encirclement and encirclement are extremely effective means. But since the same goal can also be achieved by means of a tactical encirclement, a strategic encirclement can only be recommended when our forces (moral and physical) are so superior to those of the enemy that we remain strong enough to fight in a decisive sector even with a distraction. forces to the environment.
Emperor Napoleon never undertook strategic encirclements, although he often, even almost always, had a physical and moral advantage.
Frederick II used this technique only once: during his invasion of Bohemia (Czech Republic) in 1757. True, by this he achieved the fact that the Austrians were able to give the first battle only near Prague; but what benefit did he gain from the conquest of Bohemia, all the way to Prague, without a decisive victory? The battle of Colin forced him to renounce all his conquests - proof that battles are everything. Near Prague, he was undoubtedly in danger of being attacked by all the forces of the Austrian army before the approach of Schwerin. He would not have run into this danger if he had moved with all his forces through Saxony. Then the first battle would probably have taken place at Budino nad Ohri, and it would have been as decisive as the battle at Prague. The reason for such a concentric attack on Bohemia was undoubtedly the winter deployment of the Prussian army in Silesia and Saxony. It is extremely important to note that in most cases it is precisely this kind of considerations that play a more significant role than the advantages of one form or another of grouping of forces, because the ease of execution of the operation contributes to the speed of execution, and the interference in the actions of such a huge machine as an army is so great that without much their needs should not be increased.
12. The principle we have just cited - to concentrate as far as possible on the decisive direction - already in itself eliminates the idea of a strategic encirclement, and the grouping of our armed forces follows by itself from this. I was therefore justified in stating that the form of this grouping is of little importance. However, in one case, a strategic influence on the enemy flank leads to the same great consequences as in battle, namely, when the enemy, operating in a poor country, arranges with great difficulty his stores, on the integrity of which the success of his operations undoubtedly depends. In such cases, one can even recommend not to go with the main forces towards the main army of the enemy, but to rush to his base. But this requires two conditions:
a) the enemy must be so removed from his base that our movement forced him to a significant retreat;
b) we must be able to hold him back on the main line of operations with a small force by means of natural and artificial barriers, so that he cannot make conquests that can compensate him for the loss of the base.
13. The supply of troops with food is an inevitable condition for the conduct of war, and therefore it has a great influence on operations, especially in that it allows the concentration of masses only to a certain limit and is a decisive factor in choosing a line of operation, determining the offensive zone in the theater of operations.
14. In areas that allow the supply of troops at the expense of local resources, the latter are obtained by requisitions.
With the modern method of warfare, the army occupies a much larger space than before. The formation of separate corps in our army made this possible without putting us in a worse position than the enemy, who, as always, will concentrate from 70,000 to 100,000 people in one point. After all, the corps of a modern organization can for some time fight an enemy twice or three times superior to him. In the meantime, the rest will come to the rescue, and if the first corps even turns out to be defeated, then it did not fight in vain, as already indicated above on another occasion.
Therefore, now individual divisions and corps are moving separately, side by side or one after the other; if they constitute one and the same army, then their distance from each other is limited only by the consideration of joint participation in a common battle.
This makes it possible to feed the troops directly, without their own stores. This arrangement of supplies is facilitated by the organization of the corps themselves with their headquarters and commissariat.
15. If decisive importance does not belong to more weighty reasons, for example, the location of the main enemy army, then the most fertile areas are chosen for operations, because ease of supply contributes to the speed of the operation. More important than questions of supply can only be the disposition of the main army of the enemy, the collision with which we have to, the position of the capital or fortress, which we are striving to capture. All other reasons, such as the most advantageous form of grouping of forces, which we have already discussed, are usually of much lesser importance.
16. Despite this new rationing system, we are still far from being completely without stores. Therefore, a wise commander, even if the resources of the province are completely sufficient to supply the troops with food, still will not fail to set up stores in his rear in case of an unforeseen case, in order to be able to strengthen his position in certain points. This precaution is one of those measures that do not go to the detriment of the task at hand.
Defense
1. From a political point of view, a defensive war is a war waged to defend one's independence. From a strategic point of view, a defensive war is a campaign in which I confine myself to fighting the enemy in the theater of operations that I have prepared for myself for this purpose. Whether I give battles of an offensive or defensive nature in this theater of operations does not change matters.
2. Strategic defense is chosen mainly in cases where the enemy is stronger than us. Naturally, fortresses and fortified camps, which should be looked upon as the basis for the preparation of a theater of operations, offer considerable advantages; the latter also include familiarity with the area and good maps. With these advantages, a small army of a small state, with little means, will be more able to resist the enemy than without them.
Along with this, the following two grounds may prompt a stop to a defensive war.
Firstly, if the provinces of the country adjacent to our theater of operations, to a large extent impede operations due to lack of food. In this case, by choosing a defensive war, we will avoid the inconvenience that will fall entirely on the enemy. Such, for example, is the position of the Russian army at present (1812).
Secondly, when the enemy surpasses us in the ability to wage war. In a prepared theater of operations, which is familiar to us and where all the side circumstances favor us, it is much easier to wage war; you can't make so many mistakes here. In this case, that is, when the unreliability of our troops and generals prompts us to a defensive war, tactical defense is also willingly added to the strategic defense, that is, battles are fought on positions prepared in advance - again because fewer mistakes will be made under these conditions.
3. In a defensive war, no less than in an offensive war, a major goal must be set. This may be nothing else than the destruction of the enemy army, either by fighting, or by creating difficult conditions for its existence, which puts it into disorder and forces it to retreat; during the latter it naturally suffers great losses. Wellington's campaigns of 1810 and 1811 are examples of this.
Consequently, a defensive war is not reduced to idle waiting for events. One should wait only in anticipation of obvious and decisive benefits. Extremely dangerous for the defender is that calm before the storm, during which the attacker gathers strength for a decisive blow.
If the Austrians, after the battle of Aspern, had tripled their forces, as the French emperor did - and they had the opportunity to do this, then the period of calm preceding the battle of Wagram would have been useful for them, but only on this condition. Since they still did not do this, the time was lost for them. It would have been much more prudent for them to take advantage of Napoleon's disadvantageous position in order to win a complete victory at the battle of Aspern.
4. The purpose of the fortresses is to divert a significant part of the enemy forces to the siege. This period of time should be used to defeat the rest of the enemy army. Therefore, it is better to fight behind your fortresses, and not in front of them. But one should not watch indifferently as they are taken, as Bennigsen did during the siege of Danzig.
5. Large rivers, that is, those across which building a bridge presents great difficulties (such as the Danube below Vienna and the Lower Rhine), constitute a natural defensive line. But one should not evenly distribute troops along the river in order to directly impede the crossing. It is very dangerous. On the contrary, it is necessary to observe it, and where the enemy has crossed, attack him from all sides at the moment when he has not yet had time to transfer all his forces and is still limited by a narrow space near the river. An example of such actions is the battle of Aspern. In the battle of Wagram, the Austrians unnecessarily gave the French too much space, thereby saving the latter from the inevitable disadvantages of crossing the river.
6. Mountains constitute the second type of natural barriers that can serve as a good defensive line. There are two ways to use them. The first is to leave them in front of you, occupying only light troops and treating them to some extent like a river in order to allow the enemy to cross them, and then, as soon as he begins to debounce in separate columns from the mountain passes, fall with all his might on one of them. . Another way is to bring the main forces into the mountains. In the latter case, separate mountain passes should be defended with only small detachments, and a significant part of the army (from one third to one half) should be kept in reserve in order to attack with superior forces one of the enemy columns that could break through. However, one should not disperse the forces of this large reserve, trying to absolutely block the exit of all columns. From the very beginning, one must set a goal to fall on the column that is supposed to be the strongest. If in this way it is possible to defeat a significant part of the advancing army, then the remaining columns that have broken through will retreat on their own.
The structure of most mountain systems is such that among them there are usually more or less high plateaus (plateaus), while the slopes facing the plains are usually crossed by deep, steep valleys that form mountain passes. Thus, the defender will find terrain in the mountains over which he can move quickly to the right and left, while the advancing columns are separated from each other by large and impregnable ridges. Only in those cases where the mountains are of this character do they provide a convenient defense. If the mountains are harsh and impregnable in their entire depth, so that the detachments of the defender will be scattered without mutual connection, then defending them with the main forces is a dangerous business. All advantages under these conditions are on the side of the attacker, who has the opportunity to attack individual points with superior forces; and then not a single mountain pass and pass, not a single single point will be so strong that it could not be quickly captured by superior forces.
7. In general, with regard to mountain warfare, it should be noted that everything in it depends on the skill of individual commanders, officers, and to an even greater extent on the spirit of the soldiers. Great skill in maneuvering is not required here, but fighting spirit and devotion to the cause are needed, for here everyone is more or less left to himself. That is why the people's militia is especially strong in mountain warfare, for, deprived of the first, it possesses the last two qualities to the highest degree.
8. Finally, with regard to strategic defense, it should be noted that, being stronger than the offensive, it should only serve to achieve the first major successes. But if they are achieved, and peace does not immediately follow them, further successes can only be achieved by an offensive. After all, only those who constantly want only to defend themselves are at a disadvantage, always fighting at their own expense. No state can stand this for a long time. Being attacked by the enemy and never returning blow for blow, the defender will undoubtedly weaken and be beaten in the end. It is necessary to begin with the defense, so that the more likely it is possible to end with the offensive.
Offensive
1. The strategic offensive pursues the achievement of the political goal of the war, because it is directly aimed at the destruction of enemy forces, while the strategic defense tries to achieve this political goal in part only indirectly. Therefore, the principles of the offensive are already contained in the "General Principles" of strategy. Only two points deserve special mention here.
2. The first is the non-stop replenishment of troops and weapons. For the defender, this is relatively easy due to the proximity of the sources of such replenishment. The advancing one, although in most cases it has the resources of a larger state, is forced to deliver its resources from afar and with great difficulty. Therefore, in order to never be short of strength, he must take such measures that recruiting and transporting weapons are carried out long before they are needed. The roads of his line of operations must be continuously occupied by the movement of people following the army and vehicles carrying all the necessary supplies. On these roads, milestones should be set up to facilitate the fastest possible movement of traffic.
3. Even under the most favorable conditions and with the greatest moral and physical superiority of forces, the attacker must never lose sight of the possibility of a major setback. He must therefore prepare points in his line of operations to which he can withdraw with his defeated army. These can be fortresses with fortified camps attached to them, or just one fortified camp.
Large rivers are the best way to delay the pursuing enemy for a while. Therefore, crossings over them must be protected by bridgeheads, reinforced with a belt of strong redoubts.
To occupy such points, as well as the most significant cities and fortresses, more or less troops should be left, depending on the greater or lesser degree of danger that threatens from attacks by the enemy or from an uprising of the population. These troops, together with the arriving reinforcements, form new corps, which, if successful, advance after the army, but in case of failure, they are placed in fortified points to ensure retreat.
Napoleon was always distinguished by extreme discretion in organizing the rear of his army, which is why his most risky operations were less risky than they seemed (in 1812 this did not help: having lost more than 570 thousand in Russia, including the entire cavalry, almost all artillery, he had to recruit a new army, which only delayed the inevitable - on March 18 (30), 1814, after a hard battle, the Russians and the allies entered Paris. - Ed.).
Chapter 4
On the application of the stated principles in time of war
The principles of the art of war are themselves eminently simple, and quite consistent with common sense. If in tactics they rely on special knowledge to a greater extent than in strategy, yet this knowledge is so limited that in terms of volume and variety it can hardly be compared with any other science. It does not require any scholarship or especially outstanding qualities of the mind. If, in addition to the ability to reason, any special property of the mind is required, then, most likely, cunning or resourcefulness. For a long time, the exact opposite was asserted, but only because of an exaggerated reverence for the art of generals and because of the vanity of the authors who dealt with these issues. We are convinced of this by an impartial study of the art of warfare, confirmed by practical experience. Even during the period of revolutionary wars, many people who did not receive any military education showed themselves to be skillful commanders, even commanders of the first magnitude. At the very least, the military education of Conde, Wallenstein, Suvorov and many others is highly doubtful. (Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov received a "bookish" military education at home, from childhood studying artillery, fortification, military history under the guidance of his father, General-in-Chief, senator, author of the first Russian military dictionary. And since 1748, Suvorov had already begun serving as a corporal in Semenovsky He completed his brilliant career with the rank of Generalissimo, awarded to him in 1799, died in 1800 - Ed.)
There is no doubt that waging war is difficult. But the difficulty lies not in the fact that special learning or great genius is required in order to assimilate the true principles of the art of war. This is available to every properly developed brain, free from prejudice and somewhat familiar with the matter. Even applying these principles on a map and on paper presents no difficulty, and it does not take much wisdom to sketch out a good operational plan. The great difficulty is to remain true to the learned principles in practice.
To draw attention to this difficulty is the task of the present concluding remarks, and to give Your Royal Highness a clear idea of this, I consider the most important of all that I wanted to achieve with these notes.
The conduct of war is like the complex work of a machine with great resistance, so that combinations that are easily thrown on paper may require great effort to carry them out in practice.
Thus, the free will and thought of the commander every minute encounter obstacles to their movements, and to overcome these obstacles, special strength of spirit and mind is required. In the midst of this resistance, one has to discard more than one successful idea and resort to simpler, more modest methods, although more complex ones could give great results.
It is perhaps impossible to give an exhaustive list of all the causes of this friction, but the main ones are as follows:
1. As a rule, there is far less information about the position of the enemy and about his measures than is required for drawing up plans. At the time of the implementation of the decision taken, countless doubts arise because of the dangers threatening from everywhere, if the plan was based on erroneous assumptions. Then we are seized by a feeling of anxiety, which easily attacks a person when doing a big thing, and from anxiety to indecision and from indecision to half-measures is just a small, imperceptible step.
2. Added to the inaccuracy of information about the number of enemy forces is the fact that rumors (all the information we receive from guard units and subunits, from spies and from random sources) are always exaggerated. The human crowd is timid by nature, and therefore always exaggerates the danger. Thus, the commander creates a false idea of \u200b\u200bthe forces of the enemy, with whom he will have to deal; and this is a new source of his indecision.
It is difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the catastrophe that can occur due to lack of awareness, and therefore it is especially important to prepare for it in advance.
If everything has been calmly considered in advance, if we have understood the situation without prejudice and have foreseen the most probable turn of events, we should not immediately abandon the original plan. All delivered information must be subjected to strict criticism, compared with each other, sent for new ones, etc. Very often, incorrect information can be immediately refuted, while other data can be confirmed. In both cases we obtain greater certainty and can adjust our decision to it. If we do not have complete certainty, then we must tell ourselves that nothing is done in war without risk, that the very nature of war does not make it possible to always foresee where one is going; that the probable still remains probable, even if it does not appear to us in its entirety, and that, with other prudent measures, complete destruction from a single mistake will not immediately follow.
3. The uncertainty of the state of affairs at any given moment extends not only to the enemy, but also to his own army. The latter can rarely be so concentrated that it is possible at any moment to clearly represent the position of all its parts. If we tend to be cautious, then new doubts may arise on this basis. There is a desire to wait, and its inevitable consequence will be a delay in the overall action.
Therefore, it is necessary to believe that our general routine will justify the results expected from it. In particular, you must trust your subordinate commanders. Therefore, people who can be relied upon should be appointed to these posts. This consideration must be placed above all others. Since we have expediently outlined our measures and taken into account possible accidents, having provided for all measures so as not to perish immediately if these accidents occur, then we should boldly go forward amid the darkness of the unknown.
4. If we decide to wage war with great effort, then often subordinate commanders, as well as troops (especially if they are not drawn into the war) will consider the difficulties encountered in their path as insurmountable obstacles. It will seem to them that the crossings are too great, the effort is too heavy, and the supply of food is impossible. One has only to give faith to all these difficulties (Diffikultaten, as Frederick II called them) - and soon you will find yourself overwhelmed by them, and instead of acting strongly and energetically, you will become weak and inactive.
To counter all this, you need to trust your insight and conviction. At these moments, such conviction has the appearance of stubbornness, but in fact it represents that strength of mind and character that we call firmness.
5. The results we expect in war are never exactly what they are imagined by those who do not personally participate in it and are not used to it.
Often they are mistaken for many hours in calculating the march of some column, and it is not even possible to find out exactly why the delay occurred. Often there are obstacles that could not be foreseen in advance. Often they intend to reach a certain point with the army, but they are forced to stop on the way for several hours. Often the detachment we have allocated offers much less resistance than we expected, and the enemy detachment much more. Often the resources of some province turn out to be more modest than we expected, etc.
All such obstacles can be overcome only at the cost of great effort, which the commander can achieve only by severity, bordering on cruelty. Only when he is convinced that everything possible will be done can he be sure that these minor difficulties will not have a great influence on operations and that he will not be too far from the goal that he should achieve.
6. It can be taken for granted that the army will never be in the same state in which it is imagined by one who monitors operations from his office. If he is disposed towards this army, he will imagine it to be a third or a half stronger and better. It is quite natural that the commander, who for the first time draws up a plan for future operations, is in such a position. But then he sees that his army is starting to dwindle, which he did not expect, that his cavalry is losing combat effectiveness. Therefore, what seems possible and easy to both the observer and the commander at the beginning of the campaign, when carried out, turns out to be difficult and unattainable. If the commander turns out to be a brave man, with a strong will, then, prompted by high ambition, he will still pursue his goal; but the ordinary man will consider the state of his army sufficient excuse to refuse to achieve the goal.
In most cases, the enemy army will be in the same position. Let us recall at least Wallenstein and Gustav II Adolf near Nuremberg, Napoleon and Bennigsen after the battle of Preussisch-Eylau. But the state of the enemy is not visible, and the suffering of his own army is before his eyes. Therefore, the latter act more strongly on an ordinary person, because in an ordinary person sensory impressions take precedence over the voice of reason.
7. The supply of food to the troops, no matter how it is produced (from stores or by requisition), always presents such difficulties that, when choosing a method of action, it should be taken into account in the first place. Often, interruptions in supply disrupt the conduct of military operations, as they are forced to take care of food when one could achieve victory, the most brilliant success. Due to the need for food, the entire war machine becomes ponderous, due to which its successes may lag behind the flight of broad ideas.
A general who tyrannically demands from his troops the utmost exertion of strength, the greatest hardships; an army that has become accustomed to these sacrifices in long wars - what a huge advantage they will have over their enemy, how much faster they will achieve their goal, despite all the obstacles! With equally good plans - how different will be the success!
8. It is difficult to overestimate the visual impressions received from direct participation in military operations, which are always more vivid than those presented by us upon mature reflection. But these impressions are often produced only by the visible side of events, and, as is well known, it rarely coincides with their essence. Therefore, there is a danger for the sake of primary impressions to forget about the results of mature reflections.
These initial impressions tend to create fear and lead to excessive caution, which is characteristic of the natural fearfulness of a person, which makes him look at everything one-sidedly.
Therefore, one should treat initial impressions with caution and have more confidence in the results of one's previous reflections. This approach will help to strengthen oneself against the relaxing effect of primary impressions.
Therefore, successful actions depend on the fidelity and firmness of one's own conviction. That is why the study of military history is so important, because from it we learn everything about wars, the very course of events. The principles that theory gives us are useful only to facilitate this study and to draw attention to the most important thing in military history.
So, your royal highness, you should familiarize yourself with these principles in order to test them in the study of the history of wars and to see for yourself where they coincide with the course of events and where these events make some adjustments to them or even refute them altogether.
Along with this, the study of military history, with a lack of one's own experience, is able to give a visual idea of \u200b\u200bwhat we have called the resistance of the entire machine as a whole.
True, one should not stop only at general conclusions, even less should one trust the reasoning of historians, but one should, if possible, study the details. Historians rarely set themselves the goal of depicting the highest truth. Usually they embellish the deeds of their army or prove the coincidence of historical facts with imaginary rules. They make up history instead of writing it. For the above purpose, the history of many wars is not required. A detailed acquaintance with a few individual battles is more useful than a cursory acquaintance with many campaigns. Therefore, it is more useful to read more individual reports and diaries than historical writings in the proper sense of the word. An example of such an unsurpassed report is the description of the defense of Menen in 1794, given in the memoirs of General von Scharnhorst. This narrative, especially the story of the sortie and the breakthrough of the garrison, will give your Royal Highness an example of how military history should be written.
Not a single battle, like this one, strengthened in me the conviction that in a war there can be no doubt of success until the last minute. He proves that the influence of right principles, which never appears as often as we expect, suddenly reappears in the most distressing situation, when all hope of their influence seemed already lost.
It is necessary that some feeling inspire the great forces of the commander, whether it be the ambition of Caesar, hatred of the enemy Hannibal, proud determination to perish with the glory of Frederick the Great.
Open your heart to this feeling. Be bold and cunning in drawing up your plans, firm and persistent in their execution, resolute in striving for victory, and fate will crown your young head with shining glory, which is the adornment of princes, and your image will remain in the hearts of your descendants.
Notes:
Scharnhorst Gerhard Johann David (November 12, 1755, Bordenau, Hannover – June 28, 1813, Prague) was a Prussian general (1807) and military reformer. From July 1807 he was chief of the General Staff and chairman of the commission for the reorganization of the army, from 1808 he headed the military ministry. Together with General A. Gneisenau, he carried out a military reform, as a result of which the introduction of military service was prepared (since 1813), the organization of the army and the training of officers were improved, the service life was shortened, a trained reserve was created, weapons were improved, and the rear service was reorganized. During the war of liberation with Napoleonic France in 1813, he was the chief of staff of the Silesian army, General G. Blucher. (Note. per.)
Posen - now Poznan in Poland. (Note. per.)
Breslau - now Wroclaw in Poland. (Editor's note)
Schlieffen Alfred von (February 28, 1833, Berlin - January 4, 1913, ibid) - German military leader, Field Marshal (1911). He graduated from the Officers' College (1853) and the Military Academy (1861). As an officer of the General Staff, he participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. Since 1884, the head of the German General Staff, in 1891-1905. Chief of the General Staff. Retired since 1906. One of the ideologists of German militarism. Theoretically substantiated the so-called. a destruction strategy aimed at achieving objectives through double envelopment, resulting in a tactical encirclement. Author of the German war plan (the so-called Schlieffen plan, 1905). (Note. per.)
Insight, intuition. (Note. per.)
The battle of Leuthen (the modern name of Lyutyn (Poland, Silesia) took place on December 5, 1757. The Prussian army (about 40 thousand, 167 guns) had a strength of more than one and a half times smaller than the army of Charles of Lorraine (up to 66 thousand, 300 During the battle, Frederick II attacked the left flank of the Austrians, defeated it, and then the center of the Austrian forces, using an oblique battle formation. The Austrians lost 27 thousand prisoners, killed and wounded and all artillery, the Prussians - 6.5 thousand killed and the wounded. (Editor's note)
Friedrich II (the Great), born in 1712, King of Prussia (1740–1786) is one of the great military figures in history. The first half of his reign was largely devoted to the wars with Austria, ruled by Maria Theresa (1717–1780), his main enemy in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).
Especially during the last war, when Prussia, in alliance with England, had to fight against the superior forces of the coalition of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony, Frederick proved his skill as a military leader and courage. One of the most brilliant and decisive victories was won near the village of Leithen in Silesia (modern Lutyn in Poland) on December 5, 1757. The victory over the vastly superior Austrian army, led by Prince Charles of Lorraine, owed as much to military genius as to the excellent morale of Frederick's officers and men. Before the battle, in the presence of the generals, the Prussian king delivered a famous speech illustrating Clausewitz's point of view. It ended with the words: “Gentlemen, the enemy, armed to the teeth, stands behind these fortifications. We must attack him and defeat him or die. There is no third. If you don't like it, you can resign and go home."
(Other significant battles of the Seven Years' War mentioned by Clausewitz were the battles of Rosbach, Liegnitz, Prague, Kolin, Hochkirch, Kunersdorf, Minden.)
The term "corps", as Clausewitz used ubiquitously, does not imply a specific unit (as, for example, a modern army corps), but simply any part of the army.
Ratisbon - often called and is called Regensburg, located in Bavaria on the Danube. (Note. per.)
Wagram is a village in Austria, 16 km northeast of Vienna, in the area of which on July 5–6, 1809, during the Austro-French War of 1809, a decisive battle took place between the French army of Napoleon I (170 thousand, 584 guns ) and the Austrian army of Archduke Charles (110 thousand, 452 guns). The French are believed to have won, but the Austrians retreated in perfect order, and the losses of both sides were almost equal - 32,000 for the Austrians and 27,000 for the French. (Editor's note)
Both battles were part of the Napoleonic campaign against Austria in 1809. At Eckmuhl, near Regensburg, in southern Germany, a French army under Napoleon and his marshal Davout defeated a strong Austrian army on April 22. This opened the way for Napoleon's invasion of Austria, where, near the village of Wagram, near Vienna, on July 5-6, Napoleon managed to inflict such a serious blow on the Archduke Karl that Austria still had to ask for peace.
This refers to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, Frederick's nephew, Prussian field marshal. (Note. per.)
Near Minden in Westphalia, Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, one of Frederick II's generals during the Seven Years' War, won a significant victory over the French, commanded by Marshal Contad. He was about to attack the French positions in the early morning of August 1, 1759, when he learned that the French, in turn, were ready to attack him. He carried out his plan to prepare for the battle, which nullified Contade's preparations for a surprise attack. In the battle that began, Ferdinand, commanding the combined English, Hanoverian and Prussian troops, won a decisive victory, as a result of which the French retreated behind the Rhine and Main rivers.
At the same time, about a third of Ferdinand's army, organized as a separate corps under the command of General von Wangenheim, was stationed to the left of the main army, near the village of Tannhausen (also known as Tonhausen or Todthausen). This corps was not informed of the impending French attack. At about 5 o'clock in the morning, the enemy corps under the command of de Broglie opened fire on the fortifications of Wangenheim. However, the surprise attack failed, and Wangenheim had the opportunity to line up his troops and resist Broglie, until the defeat of the main army under the command of Contad forced the French to retreat.
Under Rosbach, on November 5, 1757, the army of Frederick II, numbering 22,000 people, defeated the combined Franco-Austrian army almost twice (43 thousand) superior to it, under the command of the incompetent Marshal Prince de Soubise (France) and Prince Hildburhausen (Saxony). While his opponents, thinking that Frederick was hastily retreating, began to pursue him, Frederick II's highly trained cavalry under the command of General von Seydlitz suddenly attacked their right flank. The enemy, who did not have time to build a battle formation, was defeated, losing 7,000 people (mostly prisoners), 67 guns, 22 banners and the entire convoy. The Prussians lost over 500 men.
Frederick's victory had an incredible moral effect both in Germany and abroad. She restored his reputation, which had suffered greatly after the defeat at Colin.
In the battle of Liegnitz, as earlier in the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen, the art of Frederick II the Great manifested itself in defeating an enemy superior in strength, using the high mobility of the army in a concentrated attack and hiding his intentions from the enemy for as long as possible.
Finding himself surrounded at Liegnitz (Saxony) by several Austrian armies numbering about 100,000, he carefully planned his retreat. On the night of August 14-15, 1760, he set up camp, however, leaving burning lights to mislead the enemy, who planned a triangular attack on August 15. At dawn, the Prussian king surprised one of the detachments of the Austrian army under the command of Laudon on the Katzbach River and defeated 30,000 people with an army half that size.
Hohenlinden (Hohenlinden) - a village in Bavaria (east of Munich), near which on December 3, 1800, during the war of the 2nd European coalition of monarchical states against republican France, the French army of J. Moreau defeated the Austrian army of Archduke John. After that, Austria signed the Treaty of Luneville in 1801. (Note. per.)
Moreau Jean Victor (1763–1813) – French military commander, general of division (1794) Since 1789 in the National Guard, since 1791 volunteer of the revolutionary army. In 1792 he was elected commander of a battalion. Fought in the Netherlands. From 1794 he commanded the northern, and from 1796 the Rhine-Moselle armies, having won a number of victories over the Austrians. In 1799, inspector general, then commander of the French army in Italy, where A.B. Suvorov. After the 18 Brumaire coup by Napoleon, he commanded the Army of the Rhine, where he won a victory at Hohenlinden. In 1804 he was accused of a royalist conspiracy against Napoleon and expelled from France. Moreau settled in America, from where he was invited by Tsar Alexander I in 1813. Moreau became a military adviser at the headquarters of the allied armies. In the battle of Dresden, where Napoleon won a brilliant victory, on August 27, 1813, Moreau was mortally wounded by a French cannonball and died on September 2. There is a legend that the cannonball was fired from a cannon that Napoleon himself aimed. (Editor's note)
During the Napoleonic campaign against the 2nd Coalition (Great Britain, Austria and Russia), the French General Moreau concentrated his forces near the village of Hohenlinden (so in the atlas, but in military encyclopedias more often Hohenlinden), located in the center of a large forest area on a plateau east of Munich . Despite the warnings of his generals, Archduke John of Austria entered the forest on December 2, 1800, to pursue what he believed to be the French retreating. In the meantime, Moreau, who had drawn up his troops at the exit from the forest, in the course of the battle with four columns of the Austrians coming out of the forest, outflanked the Austrians with one division, and they were between two fires. The Austrian army was defeated, losing about 14,000 people (including 9 thousand prisoners), almost all artillery (87 guns), and Moro (having lost 2.5 thousand) was able to continue the attack on Vienna, which forced Austria to conclude unfavorable for her Luneville Peace Treaty of 1801.
Davout Louis Nicolas (1770-1823) - a representative of an impoverished aristocratic family. He graduated from the Paris military school (1788). During the French Revolution of 1789, he went over to the side of the revolutionary people. From 1794 to 1797 in the Rhine army with the rank of brigadier general. Marshal of France from 1804, in 1804–1814. corps commander. In 1798–1799 participated in the Egyptian expedition, commanding the cavalry. In 1800–1801 commanded the cavalry of Napoleon's Italian army. In 1806 he defeated the Prussians at the battle of Auerstedt, defeated the Prussian army and received in 1808 the title of Duke of Auerstedt. In 1807–1809 successfully fought at Preisisch-Eylau, Wagram and Ekmül, for which he was awarded the title of Prince Ekmül. During Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, Davout's corps took part in the assault on Smolensk and in the Battle of Borodino. During the retreat from Russia, he commanded the rearguard, after the defeat at Vyazma he was replaced by Ney. In 1813–1814 led the defense of Hamburg from the Prussian troops. During the Hundred Days, the Minister of War. With the accession of the Bourbons, he was deprived of ranks and titles (however, he was not shot, like Ney!), But in 1817 they were returned to him. Since 1819 he has been a peer of France. (Editor's note)
Frederick II achieved the necessary concentration of his troops in a special battle formation known as the "oblique order of battle". Although it is by no means new (it has been used from time to time since ancient times), it was Frederick who consistently applied this order in most of his battles. In his "General Principles of Warfare", written in 1748, Frederick described it as follows: "We "weaken" one of our flanks before the enemy and strengthen the flank with which we intend to attack." This will make it possible to defeat the enemy army, which is significantly superior in strength: "An army of 100,000 men, attacked in the flank in this way, can be defeated by an army of 30,000 people." The most successful example of Frederick's use of this "ledge" battle formation was the Battle of Leuthen.
At Hochkirche (Gochkirche), a village in Saxony, on October 14, 1758, the Austrian army of Marshal Daun * dealt a serious blow to the forces of Frederick II. Attacking at dawn, the Austrians surprised the arrogant King of Prussia and defeated his army of 40,000 with 78,000 men. The Prussian army suffered heavy losses. The Prussians lost approximately 9,000 men, and several of Frederick's generals were killed or wounded.
* Daun Leopold (1705–1766) - Austrian Field Marshal General. (Note. per.)
Provisions in italics are considered by General Friedrich von Cohenhausen, lecturer at the German Air Force Academy, to be inapplicable in modern wars.
General Friedrich von Cohenhausen, in his notes to this book, notes that most of the rules concerning the cavalry reserve, although no longer applicable in modern warfare, can be applied almost word for word to mechanized units.
Point of support (fr.).
Ipso facto (lat.). (Note. per.)
The battle near Friedland (East Prussia) on June 2 (14), 1807 ended with the defeat of the Russian army under the command of Bennigsen, who made a fatal mistake when he sent his army to the western bank of the river. Alle in order to move along this coast to the rescue of Koenigsberg from Napoleon's troops. The crossing took place in the area of the city of Friedland (now Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad region), which Bennigsen occupied as a result of successful battles with French troops. Bennigsen's mistake was that he deployed all available troops in the bend of the river. Alle, leaving behind the only way of retreat - the bridges in the city of Friedland. Napoleon immediately took advantage of the disadvantageous position of the Russian troops, who also had a large numerical advantage (80 thousand against 60 thousand for the Russians). As a result, the Russian army, after a stubborn battle, was defeated and suffered heavy losses at the crossings (the Russians burned the bridges behind them). (The Russians lost, according to various sources, from 10 to 25 thousand killed, drowned and captured, the French - 8 thousand - Ed.) Russia was forced to conclude the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon. (Note. per.)
On June 2 (14), 1807, during the Russian-Prussian-French war of 1806-1807, the Russian army under the command of Bennigsen (60 thousand) was defeated by Napoleon (80 thousand) in the battle of Friedland, in East Prussia. Hurrying to help Koenigsberg, the Russians, having crossed the Alle on June 1 and occupied Friedland, had against them the only French corps under the command of Marshal Lannes*.
Bennigsen thought this was an excellent chance to attack, but Lannes held out until Napoleon approached with the main army. The emperor delivered the main blow on the Russian left flank, separated from their right flank by a ravine with a Muhlenflus stream and a lake. The only way for the retreat of the Russian troops of the left flank was a narrow defile between this ravine and the bend of the river Alla. Napoleon's artillery battery (36 guns), advanced in this place, inflicted heavy damage on the Russians before they managed to get to the bridges over the Alle. The situation was even worse on Gorchakov's right flank. By 9 pm, his desperately fighting troops were thrown by superior enemy forces into the river and crossed under deadly fire. In total, Bennigsen lost from 10,000 to 25,000 (according to various sources> killed, wounded and drowned, Napoleon 8000 (according to other sources, 12-14 thousand).
* The son of a groom, a soldier of the revolution, Jean Lannes (1769–1809), the future Duke of Montebello, was seen by Napoleon as a battalion officer in the battle of Dego on April 15, 1796, and from that day he rapidly went up, ending the Italian campaign as a brigadier general. In the Egyptian campaign, Bonaparte commanded a division. At Montebello (1800) he held out until reinforcements arrived, contributing to the overall victory. He distinguished himself in 1805–1807. In February 1809, it was Lannes who stormed the heroically defended Zaragoza, after which he wrote to Napoleon about his rejection of such a war when civilians had to be killed. The historian J. Michelet considered Lannes a "great soldier" and a "great commander." His comrades-in-arms considered him "the bravest in the army". He was the first at the head of his hussars to break into enemy positions, fought next to his soldiers on the streets of Zaragoza, led them to storm Regensburg (1809). At the age of 40, already covered by 25 wounds by that time, he was mortally wounded at the battle of Aspern (Esling). Napoleon then wept - the second and last time in his life. (Note. per.)
During the Seven Years' War, Prussia was surrounded by enemies: Saxony and Austria in the south, France in the west, Sweden in the north and Russia in the east (Goebbels had approximately the same argument on June 22, 1941. The aggressors are similar. - Ed.). Frederick II overcame a difficult situation by fully exploiting the advantages that a highly mobile army under the leadership of an enterprising commander gives the battle on the "inner line". In 1756, he captured Saxony without declaring war. His invasion of Bohemia in 1757 was stopped by the Austrians at Kolin and he had to leave his own territories. From there he traveled at lightning speed, first to Central Germany, where he defeated the French at the Battle of Rossbach, and then back to Silesia, where he defeated the Austrians at the Battle of Leuthen. On August 14 (25), 1758, he defeated the Russians near Zorndorf ("meat grinder" at Zorndorf, where the Russians lost over 16 thousand and 60 guns, and the Prussians over 11 thousand and 36 guns, a very dubious victory. Both sides, exhausted, could no longer fight. After the battle, the opponents dispersed in different directions, “licking their wounds.” In our literature it is written that the battle ended in a “draw.” - Ed.). However, in the end, the numerical advantage of the opponents became too great, and Frederick had to limit himself to a defensive strategy, while his tactics remained offensive.
Baron Antoine Henri Jomini (1779–1869), Swiss by birth, joined the French army in 1804, commanded a battalion, then adjutant to Marshal Ney* and chief of staff of his corps (1805–1809, 1813). With the French invasion of Russia in 1812, he was the commandant of Vilna and the governor of Smolensk. He distinguished himself in the battle of Bautzen in 1813, which was successful for the French. Clashes with the chief of staff of Napoleon Berthier forced Jomini in August 1813 to go to serve in the Russian army. He was a member of the headquarters and retinue of Alexander I. He became famous for his very influential works on military theory, such as “Essays on military art”, “Discourses on great military operations or a critical and comparative description of the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon ...”, etc. His main idea was that victory over the enemy should be achieved not by maneuvering without fighting, but by decisive battle; Jomini considered strategy as the science of warfare, tactics as the science of battle and combat.
Baron Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–1807) – Prussian military writer and theorist Served in the Prussian army (1772–1790). After retiring, he participated in the uprising in the Southern Netherlands (modern Belgium and Luxembourg) against the Austrian authorities. In 1799 he published the work "The Spirit of the Newest Military System". In 1806, he wrote the pamphlet "The Campaign of 1805", which contained criticism of the actions of the Russian army in this campaign and offensive attacks against the Russian command. For this, at the request of the Russian government, he was arrested (1806) and sent by sea to Russia, but died on the way. Bülow's independent mind made him one of the most influential writers on the subject and introduced many of the modern military terms. According to Bülow, wars are not decided by battlefield victories, but rather by strategic maneuvers against enemy "line of operations" (i.e. communications). He formulated an important thesis about the subordination of military strategy to politics, tactics to strategy. Clausewitz objected to the dogmatism and geometric constructions of Bülow, who underestimated the significance of the battle.
* Marshal Ney Michel (1769–1815) - son of a cooper, Duke of Elchingen and "Prince of Moscow" (the last title he was awarded by Napoleon for valor in the Battle of Borodino - his corps attacked the Semyonov flushes), the hero of all Napoleon's campaigns, a man exceptionally popular in the army . It was to him that Napoleon, though already after the death of Lannes, gave the nickname the Bravest of the Brave, which the army put above all his titles. During the retreat of the French, he commanded the rearguard, which was almost completely destroyed in the battle near Krasnoe, where the French lost 32 thousand (including 26 thousand prisoners), and the Russians 2 thousand. During the Hundred Days, he, sent at the head of the royal troops against Napoleon, went over with the troops to the side of the former emperor. Now in Paris, on the Observatory Square, where the French shot their Bravest of the Brave on December 7, 1815, there is a monument to Ney. (Note. per.)
This statement is only partially true, in relation to such battles as the battles of Jena, Ulm, Eckmuhl, Marengo and Wagram.
In the spring of 1757, Frederick the Great invaded Bohemia (Bohemia) with three separate armies. Two of them moved from Saxony (one commanded by the king himself), and the third, under the command of the seventy-two-year-old Marshal Schwerin, from Silesia. The Austrian army under the command of Prince Karl retreated before the invaders and took up a strong position near Prague. Schwerin's army was late, and when it finally approached, the Prussians defeated the Austrians on May 6, 1757, but allowed a large part of the Austrian forces to retreat. On June 18, Frederick, although with a smaller force, again attacked the Austrian army, this time under the command of Marshal Daun, near Kolin. Frederick II was utterly defeated, mainly due to the numerical superiority of the Austrians, but also due to the talent and courage of Marshal Daun.
Kolin is a Czech city on the river. Labe (Elbe) at the crossroads of ancient trade routes. Near Kolin, on June 18, 1757, the army of Frederick II (34 thousand) was defeated by the Austrians of Daun (54 thousand). The Prussians lost 14 thousand and 45 guns. (Editor's note)
Duke of Wellington Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852) - English military and political figure, diplomat, field marshal (1813). In 1794–1795 participated in the war against Republican France in the Netherlands. In 1796–1805 served and fought in India. In 1806 he was elected to parliament. Since 1808 he was the commander of the allied forces in Portugal and Spain, liberated Spain from the French. In 1814 he occupied Southwestern France. Received a ducal title and became the first Duke of Wellington. He was appointed ambassador of England in Paris (1814). After the return of Napoleon from Fr. Elba and the beginning of a new war, Wellington, together with Blucher, commanded the allied forces at the Battle of Waterloo. Wellington represented England at the Congress of Vienna. Later he held various state and diplomatic posts. Died in England in 1852. (Note. per.)
The Wellington Campaign of 1810-1811 was part of the Peninsular War to liberate Spain and Portugal from Napoleon's rule. As in Russia during the Napoleonic campaign of 1812, the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula voluntarily destroyed their possessions and supplies in order to make it impossible to supply the enemy army and hasten its defeat. This "scorched earth" tactic, as it is known today, was a huge success in both cases.
Near Aspern and Esling, two villages near Vienna on the opposite, left bank of the Danube, on May 21-22, 1809, Napoleon suffered a major defeat. After the victory over the Austrians near Ratisbon (Regensburg) on April 19–23, on May 13, Napoleon entered Vienna. The Austrian army under the command of Archduke Charles retreated to the left bank of the Danube, and Napoleon had to cross the river to attack it. Charles in a deadly battle defeated the French, who had lost one of their most talented commanders, Marshal Lannes. Having received a major replenishment, on June 4, Napoleon made another attempt to force the Danube. This time he was successful, and on July 5-6 he won the battle of Wagram, thus putting an end to the war of liberation waged by Austria.
Count Bennigsen Leonty Leontyevich (1745–1826) – born in Brunswick In 1759–1773 served in the Hanoverian army, and in 1773 he entered the Russian army, where he made a successful career, receiving in 1802 the rank of general from the cavalry. Participated in the Russian-Turkish wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1791, the Polish campaign of 1792-1794, the Persian campaign of Russian troops in 1796. In the war against Napoleon in 1806-1807. successfully fought the battles of Pultusk, Preussisch-Eylau and Heilsberg. However, he suffered a crushing defeat at Friedland. During the Patriotic War, he was the chief of staff of the Russian troops, took part in the Battle of Borodino and the Battle of Tarutino (he was removed from his post for intrigues and opposition to Kutuzov). In 1813 he commanded the reserve army (until October), then the 2nd Russian army. In 1818 he left Russia. (Note. per.)
In the spring of 1807, Napoleon ordered Marshal Lefebvre to begin the siege of the city of Danzig. The siege, which began in March, lasted until May. The Russian commander-in-chief Bennigsen, who was nearby, remained passive all this time, despite the fact that the surrender of Danzig gave Napoleon an important base and freed part of his troops, which he soon used to great advantage in the battle of Friedland.
See note. 45.
Debush - withdraw troops from a mountain gorge or gorge to an open area ( fr.). (Note. per.)
Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé (1621–1686), known as the Great Condé, began a brilliant military career in 1640, towards the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). In 1643 he was appointed commander of the French forces defending the northeastern borders of France against the Spaniards, and won a decisive victory at Rocroix, which made him, at the age of 22, one of the most prominent military leaders. Later he commanded the French troops, fighting in Germany, Lorraine and Flanders. Participated in the "Fronde of Princes", in 1652 he was defeated by Turenne, fled to the Netherlands and in 1653-1658 fought against his own at the head of the Spanish army. In 1660 he returned. In 1672-1675 he successfully led the French army in the war with Holland.
Albrecht von Wallenstein (1583–1634) was a Bohemian Czech nobleman from the Waldstein family who was commander-in-chief (generalissimo) of the troops of the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War, although his military education, according to Clausewitz and modern standards, was short and superficial. For two years in the army (1604-1606) he fought against the Turks and Hungarians, and from 1617 he commanded an ever-increasing number of mercenaries (mostly hired by himself at the expense of a rapidly growing fortune), which he placed at the disposal of Emperor Ferdinand II. He was called "the idol of the troops and the scourge of the peoples." Killed by conspiring officers (see also note 22).
Count Alexander Suvorov-Rymniksky, Prince of Italy (1729–1800) gained fame as a commander of Russian troops during the wars of Catherine II the Great against the Turks (1768–1774, 1787–1791). In 1799, he became commander-in-chief of the allied army in Italy and, having defeated, expelled the French from northern Italy. Having received a baptism of fire in the Battle of Kunersdorf (1759), Suvorov participated in 63 battles and battles and won all of them. Suvorov took 609 banners, 2670 guns and 50,000 prisoners from his opponents (Prussians, Poles, Turks, French). The last for Suvorov was the Swiss campaign, after the brilliant conduct of which the great commander soon died.
Masséna André (1758–1817), an illiterate son of a peasant, Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling, surpassed most other marshals in the gift of military improvisation and in general as a military leader. By the beginning of the revolution, he had risen to the rank of sergeant major for 14 years. In 1791 he joined the revolutionary army and in 1792 became a battalion commander, and in 1793 a brigadier general. It was he who, having defeated the Russian-Austrian corps of A.M. Rimsky-Korsakov (38 thousand French against 24 thousand Russians), forced A.V. Suvorov to leave Switzerland and thereby saved France from the Russian-Austrian invasion that threatened her. In 1800, in Genoa, with 15 thousand Frenchmen withstood a 1.5-month siege of 30 thousand Austrians and an English squadron. In 1805, commanding an army, he occupied Venice, Carinthia, Styria and the Kingdom of Naples. In the war of 1809 with Austria he commanded a corps. Under Wagram, being on the left flank, he withstood a strong counterattack by the Austrians, which contributed to the overall success. In 1810 he was appointed commander of the French troops in Portugal. For a series of defeats in 1811, he was removed from business. (Editor's note)
André Masséna, Prince of Essling (1758–1817) - prominent French general and marshal during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. In military service since 1775, private. In 1789 he retired as a sergeant major. In 1791 he joined the revolutionary army. In 1793, brigadier general. He proved himself in the battle of Rivoli (1796). In 1799 he defeated Rimsky-Korsakov's corps at Zurich. In the spring of 1800, Napoleon ordered him to defend the Italian city of Genoa against the Austrians. The latter suddenly attacked, divided his army into two parts, and he, with the remaining right flank, had to retreat to the city. The Austrian General Ott began the siege of the city, and Massena did not give him rest with constant sorties. Despite the ever-increasing lack of food, he held out for 1.5 months, enabling Napoleon to win at Marengo.
In 1810, Masséna was given the position of commander-in-chief of a French army of 70,000 men that invaded Portugal to "throw into the sea" the English under Wellington. He again had to oppose his willpower and determination to such a terrible enemy as hunger. The British troops retreated inland, leaving behind a mountainous, barren land, devoid of any food. Only one major battle was won by the French (at Busaco). Most of the French casualties, 25,000, were due to disease and starvation. More losses were largely avoided by Masséna's skilful retreat.
During the Swedish invasion (1630–1632) of the Thirty Years' War, Albrecht von Wallenstein, the leader of the Catholic and imperial forces, and the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf took up positions against each other near Nuremberg in southern Germany. After Wallenstein refused to fight several times, on September 3, 1632, the Swedes attacked his camp. The battle continued into the night, with heavy losses on both sides, but Gustav II Adolf failed to dislodge Wallenstein. In the decisive battle of Lützen (November 6, 1632), Gustav II Adolf defeated the imperial troops of Wallenstein, but was killed.
On February 8, 1807, near Preussisch-Eylau in East Prussia, the French army (70 thousand) under the command of Napoleon and his marshals Davout and Ney won (both sides attributed the victory to themselves. - Ed.) over the Russians under the command of Bennigsen (78 thousand, including 8 thousand Prussians). Thanks to the reinforcements that both Napoleon and Bennigsen received during the battles, luck during the battle turned to face either one or the other army. But with the onset of night, no one won a decisive victory (although Bennigsen could put the squeeze on the French). The losses of the French exceeded the losses of the Russians, who lost more than a third of their people (the Russians lost 26 thousand killed and wounded, the French from 23 to 30 thousand - Ed.). However, Bennigsen, fearing a further strengthening of the French army, retreated, after which Napoleon announced his victory (and Bennigsen his). This battle was the bloodiest of all given before by Napoleon (even more bloody Borodino and Leipzig were ahead). Everything was covered in blood. Marshal Ney, looking at all this, exclaimed: “What a massacre, and without any benefit!”
The Battle of Preussisch-Eylau (now the city of Bagrationovsk, Kaliningrad Region) took place on January 26–27 (February 7–8), 1807 between the Russian-Prussian and French armies during the war with France against the countries of the 4th coalition (Russia, Prussia , England, etc.). In early January, the Russian army under the command of L.L. Bennigsen launched an offensive to the west in order to defeat the corps of Ney and Bernadotte. However, due to Bennigsen's indecision, this opportunity was missed. Napoleon, having gathered troops from winter quarters (up to 70 thousand people, 450 guns), went on the offensive in order to cut off the Russian army (78 thousand, including 8 thousand Prussians, 400 guns) from communications with Russia. The battle was not a decisive success for either side. Losses of the parties: the Russians lost 26 thousand killed and wounded, the French 23-30 thousand. However, Bennigsen at the end of the battle, having approached a fresh corps, missed the opportunity to put the squeeze on Napoleon's army, whose right flank was in complete disorder. (Editor's note)
General Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813), known for his reforms of the Prussian army, was a close friend and teacher of Clausewitz. In the rank of captain, he participated in the war of the 1st coalition against revolutionary France and was among the heroic defenders of the city of Menen in Flanders. He described his observations in a work called "The Defense of the City of Menen".
For several days in April 1794, a force of 2,000 men under the command of General Hammerstein defended this fortified city from 20,000 French under the command of General Moreau who stormed it. When Hammerstein's supplies of equipment and food were depleted, and the city was burning, on April 30 he made a successful breakthrough with his troops through the enemy lines, losing more than one-fifth of his forces.
Dominant tactics referenceground forces battles from the 15th to the 18th century, there were demonstration actions and active maneuvers by troops in order to outflank the enemy or go to the rear and carry out offensive operations. Also important was the desire to cut off the enemy from his stores, i.e. from bases with provisions. Weighed down with a lot of food carts, such numerous (tens or even hundreds of thousands of people) armies were not very maneuverable and allowed marches for two or three daily marches (10-20 km) from their stores. Leaving the army without provisions in those days was equated with defeat. For example, let's take the defeat of the Swedes at Poltava (Northern War), without going into the details of the battle itself.
Northern war interception of the convoy, as Tsar Peter, the mother of victory near Poltava, said
Let's look at the root causes loss of strategic convoy(who went to the Swedish army, from Riga), then Tsar Peter used the scorched earth tactics, (it was initiated by PETER, and not STALIN, for example, during the campaign of the Swedish movement, the city of Baturin, along with all the inhabitants, was destroyed by the advancing Russian troops, more so and not revived).
Destruction of Baturin by Menshikov's dragoons
Further winter, more than three thousand losses of the Swedes from frostbite. So by the Battle of Poltava, the Swedish army was so greatly weakened that our victory was a matter of technique. 9 hours of battle from two in the morning to 11 in the afternoon, and the Russian army turned the Swedes into a disorderly retreating crowd. Well, the second example, the invasion of Napoleon. , and then the battle for resources, who will immediately name at least a couple more battles of that war huh ...? And, here are the peasants lifting the pitchforks, the French foragers, I know everything.
Tground forces combat tactics from the 15th to the 18th centuries,
in an open offensive battle, according to the classical formation, the infantry lined up in thirds (squares), artillery was located between them, and heavy (cuirassiers) and light cavalry were on the flanks.
Cuirassiers (literally - armored men, armor) are heavy cavalry, dressed in cuirasses.
They originated in the 16th century as an addition to the relatively small number of knightly cavalry. It was equipped in relatively inexpensive incomplete armor, covering a little more than half of the body - from knees to head - they were called cuirassiers. With the development of firearms, by the 19th century, equipment was reduced to a cuirass and helmet.
1854 French cavalry cuirass
Cavalier Guard regiment officer's cuirass 1880
At the time of its inception, the main weapon, like that of a knight, was a knight's sword. Gradually it was replaced by a broadsword, in some European armies a heavy saber was used.
Horses used heavy breeds weighing under 700 kg. Only strong and tall men from 170 cm and above were recruited into cuirassiers, bearing in mind that the average height of a European of those times was 160-165 cm.
In battle, the cavalry played a secondary role, supporting the infantry. According to the rules of those wars, she did not have the right to break away from the infantry for more than 100-150 steps. During the advance of the troops, artillery, due to its bulkiness, remained in place, causing damage to the enemy from a distance. For the first time, she began to participate in the offensive, accompanying the infantry, in the French troops of Napoleon Bonaparte, when a lightweight version of the guns was created. There were situations when the cavalry lined up in front of the infantry or behind it, depending on the conditions of the battle. And of course, the main task of the cavalry is the pursuit and beating of a demoralized enemy.
having approached, they fired several volleys, then either retreated or started hand-to-hand combat
Approaching the enemy at a distance of a shot, the infantry, on command, opened fire from flintlock guns, after several volleys one of the sides began to retreat, or switched to a bayonet attack, developing into hand-to-hand combat. In the course were bayonets, rifle butts, sabers, broadswords, fists and everything that came to hand. The battle of Borodino, it was in it that the largest number of hand-to-hand fights took place. A characteristic sign of participation in hand-to-hand combat, the almost complete destruction of the unit.
Smoothbore flintlock guns had a poor hit rate. Out of a hundred bullets fired at a target standing 50 meters away, no more than 25 hit.
squeaked combat tactics
squealed Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich
Therefore, guns, as a rule, were used simultaneously as barrage fire. Of the mass of bullets fired, at least some of them hit the enemy's manpower. Interestingly, a behavioral analysis of the shooting of a defending modern unit showed that about 25% of the soldiers fire not only in the direction of the enemy in the direction, but often simply in the air.
Reloading the gun was an incredible challenge. It was necessary to execute up to a hundred commands. This is already later. In the MIDDLE of the 18th CENTURY, King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia introduced the requirement "for each soldier to fire six bullets per minute with the seventh in the barrel."
flintlock gun, for example, in the war of 1812, guns of more than 20 calibers were used
Ground Forces Combat Tactics from the 15th to the 18th Century, in this regard, in those days, the coherence of the actions of soldiers in the ranks and the ability to wield a bayonet and a butt were valued. No wonder Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov used to say: "A bullet is a fool, and a bayonet is a fine fellow." Note that even in the war of 1812, the Russian army did not have a single model of a flintlock gun as such, although in 1809 a single caliber was introduced, in practice, guns of 28 (!) Different calibers were in service at a time.
For defense, the walls of fortresses, castles and cities were widely used, which the enemy besieged for months, trying to deprive the defenders of water and provisions for the principle of survival. The walls were shelled with cannonballs in order to destroy them, or undermining was carried out to further undermine them. Powder charges that were laid under the walls were called firecrackers. Infantry burst into the gaps, carrying out single chaotic shooting with the transition to saber-bayonet and hand-to-hand combat. Also, direct assaults on the walls of fortresses were carried out with the help of battering rams, ladders, ropes with hooks, etc. One should not think that the besieged fortress was, as a rule, doomed. The besieged also had their own tactics, not many, but they were. As an example of a successful defense, for example, I have not heard more about such an application. Let's call his city N for the time being (I'll write it in more detail somehow), was surrounded by an enemy army, and a systematic siege began. The shelling of the wall began, with the aim of breaching (not a trivial task). Meanwhile, those besieged around the planned breach, they begin to build an inner wall, in the form of a bag. Then a break, an attack, an entry into the bag of the inner wall, and the almost complete destruction of the intruders ... but what happened next, let's leave it for later.
In defensive battles, as a rule, earthen or log redoubts, redans and flushes were built.
types of field fortifications redoubt lunette redan
Redoubt (shelter) - a fortification of a closed type, not necessarily, but usually earthen, with a moat and rampart, used for all-round defense. Although the defense was circular, the redoubt more often had the shape of a quadrangle, although both five and hexagonal redoubts were erected. The length of the redoubt was from 50 to 200 steps, in accordance with the size of the unit. On average, the redoubt was built for 200-800 soldiers. The redoubt consisted of an outer ditch, a rampart with an earthen step to accommodate archers and cannons, and an inner ditch to shelter the defenders. The passage to the redoubt, about 6 paces wide, was arranged from the gorge front (rear side), and behind it there was an embankment for shelling the enemy if he tried to use the passage.
Fas (face) is the side of something facing the viewer. In military affairs, the front is the side of the fortification facing the enemy (front). In the modern sense, straight sections of trenches, anti-tank ditches and wire obstacles are also called faces.
Redoubts appeared in the 16th century, they became widespread as strongholds in the 17th-19th centuries.
A redan (ledge) or redant is a field fortification, consisting of two faces at an angle of 60-120 degrees, protruding towards the enemy (front). Small redans with an acute angle are called flushes.
Fleches (arrows) are field, sometimes long-term, fortifications. They consisted of two faces 20-30 m long each at an acute angle facing the enemy (front).
Flashes of Bagration
Flushes are essentially similar to redans, but unlike them, they are smaller in size and have a larger angle of more than 60-120 degrees, which are characteristic of a redan, they also protrude towards the enemy.
Siege of Plevna, capture of the Grivitsky redoubt
Artillery, do not exaggerate its role in the Middle Ages.
Medieval cannons, if you look closely, then in the 18th century the cannons have little difference
Around the turn of the 16-17th century (why such a gap in time, not all army commanders of that time equally focus on artillery, in the same Battle of Poltava, Charles XII wanted to achieve victory with virtually no use of cannons), an increase in the rate of fire and lighter guns, improvement of artillery weapons, its role also increases until it becomes the dominant force on the battlefield, by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. She has yet to go through the carriage revolution, and it takes centuries to change the method of loading.
