The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet servicemen, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, exacerbated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military spending unbearable for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.
The real causes of the war were the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth at the expense of the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.
Since the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form in the region, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which began to spread in excess everywhere. The political rift in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow erroneously imagined, but along religious lines.
The entry of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States as the arena of some “big” zero-sum superpower game.
The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow's misunderstanding of its national interests, incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political short-sightedness.
Afghanistan showed the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy to the real state of affairs in the world.
The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by growing instability in the Middle East, which was the result of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes an uproar in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a pretext for an armed conflict and finds it in a war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (senior), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Turkey's centre-left government resigns.
The situation is also radicalizing in peripheral Afghanistan. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.
The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent, relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. In all the decades that have passed since then, there is no mention of Afghanistan in a negative context in Soviet history. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West has tacitly acknowledged this fact and has never been interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from a monarchy to a republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.
The April "revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) worked closely with them.
It seemed that Moscow had nothing to lose from regime change. However, the "socialists" repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures provoked resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the "socialists" was steadily shrinking. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began to send groups of their servicemen in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as to support the opposition with weapons. China has been active. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the "socialists" intensified.
As a result, a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more out of 34 provinces remained under its control.
On March 18, 1979, Taraki, in a lengthy telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government, A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and insistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. Despair, the consciousness of hopelessness, comes through in every word of Taraki. He returns each question of the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send troops.
For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin wonders why, they say, you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin's naive, ideologically motivated proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet premier proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.
Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov almost the same thing.
On the same day, Kosygin informs his colleagues in the Politburo about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly sensible considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean war on the population. There seems to be a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, and so on. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin suggested to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send troops. Then it was necessary to answer the question: what to do in the event of an inevitable fall of the regime, about which the regime itself warns? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of waiting and situational decisions. There is no strategy.
In the Politburo, 3 groups are gradually distinguished: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The ailing Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on problems that need to be addressed. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making appropriate decisions.
During the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increase pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help the troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.
By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, are heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin takes place in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power, removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.
Since that time, Moscow has set itself the goal of achieving the removal of Amin, whom it does not trust, to bring to power "its" man - Karmal, and to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these actions, in themselves reasonable, but committed without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.
Around October-November, the issues of a special operation by the Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, which should be covered by the second, parallel and subordinate to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with the support of Amin among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives were replaced with new ones, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin.
By December 1, the study of issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the introduction of troops is made.
Before the final decision was made, he was actively resisted by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to his open clashes and squabbles in raised tones with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and heavy losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.
The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.
Introduction
Afghan war 1979-1989 - An armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to preserve the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.
Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a little curtain in this war, namely, the causes and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.
Reason for hostilities
The main reason for the war was foreign intervention in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was the result of a power struggle between the government of Afghanistan and numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy the political and financial support of the leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.
The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the "April Revolution" - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.
As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, the leader of which was in 1978. Nur Mohammad Taraki (was killed on the orders of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would make it possible to overcome the backlog of Afghanistan ran into resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war broke out in Afghanistan.
Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. The unrest in the country and the strife between the supporters of Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics), pushed the Soviet leadership to enter in December 1979 troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, without a formal decision on this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
In March 1979, during the mutiny in the city of Herat, the first request from the Afghan leadership for direct Soviet military intervention followed. But the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.
However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Afghan border, and by order of the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing in Afghanistan by the landing method of the 105th Guards Airborne Division. The number of Soviet advisers (including military ones) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.
The impetus for the intervention of the USSR was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the Mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on covert assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.
On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.
The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan, and the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense purposes was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov issued an order to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would become garrisons and guard important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active operations against opposition groups, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed over the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high mountain pass Salang on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. Paratroopers of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. were the first to land on the Kabul airfield. Shpak.
The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. Entering troops is not easy; During the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.
USSR on the eve of the Afghan war
A few decades later, looking to the past, one can name a number of reasons that ultimately led to the collapse of a huge and powerful country - the USSR. Attitudes towards this country today can be different, for some it is negative, for some it is positive, someone talks about the fate of the Soviet empire from a scientific point of view, but, probably, there is not a single person indifferent to this grandiose formation . In this regard, consideration of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR is seen as a particularly relevant topic. Yes, the collapse of the country is usually associated with reasons that lie on the surface, associated with exorbitant costs in the arms race, lower energy prices, the restructuring that was started and such an unsuccessful one, with the general rottenness of the entire system. However, by and large, these processes, which, of course, became the objective factors of the collapse, were just a consequence. The result of a deep systemic crisis and mistakes that took place back in the "golden" Brezhnev era. Speaking about Brezhnev's policy, two major miscalculations of the Secretary General can be distinguished. The first is the curtailment of the Kosygin reform, which revived the country's planned economy, and the rejection of which became one of the main reasons for the stagnation in the economy and its complete dependence on oil exports. The second gravest miscalculation, which in the late 80s became literally a living symbol of the impending collapse of the USSR, was the decision to invade Afghanistan. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan contributed to the deepening of the crisis in the economy, which ultimately became an important factor in the collapse of the country.
Reasons for the invasion
Afghanistan - a country located on the borders of the Central Asian republics of the USSR - became a restless point in the late 70s. In 1978, a coup d'etat took place in the country, in which the government of the USSR played an important role. The result of this was the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. However, soon the new government in the country began to lose the threads of control. Amin, who tried to plant communist ideals in Islamic Afghanistan, was quickly losing authority in society, an internal conflict was brewing in the country, and the Kremlin itself was not happy with Amin, who began to look more and more towards the United States. Under these conditions, the government of the USSR began to search for a person who would suit him at the head of Afghanistan. The choice fell on the opposition Amin Babrak Karmal, who at that time was in Czechoslovakia. The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, therefore, are largely related to a possible change in the country's foreign policy vector. Having identified a new leader for the neighboring country, the USSR, after a series of consultations between Brezhnev, Marshal Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, proceeded to intervene in the country.
Invasion and the course of the war
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on December 25, 1979. Two days later, special forces groups organized an assault on the presidential palace, during which Amin was killed, after which power was transferred to Karmal. Initially, a small contingent was introduced into the country. However, the country soon became one of the hottest spots in the East. Having occupied the whole country, the Soviet troops nevertheless could not establish constitutional order here. Mujahideen detachments opposed what was actually an occupation. Soon the whole country began to fight against the presence of Soviet troops, and each village turned into a stronghold of resistance. In addition, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan complicated the country's international position. The policy of détente in US-Soviet relations was frustrated; moreover, Afghan fighters began to receive weapons and funding from Washington, and Afghanistan itself turned into a typical Cold War training ground.
End of hostilities
Year after year, and the situation in Afghanistan did not improve, a number of brilliant operations of the Soviet army, such as, for example, a galaxy of Panjshir operations, could not bring the main thing - a change of mood in Afghan society. The inhabitants of the country were categorically opposed to the ideology of the Soviets, and the Mujahideen were gaining more and more popularity. The losses of the Soviet troops grew, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan provoked a noticeable increase in military spending, an increase in discontent in society, by the way, the intervention also became the reason for the boycott by many countries of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow. The tacit defeat of the superpower was becoming obvious. As a result, in February 1989, the inglorious campaign of the Soviet army ended: the last soldier left the country on February 15. Despite the fact that this war can be called a failure, the Soviet warrior confirmed his skills, stamina, heroism and courage. During the war, the USSR lost more than 13,000 people killed. The country's economic losses were also significant. About 800 million dollars were allocated annually to support the puppet government, and the provision of the army cost 3 billion. Thus, this confirms the thesis that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan worsened the state of affairs in the country's economy, and eventually became one of the reasons for its systemic crisis.
What were the prerequisites or interests of the USSR for bringing a limited contingent of Soviet armed forces into Afghanistan?
When did the Soviet armed forces fight in Afghanistan and how did it all end?
Afghan stalemate
On December 25, 1979, the USSR entered the last war in its history. It was officially announced that on December 24, 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Ustinov D.F. Directive No. 312/12/001 was signed, stating that some of the units of the Central Asian and Turkestan military districts will be introduced into the DRA in order to provide assistance to the friendly people of Afghanistan and create conditions there that make any hostile actions impossible on the part of states bordering the DRA.
The history of tender friendship between the two neighboring states dates back to 1919, when Soviet Russia was the first in the world to recognize the independence of Afghanistan and provided military and economic support. Which, however, did not help. Afghanistan, as it was, and remains a poor feudal country, "stuck" in the Middle Ages. What Soviet specialists managed to build, for example, the airport in Kabul, highways, everything remained the same.
On April 27, 1978, the Saur took place, proclaiming Afghanistan a Democratic Republic. Armed Islamic terrorists, unrest in the army, intra-party squabbles - these factors did not contribute to the authority of the people's government. The events taking place in Afghanistan were closely watched in Moscow. The commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee that direct intervention would have negative consequences. Having received about twenty requests for help from Kabul, the “Kremlin elders” were in no hurry to respond.
The decision to bring in a limited contingent of Soviet troops was made at a secret meeting only on December 12, 1979. Chief of Staff Ogarkov N.V. was the only one who was against this decision. And the participation of our troops in the battles with the Mujahideen was not envisaged, they were entrusted with the functions of protection. The mission was supposed to be short-term.
The reasons for the introduction of Soviet troops, in fact, were not a secret to the world community. Territorially, Afghanistan's neighbor was Pakistan, which was created not so long ago, and accepted American assistance, expressed in financial support, the presence of military specialists, and the supply of weapons. Afghanistan was supposed to become a "layer" to prevent the appearance of Americans dangerously close to the Soviet borders. Each of the superpowers, the USSR and the USA, sacredly guarded its geopolitical interests, spreading its influence to the largest number of potential supporters.
On December 25, 1979, at 15:00, the 4th Battalion of the 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya. The countdown has begun.
The entire history of the war can be divided into several periods. About 50 thousand military personnel and civilian specialists were immediately sent to Afghanistan, so the first 2-3 months were engaged in their deployment. Active hostilities began in March 1980 and lasted about five years. At the beginning of April 1985, military operations were carried out mainly by units of government troops and the people's militia, while Soviet troops provided support with artillery, aviation and sapper units. A partial withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan is being prepared. Since January 1987, a policy of national reconciliation has been pursued. Preparations for the complete withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent began on May 15, 1988. General Gromov B.V., commander of the 40th Army, was the last to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. For Soviet soldiers, the war was over.
The losses among the Soviet military personnel were calculated, which amounted to 13,833 people during the hostilities of 1979-1989. Ten years later, more accurate figures of irretrievable losses appeared: among the military personnel of the Soviet Army - 14,427 people, KGB officers - 576 people, and Interior Ministry employees - 28 people. 417 people are considered missing or captured.
The exact number of Afghans who died during the war has not yet been named. There are such figures in the press - 5 million became refugees, and one and a half million Afghans died.
Now consider economic losses. Every year, 800 million "evergreen" US dollars were allocated from the country's budget to support the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The cost of maintaining the 40th Army and conducting military operations amounted to 3 billion US dollars annually.
And in what units can one calculate the mortal horror of parents whose children ended up serving in Afghanistan? How many decaliters of tears did mothers shed when they buried their boys in zinc coffins? How much energy will a crippled 20-year-old boy need to live on? But with 99% certainty, it can be argued that the Afghan war was the biggest mistake of the “Kremlin wise men”, which accelerated the collapse of the USSR.
With the onset of the Khrushchev thaw in the Soviet Union, a number of serious socio-political changes were outlined, which were supposed to overturn the established opinion about the USSR as a country with a totalitarian regime. Despite the fact that many of the innovations and reforms being introduced into the socio-political life of the country outwardly looked reformist and democratic, the essence of the Soviet system of government did not change. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union also remained unchanged, aimed at expanding spheres of influence and retaining the positions it had won. The methods of foreign policy influence on the policy of satellite countries and political regimes in third world countries have also been preserved. Every means was used, from political blackmail to threats of military force.
In the late 60s of the XX century, Czechoslovakia fully felt all the charm of the love of the Soviet Union and the care of the brothers in the socialist camp. This country, despite the socialist path of development, made an attempt to follow its own path of development. The result of such courage was an acute political crisis that broke out in the country, which ended with an armed invasion - the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.
The beginning of Operation Danube - the end of fraternal friendship
August is one of the iconic months for history, especially in the turbulent 20th century. This month, with chronological accuracy, significant events take place that have an impact on the subsequent course of history, changing the fate of peoples. In 1968, the month of August was no exception. Late at night on August 21, 1968, one of the largest military operations since 1945 began in Europe, code-named "Danube".
The scene of action was the Central European state of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which until that moment had been one of the main pillars of the socialist camp. As a result of the invasion of the troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia was occupied. The Prague Spring, a revolutionary period in the history of the country, was stifled through the use of brute military force. All the reforms that were carried out in the country and were of a revolutionary nature were curtailed. The military intervention in Czechoslovakia became a serious crack that split the unity of the socialist camp.
It cannot be said that the socialist front was united in this impulse. Protest and disagreement with the methods pursued were expressed by those countries that tried to pursue a balanced foreign policy, distancing themselves from the excessive patronage of the USSR. Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania opposed the entry of troops of the ATS armies into Czechoslovakia. The leadership of Albania in general after these events took a course towards withdrawing from the membership of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact Countries.
From a technical point of view, the operation "Danube" can be considered a model of tactical and strategic planning. The territory of the country was occupied by large military contingents in just three days. Even taking into account the fact that the invasion troops did not meet organized resistance from the Czechoslovak People's Army, the losses during such a large-scale operation were extremely small. The Soviet units participating in the Danube operation lost 36 people killed and wounded, excluding non-combat losses. The occupation of Czechoslovakia for the civilian population was not so peaceful. 108 people became victims of direct armed clashes with the occupying forces, more than half a thousand were injured.
Not without a provocation in this case. In addition to the fact that troops ready for the invasion were concentrated on the borders of Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the operation had to be carried out secretly and covertly. At the airport of the Czechoslovak capital, a Soviet passenger plane made an emergency landing at night, from the cabin of which, to the surprise of the personnel of the airfield service, armed paratroopers began to land. After the capture group captured all the main nodes and control points of the airport, Soviet transport aircraft began to land on the runway one after another. Soviet transport planes loaded with military equipment and soldiers arrived every 30 seconds. From that moment on, the fate of the Prague Spring was sealed.
At the same time, after receiving a signal about the successful start of the operation, Soviet troops, army units of the National People's Army of Germany, units and mechanized units of the Polish Army, the People's Army of Bulgaria and Hungary invaded the territory of Czechoslovakia. The invasion was carried out from three directions. Columns of the NNA and the Polish Army were coming from the North. Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia from the East through Transcarpathia. The troops of the Hungarian People's Army and parts of the Bulgarian army advanced from the southern flank. Thus the "rebellious republic" was gripped by dense steel tongs.
It is important to note that at the very last moment, the army units of the German Democratic Republic were excluded from participating in the invasion. The Soviet leadership did not want to have an analogy with the Wehrmacht invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. German troops were ordered to stop at the border, being in constant combat readiness. The Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian units performed an auxiliary function, controlling the peripheral regions of the country and a section of the border between Czechoslovakia and Austria. The main tasks in the course of Operation Danube were solved by Soviet troops, which were consolidated into two fronts - Carpathian and Central. The total number of Soviet troops involved in the invasion was about 200 thousand soldiers and officers.
In tactical terms, the Soviet Union allocated large forces to participate in Operation Danube. In total, 18 Soviet divisions took part in the operation, including tank, airborne and motorized rifle divisions. From the air, the troops had serious air support. There were 22 regiments of helicopter and aviation units of front-line aviation alone. Unprecedented was the number of Soviet tanks, approximately 5000 vehicles used for the operation! The total number of army units and subdivisions of the armed forces of the countries participating in Operation Danube amounted to about half a million people.
The motive that guided the leaders of the countries that took part in the invasion is interesting. The Prague Spring was declared an attempt by the counter-revolutionary forces to take revenge, the purpose of which was to eliminate the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people. In this connection, the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp are compelled to come to the aid of the people of fraternal Czechoslovakia in defending their gains.
The true causes of the conflict
Since the end of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia has been the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union. To ensure the strength of the socialist camp, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) were created. All this was supposed to keep the countries and states of a socialist orientation in the orbit of the political influence of the USSR. Based on this, any changes in the political structure of state administration, changes in the foreign policy of the allied countries caused a sharp reaction in the Kremlin. The events in Hungary in 1956 are vivid confirmation of this. Even then, the Soviet Union had to use force to suppress the outbreak of popular unrest.
By 1968, Czechoslovakia found itself in a similar situation. By this time, a difficult domestic political situation had matured in the country, seriously shaking the hegemony of the ruling Czechoslovak Communist Party. Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, A. Novotny, replaced the faithful Soviet course of development. His main political position was based on a radical renewal of party policy regarding the management of the socio-political life of the country and the economy.
The first steps in this direction looked optimistic. Censorship was weakened, the policy of doing business in the country was simplified. The country stood on the threshold of cardinal economic reforms. At first glance, the declared position looked progressive and modern, however, according to the curators from Moscow, such steps could cause a gradual departure of Czechoslovakia from the socialist path of development. In the intentions of the Czechoslovak communists, the Soviet leaders saw a desire to follow a rapprochement with the West. They were not going to silently contemplate what was happening in the Soviet Union, so a long diplomatic game began. The leaders of the GDR and Poland supported the unrest and feelings of the Soviet leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia. The leaders of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Socialist Republic of Romania, Josif Broz Tito, Enver Hoxha and Nicolae Ceausescu, spoke out against interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, as well as in the future against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia.
By the way: The last two leaders later became dictators and managed to stay in power for a significant period. Enver Hoxha died a natural death in 1985. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was convicted by a military tribunal and shot as a result of the 1989 revolution.
The events that took place in Czechoslovakia in those days could have an extremely negative impact on the socio-political life of neighboring countries. The situation in Poland was restless. Hungary has not yet forgotten the events of 12 years ago. The slogan declared by the Czechoslovak communists - "Let's build socialism with a human face" undermined the basic foundations of the socialist system. The liberal policy pursued by the party leadership of Czechoslovakia, in its goals and objectives, diverged from the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Czechoslovak experiment could become a detonator that could provoke a subsequent chain reaction in the socialist camp. This could not be allowed either in the Kremlin or in other capitals of the Eastern European socialist states.
Goals and methods of pressure on Czechoslovakia
The Soviet leadership, having fresh memories of the events in Hungary in 1956, made every effort to resolve the Czechoslovak crisis in a peaceful manner. Initially there was a game of giveaway. The Soviets were willing to make significant political concessions to the new Czechoslovak leadership in exchange for adherence to the ideals of socialist internationalism and a restrained policy towards the West. The military aspect was not considered at first. Czechoslovakia was an important element of the united strategy of the Warsaw Pact, an active participant in the CMEA, and a major economic partner of the USSR. According to the party leadership of the USSR, the use of military force against their main ally was unacceptable. This option was considered as the most extreme case, when all the mechanisms and means of a peaceful political settlement would be exhausted.
Despite the fact that most members of the Politburo spoke out against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the military received clear directions for the development of a strategic operation for the invasion of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia. The subsequent information that Czechoslovakia was not going to make concessions in its position only convinced the Soviet leadership of the timeliness of preparatory operations. An extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is scheduled for September 9. On August 16, the Politburo decided by a majority vote to use the armed forces to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion in the fraternal republic.
In order to whitewash itself in the eyes of the socialist community and distribute responsibility to other political players, the Soviet leadership deliberately held a meeting of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on August 18. The leaders of the Eastern European countries present at the meeting supported the initiative of the Soviet leadership.
The official version for the provision of military assistance was the appeal of a group of public and party leaders of the Communist Party to the Central Committee of the CPSU to other fraternal parties with a request for military-political international assistance. The appeal hinted at the counter-revolutionary activities of the current party leadership of Czechoslovakia and the need to urgently change the leadership of the country by any means. For the Czechoslovak side, preparations for the introduction of troops did not come as a surprise. The Ministry of Defense of Czechoslovakia, other party leaders of the country were informed that a large-scale military-police action was planned.
Finally
Naturally, 50 years after the well-known events, we can say with confidence that there was no counter-revolutionary rebellion in Czechoslovakia. Communists were in power in the country, civil society was loyal to the leading role of the party in the development of the state. The only thing you can focus on is the different approaches to achieving the goal. The course of reforms declared by the Czechoslovak leadership in its content is very reminiscent of the events that took place in the Soviet Union 20 years later, during Perestroika.
