On September 1, 1939, World War II began. Germany and the USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the secret protocol of which provided for the division of Poland and the Baltic States between the two powers. Earlier this was preceded by the visit of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain to Hitler in Berlin. The result of this visit was that the desire to delay the outbreak of war, especially for England. Upon his return to London, Chamberlain declared: "I have brought you peace ...". To this, Churchill said that England had been given the choice between war and dishonor, and that England had chosen dishonor and would get war.
All these events were preceded by the pejorative Treaty of Versailles, according to which Germany practically could not have an army and a navy. Moreover, Germany had to pay France more than 2 billion German marks in reparations.
Although today, in the age of information and information technology, as a result of the declassification of state archives and documents of those years, much has become and is becoming known. Nevertheless, from my point of view, there is a certain imbalance and information vacuum around people from the times of fascist Germany. Namely, those who determined Hitler's foreign policy. These are von Neurath, Ribbentrop and other equally interesting personalities. It is interesting that everyone who will be discussed in this article came from aristocratic families and had an excellent education. But this did not prevent them from allowing Hitler to come to power.
If you subordinate the mind to the feelings, then it would be too easy. Therefore, I will rely only on the facts.
Here is what the official representative of Germany at that time, Dr. Clodius, writes about Anglo-German relations (from his own testimony No. 54 of May 21, 1946): war and the positions of both states in relation to the Treaty of Versailles.
Immediately after the end of the war, a significant difference emerged between the policy of England and the policy of France towards Germany. Already at the peace conference, on the question of the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Saarland, England sided with Wilson, who opposed this annexation.
The attitude of the British occupying troops in the Rhineland towards the German population was completely different from that of the French troops. Soon the occupation regime in the British zone became barely noticeable.
On the question of reparations, which soon after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles became the subject of constant negotiations, England, together with America, tried to take a mediating position between Germany and France.
When Poincaré ordered the French troops to enter the Ruhr area in order to take it as a "pledge" and thereby force the Germans to pay reparations, England did not take part in this operation. Thus, for the first time, the differences between England and France were revealed openly. Italy followed the example of England, and Belgium participated in this operation only symbolically by sending some engineers to the Ruhr. The Belgian position thus led to the isolation of France in this issue, which was especially important at that time.
It goes without saying that the position of England in the first post-war years had a great influence in Germany, and under this influence was the position of the German government and the feelings of the German people, although it is natural that there were many disagreements between England and Germany about really friendly relations, in view of the general situation, then there was no question. In any case, the influence of England in Berlin was very great at that time, and the first post-war British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D. felt right, in a way, as a foreign policy consultant to the German government. What motives were decisive for the English position from Germany, of course, it was difficult to draw a definite conclusion.
In the first place, probably, traditional considerations about maintaining a certain balance in Europe played a role. England did not want France to have undeniable dominance in Western and Central Europe, and therefore she was interested in Germany becoming so strong that a "discharged space" would not form in Central Europe.
In addition, British financiers and economists were convinced that in order to restore a somewhat organized world economy, the participation of an economically ruined Germany was necessary. Hence the special interest of England in a reasonable settlement of the question of reparations. British policy also wished from the outset to secure decisive political influence in Berlin from the very beginning. Therefore, she was careful to ensure that Germany's policy did not lean to any other side. The Treaty of Rapallo, as the first sign in this direction, was met with special attention in England, as in general any change in the relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union often clearly affected the position of England in relation to Germany.
Finally, a certain role was also played by the realization that the Treaty of Versailles burdened Germany to the limits of what was possible, and on some points beyond that, so that the democratic government of Germany could not make its task too difficult.
As you can see, the mind of this German diplomat of that time cannot be denied. The same can be said about common sense. So why did it all happen the way it did? Why were the opinions of the people of that time different and the opinion of the Federal Chancellor prevailed? We will talk about this next time. Studying the documents of that time, I came to the conclusion that this war could have gone and developed according to a completely different scenario. Moreover, it is no longer a secret to anyone that the German Foreign Minister von Neurath was an ardent opponent of the war with the USSR and for this he was replaced by Ribbentrop, known to all of us.
I promised earlier that we would continue to talk about what was going on between the great powers and the Berlin-Rome axis at the time. First, it is necessary to consider the question of how Hitler came to power. In this sense, the handwritten testimony of Dr. Clodius, already known to us, No. 68 dated October 16, 1947 (quote): “After the death of the leader of the German Center Party - Marx, who was repeatedly Reich Chancellor, Brüning became, on a par with the prelate (the holy order of the Catholic Church - O B.) Kaas, leader of the Center party. After the elections to the Reichstag in September 1925, as a representative of the German Social Democrat Müller, Brüning was proclaimed Chancellor of the Reich. In the government formed by him there were representatives of the parties: the civil left and the Center, the democratic and the people's party.
These parties did not form a majority in parliament. The Brüning government received this only with the support of the Social Democratic Party. This party supported the Brüning government only to prevent the formation of a right-wing government with the participation of German nationalists and perhaps even National Socialists.
The foreign policy program of the Brüning government was to continue the policy of mutual understanding and friendship begun by Stresemann. Outwardly, this was expressed in the fact that Kurtiuis, the closest friend and political ally of the deceased Stresemann, was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Brüning government. Brüning pinned special hopes on the policy of mutual understanding in connection with the desire to further improve political relations with France. During the reign of Brüning, for the first time, an official visit to Berlin was paid by the French Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France.
In matters of domestic politics, Brüning fought for the support of the democratic Weimar Republic. His main activity was, above all, to defend parliamentary democracy from the ever-increasing attacks from the National Socialists and German nationalists.
Brüning burned out due to the ever-increasing aggravation of the economic crisis, which he was unable to prevent. He turned his main attention to the resolution of economic and financial issues and, delving into matters personally, tried to find a way out of the difficult situation that had arisen.
But his tough economic measures, wage cuts, etc., made his government unpopular, not to mention the fact that unemployment was increasing.
Brüning himself was an impeccable, ascetic person, but his policy of limitation and sacrifice for the sake of saving Germany could not have the power to counter the propaganda of the National Socialists and German nationalists. Thus, each new unemployed became an opponent of the government.
The failure of various labor programs increasingly weakened Brüning's position. His attempts to improve the position of the government in matters of domestic policy through foreign policy successes were inconclusive.
His plan for an Austro-German customs tariff in 1931 failed after a protest from France, joined by Stalin and, after some hesitation, England. The financial situation in Germany worsened even more due to the bankruptcy in July 1931 of a large Berlin bank, which led to the need to introduce even stricter bill relations in the German economy.
The Hoover moratorium that followed these events, according to which the payment of German reparations was suspended for one year, was, as it were, a political success for Brüning, but, unfortunately, this was not enough to strengthen Brüning's position, moreover, the opposition tried in every possible way to overshadow this success of law with a failure. tariff agreement with Austria.
Ultimately, the Reich President Hindenburg was forced, under pressure from the right-wing opposition, in May 1932 to propose to Brüning that he resign.
The decline of Brüning also marked the end of the democratic Weimar Republic. Brüning was the last German Chancellor to fight vigorously and with conviction for democracy. Immediately after his dismissal, Hindenburg, together with Brüning's successor, violated the constitution and dispersed the Social Democratic government of Prussia. It goes without saying that Hindenburg knew that Brüning, as Reich Chancellor, fought with all his might against the use of such an act of violence.
After being removed from leadership of the government, Brüning retired from politics. In his own party, in which he constantly joined the left wing, after his removal there was a shift to the left, which made it much more difficult for him to continue his political activities.
After the events of January 1933, Brüning at first remained in Germany and, doing scientific work, remained aloof, living on the Rhine. Subsequently, he moved to America, where somewhere in the East of the USA he began to teach as a professor at a university. His main occupation was questions of sociology. Out of a desire for his students to come to his lectures not as a former politician and Reich Chancellor, but as a mere professor, he lived in America under a pseudonym. During his stay in America until 1944, he did not appear on the political arena.
I knew Brüning personally. In 1931, during my stay in Paris as adviser and assistant at the German embassy on foreign policy issues and Franco-German relations, I made an exhaustive report to Brüning on the situation in France.
At the same time, I was able to establish how deeply he delves into the questions of this problem and how seriously he is concerned and interested in a further rapprochement between France and Germany, which should have a favorable effect on the international situation.
In the field of economics, Brüning's closest collaborator was then the Secretary of State of the Reich Ministry of Economics, Schaeffer, with whom I was well acquainted. From him I first heard the details of the energy with which Brüning himself tried, trying to use the improvement in the economic situation in Germany, to lead a successful struggle against the National Socialists for democracy. Schaeffer, being a Social Democrat, went abroad after 1933, where I saw him during the war.
CLODIUS
October 16, 1947
Translated by: Operational Commissioner of the 4th Division 3 of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Senior Lieutenant BUBNOV ”Agree, a very relevant story, from which politicians of our time should more often learn lessons. After all, it was then that the difficult political and economic situation brought Adolf Hitler to power. Who was the man who convinced the Imperial President Hindenburg that only Hitler could restore Germany to its former greatness and self-confidence? Franz Josef Hermann Michael Maria von Papen, German politician, thirteenth Chancellor of the Weimar Republic and diplomat. Until now, before the intervention of this man, the leading German politicians of that time did not want to see Hitler in power, including Hindenburg himself.
Franz von Papen was born on October 29, 1879 in Westphalia in the city of Werl in the family of a large landowner, descended from an ancient German knightly family. By religion - Catholic. Before the First World War, he was an officer of the General Staff. In 1913-1915 he was a military attache in the United States, from where he was expelled for espionage and subversive activities. Then he served on the Western Front. In 1916, he acted as an intermediary between the German government and the Irish republican rebels in the supply of weapons that were used by them against the British army. Since 1917, he served as an officer of the General Staff in the Middle East and with the rank of major in the Turkish army in Palestine. In 1918 he returned to Germany and retired from the army with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1921-1932 he was a member of the Prussian Landtag from the Catholic Center Party; adjoined its extreme right wing. Surprised his party in the 1925 presidential election by supporting the candidacy of Paul von Hindenburg over the Center Party candidate Wilhelm Marx. From June 1 to December 2, 1932 he headed the government. In January 1933, with the permission of Hindenburg, he negotiated with Hitler and entered Hitler's office as Vice-Chancellor. However, soon, on June 17, 1934, he delivered a speech at the University of Marburg in support of the views of the conservative forces of the Reichswehr, the financial and business elite of Germany, dissatisfied with Nazi socialist rhetoric and extremism (the so-called "Marburg speech"). The criticism infuriated the leadership of the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler. On the night of the long knives - the defeat of the top of the assault troops (SA) - von Papen's office was seized and searched by the Gestapo. During the search, von Bose, adviser to the Vice-Chancellor for the press, was shot dead. Von Papen himself was actually under house arrest for three days. The police officers under Goering guarding him had orders to prevent von Papen from being arrested by the Gestapo or the SA.
I had no doubts about the determination of Goebbels, Himmler and Heydrich to liquidate the Marburg reactionary in a timely manner. As I later learned, the only person who stood between me and a similar fate was Goering.
- F. von Papen. "Vice-Chancellor of the Third Reich".
From July 1934 to March 1938 (before the Anschluss), von Papen served as ambassador to Austria, providing financial and political support to pro-German nationalist organizations. In January 1938, the Austrian police searched the premises of the local Nazis' steering committee, and among the documents (according to him) was found a plan according to which the reason for the invasion of Austria was the assassination of von Papen. Then, holding the position of ambassador to Turkey in 1939-1944, von Papen sought to prevent her entry into the war on the side of the Allies. In this regard, on February 24, 1942, an attempt was made on him by agents of Soviet intelligence, which, however, was unsuccessful. During the war, the Nazi government tried to appoint von Papen as the German ambassador to the papacy, but Pope Pius XII rejected this proposal. In April 1945, von Papen was arrested in the Ruhr by the military administration of the 9th US Army. In 1946, he was tried by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, but was acquitted. However, in February 1947, he appeared before the Denazification Commission and was sentenced to eight months in prison. In the 1950s, von Papen tried unsuccessfully to re-enter politics. In his later years he lived in Benzenhofen Castle in Upper Swabia and published many books and memoirs in which he tried to justify his policies in the 1930s by drawing parallels between this period and the beginning of the Cold War. He died on May 2, 1969 in Obersasbach (Baden).
If not for von Papen, then perhaps history would never have known the name of Adolf Schicklgruber. And mankind could have avoided the Second World War. Moreover, as I have already said, in Germany itself there were opponents of the war. But history does not know the subjunctive mood. So that's why it all happened. Bulgaria and Turkey joined the Rome-Berlin axis. Since today many pages of wartime history are open, much is known about the axis mentioned above and about the countries that joined it. But few people know that many Arab states joined the sinister axis Hitler-Mussolini, I think, not everyone knows. But this is a topic for a separate discussion.
Igor Markov.

Diplomacy during the Second World War through the eyes of diplomats of Nazi Germany. Part 2 Diplomacy
Mar 5, 2013 at 05:51 pm

What ensured Hitler's triumphant rise to power is well known, since much has been written about this in our world literature. Still, let me repeat myself and remind you that the possibility of Hitler coming to power appeared after the efforts of the notorious Franz von Papen, as well as with the support of the bulk of the German population.
After becoming Chancellor, Hitler very quickly refused to comply with the basic requirements of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations. After leaving the League of Nations, Germany quickly restored what was taken from it under the Treaty of Versailles.
As you know, after Hitler came to power, on March 18, 1938, the Anschluss of Austria took place. Then there was the capture of Czechoslovakia. Civilized Europe, in the person of England, France and other great powers, turned a blind eye to all these steps taken by Nazi Germany. In the USSR and Germany at that time, the internal political situation was very similar: there and there there were repressions, persecution of dissidents. In addition to the fact that the USSR and Germany attacked Poland, in 1939-40 the USSR provoked the Soviet-Finnish war. This was the prelude to war between the USSR and Germany. Of course, from my point of view, that if Stalin had not provoked the Soviet-Finnish war, and Hitler would not have seen the deplorable state of the Red Army, then, perhaps, provided that Stalin would have accepted the warning of our intelligence, in particular the NKVD agent USSR in Germany Lehman, who was a member of the high offices of Nazi Germany, as well as the warning of Richard Sorge and other agents of the USSR, then the war could have been avoided. But the fact remains.
Perhaps I will not talk about Soviet military operations here, since a lot has been written about this in military history. Despite the fact that we, the Russian people, do not like the historical truth, and our historiography always differs from the European one in that it is too ideologically sustained and we do not want to recognize even those historical facts that are known for certain in world history. Our people say: the bitter truth is better than the sweet lie. And one more thing: the courage of the city takes. Guided by this wisdom, I will continue to consider military history from the point of view of the diplomats of Nazi Germany. I understand that today in our country the authorities are betting on pseudo-patriotism. Therefore, we all want to see only in pink colors and do not want to admit the obvious. That even such a terrible and inhuman regime as the Nazi regime in Germany had its own logic, which was determined by the desire of Hitler and Stalin for world domination.
It is impossible not to say that, for example, not only in Germany, the people accepted Hitler, as they say, with a bang, there were also citizens in Soviet Russia who met the Nazi troops with bread and salt. It is clear why the citizens of Western Ukraine and the Baltic states met the invaders with bread and salt. Deep down they wanted to get rid of the hated Stalinist regime. It is no coincidence that the so-called Lokhar Republic was located from Bryansk to Western Ukraine and the Baltic states, where no one was spread rot and sent to camps. They had their own radio, press, shops, and so on. Our military and civilian historians also spoke about this issue.
But this is exactly what is little and sometimes briefly covered in our historical literature. So it is a fact that many countries of the Arab East, albeit formally, joined the war from the German side.

Arabic question

Just as more than 2 million Soviet citizens dreamed of getting rid of the Stalinist regime, the governments of the countries of the Arab East, such as Iran, Iraq, wanted to get rid of British influence on the domestic and foreign policy of their countries by Great Britain.
The same source cites the following document: Dr. Grobba's handwritten testimony no. I was sent to Baghdad as a chargé d'affaires, successor to the consul and chargé d'affaires Wilhelm Litten, who died in January 1932. King Faisal, whom I met in 1921, when he was passing through Germany on his way from Italy to England, received me very kindly. The British Chief Commissioner in Baghdad was Sir Francis Gempris, whom I knew from Kabul. The British greeted me with distrust.
In the court of King Faisal, I met two acquaintances - the King's personal secretary Rustam Gaidar and the master of ceremonies Taxis Kadri, both of whom accompanied the king in 1921 during his trip to London. I met Taxis Kadri earlier, in 1918, in Dera, south of Damascus, where he was a Turkish lieutenant. Since I was kindly received in the courtyard, the government also received me in a friendly manner. The fact that I served in the Turkish army in the First World War contributed to the fact that I had many friends in Iraq. There were a number of senior officials, who were formerly Turkish officers, who saw me as a former comrade in arms.
The assignment I received from the Foreign Office was to keep myself out of political affairs so as not to arouse distrust among the British, to deal only with economic interests in Iraq and to take care of the German colony there. When Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations on October 4, 1932, the German consulate in Baghdad was converted into an embassy and I became ambassador. England at that time completely dominated the policy of the Iraqi government and determined it. Soviet Russia in Iraq was not taken into account, apparently, she was not interested in him.
In Baghdad, various European governments tried to get an oil concession in the Kwayar region (including the Soviet Union). An English industrial group headed by Mr. Thomas Brown was also interested in this issue. During King Faisal's four-day stay in Berlin in 1931, he promised Germany the concession. I had the task of supporting the efforts of the German industrial group. In 1932, this concession was given to the international group BOD (British Oil Company), in which England, France, Italy and Germany participated, Germany by 12%. In 1932, I was mainly engaged in this business.
At the same time, negotiations were going on between the Iranian and British governments on the renewal of the IPK (Iraq Petroleum Campaign) concession for oil production in Kerkuk. These negotiations were very difficult, as the Iraqi nationalists, led by Rashid Ali el-Geynali, were of the opinion that the British government was raping and deceiving the Iraqi government.
Iraqi-British relations deteriorated sharply in 1933 due to the uprising of the asuras living in the north of the country. These Nestorian Christians, who lived in Zandiyak (government site) Hakiara (between Wannsee, the Iraqi-Iranian border), in connection with the promises of England to grant them autonomy in the future, rose up against Turkey on the side of the allies. But since England later deceived them and did not provide them with the promised military support, they had heavy losses, inflicted mainly by the Kurds. The rest of them arrived at the end of the war in Iraq and were placed in the Baquba camp (east of Baghdad near the Iraqi border). The British selected the most military capable of them and formed battalions (levies). After two years of service, these people were released, having received a gun and a hundred rounds of ammunition. The liberated asuras were sent to the province of Mosul and settled there. In 1938, there were about 10,000 well trained and armed asuras with their officers.
When the Iraqi government, headed by Minister-President Gailani, began to oppose various measures of the British government, and primarily negotiations on the renewal of the PKI concession, the British had the idea to use the Asuras' dissatisfaction with their failure to fulfill their demands for autonomy and put the blame for this on the Iraqi government and raise the asuras against him.
The British counted on the fact that the well-prepared and trained asuras would surpass the young Iraqi army and the Iraqi government would be forced to turn to England for help. Then England will be able to achieve all her demands without much difficulty. But the British authorities in Iraq underestimated at that moment the decisiveness of the Iraqi government and its army.
Iraqi troops led by Colonel Bekir Zidki utterly defeated the Asura troops. The British flying troops even made an attempt to supply the asuras with ammunition, but the Iraqi troops captured these ammunition vehicles. But England showed with her own eyes that she was helping the Asuras, which was what the Iraqi government intended.
In this case, the British Secret Service successfully incited a whole people against the local government, but when they tried to support him when he took up arms, they misfired. The British Secret Service already bears the blame for the colossal losses of the asuras in the World War by raising them in revolt against Turkey, promising future autonomy, and then leaving them without support, now they repeated their dastardly game in 1933. The British Secret Service is itself responsible for the death of the Asura people."
Many will accuse me of taking the side of the Nazis in this case. But this is far from true. I just want people to know history not only from the point of view of historians and diplomats of the USSR and Russia, but also from other points of view.
I don’t think that any of my readers could imagine how ingenious and complex the combination and alignment of forces in that war were on different fronts. And I really would not like us to harbor illusions about how and on what principles politics was built at that time. Once Bessmertnykh A.A., the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, very critically in the program "Top Secret" "Double Portrait" said and spoke in the sense that, for example, Serbia and the Serbs. We consider them brothers in faith, but they have always looked towards Europe. Correctly. Because the Serbs have a European mentality. And there's nothing you can do. There is a political momentary interest, and the Serbs have always striven and strive to unite and merge with the peoples of Europe.
Similarly, there is no need to harbor illusions about the Arab East.

Note. It is no coincidence that I give such large quotations from German documents translated by employees of the USSR Ministry of State Security. I am doing this because and so that my reader can imagine the complexity of the diplomatic games of that time. Because I think and stand for the objectivity of history. History does not tolerate lies. Of course, all participants in those historical and political events will find justification for their actions. As you know, whoever wins is right. Our authorities still do not want to recognize the fact of Katyn and the destruction of the Poles and the Balts for participating on the side of Nazi Germany. In the same way, English, German and French historians and diplomats present everything from purely subjective points of view.
To be continued…

Diplomacy during the Second World War through the eyes of diplomats of Nazi Germany. Part 3
Mar 6, 2013 at 03:09 pm

In the previous part, I began to analyze the so-called Arab question of German diplomacy during the Second World War. To continue this theme, it should be said that the Arab leaders of that time naively harbored the illusion that they would be important allies of Nazi Germany. In the future, I will try to substantiate the fact that the leaders of Nazi Germany formally considered the countries of the Middle East as their allies. But in fact, the Arab East, the German authorities considered the Arab peoples as vassals of the Third Reich. In order not to be unfounded, I will continue to cite those documents that will prove the duality and ambiguity of relations between Germany and the countries of the Arab region.
I continue to quote Dr. Grobba's own handwritten testimony of March 22, 1946: “The Prime Minister of Iraq at the time of the Asura uprising was Rashid Ali el-Gaylani, the Minister of the Interior was his relative, Hikmet Zuleiman, who was pro-German and spoke German to some extent. Hikmet Zuleiman informed me about all the phases of the development of the Asur events and the intentions of the Iraqi government. I further received very valuable information from the head of the Protocol Department (master of ceremonies) of the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tofvik es Sadun, brother-in-law of Hikmet Zuleiman. Another very good source of information was my French colleague Paul Lepissier, who received very good information from the French consul in Mosul and the French Chief Commissar in Beirut. That is why I was so well informed about the course of events in the north of Iraq that in my reports I could correctly predict their further development.
Ogilive Forbes, the then English Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, after Iraqi troops machine-gunned 600 unarmed asuras in the village of Zimel on August 11, 1933, expressed his opinion to me that this massacre would have international consequences ( i.e. Anglo-French) occupation and later administration of the Mosul region.
Thus, according to him, England and France are ready to benefit from the misfortune of the asuras. But the English ambassador, Sir Francis Humphrys, recalled from his home leave, was of a different opinion. And he was least touched by the fate of the Asuras, who were dead and, therefore, useless to England, but he considered it his most important task, apparently on the instructions of London, to establish tolerant relations with the Iraqi government as soon as possible. He therefore reassured the Iraqi statesmen of their concern that the League of Nations would hold them accountable for the Zimel massacre, and even promised them British intercession before the League of Nations.
Nothing happened to Colonel Bekir Zidki, against whom the head of the British military mission in Iraq demanded his punishment and demotion. He was even promoted to general, and not he, but the head of the British military mission had to retire. The Iraqi government was glad that it came out of the water clean, and its attitude towards the British government soon improved again. Gailani, in any case, could no longer hold on to the post of prime minister, he had to retreat, his place was taken by Jassin Pascha.
But this one was a well-known Arab nationalist and as such had a strong interest in the general Arab movement. He was in close contact with Arab politicians in Palestine and Syria. The latter often came to meetings in Baghdad, and when Iraqi government officials came to Lisbon for their summer holidays, they met with politicians there. There was a certain rivalry between Palestinian and Syrian politicians, as the Syrians wanted to oppose the French first, while the Palestinians considered the fight against the British and Jews to be the first priority. Both the Syrians and the Palestinians sought the support of Iraq and secretly received such promises from Yassin Pasha.
When you read and study such documents, you involuntarily come to the conclusion that despite all the love of Russians for the Arabs, the history of relations between fascist Germany and the countries of the Near and Middle East looks extremely unsightly, since Arab nationalists were ready to put up with the fascist and Stalinist regimes. One gets the impression that the leaders of these countries clearly did not understand and did not accept the fact that the Germans prepared for them the fate of the Slavic peoples. But such was the fear of the communist Stalinist regime that even blocked the fear of the Nazis. The leaders of these countries could neither politically nor economically influence the policy of the Hitler-Mussolini-Rome-Berlin axis.
Let's imagine what would happen if the Germans managed to prepare the Arab brigades, and the British would not have defeated the troops of the German Field Marshal Rommel, and the allies of the USSR would continue to delay the opening of a second front. The USSR would have lost this war.
Due to the fact that Hitler and his entourage made a number of strategic mistakes during the war, the USSR won the war and the Allies forgave Stalin for repressions and other unseemly deeds within the country. It is known that the winners are not judged. Moreover, despite the fact that Stalin and Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, nevertheless, during the Tehran Conference (November 28 - December 1, 1943) and two other meetings of the Big Three, Stalin raised the question of Polish statehood. No, I do not at all want and do not want to justify Stalin and his clique. Moreover, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact cannot be justified. If not for this non-aggression agreement and the already well-known Rapallo Treaty, there would have been fewer victims.
I don't want to make assumptions, but there could have been fewer victims of the war, and preparations for World War II would have been much better. Again, if not for Stalin's stubbornness, then in the very first days of the war so many people would not have died only in Brest and in the country as a whole. According to some reports, from 3 to 7 million people died in the first days of the war! If it were not for the wisdom of the allies, then the geopolitical situation in the world would have developed like this: Hitler would have made peace with England, especially since in 1941 Hess flew to England on a diplomatic mission and tried to persuade England to the side of Germany.
The USSR and Germany, if Hitler had fulfilled the non-aggression pact, would have coexisted in one world, and the countries of the Baltic and the Balkan region would have ceased to exist. Including the countries of the Arab Near and Middle East, they would fulfill the will of the USSR and Germany, where they would be assigned a secondary role.
It is impossible not to say that today there is a historical theory on the subject that if Germany had not attacked the USSR, then Stalin himself would have done it. As I said, the political background and management style of Germany and the USSR eloquently confirms this thesis. But thank God that Hitler failed to carry out his plan of world domination.
Churchill turned out to be much wiser than Corporal Hitler, having said his famous Fulton speech, with which the Cold War between the USSR and the USA began. It is no coincidence that the United States very soon invited German scientists such as Oppenheimer, the head of the Manhattan Project and the "father of the atomic bomb." But I will continue talking about this next time.

Diplomacy during the Second World War through the eyes of diplomats of Nazi Germany. Part 4
Mar 13, 2013 at 03:37 pm

Last time I promised that we would talk about the cold war and the atomic bomb. But still, I consider it necessary to return to reflections on who diplomats are and what their role was in World War II. Diplomat (from other Greek δίπλωμα “folded in half (written document)”). In international law, a diplomat is a person authorized by the government to carry out official diplomatic relations with foreign states and their representatives. Diplomats have historically preceded other forms of organizing external relations such as foreign ministries.
Earlier, we touched a little on the geopolitical topic, as well as the Arab question in World War II. They noted the unattractive role of the politicians of that time in the Near and Middle East. But back to the topic of our conversation about the role of diplomats in Nazi Germany. Who were these people? Why, in fact, they could not prevent such a terrible phenomenon as war? It is appropriate to recall here that all dictators, including Stalin, did not like diplomats and, as a rule, did not listen to their conclusions. It is interesting that Churchill and Hitler also did not like diplomats, although, of course, Hitler listened to Ribbentrop, but at the same time did not want to listen and heed the information provided to him and Ribbentrop by the German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg and the agents I mentioned above NKVD in Germany.
Here is what Dr. Clodius wrote in his testimony. These testimonies were recorded in December 1947 in Moscow. This document is very interesting in that it lists the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry. We will not quote him in full because earlier we talked about secretaries of state. We are interested in ambassadors. As you know, a person's biography can tell a lot. Here are just a few of them (quote): “Von Bergen was born in 1873, from about 1919 to 1943 he was an ambassador to the Vatican. He never stood out in the political arena.
Count Schulenburg was born in 1876, a lawyer, and joined the Foreign Ministry around 1905. Before World War I, vice-consul in Naples and Warsaw, consul in Tiflis (until 1914, Schulenburg could only hold the position of consul and did not have the right to be a diplomat, since he did not have the appropriate status that every diplomat was supposed to have in Kaiser Germany) . From 1919 to 1922 he was an assistant for South-Eastern Europe in the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1921, he was appointed to the post of legation adviser with the right to report. At the end of 1922 envoy in Tehran. Around 1931 envoy in Bucharest. In 1934 he was ambassador to Moscow. Count Schulenburg is an experienced, intelligent diplomat. A supporter of political and economic cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. Opponent of the war with the Soviet Union. Before the start of the war, during a personal report, he warned Hitler against this step. Maintained close contact with political circles hostile to Hitler's policies, especially to those who participated in the assassination attempt on July 20. Party member after 1933.
Friedrich Gauss, born around 1885, lawyer. He entered the Foreign Ministry in 1910. He was vice-consul in Constantinople. In 1914 he served in the army as a soldier, then was recalled from the army and worked in the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the war, in the rank of legal adviser and legal adviser with the right to report, he worked as an assistant on international law in the Legal Department. From 1923 to 1943 - Head of the Legal Department. In 1924 he received the rank of ministerial director, in 1938 or 1939 - junior secretary of state. In the spring of 1943 he was elevated to the rank of ambassador for special assignments. As head of the Legal Department and, even earlier, an adviser for international affairs, Gauss served as legal adviser to all foreign ministers for almost 25 years. In this regard, he was in close contact with the minister, drew up and edited the drafts of all international treaties, participated in all negotiations and all major international conferences and meetings of the League of Nations. His influence was not limited to the legal side of the problems, he was for individual foreign ministers, mainly for Stresemann and Curtius, one of the most authoritative political advisers. Shortly after Ribbentrop's appointment as Foreign Minister, he attracted Gauss into his inner circle. Throughout the war, Gauss was almost always at Ribbentrop's headquarters, where the latter spent most of his time. If, besides Weizsäcker, any of the representatives of the old diplomacy could influence Ribbentrop and thus, indirectly, Hitler, then it would have to be Gauss, who was involved in the preparation of important diplomatic events as the only career diplomat-lawyer, so how Ribbentrop could not do without his cooperation. In addition, his help in editing all documents was extremely valuable, since Gauss was a brilliant stylist and a recognized authority in the field of international law. Gauss is a talented, highly cultured and comprehensively developed person. However, according to my observations, he never had his own political line and sufficient energy to carry out such a line in front of his superiors, although he, as a permanent legal and political adviser to the minister, always had such an opportunity. Therefore, his activity was valuable as long as he served the ministers, who themselves pursued the correct political line and could use his great abilities for the good of the cause.
This part of the article could be called "Intelligentsia and power" or "The influence of diplomacy on politicians during the Second World War." At the moment it is not as important as the title of the article. What is important is that it is typical for the governments of Germany and the USSR that they did not take into account the position of the intelligentsia. So the military took over. As you know, before the war, Stalin treated the military elite even worse than the diplomats. But now it's not about Stalin, but about diplomats and diplomacy.
On the example of the given biographies of these three diplomats, one can say the following: that the German government, headed by Hitler, as well as with Stalin, did not like, did not listen to and did not take into account the opinion of the intelligentsia of that time if Hitler and Stalin would listen and take into account attention to the position of their diplomats, it is possible that world history would have been different.
According to Dr. Clodius, the diplomats of the 1930s, the pre-war period, did not have much influence on the ruling circles of their countries. If you look at the above document and read it in its entirety, then pay attention to the fact that until 1933, almost all employees of the German Foreign Ministry of the 1930s model were not members of the Nazi Party. Of course, they could not influence the internal politics of Germany in those years. Still, it must be said that almost all of them were members and were members of the SS, except for Count von Schulenburg. In fact, this fact suggests the opposite. They knew about Ribbentrop's plans and his intentions. So they really could not influence the foreign policy line of the Nazi government? I believe that the diplomats of that time really could do little to prevent war, because, by virtue of their functions, a diplomat is obliged to protect the national interests of his country. At the same time, they could leave the diplomatic and civil service and not take part in the crimes against the peace of their government. They didn't. From the point of view of jurisprudence, the diplomats of that time are complicit in all the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany. Although, of course, history must be looked at from the position of the time in which these historical characters were. Therefore, we can only regret that history turned out this way and not otherwise.
In almost the entire article, I spend one thought: that the history of the pre-war and war period of the 1930s and 40s is extremely instructive for politicians of our time. I think that individual chapters of world history need to be reread by the heads of state of the whole world. I think that although history does not teach us anything, when considering the issue of the situation in Syria, it is necessary to be guided precisely by the diplomatic way of resolving the Syrian problem. Because if the power plant, on which the United States insists, prevails, the Third World War will begin. As far as I know, there are few experts on the Arab question.
Perhaps it is time for politicians of our time to learn the lesson of the USSR in Afghanistan. And the current experience of the United States is another confirmation of this. Of course, again, the United States is guided, like all politicians in the world, by a momentary political moment. But we must not forget that the Arab East is a very specific region where it is impossible to spread democracy with the help of weapons just like that. This will certainly lead to an aggravation of foreign and domestic policy in this region. Here it is appropriate to recall Comrade Sukhov's favorite proverb ("The White Sun of the Desert"): "The East, Petrukha, is a delicate matter."
Igor Markov

The assessment of the personality of V.M. Molotov in the life of the Soviet state, like most other top leaders of the Soviet era, has changed repeatedly over the decades - from laudatory to obscenely abusive.

Molotov had to work hard in party work and in the organs of the highest executive power. However, first of all, his personality is associated with foreign policy activities in the post of People's Commissar, and then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In total, Molotov led the NKID / Foreign Ministry for almost 13 years, including the extremely difficult - in terms of the conquest of international positions by the Soviet Union - pre-war and war years.

The strategic course of the Soviet Union in the 1930s was the creation of a system of collective security in Europe. However, these plans were frustrated by the Western powers, who preferred the policy of appeasing the increasingly impudent aggressor in the hope of diverting possible German expansion from themselves and directing it to the east over an agreement with the USSR against the growing danger of Nazism. When the USSR initiated Soviet-British-French talks in Moscow in March 1939, proposing to conclude an agreement "on a mutual obligation to provide each other immediately with all assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states" 1 , such obligations frightened the British and French politicians, and the agreement did not take place.

Conducting formal negotiations with the USSR and hoping to tie his hands with some symbolic agreement, London simultaneously continued contacts with Berlin. British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain, talking on June 8, 1939 with German Foreign Ministry employee A. von Trotzu Soltz, did not hide the fact that “from the very day he came to power, he defended the idea that European problems can be solved only on the Berlin-London line” 2 .

This position of the Western countries raised the question of the security of the Soviet Union in a new way. The Soviet leadership, not without reason, was afraid of the possibility of a new collusion between the Western democracies and Hitler along the lines of the Munich Agreement, but at the expense of the USSR. Therefore, it was considered possible to try to renew economic, and, with a favorable turn of events, political contacts with Germany.

In May 1939, V.M. Molotov replaced M.M. Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It is precisely "his name that is associated with the forced departure of Soviet diplomacy from the pre-war policy aimed at ensuring collective security in Europe, towards attempts to independently resolve the issue of the country's security" 3 .

On July 29, V.M. Molotov telegraphed to the Soviet embassy in Berlin: “Of course, we would welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries” 4 . At the same time, the Soviet leadership, in order to maintain a free hand, preferred to expect the initiative from the Germans. Berlin, in fact, showed much more activity than Moscow in mutual rapprochement. His actions were logical in their own way: Hitler was moving towards a war against Poland and was ready to make many concessions in order to prevent the creation of an independent front in the east with the participation of the Red Army. In this regard, it is difficult not to agree with the opinion of I.A. Chelyshev: “The Moscow negotiations from the very beginning acquired an ambiguous character. Both sides secretly negotiated with Germany, played on two tables at once. It can be said that a third party, Germany, was invisibly present at the talks in Moscow. Hitler also led his own party.

When it became extremely clear to the Soviet leadership that the negotiations between the military missions of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, which began on August 12 in Moscow, were being conducted by Western countries not to conclude an effective military alliance, but to put pressure on Hitler in order not to allow him, in turn, to come to an agreement with USSR, they were interrupted. Having made a choice in favor of contacts with Germany, I.V. Stalin agreed to the arrival in Moscow of the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop.

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed with Germany, which read, in particular: “Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and any attack against each other, both separately and jointly with other powers ... In the event disputes or conflicts arise between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both Parties will resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through a friendly exchange of opinions or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict” 6 . The document was signed by V.M. Molotov and I. Ribbentrop.

In modern Western historiography, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is often considered a kind of "trigger", pulling on which allowed Hitler to start World War II. In fact, it was the short-sighted policy of appeasement pursued by the Western democracies that made it possible to unleash the world slaughter in Germany. The pact was a temporary military-political compromise, which the Soviet leadership agreed to gain time and geographical space on the eve of the inevitable military clash with Germany. The Soviet Union was objectively compelled to make such agreements with an open enemy in the interests of its own security, the need to build defense lines on distant approaches.

As a result of the August, and then September, 1939 agreements with Germany, the Soviet Union, by signing secret additional protocols, achieved the inclusion in the sphere of its interests of some countries that were previously territorially part of the Russian Empire, but either gained independence after the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia (Finland), or after the First World War were torn away as a result of direct annexation (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the eastern part of Poland - Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Bessarabia).

Molotov was directly involved in the preparation of secret protocols for the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 and the friendship and border treaty of September 28 of the same year. He negotiated with Ribbentrop and put his signature on the documents. Characteristically, until the end of his days, he did not recognize the existence of such documents. To the question asked in 1983 by the historian G.A. Kumanev whether there is a secret protocol to the non-aggression pact, the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs answered extremely loosely: “The difficult question was raised. Well, in general, Ribbentrop and I verbally agreed on everything then.

Molotov was directly involved in reaching an agreement with Japan on the conclusion of a neutrality pact with her on April 13, 1941, which made it possible to remove the danger of war simultaneously on two fronts - in the West and East. The pact also bears the signature of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR 8 .

Moscow was fully aware of the compromise nature of the agreements reached in the autumn of 1939 with Germany. The Soviet leadership did not believe in Hitler's sincerity, and therefore made efforts to sound out the further plans of their future enemy. To this end, Molotov went to Berlin on an official visit in November 1940. On the eve of the trip, on November 9, in a personal conversation with Stalin, he received a number of important directives. First of all, it was necessary to find out the real intentions of Germany, as well as Italy and Japan in the implementation of the plan to create a "New Europe", as well as a "Great East Asian space"; identify prospects for other countries to join the Tripartite Pact; find out what place Berlin assigned to the Soviet Union in these plans at that moment and in the future.

Judging by the directives of the people's commissar, Stalin proceeded from the fact that the agreement reached in 1939 on the partial delimitation of the spheres of interests of the USSR and Germany was exhausted as a result of the liberation campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the entry into the USSR of the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Exhausted as outlined in the directives, with the exception of Finland. Therefore, during a visit to Berlin, Molotov was instructed, starting from the “initial outline” of the sphere of interests of the USSR in Europe, as well as in Near and Central Asia, to probe the possibility of an agreement on this score with Germany and Italy, but not to conclude any agreements, meaning the continuation negotiations in Moscow with the participation of Ribbentrop.

As for Finland, it was instructed to achieve during the negotiations that it be assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR "on the basis of the Soviet-German agreement of 1939, in the implementation of which Germany must eliminate all difficulties and ambiguities (the withdrawal of German troops, the cessation of all political demonstrations in Finland and Germany, directed to the detriment of the interests of the USSR).

During the negotiations, Molotov was supposed to achieve the assignment of the mouth of the Danube, as well as Bulgaria, to the sphere of interests of the USSR with the introduction of Soviet troops there and with guarantees from the Soviet side, similar to those given to Romania by Germany after Berlin sent its troops there. The German leadership had to be informed of the dissatisfaction of the USSR that it did not consult with the Soviet government on the issue of guarantees and the introduction of troops into Romania. "The question of the future fate of Romania and Hungary, as bordering on the USSR, is of great interest to us - it was emphasized in the directives - and we would like to be agreed on this with us." Without the participation of the USSR, in Stalin's opinion, the question of Turkey and Iran, where "serious interests" of the Soviet Union were present, could not be resolved either.

A number of modern authors consider such instructions as proof of Stalinist expansionism, a continuation of the course towards “delimitation of spheres of interest”, which the USSR, allegedly in its own selfish interests, began to implement by signing a secret protocol to the non-aggression pact with Germany. In reality, this was an attempt by the Soviet Union in the context of the impending war to push the boundaries of its defense as far as possible: where through territorial acquisitions, and where - by strengthening its own influence in the adjacent states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

The Soviet leadership played a complicated political game in this connection. A trip to Berlin on November 12-13 turned out to be a difficult test for Molotov. As it became known later, a month later, on December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 on the Barbarossa plan, thereby starting the practical preparation of Germany for war against the USSR. The Nazi leadership needed negotiations with the Soviet delegation only as a cover for the military preparations that had begun. All this, of course, left its mark on the atmosphere of Molotov's visit.

The German leaders tried to persuade Moscow to participate in the joint division of the British Empire and talked about the "expediency" of the USSR's movement south to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This was done in order to complicate Soviet-British relations, to prevent a possible rapprochement between Moscow and London. Molotov, while negotiating with Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop, insisted primarily on the withdrawal of German troops from the Soviet borders (in Finland - in the north and in Romania - in the south) and the provision of additional guarantees for the security of the USSR.

He had to put into action all his comparatively poor diplomatic baggage, all his endurance and perseverance. The course of the negotiations showed that the German side was ready to lively discuss the division of the British inheritance, but as soon as the Soviet People's Commissar reminded that the "big questions of tomorrow" should not obscure the problems of today, that is, he returned the interlocutors to the problems on which the security of the USSR directly depended, they immediately drooped or, like Hitler, became irritated. The Fuhrer, unable to persuade the Moscow guest to favorable decisions for himself, defiantly did not arrive at the return dinner, which Molotov gave at the embassy on December 13 in the evening.

The last conversation with Ribbentrop turned out to be fruitless, during which the German minister spoke "on the transition to future cooperation between the member states of the three-power pact - Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union" and on the search for ways to "jointly determine in general outline of the spheres of interest of these four states. Molotov stated that the Soviet side did not object to the joint work of the USSR with the Axis countries, but specific areas of such work needed to be worked out. As for the delimitation of spheres of interest, Germany has not yet raised such a question, as the People's Commissar noted, and "it is new for the Soviet government." In other words, he did not tie the hands of Soviet diplomacy with any concrete decisions, accepting Ribbentrop's proposal to continue a further exchange of views through the ambassadors in Moscow and Berlin.

In order to eliminate or at least postpone the danger of aggression, the Soviet leadership, having weighed all the pros and cons, agreed to "basically accept the draft pact of the four powers" (Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR) "on their political cooperation and economic understanding”, that is, to be included in the new section of “spheres of influence”. Molotov reported this to Berlin through the German ambassador F. Schulenburg on November 25th. At the same time, the consent was furnished with a number of conditions unacceptable to Hitler, such as the demand for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland or ensuring the security of the USSR in the Mediterranean straits by concluding a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria and organizing a military and naval base of the USSR in the Bosporus and Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term rent. Such a tactical move, in the opinion of the Soviet side, made it possible to ensure a free hand and at the same time retained the possibility of preventing or at least delaying the moment of Nazi aggression to a later date. However, there was no answer from Berlin: the Third Reich had already made its choice in favor of war against the USSR.

When analyzing Molotov's line of conduct during negotiations with the Nazi elite, a natural question arises about the degree of his independence. In answering this question, several considerations should be taken into account. Molotov, right up to his appointment as People's Commissar, had no diplomatic experience, communicated minimally with foreign representatives, and did not speak sufficiently any European language. Especially in the beginning, this could not but affect his activities. According to a veteran of the diplomatic service, V.V. Considering himself a politician, he did not prepare for diplomatic activity, he did not speak foreign languages…” 10 .

One cannot discount the regime of authoritarian power in the USSR, under which all significant decisions, including in the sphere of foreign policy, were made personally by the leader. Stalin "not only determined the main directions of the country's foreign policy, but also had a direct influence on the resolution of specific issues of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs" 11 . All important documents of a diplomatic nature were presented to him for viewing and approval - drafts of all documents that the USSR submitted for consideration by the international community, directives to Soviet delegations at bilateral and multilateral negotiations, diplomatic statements, records of conversations of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and his deputies with foreign diplomatic representatives, diplomatic correspondence, information received from ambassadors. As Molotov himself emphasized, “we [had] centralized diplomacy. The ambassadors did not have and could not have any independence ... Stalin had everything in his fist, I had it - otherwise we could not have at that time ... Our diplomacy was not bad. But Stalin played the decisive role in it, and not some diplomat...” 12 .

Molotov compensated for a minimum of diplomatic skills with vast experience in managing entire areas of state activity. By the end of the 1930s, he was a mature and sophisticated politician, he had his own opinion on everything, which he was ready and able to defend, including before Stalin. The practical implementation of the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the head of the ruling party, which rested on him and the team headed by him, reflected Molotov's style and methods of work.

Returning to his Berlin trip, it should be noted that the People's Commissar coordinated all his actions with Stalin through encrypted correspondence, received specific instructions and recommendations from Moscow, which he followed. But it is clear that he communicated directly with Hitler and Ribbentrop himself, and here Molotov showed himself to be a stubborn negotiator, a solid politician who knew the situation well and persistently defended the interests of his country. It is no coincidence that a very demanding leader sent an encouraging telegram to Molotov: "We consider your behavior in the negotiations to be correct."

True, not everything is so clear. On the one hand, summing up the results of Molotov's visit to Berlin, Stalin, as Ya.E. Chadaev, the head of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, recalled, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks said: “One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, at the same time he tries to win time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the question of the further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations ... We must always remember this and prepare hard to repel fascist aggression ”13. But at the same time, both Stalin and Molotov believed that until the defeat of Great Britain, the Germans would not fight the USSR, and expected to win a year or two to prepare the country to repel aggression. G.K. Zhukov recalled how, shortly after his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, in the course of a report to Stalin in February 1941, Molotov, who was present at the report, interrupted his speech with the question: “Do you think that we will soon have to fight the Germans?” fourteen

In such a dual position, in playing along with Stalin in his conviction that it would be possible to deceive Hitler (and this line was followed by the entire environment of the leader), the reason for the catastrophic blunder in determining the possible timing of German aggression, made by the top Soviet leadership, was rooted. In this, too, there is a significant fault of the head of the NKID.

The war, which began on June 22, 1941, highlighted the special role of Molotov in managing both Soviet diplomacy and the country as a whole. He was the first of the Soviet leaders, by virtue of his official position, to learn from the German ambassador F. Schulenburg the tragic news of the declaration of war on the Soviet Union. It was from his speech on the radio at noon on June 22, 1941, and not from the head of the party and government of Stalin or the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. the cause is right, the enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!"

The unprecedented test that befell the USSR demanded the strictest centralization of power. It was concentrated in its hands by a narrow circle of Stalin's comrades-in-arms, headed by the leader himself, who formed the State Defense Committee on June 30, 1941. In its composition, Molotov took the post of deputy chairman, that is, Stalin.

It was Molotov, and not Beria, as AI Mikoyan claimed, who initiated the creation of the GKO 15 . His act is logical: after all, he was the only one, except Stalin, who, in practice, knew, being secretary of the Central Committee of the party in the 1920s, the work of the Council of Labor and Defense, in the likeness of which the State Defense Committee was created, as well as the technology of the work of "troikas" in the Politburo - unspoken bodies of power created from the leaders of the party and the country in the conditions of the Civil War and the most severe economic crisis and demonstrated high efficiency. On June 30, at a critical moment after the first disastrous week of the war (Minsk fell on June 28, and the main forces of the Western Front fell into the enemy encirclement a day later), Molotov took the much-needed initiative to form a State Defense Committee. Together with G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria invited to his Kremlin office, he discussed the idea of ​​​​creating an emergency authority, after which the idea was submitted to the court of Stalin, who retired that day to the “near dacha”, and received from the leader a complete OK.

Even earlier, Molotov became a member of the Headquarters of the High Command (from August 8, 1941 - the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) formed on the second day of the war - the body of strategic control of the Armed Forces. According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, “he was almost always present at the Headquarters when operational-strategic and other important issues were considered. Disagreements and serious disputes often arose between them [Molotov and Stalin], in the course of which the correct decision was formed” 16 .

Members of the GKO, while continuing to carry out the main official workload, received significant additional responsibilities. On February 4, 1942, Molotov was entrusted with "control over the execution of decisions" on the production of tanks. And at the end of the year, in accordance with the decree of the State Defense Committee of December 8, 1942, he joined the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee - along with Malenkov, Beria and Mikoyan. The jurisdiction of the OB included "control and supervision of current work", as well as the preparation and execution of plans for the production and supply of people's commissariats of the defense industry, communications, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, coal and chemical industries 18 .

The redistribution of powers also affected the members of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. On August 16, 1942, Molotov was approved as the first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars "on all questions of the work of the Council of People's Commissars", and a little later also the chairman of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars 19 . The consideration and approval of “national economic plans (plans for production and supply), the state budget and lending to all sectors of the national economy, as well as the organization of the work of people's commissariats that were not included in the GKO leadership - machine-building people's commissariats, people's commissariats for construction and production of building materials, were transferred to the jurisdiction of the BSNK. food and light industry, agriculture, agricultural procurement and trade, sea and river transport, rubber industry, timber industry, pulp and paper industry, health care, justice, and all committees and departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Thus, taking into account Molotov's duties within the framework of the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the entire defense industry and the entire national economic complex were under his direct control. Of course, he relied on a large number of deputies and the apparatus, but, in the end, he was responsible for everything himself. And he did his job well. Let us refer to only one fact: on September 30, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his contribution to the production of armored vehicles. This award is backed by the impressive growth in the production of tanks and self-propelled artillery since the beginning of the war: from 4,968 in 1941 to 24,134 in 1943 20 .

At the same time, one should not forget that the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs continued to be Molotov's main duty. Since the beginning of the war, serious adjustments were made to the activities of the people's commissariat. The main thing that was required of him now was to provide favorable international conditions for a decisive rebuff to the countries of the fascist "axis", the search for allies and the establishment of effective political, military and economic cooperation with them, primarily with the United States of America and Great Britain. The People's Commissar played an exceptional role in solving this problem.

On June 26, he sends a telegram to the US Ambassador K.A. .Hall during his illness] and, having reported on the treacherous attack of Germany on the USSR, ask what is the attitude of the American government towards this war and towards the USSR. Questions about help should not be raised now” 22 . In the tone of both telegrams, one can feel the independent position of both the people's commissar and the country behind him, which found itself in an exceptionally difficult situation, but was not going to curry favor with anyone and beg for help.

Only after the people's commissar on June 29 received the American ambassador L. Steingardt and heard from him about "the desire and readiness to give all possible assistance to the Soviet Union, which will be in the power of the United States, so that the Soviet Union defeat Hitler", he gave K.A. Umansky an instruction to meet with F. Roosevelt or the US Secretary of State and raise the question of the possibility of rendering assistance to the USSR before the American leaders (a list of specific weapons and strategic materials followed in the telegram).

Almost from the very beginning, the Soviet leadership raised the issue of the insufficiency of mutual economic assistance to future allies, encouraging them to create a broad military-political base for the development of all-round cooperation. When, in the course of a conversation on June 27 with British Ambassador S. Cripps, the latter noted that in the economic field his country could provide the USSR with the necessary materials that it had, “the time was not yet ripe for a political agreement, since a lot of mutual distrust had accumulated from past”, Molotov reacted immediately. He stated that "it is better not to return to the past" because the situation has changed dramatically: "Both sides have one enemy, and they have common issues and common interests." At the same time, "mutual assistance must be conditional on some kind of agreement on a certain political basis, on which it would be possible to achieve military and political rapprochement between the two countries" 23 .

Such perseverance of the Soviet side was bearing fruit. On July 12, 1941, the Soviet-British agreement “On joint actions in the war against Germany” was concluded in Moscow, which recorded the mutual readiness of the parties “to provide each other with assistance and support of every kind in a real war against Nazi Germany” 24 . V.M. Molotov sealed the document with his signature.

The special value of the agreement was that it marked the beginning of the practical formation of the anti-Hitler coalition as a military-political alliance. A serious material base was also brought under such an alliance: a month later, on August 16, a Soviet-British agreement on trade, credit and clearing was signed in Moscow, which provided for the provision of a loan to the Soviet Union in the amount of 10 million pounds sterling for purchases for the needs of the Red Army and Navy military equipment and weapons.

Washington also managed to bring Washington closer to the emerging alliance between London and Moscow, which was facilitated by the visit to the Soviet capital at the end of July 1941 by G. Hopkins, the personal envoy and friend of F. Roosevelt.

As a result of common efforts, on September 29 - October 1, 1941, the first ever conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain took place in Moscow, which considered questions of mutual supplies and the best use of the material resources of the three countries in the war. A secret protocol was signed on the supply of weapons and strategic materials to the USSR for nine months at once - until June 30, 1942.

No less important was the political result, which the head of the Soviet delegation, Molotov, defined succinctly and exhaustively: “The political significance of the conference lies in the fact that it showed how decisively ... the intentions of the Nazis are frustrated, against which a powerful front of freedom-loving peoples, led by the Soviet Union, has now been created. , England and the United States of America” 25 .

Of course, many politicians and diplomats contributed to this success on the Soviet side. It is impossible not to note the role of Stalin, who personally, sparing no time, negotiated with the leaders of the American (A. Harriman) and British (Lord W. Beaverbrook) delegations. Nevertheless, the role of Molotov cannot be belittled.

Moreover, contacts with important, but still secondary persons from the camp of the allies did not allow achieving a full-fledged military-political alliance with the USA and Great Britain, without which a viable anti-Hitler coalition was impossible. In Moscow, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to send the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for a personal meeting with the first persons of the allied countries.

In May-June 1942, by decision of the government (read - Stalin), on a four-engine bomber TB-7 (Pe-8) made a long-range even by today's standards (about 20 thousand km) and extremely risky flight to the British Isles, and then to USA. On May 21, Molotov began negotiations with Churchill and Foreign Minister A. Eden with the aim of: 1) concluding an alliance treaty, which could not be signed in December 1941 during Eden's stay in Moscow, and 2) reaching an agreement on opening a Second Front. Moreover, the People's Commissar emphasized the priority importance of the second issue, announcing his intention to consider it with the President of the United States. Showing due respect for the British ally, Molotov told his interlocutors, the Soviet government considered it necessary that he, Molotov, first discuss the question of the Second Front with Churchill and Eden.

The search for a reasonable compromise was difficult. The British side did not agree to include in the draft a clause proposed by Stalin during Eden's Moscow visit, on the post-war structure of Europe with the recognition of the borders of the USSR as of June 22, 1941. In other words, the British did not want to recognize the fact of the entry of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and the Baltic countries into the USSR, as well as the new border with Finland after the Winter War. In the talks with Moscow's envoy, Churchill and Eden continued to object categorically to this point.

Molotov, together with Ambassador Maisky, following in line with the instructions received earlier, sent a telegram to Stalin, in which they regarded the English project as "an empty declaration that the USSR does not need." An unexpected response was received from Moscow: the “Instance” ordered the immediate signing of the treaty on English terms, explaining: “There [in the treaty] there is no question of border security, but this is probably not bad, since we have our hands free. The issue of borders, or, rather, guarantees of the security of our borders in this or that section of our country, we will decide by force” 26 .

Stalin set the task of signing the treaty as soon as possible and flying to America in order to press the Allies to open the Second Front as early as 1942.

On May 26, 1942, an agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war was signed. It replaced the agreement of July 12, 1941, and became a full-fledged legal basis for providing each other with military and other assistance "against Germany and all those states that are associated with it in acts of aggression in Europe." The parties reaffirmed their obligations, which prohibited any negotiations with Germany and its allies and the conclusion of an armistice or a peace treaty with them "other than by mutual agreement" 27 .

Curious is the assessment that Churchill gave to the Soviet People's Commissar when he first clashed with Molotov in a diplomatic duel. On May 27, 1942, informing Roosevelt about the signed Soviet-British treaty, the prime minister wrote: “Molotov is a statesman and has a freedom of action very different from that which you and I had to observe with Litvinov. I am very sure that you will be able to negotiate well with him.

Unfortunately, not everything depended on Molotov. May 29 - June 5, he held a series of negotiations, primarily with Roosevelt. It was the first official visit at such a level in the history of interstate relations between the USSR and the USA. The President of the United States received Moscow's envoy immediately, and talked with him before and after the dinner given in honor of Molotov. However, as soon as the head of the Soviet delegation raised the direct question of opening the Second Front in 1942, Roosevelt and his advisers in the person of G. Hopkins, the Chief of Staff of the American Army, General J. Marshall and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral E. King, did not show great enthusiasm . As Molotov reported to Moscow on May 31, “Roosevelt and Marshall declared that they wanted to do it in every possible way, but so far the matter rests on the lack of ships for the transfer of troops to France. They didn't tell me anything specific.

“My mission to Washington can be considered completed,” Molotov concluded pessimistically. However, this conclusion turned out to be premature. On June 3, it was possible to agree on the draft Soviet-American communiqué proposed by the Soviet side. It stated that "during the negotiations, full agreement was reached regarding the urgent tasks of establishing a Second Front in Europe in 1942."

On the day the communiqué was published, June 11, 1942, in Washington, the USSR Ambassador and the US Secretary of State signed an agreement between the governments of both states on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression 30 . This act completed the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. True, the declared "complete agreement" on the creation of the Second Front was implemented only in 1944.

The Allies, under various pretexts, postponed the opening of hostilities against the Wehrmacht in Western Europe, so that the Red Army assumed the entire burden in the armed confrontation with the common enemy. Soviet diplomacy made persistent efforts to change the situation. In October 1943, a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain took place in Moscow. In discussions with K. Hull and A. Eden, Molotov managed to prepare a solid basis for the first Big Three conference in the history of the anti-Hitler coalition in Tehran at the end of November 1943.

The Moscow Conference adopted a declaration on the question of general security, in which the formula for the unconditional surrender of the fascist states was proclaimed for the first time as an indispensable condition for ending the war. In the final communiqué, the governments of the three powers recognized "hastening the end of the war" as their primary goal, and proclaimed the opening of a Second Front through the landing of allied troops in northern France as one of the main means of achieving this goal. True, the Allies did not go beyond assurances about the possibility of an invasion of the continent from the British Isles in the spring of 1944 31 .

After the end of the work, the head of the American delegation, K. Hull, addressing Molotov, who chaired the conference, said: “I am sure that I will express not only my own opinion, but also the opinion of Mr. Eden, if I say that both of us are delighted with the manner with which you conducted the conference. I have personally attended many international conferences and have never met such experienced and skilful conduct of work…” The success of the conference suggests that these were not empty words.

With the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition and the establishment of the practice of personal correspondence between leaders and their communication at Big Three conferences, Stalin began to play a growing role in foreign policy affairs. Molotov involuntarily began to retreat into the shadows. This happened, in particular, at the Tehran, Yalta (February 1945), Potsdam (July-August 1945) conferences of the heads of the great powers. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is justified only when considering the public side of cooperation with the allies, while the people's commissar continued to take over the actual work on the diplomatic front and conducted it consistently and intensively.

Even Western politicians could not fail to appreciate Molotov's contribution to the achievement of foreign policy successes, which, in addition to military successes, marked the path of the Soviet Union to victory over Germany and its allies. The characterization that W. Churchill gave him deserves attention: “Vyacheslav Molotov was a man of outstanding abilities and cold-blooded ruthlessness ... I have never met a person who more perfectly represents the modern concept of a robot. And for all that, he was, apparently, an intelligent and sharply honed diplomat ... In Molotov, the Soviet machine, no doubt, found a capable and in many respects typical representative for it - always a faithful member of the party and a follower of the communist doctrine ... Mazarin, Talleyrand, Metternich would accept him into their company if there were another world into which the Bolsheviks allowed themselves to enter” 32 .

Molotov continued to play an important role even after the end of the World War. Speaking about the work to implement the decisions of the Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco conferences in organizing the post-war world, signing peace treaties with states that were allies of Nazi Germany during the war years, he recalled: “I saw my task as Minister of Foreign Affairs in it is possible to expand the boundaries of our Fatherland more ... I have been squeezing peace treaties out of the states” 33 .

In March 1949, Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, precisely removed, and not released, since he was suspected by Stalin of indulging "enemies of the people." And in 1952, at a plenum held after the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the leader was subjected to devastating criticism 34 . It is possible that if Stalin lived longer, Molotov, along with Mikoyan and Voroshilov, could become victims of a new wave of purges in the country's top leadership circles. This circumstance, however, did not force the former Minister of Foreign Affairs to change his view of Stalin's role in achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War. “I want to emphasize that we are all very lucky that Stalin was with us from the very beginning of the war,” he said about this. - I will note at least his huge role in the management of the national economy. All the main issues of military restructuring and the functioning of our economy, even in detail, he kept in mind and skillfully carried out all the levers of control along a given course.

1 year of crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials. In 2 vols. T. 1. M., 1990. S. 386-387.

2 World wars of the XX century. In 4 books. Book. 4. World War II: documents and materials. M., 2002. S. 67.

3 Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 1802-2002. In 3 vols. T. 2. 1917-
2002 M., 2002. S. 355.

4 year of crisis. 1938-1939... T. 2. S. 145.

5 Soviet foreign policy 1917-1945 Search for new approaches. M., 1992. S. 177.

6 World wars of the XX century ... S. 81.

7 Kumanev G.A. Next to Stalin. Candid evidence. M., 1999. S. 10.

8 World Wars of the XX century ... S. 182-183.

10 Sokolov V.V. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov // International Affairs. 1991. No. 5.
S. 103.

11 Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia ... S. 273.

12 Chuev F.I. One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. M., 1991. S. 98-99.

13 Op. on: Kumanev G.A. Decree. op. pp. 404-405.

14 Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. In 3 volumes. Ed. 10th, add. by hand author. T. 1. M., 1990. S. 326.

15 Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. In 12 vols. T. 10. State, society and war. M., 2014. S. 73.

16 Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 112.

17 RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 1. D. 20. L. 218.

18 Ibid. D. 72. L. 165.

19 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1045. L. 17.

20 Great Patriotic War... T. 7. Economics and weapons of war. M., 2013. S. 509.

22 Ibid. S. 39.

23 Ibid. pp. 46-48.

24 Ibid. S. 145.

25 Ibid. S. 341.

26 Op. on: Rzheshevsky O.A. Stalin and Churchill. Meetings. Conversations. Discussions. Documents, comments, 1941-1945. M., 2004. S. 157.

27 Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. January 2 - December 30, 1942. T. 25. Book. 1. M., 2010. S. 392.

28 Op. on: Rzheshevsky O.A. Stalin and Churchill ... S. 207-208.

29 Ibid. S. 231.

31 The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Vol. 1. Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (October 19-30, 1943). M., 1978. S. 311.

32 Op. on: Medvedev R.A. They surrounded Stalin. M., 2012. S. 17.

33 Chuev F.I. Decree. op. pp. 98-99.

34 Simonov K. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. M., 1988. S. 241-242.

35 Kumanev G.A. Decree. op. S. 12.

Diplomacy during World War II

German attack on the USSR. Speeches by Roosevelt and Churchill. An anti-Hitler coalition is being formed, the basis of which was the alliance of 3 great powers: Great Britain, the USSR and the USA. The statements of Churchill and Roosevelt met with the support of the majority of the British and American peoples, although some US and British statesmen considered the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR more desirable. Their point of view was expressed by Senator Truman (later President). In England, Minister of Aviation Industry Moore-Brabazon shared similar views, but the leaders of the British and American governments considered it necessary to cooperate with the USSR in the fight against Germany. Since the USSR and Great Britain, unlike the USA, had already fought against Germany, the Soviet government proposed to England that they conclude an agreement on joint actions. England agreed. On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed on joint actions in the war against Germany. The USSR and England pledged to "provide assistance and support to each other", + "not to negotiate, not to conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual consent." On July 31, 1941, the first English warship arrived in Arkhangelsk with technical equipment and ammunition for the USSR. Then to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk - English "convoys" - transport ships guarded by warships with weapons and ammunition. Until the end of 1941, 7 British convoys arrived in the Union.

In order to stop the activities of Nazi agents in Iran, the USSR and England, by mutual agreement - and in accordance with the Iranian-Soviet agreement 1921-25 August 1941 sent their troops to Iran. The Shah of Iran, oriented towards Nazi Germany, abdicated and fled. The new Iranian government concluded an alliance treaty with Great Britain and the USSR. It undertook to ensure the transportation through Iran of goods destined for the USSR, and the USSR and England undertook to withdraw their troops from Iran no later than 6 months after the end of hostilities against Germany and its allies. Taking into account the wishes of the USSR, on December 6, 1941, England declared war on Germany's allies who fought against the USSR - Hungary, Romania and Finland.
 In an effort to expand the coalition of anti-fascist forces, the USSR decided to reach an agreement not only with Great Britain, but also with the emigre governments and groups that opposed Nazi Germany. In July 1941, the USSR signed agreements with the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland based in London. The Soviet government recognized the Soviet-German treaties "on territorial changes in Poland" as "invalid", but the question of future Polish borders remained open. The parties pledged to assist each other in the war against Germany. The Union agreed to form Czechoslovak military units and a Polish On September 27, 1941, the Soviet government, following the example of England, recognized General de Gaulle as the leader of all free French. It promised to provide free French "comprehensive assistance and assistance in the common struggle against Germany and its allies "+ expressed the determination to "ensure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France" after achieving a joint victory. In response, General de Gaulle pledged to "fight on the side of the USSR and its allies until victory over the common enemy is achieved and to provide the USSR with comprehensive assistance and assistance."

Moscow conference of 3 powers: the USSR, England and the USA in September-October 1941. The governments of the USA and England pledged to transfer to the USSR a significant amount of weapons, more than 3,500 aircraft and 4,500 tanks, and the USSR pledged to supply England and the USA with strategic raw materials. On October 30, Roosevelt ordered to provide the USSR with an interest-free loan of 1 billion dollars, and on November 7, 1941, he extended the lend-lease law to the USSR. American and British weapons, equipment and food began to systematically enter the USSR. They went in 3 ways: northern, through the Arctic, to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; southern - through Iran; and east - through Vladivostok. At first, these deliveries are small.

Atlantic charter - the main policy document of the anti-Hitler coalition, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941 on a ship off the coast of Canada. According to the charter, the United States and Great Britain "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and "respect the right of all peoples to choose for themselves the form of government under which they wish to live." To seek the restoration of "sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of this by force"; ensure equal access for all countries to trade and to world raw material sources; “the ability to freely navigate the seas and oceans”; organize economic cooperation. Roosevelt and Churchill announced that they considered it necessary to disarm the aggressors and create a reliable system of general security. They called on all states to "renounce the use of force" in the future. Although the Atlantic Charter was adopted without consultation with the USSR, it did not say anything about the specific tasks of the struggle against fascism, the USSR in September 1941 agreed with its principles. At the same time, fearing that the provision on the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of them by force, can be applied to the territory. acquisitions of the USSR in 1939-1940, stipulated that the practical application of the principles of the charter "should be consistent with the circumstances, needs and historical characteristics of this or that country."

Contradictions in the anti-Hitler coalition. There were serious contradictions in the coalition, caused by differences in the social and political system of the state-tvs that were part of it; their goals and their policies. + Differences on the issue of the 2nd front in Europe, the creation of which the USSR considered the most effective way to achieve victory over Germany. Already on July 18, 1941, a week after the agreement on joint actions with England, Stalin raised this issue in a message to Churchill. Referring to the lack of forces and means, Churchill rejected this and all subsequent proposals to open in 1941 "a 2nd front in the Balkans or in France."
 Another problem is the problem of post-war borders and, in general, the post-war structure of the world. Neither England nor the United States recognized the new borders of the USSR, established in 1939-1940, and feared a possible "Bolshevization of Europe", while the USSR wanted to legally fix its new borders. This problem was first discussed in detail during the visit of the British Foreign Minister Eden to Moscow in December 1941. Eden intended to supplement the Anglo-Soviet agreement on joint actions during the war with an agreement on post-war cooperation and brought with him a draft of such an agreement, according to which England and The USSR pledged to cooperate during the war and "in the reorganization of Europe after the war with attention to the interests of each other", in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter that both sides "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples . The Union proposed drafts of 2 treaties: "on the alliance and mutual military assistance between the USSR and England in the war against Germany", the other - "on the establishment of mutual agreement between the USSR and Great Britain in resolving post-war issues and on their joint actions to ensure security in Europe after the end war with Germany. To the 2nd treaty, Stalin, unexpectedly for Eden, suggested adding 2 secret protocols, in which a specific plan for the organization of post-war Europe was outlined. These protocols provided for the restoration of the pre-war borders of the USSR and the borders of European countries occupied by Germany, with territorial changes for some. Above the pre-war borders, the USSR claimed territories at the expense of Romania, Finland and part of East Prussia from the city of Koenigsberg. The Soviet government proposed to expand Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the expense of Hungary and Italy, and Turkey, in order to reward her for her neutrality, at the expense of Italy and Bulgaria. It was planned to transfer to Poland certain areas of Western Ukraine or Western Belarus with a Polish population and to expand its territory in a westerly direction at the expense of East Prussia. Germany was supposed to be completely disarmed and divided into a number of states, restoring Austria as an independent state. The aggressors must compensate the victims for the losses caused by their attack. To preserve the future peace in Europe, it was proposed to create an international organization - the European Council and put at its disposal "a certain number of troops." Stalin suggested to Eden that British military, air and naval bases be set up in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark. The British government did not want to bind itself with specific obligations, + earlier it announced its non-recognition of the territory. changes after 1939, and promised the US government not to enter into secret agreements on a post-war arrangement without consulting it. Eden did not agree to guarantee the new borders of the USSR, and Stalin refused to sign draft treaties with Great Britain. These disagreements were kept secret, but they seriously complicated the relationship.

Japan is making plans against England, USA, Holland. Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 11 Dec Germany and Italy + Hungary, Romanian, Bolg, Slovak, Croatian declared war on the United States. Treaty of Japan, Germany and Italy on Mutual Assistance. 18 Jan 41 Agreement on the delimitation of zones of military operations.

Signing of the 26th antifa by the states of the declaration of the United Nations in Washington.

Union of 3 great powers. After the US entered the war, the British and US governments agreed on military-political plans. In December 1941, a common Anglo-American war plan was adopted. The opening of the 2nd front in Europe was not envisaged by the plan. Instead, it was planned to organize the landing of Anglo-American troops in French possessions in North Africa, which were controlled by Vichy and where there were no German and Italian troops. Such an operation could not divert significant forces from the decisive Soviet-German front, but it was simpler, could take Italy out of the war and strengthen the positions of England and the United States in the Mediterranean. Having coordinated their plans without the participation of the USSR, the governments of England and the USA continued negotiations with the Union. Again the question of the 2nd front. The Soviet government insisted that Britain and the USA set up a second front against Germany in Europe as soon as possible, during 1942. The opening of a second front was demanded by broad sections of the population in England and the USA. Roosevelt recognized the validity of this. But the military leaders of the United States and Britain, like Churchill, believed that there were still no conditions for landing troops in Europe. To discuss further plans for the anti-Hitler coalition, Roosevelt and Churchill invited Molotov to visit London and Washington in May-June 1942. The British government agreed to conclude an agreement on post-war cooperation with the USSR, but without specific reference to the future borders of the USSR. Molotov intended to postpone the signing of the treaty, but Stalin, given that Germany had launched an offensive on the Eastern Front, instructed him to accept the project proposed by England. On May 26, 1942, an Anglo-Soviet treaty "on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war" was signed in London. The treaty confirmed the agreement on joint actions against Germany of July 12, 1941 and provided for joint actions in the post-war period, + the provision of mutual assistance if one of the parties again becomes involved in the war with Germany or states associated with it. The USSR and England agreed to cooperate in organizing the security and economic prosperity of Europe; not enter into any alliances and not take part in any coalitions directed against the other side. The term of the contract is 20 years. On June 11, 1942, the USSR and the USA concluded an agreement "on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression." The parties undertook to contribute to the defense and mutually provide materials, services and information. The Soviet government promised at the end of the war to return to the United States those of the defense materials supplied to the USSR that were not destroyed, lost or used and could be useful for the defense of the United States. In the final settlement after the end of the war, the USA must take into account all the property, information, and other benefits that they received from the USSR. In the post-war period, the possibility of coordinated actions by the USSR and the USA was envisaged with the aim of developing mutually beneficial economic relations in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. The signing of an agreement with England and an agreement with the United States completed the legal registration of the union of 3 great powers: the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. Roosevelt suggested that the USSR create after the war "an international police force of 3-4 powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China," and Stalin replied that "Roosevelt is right."

Yielding to the USSR and the pressure of public opinion, the governments of England and the USA signed an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué, which stated that between the USSR, Britain and the USA "an agreement was reached on the creation of a 2nd front in Europe in 1942." In exchange, the US government got the USSR to agree to a reduction of about 40% in Lend-Lease deliveries in order to use the freed resources for organizing a 2nd front, and the British government accompanied the communique with a confidential clause: “it is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such that it will become possible carry out this operation when the specified time comes. England and the USA did not fulfill their obligations on the 2nd front. A week after the publication of the communiqué, Churchill met again with Roosevelt and convinced him to postpone the creation of a 2nd front in Europe. They returned to the old plan for French North Africa. The USSR again had to fight alone with the main forces of Germany and its allies.

The historical and documentary department of the Russian Foreign Ministry should, in theory, be the quietest area in a skyscraper on Smolenskaya Square in Moscow. But today this is not the case - the department is overwhelmed with work on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the victory in World War II, celebrated on May 9.

The manuscript of the Minister (more precisely, People's Commissar) of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, under glass, must be delivered to the Victory Museum, according to which he read his famous radio address on the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. For many magazines, little-known photographs of the leaders of the victorious powers - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain - should be retaken at a conference in November 1943 in Tehran, where the question of opening a second, Western front in Europe was discussed.

The Soviet military machine, as you know, took the brunt of the war with Germany and played a major role in the military victory that culminated in the entry of Soviet troops into Berlin. Soviet diplomacy during World War II is interesting in that it played a correspondingly key role in creating the model of the world in which we still live, although this period is coming to an end - the model formed by the victors in World War II.

The archives of the historical and documentary department show how this was done - at random, by trial and error, often in a sharp diplomatic struggle between the allies.

The most famous episodes of this story are the attempts of Moscow, which fought almost alone for almost 3 years, to speed up the opening of a second front, the efforts of Russian diplomacy to prevent a separate peace between London, Washington and Hitler. And also - the history of the creation of the UN. But these episodes of the war are well known. And there were lesser-known diplomatic plots that preceded the climax of World War II. The bottom line here is that the principles of the world order, reduced by the beginning of 1945 into a single system, were first tested and played out, with varying success, in relation to many individual countries of Europe.

Initially, the task was to get them out of the war, in which they either acted as allies of Germany and Italy, or were occupied. But then, naturally, the question arose about their political system, their place in European and world politics.
Here is an episode of August 1941, when the German offensive towards Moscow unfolded, seemingly unstoppable, and in London almost no one doubted that Germany's victory over the USSR was expected by winter. In those days, Joseph Stalin did not expect any help, except verbal, from Winston Churchill. However, British diplomacy continued to fight for at least the neutrality of the countries of the Near and Middle East, expecting future wars with Germany over this region. Turkey, with its long-standing pro-German sympathies, was a key country here, as, indeed, for its immediate neighbor, the USSR.

It was this neighborhood that gave Soviet diplomacy those levers of pressure on Ankara that London did not have. The result of this situation was the agreed diplomatic representations on August 10 from London and Moscow, which expressed their readiness to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey and provide assistance to her "if she were attacked by any European power."

Ankara, for a start, used this situation in trade negotiations with Germany, achieving favorable conditions for itself. And then Turkey, having appreciated the benefits of the situation, remained completely neutral until the end of the war, broke off relations with Germany in August 1944, and did not suffer any damage after the end of hostilities.

Here is the episode with Czechoslovakia, which apparently began in a telegram from the Russian Foreign Ministry to its ambassador in Great Britain dated March 10, 1943. It put forward the concept of the unity of interests of the Slavic peoples of Europe, the idea of ​​the need for Moscow to conclude a pact with them on relations during the war and the post-war period.

The emigrant Czech government of Benes, we note, was located precisely in London. As a result, on December 12, 1943, a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship and post-war cooperation was signed with this government, which removed all questions about who would rule Czechoslovakia after it was liberated from German occupation. Moscow, in particular, did not support the attempts of the Slovak resistance forces to act autonomously from Beneš.

On the eve of the end of the war, Beneš himself proposed to introduce communists into the post-war government of the country, moreover, in order to provide them with leading positions in the military and other power ministries. Stalin, on the contrary, reproached Benes for the fact that the representatives of the Communist Party received too many ministerial posts in the coalition government of Czechoslovakia, created in March 1945, after the Soviet troops liberated most of the country.

And here is the story of Finland, which was not neutral, like Turkey, and not occupied, like Czechoslovakia. Finland was an ally of Hitler. The most famous woman of the Soviet era, Alexandra Kollontai, then ambassador to Sweden, tried to bring this country out of the war. In Stockholm, she met with Finnish Prime Minister Paasikivi, who was given Soviet conditions for his country's withdrawal from the war. Negotiations on this subject between Paasikivi and Foreign Minister Molotov took place in Moscow in March 1944. Simultaneously with the act of withdrawing the Finns from the war, the USSR renewed the agreement of 1940 with this country, settled the common border, and did it to mutual satisfaction. Finland then became for many decades (and remains today) a great friend and important economic partner of Moscow.

And the Finnish episode turned out to be historic because negotiations with this country prompted the statement of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1943. It determined that the Soviet government should have a "decisive voice" in any negotiations with Germany's allied states. It was one of the building blocks from which the model of the United Nations was later built.

Spain, on the other hand, suffered the most unusual fate of all the countries of Europe - the country found itself, as it were, aloof from the redistribution of borders and the reorganization of governments, which, as we see, unfolded back in 1943-1944. For Spain, according to the paradoxical assessment of the former Soviet ambassador to Madrid, Yuri Dubinin, World War II ended in 1977, when, among other foreign policy actions of the Spanish government, diplomatic relations with Moscow were established.

From the very beginning, we made a bet that it was the King of Spain who would become the person who would help start a new chapter in relations with our country, says Dubinin. The king, however, saw the situation at that time better than I did, the ambassador admits, he understood much more clearly that on the way to normalization with the USSR he was also moving towards national peace, leading Spain out of isolation, into the expanses of world politics.

Yuri Dubinin included these and other thoughts in his book of memoirs, which was published in Russia several years ago, and in Spain only a few months ago.

The king read this book and sent a letter of thanks to the ambassador.

... A person entering the high lobby of the building of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs today sees a polished granite plaque with the names of Soviet diplomats who volunteered for the front and died there. The names of those employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were engaged in their direct business in those years are not carved in granite. But largely thanks to them, we lived 60 years after the World War without new total upheavals on a global scale. –0-

German attack on the USSR. Speeches by Roosevelt and Churchill. Is the anti-Hitler coalition taking shape? who? became an alliance of 3 great powers: Great Britain, the USSR and the USA. The statements of Churchill and Roosevelt met with the support of the majority of the British and American peoples, although some US and British statesmen considered the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR more desirable. Their point of view was expressed by Senator Truman (later President). In England, similar views were shared by the Minister of Aviation? industrial Mur-Brabazon, but the leaders of the British and American governments considered it necessary to cooperate with the USSR in the fight against Germany. Since the USSR and Great Britain, unlike the United States, had already fought against Germany, the Soviet government offered England to conclude an agreement on joint actions. England agreed. On July 12, 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed on joint actions in the war against Germany. The USSR and England pledged to "provide assistance and support to each other", + "not to negotiate, not to conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual consent." On July 31, 1941, the first one arrived in Arkhangelsk. English? Skies? military? ship with technical equipment and ammunition for the USSR. Then to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk - English "convoys" - transport ships guarded by warships with weapons and ammunition. Until the end of 1941, 7 British convoys came to the Union.

In order to stop the activities of Nazi agents in Iran, the USSR and England, by mutual agreement - and in accordance with the Iranian-Soviet agreement 1921-25 August 1941 sent their troops to Iran. The Shah of Iran, guided by Nazi Germany, abdicated and fled. Has the new Iranian government concluded an alliance treaty with the UK? and the USSR. It undertook to ensure the transportation through Iran of goods destined for the USSR, and the USSR and England undertook to withdraw their troops from Iran no later than 6 months after the end of hostilities? against Germany and her allies. Taking into account the wishes of the USSR, on December 6, 1941, England declared war on Germany's allies who fought against the USSR - Hungary, Romania and Finland. and groups that opposed the Nazis? Germany. In July 1941, the USSR signed agreements with the emigrant governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland based in London. The Soviet government recognized the Soviet-German treaties “on territorial changes in Poland” as “invalid”, but the question of future Polish borders remained open. The parties pledged to assist each other in the war against Germany. The Union agreed to form Czechoslovak military units on the territory of the USSR and the Polish army (mainly from Polish prisoners of war who were in the USSR).On September 27, 1941, the Soviet government, following the example of England, recognized General de Gaulle as the leader of all free French. It promised to provide the free French with "all-round assistance and assistance in the common? struggle with Germany and its allies, "+ expressed the determination to "ensure the complete restoration of the independence and greatness of France" after achieving a joint victory. In response, General de Gaulle pledged to "fight on the side of the USSR and its allies until victory over the common enemy is achieved and to provide the USSR with comprehensive help and assistance?

Moscow conference of 3 powers: the USSR, England and the USA in September-October 1941. The governments of the USA and England pledged to transfer to the USSR a significant amount of weapons, more than 3,500 aircraft and 4,500 tanks, and the USSR pledged to supply England and the USA with strategic raw materials. On October 30, Roosevelt ordered to provide the USSR with interest-free? a loan of 1 billion dollars, and on November 7, 1941 extended the Lend-Lease law to the USSR. American and British weapons, equipment and food began to systematically enter the USSR. They went 3 ways: northern, through Northern? Arctic?, to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; southern - through Iran; and east - through Vladivostok. At first, these deliveries are small.

Atlantic Charter - the main policy document of the anti-Hitler? coalition signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941 on a ship off the coast of Canada. According to the charter, the United States and Great Britain “do not seek territorial or other acquisitions” and “respect the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government under which? they want to live." To seek the restoration of "sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of this by force"; ensure equality? for all countries access to trade and to world raw material sources; “the ability to freely navigate the seas and oceans”; organize economic cooperation. Roosevelt and Churchill announced that they considered it necessary to disarm the aggressors and create a reliable system of universal security. They called on all states to "renounce the use of force" in the future. Although the Atlantic Charter was adopted without consultation with the USSR, it did not say anything about the specific tasks of the struggle against fascism, the USSR in September 1941 agreed with its principles. At the same time, fearing that the provision on the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of those peoples who were deprived of them by force, can be applied to the territory. acquisitions of the USSR in 1939-1940, stipulated that the practical application of the principles of the charter “should be consistent with the circumstances, needs and historical features of the country? or other countries.

Contradictions in the anti-Hitler? coalitions. There were serious contradictions in the coalition, caused by differences in social and the political system of the state-tv included in it; their goals and their policies?. + Differences on the issue of the 2nd front in Europe, the creation of which the USSR considered the most effective way to achieve victory over Germany? Already on July 18, 1941, a week after the agreement on joint actions with England, Stalin raised this issue in a message to Churchill. Referring to the lack of manpower and means, Churchill rejected this and all subsequent proposals to open in 1941 “2oi? front in the Balkans or in France.? Another problem is the problem of post-war borders and, in general, the post-war structure of the world. Neither England nor the United States recognized the new borders of the USSR, established in 1939-1940, and were afraid of the possible? "Bolshevization of Europe", and the USSR wanted to legally secure its new borders. For the first time this problem was discussed in detail during the visit of the British Foreign Minister Eden to Moscow in December 1941. Eden intended to supplement the Anglo-Soviet agreement on joint actions during the war with an agreement on post-war cooperation and brought with him? a draft of such an agreement, according to which England and the USSR pledged to cooperate during the war and "in the reorganization of Europe after the war with attention to each other's interests", in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic? charter that both parties "do not seek territorial or other acquisitions" and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples. The union proposed drafts of 2 treaties: “on the union and mutual? military? assistance between the USSR and England in the war against Germany”, others? - “On the establishment of mutual agreement between the USSR and Great Britain? in resolving post-war issues and on their joint actions to ensure security in Europe after the end of the war with Germany? To the 2nd treaty, Stalin, unexpectedly for Eden, proposed adding 2 secret protocols, in which specific ones are outlined? plan of the device? post-war? Europe. These protocols provided for the restoration of the pre-war borders of the USSR and the borders of European countries occupied by Germany, with territorial changes for some. Above the pre-war borders, the USSR claimed territories at the expense of Romania, Finland and part of East Prussia from the city of Koenigsberg. The Soviet government proposed to expand Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia at the expense of Hungary and Italy, and Turkey - to reward her for her neutrality - at the expense of Italy and Bulgaria. It was planned to transfer to Poland certain regions of Western Ukraine or Western Belarus with a Polish population and expand its territory in a westerly direction at the expense of East Prussia. Germany was supposed to be completely disarmed and divided into a number of states, restoring Austria as an independent state. The aggressors must compensate the victims for the losses caused by their attack. To preserve the future of peace in Europe, it was proposed to create an international organization - European? Council and put at its disposal "a certain number of troops." Stalin suggested to Eden that British military, air and naval bases be set up in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark. The British government did not want to bind itself with specific obligations, + earlier it announced its non-recognition of the territory. changes after 1939, and promised the US government not to enter into secret agreements on a post-war organization without consulting it. Eden did not agree to guarantee the new borders of the USSR, and Stalin refused to sign draft treaties with Great Britain?. These disagreements were kept secret, but they seriously complicated the relationship.

Japan is making plans against England, USA, Holland. Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 11 Dec Germany and Italy + Hungary, Romanian, Bolg, Slovak, Croatian declared war on the United States. Treaty of Japan, Germany and Italy on Mutual Assistance. 18 Jan 41 Agreement on the delimitation of zones of military operations.

Signing of the 26th antifa by the states of the declaration of the United Nations in Washington.

Union of 3 great powers. After the US entered the war? Well, the British and US governments agreed on military-political plans. In December 1941 adopted a general? Anglo-American? war plan? The opening of the 2nd front in Europe was not envisaged by the plan. Instead, it was planned to organize the landing of Anglo-American troops in French possessions in North Africa, which were controlled by Vichy and where there were no German and Italian troops. Such an operation could not divert significant forces from the decisive Soviet-German front, but it was simpler, could take Italy out of the war and strengthen the positions of England and the United States in the Mediterranean. Having coordinated their plans without the participation of the USSR, the governments of England and the USA continued negotiations with the Union. Again the question of the 2nd front. The Soviet government insisted that Britain and the United States set up a 2nd against Germany? front in Europe as soon as possible, during 1942. Open 2i? front demanded by broad sections of the population in England and the United States. Roosevelt recognized the validity of this. But the military leaders of the United States and Britain, like Churchill, considered that there were still no conditions for a landing in Europe.

To discuss further plans for the anti-Hitler? Roosevelt and Churchill invited Molotov to visit London and Washington in May-June 1942. The British government agreed to conclude an agreement on post-war cooperation with the USSR, but without specific reference to the future borders of the USSR. Molotov intended to postpone the signing of the treaty, but Stalin, given that Germany launched an offensive on the Eastern Front, instructed him to accept the project proposed? England?. May 26, 1942 in London signed the Anglo-Soviet? agreement “on an alliance in a war? Not against Hitler? Germany and its accomplices in Europe and about cooperation and mutual? assistance after the war?

The agreement confirmed the agreement on joint actions against Germany of July 12, 1941 and provided for joint actions in the post-war? period, + rendering mutual? help if one of the parties gets involved again? in the war? Well, from Germany? or related to it? gos. The USSR and England agreed to cooperate in organizing the security and economic prosperity of Europe; not enter into any alliances and not take part in any coalitions directed against the other side. The term of the agreement is 20 years. On June 11, 1942, the USSR and the USA concluded an agreement "on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war? Ny against aggression.

The parties undertook to contribute to the defense and mutually provide materials, services and information. At the end of the war, the Soviet government promised to return to the United States those of the defense materials supplied to the USSR that were not destroyed, lost, or used and could be useful for the defense of the United States.

In the final settlement after the end of the war, the USA must take into account all the property, information, and other benefits that they received from the USSR. In the post-war? period provided for the possibility of concerted action? USSR and the USA with the aim of developing mutually beneficial economic relations? in the spirit of the Atlantic? charters. Signing an agreement with England? and agreements with the United States, the legal registration of the union of 3 great powers: the USSR, Great Britain and the USA was completed. Roosevelt suggested that the USSR create after the war "an international police force of 3-4 powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China," and Stalin replied that "Roosevelt is right."

Yielding to the USSR and the pressure of public opinion, the governments of England and the USA signed an Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué, which stated that between the USSR, Britain and the USA "an agreement was reached on the creation of a 2nd front in Europe in 1942."

In exchange, the US government obtained from the USSR consent to a reduction of about 40% in lend-lease supplies in order to use the freed resources for organizing a 2nd front, and the British government accompanied the communiqué confidentially? reservations?: “it is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such that it will be possible to carry out this operation when the indicated ones come? term". England and the USA did not fulfill their obligations on the 2nd front.

A week after the publication of the communiqué, Churchill met again with Roosevelt and convinced him to postpone the creation of a 2nd front in Europe. Back to the old French plan? North Africa. The USSR again had to fight alone with the main forces of Germany and its allies.