In the last century, there was, perhaps, no other political event as significant as the revolution of 1917 in Russia, in the assessment of which points of view, views, judgments and assessments differ so strikingly. For some, it was the “great revolution”, the main event of the 20th century, which radically changed the social image of Russia and the entire planet, others see it as a national catastrophe, a coup d'etat, an armed conspiracy, even, as, for example, Academician A.N. Yakovlev - the most destructive counter-revolution in world history. “Without full recognition of this fact,” he argues, “we will be haunted for a long time by the painful questions of what happened to us in the past and what is happening today” 2 .

The topic of the October Revolution did not leave the pages of the Russian and world press for many decades, involving representatives of various schools and directions of historical and social thought in heated debates and discussions. Among the outspoken opponents of the October Revolution, as well as among its sincere supporters, the views and assessments were determined mainly by political motives. But for a large group of researchers, the October events are, first of all, a subject of scientific knowledge, an objective study that requires the identification of both positive and negative aspects of this most important historical event of the 20th century.

The current controversy unfolding around this problem is distinguished by a particularly sharp and politically predetermined debate, a very wide range of opinions. This is largely due to the events that developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to find a historical analogy between contemporary Russian events and the February Revolution of 1917. The purpose of this analogy is obvious: to pay tribute to the latter and belittle the significance of the October Revolution. The center of the discussion is increasingly shifting further and further towards not scientific, but political disputes about words and terms, but not about the nature and essence of the phenomenon itself. It is noteworthy that the leaders of the October Revolution themselves, in relation to the October events, used both terms - "revolution" and "coup" - without making any special distinction between them. Recently, these terms have taken on, more than ever before, a pronounced political connotation.

The assessment of the October events of 1917 as a counter-revolution is close to that given to them by the head of the Provisional Government overthrown in October 1917, A.F. , in a soldier's overcoat, in a sailor's jacket "3 . At the same time, the "democratic socialist", which either the Trudovik or the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky considered himself to be, advanced two main accusations against the Bolsheviks, the essence of which boiled down to assertions that the latter planted "social

ism of poverty and hunger, which has nothing to do with genuine socialism, and that they were tearing their socialism away from democracy, for the sake of seizing power, they abandoned their own proclaimed devotion to democratic principles. He convinced himself and others that there is no and cannot be "socialism without democracy", just as social liberation is impossible where "the personality of a person and his rights are not respected." At the same time, Kerensky referred to the opinions of the leaders and theorists of Western European social democracy, in particular, to K. Kautsky, who argued that a system in which the revolutionary and socialist government seeks to crush democracy, defeating all its rights, is condemned to death and not at all as victims of violence, under the blows of which he falls, and not in the radiance of the glory of a martyr who exalts his convictions above all. Kerensky agreed with the opinion of the German Social Democrat that such a system would perish under a curse, as befits one who betrayed his convictions in the name of power, who by his lies increased general misfortune and poverty, who destroyed all the democratic gains of the people.

If the motives that prompted Kerensky to seek justification for his own defeat in these arguments can still be understood and explained, then the situation is much more complicated with the position of the first teacher of Russian Social Democracy G.V. Plekhanov, who turned out to be among those whom the October Revolution upset rather than delighted. Addressing an open letter to the Petrograd workers, published a day after the victory of the armed uprising in the capital and the transfer of power into the hands of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, he tried to frankly state his vision of what had happened. These events, Plekhanov wrote, “grieve me not because I do not want the triumph of the working class; but, on the contrary, because I call on him with all the powers of my soul and at the same time I see how far the above-mentioned events push him back. Their consequences are already very sad. They will be even incomparably sadder if the class-conscious elements of the working class do not speak out firmly and resolutely against the policy of seizing power by one class or, even worse, by one party. Power must be based on a coalition of all living forces of the country, that is, on all those classes and strata that are not interested in restoring the old order. I've been saying this for a long time. And I consider it my duty to repeat this now, when the politics of the working class are in danger of taking a completely different direction. The conscious elements of our proletariat must warn them against the greatest misfortune that can befall them.

The October events in Russia, their nature and prospects were animatedly discussed in those days not only by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, but also by representatives of the international Social Democracy. Some of its leaders actively supported the Russian revolution, while others were no less actively opposed. Even among the true supporters of the revolution, there were many who criticized, however, rather cautiously, some of the negative aspects of the revolution, which, in their opinion, manifested themselves already at its first stage. In particular, they were legitimately worried that the unrestrained and unrestricted revolutionary energy of the masses would lead in the complex and largely chaotic wartime situation to the establishment of distorted ideas about socialist values, which

would cause irreparable harm to both democracy and socialism. Perhaps Rosa Luxembourg, an outstanding figure in the labor movement in Germany, was able to discern this dangerous trend earlier than others and react to it more sharply than others. She expressed her "sad thoughts" on this subject in a work specially devoted to the Russian revolution, which she wrote in September-October 1918, while imprisoned in the Breslau prison. Without hiding her sympathies and sincere support for the October Revolution, which brilliantly confirmed, in her words, “the main lesson of any great revolution, the law of life of which says: either it must rush forward very quickly and decisively, crushing all obstacles with an iron hand and putting forward ever more far-reaching ones. goal, or it will very soon be thrown back behind its weak starting point and crushed by the counter-revolution. And further: “In a revolution there can be no stopping, marking time, self-limitation with the first goal achieved. And whoever tries to transfer to revolutionary tactics the home-grown wisdom from the parliamentary wars of mice and frogs, only shows that psychology, the vital law of the revolution itself, is just as alien to him as all historical experience, that they are for him a book with seven seals. At the same time, she was extremely surprised and even irritated by how the Bolsheviks and their leaders, from the very first days of being in power, began to crack down on democracy, engaged in frantic searches for a way to do without democracy altogether.

However, such a remedy, she resented, would be “even worse than the ailment it is intended to cure; after all, it falls asleep that living source, drawing from which only it is possible to correct all the innate defects of public institutions - the active, unhindered, energetic political life of the broad masses of the people. If the power born of October, wrote Luxemburg, goes to suppress public life, then by doing so it cuts off the source of political experience and the further development of the revolution, or “it must be admitted that experience and development were needed only before the Bolsheviks seized power, and, having reached a maximum, become redundant." As a result, public life comes to a standstill, turning into its appearance, and only the bureaucracy remains an active element. “Public life,” Luxemburg noted with regret, “is gradually fading away, orchestrated and ruled with irrepressible energy and boundless idealism by a few dozen party leaders, among them a dozen outstanding minds really lead, and the elite of the working class is called from time to time to meetings to applaud speeches. leaders, unanimously approve the proposed resolutions. In essence, this is nothing but the rule of a clique, such as "the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is, a dictatorship in a purely bourgeois sense, in the sense of Jacobin rule" 6 . Unfortunately, the Bolshevik leaders did not heed her very reasonable warnings, dismissing them as if they were an annoying fly. At the end of February 1922, V. I. Lenin, recalling Luxembourg's manuscript, sharply rejected her criticism of the Bolsheviks, stating that she "was mistaken in her prison writings of 1918 (moreover, she herself, upon her release from prison in late 1918 and early 1919 corrected most of her mistakes)" 7 . True, the Soviet leader did not specify what kind of mistakes Rosa Luxembourg was talking about.

From the very first days of the accomplishment of the October Revolution, in the ranks of its opponents were a variety of political figures, parties and currents.

niya - from the extreme right to the left-wing extremist. Criticism went in different directions and covered a wide range of problems around which sharp discussions unfolded, which do not subside even today.

From the very first days, the October Revolution overflowed the purely Russian borders, having received the widest international impact. The interest of world, primarily European, public thought in the problems of the October Revolution was not least dictated by the undisguisedly wary attitude of many scientists and politicians to revolutions in general, and especially to those that shook Europe since the Great French Revolution of the late 18th century. The October Revolution was compared with the French Revolution in order to highlight the most odious aspects of the latter through their similarity and to intimidate contemporaries with the inevitable repetition of its darkest and most terrible aspects, which manifested themselves with particular force at its final stage, when violence and terror prevailed. It was difficult for Europeans, of a wide variety of beliefs and political preferences, to understand, much less approve, what France was then faced with. The revolution, which proclaimed great democratic principles and norms, called for freedom, equality and fraternity, degenerated into something unimaginable and terrible: rampant terror began in the country, and the Jacobin dictatorship, justifying these mass bloody massacres, blasphemously declared them the most desirable and direct way to universal democracy and freedom.

Fears associated with the fact that the October events of 1917 would not be a mirror image of all the worst and terrible that happened during the French Revolution, were experienced not only by outspoken opponents of October. The rejection of any convincing arguments in favor of establishing the democratic foundations of the October Revolution, as well as the complexity and inconsistency of the situation that developed in Russia after the October Revolution, only strengthened these fears. And the Bolsheviks themselves, through the lips of their leaders, constantly emphasized the continuity of the two revolutions, demonstrating their sympathy for the political line of the Robespierre Jacobins, who ultimately found themselves in irreconcilable antagonism with democracy.

The French and October revolutions really had many common features and properties. However, this similarity was limited mainly to the sphere of destructive functions performed by both of them. The great goals and ideals proclaimed by the French Revolution turned into a ferocious dictatorship and bloody terror, which became strongly associated with the mood and activity of the left wing of the Jacobin leaders. Dictatorship, terror and violence also manifested themselves during the October Revolution, but not at the final stage, as during the French Revolution, but from the very beginning, and in the future, this trend not only did not weaken, but every year it grew stronger, depriving the revolution of its noble halo of the nation's liberator, fighter for the people's happiness, democracy and true freedom. If the history of the French Revolution turned out to be firmly tied to the execution of King Louis XVI, who, according to Robespierre, should not have been judged, but punished, then the extrajudicial execution of the last Russian tsar and members of his family fell on the October Revolution. Such crimes cannot go unnoticed; no evidence to justify this massacre

can be erased from the public consciousness. They constantly remind of themselves, causing tragic associations and terrible historical analogies and parallels.

Comparison of the two revolutions quite naturally prompted Russian and foreign researchers to delve deeper into the meaning and significance of the Russian revolution, its origins, and to foresee possible prospects for the further development of the country. It was necessary to understand the causes and characteristics that bring together these two, perhaps the most significant revolutionary experiments, not only in European, but in fact in the entire world history.

The October Revolution, like the French Revolution, began to devour its heroes very early. And this became possible, among other things, because the hatred towards Russian state structures, and towards political parties and movements, which manifested itself during this revolution, was too great. Violence has become a compass showing the shortest path to socialism. It is characteristic that among the leaders of the Russian revolution there was not a single one who even for a moment doubted the correctness and justice of the thesis about the impossibility of building socialism without violence and mass repressions. This frightening and extremely dangerous psychological phenomenon does not yet have a clear and precise explanation. We will have to refer to it more than once in the course of this story.

The special interest of the Bolshevik leaders in the final stage of the French Revolution, when the regime of the Jacobin dictatorship was established and the guillotine was operating at full capacity, is hardly a mere accident - this is the diabolical invention of Dr. J. Guyotin. More and more often, not only representatives of the overthrown classes, but also the Jacobins themselves found themselves under its knife. According to some information, in just a month and a half of the functioning of the so-called revolutionary tribunal, 1,285 people were sent to the guillotine 8 . And no matter how hard the Jacobin leaders and their followers try to justify the regime of terror and violence by revolutionary expediency and inevitability, the fact remains: it was the Jacobins - the first among the revolutionaries of the new time - who elevated terror against "enemies of the people" to the rank of state policy. They were also convinced that the people should be ruled with the help of reason, but in practice this thesis sounded demagogic.

Such a policy was bound to fail sooner or later, and it really ended in the defeat of Jacobinism and the personal tragedy of its leaders. Apparently aware of the weakness and unpopularity of their policy, the Jacobins unsuccessfully sought all sorts of theoretical and legal arguments to justify their terror. Robespierre, for example, argued that this is nothing more nor less than a manifestation of virtue, "nothing but quick, strict and uncompromising justice." Terror, he added, is "a deduction from the general principle of democracy applicable to the most extreme need of the fatherland" 9 . And these words, intended to serve as a justification for any terrorism, both domestic and international, belong to a person who is not far from politics, but a certified lawyer who spent more than one year within the walls of the law faculty of the famous Sorbonne! And they were addressed primarily to comrades-in-arms, for whom the guillotine and democracy were decidedly incompatible.

After this, should we be surprised that for more than two centuries in French and world historiography, disputes over the French Revolution of the late 18th century have not subsided, polar opinions have been expressed about its leaders, character and driving forces, but especially about its Jacobin stage?

The opponents of the Robespierreists are too often reproached for taking an unnecessarily “moralistic” position in their criticism, and politics, as such, is, in essence, generally immoral and immoral. And here, with all its acuteness, the question of the humanistic or moral aspects of the revolution arises. But it is precisely the neglect of these aspects of the revolution (the French, in particular) that not only diminishes, but also undermines, as evidenced by rich historical experience, the significance of the revolutions themselves as an instrument and means of liberating and renewing humanity. In fact, this denies the high ideological and noble orientation of the revolution, which is usually claimed by its leaders.

Therefore, it is impossible to agree with the opinion of the well-known researcher of the history of the Great French Revolution A. Z. Manfred, who wrote: “When some of the politicians or historians fold their hands in prayer, or raise their eyes to heaven, or express their sorrow for the innocent souls with other gestures of silent despair, when they swear at the bloodthirsty cruelty of Robespierre or Saint-Just, depicting them as insatiable demons of death - all this should be discarded as conscious, through and through false hypocrisy, as an attempt to shift the blame for crimes to which their ancestors or themselves were involved.

It is not the Jacobins who are responsible for the emergence of terrorism as a means of politics, political practice, but their opponents. For the Jacobins, the revolutionary terror was, let us repeat for the last time, only a retaliatory measure.

Such a “logic”, entirely built on the recognition of the “revolutionary expediency of terror”, which, by the way, every revolutionary understood in his own way, absolutely arbitrary and unprincipled, “ennobles” any revolutionary terrorist who allows such “insignificant weaknesses and miscalculations” as an attempt to put the interests of the revolution above the rights and freedoms of the individual. The beliefs that “the end justifies the means”, “they cut down the wood - the chips fly”, “the winners are not judged”, etc. are introduced into the “revolutionary consciousness”. dissent means - no more and no less - deliberately indulging in the grossest violations of democratic rights and freedoms of the individual.

It would, of course, be wrong to assert that the leaders of the Russian Social Democracy, including the Bolsheviks, fully shared the views and political line of the Jacobins, including their attitude towards terror and violence. In a speech at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which took place a few days after the October events, Lenin, who sought to knock out the arguments that the Bolsheviks intended to repeat the Jacobin experiment on Russian soil, wrote: "We are reproached for using terror , but the terror that the French revolutionaries used, who guillotined unarmed people, we do not use and, I hope, will not

apply" 11 . This was sheer deceit. In fact, Lenin and the Bolsheviks not only admired the Robespierreists, but also regarded them as the direct predecessors of revolutionary Social Democracy, urged their supporters to act like the Jacobins, mercilessly, "plebeian" to deal with the monarchy and aristocracy, "mercilessly destroying the enemies of freedom suppressing their resistance by force” 12 Perhaps you can’t say it more clearly.

In Soviet historiography, the Jacobin dictatorship was frankly idealized, the serious socio-political, ideological and moral contradictions that emerged during the French Revolution were deliberately obscured, and they tried to evaluate terror with the most exalted epithets. All this was calculated to exalt in every possible way the heroes of the October Revolution, to justify any of their actions, including violence and terror, that accompanied this revolution (as well as the Civil War that followed it). Of course, even in not the best times for Soviet historical science, there were historians who held different views and opposed extremely simplified schemes that ruled out the very possibility of raising the question of underestimation by the Jacobin leaders, as well as the guiding core of the October Revolution, of the importance of democratic reforms. However, these voices were not heard, and they did not determine the weather in the "historical workshop", where completely different orders and other customs reigned 13 .

The restrained and wary attitude towards many aspects of the October events on the part of not only their outspoken opponents, but also some of their supporters, can be explained, however strange it may seem, by the international influence of the October Revolution, as well as by the possibility of its active interaction with foreign, primarily European , revolutionary forces. Perhaps the most important concern was the fact that the October Revolution, generated by the world war, borrowed a lot from the arsenal of means and methods used in the course of hostilities. The revolution was identified with the world revolutionary war, and Russia, with its vast territory, was assigned a kind of military springboard for the deployment of these battles.

The reality of such a prospect was associated with at least two factors. Firstly, the Bolsheviks quite early began to manifest a messianic idea: the desire to “make happy” the peoples of the states neighboring Russia, to impose on them the Russian model of revolution, even if the latter did not correspond to the peculiarities of the revolutionary liberation process in these countries. Secondly, the socialist revolution, as the Bolsheviks believed, needed external support, a connection with the world proletarian revolution. Only under this condition was it possible to rebuild Russia in a socialist way.

The world socialist revolution and messianism are two sides of the same coin. At the same time, the bet on the world proletarian revolution pursued another goal: to muffle the criticism of the October Revolution, which came from both internal and especially external forces that opposed the grossest violations of democratic norms and principles, which, in revolutionary ecstasy, assumed an increasingly massive and dangerous character.

The theme “Revolution and Democracy” is the touchstone on which various ideas, models and schemes related to the perception and evaluation of the October Revolution, as well as ways and forms of further development of its principles, goals and tasks were tested and are being tested. Unwilling to recognize the October events as the greatest socio-political event of the 20th century, their critics, both before and now, have mainly focused on the insufficient connection of these events with democratic values ​​and humanistic aspects. Neither in the year of revolutionary upheavals, nor in the subsequent period of the development of the Russian revolution, was there a shortage of authors who were inclined to think that the October Revolution should be regarded as another barrier artificially erected on the extremely narrow path leading to the democratization of Russian society, and this, according to in their opinion, it must necessarily lead to the destruction of the very weak shoots of young Russian democracy that had come into being with such difficulty.

The Bolsheviks were accused of going ahead, disregarding the objective conditions of Russia's social development, constantly trying to force events. As one of the first historians of the Russian revolution, its chronicler N. N. Sukhanov, noted, all Russian socialist forces, which included not only the Bolsheviks, but also the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and even the left wing of the Cadet Party, believed that “it is necessary to head for a radical political upheaval” 14 , although they did not have complete clarity of what it would result in and what its program and form would be. The success of the February Revolution was largely ensured precisely by the fact that a certain compromise was outlined between the socialist forces and trends and a kind of consensus was developed, and, according to Sukhanov, every socialist party and its leaders should have reckoned with this if they really thought about the good of Russia. and her people.

However, after February, the situation on the Russian political scene began to change dramatically. The new government turned out to be practically very weak, unable to fulfill the tasks assigned to it. The Kerensky regime and Kerenskyism gave the green light to the October uprising, which, as Sukhanov wrote, “is still branded as a military conspiracy and almost a palace coup,” although in fact he “had no enemy,” just as he did not have to conduct mass actions, military battles, build barricades 15 .

Sukhanov's criticism, like that of many other representatives of socialist parties and trends, was not directed against the fact that the Bolsheviks took advantage of the situation more resolutely and practically more competently than others, declaring their claim to the possession of power in the country. The forms and goals of the Bolshevik government were unacceptable. Most worried about the fate of democracy, without the full and broadest development of which Russia was not destined to rise from its knees. The very first actions of the new rulers to curtail those few democratic gains that had just begun to break through the harsh soil of Russian reality caused a sharply negative attitude towards themselves from almost all non-Bolshevik forces and trends, who regarded these encroachments as a violation of all previous agreed agreements and agreements. . They were especially indignant at the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in which Sukhanov, like others, saw the "Asiatic treachery of the leader," 16 ie, Lenin.

A completely conscious retreat from positions on such a key issue as the organic interconnectedness of socialism and democracy, as well as their direct opposition and confrontation, from the very first days of the revolution, ultimately turned out to be the main and decisive reason, which even more than 70 years later made itself known to know and led first to the decomposition, and then to the disintegration of the great state. And it all began, it would seem, with a not very significant circumstance - a gap between word and deed, which every year became deeper and more dangerous.

It was the most significant and hardest, after the Great French Revolution, payment for historical forgetfulness and neglect of the fundamental foundations and principles of the revolution. Punishment for this sooner or later had to come. The history of the 20th century has repeatedly testified that no political regime and no statesman, no matter how skillfully and inventively they manipulated public consciousness with the aim of allegedly democratic formation of a system of power that was undemocratic in its essence, could maintain it for a more or less long period. .

The defeat of Nazism in Germany and Italy, Francoism in Spain, militarism in Japan, colonial regimes in Asia and Africa, military dictatorships in Latin America and many other facts are clear evidence of this. "Games of democracy" inevitably ended in the political bankruptcy of those who tried to use it only for appearances, for political disguise. The worse these historical lessons are assimilated and the more severe the measures used to tame democracy, the more severe the social and political consequences of such experiments. The obvious underestimation of democracy by the Jacobins in the society they were going to build became a stumbling block that they could not overcome, which led to a sharp change in the entire course of the French Revolution: to the retreat and rejection of the French revolutionaries from their own proclaimed ideals and goals .

Something similar happened to the Bolsheviks, but under different conditions - already at the very beginning of the revolution. And they no longer sought to attempt to combine democracy and socialism. It is difficult to say what the Bolsheviks actually counted on when they undertook such an experiment, so risky in all respects, rudely breaking the already very thin thread that connected one with the other. This can hardly be explained by their maniacal hatred for Russia, its history, culture, religion, national traditions and customs, and finally, for the very mentality of the Russian people, or the feeling that they had for both former regimes and their political opponents, and even more so Lenin's desire to avenge his older brother executed by Tsar Alexander III. This phenomenon is difficult to explain by anything other than, perhaps, an inexorable and unbridled thirst for power, which darkened the mind. What self-confidence one had to have in order to consciously go for a complete break with their recent allies, albeit not reliable in everything, and not be afraid to find themselves in complete political isolation, face to face with many incredibly complex economic, political, social, ideological problems, requiring urgent and unusual decisions!

In those revolutionary days, many political figures, including

and the Bolsheviks, understood the fallacy of tactics that artificially erected barriers to the democratization of Russian society. They rightly believed that as the revolution developed, difficulties and conflicts could increase and their solution would require much heavier and more expensive expenses. It was also alarming that such an understanding of the nature and direction of the Russian revolution, its increasingly obvious departure from democratic principles, could lead to a rupture of the organic ties of historical epochs and generations, and oblivion of Russian history proper. Of considerable importance was the fact that the latter was actually assigned the role of “prehistory”, and the true history of Russia was to begin only from October 1917. Even today, some authors are trying to separate the Soviet period from the rest of Russian history, calling it “Soviet civilization”, which arose and existed, as it were, on the sidelines, standing apart in relation to a single Russian civilization and, moreover, opposed to the latter. Similar “theories” may arise only on very dubious grounds, only when denying their historical roots. This is a direct result of a misunderstanding of the very essence of the concept of "civilization". Now it is unlikely that anyone will deny that civilization is, first of all, a set of traits and signs that have evolved over many centuries and relate to the whole people, and not to its separate part or class, even if the latter manages to impose its dictatorship on society. . Civilization is a systemic integrity, formed from well-defined cultural and spiritual values ​​that exist regardless of class, and even more so party or ideological and other incoming elements. If with the victory of each revolution a new civilization arose, then humanity would long ago have lost its most precious distinguishing feature - individuality and uniqueness, the unique identification of the culture of a given people, that set of features and characteristics that actually constitutes a stable nationwide community - civilization.

The greatness and significance of a social revolution is determined not only by how deeply, consistently and qualitatively society changes, but also by the national and international goals that it sets for itself. The French Revolution of the end of the 18th century was called “great” precisely because it proclaimed such goals and ideals that contained fundamental values ​​of a universal nature, reflecting the mood of advanced humanity, which advocated social liberation and the moral renewal of all mankind. It was also great because, as Lenin noted, it gave the whole world "such foundations of bourgeois democracy, bourgeois freedom, which were already irremovable" 18 . Even today, these foundations occupy a significant place among the values ​​recognized by all or at least by the majority of the peoples of the world, which determine the moral principles and norms of public life, which the entire modern civilized world adheres to.

As for the October Revolution, it must be admitted with regret that the socialist ideals and goals proclaimed by it, which by that time had broad support not only in Russia, but throughout the world, did not become equally “indispensable foundations” and therefore did not gain universal attractive force. Perhaps those who were right

He perceived the October Revolution primarily as a purely national phenomenon and believed that, having taken place in Russia, it did not have a sufficiently pronounced democratic character. This circumstance, apparently, did not allow it to make a real breakthrough in all spheres of the country's social and state life and to solve problems in a short time that required much longer historical periods. However, others, on the contrary, believed that all three Russian revolutions lacked just national features precisely because they experienced the strongest influence of external factors. It is noteworthy that both sides in this dispute agreed in recognizing that the armed uprising in Petrograd and the triumphal march of Soviet power across the vast expanses of a vast country can, albeit with some reservations, be regarded as general democratic movements with all the characteristics and assessments that follow from this.

The current disputes about the causes and nature of the October Revolution are no less acute than in the autumn days of 1917. At that time persistent calls for an armed uprising often ran into restrained resistance from those who did not agree that Russia was ripe and even overripe for a revolution. This thesis was especially sharply defended by L.D. Trotsky, who resolutely supported Lenin and passionately believed in the successful implementation of his theory of the “permanent” (continuous) revolution, which he, without undue modesty, called “peculiar and significant”, and ranked himself among the theoretical interpreters of the October Revolution.

In assessing the revolutionary situation that had developed in Russia by October 1917, as well as in developing a course for an immediate proletarian uprising in Petrograd, there was complete mutual understanding between Lenin and Trotsky. Both of them rather sharply criticized their colleagues, including members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), who for the most part did not share this point of view and believed that the time had not yet come for a socialist revolution in Russia. Some members of the Central Committee generally opposed the uprising, others believed that the moment had not yet come for it, and still others took a wait-and-see attitude. Later, recalling this confrontation, Trotsky wrote that no one before that, except Lenin and, of course, himself, "had so imperiously and nakedly set the task of an armed coup" and so scourged "those Bolsheviks who do not understand their internationalist duty" 19 .

These two most influential Bolshevik leaders at that time, the leaders of the October Revolution, were united by a common view of the Petrograd uprising as the beginning and an integral part of the world socialist revolution, and, of course, as a stimulus for the emergence of the latter, its development and expansion. At the same time, Trotsky shared and actively supported the original position of Lenin, who considered the seizure of power in Russia as a kind of impetus, first to the European, and then to the world revolution, which would be incomparably more important for the destinies of all mankind than for backward Russia. For Trotsky, this was the “moment of truth”, a real opportunity to put into practice the idea of ​​a “permanent” revolution, which he associated not only with the elimination of absolutism and serfdom in Russia, but also with the beginning of ever-increasing social clashes, uprisings, incessant

ongoing attacks by the proletariat on the political and economic privileges of the ruling classes on a world scale.

Trotsky tried to explain the differences in the Bolshevik leadership on the question of the attitude towards the October Revolution by the difference in worldview approaches. He divided the then party leaders into "theoreticians", to whom, naturally, he included himself, and "practitioners", whom he contemptuously called the bearers of "the ideas of patriotic reformism." “It was possible to arrive a priori at the ideas of the October Revolution,” Trotsky wrote with undisguised snobbery, “not in Siberia, not in Moscow, not even in Petrograd, but only at the crossroads of world historical paths. The tasks of the belated bourgeois revolution had to intersect with the prospects of the world proletarian movement in order to be able to put forward for Russia the program of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A higher observational horizon was needed, not to mention more serious weapons than what the so-called Russian practitioners of the party had at their disposal.

In fact, the dividing line that Trotsky arbitrarily outlined was not so much on the issue of the upcoming armed uprising (although the seriousness of these disagreements cannot be underestimated), but on such fundamentally important issues as the relationship between the national and the international in the development of the Russian revolution, the Bolsheviks' faith in the ability of the October Revolution to change the course of social development in Russia, to direct it along the socialist path, or, in order to build a socialist society, one should wait for a world revolution, for which October would be just a springboard, a kind of springboard. These problems were really and very acute, and very sensitive. They remained so for quite a long time, while the party and its leadership were arguing about the possibility of building socialism in one single country.

Perhaps the position of the majority of the leadership of the party, who were very wary of Lenin's plan for preparing the proletarian revolution, was dictated by the fact that too much emphasis was placed on external factors and little consideration was given to internal conditions. Hence the desire arose to view the Russian revolution not as a product of internal development, but as a kind of powder keg capable of blowing up world capitalism and kindling a worldwide revolutionary fire.

Another aspect explaining precisely this behavior of the party leadership was associated with the unclear position of Bolshevik theorists on the key issue - about Russia's transition to the rails of socialism in the event of the victory of the proletarian uprising in Petrograd. In any case, until April 1917, according to the same Trotsky, none of the Russian Marxists believed at all in the possibility of building a socialist society in one single country, and even more so in Russia. Moreover, it was considered impossible that the Russian workers would be able to win power even before the dictatorship of the proletariat was established in the more advanced countries. According to Trotsky, the revolutionary process in Russia should develop according to the following scheme: "The Russian revolution can unleash and, in all likelihood, will unleash a proletarian revolution in the West, which, in turn, will ensure the socialist development of Russia" 21 . He was

convinced that the Russian revolution can lead to socialism only by assuming an international character; without the direct support of the European proletariat, "the working class of Russia will not be able to hold on to power and transform its temporary rule into a long-term socialist dictatorship" 22 .

Such a clearly expressed international emphasis in the position of the Bolshevik Party on the question of the nature of the forthcoming revolution gave rise to all sorts of rumors and rumors. In particular, the rumor stubbornly circulated that states hostile to Russia generously financed revolutionary forces and movements that undermined the great power. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the tsarist government S.D. Sazonov asserted, referring to the assurances of one of the leaders of the German Social Democracy, E. Bershtein, that Germany allocated 70 million marks for the needs of the Russian revolution. P.N. Milyukov, who cannot in any way be suspected of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks and their leaders Lenin and especially Trotsky, puts this question somewhat differently. In his book The History of the Second Russian Revolution, which the author began to write in 1918, being under fresh impressions from the October events, more modest figures are given. We are talking about 207,000 marks and 400,000 crowns, which in those days Germany, through its front companies in other countries, in particular in Sweden, transferred to the disposal of Lenin and Trotsky for the purchase of weapons and their delivery to Russia. Milyukov, in his book, speaks of "solid German aid in money and weapons", which allegedly went to support the Bolsheviks, not excluding, however, the completely falsified nature of the documents referred to by Russian officials and which were distributed in the press, although he believed that the Bolsheviks overstepped a certain line of conscience and morality 24 .

According to Sukhanov, Milyukov himself made efforts to spread rumors about German assistance to the Bolsheviks, as well as to insinuations related to the return of Lenin to Petrograd in April 1917 through Germany in a sealed carriage, and Milyukov himself, who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, sent telegrams to the Allied States with an urgent request to take all measures to prevent the return of Russian emigrants to their homeland. When this became known to the general Russian public, the newspapers, as Sukhanov notes, published statements by those who saw Milyukov's telegrams, in particular, in the Russian mission in Copenhagen, and asked Milyukov if these telegrams were forged. However, the minister preferred to remain silent. Speaking about the fact that Russian emigrants did not have the slightest opportunity to get to Russia in other ways, without using the services of the German authorities, Sukhanov adds: “Everyone understands that the German authorities, in this case, meeting the interests of Russian citizens, pursued exclusively their their own interests: they, of course, speculated on the fact that the Russian internationalists, under the conditions of the revolution, would shake the foundations of Russian imperialism, and then tear Russia away from the plundering allies and push it towards a separate peace ... Russian internationalist emigrants were fully aware of the mood of the German authorities and appreciated the source of their grace” 25 .

But let us return to the October Revolution, disputes about which continue to this day. The divisions in these disputes lie not only between

understanding and interpretation of the two tendencies that were originally embedded in the Russian revolution: internal, associated with efforts aimed at building socialism in one separate country - Russia, and external, which had the main goal of pushing the world proletarian revolution, on the success or failure of which the success of the socialist experiment in Russia, which thus turned into a kind of experimental ground. For the inspirers and supporters of the second trend, the October Revolution was a war, without which no revolutionary tasks and goals could be achieved. Such frank absolutization and glorification of the war led some theorists of the October Revolution to judgments and conclusions that left no room for creative activity at all. One of these party theorists, N. I. Bukharin, assured that the grandiose world upheaval, which would certainly come after October, would include both defensive and offensive wars on the part of the victorious proletariat. Moreover, preference should be given precisely to offensive wars, which, according to him, will more and more take on the character of civil wars, "turning into an organized class war", unfolding both within the country and in the international arena, the victory of which will mean the restoration of the unity of society. on the basis of its complete "declassing". Only then will "complete stateless communism" 26 come.

In the era of offensive wars that began with the victory of the October Revolution, only incredibly naive and simple-minded people could, party theorists confidently believed, raise the question of democracy, which more and more frankly began to be identified with dictatorship, and not even the working class and not the ruling party, but rapidly emerging new class. The well-known Yugoslav politician and political scientist M. Djilas, who carefully studied the history of the October Revolution and sharply criticized its negative consequences, in his work “New Class”, published in 1957, referred to this class the “political bureaucracy”, which came to power only to to establish their own dominance over society 27 . The "new class," writes Djilas, is rooted in the party itself, or rather, in its core. It is created and formed from above - by party leaders who ensure its dominance in society and its property. This party-state bureaucracy of a special type acts as the main pillar of power. According to Djilas, the emergence and strengthening of a "new class" became inevitable, since even after the victory of the October Revolution, one of its most negative aspects, the violent one, continued to operate.

The process of formation and strengthening of the "new class" in the person of the ruling privileged party-state elite - the nomenklatura - took place in conditions when the official party setting was in effect, based on a false thesis, simple and understandable to the broad masses, who were still under the psychological influence of recent revolutionary events and blindly believing in the justice of words, as if, as we advance towards socialism, the class struggle will inevitably intensify. All this was presented as a continuation of the assault on world capitalism, the beginning of which was laid by the October Revolution.

Of course, with this approach, the very posing of the question of the development of democracy, which was considered a product and attribute of a hated

bourgeois system, and various forms of its manifestation looked strange and abstract. Rejecting the very idea of ​​democracy, considering it absurd and harmful in a revolutionary era full of civil and other wars, Bukharin wrote: correlation of forces, they are impossible. "With the given balance of forces" ... A very significant caveat! It can also be understood and interpreted in the sense that one can speak of democracy only when the balance of forces is in favor of the Bolsheviks. In the meantime, this ratio is unfavorable to the new government, and "the era of a direct assault on the capitalist fortress and the suppression of the exploiters" is far from over, then "only a miserable petty bourgeois can be content with arguments about the" defense of the minority "29. It is easier to eliminate this "minority" than to think about protecting its political and other rights and freedoms. So, in fact, the Bolsheviks acted with everyone who at least somehow dared to disagree with the official line of the party, which, by the way, was by no means always distinguished by consistency, not to mention special morality and honesty, including in relation to their own people. former political allies.

Sukhanov reproduced a curious conversation that took place on the second day after the victory of October between him and L. B. Kamenev, who, like the majority of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), opposed an armed uprising in Petrograd. The dialogue was quite expressive. He testified not only to how quickly the Bolshevik leaders changed their position on the question of a coalition of all socialist forces (or perhaps they did not change it, but simply concealed their true goals earlier).

The conversation took place in the cafeteria of Smolny during a break between sessions of the Congress of Soviets, at which the first decrees of Soviet power were discussed and adopted. “From the crowded corridor,” writes Sukhanov, “I ended up in the buffet. There was a crush and a dump at the counter. In a secluded corner I came across Kamenev, who was sipping his tea in a hurry:

Well, then, you alone are going to rule us?

Are you not with us?

Depending on the limits and meanings. Just now, in the faction of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, I urged by all means to prevent you from establishing the dictatorship of your party...

Kamenev got angry:

Well, if so, what are we talking about! You think it appropriate to go around foreign factions and agitate against us...

Do you think this is indecent and unacceptable? I interrupted. - Fast! So, I cannot use my right to speak in any audience? After all, if it’s impossible in Smolny, then it’s impossible at the factory ...

Kamenev immediately relented and spoke of the brilliant course of the coup: they say that Kerensky succeeded in mustering a completely insignificant and harmless army...

So you finally decided to rule alone? - I returned to the previous topic. I find this situation completely scandalous. I'm afraid that when you fail, it will be too late to go back...

Yes, yes,' Kamenev uttered hesitantly and vaguely, looking at one point.

Although... why do we actually fail? He continued just as hesitantly.

As you know, not only their political allies, in particular, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, did not believe in an easy victory for the Bolsheviks, but also the leaders of the October Revolution themselves, who were visibly nervous, changed the timing of the uprising several times, clearly aware that any delay threatened them, that they would find themselves in the position of a bankrupt political force and in one moment will lose the trust and support of the broad masses. It was the possibility of such an unpleasant outcome for himself that prompted Trotsky to declare: "If the Bolsheviks had not taken power in October-November, they, apparently, would not have taken it at all" 31 .

Almost all participants in the October events, their observers and researchers agree that the revolutionary events developed unusually rapidly, as if according to a specially developed scenario, and victory came so unexpectedly and quickly that it seemed that there were no obstacles on the way to it at all, including such as resistance from the Provisional Government. True, some researchers see this fact as a natural result, towards which Russia has been moving throughout almost its entire centuries-old history, and almost all the popular, revolutionary, liberation movements and other movements that have shaken the country that have ever taken place on its territory, were nothing but preparations for a victorious armed uprising by the Petrograd proletariat. This, they conclude, was not only the call of the times, but also a manifestation of historical fate, a fatal predestination that left Russia no other choice. However, in such a historical inevitability, as well as in revolutionary expediency, it seems that the leaders of the October Revolution themselves did not really believe, otherwise they would not have forced the development of events so energetically.

As Miliukov noted, on the eve of the October Revolution, in the press of various trends, an almost universal opinion was expressed: the Bolsheviks would either not dare to take power, not being sure that they would be able to approve it, or, if they did, they would hold out only for a short time. According to him, only in some political circles this experiment was considered desirable, and then only in the sense that it could help "to cure Russia forever of Bolshevism." As for the Kadet Party, as Miliukov wrote, it was reproached for hindering the success of the Bolsheviks and thereby delaying the inevitable revolutionary process and the resulting disorganization of the country.

Thus, there was, as it were, a clash of two opposing views on the development of the revolutionary process in Russia: some believed that development was proceeding quite naturally and naturally, and no external influences could stop it or turn it off the right path. Others declared just as confidently that the revolutionary movement led by the Bolsheviks, regardless of temporary successes, was doomed to failure. Therefore, it is necessary to promote the seizure of power in every possible way.

Bolsheviks in order to permanently excommunicate them from the Russian liberation movement. However, this approach did not have the slightest chance of success: its supporters, wishful thinking, did not take into account the fact that the victory of the October Revolution was ensured primarily by the doom of the existing regime to defeat and the weakness of the political forces that opposed the Bolsheviks on their way to power. This gave Milyukov a reason to assert that neither his enemies nor his friends wanted to defend Kerensky: statehood, this statehood was called the name of Kerensky. And the Bolsheviks owed their easy victory to a very large extent to the fact that they had such an opponent in the high rank of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Recognizing the ease of the victory of the October Revolution, Milyukov and his party, as well as many other political figures, still hoped for a short-term victory for the Bolsheviks, who would not be able to hold power in their hands for a long time. On this he built his predictions, in which the gloomy worldview of a person whose political fate did not turn out the way he would like was combined with prophecies that looked more like spells: “The domination of the Bolsheviks,” he wrote, “began with confident predictions of the parties that the Bolshevik government will not be able to fulfill any of the promises it has made - it will not give the people it deceived peace, land, bread, or the "socialization" of industry, and that the disappointed population will not tolerate the domination of rapists. At the same time, the People's Freedom Party predicted that the victory of the Bolsheviks would entail the loss of the war and the division of Russia into parts. But no one, including this party, foresaw that a regime would arise here that would last for many years and which would bring Russia to the extreme degree of destruction of all her national goals - state, economic and cultural, which had been accumulating for many centuries.

The easy victory of the Bolsheviks was accompanied by very significant factors - objective and subjective - that hardly anyone could have foreseen. The first fits perfectly into the conditions and circumstances of the 20th century associated with wars. The fact is that the revolutions that took place in the 20th century were more or less influenced by wars, reflecting not so much the features and patterns of the internal social development of a country as the strong influence of external circumstances, which in most cases acted as a decisive condition . Even the Chinese Revolution, which began before the Japanese invasion of this country, stretched out for decades and won only in 1949, after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, and the 1936 revolution in Spain, although it had a chance of winning, never achieved victory. her.

The second factor relates to the field of leadership of the revolution, which, as the October events testify, is sometimes no less important for its victory than a fortunate confluence of objective circumstances. In this case, we are talking about the role of such outstanding personalities as Lenin and Trotsky, who found themselves at the right time in the right place. They were people with great strength of will and spirit, incredibly persistent, possessing personal courage, the ability to timely and energetically respond to a rapidly changing situation, to accept extraordinary

decisions, free from any schemes and dogmas, self-confident, capable of persuading the broad masses of the correctness of their views with their oratory and leading them, defending their position, regardless of anything, figures who are absolutely free from a sense of fear, always confident in victory. It was thanks to these qualities, as well as a sharp mind, an innate propensity for deep analysis and broad generalizations, that on the eve of the October events, they were able to turn the political situation in the country and in their own party and achieve a victory in which few believed from the then Russian politicians.

This does not mean, of course, that they were "twin brothers" and held the same views on all fundamental problems. They also had disagreements, and on quite significant issues. Their differences were not limited to the fact that one was characterized by an almost hypertrophied thirst for power, while the other saw his vocation not in being in power, but in the revolutionary process itself - in the element of revolution or war. However, in the October days they acted together and harmoniously, with a firm hand, putting their plans into practice. Unfortunately, in the characterization and evaluation of these personalities, as well as other leaders of the Russian revolution, many recent studies reveal many biases and controversial points. This will be discussed in detail in special essays on the life and work of the leaders of the October Revolution and the Soviet state.

The leaders of the October Revolution were often accused of conspiratorial activity and even of Blanquist tactics, excessive harshness, bordering on vindictiveness, in relation not only to the enemies of the revolution, but also to their potential allies - the Left Social Revolutionaries, Menshevik Internationalists and other representatives of the socialist part of the Russian political spectrum. life. How objective is this criticism?

Within the Bolshevik Party, including its leadership, two tactics fought: conspiratorial and based on the conviction that there were real driving forces for the revolution. In other words, it was about those who supported the impending armed uprising to the end, and those who advocated the implementation of the conspiracy. “It was along this line,” Trotsky wrote, “that the main, really principled dispute went on in the party, on the resolution of which the fate of the revolution depended in one direction or another,” and, possibly, of the country. And often, according to him, the conspiracy was mistakenly opposed to an armed uprising. Trotsky's position, which many, including Lenin, did not share, amounted to the assertion that the conspiracy not only did not contradict the insurrection, but "facilitated its course, hastened its victory. The higher the political level of the revolutionary movement, the more serious its leadership, the more important is the conspiracy in the popular uprising.

Such an understanding of the role of the conspiracy in the revolutionary movement gave the opponents of the October Revolution a pretext for accusing the Bolsheviks of insincerity and dishonesty, as well as of intrigue, of discrepancy between their declarations and true thoughts. The Bolsheviks did not want to share with anyone their plans for the preparation and conduct of an armed uprising. This behavior of theirs only confirmed Trotsky's assertions that the Bolsheviks were not alien to conspiratorial activity.

So, to the question posed in the title of this essay, we can give a definite answer: it was really a great revolution. First, it caused fundamental changes in the social development of Russia, liquidating, in essence, all the institutions and structures of the old regimes. Secondly, the goals and objectives of building a qualitatively new society were clearly stated. Thirdly, it had a huge impact on the rest of the world, challenging long-established orders in it. But, of course, every social phenomenon, especially such as a revolution, has many sides and aspects. For a complete and objective assessment of the revolution, it is necessary to take into account all these moments and features.

No matter how we feel about these, now not so close events in our history, and no matter how much we criticize one or another of their sides and aspects (especially since all the new, previously inaccessible to researchers, facts and documents allow us to do this), we cannot but agree with those authors of the latest works devoted to October 1917, who, along with an analysis of the development of internal events brought to life by the October Revolution, although later subjected to serious deformations, attach great importance to an assessment of the international aspects of the Russian revolution.

One of its important features (and in this, perhaps, the incomprehensibility of a number of its negative aspects and costs was most manifest) was that many of its consequences turned more outward than inward. Frightened by the October Revolution and trying in every possible way to prevent a similar development of events in their countries, the ruling forces of the capitalist world were forced to significantly raise the standard of living of the working people in their countries and go to a significant improvement in the social sphere.

However, despite all the negative aspects and aspects of the October Revolution, which were especially acute in the course of the subsequent turn of the revolutionary policy, although they did not follow from its social nature, it nevertheless rightfully belongs to an outstanding role in the history of Russia and the world liberation movement. It took place in a huge Eurasian country, with a multinational population, socio-economically backward, with the most severe social and national oppression. Because of this, she had to put forward and solve tasks that are incredible in their scale and world-historical significance. The events of the October Revolution take on a special meaning and put it, despite all the costs, blunders and mistakes, on a par with the great revolutions - the engines of historical progress. And this, above all, is the enduring historical significance of the Great October Revolution.

(To be continued)

A.I. Owl
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Chernivtsi National University. Y. Fedkovich

"Historical space", 2008

Some 20 years ago, the concept of the “Great October Socialist Revolution”, both in Russian (Soviet) historiography and in the public consciousness, was shrouded in a halo of holiness, revolutionary romance, was proclaimed “the main event of the 20th century”, and therefore could not be the subject of criticism.
However, since the late 1980s the tendency to reconsider the role and place of this phenomenon in our history became more and more clear. Instead of the term "Great October Socialist Revolution" generally accepted in Soviet times, the expression "October (or Bolshevik) coup" appeared in journalistic and special historical works, as well as in television programs and radio programs.

This was accompanied by a reassessment of the significance of the event itself, which happened in October 1917, from unambiguously progressive to almost completely negative (like a “national catastrophe”, etc.). Today it is not easy to find a textbook or an article where the October Revolution would be written in a positive sense, or at least in a neutral way. In many Ukrainian history textbooks, a dual approach to assessing the very phenomenon of revolutions is clearly traced. On the one hand, the events in Petrograd in the autumn of 1917, which, according to John Reed, "shook the world", are called only the "October (Bolshevik) coup", the negative impact of which on the historical fate of Russia is almost not questioned, but, with on the other hand, at that time “our own”, “national revolution” was taking place on the Ukrainian lands, which, of course, is interpreted as a positive phenomenon. Thus, it turns out that there are "bad" revolutions, and there are "good" revolutions. At the same time, it is as if “not noticed” that the “Ukrainian revolution”, which began with the formation of the Ukrainian Central Rada in March 1917, would hardly have taken place without the February Revolution in Petrograd, as well as the fact that its development took place for a certain time in line with or under the direct influence of the Russian revolution: first, depending on the intensification of the crisis of the Provisional Government, and then in the confrontation with the Soviet government.

By the way, the chairman of the Rada, the famous historian Mikhail Grushevsky frankly admitted this: “The Ukrainian revolution, unfortunately, did not develop independently ... it always had to measure its march with the convulsive movements and shyness of the Russian revolution, chaotic and terrible.” Moreover, a significant and probably even a large part of the population of Ukraine did not support its main goals - state self-determination and national revival, preferring them to fight for the solution of agrarian and other social issues.

Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky, an outstanding scientist of the 20th century, naturalist and thinker, creator of many scientific schools, wrote in his diaries about the limited and weak social base of the “Ukrainian national revolution”: “Under the conditions that exist in the country, Ukraine can hardly revive with purely Ukrainian language and culture. For this, there is not a single layer that would support and be embraced by this idea ... There is surprisingly little circle of faith in the power of the spiritual revival of Ukraine, and everywhere there is a desire to carry out by force what can only be carried out by life. But a number of modern Ukrainian historians seek to find other "Ukrainian revolutions".

A version has spread that, it turns out, another “national revolution” took place in the middle of the 17th century - under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and this “discovery” is being actively introduced into educational literature. It seems that all this is a consequence, first of all, of an arbitrary interpretation of the content of the very concept of "revolution", which can give "grounds" and declare some other historical events a revolution.

It should be noted that this cardinal reassessment of the essence, significance and consequences of the October events of 1917 did not occur as a result of the appearance of new fundamental theoretical works or serious scientific discussions where this historical phenomenon would be rethought, but mainly due to changes that occurred in public sentiment under the influence of political struggle that unfolded in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s - early 1990s. and especially after its collapse.

And in our time, many Russian and foreign historians are trying to destroy the myth of the October Revolution of the 17th year to the ground, arguing that the “October Revolution” or the “Red Revolution” was simply “ordered”, that is, artificially provoked, and Lenin, as "German agent", just worked out German money, and Trotsky - Anglo-American. It is this version of the explanation of the October events that is followed, for example, by the creators of the documentary film “Leo Trotsky. The Secret of the World Revolution (screenplay Elena Chavchavadze, director Galina Ogurnaya).

True, the question arises: are the authors of such explanations of the causes of the Russian revolution trying to extrapolate to the events of the past modern technologies for manipulating public consciousness, with the help of which certain forces are really able to fulfill the “order for the revolution”, which is confirmed by the events of the so-called “color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan. A certain “scenario” is clearly visible in them, and the customer, in general, is known.

It should be noted that the appearance of various newfangled or sensational versions of the October events of 1917 is often the result of an arbitrary interpretation of the very concept of "revolution". It seems that the authors and adherents of such versions did not even bother (or consciously did not want to do this) to look at least in reference or encyclopedic publications in order to get acquainted with the content of this concept.

As is known, the essence of a revolution as a social phenomenon lies in a deep, qualitative change in the state of society, in a sharp, abrupt transition to a new stage of its development. A coup d'état, usually carried out by force, is, in essence, a struggle for power between separate groups of the ruling elite or those forces that strive to become one, while society continues to be in almost the same state, watching what is happening as if from the outside. .

A real revolution sharply polarizes society, drawing large masses of the people into the whirlpool of political struggle (often reaching civil war), brings new classes or social groups to power, changes the form of ownership, that is, it carries out an essential transformation of society, actually changing its basic characteristics. The coup is limited, as a rule, to changes in the alignment of political forces that are at the state helm or seek to master it.

Unlike a coup, which the forces interested in it plan and organize in advance, it is impossible to develop a “scenario” for a revolution, because, as historical experience shows, revolutions develop according to their own “laws” and logic, which people can hardly master. Saint-Just, one of the most striking and interesting figures of the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, said: "The force of circumstances may lead us to results that we did not expect." The famous English historian E. Hobsbawm emphasized that "lack of control is just an integral feature of great revolutions", which he considered as "a spontaneous phenomenon beyond the control of man" . Note that the concepts of "revolution" and "coup" can be used as synonyms when they result in radical, qualitative, fundamental - or, as they are also called, revolutionary - changes.

For example, at one time England became the birthplace of precisely such, that is, revolutionary, changes in the sphere of material production, starting the transition from manual labor to machine labor, from the manufacturing stage of development of capitalism to the industrial (or industrial) one. Therefore, this phenomenon is called the industrial revolution or the industrial revolution, meaning by this one and the same phenomenon. After these general theoretical considerations, but necessary for our topic, let's try to determine what happened in October 1917 in Russia and what name does it deserve?

Any competent historian knows that Russia "conceived" the revolution long before October 1917. Its origins are in the contradictory results of the reform of 1861 and the incompleteness of the reforms of the 70s and 80s. XIX century By the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia needed a deep modernization, and the Romanov monarchy was losing its creative potential and connection with reality before our eyes. The process of modernization, which the country had long needed, began, but proceeded inconsistently and not efficiently enough, since the policy of the top of the Russian Empire, led by tsarism, slowed it down. And this is when Russia, having entered the 20th century, had to sharply accelerate capitalist modernization in order to eliminate its civilizational gap from the advanced countries of the West and take its rightful place in a world that was changing rapidly.

The urgent tasks of social development remained unresolved for decades, and their scale and severity became threatening. Among them the most important were:
the agrarian question, which was of key importance for a country where the peasantry made up the overwhelming majority of the population;
implementation, or rather bringing to the end of industrialization;
raising the cultural and educational level of the people, without which the fate of industrialization would look problematic;
the solution of the national problem, which was aggravated (recall that non-Russian peoples accounted for 57% of the population of the Russian Empire);
democratization of social and political life, that is, the replacement of obviously archaic, absolutist-bureaucratic orders by more progressive, bourgeois-democratic ones.

The unwillingness (and inability) of the ruling circles to look for ways acceptable for Russia to solve these historical problems and contradictions plunged the country into a crisis that eventually took on open and stagnant forms. Revolutionary performances 1905 - 1907 clearly showed that Russian society came close to a dangerous line, crossing which it was under the threat of a social explosion.

Despite all attempts to give a new impetus to the process of modernization (Stolypin's reform), Russia in 1913 - in almost all indicators of socio-economic development - lagged behind the advanced capitalist countries. In addition, the world war of 1914-1918. extremely aggravated all social contradictions and led to unprecedented economic ruin compared to other belligerent states.

The autocracy once again demonstrated its helplessness, for which it was "punished" by the February Revolution. The social crisis reached such a depth that in the spring of 1917 Russia was actually falling apart as a state, and Russian capitalism as a social system. After the abdication of the tsar, it seemed that the Russian bourgeoisie, having come to state power, had a chance to overcome the crisis, and, consequently, the opportunity "from above" to implement a series of long-awaited reforms and overdue transformations. But its representatives in the Provisional Government did not take advantage of this chance. Less than half a year passed, and the government itself experienced three crises - in April, June and July, gradually yielding power to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. But even they could not offer a constructive program and ensure the progressive development of the country through reforms and peaceful transformations.

As a result, the prestige of the socialists among the masses of workers began to decline. If in the elections to the Moscow Duma in June 1917 the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks received 70% of the votes, then in the September elections they were supported by only 18% of voters; a similar situation was typical for Petrograd, as well as for other industrial centers of Russia. Thus, the inability of the liberal-bourgeois and non-Bolshevik democratic forces after the February Revolution (or, as some modern historians believe, the February stage of the Great Russian Revolution) to cope with the primary and complex problems of social development, finding a reformist way out of the crisis, made a new revolutionary explosion inevitable.

In the autumn of 1917, the progressive paralysis of state power became apparent, which turned out to be unable even to hold the promised elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to determine the further direction of the country's development. As one of the researchers wrote, already a few months before the start of the October events, “Russia was breathing the air of revolution, an explosion was expected every minute.” Moreover, another - really terrible - alternative began to be seen. Almost ten million wild and furious soldiers, with weapons in their hands, in droves refused to obey the orders of the command, often raising officers on bayonets, left the front and, having captured the echelons, moved inland.

The state was on the verge of a national catastrophe, as it was threatened, perhaps, by the most terrible thing - sliding into chaos. By the way, this was well understood by the same Lenin, who then said that “the wave of real anarchy can be stronger than we are,” and the masses “will smash everything, smash everything ...”. An unbiased analysis of the entire set of historical facts refutes the “fashionable” version today that the October Revolution was just the result of a conspiracy or actions of a handful of Bolshevik adventurers who, almost following the instructions of the German General Staff, carried out (again with German money) the state coup. As is known, back in 1956, the patriarch of Western Sovietology, George Kennan, proved that the so-called "Sisson documents" were fakes. And modern Western historians (eg, A. Rabinovich, Landers, etc.), having carried out new research, confirm this, but our press and sensationalist authors stubbornly ignore or hush up their conclusions.

Taking into account the then population of the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik Party really looked like a handful of revolutionaries, and their coming to power, of course, would have ended in complete failure if they had not put forward slogans that were understandable and desirable for millions of Russians, and had not taken up the task of which have been on the agenda of Russian history for several decades.

The principal opponent of Bolshevism, the famous philosopher N. Berdyaev wrote: “The hour has come when the people no longer wanted to endure the injustices of the social system, and the whole mood of the people's soul turned upside down. Lenin could not have carried out his plan of revolution and the seizure of power without a revolution in the soul of the people.”

Thus, the main reasons for October 1917 were the deep-seated contradictions that accumulated in the political, economic, social, national spheres of public life, which it was no longer possible to resolve by reformist means, especially because of the position of the ruling circles, which hindered the necessary process of modernization. Recall at least the June 3 coup of 1907 (by the way, it was a coup that in no way violated the foundations of the autocratic order).

The political elite and state institutions of old Russia turned out to be unable (and, by and large, unwilling) to give a worthy response to the challenge of the time, without realizing that at the beginning of the 20th century the country entered an era of social upheavals fraught with revolution. The revolution "knocked on the door" in 1905-1907, in February 1917, and finally in October of that year. However, some historians generally believe that it was one revolution that began in 1905 and continued until about 1922, having gone through several stages in its development. The immediate results of the October Revolution were real and undeniable: it pulled Russia out of a bloody, exhausting war; averted a national catastrophe that threatened a society that was increasingly plunging into a state of chaos; preserved the territorial integrity and independence of the country, protecting its sovereignty; freed the working people from exploitation and oppression, giving land to the peasants, transferring factories and plants to the management and control of the workers; established a new form of power - the Soviets - as truly people's power.

So that today they don’t write about the October Revolution, but it remains a fact that it was thanks to it that the people for the first time felt themselves the master of their own destiny, the subject of the political life of the country, felt their strength and, most importantly, believed in the feasibility of the age-old dream of the possibility of building a society on the principles of equality and social justice. That is why, despite the unheard of suffering and sacrifice that fell to his lot in the 20th century, he managed to carry out grandiose transformations in the sphere of social relations, economy, and culture in a surprisingly short period of time.

For the first time, not only in the history of the Russian state, but also in the history of mankind, the principles of justice and equality of citizens in society were implemented - albeit not quite consistently and, as it turned out, temporarily. There has never been a society in history in which for several generations of people (that is, for tens of millions of Soviet citizens) money was not the most important social value. It was already during the Civil War that the Bolsheviks created a centralized party apparatus, which soon began to control all spheres of the country's life, and the party itself, increasingly crushing the state apparatus under itself, gradually moved away from one of the most attractive slogans of the October Revolution - the establishment of real democracy, that is, democracy of a higher level than in the capitalist countries.

After some time, as is known, the accelerated industrialization of the country began (largely at the expense of the peasantry), the collectivization of agriculture was carried out mainly by violent methods, and a campaign of large-scale political repressions was launched. But all this happened later, and was by no means "programmed" by the Bolsheviks and those who followed them, in the autumn of 1917. By the way, in such a turn of events, or rather the internal development of the October Revolution, - from the point of view of the general theory of revolutions - there is nothing extraordinary, for in fact, each revolution has its own "thermidor", its own descending line, when many of the achievements of the revolution won on its ascending line of development are lost.

Unfortunately, the October Revolution in Russia was no exception in this regard, which, however, does not detract from its enormous historical significance. The already mentioned Berdyaev admitted: “The Russian revolution awakened and unchained the enormous forces of the Russian people. This is its main meaning! The illustrious general of the First World War Brusilov, emphasizing that he “is not a socialist and never will be”, at the same time noted: “The revolution was a Russian necessity ... Russia is now in immeasurable need, into which it has been plunged by various reasons. And you can not blame the new government for this. The Bolsheviks turned out to be right in many respects. They uprooted the rotten Russian aristocracy, deprived the factory owners and landlords of their wealth, accumulated over many years at the expense of the Russian people. The Bolsheviks have finally preserved the integrity of Russia.”

Among those who do not agree to consider the October events of 1917 a revolution, there are popular assertions that, they say, the organizers of the armed uprising in Petrograd themselves - Lenin and Trotsky - called the coming of the Bolsheviks to power a coup. Indeed, in the works of Lenin and Trotsky one can find the expression "coup" or "October revolution", but even more often - and much more often! - they used the expression "October Revolution".

Moreover, they used the term "October Revolution" precisely in the meaning of the concept of "revolution", that is, implying a radical change in the social system. According to the approximate calculations of the author of the article, V. I. Lenin used the concept of "revolution", "October Revolution", "Great October Revolution", "October Workers' and Peasants' Revolution", "socialist revolution", "proletarian revolution", "revolution of the proletariat" , "communist revolution", "workers' revolution", "Russian revolution", "Russian revolution", etc. at least 50 times more often than the "October revolution" .

For example, in written responses to questions from the American United Press agency on July 20, 1919, he said: “After the revolution of October 25 (November 7), 1917 (emphasized by the author of the article), we did not even close bourgeois newspapers, and there was no talk of terror and speech. We released not only many of Kerensky's ministers, but also Krasnov, who fought against us. Only after the exploiters, that is, the capitalists, began to develop their resistance, did we begin to systematically suppress it, up to terror. And dozens of such statements by the leader of the Bolsheviks can be cited.

One gets the impression that those who stubbornly refuse to call the October events of 1917 a revolution, trying in every possible way to downplay its significance or even almost delete it from their history - Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, etc. - do not understand that in As a result of such “new approaches” and “discoveries”, they find themselves in a strange, if not ridiculous, position. At the same time, we note that, unlike many domestic historians, who, under the influence of the current political situation, hastened to make appropriate “corrections” in their views and began to interpret the revolution, which changed the entire course of the history of the twentieth century, as a historical accident or the result of the evil will of a handful of fanatics, who seized power through a coup d'etat, serious foreign researchers, who for the most part relate to the October Revolution and its offspring - the Soviet state - without any sympathy, despite this, call it the way it should be called - a revolution, albeit with different adjectives.

So, abroad, in many scientific studies and university textbooks on history, it is called the "Russian revolution". The name “Bolshevik revolution”, “Bolshevik revolution in Russia” is often used (as an option - “the Bolsheviks seized power through a violent revolution”). It is characteristic that in general works on world history or on the history of Western civilization (Western society), the events of the October Revolution and the Civil War in Russia, however, as well as the construction of a new society in the USSR, have always been given due attention. For example, in a popular science publication on world history that was popular in the Western countries at one time, one of the chapters is called “The November Revolution of 1917”.

In A Brief History of Western Civilization, a separate paragraph is titled "The Russian Revolution of 1917," which states that "On November 6, Trotsky carried out a well-organized revolution." In the second volume of the "History of Western Society" (authors - J. P. McKay, B. D. Hill, J. Buckler), in the 27th chapter there is a separate paragraph called "The Russian Revolution", and it also has a subparagraph - "Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution".

In an even more fundamental work, which went through five reprints at the beginning of the 1990s, one of the paragraphs is generally called "The October Revolution". This name has also been fixed in reputable encyclopedic and reference publications. For example, in one of the newest publications that the Ukrainian reader could get acquainted with, namely, in the illustrated Atlas of World History by the well-known publishing house Reader's Digest, the corresponding chapter is titled "Revolution in Russia", where a photograph of the "chief organizer of the October Revolution" is placed - V. I. Lenin.

And this is not surprising, because any unbiased Western historian understands what a huge impact the October Revolution had on the course of world history in the 20th century. in general and on the fate of Western civilization in particular. Authors of the book “World Civilizations. Their history and culture”, talking about the “revolution of 1917 in Russia”, admit: “The results of the Soviet revolution were profound”.

The American authors K. Findley and D. Rothney in their interestingly compiled book "The World of the Twentieth Century", at the beginning of the fourth chapter, call it "the most important revolution of the early twentieth century", which influenced both the history of Russia and world history, and after a few pages, they clarify "the most influential among the revolutions of the twentieth century."

In this regard, we can also recall the serious works translated into Russian by such well-known connoisseurs of the history of Russia and the Soviet Union as the French historian, researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History Nicolas Werth and the American historian and political scientist, professor at Indiana University Alexander Rabinovich. By the way, in the book of N. Werth in the paragraph entitled "Coup d'état or general revolution?" says: “The October Revolution of 1917 seems to us to be a merger of two currents: the seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks is the result of both the careful preparation of an armed uprising by one party, and the development of a large-scale, versatile social revolution.

The social revolution developed gradually, in completely different forms. Large-scale peasant war, caused by the movement of the lower classes of society, which had its own history; deep moral decay of the army; workers' struggle for their rights; the movement for the national independence of the non-indigenous peoples of Russia are all components of the social revolution in Russia; and each of these movements supported popular Bolshevik slogans: "Peace to the peoples!", "Land to the peasants!", "All power to the Soviets!", "Factories to the workers!" .

Therefore, to assert that in October 1917 only a coup took place in Petrograd means deliberately ignoring historical facts or interpreting them quite freely. We must not forget that this event undermined the centuries-old foundations of tsarist Russia and radically changed the vector of its historical development, initiating the creation of a completely new society. No coup d'état is capable of giving rise to a new society. As you know, a real artist has the talent to comprehend the deep essence of events and phenomena, of which he is a contemporary, and long before they are systematized and analyzed by scientists.

In his well-known article “The Intelligentsia and the Revolution”, the famous Russian poet Alexander Blok defined the essence of the phenomenon called revolution as follows: “Redo everything. Arrange so that everything becomes new; so that our false, dirty, boring, ugly life becomes a fair, clean, cheerful and beautiful life. When such plans, hidden from time immemorial in the human soul, in the soul of the people, break the fetters that fettered them and rush in a stormy stream, breaking the dams, sprinkling unnecessary pieces of the coast, this is called a revolution.

Lesser, more moderate, more base - is called rebellion, rebellion, coup. She is like nature. Woe to those who think to find in the revolution the fulfillment of only their dreams, no matter how lofty and noble they may be. Revolution, like a thunderstorm, like a snowstorm, always brings something new and unexpected; she cruelly deceives many; she easily cripples the worthy in her whirlpool; she often brings the unworthy to land unharmed, but this is her particulars, this does not change either the general direction of the stream, or that terrible and deafening roar that the stream emits. This rumble - all the same, always - about the great.

In the above excerpt, Blok, by artistic means, reflected the atmosphere and moods of the then Russian society, which felt that a cataclysm had begun in the country, whose name was the Revolution. Therefore, probably, it is not worth arguing with contemporaries and eyewitnesses of those distant events; after all, they, who lived and survived those terrible years, as they say, know better.

The October Revolution can be treated differently, and everyone has the right to their own point of view and their own assessment of its significance. However, according to the author, to deny the obvious fact that in October 1917 a revolution began in Petrograd - namely, a revolution, and not just a coup - means not understanding the essence of the very concept of "revolution", distorting historical realities and simply going against common sense. meaning.

And although in form the uprising organized by the Bolsheviks and the seizure of power did resemble a coup d'etat, in fact it was the beginning of one of the most profound and dramatic social revolutions in history. As we tried to show, according to all the "parameters" of the phenomenon that is called "revolution", the October armed uprising was the beginning of a revolution that truly shook the world. It seems that Russia already understands this.

So, in the educational literature in recent years, the term “Great Russian Revolution (1917-1920)” has increasingly appeared, which is divided into four stages. In 2008, on the pages of such a reputable and respected publication as Literaturnaya Gazeta, for several months there was an interesting discussion on the topic “Lessons of October: a view from the 21st century”, which gave grounds to the editors to state: “It seems that the primitive idea is receding into the past , according to which in October 1917 a coup d'etat took place in Petrograd, carried out by a handful of international adventurers led by Lenin.

Historical facts irrefutably testify that the revolutions in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century were the result of a relatively long development of Russian life, where October became the final phase. That is why the October Revolution cannot be considered in isolation from the February Revolution and the Revolution of 1905-1907, as well as events even more distant from it. Otherwise, one cannot understand the historical role and purpose of the Great October Revolution.

And one of the participants in the discussion, a well-known Russian historian, prof. Igor Froyanov expressed surprise at the fact that “the events of October, which have every reason in their nature to be called a revolution, are called a coup in historical and historical-publicist literature (from A. I. Solzhenitsyn to A. N. Yakovlev), while the events of February, devoid of revolutionary depth, they are declared a revolution. It is time to finally part with such a historical illusion. October 1917, in his opinion, was precisely the revolution that “produced the most profound changes in Russian society, eliminating private property and exploiting classes,” and socialist in nature, because it was “aimed at social justice and equality.”

Another participant in the discussion, Prof., Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. Gromyko rightly notes: “No “donors” like Gelfand-Parvus could organize and manage the revolution in Russia, as in any other country. A real revolution is not a man-made process of individuals, but a skating rink of history that crushes everything in its path ... The October Revolution was Great because it corresponded to the desires and hopes of the working people.

However, here, in Ukraine, objective assessments of this event are beginning to appear. So, T. V. Orlova in her interesting manual on the history of the modern world writes: “Respecting the right of everyone to have their own point of view, one can hardly agree that then there was only a coup. A coup d'état means a sudden or drastic change in government, a change that is sometimes brought about by violence. But it differs from revolution in that only the government, and not the foundation of the social and political system, changes.

The uprising develops into a revolution only if the government is eventually overthrown and the social order is radically changed. Revolution as a political phenomenon in its essential meaning is a challenge to the existing political system and, ultimately, the establishment of a new order, radically different from the previous one.

The great revolutions of European history, among them the Russian one of 1917, changed not only the system of political government in their country, but also the social structure with all its branches: economic, social, cultural. ...it cannot be denied that the consequences of the October events of 1917 really did last for many years and significantly changed the historical development of those countries and peoples that fell under the rule of the "new democracy". The "new democracy" began with the social revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks in it.

The events of the past, as well as generations of people - our predecessors, deserve respect or at least understanding. A feature characteristic of the consciousness of a truly civilized society is a respectful attitude to its history with all its dark and light sides. Finally, we need to understand that all sorts of "experiments" with history (under the guise of its "rethinking") have recently turned into a mockery of it, leading to a distortion of the historical consciousness of young generations, which - as historical experience shows - with impunity for society does not pass.

And who knows if that unprecedented bacchanalia of denigrating the Soviet period of history and, in particular, the Great October Revolution, is not one of the reasons for the deep socio-psychological crisis in which the peoples of the former Soviet Union are actually still today. E. Hobsbawm in his famous book "The Age of Extremes", which became a very popular textbook on the history of the twentieth century. among students in the USA, Canada, Great Britain and other Western countries, wrote that the Russian, or rather, the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 "for the twentieth century ... became as important a phenomenon as the French Revolution of 1789 for the nineteenth century" .

It is impossible to imagine the 20th century without the October Revolution in Russia, because without it the very history of this century would have been different.

2017 marks the 100th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which, according to the American writer D. Reed, "shook the whole world."

But it shocked, first of all, Russia, deeply plowed Russian society. For the first time in the history of mankind, the proletariat won in alliance with the peasants and created the Soviet state - the state of the working people. The revolution abolished the estate system and landlordism that had survived from feudalism, nationalized land, banks, and then industry. First of all, the peasants, who received all the land at their disposal, benefited from the revolution. The workers began to participate in the management of enterprises, although in the conditions of the ruin of the national economy they could not increase their financial situation. All this caused a sharp internal class and political struggle. The October Revolution had a revolutionary influence on the whole world, hence the desire of world capital to crush the Russian revolution was manifested.

Naturally, a fierce ideological struggle unfolded in relation to the October Revolution. Domestic and foreign anti-Sovietists portray the revolution as a conspiracy of the Bolsheviks, who, having seized power, began to impose communist experiments on the people by force, suppressing the resistance of not only the bourgeoisie, but also the workers and peasants with violence and terror. At the same time, October aroused great sympathy and support from working people all over the world. Friends of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union noted the enormous positive results of the revolution, the change for the better in the position of the working people in the Soviet country. In the USSR, the October Revolution was called the main event of the 20th century, which had a huge positive impact on the whole world and on our country. In post-Soviet Russia, there is a sharp struggle between supporters and enemies of the Great October Revolution.

In a series of articles dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, their authors - philosophers, political scientists, historians, etc. - cover the history of the Great October Revolution as an objective and natural phenomenon in world history that marked the beginning of the transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism. History chose Russia as a pioneer in this transition as a weak link in the system of imperialism, on the one hand, and as a country with enormous human and material potential, which contributed to the victory of the revolution and its defense, on the other.

After the February Revolution of 1917, all classes and social strata in Russia showed unprecedented political activity, many political parties, public organizations, committees appeared, which resulted in the elements of popular movements. The authors of the collection show that the genius of V.I. Lenin manifested itself in a scientific, Marxist analysis of the situation in the country, in determining the strategy and tactics of the party, the course towards the socialist revolution. The activities of the Bolshevik Party, which managed to lead the popular movements and with their help ensure the victory of the October Revolution, are characterized.

The series of articles dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Great October Revolution analyzes the fundamental changes that took place in Russia after the revolution, which changed the civilizational foundations of society and people's consciousness. The authors show the implementation in the USSR of industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution, as a result of which a new socialist society and the Soviet state with a powerful material base were created, which ensured the victory of the Soviet people over Nazi Germany and the transformation of the USSR into a world superpower.

IN AND. Egorov

Scientists from the humanities and socio-economic specialties, having gathered at a round table, discussed questions about the nature and historical significance of October 1917 and came to the following conclusions:

1. An objective scientific analysis confirms the correctness of the concept developed by Soviet historiography and supported by many authoritative foreign scientists, representatives of the school of "social history", according to which a people's anti-bourgeois social revolution took place in Russia on October 25-26, 1917. The term "coup" is applicable to this event only in the sense that it was the first, purely political act of the Great Social Revolution.

2. The October social revolution was undoubtedly a continuation of the February people's anti-monarchist revolution. She defended the gains of February and brought to the end the democratic transformations begun at that time.

3. The armed uprising on October 25 against the Provisional Government and the creation of a new, Soviet government headed by V. I. Lenin were a natural result after the February development. The change of power turned out to be in the fall of 1917 an indispensable condition for getting out of the catastrophe threatening the country, in fact, the solution of the question of life and death of Russian civilization.

4. This historical mission was taken on by the lower strata of the people—the working class, the working peasantry, the soldiers and sailors of the Russian army. The political leader of the insurgent people was the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), founded in 1903.

5. The Bolsheviks earned this high confidence by their selfless struggle for the interests of working people, for the national interests of Russia. They were the keepers of revolutionary traditions and continue the cause of the fighters for freedom, justice and people's happiness: A. N. Radishchev, the Decembrists, A. I. Herzen, N. G. Chernyshevsky, the populists of the 60-70s of the XIX century.

6. It should be rejected as untenable the assertions of some authors that in October 1917 there was a "seizure of power by the Bolsheviks" and "the establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship." The real power in Russia from the moment of the victory of the February Revolution belonged to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and in October, in fact, the legal registration of this power took place. Although the Bolshevik Party by this time enjoyed great influence in the Soviets and other mass democratic organizations, however, it was not the only political force in them. These organizations functioned on a multi-party basis; most of the seats in them were occupied by non-partisans. Therefore, the characterization of the new political reality as “workers' and peasants' Soviet power” enshrined in the documents of that time seems to be quite correct and accurate. The legitimacy of this power is beyond question.

7. The Bolshevik Party, which led the first Soviet government, had a comprehensive program that included measures to overcome the economic and social crisis, withdraw the country from the imperialist war, save the people and revive the united multinational Russian state. And although the new government at the beginning of its existence met with fierce resistance from the overthrown social groups supported by the ruling circles of the imperialist states, this program was carried out in the shortest possible time. This confirms the necessity and justification of the October revolution, the vitality of the new, Soviet, system. 8. The decades that followed October 1917 became an epoch of the creation of new, more just forms of life and great accomplishments in all spheres of activity on the part of the masses themselves. The decisive contribution made by the Soviet people to the fight against the brown plague of the 20th century demonstrated the deeply humanistic, universal nature of the work begun in October 1917. The creative work of several generations of Soviet people—non-Party people and Communists—brought backward Russia into the ranks of the most developed countries in the world. The USSR became the second world superpower.

The final conclusion is that the October proletarian revolution was neither an accident nor a mistake. Caused by the concrete historical conditions of 1917, it saved Russia from a national catastrophe and led it to the only possible path of modernization and social progress at that time.

Round table participants:

- appeal to the young generation of Russians with a call to remember, carefully study the events of the Great Revolution of 1917, to respect those who, risking their well-being, health and life, in a critical situation, took responsibility for the fate of the country and managed to fully fulfill their duty;

- call on scientists, teachers of higher and secondary educational institutions, cultural workers and the media to give an objective, scientific, verified interpretation and assessment of these events and the entire post-October, Soviet period of national history;

- support the initiative of the Communist Party faction in the State Duma to restore the holiday on November 7 - Victory Day of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The main event in the history of the 20th century has not yet found an assessment tolerable for everyone. In the history of Russia, the most important place is occupied by the October Revolution of 1917 as an open challenge to the capitalist system of oppression. In this event, someone sees the apogee of the struggle of the human race for freedom, and someone curses October, considering it the greatest crime against humanity, someone calls it a coup, and someone calls it a revolution. Who is right?

In the Russian rebellious context, the events of October 25-26 follow the third wave of the revolutionary process that began in 1905. The Bolsheviks took power into their own hands because:

1. Socio-economic difficulties intertwined into an insoluble knot.
2. The convocation of the Constituent Assembly was delayed, and this became a serious problem.
3. The authority of the Provisional Government fell to extremely low values.
4. The Bolsheviks resolutely undertook to lead the country out of the impasse.
5. The radical left of the socialist parties supported the Bolsheviks.

The concept of "coup" was freely used in Soviet journalism and documents until 1927. For the celebration of the tenth anniversary, the term "Great October Socialist Revolution" was introduced into use.

Three Views of the Armed Insurrection

Despite the fact that the autocracy was overthrown and the country was ruled by the Provisional Government, the tasks of the February Revolution were never completed. The political crisis required a search for a cardinal way out of a difficult situation. In the Bolshevik environment, three points of view on the armed uprising were formed:

1. Leninskaya - an uprising without delay, and then the consolidation of the seizure of power by the Congress of Soviets.
2. Trotsky and Stalin - the Congress of Soviets takes power, and if it does not vote, then start an uprising.
3. Zinoviev and Kamenev - participation in the work of the pre-parliament and against the armed uprising.

Preparation of the uprising "for" and "against"

It so happened that the Leninist approach prevailed over other options and formed the basis of preparatory measures in three areas:

The alignment of forces and the dynamics of the armed coup

The uprising in Petrograd easily won, almost without meeting the resistance of the armed supporters of the Provisional Government. The balance of power was far from equal.

Armed Forces of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet	Armed forces on the side of the Provisional Government
Detachments of the Red Guard - 75 thousand people. Parts and subdivisions of the Petrograd garrison and the Baltic Fleet - 240 thousand people.	Officers of the garrison and fleet - 7-8 thousand people. Junkers of military schools - 9-10 thousand people. Shock battalions (cavaliers of St. George and women), volunteer detachments (students and crippled soldiers) - 6-7 thousand people. City police and civil defense detachments - 5-7 thousand people. Cossacks - 3-4 thousand people (at the time of the uprising they declared neutrality).
In total, about 325 thousand people.	In total, about 35 thousand people.

On October 24, armed detachments of the Military Revolutionary Committee seized key places of life support and communications in the capital. Supporters of the Provisional Government (with the exception of individual detachments and the women's battalion) did not defend the legitimate government.

On October 25, the appeal "To the Citizens of Russia" announced the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power to the Military Revolutionary Committee of Petrograd. Opening of the II Congress of Soviets.

On the night of October 26, the Provisional Government was arrested. The victory of the socialist revolution was proclaimed at the Congress of Soviets. The first Decrees of Soviet power "On Peace" and "On Land" were announced, and the reforms of the Bolsheviks began.

Practice is the most important evaluation criterion

Any social upheaval, which is situationally called a coup or revolution, has its deep roots, which lie in the ability or inability to meet the urgent requirements of the time.

Problem	provisional government	Bolsheviks
The relationship between government and people	Ignorance and misunderstanding of the basic needs of the people.	Demonstration of knowledge and understanding of people's aspirations.
Political determination	Indecisiveness, half-measures and delaying the resolution of pressing issues until the Constituent Assembly.	A bold exercise of political will that responds to the acute needs of the people at a decisive moment.
Social class support	Activities in the interests of big capital and landowners against workers and peasants.	The proletariat, the peasantry and all who are tired of the war and the inaction of the Provisional Government.

Form and content in the context of a historical event

The provisional government turned out to be powerless to really alleviate the plight of the people of Russia. Having lost faith in the Provisional Government, the people, for the most part, supported the coming to power of the Bolsheviks through an armed uprising. In form, the change of power in October 1917 was a coup, but in content and world-historical significance, it was a revolution. Its result was the emergence of the Soviet state.

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution of higher professional education

Volgograd State Technical University

( VolgGTU )

Department of History, Culture and Sociology

ESSAY

on the history of Russia

"October 1917: pattern or error, revolution or coup?"

Made by a student of group E-158

Kuznetsova Julia

Checked by supervisor

Potapov A.N.

Volgograd 2006

Introduction……………………………………………………………..............3

1 Development alternatives after February…………………………………4

2 Provisional government: no change………………………………...5

3 Deepening the split of society…………………………………………...6

4 Lenin’s theses………………………………………………………….....8

5 On the brink of a national catastrophe………………………………..........9

6 Democracy or dictatorship……………………………………………...10

7 The Bolsheviks are picking up power…………………………………………….11

8 Bolsheviks preparing an armed uprising………………....12

9 Assault on power…………………………………………………………….....13

10 Coup or revolution .......................................................... .........................fifteen

Conclusion………………………………………………………………….16

List of used literature……………………………………...17

Introduction

The period from 1917 to 1928 was a time of painful search for Russia's place in world civilization. The country, drawn into the war, was unable to solve the modernization tasks facing it. Moreover, the war gave rise to new contradictions. Growing economic ruin, the threat of famine, millions of victims and serious changes in the psychological mood of society caused by the war were rapidly bringing the country closer to a revolutionary explosion.

In February 1917, unlike the first Russian revolution, the autocracy failed to turn the tide in its favor. Moreover, the imperial power, which had finally lost its authority, completely surrendered its state positions to the liberals. The prospect of implementing the liberal bourgeois model of social development opened up before the country. However, this alternative was complicated from the very beginning by two circumstances. First, the war. The Russian liberals, above all the Cadets, who were concerned about the subsequent prospect of Russia's existence as a full-fledged member of the international community, could not even allow the thought of the country's withdrawal from the military redivision of the world. Secondly, the Russian people from the very beginning of the revolution did not want to behave according to the rules of the liberal game. Not satisfied with the main liberal values ​​- democratic rights and freedoms granted by the new government, he began to urgently demand what he had not received since the first revolution - land and social guarantees, and now also peace.

The masses of the people, without going into ideological subtleties, were ready to follow any political force that firmly promised them peace and land. At the same time, the Russian people made it much easier for the Bolsheviks to gain political power by creating very specific bodies of popular representation that have no analogues in Western political culture - the Soviets. It is logical to ask the question: "The October Revolution of 1917 - a revolution or a coup, a pattern or a mistake?"

Development alternatives after February

The revolutionary outburst of the masses, which spontaneously arose, temporarily rallied everyone: revolutionaries and reformers, workers and peasants, soldiers and officers, and united various detachments of the "incompatible" intelligentsia. However, this unification could not but be of a temporary nature, since it was inevitably followed by a regrouping of political forces and a new disengagement.

Thus, February opened up the following possible alternative development paths for the country:

The bourgeois-democratic development of the country, it was precisely for this path that the Provisional Government fought;

Military dictatorship, General Kornilov tried to implement it;

Creation of a democratic socialist government (from the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries)

Left radical, Bolshevik path, the establishment of the dictatorship of one party.

At that moment, everything depended on the will and swiftness in the actions of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. However, neither one nor the other was enough for them in the conditions of the ongoing war and the patience and trust of the masses, which was melting day by day.

Provisional government: no change

Having arisen during the February bourgeois revolution, the Provisional Government faced all the problems that the old government could not solve. The main issue was the war. The government declared that Russia would fight the war to a "victorious end" and fulfill all the international obligations it had undertaken.

Based on the course to continue the war, the internal policy of the Provisional Government was also built. It considered it possible to carry out only such measures that would not affect the reduction of the country's defense capability. That is why the project on the introduction of an 8-hour working day was rejected.

In March, the Provisional Government issued a decree on the transfer of imperial property to the disposal of the relevant ministries. In March, on the eve of sowing, the peasants arbitrarily seized the master's lands, set fire to and sacked estates, kulak farms. The government tried to protect the owner from arbitrariness by sending soldiers to restore order. And the soldiers not only sympathized with the peasants, but often took their side.

The Provisional Government's declaration of March 19 forbade the seizure of landowners' lands and promised to convene a Constituent Assembly that would resolve this issue. Lenin noted: “The peasants are led by the nose, urging them to wait until the Constituent Assembly. With the Constituent Assembly, wait until the end of the war. From the end of the war, wait until complete victory ... "

June was a turning point in the February-October events. The village seethed, the difficult situation in industry, the collapse in the army. Lenin described the general situation as follows: “Everyone admits that an unheard-of catastrophe is inevitable…” The Bolsheviks understood the catastrophe as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The Cadets saw a catastrophe in the establishment of Bolshevik power.

The confusing, complex land question remained unresolved. The village, tired of promises, ceased to trust the authorities and was inclined to support those who would satisfy its needs. The agrarian reform was late, the Constituent Assembly was delayed, there was no unity in the government on the land question.

Unemployment rose in the cities, there were not enough basic necessities, the price of bread rose exorbitantly, the productivity of factories and plants fell. True, the demands of the workers to increase wages were nevertheless satisfied by the government, but this was little consolation in the current economic situation.

The government adopts resolution after resolution: on the distribution of sugar; on the introduction of a nationwide rationing system for the distribution of meat; on the procedure for the release of sugar, etc.

However, the situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

Deepening the division of society

On April 3, 1917, the leader of the Bolsheviks, V.I., returned to Petrograd from exile. Lenin. He criticized the party's policy of "completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution", declaring it dogmatic and inconsistent with the "originality of the current situation in Russia", and demanded to immediately take a course towards the socialist revolution.

What guided V.I. Lenin, having made such an appeal, unexpected for all political forces in Russia, including his own party?

Lenin understood that Russia was materially unprepared for "the dictates of socialism." Developing his course, he was clearly inspired by the well-known principle of Napoleon - "first you need to get involved in a serious battle, and then you'll see." At the same time, two starting points were of decisive importance for Lenin:

The firm conviction that Russia will not be left alone, that its breakthrough towards socialism will cause a response in the countries of the West. Growing anti-government protests in Western countries, the aggravation of social contradictions caused by the exhausting world war, confirmed in Lenin's eyes the correctness of his forecast;

No less firmly V.I. to use it, with the direct assistance of the revolutionary West, to "pull up" the country to an economic and cultural level at which the establishment of socialism is possible.

The peculiarity of the political situation in post-February Russia, about which V.I. Lenin spoke a lot at that time, really existed and consisted not only in dual power. An even more prominent role was played by the opposition, occupied by the country's leading political forces. An analysis of the first weeks of the activities of the bourgeois and socialist parties allowed the leader of the Bolsheviks to draw a conclusion that was fully justified in the future: about their unpreparedness for a quick and radical solution to the most burning issues of Russian life - to give land to the peasants, bread to the hungry, freedom to the oppressed peoples, to end the war .

What explains this circumstance, which is especially important for understanding the future fate of Russia? Some modern historians pass over in silence this phenomenon, not finding reasonable explanations for it. Others see the clue in the commitment of the ministers of the Provisional Government to the idea of ​​a constitutional state. The desire to remain within the bounds of law and not prejudge the issues that were within the competence of the Constituent Assembly, they believe, significantly "narrowed the possibilities of political maneuvering of the authorities during the turbulent events of 1917." Yet the answer to the question posed lies deeper.