On the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941

Versions of Stalin's miscalculation in the timing of a likely German attack on the USSR as the main reason for our failures are accompanied by the assertion that our troops in 1941, before the war, were not inferior to the Wehrmacht in the ability to fight, in professionalism, and if they were put on alert in time, they they would successfully repel the attack of the aggressors. At the same time, combat readiness is understood only as the ability of troops to occupy the deployment lines on alert, missing the main component of combat readiness - the ability to successfully complete the combat mission of repelling a surprise attack, which, with such a skill of the army, will not be sudden.

Many consider the very fact of their defeats to be the main "evidence" of our troops not being put on alert before aggression, although there is no direct connection here. Instead of vague allegations that the troops were not put on alert, it would be time to define a specific list of the main measures that had to be taken to achieve the required readiness before the war. And to reveal - which of them were carried out before the war, On time; what was not done and how it affected the outcome of the first battles.

In 1935-1941. The leadership of the USSR carried out a number of major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces:

1) transfer of the Red Army in 1935-1939. on a staffing basis;

2) the introduction of universal conscription in 1939;

3) creation and deployment of serial production of a new generation of tanks and aircraft in 1939-1941, before the war;

4) strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941. from the peacetime army to the wartime army (before the war), from 98 divisions to 303 divisions;

5) creation and concentration on the western borders in 1939-1941. cover armies of 186 divisions, unprecedented in the history of mankind for peacetime, taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon that arrived in the cover army before the war;

6) preparation of the Western theater for war - airfields, fortified areas, roads.

In April-June 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including:

The call in April-May of 793 thousand reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to the state of wartime;

Directive of the Chief of the General Staff dated April 14 on the urgent putting into combat readiness of all long-term firing structures, fortified areas with the installation of field troops weapons in them in the absence of service weapons;

From May 13, covert transfer from the internal districts of troops of the second strategic echelon to the western districts, while bringing them to combat readiness - 7 armies 66 divisions (16, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28 armies, 41st rifle, 21st th and 23rd mechanized corps);

Bringing into combat readiness 63 divisions of the reserves of the western districts and nominating them by night marches, covertly, from June 12, to the cover armies of these districts (NPO Directive of 12.6.41);

Bringing to combat readiness and covert withdrawal under the guise of exercises in the place of concentration of 52 divisions of the second echelon of the covering army from the places of permanent deployment (Order of NPO dated 16.6.41);

The withdrawal of divisions of the first echelon of the covering armies to fortified areas according to the telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of 10.6.41 and the Instruction of the People's Commissar of Defense of 11.6.41 - from the beginning of June;

Bringing all troops of the PribOVO and OdVO into readiness 18-21.6.41;

Creation from April 1941 of command posts and their occupation on June 18-21 by urgently formed front departments;

Creation of an army group by S.M. Budyonny on the Dnieper line - 21.6.41;

Early graduation according to the Order of the NPO dated May 14 from all schools and the direction of graduates to the western border districts;

NPO Order No. 0367 of 27.12.40 and its repetition on 19.6.41 on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft, etc.;

Direction People's Commissar of Defense General K.A. Meretskov I.V. Stalin in the ZapOVO and PribOVO to check the combat readiness of the Air Force districts 14.6.41;

The publication of the Directive of the NPO and the Stavka (No. 1) on bringing the troops of the western military districts into combat readiness (signed on 21.6.41 at 22.00, because S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov already left Stalin at 22.20, having received his approval of this Directive and sending it with N.F. Vatutin to the communication center of the General Staff).

In total, before the German attack, 225 of the 237 divisions of the Red Army intended for the war against Germany and its allies according to defense plans were thus put on alert.

Only two important measures were not put into practice before the war - general mobilization in the country and the introduction of troops into the foreground of the fortified areas.

The strategic mobilization deployment of the Red Army before the war into the wartime army (5.4 million people), the creation of huge covering armies, the covert mobilization of an additional 793,000 spares, etc. the need to carry it out before the war disappeared. Already in peacetime, all 303 divisions planned for the war were formed. All the main things that the country had to and could do to successfully repel the impending aggression were done, if not to touch upon the quality of our troops in comparison with the Nazis. In fact, from March 1941 there was a reciprocal strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces of Germany for aggression and units of the Red Army - to repel it.

In fact, now a completely different thing is called a miscalculation in the probable timing of the German attack - Stalin's decision, despite the obvious inevitability of Germany's aggression in June 1941, not to announce general mobilization and not to send troops into the fortified areas before the German attack, considering the events carried out in the spring of 1941 completely sufficient, and a covering army of 186 divisions - capable of repelling any surprise attack by Germany and its allies!

This is not a miscalculation in terms, but a conscious decision that takes into account all the pros and cons. At the same time, Stalin made a mistake in one thing - he overestimated the combat capability of our troops, which looked much stronger than the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of divisions and military equipment. This was the main and only miscalculation of Stalin (and NGOs as well).

There was also no miscalculation in anticipating the likely direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht, but there was a decision by Stalin and the NGOs - assuming the possibility of the main attack of the Germans in Belarus, to concentrate our main forces in Ukraine, believing that in Belarus 44 Soviet divisions would be enough for a successful defense against 50 German divisions . And it is more profitable for us to strike back from Ukraine - to Krakow ... Here again, a miscalculation in the combat capability of our troops, and nothing more.

The version about the defeat of our troops on the first day of the war is nothing more than a legend. In fact, only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering armies from the Baltic to the Carpathians out of 237 divisions of reserve border districts and the second strategic echelon were subjected to the first blow of the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of three special military districts (118 divisions) did not occur on June 22, but later, during the oncoming battles on June 24-30, 1941 between the new and old borders.

In order to prove the superiority of the Wehrmacht in the number of troops and weapons, as the reasons for our failures, for many years the number of Soviet troops, the quantity and quality of their military equipment have been underestimated in every possible way, and, conversely, all this has been exaggerated by the Wehrmacht.

So, in fact, Germany put up not 4.6 million people against the USSR, as is commonly believed, but 3.3 million, because. in the air force, air defense and navy, only combat assets, and not personnel, should be taken into account (like ours). In total, the aggressor, therefore, had not 5.5 million people, but 4.2 million against more than 3 million people. in the western border districts and troops of the second strategic echelon.

The ratio in artillery is distorted - we take into account guns and mortars of 76 mm and higher caliber (without anti-tank guns), while the Germans count 14 thousand anti-tank guns (37 and 50 mm) and 5 thousand artillery barrels of 28 OKH reserve divisions. In fact, the troops of the western border districts alone had 37,000 guns and mortars, while the troops of all the aggressors had no more than 31,000 guns.

It is not true that almost all Wehrmacht artillery was motorized. In the states of the German infantry division of the first waves there were 6300 horses, of which almost half were in the artillery regiment. This means that all the artillery of the infantry divisions was horse-drawn. Only the artillery of anti-tank guns, RGK, tank and motorized infantry divisions was motorized.

A total of 3300 tanks and 250 self-propelled guns, and not 4-5 thousand, were thrown by the Wehrmacht against the USSR, of which 1600 were light (T-1, T-2 and T-38) and 1610 medium (T-Z and T-4). This means that against 1610 German medium tanks in the western districts of the USSR there were 160 heavy and medium tanks KB and T-34, which far exceeded the German ones in combat qualities. And against 1600 German light tanks there were about 9 thousand Soviet light tanks, which were in no way inferior to the German ones. The result is an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht in the quantity and quality of tanks. This is without taking into account 2,000 tanks of the mechanized corps of the second strategic echelon.

Against 3046 of all German combat aircraft (1067 fighters, 1417 bombers and 562 reconnaissance aircraft), the air forces of the western districts, fleets and long-range bomber aviation had 9917 combat aircraft, including 7133 in the districts, 1339 in the DBA and 1445 in the fleets.

Aircraft of new types, the Soviet Air Force received from factories not 2739, as they think, but 3719, because. among the new ones, it is necessary to take into account the aircraft of the 1939-40 model. DB-ZF, Ar-2, Su-2, Tu-2, Yak-4, Pe-8, BB-2, of which there were more than a thousand. This means that our Air Force could and should have had not 1540 new types of aircraft against the Germans in June 1941, as they now believe, but more than 3 thousand. Of all 3046 combat aircraft, the Wehrmacht had less than 2 thousand new ones, if we exclude obsolete Yu aircraft -87, Xe-111, Do-217, etc.

Our rifle divisions of the western border districts on 22.6.41 had on average not 8-9 thousand, as long thought, but 12,360 (with a staff of 14,483) - 20 divisions had 14 thousand people each, 70 - 12 thousand each, and 6 - 11 thousand each. The data sometimes given for June 1, 1941 do not take into account the receipt of 500 thousand people from the additional conscription in these divisions in June 1941.

Of those dismissed due to the repressions of 1937-38. 38 thousand commanders and political workers, 12 thousand returned to the army in 1939-40, 9 thousand were dismissed for non-political reasons (natural decline), and about 17 thousand people were expelled from the army for political reasons - unreasonably and illegally. Of these, about 9.5 thousand were arrested.

The opinion that the top commanders who were repressed were the best, and the worst remained in the army, is unproven. The best of the repressed (M.N. Tukhachevsky and others) are often compared in the press with the worst of the rest. The question has not been investigated - what experience of modern warfare (except for the Civil War) could our senior command personnel of the 30s (including those who were repressed) get, serving from the end of the Civil War until 1937 in our small, then backward, territorial-cadre army, in in which there were two dozen (26%) personnel divisions in twenty military districts (there were none at all in the internal districts), army departments did not exist from 1920 to 1939, major maneuvers began to be carried out only in 1935-37. etc. No wonder 120 of our military leaders went to Germany to study military affairs in the 20-30s.

And the ideas associated with the name of Tukhachevsky were not rejected, as they say, they were not always justifiably introduced into the army before the war, were reflected in the charters. In particular:

The idea of ​​"strike back" became the core of the war plan instead of the more appropriate idea of ​​strategic defense for our army;

Theories of deep combat and operations have obscured for our army the questions of defense, mobile warfare, counter operations, etc.;

The idea of ​​creating cover armies was put into practice on a large scale, which saved us in 1941.

The consequences of the repressions of 1937-1938 against the command staff were partially overcome by the summer of 1941, so they cannot be attributed to the main reasons for the failures of our army at the beginning of the war.

The trouble is that the Red Army did not have time to become personnel either in 1936, or by 1939, or by June 1941. Since 1935, it has developed extensively, increased 5 times - but all to the detriment of quality, especially officer and sergeants.

The Soviet military leadership, preparing for the war with Germany, strenuously sought by 1941 quantitative superiority over the Wehrmacht, especially in tanks and aircraft, but it remained a secret for him that the Red Army lagged behind the German Army many times in the quality of troops, headquarters, command staff of all degrees, especially junior .

The troops were poorly trained in the methods of modern warfare, weakly put together, and not well organized. Radio communications, control, interaction, intelligence, tactics were at a low level ...

The transition of the army to a personnel basis, an increase in its strength by 5 times in 1939 and reorganization in 1940-1941. exacerbated the shortage of command staff and worsened its quality. The real main reason for the defeat of our troops in the summer of 1941 was the unpreparedness of the Red Army to conduct a modern mobile war against an enemy who had the richest experience in it and excellent preparation for just such a fleeting war. Our Armed Forces were not able to realize the huge technical and human potential, which surpassed the potential of the aggressors by the beginning of the war. The reason for this backwardness of our army is the complete failure in 1930-37. advance training of command personnel of the technical level for the multiple increase (deployment) of the Armed Forces before the war. Hasty, emergency measures in 1939-41, and especially in the spring of 1941, could not rectify this situation.

Military Bulletin (APN). 1992. No. 9. S. 3-8.

http://www.hrono.info/statii/filipp_rkka.html

The preparation of the USSR for the World War was comprehensive: they developed the national economy, increased the capabilities of the Armed Forces, created new models, and carried out mass educational patriotic work. The Soviet state rapidly increased its power. In the reasons for the Victory, one cannot underestimate the scale and enormous significance of the simply titanic work done by the peoples of the USSR in the prewar years. The first (1929-1932) and the second (1933-1937) five-year plans brought the country into the ranks of the most powerful industrial powers of the planet. Giant enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical industry, mechanical engineering, and power engineering were built, and new branches of industry were actually created.

The rise was simply amazing, in the 20s the country was a backward state, which lost even what it was in 1913, mainly of an agrarian nature. What other countries took decades and even centuries to accomplish, the Soviet Union did in years.

Assembly shop of KV-1 tanks of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. It is clearly seen that all the hulls are already of a “simplified” type with a straight stern sheet, and the turrets are both welded and cast. Spring 1942.

Thus, according to People's Commissar for Armaments Boris Vannikov, “a deeply thought-out and clear mobilization task was set in the industry. It consisted in creating head plants, design bureaus and research institutes, designed to design and then master in serial or mass production new advanced weapons; produce weapons in the amount necessary to supply the army in peacetime; to ensure stockpiles of weapons in quantities corresponding to mobilization needs in case of war and to make up for losses at its initial stages, and thereby make it possible, within the time limits established by the mobilization plan, to ensure the deployment of the capacities of the military and civil industry until the needs of war are fully met by weapons.

In 1930, at the 16th Party Congress, it was decided to create a new metallurgical base in the east of the country, inaccessible to enemy aircraft, this decision actually saved our state from disaster - at the beginning of the war, almost all the metallurgy of the South and Center was either lost or exported and has not yet begun work in new places. If capacities had not been created in the east of the country in the pre-war period, it would have taken several years to compensate for the lost capacities, the war would have been even longer and more bloody.

The XVIII Party Congress, held in March 1939, decided that the main direction of economic development was still the growth of heavy industry, and much attention should be paid to the creation of a powerful industry in the east of the USSR. In 1939, it was decided to build and reconstruct in 1940-1941. aircraft factories. After it, the capacity of Soviet aircraft factories was supposed to exceed the capacity of German aircraft factories by about one and a half times. In addition, they created new fighters, bombers, attack aircraft, which were not inferior to world analogues.

At the 18th party conference held in February 1941, Gosplan Chairman N. A. Voznesensky correctly noted that modern warfare “is a war of engines, ... is also to a large extent a war of reserves, ... requires huge raw material, fuel, metal and productive reserves ... ".

Production of T-34-76 tanks. In the foreground are 76.2 mm F-34 guns of the 1940 model.
Workshop of the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, 1943.

A lot of work was done in the tank industry, by the summer of 1941 its production capacity was also to surpass the German one and a half times. Serial production of new KV and T-34 tanks began, Germany did not yet have such vehicles. The artillery industry was developed, from May 1940, by the beginning of the war, the gun fleet was increased by one and a half times. Mobilization stocks of all kinds have been created. During the years of the Third Five-Year Plan, the growth of military production amounted to 39% annually, while the growth of all industry was 13%. By the beginning of the war, a new tank industry had actually been created, and the aviation industry had been qualitatively restructured. The foundations have been created for the qualitative renewal and growth of the production of small arms and artillery. The Navy was regularly replenished with new warships and submarines.

Training of the Armed Forces: in 1939, the transition to a personnel recruitment system based on universal military service was completed. From August 1939 to June 1941, the army grew by more than two and a half times - up to 5.4 million people. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were created, the Air Force was reorganized - 75 divisions and 5 brigades were created for the war, of which 25 divisions were at the formation stage. The army was quickly re-equipped.

In the pre-war period, the state actually destroyed or defeated "internal enemies", a possible "fifth column" of the enemy. The society was united and united. At present, one can find a lot of literature that says that Stalin did not invent "internal enemies", they were. From the very beginning, there were “patriots” and “internationalists” (or “Trotskyists”) among the Bolsheviks, as a result, the “statists” led by Stalin won, but the “Trotskyists” did not go away, they still occupied many important posts. Therefore, in order to save the state in the face of the threat of an imminent world war, to save the people and socialism, they had to be destroyed. It is clear that innocent people also suffered in the process of repression - even at the present time, according to various estimates, approximately one in ten is in prison innocently. To do this, they also carried out a “cleansing” of commanders in the army, drunkards, politically unreliable, were fired, someone was arrested and shot. As a result, the influence of the "Trotskyites" in the army was undermined, the combat effectiveness of the army did not suffer, those commanders "went" to the top, who later in the war will show their best side.

Soviet military thought in the prewar years, on the whole, correctly assessed the changes taking place in the field of the Armed Forces and in the world. In April 1940, the General Staff developed an operational plan to repel a possible German attack. A.M. Vasilevsky, who at that time was the first deputy chief of the operational department of the General Staff, reported that Germany was considered the main enemy, Italy would also take the side of Berlin, but its role would be insignificant. Finland, Romania, and Hungary will also oppose the USSR. Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov believed that the war would be limited to the western borders of the USSR, so the main forces were concentrated here, but in order to fully guarantee security in the east of the state, forces were located there that guaranteed a “stable position” there. It was correctly determined that the future war would be of a maneuverable nature, but would become protracted and require the maximum effort of all the spiritual and material forces of the state and society. Soviet military thought developed a completely new theory of deep operation.

Society was prepared for war - year after year, work was carried out on the patriotic education of children, youth, and the entire population as a whole.

As a result, we can say that, despite a number of mistakes, the foundations of the economy, the development of the Armed Forces, and the education of the population were laid in a timely and correct manner. And this is in the shortest possible time. This was confirmed by the Great Patriotic War, the USSR and its peoples with honor withstood the most terrible war in all of mankind, not only won, but became even stronger. And no one expected this, it was believed that if the USSR won, it would be so weakened that for many decades it would not be able to influence world processes. The USSR and its peoples accomplished three titanic feats in just two decades: they prepared for a world war, were able to win it, and restored the country, becoming even stronger. There is nothing like it in world history.

Shop for the production of Il-2 attack aircraft at the plant number 18 in the city of Kuibyshev

Sources:
Voznesensky N.A. Selected works. M., 1979.
Zhukov Yu., Kozhinov V., Mukhin Yu. Riddle 37 years old. M., 2010.
Kozhinov V. The truth of Stalin's repressions. M., 2009.
Smirnov G. V. Purification of the army. M., 2007.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vannikov/index.html
http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000125/index.shtml
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vasilevsky/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/

Russia. WWII. Soviet preparation for war

Preparation of the Red Army for war:

Since 1931, on the initiative of Tukhachevsky, mechanized corps, massive airborne forces. The total strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1938 reached 1.5 million people. But in 1937-1938. there were repressions on the military elite of the country. In 1940, 70 commanders and chiefs of staff did not have basic military training, they completed only short-term courses. They had no combat experience.

AT 1940 S.K. was appointed People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, who proved himself at Khalkhin Gol.

Building up the military-economic potential of the country. In the 3rd five-year plan (1938-1942) the main funds were directed to the developmentheavy industry , especiallymilitary . In the Urals and Siberia were built backup enterprises. Warehouses were set up. Formed state reserves of metal, oil, coal, food. The increase in defense production in 1939-1840 amounted to. 39%.

Walked militarization of labor in 1940 d.: a 7-day working week was established, an 8-hour working day was introduced (before that it was 7-hour), a ban under the threat of criminal punishment of dismissal of one's own free will and the transition from one enterprise to another without the permission of the administration. The official attachment of workers and employees to their jobs was carried out. Being late for work was punishable by the criminal code. Delays over 20 min. equated to walking. The release of substandard products was considered an "anti-state crime." Thus, the industry has established itself team leadership style .

AT 1939 introduced universal conscription. The size of the Red Army was increased to 5.5 million people. The draft age has been reduced from 21 to 18 years, the service life has been increased to 3-5 years, the term of the state in the reserve has been increased from 40 to 50 years.

Shortage of command personnel. In 1937-1938. was arrested, expelled from the party and dropped out of the army 35 thousand human. Of the 733 people in the top command leadership, 579 people died. Of the 16 army commanders, 15 were killed .. Of the 169 division commanders - 136. Thousands of commanders of regiments, battalions, squadrons were arrested and shot. deficit command staff was partially reimbursed the return to the army of part of the repressed officers (12 thousand). In 1938 - 1940. combat experience was gained at Khalkhin Gol, Poland, Finland

The rearmament of the Red Army with new military equipment began(from 1939-1940). Serial production of aircraft began (Yak-1, Mig-3 fighters, Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-20 bombers; tanks (T-34 and KV), which were not inferior to the German ones. However, the equipment of the troops with them was unsatisfactory.

Developedstrategy coming war. Stalin insisted on an offensive strategy, but did not seriously consider defensive plans. Operational plans were developed to deliver a preemptive strike. But they were not approved. However, serious miscalculations were made. Management believed that A. war will be waged on two fronts, against Germany and Japan. B) The concept of retaliation: it was assumed that The Red Army will repel an enemy attack near the western border of the USSR, transfer military operations to enemy territory. AT). Main battles deploy on the border. The idea of ​​the possibility of the retreat of the Red Army deep into the country was not allowed.. It was believed that the war will be waged on the territory of the enemy "with little blood". D) defensive structures on the old border of the USSR were dismantled. But they did not have time to build defensive structures on the new borders. E). It was assumed that Germany will try to seize the lands and resources of Ukraine and deliver its main blow to the South. Therefore, the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated in the South-Western direction.. According to Zhukov, by June 22, 1941, there were no operational and mobilization plans approved by the government.

The troops did not study the experience of the Wehrmacht fighting in Europe in 1939-1940.

Ideological and moral preparation for war. A) 1934, Stalin's work “A Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” was published. It developed the idea of ​​continuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR in confronting external enemies. It was intended to form a patriotic worldview. In the 1930s Stalin wrote the work "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism", creating his own image of the main theoretician of Marxism in the USSR, the successor of the work of Marx and Lenin. B) The prestige of the Red Army was rising (the film "Tractor Drivers"; songs that stated that "the armor is strong and our tanks are fast"). People were sure that if the war starts, it will be fought on foreign territory and with "little bloodshed."

However, according to Zhukov, on the eve of the war, the organization and armament of our troops were not up to par, air defense remained at an extremely low level, and there were practically no mechanized formations.

Before the war, Soviet aviation was inferior to German, artillery was poorly provided with tractors.

The miscalculations of Hitler and his entourage(did not doubt a quick victory):

1. They underestimated the strength of the Red Army, believing that the repressions led to the loss of its combat effectiveness. The rearmament of the army has just begun.

2. They underestimated the economic potential of the USSR.

3. They underestimated the patriotism of the peoples who lived in the USSR. They hoped for an explosion of ethnic strife in the USSR.

4. They hoped for the support of collective farmers who were forcibly driven into collective farms. It was believed that the collective farmers were opposed to the Soviet regime

Before the German invasion

Stalin hoped to be able to delay the war at least until 1942. He doubted the reliability of the information about Germany's preparations for an invasion of the USSR. He was sure that Germany would attack the USSR only after the defeat of England and the conquest of the Middle East, i.e. in 1942, Stalin considered the information of intelligence officers (Richard Sorge) as disinformation.

Stalin and his entourage made serious political and military-strategic miscalculations in the analysis of the pre-war situation. The country was preparing for war, but the war was quick and victorious. These miscalculations resulted in huge losses. Preparations for war were not completed.

In order to avoid a war on two fronts, in 1941 a neutrality pact was concluded between the USSR and Japan.

To strengthen the central leadership, Stalin was appointed in May 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Balance of forces in June 1941 before the invasion

The Red Army was inferior to the enemy in numbers, motorization of troops.

In the early days of the war, the Soviet leadership did not understand the scale of the German invasion. This is evidenced by the directive sent at 7 o'clock. On the morning of June 22, 1941: "... troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border."

War. Preparing the USSR for war.
Stalin, from the moment he came to power in the ruined agrarian Russia, directed all his efforts to raising the economy and, first of all, to creating powerful armed forces that would protect the first socialist state - the USSR from the invasion of capitalist armies. He carried out industrialization and created the basis of a powerful industrial base for the production of means of production, primarily for the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition. He implemented Lenin's GOELRO plan, i.e., the electrification of the entire country, to create modern military technologies: "winged metal" aluminum was obtained only by electrolysis.
aluminum plant. Stalin carried out the collectivization of the countryside with the formation of collective farms and state farms in order to eliminate private ownership of land, and at the same time transfer huge amounts of money and masses of people from the village to industry.
In the first half of the 1930s in the USSR, millions of peasants cut off from the land built powerful power plants, new mines and mines, the world's largest metallurgical plants for the production of metals, from which all kinds of machines would be made, but mainly military equipment and weapons. In a completely illiterate country, hundreds of universities appeared, which prepared thousands of engineers: metallurgists, designers, technologists, chemists, engine builders, military men, radio engineers, etc. At the same time, huge factories were laid for the production of products in the future, mainly military, in unprecedented quantities: tanks, aircraft, warships and submarines, cannons, small arms, cartridges, bombs, shells and mines, gunpowder and explosives.
By the mid 30s. the industrial base was basically created, and the production of weapons proper began. Soviet designers have developed the most modern military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Trained personnel were needed for the Red Army, and thousands of military schools, colleges and academies sprang up in the country to train combat commanders, pilots, tankers, navigators, artillerymen, naval specialists, radio engineers, and sappers.
In every major city, parachute towers have grown in parks to train future paratroopers. It was considered indecent for young men to appear without a TRP badge, "Voroshilovsky shooter", "Osoaviakhim", a parachutist badge. Young people and girls were recommended to go in for parachuting after work and study, learn to fly gliders, and then transfer to airplanes. The standard of living in the country was steadily declining, light industry and agriculture were increasingly serving the army.
Stalin saw the growth of Germany's military power and understood that sooner or later Hitler would attack the USSR, Germany needed Russian natural and human resources. Stalin invited the European leaders to discuss joint actions in the event of German aggression. Delegations from France and England arrived in Moscow. They insisted on military assistance from the USSR in the event of a German attack on one of the contracting countries. Since the USSR had no common borders with either England or France, the head of the Soviet delegation, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, demanded that the Red Army pass through Poland. The French and British delegations categorically refused. This ended the negotiations.
Stalin understood that Germany would soon attack Poland, and then inevitably go east, and he offered Hitler negotiations. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop came to the USSR. On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance Pact between Germany and the USSR (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed.
On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland, but Stalin said that the Red Army was not yet ready for war. So Hitler was the only culprit of the war, England and France declared war on Germany. Only on September 17, when the Polish army was defeated, did the Red Army enter the territory of Poland to protect its borders from German aggression.
The USSR annexed Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, pushed its border 200-300 km to the west. Thousands of Polish officers ended up in Soviet captivity. They were offered to join the Red Army. Part agreed, and they organized the Polish Army, which later fought successfully against the Nazis along with the Red Army. Those who did not agree were shot at Katyn.
The United States had a great influence on drawing the USSR into the war. Hitler's inhuman policy, his bloody anti-Semitism frightened all the capitalists of the world. But the oligarchs of the world, especially the American ones, were even more afraid of the communist threat from the USSR. Indeed, according to the theory of Marx and Lenin, the USSR was supposed to destroy the entire capitalist society as a result of the world revolution and build a World Communist society without private property and without the exploitation of man by man.
Back in the 1930s, at the Congress in the United States, a call was made to draw the USSR into a war with Hitler and for this to provide all kinds of assistance to the USSR in strengthening its military power. And when both sides exhaust themselves mutually, the United States, in alliance with European countries, will destroy both the fascist and communist threats. Congressman G. Truman, with the approval of Roosevelt, said: “Let Germany and Russia fight among themselves. If we see that Russia is winning, we will help Germany. If we see that Germany is winning, we will help Russia. And let them kill each other as much as possible."
Long before the war, American technologies, American materials and American equipment began to flow into the USSR. American specialists helped build the latest factories in the USSR and master them. America even supplied military equipment to the USSR. So, under the guise of agricultural tractors, the United States sold unique high-speed BT tanks to the USSR. The USSR paid for all this at speculative prices in gold, works of art and valuable raw materials.
The major Western countries correctly assessed US policy and, instead of the previous boycott, also began to help Stalin in the construction of factories, sold the latest technologies and valuable raw materials to the USSR. Even Hitler supplied the USSR with unique equipment and military equipment in exchange for valuable raw materials, grain and timber, which Germany did not have.
On September 1, when the world did not yet suspect that the Second World War had begun, the 4th extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR took place. The main decision of the session was the introduction of the military age from 18 years. Prior to that, the draft age was 21 and not everyone was drafted into the Army, but selectively. Now, during 1939-40, all conscripts of 4 conscript years at once were mobilized into the Red Army: 21st, 20th, 19th and 18th years of birth, and at the same time all men who had not been called up before. It was a gigantic call, the magnitude of which no one can still name. These conscripts should have been demobilized after 2 years, i.e. at the end of 1941. It was impossible to repeat such a set. That is, Stalin already in 1939. planned to enter the Second World War in 1941 and no later.
Taking advantage of the Pact with Germany, Stalin continued to push back the western border. The border with the Finns was only 30 km from Leningrad. On November 1, 1939, Stalin declared war on Finland, but the Red Army was stuck in front of the Mannerheim Line, which the Finns had been building for 20 years, and which was considered absolutely insurmountable all over the world. Frosts below -40 degrees, snow 1.5-2 meters deep, huge boulders under the snow, on which tanks and cars broke down, unfreezing swamps and lakes under the snow. And the Finns covered all this with minefields, mined bridges. Columns of our troops turned out to be locked on narrow forest roads, and Finnish snipers - "cuckoos" - accurately knocked out our commanders, drivers, sappers. The wounded died from loss of blood in severe frost, from frostbite.
The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but managed to completely rebuild, commissioned the invulnerable KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, the maneuverable T-34, and crushed the theoretically impassable Mannerheim Line by March. The Finns asked for peace, and our border here was pushed back by almost 200 km. Militarily, it was the most brilliant victory of the 20th century, but it went unnoticed because The West raised a noisy scandal about Soviet aggression, and the League of Nations expelled the USSR from its membership as an aggressor.
Stalin did not pay much attention to this noise and continued his policy. He demanded that Romania return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. On June 28, 1940, these territories became part of the USSR.
Stalin demanded from the Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) consent to the entry of Red Army garrisons into major cities. The Balts, unlike other countries, perfectly understood the significance of the victory of the Red Army in Finland and did not object. And soon the workers here demanded to join the USSR, and these countries became part of the USSR in 1940: Lithuania - August 3, Latvia - August 5, Estonia - August 6.
As a result, the USSR came into direct contact with Germany along the entire western border. This made it possible in the event of war to immediately transfer military operations to German territory, but also created a serious danger of a sudden German attack on the USSR.

In the USSR, with the help of Western countries, intensive production of military equipment continued. Ammunition for all types of weapons was produced in unimaginable quantities: shells, bombs, mines, grenades, cartridges. Huge batches were produced of light tanks T-26 (under an English license), which made up the bulk of Soviet tanks, and high-speed wheeled-tracked light tanks BT (according to American technology) - for swift raids along the highways of Europe. Factories produced in large quantities the latest and best guns, howitzers and mortars in the world.
The Red Army, the only one in the world, had powerful all-terrain tanks running on hardly flammable diesel fuel: invulnerable heavy tanks KV, medium tanks T-34, light tanks T-50, amphibious tanks T-37 and T-40, high-speed wheeled-tracked tanks BT -7m, which on European motorways developed speeds of up to 140 km / h on wheels. For comparison: in addition to the USSR, England had heavy tanks "Matilda", but they could only move on level ground and could not climb a single hill, and their armor on rivets was loosened by shells and fell off.
The USSR began mass production of modern aircraft. The Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3 fighters were not inferior to the German Messerschmitts, Focke-Wulfs and Heinkels. The fully armored attack aircraft Il-2, the "flying tank", had no analogues in the world at all. The Pe-2 front-line bomber remained the best in the world until the end of the war. The DB-3F (IL-4) long-range bomber was superior to all German bombers. The Pe-8 strategic bomber had no equal in the world. On it, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, flew twice through Germany to England and the USA and back during the war, and the German air defense forces did not notice him.
Gunsmiths have developed the world's best and easiest-to-manufacture Shpagin submachine guns (PPSh) - the most massive in the Red Army; Degtyarev (PPD); Goryunova (PPG); Sudayev (PPS) - recognized as the best in the 2nd World War - which any bed workshop could produce, and prepared their mass production. One such production of PPSh began to operate before the war in Zagorsk (ZEMZ, - "Skobyanka").
For the first time in the world, RS rockets were developed for aviation, with which all fighters and attack aircraft were armed. On June 21, 1941, a fundamentally new weapon was adopted by the Red Army: ground-based multiple launch rocket launchers BM-13 (caliber 130 mm) and BM-8 (caliber 68 mm), the famous Katyushas.
At the urgent request of Prime Minister Churchill, with the unspoken pressure of the United States, I.V. Stalin finally agreed to open a Second Front against Hitler in July 1941 if the Wehrmacht attacked England. Stalin began to concentrate troops near our Western border, the Red Army was gathering gigantic forces for offensive operations. However, this concentration of the Red Army at the eastern border of Germany alarmed Hitler. In July 1940, he issued an order to develop a plan for war with the USSR. In December 1940 this Barbarossa plan was ready. Hitler began to prepare a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR and to gather troops to our border. The real competition has gone ahead.
Hitler won the competition, because our General Staff, headed by G.K. Zhukov, was blindly guided by Stalin's statement that Hitler would not dare to start a war on two fronts. But Stalin is not a military man, but a politician. G.K. Zhukov, as a strategist ex officio, was obliged to convince Stalin or at least on his own initiative to prepare measures for the defense of the country. But this did not happen, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army did not dare to object to Stalin and only agreed with him. The Red Army did not prepare for defense at all. As a result, on June 22, 1941, Hitler delivered an unexpected blow to the Red Army, which was practically all on the move - on the march, in echelons. This blow turned out to be crushing and ultimately fatal for the USSR.

So, what happened after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed? Despite the great friendship, the joint partition of Poland, and the subsequent actions of the Soviet Union in relation to Finland and the Baltic states, it was quite obvious that each of the opposing sides was striving to use the remaining time to build up the material and technical base, military muscles.

It is worth noting that the Soviet Union used this time very, very effectively. That is, for the period from 1939 - summer 1941 to the beginning of the war, according to Soviet historiography, we produced about 18 thousand combat aircraft, not counting those that were produced before 1939. The numbers regarding tank production are even more impressive. The total number of them approached 26 thousand, of which there were 9998 T-26 units, BT - 7519, T-28 - 481, T-35 - 59, T-37 of various modifications - about 6 thousand, T-40 - 132, T -34 - 1225 pieces and "Klimenty Voroshilov" (KV) - 636 cars. This was the potential of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

To strike at the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht managed to allocate 3932 tanks and 266 assault guns. Moreover, we note that in 1941 the Germans managed to produce only 3094 tanks of all types, including 678 Czech light tanks.

What was it? The classic formulation that was used in Soviet times was that all our tanks were hopelessly outdated, useless, except for the T-34 and KV. However, there is a certain figure of cunning here, because if we consider what the tank units of the Wehrmacht were armed with, the picture emerges very, very curious.

At the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht was armed with a significant number of not even tanks, but T-I tankettes, which weighed only 5.5 tons and were armed with machine guns; T-II tanks, which weighed 9 tons and had a 20-mm automatic cannon and, as our veterans recalled, could not withstand a heavy machine gun bullet. There was simply no question of them surviving after being hit by at least a 37-mm projectile. As a matter of fact, these tanks were originally created as training tanks. Later, during the war, they were used in counterguerrilla and patrol operations. And such equipment made up a good half of what the Wehrmacht had at the time of the start of the war.

A Wehrmacht soldier near a burned-out Soviet T-34 tank, 1941

In addition, the Wehrmacht had a certain number of Czech tanks, which the German tankers were very fond of, because they were better than the T-I and T-II. These are Skoda LT vz.35 tanks, which had a weight of 10 tons, a crew of four and more or less decent armor. This tank could withstand a 20 mm shell, but anything larger was already deadly for it. The Germans had 218 such tanks. In addition, there were Czech tanks LT vz.38, which were of a later release, with a weight of about 10 tons; their armor was a little more, but by December 10, 1941, the last LT vz.38 was disabled, and in the future all such tanks (those that survived) were used by the Germans, as already mentioned, for counterguerrilla and patrol purposes.

As for decent equipment that could be called a tank, these were the T-IIIs, which were in service with the Panzerwaffe. The weight of this tank was 19.5 tons, at first it was armed with a 37-mm cannon, then with a 50-mm short-barreled one.

This tank became, so to speak, a draft horse, which during the first years of the war on its backbone took out everything and everything that fell to the lot of the Panzerwaffe, although these vehicles could not be compared with our later tanks. There were 1,440 such tanks at the disposal of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war. And, in fact, they managed to allocate 965 vehicles to the Soviet front.

Not a single French captured tank was in service with the Panzerwaffe

Well, the most formidable machine, which was lighter than the T-34 and which for some reason we call a “heavy tank”, was the T-IV. The T-IV appeared in 1938, it was armed with a short 75 mm gun, and it really was a vehicle capable of providing some more or less serious resistance to our tanks, although it was also inferior in its parameters to what we had.

Of course, one can endlessly list which tanks the Germans got from the French as trophies, but these vehicles were simply not suitable for any purpose other than for training tasks. There was a very interesting trend in the production of armaments in Germany after the end of the "Strange War". As Halder noted in his memoirs, the word "impossible" ceased to exist for the high command of the Wehrmacht and, accordingly, the political leadership of Germany in general. That is, a period of some euphoria and hatred began, which, in general, later acquired quite pronounced consequences.

As for the Soviet Union, the actions of Germany in Poland and the lightning defeat of the French army, which at the time of the outbreak of the war was not the weakest, having more than 3 thousand tanks at its disposal, showed that the enemy was very, very serious and should be treated with a certain, if not reverence, then with the awareness of the degree of danger that he represents. Accordingly, in the Soviet Union in 1939-1941, active research and development work was carried out in almost all areas of the creation of equipment and weapons. You can endlessly repeat and sing the praises of the T-34 and KV tanks, but, indeed, at the beginning of the war, these vehicles had no equal in any country in the world and until 1943 were (undoubtedly) out of competition. And I must say that if in 1941 there were not so many of them, somewhere a little more than 1.5 thousand, then already in 1942 the Soviet industry produced 24718 tanks, of which T-34s were 12.5 thousand pieces.

Soviet I-16 fighters captured by the Germans at the airfield, 1941

The work really went on, as they say, at an accelerated pace, and the development of tanks capable of withstanding the hit of anti-tank and tank guns was quite successful. You can bring a lot of reservations and a certain unwillingness of the military to be loaded with the adoption of new equipment (quite often this was faced with a conservative approach), nevertheless, these tanks began to enter the military units. The question is, how were they used in 1941?..

As for aviation, there was also quite active work going on here. There were several aviation schools that created aircraft in the Soviet Union. This is the school of Nikolai Polikarpov, the "king of fighters" of the 30s, who built the I-15, I-16, I-153 (quite a curious car, a biplane with retractable landing gear, which has outlived itself even at the moment when it was born ), I-180, I-185 (later developments). During the testing of these aircraft, Valery Chkalov died, which led Nikolai Polikarpov to a certain career decline. Indirectly, this was imputed to him, and work on these aircraft, unfortunately, was stopped, although the characteristics of such a machine as the I-185, it must be said, were outstanding.

The forces of the Soviet Union by the summer of 1941 were the largest army in the world

A group of young designers: Yakovlev, Lavochkin, Gorbunov, Gudkov and Mikoyan also created fighters. The undisputed leader was Yakovlev, Stalin's favorite, who built the Yak-1 aircraft. In his book Time, People, Aircraft, test pilot Rabkin provides documents on the state of the Yak-1, as well as the LAG-1 (later LAG-3), and the MiG-1 (MiG-3) were taken on armament. Perhaps the most horrifying picture was with the Yakovlev machine. The number of defects on the aircraft exceeded 120 positions, including failures of carburetors, generator, engine overheating, defects in the cooling system, oil and water, and much, much more. As a matter of fact, the history of the birth of such aircraft as the Yak-1 and LAG-1 is quite curious.

The fact is that on both planes there was the same propeller group - a French-made Hispano-Suiza engine, bought under license. It has been in production with the French since 1936, and by the time the license was purchased, the engine was named M-105 (subsequently there was also a modification of the M-107, super-forced and unviable). In fact, the French removed this engine from production, replacing it with a more efficient one. In a word, such a "new" engine was installed on Yakovlev's aircraft and on Lavochkin's aircraft of the first generation.

Yakovlev's plane was a structure made of metal tubes, covered with fabric, sometimes with plywood, and in terms of its characteristics was in many respects close to a sports aircraft. His survivability factor was relatively small, but due to the fact that fabric was used, he was quite light.

As for the Lavochkin aircraft, it was made of delta wood, plywood, and had greater survivability, but also more weight, for which the pilots during the war called the LAG-1 "a guaranteed flying coffin", because the car did not have sufficient maneuverability . And if we add to this the problems with carburetors and many others that were encountered on these aircraft, then, in general, one can imagine how difficult it was for our pilots to fight on them.

Wehrmacht unit at a Catholic service before the invasion of the USSR, 1941. Photo by: Alois Beck

A very interesting machine was the Mikoyan MiG-1, later the MiG-3, which was discontinued in 1941. It's also a vague and incomprehensible story. German test pilot Hans-Werner Lerche, who was responsible for testing captured Soviet aircraft in Germany, noted the very high performance of the MiG-3 in 1941 and even 1942. The fact is that this machine developed about 640 km / h, while the later modifications of the Messerschmitt Bf.109 developed only 600. Nevertheless, the MiG was discontinued. It was believed that this machine was rather strict in piloting, that it had insufficiently powerful weapons, and the main thesis, which is given in Yakovlev's memoirs, is that the aircraft had an engine for flying at high altitudes. The same test pilot Rabkin refutes Yakovlev, saying that the altitude of an aircraft is determined by how its fuel system, carburetors are set up, and how the mixture is enriched or lean. That is, the MiG-3 could also be made an aircraft for fighting at medium and low altitudes. And by the way, Alexander Pokryshkin, who started the war on the MiG-3, despite its declared high-altitude characteristics, quite coped with this aircraft and used it very effectively at low altitudes in battles with the Messerschmitt Bf.109.

Thus, the total number of our aviation at the time of the outbreak of the war was very, very impressive. The total number of aircraft in the Red Army Air Force fleet was approaching the number of tanks in tank fleets. At the same time, the Il-2 aircraft was developed and brought to production - a very ambiguous machine, the most massive in our aviation. Almost 40% of the pilots who died during the war are IL-2 pilots, who had the most bitter bread: they plowed the front line and, accordingly, died more often than all other aces. According to statistics, IL-2 shooters were killed seven times more often than pilots. That is, before one Il-2 pilot died, he changed seven shooters.

By the beginning of the war, our aviation numbered somewhere under 30 thousand aircraft. It would seem that a huge mass of equipment and weapons ... Torpedo boats were built in large quantities, as a cheap, economical and, with reasonable use, an effective means of combating naval targets. Produced under a German license 85-mm guns (essentially an analogue of the famous 88-mm guns), guns of other calibers. That is, the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union worked at full speed, and by the time Germany attacked our country, we had a huge numerical superiority in technology. We were many times superior to the Wehrmacht, Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe.

Quality was on the side of Germany, quantity was on the side of the USSR

As for the use of this technique, this is the other, reverse side of the issue. The fact is that it is not enough to produce a lot of weapons, you must also be able to use them. As many of our pilots and tankers wrote in their memoirs, in the units there was a struggle to save fuel and lubricants, firing was carried out extremely rarely, but things were very well done with chores, with all kinds of political classes, lectures, seminars, marching and other completely " necessary" in the preparation of the armed forces affairs. A quote comes to mind from Eike Mitteldorf, an officer of the Wehrmacht General Staff, who wrote an army operating manual, which, among other things, says that soldiers should do minimal drill training in order to be able to decently walk in the ranks. Of the 16 hours of daily training in the Wehrmacht, most of the time was devoted to practicing tactics, shooting and other activities necessary for survival on the battlefield.

This picture was emerging by June 1941. At the same time, interestingly, each of the opposing sides had its own euphoria: ours, because we had a huge technical fleet, the Germans, because they managed to pass half of Europe with small forces and it seemed that this would go on forever. However, the events that began to take place in the summer of 1941 and in subsequent years showed that a quantitative superiority is by no means always a guarantee of success, while a qualitative superiority is not always a guarantee of victory.