Polish uprising of 1830-1831. they call the rebellion organized by the nobility and the Catholic clergy in the Kingdom of Poland and the neighboring provinces of the Russian Empire.

The rebellion was aimed at separating the Kingdom of Poland from Russia and tearing away from Russia its original western lands, which were part of the 16th-18th centuries. part of the former Commonwealth. The constitution granted by Emperor Alexander I to the Kingdom (Kingdom) of Poland in 1815 granted Poland broad sovereign rights. The Kingdom of Poland was a sovereign state that was part of the Russian Empire and associated with it by a personal union. The All-Russian Emperor was at the same time the Tsar (King) of Poland. The Kingdom of Poland had its own bicameral parliament - the Sejm, as well as its own army. The Sejm of the Kingdom of Poland was solemnly opened in 1818 by Emperor Alexander I, who hoped to receive in his person proof of the possibility of the peaceful development of the Polish nation within the framework of the Empire as a link connecting Russia with Western Europe. But in subsequent years, the implacable anti-government opposition intensified in the Seimas.

In the 1820s in the Kingdom of Poland, in Lithuania and on the Right-Bank Ukraine, secret conspiratorial, Masonic societies arose, which began to prepare an armed rebellion. Guards Lieutenant P. Vysotsky in 1828 founded a union of officers and students of military schools and entered into an agreement with other secret societies. The uprising was scheduled for the end of March 1829 and timed to coincide with the proposed coronation of Nicholas I as the king of Poland. But the coronation took place safely in May 1829.

The July Revolution of 1830 in France gave rise to new hopes for the Polish "patriots". The immediate cause for the uprising was the news of the imminent dispatch of Russian and Polish troops to suppress the Belgian revolution. The viceroy in the Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was warned by the Polish ensign about the conspiracy existing in Warsaw, but did not attach any importance to this.

On November 17, 1830, a crowd of conspirators led by L. Nabelyak and S. Goszczyński broke into the Belvedere Palace, the Warsaw residence of the governor, and carried out a pogrom there, injuring several people from among the Grand Duke's close associates and servants. Konstantin Pavlovich managed to escape. On the same day, an uprising began in Warsaw, led by the secret gentry officer society of P. Vysotsky. The rebels seized the arsenal. Many Russian generals and officers who were in Warsaw were killed.

In the context of the outbreak of the rebellion, the behavior of the governor looked extremely strange. Konstantin Pavlovich considered the uprising a mere outburst of anger and did not allow the troops to come out to suppress it, saying that "the Russians have nothing to do in a fight." Then he sent home that part of the Polish troops, which at the beginning of the uprising still remained loyal to the authorities.

November 18, 1830 Warsaw passed into the hands of the rebels. With a small Russian detachment, the governor left Warsaw and left Poland. The powerful military fortresses of Modlin and Zamostye were surrendered to the rebels without a fight. A few days after the flight of the governor, the Kingdom of Poland was left by all Russian troops.

The Administrative Council of the Kingdom of Poland was transformed into the Provisional Government. The Sejm elected General Yu. Khlopitsky as commander-in-chief of the Polish troops and proclaimed him a "dictator", but the general refused dictatorial powers and, not believing in the success of the war with Russia, sent a delegation to Emperor Nicholas I. The Russian tsar refused to negotiate with the rebellious government and on January 5 1831 Khlopitsky resigned.

Prince Radziwill became the new Polish commander-in-chief. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm announced the deposition of Nicholas I - depriving him of the Polish crown. The National Government headed by Prince A. Czartoryski came to power. At the same time, the "revolutionary" Seimas refused to consider even the most moderate projects of agrarian reform and improving the situation of the peasants.

The national government was preparing to fight with Russia. The Polish army grew from 35 to 130 thousand people, although only 60 thousand of them could participate in hostilities with combat experience. But the Russian troops stationed in the western provinces were not ready for war. Here, the vast majority of military garrisons were the so-called. disabled teams. The number of Russian troops here reached 183 thousand people, but it took 3-4 months for their concentration. Field Marshal Count I.I. was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Dibich-Zabalkansky, and the chief of staff, General Count K.F. Tol.

Dibich hurried the troops. Without waiting for the concentration of all forces, without providing the army with food and not having time to equip the rear, on January 24-25, 1831, the commander-in-chief, together with the main forces, began an invasion of the Kingdom of Poland between the Bug and Narew rivers. A separate left column of General Kreutz was to occupy the Lublin Voivodeship in the south of the Kingdom and divert enemy forces. The spring thaw that began soon buried the original plan of the military campaign. On February 2, 1831, in the battle at Stochek, the Russian brigade of horse rangers under the command of General Geismar was defeated by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky. The battle between the main forces of the Russian and Polish troops took place on February 13, 1831 near Grokhov and ended with the defeat of the Polish army. But Dibich did not dare to continue the offensive, expecting a serious rebuff.

Soon Radziwill was replaced as commander-in-chief by General J. Skshinetsky, who managed to raise the morale of his troops after the defeat at Grokhov. The Russian detachment of Baron Kreutz crossed the Vistula, but was stopped by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky and retreated to Lublin, which was hastily abandoned by the Russian troops. The Polish command took advantage of the inaction of the main forces of the Russian troops and, trying to gain time, began peace negotiations with Dibich. Meanwhile, on February 19, 1831, Dvernitsky's detachment crossed the Vistula at Puławy, overthrew small Russian detachments and tried to invade Volhynia. The reinforcements that arrived there under the command of General Tol forced Dvernitsky to take refuge in Zamosc. A few days later, the Vistula cleared of ice and Dibich began to prepare a crossing to the left bank near Tyrchin. But the Polish detachments attacked the rear of the main forces of the Russian troops and thwarted their offensive.

In the areas adjacent to the Kingdom of Poland - Volhynia and Podolia, unrest broke out, an open rebellion broke out in Lithuania. Lithuania was guarded only by a weak Russian division (3200 people), stationed in Vilna. Dibić sent military reinforcements to Lithuania. In March, the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky set out from Zamosc and invaded Volhynia, but was stopped by the Russian detachment of F.A. Rediger and thrown back to the Austrian border, and then went to Austria, where he was disarmed. The Polish detachment of Hrshanovsky, who moved to help Dvernitsky, was met by a detachment of Baron Kreutz at Lyubartov and retreated to Zamosc.

However, successful attacks by small Polish units exhausted the main forces of Dibich. The actions of the Russian troops, moreover, were complicated by the cholera epidemic that broke out in April, there were about 5 thousand patients in the army.

In early May, the 45,000-strong Polish army of Skshinetsky launched an offensive against the 27,000-strong Russian guards corps, commanded by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, and threw it back to Bialystok - outside the Kingdom of Poland. Dibich did not immediately believe in the success of the Polish offensive against the guards, and only 10 days after it began, he threw the main forces against the rebels. On May 14, 1831, a new major battle took place at Ostroleka. The Polish army was defeated. The military council, assembled by Skshinetsky, decided to retreat to Warsaw. But a large detachment of the Polish general Gelgud (12 thousand people) was sent to the rear of the Russian army, to Lithuania. There he united with Khlapovsky's detachment and local bands of rebels, his numbers doubled. Russian and Polish forces in Lithuania were approximately equal.

On May 29, 1831, Dibich fell ill with cholera and died the same day. Command was temporarily taken over by General Tol. June 7, 1831 Gelgud attacked the Russian positions near Vilna, but was defeated and fled to the Prussian borders. Of the troops under his command, only the detachment of Dembinsky (3800 people) was able to break through from Lithuania to Warsaw. A few days later, the Russian troops of General Roth defeated the Polish gang of Pegs near Dashev and at the village. Maidanek, which led to the suppression of the rebellion in Volhynia. New attempts by Skshinetsky to move behind the lines of the Russian army failed.

On June 13, 1831, the new commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Field Marshal Count I.F., arrived in Poland. Paskevich-Erivansky. Near Warsaw was the 50,000th Russian army, it was opposed by 40,000 rebels. The Polish authorities declared a total militia, but the common people refused to shed blood for the power of the greedy gentry and fanatic priests.

Paskevich chose Osek near Torun, near the Prussian border, as the place of crossing to the left bank of the Vistula. From July 1, 1831, the Russians built bridges near Osek, along which the army safely crossed to the enemy coast. Skshinetsky did not dare to interfere with the crossing, but the dissatisfaction of the Warsaw society forced him to move towards the main Russian forces. Under their onslaught, the Polish troops rolled back to the capital. At the end of July, Skshinetsky was dismissed and Dembinsky became the new commander-in-chief of the Polish army, who wanted to give the Russians a decisive battle right at the walls of Warsaw.

On August 3, 1831, unrest broke out in Warsaw. The Seimas dissolved the old government, appointed General J. Krukovetsky as head of government (president) and endowed him with emergency rights. On August 6, Russian troops began to besiege Warsaw, and commander-in-chief Dembinsky was replaced by Malakhovych. Malakhovych again tried to attack the Russian rear in the north and east of the Kingdom of Poland. The Polish detachment of Romarino attacked the Russian troops of Baron Rosen, stationed on the Brest highway - east of Warsaw, and on August 19, 1831 pushed them back to Brest-Litovsk, but then hastily retreated to protect the capital.

Paskevich's troops, having received all the necessary reinforcements, numbered 86 thousand people, and the Polish troops near Warsaw - 35 thousand. In response to the proposal to surrender Warsaw, Krukovetsky stated that the Poles had raised an uprising in order to restore their fatherland within its ancient borders, i.e. . to Smolensk and Kyiv. On August 25, 1831, Russian troops stormed Wola, a suburb of Warsaw. On the night of August 26-27, 1831, Krukowiecki and the Polish troops in Warsaw capitulated.

The Polish army, leaving the capital, was supposed to arrive in the Plock Voivodeship in the north of the Kingdom in order to wait for the subsequent orders of the Russian emperor. But the members of the Polish government, who left Warsaw with their troops, refused to comply with Krukowiecki's decision to surrender. In September and October 1831, the remnants of the Polish army, which continued to resist, were expelled by Russian troops from the Kingdom to Prussia and Austria, where they were disarmed. The last to surrender to the Russians were the fortresses of Modlin (September 20, 1831) and Zamostye (October 9, 1831). The uprising was pacified, and the sovereign statehood of the Kingdom of Poland was liquidated. Count I.F. was appointed viceroy. Paskevich-Erivansky, who received the new title of Prince of Warsaw.

Bibliography

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://www.bestreferat.ru were used.

Political situation ¦ Forces of the parties ¦ Plans of military operations

In 1807 Napoleon founded the Duchy of Warsaw. It did not satisfy the expectations of the majority of Poles, who dreamed of Poland "from sea to sea" with the inclusion of Lithuania and Western Russia. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I formalized the annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia under the name of the Kingdom of Poland and granted it a constitution. Poland received the right to have its own army of 30,000. Moreover, the money for armaments, uniforms and food for this army was not issued from the treasury of the Kingdom, but from the sums of the empire.

Alexander's measures regarding Poland did not meet with sympathy among the Russians. The historian Karamzin even spoke harshly. “The tsar,” he wrote, “corrects the division of Poland by the division of Russia; with this he will cause applause, but plunge the Russians into despair; the restoration of Poland will either be the destruction of Russia, or the Russians will water Poland with their blood and once again take Prague by storm.”

“At one of the reviews,” Paskevich, who was then passing through Warsaw, says in his notes, “I go up to Count. Miloradovich and gr. Osterman-Tolstoy and I ask: “What will happen from this?” Osterman answered: “But what will happen - in 10 years you will storm Warsaw with your division.” The prediction came true.

Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish army, and the old veteran of the Polish army, General Zaionchek, who acted in complete accord with the Grand Duke, was appointed viceroy of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the post of vicegerent harbored the hope of taking Adam Czartoryski in such an influential post to achieve the cherished Polish goals. Struck by failure, Czartoryski took the position of trustee of the Vilna educational district and curator of Vilna University and, with his mother, Isabella, became the secret center of all Polish intrigue.

Then there was the time of Freemasonry, the Decembrist movement in Russia, the Carbonari in Italy, etc. The Kingdom of Poland and the Western Territory were quickly covered with a network of secret societies. The anarchy that reigned in the government of Poland for centuries, the right of confederations, which, as it were, gave the appearance of legality to every rebellion, gave a certain political education to the nation. The Poles were imbued with an indelible passion for conspiracies - this explains their constant readiness for reckless uprisings.

The center of revolutionary ideas in Lithuania was the Vilna University and churches, and in Ukraine, Volhynia and Podolia - the Kremenets Lyceum, founded by Count Chatsky. The chief propagandist in Vilna was the talented history professor Lelewel.

Of course, all this was known to the Russian government, but it either did not take any measures, or these measures were extremely unsuccessful. Since the annexation of Lithuania to Russia, nothing has been done to unite it with other parts of the empire. When it was reported that at Vilna University a professor of philosophy was lecturing in a revolutionary direction, the police captain was ordered to attend the lectures. In 1823, Czartoryski was replaced by Novosiltsev, and Lelewel was transferred to Warsaw, where he indulged in propaganda with even greater convenience.

The political mood of Poland was so clear to everyone that Nicholas I, leaving Warsaw in 1829 after being crowned Tsar of Poland, told the Empress that they were on a volcano that had been threatening to erupt for ten years. It is clear after that that the explosion of 1830 was not a surprise, and it is completely naive to assert that the revolution was made by lieutenants Vysotsky, Zalivsky and Urbanasy and the school of ensigns, “snots” (brats), as they were called by the Polish Minister of War Gauke.

The July Revolution of 1830 in Paris and the August Revolution in Brussels added fuel to the Polish fire. The last impetus for the uprising was the expulsion of Polish troops along with the Russians to suppress the revolution in Belgium. With the removal of the national troops, all hope for the success of the revolution disappeared, and therefore the Poles decided to act. Thus, for the sake of political dreams, unrealizable just because their implementation affected the interests of three powerful states (Russia, Austria and Prussia), which concluded the former Polish provinces, the institutions already granted and the material well-being of the country achieved under Russian rule were sacrificed, made such remarkable progress in 15 years that in the treasury, instead of the previous constant deficit, there was now free cash in the amount of 66 million zlotys (15 k.).

On the evening of November 17, the conspirators attacked the residence of the Tsarevich Belvedere. The Grand Duke, thanks to the valet Friese, escaped, and the Russian troops and part of the Polish gradually joined him and left the city on November 18 in the evening.

According to the Poles themselves, the uprising was easy to suppress at the very beginning, but the Tsarevich was confused. He kept saying that “every drop of blood spilled will only spoil the matter”, and released the Polish troops that remained loyal (these excellent regiments joined the rebels), retreated with the Russian detachment through Pulawy to Vlodava within the empire and surrendered the Lublin fortress to the Poles, which had of great strategic importance, and large artillery reserves, and Zamostye. The uprising spread throughout the region.

General Khlopitsky, a well-known veteran of the Napoleonic troops, a man with great military talents, a favorite of the troops and people, was declared the commander-in-chief of the Polish troops. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm declared the Romanov dynasty deprived of the Polish throne. Czartoryski, who openly became the head of the revolutionary government, entered into negotiations with foreign powers to provide assistance to the Poles. The calculations turned out to be wrong. For Austria and Prussia, the restoration of Poland was dangerous, the sovereign rejected the petitions of England and France, declaring that he considered the Polish question to be internal; other states could not exercise any influence.

The Poles responded to Nicholas's calls for obedience by demanding that the western provinces be annexed to the kingdom. The fight became inevitable.

Side forces. Poles. The Polish army consisted of 35 thousand (28 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry) with 106 guns. The revolutionary government: firstly, called up old-time soldiers and retired officers - 20 thousand; secondly, announced the recruitment of 100 thousand, of which 10 thousand for the cavalry; thirdly, they took draft horses for the cavalry, and then they had to take peasant horses as well; fourthly, to form five 8-gun batteries, they took howitzers from Modlin, Prussian cannons left over from the time of the Prussian domination, Turkish cannons and cast 20 cannons from bells; fifthly, from the school of ensigns and from the Kalisz cadet corps, they made an increased release of officers, and in addition, nobles who had never served in the troops were appointed to officer positions - an unsuccessful measure, because the servicemen were bad, but as revolutionaries they introduced a corrupting principle into the army.

By the beginning of hostilities, there were up to 140 thousand in total, but 55 thousand could be put in the field. The active army was divided into 4 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, in addition, there were troops in fortresses and in detachments that had a separate purpose. Infantry regiments consisted of 4 battalions, cavalry regiments - from 6 squadrons; the battalions were strong, much stronger than the Russian battalions.

The old troops were excellently trained thanks to the vigilant care of the Tsarevich. The new ones were significantly inferior to the old ones in terms of training, discipline and endurance. The mistake was that from the old units they did not single out strong enough personnel who would give strength and stamina to the new troops. The armament was good thanks to the stock of guns accumulated in the arsenal: the Tsarevich handed over all the slightly damaged guns to the Russian arsenal, and in return demanded new ones from the empire.

After Khlopitsky's refusal, Prince Radziwill was appointed commander-in-chief, who had neither military talents nor the corresponding character, so he was entirely under the influence of Khlopitsky, who was assigned to him as an adviser. However, the power of the commander-in-chief does not tolerate any division, and therefore the position of the seemingly all-powerful Khlopitsky was nevertheless false and led to harm in the battle of Grokhov. In addition, Khlopytsky, although he had all the data to lead the army, did not sympathize with the uprising - he abandoned offensive actions and believed that only an honorable grave could be prepared for the Polish army under the walls of Warsaw.

The chief of staff was Khrzhanovsky, an excellent officer of the General Staff. Quartermaster General Prondzinsky, in addition to his extensive education as an officer of the General Staff, was distinguished by the brilliance and courage of shrewd strategic considerations.

Although many among the Polish officers served in the Napoleonic troops, the French usually commanded the Polish divisions there, and therefore there were not enough experienced generals among them during the revolution.

The Poles were distinguished by the ardor of their attacks, as well as their steadfastness in defense. The Pole is agile, ardent, brave, enterprising, but he has no moral stamina. He considers his impulse irresistible, but if he fails, then cowardice sets in, he loses heart. In addition, party membership brought a lot of harm. Love for the fatherland has turned over the centuries into devotion to one's party. The triumph of the latter became the main goal - for him they were ready to sacrifice the interests of the state. All this led to disagreement among the highest, destroyed the unity that was so necessary in the war.

Russians. The infantry corps (as the norm) consisted of 3 infantry divisions, 3 two-regiment brigades each, regiments of 3 four-company battalions, but the third battalions (reserve) were left in the rear to occupy more important places of the border country.

Cavalry: 5 reserve cavalry corps of 2 divisions and 10 light cavalry divisions, one each for an infantry corps. Cavalry regiments - 6 squadrons. For each infantry division - 3 companies of artillery with 12 guns; with the cavalry - 2 cavalry companies. Engineer troops - 11 sapper battalions, and with the guards corps and the first reserve cavalry - one cavalry pioneer division each. The guns were partly bad, spoiled by stupid cleaning, with bent barrels and faulty locks.

In no way inferior to the Poles in maneuvering masses, the Russians turned out to be less prepared in single actions, in skirmishing, etc. Frequent battle fire in a deployed formation was considered panache. Arakcheev's system had a detrimental effect on the development of enterprise and the ability for independent action in superiors.

The following were appointed to the active army: 6th Infantry Corps (Lithuanian) Rosen; the guards detachment of the Tsarevich is also included in it; 1st Infantry Corps Palen 1st; Witt's 3rd Reserve Caucasian Corps and Kreutz's 5th Reserve Cavalry Corps; grenadier corps of Shakhovsky; Guards Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich; 2nd Infantry Corps Palen 2nd. Only 183 thousand (of which 41 thousand cavalry) and, in addition, 13 Cossack regiments.

The spirit of the troops, however, was the same; in this war the usual virtues were manifested. In all clashes with the enemy, the regiments maintained their old glory and showed their characteristic courage and steadfastness. The Prussian General Brandt, who was then with the Russian army and knew it well, writes that Russian soldiers are the first in the world. The grenadier corps and the famous 13th and 14th chasseur regiments were especially distinguished for their exploits. This was not the spirit of Rosen's 6th (Lithuanian) Corps. Many Poles officers who participated in secret societies served in it, and therefore sympathy for the Poles was noticed in the corps, "the entire Lithuanian corps is looking at Warsaw."

Before the start of hostilities, the troops were given "Rules for observation during the march, in bivouacs, in cramped apartments and in the battle itself." This field charter was compiled on the basis of the combat experience of that era by people who knew the war, and therefore is of great value even for the present. Unfortunately, the tactical training of the Russian army, under the influence of parade ground masters who did not know the war, was far from up to par and did not meet the basic requirements of the Rules.

When the troops had provisions for only 15 days and fodder for the cavalry for 12 days. Replenishment of these stocks was extremely difficult, because there was a crop failure in the country, and the inhabitants were either hostile or indifferent. They resorted to requisitions - and the tariff was set low - and the inhabitants avoided the concession of products. The only way to extinguish the patriotism of the regiments was with money. In addition, the requisitions were not without abuse and violence. The best way to provide food would be a reliable arrangement of the transport part of the army, but the Russians expected to finish off the Poles immediately and then spread out in wide apartments with allowances from the inhabitants, and therefore neglected this part. Shortcomings in the organization of food had a detrimental effect on military operations.

Field Marshal Count Dibich-Zabalkansky, 45 years old, with great military ability, extensive combat experience and recognized authority, was appointed commander in chief. However, in 1831 he did not fully justify the hopes placed on him. He did not always show sufficient decisiveness and asked himself too complex combinations. After the death of his beloved wife, Dibich began to notice a decline in spirit and an addiction to alcoholic beverages. To top Dibich's misfortune, at a time when the Russian army had survived all the crises, when the most important part of the campaign was over and the enemy was weakened, so that it remained to strike the last blow and reap the fruits of his labors, the commander-in-chief died suddenly of cholera - all the glory went to his successor Paskevich.

The chief of staff, Count Tol, was talented, educated, determined, energetic, went through the military school of Suvorov and Kutuzov, and was on excellent terms with Dibich.

War plans. Poles. Around December 20, 1830, the Poles could muster about 55,000 ready troops. Meanwhile, on the part of the Russians, only the 6th (Lithuanian) corps (38 thousand, and with the detachment of the Tsarevich 45 thousand) was ready, which Baron Rosen concentrated in two places (Brest and Bialystok), 120 miles apart from each other. It is clear that it was more profitable for the Poles to advance in order to break the Russians in parts and capture as much territory as possible (Lithuania) in order to expand the sources of manning the army and materiel.

Khlopitsky, for his own political reasons, did not want to take any offensive actions and decided: the Polish army would deploy in echelons in two directions leading to Warsaw from Kovna and from Brest-Litovsk; when the Russians advance, retreat to the position at Grokhov and take the fight there. It was believed that it was risky to move far ahead to cover Warsaw, for fear of being outflanked and cut off from the bridges in Prague and Molina. On the Grochowska position, one cannot be surrounded, the Russians, according to the conditions of the terrain, could not deploy all their forces and take advantage of superiority, and finally, the Poles relied on the extensive sources of Warsaw and on the Prague tete-de-pon. However, it should be noted that the position of the Poles did not correspond in size to the number of their troops, they managed from the left flank, and in the rear there was a large river with one bridge.

According to this plan, the 1st infantry division of Krukovetsky stood on the Kovno highway to Serock, and the cavalry division of Jankowski advanced to Rozhan. Zhimirsky's 2nd Infantry Division is on the Brest Highway, with advanced regiments on the Livets River, and Sukhorzhevsky's Lancers Division ahead on the Veprzh River. Skrzynetsky's 3rd Infantry Division stood between these two lines at Stanislavov and Dobre. General Reserve (Schembek's 4th Infantry Division and three Caucasian divisions) - ahead of Warsaw. Separate detachments of Serovsky, Dvernitsky, Dzekonsky, Kazakovsky were assigned to guard the upper Vistula.

Russians. All the forces intended against the Poles could not be immediately opposed to the enemy. The Lithuanian corps could only assemble at the end of December; The 3rd reserve cavalry corps (from Podolia) needed a month to join the Lithuanian; by the beginning of January, the 1st Corps could approach Brest; in early February - grenadier; in early March - guards; at the end of March - the 2nd Corps, that is, the entire army - in 3-4 months.

By January 20, in fact, 126 thousand were collected (of which 28 thousand were cavalry); leaving 12 thousand in the rear, there were 114 thousand for the offensive - quite significant forces.

Dibich's goal is to defeat the enemy army and capture Warsaw. To do this, he intended to concentrate between the Narew and the Bug, between Lomzha and Nur, and act depending on the circumstances, trying to cut off the enemy from Warsaw. If this fails, then cross the upper Vistula, surround Warsaw and force it to capitulate by starvation or storm.

The plan corresponded to the situation and pursued important goals (the army, the capital), but it did not take into account the possibility of a change in the weather, that is, that during the thaw the Bug and Narew would present an obstacle to the crossing. In addition, if a crossing over the upper Vistula was already envisaged, then some advised choosing Brest-Litovsk as the center of operations and from there to act, according to circumstances, either to Warsaw or to the upper Vistula. But the execution of this plan was fraught with various inconveniences, and most importantly, with the loss of time, meanwhile, the field marshal hoped to soon put an end to the uprising and, moreover, with one blow.

Then Tol suggested a compromise: to move through Drogichin to Siedlce and from there to Warsaw, or to the upper Vistula; at the same time, the troops would move further near the border, and therefore food would be easier; but the path lengthened, and the army moved away from the grenadier and guards corps, following from the north of Kovna. Dibich did not agree and began to act according to the original version.

Diebitsch offensive towards Warsaw

Crossing the Polish border by Russians ¦ Change of line of action ¦ Advance of the Russian army to Wavre ¦ Battle of Wavre on February 7 ¦ Battle of Bialolenka on February 12 ¦ Battle of Grochow on February 13 ¦ Location of Russians in apartments

On January 24 and 25, the Russian army crossed the Polish border in 11 columns over a vast area from Kovna through Grodna, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk to Ustilug. Despite the apparent dispersion, the entire movement and distribution of troops was so calculated that in the main forces in any place it was possible to concentrate 80 thousand in 20 hours, while the Poles could not oppose more than 55 thousand.

On January 27, the main forces reached the line of Lomzha, Zambrov (1st Corps of Palen), Chizhev (6th Corps of Rosen), that is, in three days they passed only 60 miles, and meanwhile the transitions were forced. As a result of the thaw, the roads turned into swamps; walked no more than two miles per hour; the wagon trains, put on the sledge track, stopped. Give the troops a rest. On January 27, the rain drove all the snow from the fields; On the 29th the thaw intensified; small rivers opened up, on the Bug the ice melted in places. It was impossible to be drawn into the wooded and swampy space between the Bug and the Narew.

After a discussion at the military council, the field marshal decided to cross to the left bank of the Bug near Brok and Nur, draw troops from Vengrov and Siedlce, then use the Brest highway and continue moving towards Warsaw. The road to Drogichin could have been used for messages.

Change of line of action. Thus, it was necessary to make a flank march and change the line of action. On January 30, the crossing began. The difficulty of crossing was great. If the Poles showed proper activity, they could greatly interfere with Dibich. After the crossing, the army moved to the Livets River, where it established itself almost without resistance from the Poles - there were small avant-garde skirmishes. By February 2, the army stood in two masses at Vengrov and Siedlce, putting forward the vanguards.

The march of 100 versts along disgusting roads was accomplished extremely quickly, but with great effort. Rest was given on February 2, 3 and 4 - it was also necessary to tighten the carts.

On February 2, the head of the cavalry division, Baron Geismar, from the 5th reserve cavalry corps advancing from Kyiv to Pulawy, allowed himself to be defeated in parts near the village of Stochek by the Polish general Dvernitsky (3 battalions, 17 squadrons and 6 guns).

Tall horse rangers on massive horses could not act quickly against the evasive Polish lancers on light horses. Taking advantage of the superiority of forces, Dvernitsky defeated both Russian regiments in turn, which were panicked. The Poles did not pursue them. The Russians lost 280 men and 8 guns, the Poles 87 men.

Geismar went to Siedlce. Dvernitsky, having formed a battery of cannons taken and taking advantage of the horses captured from the Russians, went back behind the Vistula. This matter, unimportant in itself, had a very great moral significance for the Poles: it gave the people confidence in their troops, reinforced their conviction that it was possible to fight against Russia. Dvernitsky immediately became a folk hero, volunteers began to flock to him. In general, the significance of Stochek's case is determined by the fact that it was the first in the forthcoming campaign.

The offensive of the Russian army to Wavre. On February 5, the 6th Corps moved on Dobra; 1st Corps - from Liva to Kalushin; for communication between them, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade (Muravyova) - along the old Warsaw road to Zimnovody (then the road goes to Stanislavov, Okunev); reserves, under the command of Tolya, from Siedlce along the Brest highway. In the rear of the army Nur, Vengerov and Siedlce were occupied by garrisons. With such a direction of movement, collisions between Skrzynetsky and Rosen at Dobre and Zhimirsky with Tol and Palen at Kalushin were inevitable.

Battle at Kalushin. Tol before Palena went to Kalushina and bypassed the position of Zhimirsky from both flanks. Zhimirsky managed to retreat to Minsk without great losses.

Fight at Dobre. Skrzhinetsky took a strong position in a forest clearing, relying on the village of Dobre. He stubbornly held out against the avant-garde of Rosen and even went on the offensive with the 4th regiment (who were famous as "chvartaki"), but with the arrival of the main forces of the 6th corps, after a hot 4-hour battle, they were overturned; however, he retreated in order to Okunev. Russian losses 750 people, Poles 600 people.

Skrzynetsky had 12 battalions, 12 guns, 4 squadrons; Rosen - 19 battalions, 56 guns, 2 uhlan regiments and a Cossack, but sent troops into battle in parts and still did not bring all of them. In addition, the Poles had an advantageous position, and the Russians could not deploy their numerous artillery.

On February 6, pressed by the Russians, Skrzhinetsky withdrew to the Grokhovsky position near the Alder Grove, and Zhimirsky settled down, not reaching Wavre. Rosen advanced to Okunev (avant-garde), Palen - to Milosna (vanguard); the left flank of the army was guarded by Geismar at Schennitsa.

Battle of Wavre on February 7th. The battle was random for both sides. On February 7, the field marshal did not count on a battle. He ordered the 1st and 6th corps to set out at 7 o'clock in the morning and take control of the exits from the forest gorges to the Grochow Plain. The 1st corps had to go 8 versts along the highway, and the 6th 12 versts to the tavern Benefit along the bad old Warsaw road. It is clear that the movement of the columns was not uniform.

Khlopitsky also did not think of accepting battles, but since Palen strongly pressed Zhimirsky, the Shembek division was sent to replace and support; they had only 18 battalions.

Battle of Wavre in 1831

In the main forces of the vanguard of Palen, between the infantry, there was a brigade of horse rangers, in addition, in the tail - another 22 squadrons and 16 K. Or.

Khlopytsky ordered to attack Palen, leaning forward mainly on the left flank, Krukovetsky ordered to take Vygoda, Skrzhinetsky stood behind Krukovetsky. Thus, almost the entire Polish army was on the battlefield. Polish artillery opened frequent fire.

The head of the vanguard, Palen Lopukhin, was quickly overthrown. The Black Sea Cossack regiment barely rescued Ataman Vlasov, who had already fallen under sabers. Palen immediately pushed the 1st cavalry artillery company to the left of the highway, ordered the cavalry to clear a place for infantry and move to the left in order to hold the pressure of the right flank of the Poles. The regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division, which had come running, were hastily deployed on the highway and to the right; they delayed the enemy a little, but still, Zhimirsky, who was moving forward, pressed the right flank of the 1st corps and threatened to cut it off from the 6th. Palen advances the Novoingermanlandsky regiment to the right flank. Tol, who arrived, moved the Staroingermanlandsky regiment and other infantry units to the right, and placed the artillery of the 3rd division in a ledge behind the horse.

About 11 o'clock Dibich arrived. He ordered the horse rangers to let the infantry through. But while the cavalry cleared the highway, the Poles made a new offensive on the right flank. The cavalry company suddenly doused them with buckshot; the Poles retreated, but the skirmishers rushed to the battery. Dibich sent his convoy against them (half-squadron of the Lubensky hussars) and supported him with a sapper battalion, that is, in extreme cases, even these units that were at hand, regardless of their special purpose, were put into action. The skirmishers were driven back and disappeared into the forest.

It was already 12 o'clock. Dibich sent Rosen to rush, who managed to turn around only by 3 o'clock in the afternoon. It was necessary, of necessity, to send Palen's troops into battle in parts, as they approached: Lopukhin's haste put the Russian army in a critical situation.

Meanwhile, the head of the vanguard of the 6th Corps, Vladek, having passed the Gribov will, heard shots from the side of Palen and immediately advanced towards him into the forest 3 battalions of rangers, who attacked the enemy along with the right flank of Palen. The field marshal, having heard the cannonade at Rosen, no longer fearing for his right flank, ordered a general offensive to be launched, and Saken was sent to the extreme left flank to lead the numerous cavalry. The Poles are thrown back everywhere; Lubensky, overturned by Saken, tries to find protection behind the infantry, but Zhimirsky and Shembek are also pressed. Then Khlopitsky himself directs the Guards Grenadier Regiment.

Dibich orders the horse rangers to attack right along the highway. They are glad in front of the field marshal to make amends for their failure at Stochek. The Württemberg Horse Chasseur Regiment overturned the 3rd Polish Horse Chasseur Regiment, then cut into the square of the Guards Grenadiers, threw them into the swamps, scattering and chopping some of the people. Gradually pushing the enemy, the Russians occupied Wavre.

Khlopytsky also had a division of Skrzynetsky, which he did not use. If he did not have in mind a decisive attack and intended to give the final battle on the Grochov position, then it is not clear for what purpose he fought the battle at Wavre on such a large scale. Krukovetsky tried to keep Rosen, but, attacked by significant forces and seeing the retreat of the rest of the troops, he retreated to Alder Grove, occupied by Skrzhinetsky. Rosen also occupied Kavenchin, driving out a small Polish detachment from there. At 4 o'clock, Dibich had already taken possession of the exits from the forest, which he considered the goal of the battle to be achieved.

The damage of the Russians is 3700 people, the Poles lost no less, counting the 600 people taken by the Russians as prisoners.

On February 8, a firefight broke out at the forward posts near the Alder Grove. Rosen sent Reibniz's 25th division to drive out the Poles. Reibnitz was repulsed with the loss of 1,620 men.

Dibich, having learned about this useless bloodshed, confirmed the order to refrain from any clashes with the enemy.

Battle of Bialolenk February 12. Prince Shakhovskoy with the grenadier corps went from Kovna (starting from January 24) to Mariampol, Kalvaria, Suwalki, Raigrod, Shchuchin, Lomzha and reached Ostrolenka on February 8. Here he crossed the Narew and went further to Pultusk, Serock and Zegrzh. Having crossed here on February 11 through the Bugo-Narev, Shakhovskoy at Neporent joined with Saken (1 battalion, regiment of lancers, a company of sappers, 2 guns), sent by the field marshal to facilitate the movement of Shakhovsky. At this time, Khlopitsky sent a detachment of Jankowski to the north of Warsaw to collect food. Yankovsky attacked Shakhovsky early in the morning of February 12 and was repulsed. Then Shakhovskoy went to Byalolenka, intending to cut off Jankowski.

Dibich, meanwhile, created a plan for the Grokhovsky battle, and intended to advance, as suddenly and covertly as possible, Shakhovsky with part of other troops against the left flank and rear of the Polish army and deliver the main blow to it in this direction.

Field Marshal Shakhovsky did not explain his plan, but simply sent an order (in fact, this is not an order, but a command) to stop in Neporent or where the sent one finds. The Cossack with a note came across Yankovsky, was late and arrived at Shakhovsky when he was already approaching Byalolenka, which was heavily occupied by Malakhovsky and Yankovsky. Shakhovskoy attacked; the Poles withdrew to Brudno, where Krukovetsky connected his division and 18 guns, that is, forces equal to those of Shakhovsky. Losses on both sides of 650 people.

The battle at Bialolenk showed the field marshal that his plans for surprise had been violated. Fearing that the Poles would not attack Shakhovsky in superior forces, he sent an order to him that same night, again without explaining the goal, to remain and not start a fight again, and if the Poles attack him, then our main forces will attack the enemy from front. The adjutant who brought the order reported that Dibich was extremely dissatisfied with the occupation of Bialolenka. This greatly agitated the old man Shakhovsky, he began to consult what should be done, but nothing was decided.

On the morning of February 13, Shakhovskoy, imagining that the entire Polish army could rush at him, decided to retreat through Grodzisk and Marki to connect with Dibich. Krukovetsky, seeing the retreat of the Russians, opened artillery fire and went on the attack. Shakhovskoy left safely, having lost only one gun, bogged down in a swamp. The battle ended at 11 am.

Dibich, having heard the cannonade of Shakhovsky, decided to attack the Poles with the main forces for his rescue. As a result, the Grochov battle broke out a day earlier than expected - on the 13th instead of the 14th, and not at all according to the previously worked out plan.

Battle of Grochow 13 February. Grochow's position was on a vast low-lying plain intersected by swamps and drainage ditches. From M. Grokhov past Kavenchin and Zombka to Byalolenka stretches a swampy strip 1–2 versts wide.

To the south of B. Grokhov, the division of Shembek was located, notches were arranged in the grove. Zhimirsky's division occupied Alder Grove, north of M. Grokhov (about 1 verst along the front and? verst in depth, cut through by a sazhen ditch). The swampy ground froze and allowed movement. Roland's brigade scattered a dense line of skirmishers along the edge of the forest with strong reserves behind. The main mass of the brigade stood behind the ditch in an expanded formation with intervals between units so that the overturned front troops could go back and settle under the cover of battle fire and the bayonets of the deployed units. Chizhevsky's other brigade stood behind, in reserve. Nearby behind the grove, epolements for batteries were dug up, penetrating the entire grove. 2 batteries fired at the territory to the left from the grove to Kavenchin. Behind the Zhymirsky division was Skrzynetsky, who was also intended to defend the grove.

Battle of Grochow in 1831

Lubensky's cavalry stood between the highway and the village of Targuvek. Cavalry Corps Uminsky (2 divisions with 2 horse batteries) - at the count. Elsner. Krukovetsky acted against Shakhovsky near Brudno; near Prague - militias with braids (cosigners) and parks. There was no general reserve, because it is impossible to consider cosigners for it.

Position benefits: Russian troops did not have enough space for deployment and had to perform it when leaving the forest under artillery and even rifle fire. Flaws: the left flank hung in the air, which gave Dibich the basis for his bypass of this flank by Shakhovsky's corps, but failed - in the rear there is a large river with one bridge, so the retreat is dangerous.

The forces of the Poles - 56 thousand; of them 12 thousand cavalrymen; without Krukovetsky - 44 thousand; Russians - 73 thousand, of which 17 thousand cavalrymen; without Shakhovsky - 60 thousand.

AT 9? hours the Russians began a cannonade, and then their right flank began to move to the right to attack the Alder Grove. The attacks were carried out incorrectly: the troops were brought into battle in parts, there was no artillery preparation and by means of encirclement. First, 5 battalions broke into the forest, but ran into reserves behind the ditch and were driven out of the grove by Roland's battalions. Reinforced with 6 battalions. Again the Russians broke in, but Chizhevsky, together with Roland (12 battalions), again forced them to retreat. The Russians bring in 7 more battalions. A long line (18 battalions) of Russians swiftly rushes at the Poles and knocks out the entire division from the grove at about 11 o'clock in the morning. Zhimirsky himself was mortally wounded. But, not supported by sufficient artillery, the Russians suffered greatly from the Polish buckshot. Khlopitsky introduces Skrizhenetsky's division into action. 23 Polish battalions take possession of the grove.

At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Dibich strengthens the attack with another 10 battalions, begins to surround the grove on the right and left, where new batteries are put up on the flanks. Having successfully forced out from the edge, the Russians on the right could only reach a large ditch; but on the left, the fresh regiments of the 3rd division circled the grove and went far ahead, but came under the closest fire from the batteries.

Khlopitsky, wanting to take advantage of this moment, introduces both divisions (Zhymirsky and Skrzhinetsky) and 4 fresh battalions of guards grenadiers, whom he personally leads into the attack. Seeing in their midst their beloved leader - calm, with a pipe in his teeth - the Poles, singing "Polish has not yet perished," with irresistible force, attack the Russian tired, upset regiments. The latter are starting to retreat. The Poles gradually capture the entire grove, their columns approach the very edge of the forest, the skirmishers run forward.

Prondzinsky, pointing to the Russian battery, shouts: "Children, another 100 steps - and these guns are yours." Two of them were taken and directed to the height where Dibich stood.

This was the last desperate effort of the Poles. The field marshal directs everything possible from the infantry (2nd Grenadier Division) to the grove; reinforces artillery: more than 90 guns acted on the sides of the grove and, moving forward from the right side (from the north), heavily hit the Polish batteries behind the grove; to bypass the grove on the right, the 3rd cuirassier division was moved with the Life Guards Lancers of His Highness and 32 guns to help seize the groves, and at the same time break the front of the retreating Poles and try to push back to the swamps near the Brest highway at least their right flank. Even further to the right, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade of Muravyov with the Lancers division occupied the colonies of Metsenas and Elsner, advancing forward, contacting the cuirassiers on the left flank.

Excited, Dibich gave the spurs to his horse and, jumping up to the retreating troops, shouted loudly: “Where are you guys, because the enemy is there! Forward! Forward!" - and, standing in front of the regiments of the 3rd division, led them to attack. A huge avalanche hit the grove from all sides. The grenadiers, not responding to the fire of the Poles and bowing their bayonets, burst into the grove; they were followed by the 3rd division, then the 6th corps of Rosen. In vain Khlopitsky, already wounded in the leg, personally bypasses the front line and tries to inspire the Poles. On piles of bodies, the Russians cross the ditch and finally take possession of the grove.

Khlopitsky orders Krukovetsky to go to the grove, and Lubensky with the cavalry to support the upcoming attack. Lubensky replied that the terrain was inconvenient for cavalry operations, that Khlopitsky was an infantry general and did not understand cavalry business, and that he would execute the order only after receiving it from the official commander-in-chief Radziwill. It was at this critical moment that Khlopitsky's position was incorrect. He went to Radziwill. On the way, the grenade hit Khlopitsky's horse, exploded inside and injured his legs. His activity has ceased. The whole cause of the Poles fell into disarray, the general administration disappeared. Radziwill was completely at a loss, whispered prayers and answered questions with texts from the Holy Scriptures. Cowardly Shembek wept. Uminsky quarreled with Krukovetsky. Only Skrzynetsky kept his presence of mind and showed diligence.

Dibich entrusted the leadership of the actions of the cavalry mass to Tolya, who became carried away by particulars and scattered his cavalry across the field, only one cuirassier regiment of Prince Albert, led by a division of Lieutenant Colonel von Zon, rushed to pursue the randomly retreating Poles. The regiment went through the entire battle formation of the enemy, and only at Prague itself did 5 Polish lancer squadrons take the Zone on the flank. But he deftly led his cuirassiers onto the highway and escaped from infantry and missile battery fire. The attack lasted 20 minutes over 2? miles. Although the losses of the cuirassiers reached half of the composition (Zon was mortally wounded and captured), however, the moral effect of the attack is enormous. Radzwill with his retinue rode off to Warsaw.

The Olviopol hussars famously attacked Shembek, pinned two regiments to the Vistula and scattered them. The Poles were pushed back everywhere. Skrzyniecki gathered and arranged the remnants behind in position on the sandy hills.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Shakhovsky finally appeared, showing complete inactivity that day. The delighted Dibich made no reproach, only announced that the honor of completing the victory belonged to them, and he himself became the head of the grenadiers. But when they approached the enemy position, it was 5 o'clock, the day was drawing to a close. The field marshal thought about it and after some hesitation ordered to stop the battle.

The loss of the Poles - 12 thousand, Russian 9400 people.

Meanwhile, a terrible disorder prevailed among the Poles. Troops and convoys crowded near the bridge, only by midnight the crossing ended, under the cover of Skrzynetsky.

Under such conditions, it would not be difficult for the Russians to cope with Skrzynetsky, and then storm the Prague tete-de-pon. It is completely incomprehensible why Dibich did not do this. His plan was to put an end to the uprising with one blow and, moreover, as soon as possible. The opportunity just presented itself, and the field marshal did not take advantage of it. The obscure question of causes has not yet been clarified by history.

The location of the Russians in the apartments. The next day, the Poles occupied and heavily armed the Prague fortifications. It was possible to attack only with the help of siege weapons, and their delivery required 4 months. Crossing the upper Vistula, in order to then attack Warsaw from the west, also required time. Therefore, Dibich deployed the army in wide apartments (Okunev, Kolbel, Zhelekhov, Radzyn, Siedlce), about 40 versts along the front and 40 in depth, in order to facilitate food through requisition.

Meanwhile, by March 10, the Vistula was cleared of ice and it was possible to start crossing. To do this, they chose Tyrchin (outside the sphere of influence of the Polish army, the width is only 400 steps, the fairway is closer to the right bank, the Veprzh flows not far, which can be used for harvesting and alloying materials). Although the thaw had reached its extreme limit, Dibich was in a hurry and on March 15 ordered the army to move to the crossing.

Polish offensives

Expedition of Dvernitsky ¦ Offensive of Skrzynetsky

The Poles took advantage of the suspension of the actions of the Russian main army for private enterprises. Since the Lublin Voivodeship was occupied by the Russians weakly, and kr. Zamostye could serve as a support for a partisan detachment, then at the insistence of Lelevel, a detachment of Dvernitsky (2 battalions, 22 squadrons, 12 guns - 6500 people) was assigned to move to Volhynia with the aim of inciting an uprising there. On February 19, Dvernitsky crossed the Vistula and at Kurov attacked the cavalry detachment of General Kaver, overturned the Finnish dragoons and captured 4 guns. On February 21, Dibich moved significant forces from different directions, and Tolya entrusted the leadership of the whole business. Then Dvernitsky took refuge in Zamostye on March 4.

At the end of March, Dvernitsky decided to continue the expedition to Volyn: he quickly moved to Krylov and there on March 29 he crossed the Bug. Ridiger's troops were against the Poles in Volyn - 11 thousand with 36 guns.

Dvernitsky, moving along the Austrian border, became convinced that in this direction with the dominant Russian population there was nothing to think about a general uprising, and therefore decided to make his way to Podolia. At Styr near Boremli (Mikhailovka), Ridiger blocked his path.

Dvernitsky secretly withdrew from the position at night: he walked along the border, and Ridiger pursued in parallel. On April 15, Dvernitsky took up a strong position at the Lyulinsky tavern, with his rear to the Austrian border. Ridiger attacked, but at the last minute Dvernitsky did not accept the attack, crossed the border and was disarmed by Austrian troops.

The advance of Skrzynetsky. To provide for the army moving towards the crossing, the 6th Rosen Corps was temporarily left on the Brest highway, which was ordered to observe Prague, cover the rear of the movement, secure the edge, and especially protect Siedlce and communication with Brest. In the event of an offensive by the Poles in superior forces, retreat to Kalushin and even to Siedlce.

Adjutant General Count Karl Fedorovich Tol

On March 17, the army set off from the apartments. The march was very difficult: people were exhausted from fatigue, artillery was dragged by infantry, carts lagged behind, pontoons got stuck in the mud. But still, on March 19, the army approached the crossing. It took another 2-3 days to lift the convoy. The field marshal was already ready to start the crossing, when the Poles went on the offensive and delivered a blow to Rosen, which upset the whole plan of Dibich.

On March 19, Rosen's corps consisted of 18,000, of which 6,000 were in the vanguard of Geismar at Wavre. Despite the instructions of the field marshal, Rosen did not pull back the vanguard. The Poles, aware of all the difficulties of the direct defense of the Vistula, decided, among 40 thousand, to suddenly attack Rosen and thereby divert Dibich from the crossing. All secrecy measures were taken. At 3 am on March 10, in the midst of thick fog, the Poles began debushing from Prague.

Although Geismar acted energetically, the attack was somewhat sudden, and the Poles pressed Geismar, who retreated to Dembe-Velka, for 8 hours in a row.

Rosen managed to withdraw his troops from the apartments, but in three places: at Dembe-Velke (10 thousand together with Geismar), at Ryshe (3 miles to the right) and at Mistov (in the rear). The terrain in front of the position is swampy, hard to reach for the enemy, but the swamps stretched at an angle to the retreat route (highway), which ran along the left flank. Meanwhile, Rosen did not even break the bridge here.

The battle went very well for the Russians, numerous attempts by the Poles were repelled. However, a brilliant attack by the cavalry division led by Skarzhinsky, carried out in the evening, forced Rosen to retreat. The corps retreated to Minsk. Losses: Russians - 5500 people and 10 guns, Poles - 500 people.

On March 20, the retreat continued towards Siedlce, the rearguard stopped at Yagodnia. Skrzhinetsky settled down near Latovich.

Movement of the main Russian army. On March 23, Dibich convened a military council, at which it was decided, at the suggestion of Toll, to temporarily abandon the crossing and move against the Polish main army and its messages. The disposition was already given for the movement of the army on March 28 to Garvolin, as quartermaster general d.s. With. Abakumov reported to Dibich that the allowance for the troops was completely unsecured, since, due to impassability, the waiting transports were far behind; the military reserve was already for the most part used up, and it was impossible to replenish it with requisitions due to the exhaustion of the country. On March 28, Dibich decided on a flank march to Lukov to get close to the supplies in Siedlce and Mendzirzhets and with transports from Brest and Drogichin. On March 31, the field marshal entered Siedlce.

Prondzinsky convinced Skrzynetsky to finish off Rosen near Siedlce, advance to Brest and cut off Dibich from communications with the north. Plan: from the front, from Boime, Skrzynetsky himself; on the left, through Sukha, Lubensky and on the right, through Vodyne, Prondzinsky, who is entrusted with the main role (12 thousand). This led to the battle on March 29 near Igane, where the 13th and 14th chasseur regiments were badly damaged and Prondzinsky managed to disperse the 2 regiments of the rearguard of General Fezi.

Losses: Russians - 3 thousand, Poles - much less. Only late in the evening did Polish troops appear from Suha, and then Skrzynetsky himself. He arrived at the troops on the morning of March 29, who were waiting for him under arms. Without leaving the carriage, he began to complain of fatigue, had breakfast in the nearest village and lay down to rest; dare not wake him up. The commander-in-chief overslept the battle. The troops from Sukha received no instructions.

Stay of Dibić near Siedlce. During the forced inactivity, the field marshal took steps to provide food for the army in order to meet current needs and form another two weeks' supply for 120,000 people. For this, by the way, 450 regimental trucks and 7 mobile artillery parks were sent from the army to Brest for food, which were ordered in Brest to lay down ammunition and bring grain fodder. Transports from Volhynia began to approach Kotsk.

To ensure the rear, Brest-Litovsk was fortified, equipped with a significant garrison of 12 battalions, 10 squadrons and 60 guns under the command of Rosen. This was supposed to calm Lithuania, which was already worried.

Diebitsch's first offensive. Finally, it was decided to move with the army through Vodynia and Yeruzal to Kuflev in order to outflank the Polish avant-garde from the south, suddenly attack the main enemy forces and overturn them from the highway to the north.

The preparations were quite lengthy, secrecy measures were not taken during the march on April 12, and, by the way, the Poles had previously been aware of the Russian enterprise. As a result, Skrzyniecki managed to slip away and retreated to Dembe-Velka, where the position was well fortified. The whole enterprise was expressed in a rearguard battle near Minsk, where the Poles lost 365 people.

After a day's rest between Minsk and Dembe-Velke, the Russian army (60 thousand) retreated.

New war plan

Diebitsch's Second Offensive ¦ Cholera

Emperor Nicholas himself indicated the plan of military operations. Dibich's difficulties consisted in providing the rear of the army in the field and in supplying it with food. The provision of the rear was entrusted to the newly formed reserve army of Count Tolstoy and to the 1st Army, which had existed before. Thus, Dibich's hands were untied. His army was ordered to move to the lower Vistula, providing a supply of food, initially by purchase in Prussia, and subsequently by delivery by water from Russia through Danzig and further along the Vistula.

Thus, it was necessary to completely change the line of action, that is, it was necessary to clear the Brest highway of hospitals and warehouses and arrange everything again on the line from the Narew to the lower Vistula.

Soon the Poles learned about these new proposals.

Dibić's second offensive. The movement of Khrzhanovsky in Zamosc disturbed the field marshal, who received false information that on May 1 Skrzhinetsky intended to move against the left flank of the Russian army and attack Siedlce. Then, at dawn on May 1, Dibich himself moved along the highway. The first Polish troops retreated non-stop. At Yanov, the Russians stopped for the night, and the next day they retreated. We learned from the prisoners that the troops belonged to the Uminsky detachment. Diebitsch concluded that Skrzyniecki had slipped away again. In fact, the Polish commander-in-chief went against the guards, which remained unknown to Dibich.

Cholera. If the monthly stop at Siedlce helped the Russian army to settle down, then the Poles completed their troops, completed the formation of new regiments, believed in their strength and in the significance of their private successes. Now at the disposal of Skrzynetsky there were 5 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, very comfortable.

At the same time, cholera was rapidly developing in the Russian army. It appeared on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea as early as 1830, and the following year it spread throughout Russia and even into Western Europe. She entered the army through Brest, where transports and staffing converged from everywhere. It appeared on March 6, but at first weakly, so that in March there were only 233 patients, in April, due to crowded and motionless parking, there were 5 thousand of them. In early April, cholera also penetrated the Polish army, which suffered from it no less than the Russian one.

Skrzynetsky's campaign against the guard

The guards corps under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich stood apart from the main army between the Bug and Narew and was not completely subordinate to Dibich. This situation was detrimental. If, during the offensive to the crossings on the upper Vistula, Dibich could have disposed of the guards, then, perhaps, there would not have been a catastrophe with Rosen's corps.

Now the Poles planned to break the guard before Dibich came to her aid, and then join the connection with the Lithuanian insurgents through the Augustow Voivodeship. Stopped on the Brest highway to defend Warsaw, Uminsky (11 thousand), uniting with the detachment of Dzekonsky, who was on the upper Vistula, and Khozhanovsky from Zamosc, could collect 25 thousand and operate Dibich in the rear or join Skrzhinetsky for a general attack, if Dibich will go to the aid of the guards.

In total, Skrzhinetsky had 46 thousand, and the Russian guard with the Saken detachment that reinforced it had only 27 thousand. It is clear that the chances of success were significant, but Skrzynecki hesitated. First, on April 30, the Poles left their location near Kalushyn to Serotsk, from where they divided into three columns: 1) Dembinsky (4200 people) - along the highway along the right bank of the Nareva to Ostrolenka against Saken; 2) Lubensky (12 thousand) - up the Bug to Nur to destroy bridges and interrupt Dibich's communications with the guard; 3) Skrzhinetsky (30 thousand) - in the middle between the two previous ones on Lomza.

The guards concentrated at Zambrow, the vanguard of Bistrom at Vonsev, the advance detachment of General Poleshka at Przhetyche.

On May 4, the Polish avant-garde of Jankowski pushed back the Cossacks, but at Przhetyche he met stubborn resistance from the guards chasseurs. Poleshko, all right, went step by step to Sokolov. The Grand Duke at that time concentrated the main forces at Snyadov.

On May 5, the Russian avant-garde withdrew to Yakots. Lubensky occupied Nur. To help the Lithuanians, Skrzynetsky sent in the intervals between Dibich and the guards of General Chlapovsky with a lancer regiment, 100 infantrymen and 2 guns, in the form of personnel for future Polish troops.

Prondzinsky insisted on attacking the guards (23 thousand), taking advantage of the superiority of the Polish forces (30 thousand). Skrzhinetsky did not agree, but went with Gelgud's division to Ostroleka. Saken managed to retreat to Lomzha; Gelgud pursued him and occupied Miastkovo, that is, almost in the rear of the guard. On May 7, the Grand Duke reached out to Bialystok.

So, Skrzynetsky's blow fell in the air; not only that, by going so far, he put the army in a perilous position. Moving to connect with the guards, on May 10, Dibich defeated Lubensky at Nur.

The field marshal continued to move towards the connection with the guard, on May 12 he reached Vysoko-Mazowiecka, and the guard was already in Menzhenin. Skrzyniecki hastily retreated to Ostrołęka.

On May 13, Diebitsch made an extraordinary forced march. Palen's troops passed 50 versts, Shakhovsky's - 40 versts, and yet, after a short night's halt, the field marshal continued to move.

Battle of Ostroleka on May 14th. The city of Ostroleka lies on the left bank of the Narew and is connected to the right bank by two bridges, about 120 sazhens long: permanent on piles and floating. About 700 sazhens from the shore stretch sandy hills covered with small and rare shrubs. The whole area is somewhat swampy. The battlefield offered many passive defense benefits, especially if bridges were destroyed. But this could not be done, since there were still many Polish troops on the other side of the river: Gelgud's division in Lomza and Lubensky's rearguard. Prondzinsky planned, hiding the troops in the bushes, to smash those who crossed over with artillery fire, and then, with a joint attack from several sides, throw them back to Narew, and because of the tightness, the Russians would not be able to turn around or use significant forces, especially cavalry. Skrzhinetsky, counting on the usual slowness of the Russians, did not expect a fight the next day and, completely reassured, allowed Prondzinsky to make the necessary orders; he himself went to m. Kruki and spent the night at the inn, enjoying champagne.

The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions stood on the sand hills. In front of the left flank on a hill - 10 Tursky guns; Bielitsky with 12 guns advanced to the bridge itself; the cavalry initially became to the right, beyond the river. Omulev.

Already at 6 o'clock in the morning on May 14, Bistrom appeared in view of Lubensky, who, after some resistance, began to retreat towards Ostrolenko. At about 11 o'clock in the morning the head of the Russian army approached the city, making 70 versts in 32 hours, and the troops retained excellent order and good spirits. Complete carelessness reigned in the Polish main camp: the horses in the cavalry were unsaddled, the infantry dispersed for firewood, water and for bathing.

Opening artillery fire, the grenadiers swiftly attacked Lubensky. Despite the deep sands, they quickly broke into the city and went through it, overturning or cutting off the enemy. Even the famous 4th regiment (“chvartaki”) was pushed back and completely upset by the guards horse rangers and lancers. In total, 1200 people were taken prisoner.

Although the army was greatly stretched out, Dibich ordered to continue the battle and take control of the bridges. Immediately, 3 guns were put up along the street against the bridge, 4 guns to the right of the city and 2 to the left. Then these batteries, which were of great importance, increased to 28 and 34 guns, respectively.

The Poles tried to destroy the bridge, but Russian buckshot forced them to retreat. The Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment, led by the Cavaliers of St. George, rushes, despite the buckshot of two guns from Bielitsky, along the beams and captures the guns. Patz with the remnants of the rearguard falls on the Astrakhans, but General Martynov with a battalion of the Suvorov (Fanagoriysky) regiment ran across the floating bridge; another battalion is sent along the pile bridge, and by common efforts the enemy is driven back. Arriving on the battlefield, Skrzynetsky was completely puzzled by what had happened and began to throw his troops in parts to attack the Russians, who had crossed to the left bank.

Meanwhile, the Suvorov and Astrakhan troops broke into the battery and took possession of several guns, but they were unable to take them away, because Polish horse rangers appeared on the left. Suvorovites without rank lined up in a heap and met the enemy with fire. The horse rangers were not embarrassed by the fire, they galloped from the battalion and, trying to break into the square, cut down the Russians with their sabers. Then the battalion commander ordered to sound the alarm and shout "Hurrah"; the frightened horses rushed back.

The Hungarian brigade, thrown forward by Skrzhinetsky, grappled hand-to-hand with the Russians near the highway. The Suvorov battalion, which crossed the bridge, hit the Poles on the flank - they were driven back. Artillery from the left bank provides the Russians with the strongest support.

The Hungarian brought his brigade into order and again led the attack. But Martynov also received help: two more regiments crossed the bridge. They hit the Hungarian from the flank, threw back and captured one gun. The Hungarian lost half of his men and went into the bushes. Then Skrzynetsky ordered the Langerman brigade not only to push the Russians back across the river, but also to capture the city. The attack was unsuccessful.

In indescribable excitement, the Polish commander-in-chief galloped along the front and shouted: “Malakhovsky, forward! Rybinsky, go ahead! All forward!” He continued to consistently break the brigades against the Russian grenadiers. Finally, he took Krasitsky's brigade, reinforced it with an infantry regiment and several squadrons, and led the attack himself. Encouraged by the presence of the commander-in-chief, the Poles sang "Polish has not yet perished" and rushed at the Russians. Proud of the feats already accomplished, the grenadiers overturned this attack, and inflicted severe damage, for they had 4 guns. Krasitsky, who was knocked down by a rifle butt from a horse, was taken prisoner.

At 4 o'clock, 17 battalions had already gathered on the right bank. They moved forward and pushed the enemy back. The 2nd Polish Lancers, famous for its bravery, tried to attack, but all of its attacks were repulsed.

Skrzyniecki retained his unshakable firmness; For 8 hours he was exposed to fire, seeking death. “Here we must conquer or perish all,” he said. “The fate of Poland is being decided here.” He planned to make a general attack with the remnants of all divisions. The decision is belated - the Russians have already established themselves on the right bank, and the Poles are greatly weakened. Skrzhinetsky himself became the leader, and yet he had to withdraw with the loss of 250 prisoners.

Private attacks were repeated several more times, and in the end half the troops were out of action. Now Skrzynetsky is only trying to prolong the fight until nightfall. He ordered to collect all the scattered units and individuals, to bring them into battalions, at the head of which to put all available officers. A long line of battalion columns without a reserve moved forward, and the battery galloped to the nearest distance to the troops of the 3rd division, who had just crossed the bridge, and doused them with grapeshot. The stunned Old and New Ingermanland regiments ran back to the bridge. But the commanders managed to restore order, and the same regiments bravely attacked the Poles and pursued them.

At 7 o'clock in the afternoon the battle ceased. At 8 o'clock, due to a misunderstanding, artillery fire resumed, but immediately subsided. The Polish army was in complete disarray; the transition of the Russians to a decisive offensive could lead to complete extermination. But the field marshal, under the influence of some secondary thoughts, or about the unknown where Gelgud's division was located, did not dare to pursue with all his might and sent 3 regiments of Cossacks at night. Already on the 15th in the afternoon, 7,000 were sent under the command of Witt, and even he moved with such slowness that in 5 days he covered 56 miles.

The retreat of the Poles looked like the most disorderly flight; to take away the guns, they demanded cabs from Warsaw. Dibich himself, with the main forces, left Ostroleka only on May 20 and went over to Pultusk. Losses of Russians - up to 5 thousand, Poles - up to 9500 people.

Death of Dibich. The field marshal energetically prepared to cross the lower Vistula. Significant food supplies, transportation means, artillery and hospital allowances, materials for the crossing were prepared. Finally, reconnaissance of places for the crossing and ways to them was made. Thus, when all the difficulties had been experienced, everything was prepared for a decisive blow to the weakened enemy, when the victory was to crown the whole cause of the field marshal and his glory would shine with new brilliance, at this time, on May 29, Count Dibich died of cholera within a few hours. On the basis of the law, the chief of staff, Count Tol, took command of the army, but only until the arrival of the newly appointed commander-in-chief, Count Paskevich-Erivansky.

Partisan actions in Lithuania and Podolia

The uprising in Lithuania spread everywhere, and only the cities of Vilna, Kovna and Vizdy were in the hands of the Russians. The organization of the insurgent troops advanced especially far in Samogitia, in Rossien and Telshi. For the Russian detachments, the fight against the insurgents, despite the constant successes in the battles, was painful, because the enemy was directly elusive.

Khlapovsky, who skillfully made his way between the Russian troops, gathered a detachment of up to 5 thousand people and organized it into several infantry and cavalry regiments.

After the battle of Ostroleka, a detachment of General Gelgud was sent to Lithuania, with a force of up to 12 thousand with 26 guns. Gelgud was a brave, but spineless and incapable man. General Saken acted against him with a detachment, with a force of up to 6 thousand. On May 21, he reached Kovna, passing 150 miles in 4 days, and on the night of May 31, Saken came to the Vistula with 7 thousand and took up a position 7 miles to the west on the Ponar Heights .

Gelgud's forces increased to 24,000. Under the influence of Khlapovsky, Gelgud decided to attack the Russians on the Ponar Heights, but hesitated to carry out this plan. Meanwhile, detachments of Sulima, Prince Khilkov, and others were converging on Vilna. Finally, on June 4, Kuruta approached. In total, 24 thousand gathered with 76 guns.

On June 7, a battle took place on the Ponar Heights, in which Saken ordered, although General Kuruta was the eldest. The Poles acted ineptly and piecemeal, the Russians acted decisively (the Life Guards Volyn and Orenburg Lancers especially distinguished themselves). The Poles were utterly defeated and began to hastily retreat.

There were signs of panic among the retreating Poles. Saken was preparing to inflict a decisive defeat with an energetic pursuit, but ... at this time, Kuruta declared his seniority and resolutely told Saken: "No, you will not pursue." Damage of Russians - 364 people, Poles - together with 2 thousand who fled.

With the approach of Tolstoy's reserve army to Vilna, Gelgud made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Shavli, where Lieutenant Colonel Kryukov was with 5 battalions and 5 guns, after which his detachment dispersed: Khlapovsky, pursued by the Russians, crossed the Russian border at Gudaun on June 30, and Roland - 3 July at Deguce.

During the turmoil at the Prussian border on June 30, Gelgud sat on horseback; officers showered him with reproaches and curses. Adjutant of the 7th Regiment, Lieutenant Skulsky, killed Gelgud on the spot with a pistol shot in the chest and calmly joined his regiment.

Dembinsky's campaign is an excellent example of partisan action. In total there were up to 4 thousand. Dembinsky avoided open spaces and significant cities; he made his way through the forests between the Russian detachments, breaking the small ones and bypassing the stronger ones. On June 28, he set out towards Belovezhskaya Pushcha and reached it on July 15. Acting successfully and happily slipping past the detachment of Generals Savoini and Rosen, Dembinsky through Rudnya, on July 22, Sterdyn arrived at the Marks near Warsaw.

The uprising in Podolia flared up mainly among the gentry, because it was not possible to revolt the mass of the Russian peasant population. The banner of the uprising was raised by the Sabansky brothers, landowners near Olgopol. By the end of April, the number of rebels reached 5 thousand under the command of the retired General Kolyshko. The commander of the 5th corps Roth from Bessarabia arrived in forced marches and defeated them utterly near Dashev (loss of 1,600 Poles). The remnants were once again defeated by General Sheremetyev at Maidanek (near Derazhnya). The remnants of 700 people on May 14 crossed the Austrian border at Satanov.

Pacification of the rebellion by Paskevich

Toll was going to make a flank march from Pultusk past the Polish army, which was based on Lublin, along convenient roads that had already been explored earlier. But Paskevich, who arrived in Pultusk on June 13, sent the army further north, ostensibly for safety. On June 22, the movement began in four columns. The march on bad roads was very difficult, everything was drowned in the impenetrable mud. There were no roads between the columns for communication, and therefore, in case of need, one could not give help to the other.

Osek, near the Prussian border, was chosen for the crossing. The construction of bridges by Palen 1st began on July 1, as well as the construction of tete-de-pons on both banks. On July 8, the crossing of the entire army, which was located in the vicinity of Neshava, was completed.

Actions on the Brest highway. Paskevich ordered Rosen to put forward the vanguard under the command of General Golovin in order to: 1) disturb the enemy, 2) distract the Poles from the crossing of the main army, but at the same time avoid a decisive clash with the strongest enemy, 3) demonstrate to Prague and Lublin. All this was given less than 7 thousand. Golovin advanced to Kalushin and on July 2 decided to attack the enemy with several small columns, capturing the tracks adjacent to the highway. On the same day, Khrzhanovsky, having concentrated 22 thousand under his command, also decided to attack. Of course, the Poles overthrew the Russians, but only with such audacity could Golovin achieve the goal of reconnaissance and distracting the enemy.

Paskevich's movement towards Warsaw. The plan of the cautious field marshal, who was afraid to risk his newly acquired laurels, was to bring the army to Warsaw without a fight if possible, and then force it to surrender by blockade.

Having provided himself with excess food delivered from Prussia, the field marshal on July 15 moved through Brest-Kuyavsky, Gostynin, Gombin (July 18). The Poles occupied a well-known position near Sokhachev across the river. Baura; you can get around it through Lovich. The Poles did not appreciate the importance of Lovich, and therefore the advanced units of the Russian army occupied Lovich on July 20, and on the 21st the whole army concentrated there. Pushing the Poles across the river. Ravka, the Russians stopped, and so both armies remained until the first days of August.

At this time, a great excitement arose in Warsaw. Instead of Skrzhinetsky, Dembinsky was appointed commander-in-chief, crowned with the glory of the recent skillful movement from Lithuania. On the night of 3 August, he withdrew the army towards Warsaw and took up position behind Wola. On August 3, indignation of the street mob broke out in Warsaw; they searched for traitors and killed many suspects and innocent people. The old intriguer Krukovetsky was elected president of the board, and the old man Malakhovsky was elected commander-in-chief. On August 6, the taxation of Warsaw began; the army moved to Nadarzhin and its environs.

Riediger's actions. He occupied the Lublin Voivodeship. Paskevich suggested that he also cross the Vistula. Field Marshal Sacken, commander of the 1st Army, to whom Ridiger was subordinate, agreed, and Ridiger (12,400 men and 42 guns) crossed the Vistula and Józefow on 26 July. The Polish general Rozhitsky, who had no more than 5 thousand people in several detachments, acted against Ridiger. On July 31, Ridiger occupied Radom.

In early August, Rozhitsky increased to 8 thousand and began to act offensively. On August 10, Ridiger destroyed the Gedroits detachment, and captured him himself. Then Rozhitsky calmed down, but Ridiger, who sent a division to him at the invitation of Paskevich and left the protection of the bridge, himself remained with 4 battalions and could not do anything.

Actions on the Brest highway. On the night of August 10, Romarino set out from Prague with 20 thousand and went to Garvolin and Zhelekhov with the aim of defeating Golovin and Rosen separately. Romarino managed to win small private successes and even reach Terespol (near Brest), but failed to defeat Golovin and Rosen. On August 24, Romarino stopped in Miedzirzec, as he learned about the negotiations between Krukovetsky and Paskevich.

Storming of Warsaw on 25 and 26 August. Paskevich managed to concentrate 70 thousand and 362 guns at Nadorzhin. There were 35,000 Poles in Warsaw with 92 guns. If you count Romarino 20 thousand, then the largest will be - 55 thousand. True, Rozhitsky still had 8,000, Lubensky had 4,000 in the Plock Voivodeship, 10,000 in the garrisons of Lublin and Zamostye, which in total would give 77,000 and 151 guns. But all these troops did not take part in the defense of the capital, as well as Romarino.

To strengthen Warsaw, Khrzhanovsky proposed to build several strong forts at intervals to go on the offensive. To occupy them, he considered it necessary to assign 15 thousand, and 10 thousand to the reserve, a total of 25 thousand would be enough. The engineering committee rejected this project and sketched a whole hundred small fortifications, which they did not even have time to finish by the day of the assault. It would take at least 60 thousand to occupy all the fortifications. The troops, scattered in small units behind weak parapets that did not cover the numerous Russian artillery from fire, could not offer staunch resistance, especially in the absence of an external reserve.

The fortifications formed three circles. The strongest fortification in the 1st line was the Volya redoubt (No. 56) with semi-bastions at the corners, with a reduit in the southwestern corner and with a flank defense of the ditches. The internal fortifications were divided into two parts by retransaction: the larger of them had a garden, and the smaller one had a stone church with a stone fence, adapted for defense. The approaches to Wola were defended by lunette No. 57. The second line was especially strong near the Kalisz highway, fortifications No. 22 and 23. The third line was the city rampart, 10 feet high and thick, built opposite the smuggling, without any consideration for the conditions of defense; only later it was reinforced with lunettes and flushes. The Jerusalem outpost is the strongest place in the third line, fortifications No. 15, 16, 18. In service, in addition to field guns, there were 130 serfs, but very scattered.

Uminsky's corps (20 thousand) defended the territory from Chernyakovskaya Zastava up to No. 54, and Dembinsky (13 thousand) - everything else.

The Russians decided to attack Wola. With the fall of this strongest fortification, the assault on the rest seemed easy. In addition, when fighting inside the city in this direction, it was more likely to get to the Prague Bridge.

1st day of the assault, August 25th. According to the will of the sovereign, Paskevich offered the Poles to submit on the condition of a general amnesty. Krukovetsky answered about the desire to restore the fatherland within the ancient limits. On the evening of August 24, the troops occupied the following places: 1) Palen (11 thousand) near the Kalisz highway at the height of Khrzhanov; the target is an attack of Will. 2) Kreutz (12 thousand) about with. Vlohi; attack the fortifications to the right of Will. 3) Ants (3 thousand) at Rakov; distract the attention of the enemy along the Krakow highway. 4) Strandman (2 thousand) at Sluzhevets; for a false attack along the Lublin highway. 5) Khilkov (2800 cavalry) near Khrzhanov, to the left of Palen, to guard the left flank. 6) Nostitz (2100 light guards cavalry) behind Zbarzh, to communicate between Shtrandman and Muravyov and to repel attacks. 7) Guards and grenadiers (2700) reserve, behind Palen and Kreutz. 8) cut artillery (198 guns) and Witt's reserve cavalry (8 thousand) at Solibsa, not far from Kreutz. 9) The Cossacks are distributed over different points. At 5 o'clock in the morning the artillery opened fire, and an hour later two troops rushed to the assault. Kreutz took control of fortifications No. 54 and 55 on the fly. Palen No. 57 got more difficult. The stuck bayonets served as steps for climbing the parapet of the brave. Despite desperate resistance, the lunette was taken, most of the garrison was put on the spot, 80 people were taken prisoner.

There was an assault on Wola, which was occupied by the elderly General Sovinsky with 5 battalions and 12 guns. The Russians put forward 76 guns, and then selected infantry went from three sides. She broke through the rampart, but was stopped here by desperate resistance. Finally, the Poles were driven out of the garden, but the reduit remained in their hands, it was impossible to shoot them with artillery fire, so as not to shoot at their own. Paskevich sent several more regiments, with the grenadiers led by Tol. Under heavy enemy fire, the Russians overcame a number of obstacles, but the proximity of the target inflamed everyone. After climbing over the fence of the church, the soldiers approached the palisades that protected the entrance to the church. Having made a breach, they found themselves in front of the littered doors of the church, which had to be knocked out. Finally, at 11 o'clock, they managed to break into the inside of the church, where, after a fierce battle, the enemy was exterminated or captured. Sovinsky fell under the bayonets of the grenadier at the altar. 30 officers and 1200 lower ranks were captured, among the prisoners one of the instigators of the rebellion - Vysotsky.

Ants took Rakovets, Shtrandman - Shops. Meanwhile, Uminsky made a demonstration against them. Then Paskevich sent support to Muravyov, and at the same time ordered, despite Tol's ideas, to suspend all offensive actions for the time being. This was completely wrong: the more troops Uminsky would send against Muravyov and Shtrandman, the easier it would be to attack in the main direction. The Poles took advantage of the suspension to correct errors in the distribution of their troops, which caused unnecessary effort and sacrifice on the part of the Russians the next day. Finally, the Poles mistook the suspension for the exhaustion of the Russian forces and immediately went over to the offensive against Wola, and approached it with a half-gun shot. Then two carabinieri regiments, without any order, with desperate swiftness, rushed forward with bayonets and overturned the Poles. But the battle did not end there - they had to go with hostility 3 times, made their way behind the second line of fortifications and even into the Volsky suburb, but, by order of the field marshal, they were recalled back. It was one of the bloodiest episodes of the day.

Uminsky took Shops from Strandman, but Muravyov kept Rakovets. It was still only 3 p.m., but the field marshal did not want to continue the assault that day. The troops spent the night without overcoats and warm food, many without even a piece of bread, since there was only one day's supply.

2nd day of the assault, August 26th. The next day, Paskevich had a meeting with Krukovetsky, but it did not lead to anything. Polish troops were concentrated mainly to the center between the Volskaya and Jerusalem outposts. At about 2 p.m., the Russians began a cannonade. At the very beginning of the case, Paskevich was shell-shocked in the hand and, pale, with a distorted face, he fell to the ground. He handed over unlimited command of the army to Tolya.

A 120-gun battery was immediately concentrated, which began to fight the Polish battery of 112 field and fortress guns. Muravyov was ordered to attack energetically. Muravyov, reinforced by a guards brigade, led the attack in two columns. After a stubborn battle, he captured fortification No. 81, and the other rushed to No. 78. Uminsky sent infantry and cavalry regiments against her. Then Nostitz sent to the aid of the guards dragoons, who covered themselves here and arrived in time to help them with unfading glory in the fight against the enemy, four times stronger.

At about 5 o’clock, Kreutz went in two columns to fortifications No. 21 and 22: the 4th cavalry company of Colonel Zhitov jumped to redoubt No. 21 for 200 steps and showered the enemy with such cruel buckshot that he fled without waiting for the attack, and horse-artillery hunters rushed on horseback into redoubt and captured the gun. Thus, Zhitov showed an extremely rare example of an independent attack with artillery without the help of other branches of the military.

No. 22 with two battalions was occupied by the troops of Kreutz after a stubborn battle, and the garrison was almost completely exterminated.

Palen took possession of No. 23 and 24, and then, after a fierce battle, the Evangelical cemetery. It was already about 6 pm, dusk was approaching. Some generals suggested that Tolya postpone the assault until the morning. “Now or never,” Tol answered and ordered the troops to be put in order, reinforced with reserves, send artillery and storm the city rampart. After a 3-hour struggle, the Jerusalem outpost was taken, and at about 10 pm - Volskaya. At night, half of the troops rested, while the other was under arms, pushing forward posts only 50 paces ahead of the rampart. The sappers cut through the gun embrasures for tomorrow. However, there was no need to fight: at night, Commander-in-Chief Malazovsky sent a letter addressed to Paskevich that Warsaw would be cleared by 5 o'clock in the morning.

Having cleared Warsaw, the Poles moved towards Modlin. On August 27, the Russian army entered the enemy capital. Russian losses amounted to 10? thousand, Poles - 11 thousand and 132 guns.

It seemed that the struggle with the Poles was over and the defeated Polish army should surrender to the mercy of the winner. However, as soon as the Poles escaped the death that threatened them, the members of the board who gathered in Zakrochim (near Modlin) declared their unwillingness to obey unconditionally. Paskevich had 60 thousand, but 12 thousand had to be allocated to the Warsaw garrison, and a detachment to secure the Brest highway, that is, 45 thousand would remain, which he did not want to risk and go against 30 thousand Poles, although defeated and disorganized. He wanted to wait until Rosen and Ridiger had dealt with Romarino and Rozhitsky.

Malakhovsky ordered Romarino to arrive in Modlin, but the latter, pursuing his personal goals and obeying the desire of the magnates who were with his detachment, did not comply with the orders of the commander-in-chief under the pretext of the danger of moving to Modlin. He decided to retreat to the Upper Vistula, cross at Zavikhost and join Rozhitsky. Romarino took up a strong position at Opole, but on September 3 was overturned by Rosen, who finally pinned him to the Austrian border. On September 5, Romarino, with 14 thousand and 42 guns, crossed the border at Borov and surrendered to the Austrians.

In early September, Ridiger, reinforced from Rosen's detachment, had 9 thousand with 24 guns. Rozhitsky also had 9 thousand, but retreated to Pinchov and, assuming to hold on to the river here. Nida, separated Kamensky to Stopnitsa with most of the cavalry, 3 battalions and 2 guns. On September 11, Ridiger sent against Kamensky Krasovsky with 2 thousand, and he himself went to Pinchov. On September 12, Krasovsky overtook and defeated Kamensky at Shkalmberg (there were 2,000 prisoners alone), and General Plakhovo, with the vanguard of Ridiger, inflicted a severe defeat on Rozhitsky, who was retreating to Mekhov. On September 14, Rozhitsky decided to move to Krakow possessions. Ridiger followed him and drove him into Galicia, where the Austrians disarmed the Poles; however, only 1,400 of them remained.

The death of Colonel Kozlinikov in the vicinity of Plock

Seeing successes against Romarino and Rozhitsky, Paskevich decided to act by force of arms against the main Polish army. It was impossible for the Poles to continue the war in the north, it remained to move the war south to the wooded, mountainous and rugged terrain, where it was possible to rely on Krakow and Galicia, which sympathized with the Poles. However, moving an army south past the Russians required speed, energy, and stealth.

The new Polish commander-in-chief Rybinsky, leaving the garrison in Lublin, arrived on September 11 at Plock. The crossing began safely, but Rybinsky returned the troops back, the conditions of obedience, accepted by the majority at the military council, were returned from Paskevich. But such a decision caused indignation, especially among young officers, and therefore the proposal was rejected. Paskevich sent most of his forces after the Poles along both banks of the Vistula.

On September 16, the crossing of the Poles began safely at Vlotslavsk, but Rybinsky, having learned about the fate of Rozhitsky (it was no longer possible to count on connecting with him), again refused the crossing. Immediately, Mülberg, who was negotiating with Paskevich, brought his new proposal, more severe, the words “constitutional” and “fatherland” were excluded from the oath. The proposal was rejected and decided to go to Prussia.

On September 20, the Polish army (21,000, 95 guns and 9,000 horses) crossed the Prussian border at Soberzyn, Shutov and Gurzno (east of Thorn). Ragged, in linen trousers, without overcoats, and many even without shoes, the Poles inspired compassion for the Prussian troops who were preparing to receive them. While the troops had weapons in their hands, they still seemed calm, but when they had to give up their guns, dismount from their horses, unfasten and lay down their sabers, some began to cry. A few days later, however, the Poles indulged in a carefree and scattered life. Their restless behavior, constant desire for intrigues and gossip, hatred of everything that bore a sign of order, finally, their boasting and vanity - all this was the reason that those who crossed the border fell even more in general opinion.

During the uprising, the Kingdom of Poland lost 326,000 people, of which 25,000 were Warsaw alone, and more than 600 million zlotys, not counting private losses. But most importantly, the Poles lost those significant privileges that they enjoyed before the uprising.

Notes:

Before the invasion of Napoleon, there were 9257 monasteries, churches, government and private buildings in Moscow; 6496 of them burned down; all others were more or less plundered. The losses of individuals amounted to 83,372,000 rubles. real estate and 16,585,000 rubles. movable property. This did not include losses of the palace, spiritual, military and other state and public departments.

These facts, set forth in the work of Count Yorck von Wartenburg, are incomprehensible; Napoleon, undoubtedly, had already decided to retreat to Smolensk and, in relation to this, echeloned his troops; under such conditions it was impossible to even think of a battle.

Deciding to retreat is very difficult, especially for someone who fancied himself a superman and before whom almost the whole world trembled.

On the same day, October 16, in the rear of Napoleon, Admiral Chichagov moved from the vicinity of Pruzhany to Minsk and the river. Berezina, leaving Saken against Schwarzenberg and Rainier, pushed back beyond the river. Bug.

The Sejm is a class representative institution; a representative assembly in the former Poland and later in Finland. - Note. ed.

Formerly, oddly enough, Czartoryski had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia.

Sub-ensign - the rank in which the lower ranks were promoted, who passed the ensign examination after completing the course at the ensign school and remained in long-term service. - Note. ed.

Shlyakhtich is a Polish small estate nobleman. - Note. ed.

The skirmisher is a soldier in the forward line. - Note. ed.

Tete de pont (French tete de pont< tete голова + pont мост) - предмостное укрепление. - Note. ed.

Here: “four” (from Polish cwiartka - four, quarter. - Note. ed.

Notch - a barrier of fallen trees. - Note. ed.

Epolements are parapets of a special device that serve to cover troops where the terrain does not have convenient natural covers. - Note. ed.

Cosigners - during the uprising, the Polish army, armed with scythes, which were attached to poles. - Note. ed.

It is this attack of the Poles that is depicted in the painting by Kossak, where the patriotic artist completely depicted the triumphant Poles and only in the right corner of one Russian staff officer, cast down to dust. Khlopitsky - in a civilian gray coat and top hat, on horseback, followed by Prondzinsky in the uniform of the General Staff. In general, a lot of portraits. The Piontek battery is visible on the highway. He used up the shells, but did not want to leave the position, sat on the gun, lit a pipe and decided to wait until the shells were fed. Warsaw is visible in the distance.

POLISH Uprising of 1794
Prehistory of the uprising (1791-1794) The Constitution of May 3, 1791 (see MAY 3rd, 1791 CONSTITUTION) laid the foundations for the transformation of the Commonwealth into a viable state with a strong central authority.

The restriction of class privileges caused displeasure among some of the magnates (see Magnates) and the gentry (see gentry), who in May 1792 organized the Targowice Confederation against the constitution. King Stanislav August Poniatowski (see PONYATOVSKY Stanislav August) declared Targovičians rebels and ordered the confederation troops to be dispersed by force. However, the Russian Empress Catherine II (see EKATERINA II), who did not want the strengthening of the Commonwealth, came out in support of the confederation and ordered the troops of General Mikhail Kakhovsky to enter Poland, and General Krechetnikov - to Lithuania. Fighting broke out. Catherine II was joined in the Polish question by the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm II (see FRIEDRICH WILHELM II). For about three months, the Polish army resisted. But under pressure from superior forces, King Stanislav August was forced to capitulate and submit to the demands of the Targovichans and interventionists. The new diet, convened in the city of Grodno, proclaimed the abolition of the May 3 constitution. Garrisons of Russian and Prussian troops were stationed in the major cities of the Commonwealth, including Warsaw. The Polish army was being reorganized, many of its units were supposed to be disbanded. In December 1792, Catherine II and Friedrich Wilhelm II agreed on a new, second division of the Commonwealth. On April 9, 1793, the terms of the partition were announced: Prussia received Greater Poland with the cities of Poznan, Torun and Gdansk, Russia - Eastern Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine. In September 1793, the terms of the division were accepted by the Polish Sejm, which was controlled by the Targovičians. Not all Polish patriots have come to terms with the dictates of foreign powers. Everywhere secret societies were organized, which set as their goal the preparation of a general uprising. The head of the patriotic movement was General Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who had proven himself well in the fight against the Targovians, and a participant in the American Revolution (see Tadeusz KOSTUSHKO). The conspirators pinned great hopes on revolutionary France, which was at war with Austria and Prussia, participants in the partition of Poland.
Beginning of the uprising (March-June 1794) The uprising began on March 12, 1794 in Pultusk with a mutiny of the cavalry brigade of General Anton Madalinsky (Madalinsky, d. 1805), which refused to obey the decision to disband. Other parts of the army of the Commonwealth began to join the rebels. A few days later, Madalinsky's cavalry captured Krakow, which became the center of the uprising. March 16, 1794 was elected leader of the rebels - proclaimed dictator Tadeusz Kosciuszko. On March 24, an Act of Uprising was published in Krakow, which proclaimed the slogans of restoring in full the sovereignty of Poland, returning the territories torn away in 1773 and 1793 (see Partitions of Poland (see Partitions of Poland)), continuing the reforms initiated by the Four-Year Sejm (see FOUR-YEAR SEIM ) 1788-1792. The insurgents were supported by broad sections of Polish society, the arming of the population and the formation of insurgent detachments began everywhere. The Russian ambassador in Warsaw and the commander of the Russian troops on the territory of the Commonwealth, General I. A. Igelstrom, sent a detachment of General A. P. Tormasov to suppress the uprising (see TORMASOV Alexander Petrovich). But on April 4, 1794, in a battle near Roslavitsy (Ratslavice), the Poles managed to defeat a detachment of Russian troops. Following this, the uprisings of the townspeople liberated Warsaw (April 17-18) and Vilna (April 22-23). Taking the title of Generalissimo, Kosciuszko announced a general mobilization. The number of the rebel army was increased to 70 thousand, but a significant part of it was armed with pikes and scythes. By May, the rebels had established control over most of the Commonwealth. The democratically minded leaders of the uprising tried to start reforms in Poland. On May 7, 1793, Tadeusz Kosciuszko published the Polaniec Universal, which provided serfs with personal freedom on condition that they settled with the landlords and paid state taxes, recognized the peasants' inheritance right to cultivated land. This act was hostilely perceived by the gentry and the Catholic clergy, who sabotaged its real implementation. Under the influence of the French Revolution (see GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION), the most radical part of the rebels formed into a group of Polish Jacobins (see POLISH JACOBINS) and tried to unleash revolutionary terror in Poland. On May 9 and June 28, 1794, the Jacobins provoked popular unrest in Warsaw, during which the leaders of the Targowice Confederation were executed. The extremism of the Jacobins alienated many moderate Poles from the rebel camp. Russia, Prussia and Austria decided to suppress the uprising by force of arms and force the Poles to recognize the partitions of Poland. Russian troops acted in two directions: Warsaw and Lithuanian. In the second echelon of the Russian troops, the 30,000th cover corps of General Saltykov was deployed. From the Turkish border to Poland, the corps of General-in-Chief A. V. Suvorov was urgently transferred (see SUVOROV Alexander Vasilyevich). The Austrians concentrated a 20,000-strong corps on the southern borders of the Commonwealth. Under the personal command of King Frederick William II, a 54,000-strong Prussian army invaded Poland from the west. Another 11 thousand Prussians remained to cover their borders. The main forces of the Poles - the 23,000-strong corps, under the personal command of Kosciuszko, were located in the vicinity of Warsaw. The seven thousandth reserve of the rebels stood in Krakow. Smaller detachments covered the directions to Vilna, Grodno, Lublin, Rava-Russkaya.
Fighting in the summer of 1794 In the summer of 1794, active fighting broke out between the opponents. Having superior forces, Kosciuszko tried to destroy the Cossack detachment of Ataman Denisov, who remained in Poland, near Radom. But the Cossacks evaded the battle and retreated to join the Prussians. In the battle near Shchekotsin, Kosciuszko's corps was defeated and was forced to retreat to Warsaw. Building on the success, the Prussian General Elsner captured Krakow. In July 1794, Friedrich Wilhelm II began the siege of Warsaw, where he met with desperate resistance from its defenders. In the eastern direction, the Russian detachment of General Derfelden successfully operated, which, advancing from the Pripyat River, defeated the Polish corps of General Jozef Zayonchek (Zajaczek, 1752-1826), occupied Lublin and went to Pulawy. Field Marshal Prince Nikolai Repnin (see REPNIN Nikolai Vasilievich), appointed commander of the Russian troops in Lithuania, waited for the arrival of Suvorov's corps from the Turkish border and did not take decisive action. Repnin's passivity allowed the Poles to develop successful combat activities in Lithuania. While the detachments of Count Grabovsky and Yakub Yasinsky (Jasinsky, d. 1794) held Vilna and Grodno, Count Mikhail Oginsky (see OGINSKY Mikhail Kleofas) launched a partisan struggle in the rear of the Russian troops, and the 12,000-strong rebel corps went to Courland and occupied Libava. Only the unsuccessful actions of the commander of the Polish troops in Lithuania, Mikhail Villegorsky, did not allow the rebels to achieve decisive successes. After a double attack, Russian troops captured Vilna and on August 1, 1794 defeated the main rebel forces in Lithuania. After that, the Russians firmly seized the initiative, which was facilitated by a confederation in support of Russia, organized by Count Xavier Branitsky from part of the Lithuanian gentry. Meanwhile, in the rear of the Prussian troops, in the previously annexed Greater Poland, an uprising broke out. The rebels managed to take several cities. Never having achieved success, the Prussians were forced in September 1794 to retreat from Warsaw. Kosciuszko pursued the retreating Friedrich Wilhelm II, General Madalinsky successfully acted on the Lower Vistula. Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Poles were busy in other directions, the Austrian troops occupied Krakow, Sandomierz and Kholm, and limited their actions there.
Suppression of the uprising (September-November 1794) At the beginning of September 1794, the 10,000th corps of Alexander Suvorov arrived at the theater of operations in Belarus. On September 4, he took Kobrin, on September 8 near Brest he defeated the rebels under the command of Serakovsky. On September 28 (October 9), 1794, the Russian corps of General Ivan Ferzen defeated the main forces of the rebel troops in the battle of Maciejowice near the town of Siedlce in Eastern Poland. Tadeusz Kosciuszko himself was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. Of the 10 thousand rebels who participated in the battle, only two thousand managed to escape to Warsaw. The news of the disaster near Maciejowice caused a panic in Warsaw, which there was no one to protect. The new commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Tomasz Wavrzhetsky, ordered all insurgent detachments to rush to the capital. But the efforts made were in vain. Suvorov, having attached to himself the detachments of Fersen and Derfelden, on October 24 (November 4) stormed Prague - the right-bank part of Warsaw. Under the threat of artillery bombardment, the Varsovians decided to capitulate. On October 26 (November 6), 1794, Suvorov's troops occupied the capital of the Commonwealth. After the fall of the capital, the resistance of the Poles began to fade. Part of the remnants of the Polish army crossed the Prussian border and joined the rebels in Greater Poland. But even here the uprising was soon crushed. Another part of the rebel army tried to break through to the south, across the Austrian border into Galicia. Near Opochno, the rebels were overtaken by the Prussian detachment of General Kleist and the Cossacks of Ataman Denisov. In the battle, the Poles were completely defeated and only a few of them managed to escape to Galicia. The desperate resistance of the insurgents pulled over a significant part of the forces of the anti-French coalition and eased the position of revolutionary France in the most tense period. The defeat of the uprising predetermined the third partition of Poland in 1795 and the complete liquidation of Polish statehood.

In September 2009, the 210th anniversary of the famous crossing of the Alps by Alexander Suvorov's army was widely celebrated in Switzerland. In a distant mountainous country, several monuments were erected to the Russian commander at once, including a grandiose memorial cross on the St. Gotthard Pass. Autumn is a memorable time for the Suvorov epic in Belarus. It was during these months 215 years ago that the final battles of the uprising led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko took place. The main character who achieved a turning point in the course of hostilities in favor of the Russian troops was precisely Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. As a result, the Commonwealth ceased to exist, and the lands of Belarus became part of the Russian Empire.

Who is more valuable than mother history?
Recently, in nationalist circles, it has become customary to excessively demonize the figure of an outstanding Russian commander. What only epithets in his address you will not hear! He is both a “bloody butcher” and a “strangler of freedom”, he also “brought serfdom to Belarus”.
The peak of anti-Suvorov hysteria (you can't say otherwise) was the campaign launched by some "members of the public" in 2007 against the construction of an Orthodox church in Kobrin, which the local church community dedicated to the memory of A.V. Suvorov. Then Ales Pashkevich, Vladimir Orlov, Oleg Trusov and his comrades literally mixed the name of the commander with mud. There were even leaflets in which it was stated that the Suvorov soldiers impaled Belarusian children on pikes and bayonets and so walked around the cities and villages. In the press, one can also come across allegations that Suvorov's troops passed through Belarus in a bloody march, leaving behind a forest of gallows.
Opposition representatives counted how many streets, monuments, collective farms and state farms in Belarus named after Alexander Suvorov. Naturally, all of them are called to rename. There are constant demands to change the name of the Minsk Suvorov Military School.
With Tadeusz Kosciuszko, the story is somewhat different. Until the beginning of the 90s of the twentieth century, few people on the globe doubted the Polish origin of Kosciuszko. But at the same time, even in Soviet times, it was not a secret that an outstanding Polish military leader was born in Belarus. This was written in history textbooks, scientific publications. Since 1994, when the 200th anniversary of the uprising under his leadership was celebrated, there have been more and more assertions that Tadeusz Kosciuszko is actually a Belarusian and fought for the freedom of our country. Streets named after Kosciuszko began to appear, monuments were erected, even a commemorative stamp was issued in his honor.
The Belarusian poet Leonid Daineko dedicated a poem to this topic with the eloquent title "Patriotic Test":
Nominee (does not require a quorum),
Who are you and your people -
Patryet for you Suvorov
Qi Kasciuszka is patriotic?
So let's follow the poet and we will sharpen the issue and try to figure out who is more valuable for Belarus: Suvorov or Kosciuszko?
Popular uprising. But what people?
Even supporters of the concept of Litvinism can hardly find arguments to prove that T. Kosciuszko and his associates defended the idea of ​​independence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And yet such attempts are being made. This usually uses multiple arguments. Firstly, the origin of the head of the uprising himself from the old Belarusian gentry family of Kostyushek-Sekhnovitsky. Secondly, his birthplace is the Merechevshchina estate, not far from Kossovo (now the Ivatsevichi district). Thirdly, the text of the appeal of T. Kosciuszko "To the citizens of Lithuanian and order commissions" dated June 2, 1794. In it, the head of the uprising wrote: “Lithuania! Glorious in struggle and citizenship, unhappy for a long time through my own sons of treason, I promise to become among you with gratitude for your trust in me, if military circumstances allow me ... who am I but Litvin, your fellow countryman, chosen by you? On this basis, some publicists conclude that it was about the struggle for the independence of Belarus, identified with Lithuania. But the theory of "Belarusian" T. Kosciuszko does not stand up to criticism. Regrettably, by the end of the 18th century Belarus did not act not only as an independent state, but even in principle as a subject of political relations. After the Union of Lublin in 1569, there was a rapid Polonization of the gentry class and a significant part of the townspeople of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1696, the Old Belarusian language was banned.
Polonization did not bypass the Kosciuszko family. Tadeusz himself, who studied at the PR College, where teaching took place in Latin and Polish, and the Knights' School in Warsaw, was a perfect Pole in his self-consciousness. In the same appeal dated June 2, he mentions the GDL only as his small homeland, somewhat distantly: “Lithuania! My countrymen and compatriots! I was born on your land, and in the fervor of righteousness for my Fatherland, a special affection for those among whom I have taken root of life resonates in me. The appeal itself was nothing more than a propaganda proclamation designed to intensify the activities of the rebels on the territory of the GDL. By the way, another Polish “chief” J. Pilsudski made a similar appeal “To the citizens of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania” in April 1919. This gentleman also used to call himself a Litvin, since he was born in the Vilna region. For Belarusians, this “Litvinian nostalgia” of another Polish “chief” ended with the closure of national schools and newspapers, the arrests of leaders of the liberation movement and massive Polonization.
One of the main goals of the rebels T. Kosciuszko was the restoration of the Constitution of the Commonwealth on May 3, 1791, which actually eliminated even the ghostly autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, turning it into one of the provinces of the Polish state. The constitution refers exclusively to the Polish people, and the name "Poland" is repeatedly given as a synonym for the Commonwealth.
There was no question of any independence of the GDL, and even more so of Belarus. Nobody even thought about it! As soon as Vilna was suspected of some illusory separatism at the main headquarters of T. Kosciuszko, then on June 4, 1794, Y. Yasinsky was removed from the post of commander-in-chief in Lithuania, and the Supreme Lithuanian Rada was dissolved, replacing it with the Central Deputation of the ON, completely subordinate to Warsaw. All district ordinal commissions were approved in the Polish capital. Yes, and the notorious separatism of Y. Yasinsky manifested itself, rather, in extreme revolutionary radicalism, like French Jacobinism, in self-will and disobedience to the orders of the head of the uprising, that is, T. Kosciuszko himself. After all, Y. Yasinsky, whom some people are in a hurry to write down almost as the first "Belarusian" revolutionaries, was a Pole not only by self-consciousness, but also by origin: he was born in the Poznan province in a family of Polish gentry.
All the documents of the rebels in the GDL were drawn up exclusively in Polish, they are literally saturated with the ideas of "Polishness". So, in the accusation made against the last great hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Sh.M. Kosakovsky, it was said that he used "violence with disgust for all Polish rights." The leaders of the uprising in the Merech Voivodeship of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (now it is the territory of the Republic of Lithuania) wrote: “Remember that the inhabitant called for this holy cause is so obliged to act like a respectable Pole, a defender of glory, liberty, integrity and independence.” T. Kosciuszko himself did not question the Polish nature of the uprising. On March 25, 1794, in his famous universal about the beginning of the uprising, he appealed to "all voivodeship generals, commanders of the troops of the Polish Republic."
In order to avoid illusions about what Belarus would have expected if the uprising was victorious, this fact should also be cited. One of the leaders of the rebels in the GDL, M.K. Oginsky, the author of the famous polonaise, in October 1811 submitted a letter to the Russian Emperor Alexander I with a draft decree on a new organization of the western provinces of the empire. According to this document, it was supposed to restore the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, according to the plan of M.K. Oginsky, Polish was to become the official language in this state. In another note addressed to the Russian emperor dated December 1, 1811, as well as during a personal audience with Alexander I at the end of January 1812, M.K. of the year. At the same time, he suggested that the emperor accept the title of the Polish king and conclude a Russian-Polish union. So, no matter who now proposes to make Oginsky's polonaise the Belarusian anthem, Michal Kleofas himself knew exactly the name of his Fatherland, which he so heartily said goodbye to in his work. And the name is not Belarus at all. ON for the rebels of 1794, as well as for the entire numerous gentry of the Commonwealth, seemed to be a vast province of a single Polish state. Yes, with its regional differences, with its rich historical past, but just a part of Poland, the same as, say, Mazovia, also once an independent state.
Fight for souls and minds
The elite of Polish society had a fairly good idea of ​​the mood in the lower classes, and even more so among the Belarusian peasants. King Stanisław August Poniatowski at the Four-Year Sejm in a speech dated November 6, 1788 warned members of the Sejm that "during the war with Moscow, we may have a worst enemy from our clap." The same applied to the Orthodox population. Throughout the 18th century, the Polish authorities persecuted Orthodox residents, accusing them of sympathy for Russia. The Belarusian Metropolitan Georgy Konissky was subjected to persecution. The vicar of the Kyiv Metropolitan in Slutsk, Bishop Viktor Sadkovsky, was thrown into prison on false charges in 1789 and kept there without any sentence for three long years, until he was released by Russian troops.
The situation did not change during the uprising itself. True, some Orthodox, even clergy, joined the rebels. But this is more of an exception that proves the rule.
During the uprising of 1794 on the territory of Belarus, about 30 thousand people took part in it, of which the majority were the gentry, only a third were peasants. The Belarusian historian V.P. Yemelyanchik, who was clearly sympathetic to the rebels T. Kosciuszko, was forced to admit: “The attempts of part of the leadership of the uprising to close it only on questions of “Polishness”, as well as unfavorable conditions for a cardinal solution of the “peasant question” did not lead to his victory. Hence the relative passivity of the Belarusian peasantry.”
In fact, the Belarusian peasants, who made up the vast majority of the population, were not so passive. The sources noted repeated cases of active resistance that local residents provided to the rebel groups. On May 25, 1794, the Russian general V.Kh. Brigadier L.L. Bennigsen reported from Smorgon to his command about mass demonstrations of Belarusian peasants against the rebellious gentry. According to him, the inhabitants of many villages, being sure "that they would remain under the protection of Russia", pointed out those places "where guns and various military ammunition were buried in the ground, which I received, somehow: in pikes, sabers, guns, pistols, bayonets, a considerable number. Major General B.D. Knorring, one of the Russian military leaders who led the suppression of the uprising, recalled: “... Upon the publication of my station wagons, the peasants, who were already armed and left alone, attacked their armaments and leaders and could not flee from them were taken by them and delivered to us." According to the reports of the same general, the rebels were forced to leave the vicinity of Slonim, not so much due to the actions of the Russian troops, but because of the complete hostility on the part of the local population.
In August 1794, 170 local Belarusian peasants took an active part in the defense of the Dinaburg fortress by the Russian troops. And this is not surprising, since the rebels led by M.K. So, from the peasants of the landowner Ziberkh, whose estate was located in the vicinity of Dinaburg, the rebels received 50 chervonets as an indemnity, in addition another 45 rubles in the form of requisitions, they seized 7 landlord and 5 peasant horses. All this was accompanied by mass beatings of local residents. Such actions were common practice. After one of his "partisan" actions, M.K. Oginsky was returning with a convoy of 200 peasant carts.
Researcher A. Benzeruk rightly states: “The events of the uprising once again showed that for the Belarusians the year 1794 acquired the features of a civil war, since our compatriots fought on both sides of the barricades.” And our countrymen fought in the troops of A.V. Suvorov. One of the most famous formations of his army was the Belarusian Jaeger Corps, which consisted of several battalions. Warriors-Belarusians (as they were called in the Russian army) were distinguished by their daring and fearlessness.
The widespread anti-insurgent sentiment in Belarus is evidenced not only by Russian officers, but also by the Polish insurgents themselves. Colonel I. Dzyalinsky later testified: “According to Evo, Krautner, the excitement meant that the peasants wanted to rebel against the Russian troops. But Dzyalinsky considers these news to be completely false, knowing the well-known attachment of the peasants to the Russian troops. M.K. Oginsky, breaking into the territory that went to the Russian Empire after the second partition, was defeated precisely because of the hostility of the local residents. According to his own recollections, he had to abandon the assault on Minsk, since the Russian governor Neplyuyev attracted "a large number of armed peasants to the defense of the city in order to put them up for the first attack."
Even in Vishnevo and Shchorsy, where Count Khreptovich carried out reforms, the peasants refused to give recruits and actively opposed the Kostyushkovites. Captain I. Goyzhevsky sadly stated: in “Vishnev, with the help of execution, I choose infantrymen ... But people are rebelled by Moscow and do not want to be obedient ... Similarly, in Smotovshchizna and Shchorsy, the claps rebelled and do not want to give recruits.”
By the way, modern pseudo-scientific publicists usually accuse the troops of A.V. Suvorov that "they brought recruitment on their bayonets." But recruitment sets were introduced by T. Kosciuszko's rebels themselves. If they had counted only on volunteers, then the uprising would have died out before it began.
However, the situation with the recruitment of recruits was not the best. Various sections of society showed indifference towards, if not ideas, then participation in the uprising. Documents of that time are full of complaints, threats from various rebel representatives, caused by the passivity of the inhabitants, their unwillingness to fight against Russian troops. The insurgent center in Vilna received reports of the following content: “People are fleeing Vilna continuously, so except for women) who have panicked souls, and therefore it is reasonable that they leave) this covers a lot of fit-for-weapons and armed men.” The authorized representative of the rebels, J. Garain, wrote to the Brest commission that he was producing a "forced recruitment" of recruits.
After the defeat in the battle near the village of Perebranovichi in May 1794 from Russian troops, "Polish gentry, without much resistance, pointed to the place where weapons (pistols, pikes, guns) were stored and declared that they would forever remain under the protection of Russia."
The leader of the uprising himself was forced to acknowledge the failure of the recruitment in the Belarusian lands. On September 12, 1794, he wrote: “Out of the 500 recruits intended for my convoy, only 372 were delivered from the Brest-Litovsk Voivodeship, the rest fled along the road.” At the beginning of August 1794, a riot broke out in the 3rd regiment of the Lithuanian vanguard of the rebel detachment of Major General P. Grabovsky, after which five death sentences were pronounced, but not carried out.
The peasants refused to go into the rebel army, and the gentry constantly complained that the farmers were getting off the ground. The recruitment sets introduced by the Kostyushkovites were really unbearable for Lithuania and western Belarus, since here in 1793 there was a severe famine, which happened as a result of a protracted drought. The spring crops did not bear fruit, there was no hay at all.
Almost the only evidence of some semblance of broad popular support for the rebels on the territory of Belarus is the often quoted testimonies of the Russian military leader N.V. Repnin: , you can’t drive it away in front of you, but they will always remain in the back of the troops, posing as calm inhabitants. However, these assessments of the Russian general, in principle, should be treated with a significant degree of skepticism. As, incidentally, contemporaries did. Nikolai Vasilyevich Repnin was, to put it mildly, a reinsurer. He literally attacked Petersburg with panic reports based on unconfirmed rumors and conjectures. Already after the suppression of the uprising, N.V. Repnin opposed the settlement of the former king Stanislav August in Grodno, arguing that under the overthrown monarch there was a well-armed guard of 300-400 people. In the city itself, he imagined a secret plot to free Poniatowski. Repnin offered to transfer the former king away, for example, to Riga. None of these fears turned out to be true. This is how Repnin himself is assessed by one of the most authoritative researchers of that era, M. de Poulet: “Although during the wars with the Turks, Prince Repnin gained fame not only as a military general, but also as an excellent commander, but one cursory glance at his actions in Lithuania is enough , from the first days of April 1794, to be convinced of the insufficiency of his military leadership abilities: he was slow and cautious everywhere, at every step, and, moreover, to the extreme. ”However, even N.V. Repnin eventually admitted that the local population but it is more pro-Russian than pro-Polish. He also has such a statement, which for some reason has not been practically quoted recently: "The peasants are more on our side than the rebels." It is also necessary to discard all speculations about serfdom, allegedly "brought on Suvorov's bayonets." Serfdom (prygon) was finally approved in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to the Statute of 1588, half a century earlier than in Russia. And serfdom in the Commonwealth was no easier than in the Russian Empire, burdened by the complete self-will of the gentry and magnates, additional exploitation by the tenants. True, in the "Polonets Universal", published on May 7, 1794, T. Kosciuszko proclaimed that "the personality of each peasant is free", the hereditary right to use the land was recognized for the peasants. However, this did not mean the abolition of serfdom. The peasant could leave the pan, provided that all duties were fulfilled and debts were paid, which was an almost impossible requirement. Only the participants in the uprising were exempted from corvée, while the rest had to "diligently serve the days of corvée that remained, to serve, to be obedient to their superiors." In addition, in a number of places, the gentry, who participated in the uprising, openly sabotaged the execution of the station wagon. Contemporaries wrote about this: "The gentry in a large part declares: let a Muscovite, Prussian or Austrian rule us, but we will not free the peasants from citizenship."
In the literature, one can find constant references to a large number of peasant souls granted to Russian officers and officials in Belarus. These facts are cited as evidence of the enslavement of the Belarusian peasantry. But the Russian landowners were allotted land together with the peasants, who were by no means free. Prior to that, they belonged to the Russian treasury, which came into possession after the confiscation of land from Polish landowners who refused to swear allegiance to the Russian Empress. On June 1, 1773, in the Mogilev and Pskov provinces, 95,097 peasant souls passed into the ownership of the state treasury. Lands and estates, by the way, were endowed not only with immigrants from Russia. So, on December 3, 1795, with her rescript, Catherine II ordered the Lithuanian governor-general to return the estates to all the relatives of the former Polish king, as well as to a number of other prominent figures of the Commonwealth, including the former Lithuanian hetman Michal Kazimir Oginsky.
Not only by force of arms
We should immediately make a reservation: of course, war is war. Always and at all times, in the course of hostilities, civilians die, war crimes occur. Even in peacetime, military personnel commit offenses, there is enough work for special military prosecutors and courts. What can we say about the military hard times in the XVIII century, when there were no Geneva and Hague conventions prescribing the rules of war. Therefore, when evaluating the actions of certain troops, the most important criterion is the attitudes and orders given by the military leaders. All the same N.V. Repnin ordered his officers, first of all, to strive to protect the peasants. Requisitions of food and fodder were ordered to be done mainly from the gentry. Peasants who voluntarily left the rebel detachments were recommended to be sure to be rewarded with money and set free. Suvorov himself, in his famous Science of Victory, taught the soldiers: “Do not offend the layman, he gives us water, feeds us. A soldier is not a robber."
All this completely fit into the framework of the concept of policy pursued by the imperial authorities in Belarus and Lithuania. Its foundations were formulated in the famous “Instruction” of Catherine II to the governors of Pskov and Mogilev on administration in the lands annexed from Poland dated May 28, 1772. All the activities of the new government, in the opinion of the great empress, should have led to the fact that “not only these provinces would be subjugated to us by force of arms, but so that you (the governors. - V.G.) the heart of the people living in them, kind, decent They appropriated the just, indulgent, meek and philanthropic administration of the Russian Empire, so that they themselves would have a reason to consider their rejection from the anarchist Republic of Poland as the first step towards their prosperity. This document provided for freedom of religion. As you know, the Jesuit order, banned at that time throughout Europe, continued to operate quietly only in one country - the Russian Empire.
Judgment and reprisals were carried out according to local laws and in the local language. Torture was abolished everywhere. The population of the former lands of the Commonwealth, annexed to the Russian Empire under the second section of 1793, was exempt from taxes for two years.
Naturally, the moratorium on the death penalty introduced in the Russian Empire in 1744 also extended to the Belarusian lands. It was violated only in exceptional cases: after the conspiracy of V.Ya.Mirovich in 1764 and during the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion. The uprising of 1794 was no such exception. The captured rebels, regardless of their rank and nationality, were not executed. A.V. Suvorov often released prisoners altogether, as happened with 6,000 Polish soldiers released by him after the capture of Warsaw.

T. Kosciuszko himself was not executed either. After a short imprisonment in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he enjoyed considerable freedom, the former leader of the uprising was released by Emperor Paul I, who awarded him 12 thousand rubles, a sable coat and hat, fur boots and silverware. At the same time, T. Kosciuszko took an oath of allegiance to the Russian autocrat and kept it, and then did not take up arms against Russia.
Another leader of the uprising, M.K. Oginsky, the same author of the polonaise, not only returned after a short emigration to the Russian Empire, but even became its senator under Emperor Alexander I.
Finally, is it possible to imagine that the "brutal occupiers" would consider the complaints of the inhabitants of the "captured territory", including their former opponents, about damage to property during hostilities? Moreover, did they recover the amount of damage from the commander of their own troops? What are these occupiers and what kind of occupation is this?! But this is exactly what happened after only a couple of years after the end of the uprising T. Kosciuszko. In June 1797, the former Lithuanian podstoly Count Vorzel filed a petition to the Russian authorities for compensation for the damage to him for the timber and potash destroyed as a result of the actions of the troops under the command of A.V. Suvorov. Despite the fact that the commander himself had nothing to do with this case, a sequestration was imposed on his Kobrin estate to compensate Worzel for damage in the amount of 5,628 chervonets or 28,000 paper rubles. Six months after this incident, the former Polish major Vyganovsky filed a similar petition for the recovery of 36,000 rubles from Suvorov, allegedly for setting fire to the estate during the Krupchitsky battle. The Russian authorities conducted a thorough investigation into this incident. The great commander was indignant: “I am not an incendiary and not a robber. War or Peace? In desperation, he was even ready to start selling jewelry, while saying: “Unfortunately, diamonds. I deserve them. God has given, God will take and can give again.” However, the investigation concluded that Vyganovsky's claims were unfounded, and as a result of hostilities on his estate, which was not worth the claimed amount of the claim, only one dilapidated barn was damaged.
When did the first "enemies of the people" appear?
But the Polish rebels were not at all so peaceful. In fact, in 1794, revolutionary terror was introduced into the territory covered by the uprising. Already in the “Act of Uprising of the People of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania” itself, a principle was spelled out that opened the way for the widespread use of violence: “whoever is not with us is our enemy.” One of the first victims of terror was the Grand Hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania Sh.M. Kosakovsky, a supporter of breaking the union with Poland and concluding an alliance with the Russian Empire. He was hanged on the Market Square in Vilna. During the execution, Y. Yasinsky made a demonstrative speech: “Dear sirs! There will be a matter here that is forbidden to be discussed, and whether one of you likes it or not, everyone is obliged to be silent, and whoever casts his vote will be immediately hanged on this gallows. Y. Yasinsky continued to seek the widespread use of "reprisals" in relation to his political opponents. The brother of the great hetman Yu.K.Kosakovsky, bishop of inflation, was also hanged.
Soon, "gallows for the enemies of the people" (this is their official name) appeared in other cities and towns that were in the power of the rebels. The decision of the Grodno Order Commission on this occasion stated: “... a gallows was placed on the Grodno market with the inscription on one side - “Death to the traitors of the Fatherland”, and on the other - “Fear, traitor”, recognizing in that installed instrument of death an honest and a kind way of thinking and love for one's fatherland during a real uprising from the captivity of our Fatherland. So that the love for the Fatherland in the citizens would not fade away, the rebels established repressive bodies to organize and carry out terror. Chief among them was the Deputation of Public Security. The Criminal Court was also established, which was called upon to punish "traitors to the Fatherland, its revolt against it, by advice or conspiracy of some kind threatening, and those who are already guilty of their Fatherland." All cases were dealt with within 24 hours. There was only one punishment - hanging. The rebel authorities introduced censorship, and freedom of speech was also limited, “so that no one would incite with frivolous and passionate speeches, inflame the people and excite them to any actions that violate public peace.” The same security departments were supposed to monitor the observance of "public peace". The rebels carried out real punitive operations. In the Oshmyany povet, a certain gentry T. Gorodensky, immediately after the victory of the uprising in Vilna, organized a detachment with which he went to take revenge on his neighbors who refused to join the uprising. Having shed a lot of blood, T. Gorodensky fled to Vilna. Captured Russian soldiers were subjected to brutal reprisals. In Warsaw, the Russian garrison was almost completely cut out by the rebels. At the same time, unarmed soldiers who took communion in the church, women and small children who were nearby were killed.
These are facts confirmed by documents, historical sources, eyewitness accounts. But the tales that A.V. Suvorov ordered “to shoot the inhabitants of Kobrin and Malorita, to drive them through the line”, as they sometimes write, are not confirmed by anything. In publications of this kind, you will not find any footnotes or a list of sources - they simply do not exist. The only episode really confirmed by the sources is the destruction by the Cossacks from the corps of A.V. Suvorov of the remnants of the detachment of K. Serakovsky in the Krupchitsky Carmelite Monastery. Then, about four hundred rebels died in a fleeting felling. And it is not clear who it was. Some write about the cosiners, others about the horsemen under the command of K. Rushchits. One way or another, it was not about any extermination of civilians. Armed people came to the monastery and refused to surrender. A.V. Suvorov himself wrote about those events: “Those who fled during the battle into the forests, which do not surrender and do not appear themselves, are still being shot by rangers and other infantry, such as in swamps, which did not drown in them.” War is war: it is not played with spillikins. The widely propagandized "fact of atrocities" of the Suvorov troops is the assault on the Warsaw suburb of Prague. In this article, we will not dwell on this dramatic episode, since it is not directly related to Belarus. Moreover, on this occasion there are a large number of various publications, both accusing A.V. Suvorov and his soldiers, and justifying their actions. One of the best in recent times is the article “Historical myth-making” by E.V. Babenko, director of the Kobrin Military History Museum named after A.V. Can civilians remain unharmed during the assault on the fortress, which has about 17 thousand garrison people, more than 100 guns, and even the inhabitants themselves, who took up arms? And all this took place in Prague, turned into a first-class fortress, according to the Poles themselves. And who is to blame for the deaths of civilians: the attackers or the leaders of the defense, who left ordinary inhabitants at the forefront? Nevertheless, no matter how anyone depicts the "Suvorov atrocities", most of the population and the houses of Prague survived. This is evidenced by at least the fact that after the battle it was in this suburb that some units of the Russian troops were stationed. Most of the prisoners were also released. Here is such a "savage massacre"!
Not by number, but by skill
Read some of the publications - and you will be amazed! Brilliantly educated officers, carriers of advanced ideas, "relying on popular support", were suddenly defeated by "backward Moscow savages." How can this be? The explanation is simple - the overwhelming, simply unheard of numerical superiority of the Russian troops. As always, crushed by mass, filled up with corpses. As an example, let's take the Krupchitsy battle on September 17, 1794 - the largest military clash during the uprising on the territory of Belarus. With the troops of A.V. Suvorov, everything is clear - according to exact data, together with the reinforcements received on the way to Kobrin, they numbered about 11 thousand people. Confusion arises with the number of troops of the insurgent division of K. Serakovsky. A.V. Suvorov himself wrote about 16 thousand people with 28 guns. The well-known Russian historian A.F. Petrushevsky estimates the detachment of K. Serakovsky at 13 thousand. The Polish historian S. Herbst already writes about about 5 thousand troops of K. Serakovsky. The Belarusian historian V.P. Emelyanchik in his monograph “Palanese for Kasinera” wrote about 10 thousand people and 28 guns. In his article about this battle in the Encyclopedia of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, he writes more streamlinedly that "about 20 thousand people participated on both sides." But in the same edition, A.P. Gritskevich claims that Suvorov's corps outnumbered the rebel forces by more than two times. A. Benzeruk writes that near Krupchitsy, K. Serakovsky had only 4 thousand people, that is, 13 squadrons and 5 battalions, as well as 26 guns, and Suvorov outnumbered his forces by three times.
Who knows, maybe somewhere as yet an unknown battle painter has already drawn a large-scale diorama, on which countless Suvorov hordes are pressing on a small handful of K. Serakovsky's fighters? In fact, there was no not only overwhelming, but even significant or relative superiority in numbers among the Russian troops in that war. By the time the armed uprising began, Russian troops on the territory of the GDL consisted of two detachments: General N.D. Arseniev in Vilna and General P.D. Tsitsianov in Grodno, Novogrudok and Slonim. The total number of Russian troops was about 11 thousand people, that is, it was equal to the ON army. At the same time, the Russians had superiority in artillery, and the Lithuanian forces in cavalry. The Polish historian K. Bartoshevich calculated that in the Russian army in the Crown and Lithuania there were only 45 thousand people, in the Suvorov corps at the time of the assault on Prague - 15 thousand. He determines the size of Kosciuszko's army at 64 - 70 thousand people. True, there was also a 50,000-strong Prussian army allied with Russia, operating in Greater Poland. However, another “strange war” took place there, which is proved both by the extremely unsuccessful and passive actions of the Prussians in the Warsaw area, and by the fact that Kosciuszko kept a relatively small detachment in Wielkopolska. Russian troops won in full accordance with the military teachings of A.V. Suvorov: not by numbers, but by skill. It was achieved thanks to the genius of the greatest commander, as well as the military skill of his pupils, the generation of "Catherine's eagles" who went through the school of Ochakov and Fokshan, Rymnik and Izmail. The magnificent fighting qualities of the Russian troops were then tested on the fields of Italy and in the Swiss mountains in battles with a new type of armed force - the French revolutionary army. And the test was successfully passed.
Not apart, but together
Many of the examples given in this publication are taken from the works of supporters of the theory of the "Belarusian" Kosciuszko and the "bloody executioner" Suvorov. Their authors simply could not ignore documentary sources. However, when drawing conclusions, for some reason they "forgot" entire layers of historical facts. As a result, such a chain of “forgotten” facts leads to the distortion and falsification of history. And this is not an accident at all, but a conscious activity with the aim of changing the national identity of the Belarusian people, their historical memory. We are dealing with another attempt to artificially wrest the Belarusians from the area of ​​the East Slavic civilization, and for this to denigrate, make hostile all Russian heroes and artificially “Belarusianize” the Polish heroes, establishing a synonymous relationship between the concepts of the Commonwealth and the Belarusian state. Naturally, the ultimate goal is to create a "cultural-historical" basis for a radical change in the domestic and foreign policy of the Belarusian state. This trend was revealed and shown on the facts in his article “The Choice of the Nation” on the pages of the “Belarusian Dumka” by the national historian Ya.I. Treshchenok. A.V. Suvorov wrote: "I forgot myself when it came to the benefit of the Fatherland." Surely T. Kosciuszko and many of his associates would have signed these words. In no case was the goal of this article to denigrate the rebels of 1794. For the most part, they were sincere, disinterested and honest people, selfless patriots, but not of Belarus, but of the country that they considered their homeland - Poland. After long years of anarchy, national and religious intolerance, the Polish people woke up and stood up in arms to defend their Fatherland. In this sense, his fight was fair. It was during this period that the formation of a new Polish nation took place. Unfortunately, this formation was due to the eradication of the ethnic identity of other peoples living on the territory of the Commonwealth, primarily Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The revival of the Polish state in 1918 and the history of the oppression of national minorities during the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proved this convincingly.
Attempts to clash the images of Suvorov and Kosciuszko in Belarusian history are extremely counterproductive. A careful study of the program of the 1794 uprising shows that its success would have led to the absolute Polonization of Belarus and the disappearance of the Belarusian people as an independent ethnic group. The victory of the Suvorov troops changed this logic of events. After all, it was the sharpest struggle between the two great national ideas - Russian and Polish, which collided with our land, that led to the birth of an independent Belarusian idea in the middle of the 19th century. Therefore, it is ugly and ungrateful to spit on the memory of the late great commander, a true military genius, a true Christian who has absorbed all the best features of the Russian character. Who knows, maybe time will pass, and we will be able to put a candle in front of the icon of the new Orthodox warrior saint Alexander? After all, the Church recently canonized a contemporary of Suvorov, Admiral Fyodor Ushakov.
But Kosciuszko is also a symbolic and significant figure for our history. Even his very birth and formation as a person symbolizes the tragedy of the Belarusian gentry, Polonized, who lost touch with their folk roots, who forgot the customs, language and faith of their ancestors. But we have the right to be proud that a great son and hero of the Polish people was born on our land.
T. Kosciuszko died in Switzerland, the very country where the anniversary of the Alpine campaign of A.V. Suvorov was celebrated this year. In a small European state, two outstanding historical characters are treated with respect: both Russian and Pole. Their memory is equally honored and duly commemorated. So isn't it time for us, Belarusians, to stop pushing these two great people, disturbing their eternal peace, and start treating them as symbols of our difficult and contradictory history. Moreover, the two commanders never met on the battlefield, but the places in Belarus associated with their names (Kobrin and Merechevshchina) are so close...
Vadim GIGIN,
Candidate of Historical Sciences, Editor-in-Chief of the journal "Belarusian Dumka"D

(CP), which spread to a number of western provinces of the Russian Empire.

Flashed-well-lo in connection with the revolutionary upsurge in Western Europe - the July re-in-lu-qi-ey of 1830 in France and Belgium -sky re-vo-lu-qi-ey of 1830. Ve-che-rum 17 (29). -skim, by order of in-st-ruk-to-ra of the Warsaw school of under-ho-run-zhih ne-ho-you P. You-sots-to-on-pa- la on the palace of Bel-ve-der - re-si-den-tion of the actual on-me-st-no-ka in the CPU of the Grand Duke Kon-stan-ty-on Pav-lo-vi-cha. With the support of the city-ro-zhan for-go-vor-schi-ki for-hwa-ti-li ar-se-nal (about 40 thousand guns), killed 7 Polish military-on- chal-ni-kov, who kept their loyalty to Ni-ko-lai I, including the military mini-ni-st-ra of the Central Command of the infantry general Count M.F. Gau-ke. Under the influence of these events, instead of Co-ve-ta management Go-su-dar-st-ven-no-go co-ve-ta Tsar-st -va Pol-sko-go after-before-va-tel-but about-ra-zo-va-ny our National Council (December 1830 - January 1831) and the National Government (January - September 1831), headed by Prince A.A. Char-to-ryi-skim (replaced in August by Lieutenant General Count Y.S. Kru-ko-vets-kim). Temporary pra-vi-tel-st-vo-na-zna-chi-lo chief-but-ko-man-duyu-shchim of the Polish army lieutenant-general Yu. -go, you-sa-zav-she-go-sya in the us-lo-vi-yah from-the-day-st-via of the military aid of the Western European states at a time- re-she-nie con-flik-ta pu-tem per-re-go-vo-ditch. One-to-be-zhav-shi from Var-sha-you Kon-stan-tin Pav-lo-vich on the pre-lo-s-the-same Chlo-pits-to-go back from-ve- teal from-ka-zom. Wishing to hold back from military clashes, the Grand Duke, fak-ti-che-ski, handed over the main fortresses to the new Polish ruler according to Mod-lin (we are not in the city of No-you-Dvur-Ma-zo-vets-ki Ma-zo-vets-ko-vo-vod-st-va, Poland) and Za-most-tye (now-not the city of Za-most Lub-lin-sko-go-voo-vo-vo-va) with weapons depots and zero CPU along with Russian gar -ni-zo-nom Var-sha-you. Then Chlo-pits-kim in St. Petersburg on the right-le-on de-le-ga-tion, led by K.F. (F.K.) Druts-kim-Lyu-bets-kim. Before her arrival, Ni-ko-lai I in the “Invocation to the troops and the people of the Tsar-st-va of Poland” dated December 5 (17) and in Ma-ni -fe-ste dated December 12 (24), ras-ra-dil-sya-sta-no-twist Council of administration, residents of the CPU called for non-med-len- but move away “from the pre-stup-to-go, but mi-nut-to-go-to-le-che-niya”, and the Polish army - follow-to-vat with-sya-ge, dan- noy to the Russian im-pe-ra-to-ru as the Polish tsar. Nevertheless, the Polish de-le-ga-tion to-ve-la to the news of Count K. V. Nes-sel-ro-de, and then Ni-ko-lai I, his tre-bo-va-nia: re-re-da-cha in the composition of the CPU ter-ri-to-rii of the former of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Ma-lo-Polish province of the Polish-ko-ro-lev-st-va; co-blu-de-nie im-pe-ra-to-rum Kon-sti-tu-tion of the Tsar-st-va of Poland 1815 -ny, including two-zh-dy pre-vy-she-na time-ki so-zy-va Sei-ma, in 1825 from-me-not-to the publicity of his for-se-yes- niy, in 1819, introduced a pre-variant censor-zu-ra); am-ni-stiya teaching-st-ni-kam of the Polish uprising; Russian diplomatic support for the Polish ok-ku-pa-tion Ga-li-tion. No-ko-bark I from-clo-nil pain-shin-st-in tre-bo-va-niy, but promised to am-ni-sti-ro-vat “me-tezh-ni-kov” . After the weight of the firm on the zi-tion im-pe-ra-to-ra and under the pressure of the o-g-ni-zo-van-noy “Pat-rio -ti-che-soc-sche-st-vom ”street ma-ni-fe-sta-tion 13 (25). of the year I announced the downfall of Ni-ko-lai I as the king of the Polish, but kept the constitutional-mo-nar-chic device -state of the CPU, declaring that the Polish people are "free-on-chi-she", having the right to give the Polish co-ro-nu to-mu, whom "her dos-that-nym respects." Soon, the Seim appointed Prince M. Rad-zi-vil-la as the new chief-but-commander of the Polish army but changed, in part-no-sti in February - brigade general Y. Skzhi-nets-kim, in July - di-vi-zi-on General G. Dembinsky).

In February 1831, military operations began between the Russian and Polish armies. Under the pressure of the Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal I.I. Di-bi-cha after the first battles near Wav-r and Gro-hu-vom (now-not in the black of Var-sha-you) Polish army from-stu-pi- la to Prague - strong-but uk-re-p-lyon-no-mu eastern near-go-ro-du of Var-sha-you, and then beyond the Vistula River (one-but-time- men-but in February / March, the Russian troops under the command of the chief of staff of the army, infantry general K.F. To-la for-nya-whether the city of Lub-lin). The Russian army on-cha-la under-go-tov-ku to storm Var-sha-you from behind-pa-yes. Two-well-dy Di-beach from-kla-dy-shaft assault; in part, at the order of Ni-ko-lai I, he was waiting for the approach of the Guards Corps of the Grand Duke Mi-khai-la Pav-lo-vi-cha, one -to soon you-drank on the help of your own Guards cor-pu-su and won 2 victories over the Polish army, including 14 (26) May near the city of Ost-ra-len-ka Ma-zo-vets-ko-go voo-vod-st-va. 4-8 (16-20) July Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal I.F. Pas-ke-vi-cha, for-me-niv-she-go from ho-le-ra Di-bi-cha, at the Polish-Prussian frontier for-si -ro-wa-whether the river Vi-s-la and moved-well to Var-sha-ve, someone took the helm on August 26-27 (September 7-8). Pas-ke-vich pre-lo-lived os-tat-kam of the Polish army ka-pi-tu-li-ro-vat, ra-zo-ru-living in Plots-ke and from-right-viv from-to-yes No-to-bark I de-pu-ta-tion with wine-noy (condition-lo-via with-nya-you Y.S. Kru-ko-vets-kim, but from- verg-well-you Se-mom). In September-Tyab-re, the cor-pus of the brig-gad-no-go general J. Ra-mo-ri-no crossed the Austrian border, and in September / October the main part of the Polish army - Prussian gra-ni-tsu, in-ki-nuv ter-ri-to-riyu CPU. Polish uprising for-the-top-shi-elk surrender-whose Russian how-to-skam cre-po-stay Mod-lin (September 26 (October 8) and Za-most-tie (October 9 (21)). Spring - le -that is, the re-stand-ing is also for-tro-well-lo Li-tov-sko-Vi-Len-skaya, Grod-Nen-skaya, Minsk, Vo-lyn-skaya, Po-dol-skaya gu-ber-nii and the Be-lo-sto-kskaya region of the Russian Empire.

Ma-ni-fe-stom dated 20.10 (1.11).1831 Emperor Ni-ko-lai I am-ni-sti-ro-val most of the teaching-st-ni-kov of the Polish uprising, then from-me- neil con-sti-tu-tion of 1815 and introduced the Or-ga-ni-che-sky statute of the Tsar-st-va of Poland of 1832, declaring the CPU part of the Russian im -pe-rii. Ucha-st-ni-ki on-press-le-tion of re-stand-on-gra-g-yes-were “Polish sign from-li-chia for military sub-vi- gi”, uch-re-zh-den-nym in 1831/1832 and is the exact copy of the Polish op-de-na “Virtuti militari”.

The events of the Polish uprising from-ra-zhe-na in verse-ho-two-re-ni-yah by K. De-la-vin-nya “Var-sha-vyan-ka”, V.A. Zhu-kov-sko-go “Old song in a new way”, A.S. Push-ki-on “Before the coffin-ni-tseyu saint ...”, “Kle-vet-ni-kam of Russia”, “Bo-ro-din-skaya year-dov-schi-na”, musical pro-from-ve-de-nii by F. Sho-pe-na - “Re-vo-lu-qi-on-nom” etude de for piano (orchestra 10, c-moll) (all 1831) and others . In memory of those who were killed by the rebels on the first day of the Polish uprising, the military commander of the Polish army in Var-sha-ve us-ta-nov-len pa- mint-nick (1841, author of the project - A. Ko-rats-tsi; destroyed-to-women in 1917).

Historical sources:

War-on with the Polish ski-mi me-tezh-ni-ka-mi 1831 ... // Russian old-ri-na. 1884. Vol. 41, 43;

Mokh-nats-kiy M. Polish revolt in 1830-1831. // There. 1884. T. 43; 1890. T. 65; 1891. T. 69;

Go-li-tsy-na N.I. [Remembrance of the Polish Restoration of 1830-1831] // Russian Ar-Khiv: Is-to-ria Ote-che-st-va in the -de-tel-st-wah and do-ku-men-tah XVIII-XX centuries. M., 2004. Issue. 13.

Polish uprising of 1830-1831. they call the rebellion organized by the nobility and the Catholic clergy in the Kingdom of Poland and the neighboring provinces of the Russian Empire.

The rebellion was aimed at separating the Kingdom of Poland from Russia and tearing away from Russia its original western lands, which were part of the 16th-18th centuries. part of the former Commonwealth. The constitution granted by Emperor Alexander I to the Kingdom (Kingdom) of Poland in 1815 granted Poland broad sovereign rights. The Kingdom of Poland was a sovereign state that was part of the Russian Empire and associated with it by a personal union. The All-Russian Emperor was at the same time the Tsar (King) of Poland. The Kingdom of Poland had its own bicameral parliament - the Sejm, as well as its own army. The Sejm of the Kingdom of Poland was solemnly opened in 1818 by Emperor Alexander I, who hoped to receive in his person proof of the possibility of the peaceful development of the Polish nation within the framework of the Empire as a link connecting Russia with Western Europe. But in subsequent years, the implacable anti-government opposition intensified in the Seimas.

In the 1820s in the Kingdom of Poland, in Lithuania and on the Right-Bank Ukraine, secret conspiratorial, Masonic societies arose, which began to prepare an armed rebellion. Guards Lieutenant P. Vysotsky in 1828 founded a union of officers and students of military schools and entered into an agreement with other secret societies. The uprising was scheduled for the end of March 1829 and timed to coincide with the proposed coronation of Nicholas I as the king of Poland. But the coronation took place safely in May 1829.

The July Revolution of 1830 in France gave rise to new hopes for the Polish "patriots". The immediate cause for the uprising was the news of the imminent dispatch of Russian and Polish troops to suppress the Belgian revolution. The viceroy in the Kingdom of Poland, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, was warned by the Polish ensign about the conspiracy existing in Warsaw, but did not attach any importance to this.

On November 17, 1830, a crowd of conspirators led by L. Nabelyak and S. Goshchinsky broke into the Belvedere Palace - the Warsaw governor's residence and committed a pogrom there, injuring several people from among the Grand Duke's close associates and servants. Konstantin Pavlovich managed to escape. On the same day, an uprising began in Warsaw, led by the secret gentry officer society of P. Vysotsky. The rebels seized the arsenal. Many Russian generals and officers who were in Warsaw were killed.

In the context of the outbreak of the rebellion, the behavior of the governor looked extremely strange. Konstantin Pavlovich considered the uprising a mere outburst of anger and did not allow the troops to come out to suppress it, saying that "the Russians have nothing to do in a fight." Then he sent home that part of the Polish troops, which at the beginning of the uprising still remained loyal to the authorities.

November 18, 1830 Warsaw passed into the hands of the rebels. With a small Russian detachment, the governor left Warsaw and left Poland. The powerful military fortresses of Modlin and Zamostye were surrendered to the rebels without a fight. A few days after the flight of the governor, the Kingdom of Poland was left by all Russian troops.

The Administrative Council of the Kingdom of Poland was transformed into the Provisional Government. The Sejm elected General Yu. Khlopitsky as commander-in-chief of the Polish troops and proclaimed him a "dictator", but the general refused dictatorial powers and, not believing in the success of the war with Russia, sent a delegation to Emperor Nicholas I. The Russian tsar refused to negotiate with the rebellious government and on January 5 1831 Khlopitsky resigned.

Prince Radziwill became the new Polish commander-in-chief. On January 13, 1831, the Sejm announced the deposition of Nicholas I - depriving him of the Polish crown. The National Government headed by Prince A. Czartoryski came to power. At the same time, the "revolutionary" Seimas refused to consider even the most moderate projects of agrarian reform and improving the situation of the peasants.

The national government was preparing to fight with Russia. The Polish army grew from 35 to 130 thousand people, although only 60 thousand of them could participate in hostilities with combat experience. But the Russian troops stationed in the western provinces were not ready for war. Here, the vast majority of military garrisons were the so-called. "disabled teams". The number of Russian troops here reached 183 thousand people, but it took 3-4 months for their concentration. Field Marshal Count I.I. was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Dibich-Zabalkansky, and the chief of staff, General Count K.F. Tol.

Dibich hurried the troops. Without waiting for the concentration of all forces, without providing the army with food and not having time to equip the rear, on January 24-25, 1831, the commander-in-chief, together with the main forces, began an invasion of the Kingdom of Poland between the Bug and Narew rivers. A separate left column of General Kreutz was to occupy the Lublin Voivodeship in the south of the Kingdom and divert enemy forces. The spring thaw that began soon buried the original plan of the military campaign. On February 2, 1831, in the battle at Stochek, the Russian brigade of horse rangers under the command of General Geismar was defeated by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky. The battle between the main forces of the Russian and Polish troops took place on February 13, 1831 near Grokhov and ended with the defeat of the Polish army. But Dibich did not dare to continue the offensive, expecting a serious rebuff.

Soon Radziwill was replaced as commander-in-chief by General J. Skshinetsky, who managed to raise the morale of his troops after the defeat at Grokhov. The Russian detachment of Baron Kreutz crossed the Vistula, but was stopped by the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky and retreated to Lublin, which was hastily abandoned by the Russian troops. The Polish command took advantage of the inaction of the main forces of the Russian troops and, trying to gain time, began peace negotiations with Dibich. Meanwhile, on February 19, 1831, Dvernitsky's detachment crossed the Vistula at Puławy, overthrew small Russian detachments and tried to invade Volhynia. The reinforcements that arrived there under the command of General Tol forced Dvernitsky to take refuge in Zamosc. A few days later, the Vistula cleared of ice and Dibich began to prepare a crossing to the left bank near Tyrchin. But the Polish detachments attacked the rear of the main forces of the Russian troops and thwarted their offensive.

In the areas adjacent to the Kingdom of Poland - Volhynia and Podolia, unrest broke out, an open rebellion broke out in Lithuania. Lithuania was guarded only by a weak Russian division (3200 people), stationed in Vilna. Dibić sent military reinforcements to Lithuania. In March, the Polish detachment of Dvernitsky set out from Zamosc and invaded Volhynia, but was stopped by the Russian detachment of F.A. Rediger and thrown back to the Austrian border, and then went to Austria, where he was disarmed. The Polish detachment of Hrshanovsky, who moved to help Dvernitsky, was met by a detachment of Baron Kreutz at Lyubartov and retreated to Zamosc.

However, successful attacks by small Polish units exhausted the main forces of Dibich. The actions of the Russian troops, moreover, were complicated by the cholera epidemic that broke out in April, there were about 5 thousand patients in the army.

In early May, the 45,000-strong Polish army of Skshinetsky launched an offensive against the 27,000-strong Russian guards corps, commanded by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, and threw it back to Bialystok - outside the Kingdom of Poland. Dibich did not immediately believe in the success of the Polish offensive against the guards, and only 10 days after it began, he threw the main forces against the rebels. On May 14, 1831, a new major battle took place at Ostroleka. The Polish army was defeated. The military council, assembled by Skshinetsky, decided to retreat to Warsaw. But a large detachment of the Polish general Gelgud (12 thousand people) was sent to the rear of the Russian army, to Lithuania. There he united with Khlapovsky's detachment and local bands of rebels, his numbers doubled. Russian and Polish forces in Lithuania were approximately equal.

On May 29, 1831, Dibich fell ill with cholera and died the same day. Command was temporarily taken over by General Tol. June 7, 1831 Gelgud attacked the Russian positions near Vilna, but was defeated and fled to the Prussian borders. Of the troops under his command, only the detachment of Dembinsky (3800 people) was able to break through from Lithuania to Warsaw. A few days later, the Russian troops of General Roth defeated the Polish gang of Pegs near Dashev and at the village. Maidanek, which led to the suppression of the rebellion in Volhynia. New attempts by Skshinetsky to move behind the lines of the Russian army failed.

On June 13, 1831, the new commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Field Marshal Count I.F., arrived in Poland. Paskevich-Erivansky. Near Warsaw was the 50,000th Russian army, it was opposed by 40,000 rebels. The Polish authorities declared a total militia, but the common people refused to shed blood for the power of the greedy gentry and fanatic priests.

Paskevich chose Osek near Torun, near the Prussian border, as the place of crossing to the left bank of the Vistula. From July 1, 1831, the Russians built bridges near Osek, along which the army safely crossed to the enemy coast. Skshinetsky did not dare to interfere with the crossing, but the dissatisfaction of the Warsaw society forced him to move towards the main Russian forces. Under their onslaught, the Polish troops rolled back to the capital. At the end of July, Skshinetsky was dismissed and Dembinsky became the new commander-in-chief of the Polish army, who wanted to give the Russians a decisive battle right at the walls of Warsaw.

On August 3, 1831, unrest broke out in Warsaw. The Seimas dissolved the old government, appointed General J. Krukovetsky as head of government (president) and endowed him with emergency rights. On August 6, Russian troops began to besiege Warsaw, and commander-in-chief Dembinsky was replaced by Malakhovych. Malakhovych again tried to attack the Russian rear in the north and east of the Kingdom of Poland. The Polish detachment of Romarino attacked the Russian troops of Baron Rosen, stationed on the Brest highway - east of Warsaw, and on August 19, 1831 pushed them back to Brest-Litovsk, but then hastily retreated to protect the capital.

Paskevich's troops, having received all the necessary reinforcements, numbered 86 thousand people, and the Polish troops near Warsaw - 35 thousand. In response to the proposal to surrender Warsaw, Krukovetsky stated that the Poles had raised an uprising in order to restore their fatherland within its ancient borders, i.e. . to Smolensk and Kyiv. On August 25, 1831, Russian troops stormed Wola, a suburb of Warsaw. On the night of August 26-27, 1831, Krukowiecki and the Polish troops in Warsaw capitulated.

The Polish army, leaving the capital, was supposed to arrive in the Plock Voivodeship in the north of the Kingdom in order to wait for the subsequent orders of the Russian emperor. But the members of the Polish government, who left Warsaw with their troops, refused to comply with Krukowiecki's decision to surrender. In September and October 1831, the remnants of the Polish army, which continued to resist, were expelled by Russian troops from the Kingdom to Prussia and Austria, where they were disarmed. The last to surrender to the Russians were the fortresses of Modlin (September 20, 1831) and Zamostye (October 9, 1831). The uprising was pacified, and the sovereign statehood of the Kingdom of Poland was liquidated. Count I.F. was appointed viceroy. Paskevich-Erivansky, who received the new title of Prince of Warsaw.
© All rights reserved