The events of the Second World War - the Great Patriotic Wars - go farther and farther into the past. But the interest in those difficult months and years, when our people rose to the defense of the Fatherland and defeated the fascist aggressors in fierce battles, does not weaken. Recently, documents and materials have been released that allow a different, fresh look at the harsh everyday life of those distant fiery years. Some, recalling the "battles for Rzhev", present a map of hostilities with many arrows and numbers of military formations, a large with the infamous "bloody polygon" Rzhev - Zubtsov - Sychevka - Gzhatsk - Vyazma - Bely - Olenino.

Others get the impression of battles of local importance near the walls of the ancient Upper Volga city. This is where the reason for belittling the significance of those events lies: it’s one thing to talk about local battles for individual cities, it’s another thing to see and show the scope, scale and tragedy of many months of bloody massacre. In military history literature, the terms “battle”, “battle ", "battle".

Often the distinction between them is so blurred that the same battle is called this way and that way. At the same time, many publications list the battles of the Great Patriotic War: Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, for Leningrad, the Caucasus, the Dnieper. There is no Rzhev battle. Is this fair? In the initial period of the war, there was no clear gradation of concepts - "battle", "battle", "battle" -.

In Stalin's order of February 23, 1943, we are talking about stubborn battles near Moscow, in the Caucasus, near Rzhev, near Leningrad and the Battle of Stalingrad. All of them are in the same row. Moreover (for some reason they do not pay attention to this), then the Supreme Commander-in-Chief calls all these battles "great battles". The reference literature gives definitions of the battle. Soviet Military Encyclopedia: "In the wars of the 20th century (World War II, Great Patriotic War), the concept of "battle" meant a series of simultaneous and successive offensive and defensive operations of large groupings of troops carried out in the most important areas or theater of military operations in order to achieve strategic results in the war (military campaign).

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (the last, third edition): "During the years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, the battle meant the struggle of large strategic groupings in an important strategic direction. Front-line formations (for the enemy - army groups) were the decisive force in these battles." Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary: "Battle, a major battle, often deciding the course of the war.

During the Great Patriotic War, several interconnected major strategic operations were called battles ... "From these definitions (for all the differences), a general idea can be obtained. At the same time, the vagueness of the wording attracts attention, which opens the way to subjective assessments.

How did the events develop "in the Rzhev region" and to what extent do they fit the definition of "battle"? In early 1942, after the successful counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow, Soviet troops approached Rzhev. At the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to continue moving forward without an operational pause in order to complete the defeat of the Nazi Army Group Center. On January 8, an offensive operation began, called the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya.

The troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts participated in it with the assistance of the North-Western and Bryansk Fronts. As part of the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation, the Sychevsko-Vyazemskaya and Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operations were carried out. Initially, success accompanied the Red Army. However, by the end of January, the situation changed dramatically.

The fascist German command hastily transferred 12 divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe. As a result of counterattacks, the 33rd Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps were surrounded, only a narrow corridor connected the 22nd, 29th, 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps with their own, and later it was cut. So the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead appeared on wartime maps.

From the dictionary-reference book "The Great Patriotic War 1941-45": "The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead, a ledge formed in the defense of the Nazi troops during the offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-42 in the western direction. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead had dimensions up to 160 km in depth and up to 200 km along the front (at the base).In the winter of 1942-43, about 2/3 of the troops of Army Group Center were concentrated here. The main forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts acted against this grouping. "From 2 to On July 12, the Wehrmacht carried out an offensive operation code-named "Seidlitz" against the formations of the Kalinin Front, which were surrounded.

For many years, they preferred not to talk about it. Within the framework of the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, carried out by the forces of two fronts, the Pogorelo-Gorodischensk operation of the Western Front stands out. This is the only operation on the bridgehead that has received a broad description: Colonel General L. M. Sandalov's book "The Burned-Gorodishchenskaya Operation" was published.

This offensive of the Red Army brought some success: dozens of settlements were liberated, including on Tver land - Zubtsov and Burnt Gorodishche. The operation was defined as "the first successful offensive of the Soviet troops in summer conditions." In the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out on November 25 - December 20, 1942, is indicated in one line. And even more so, a sensational article by the American military historian David M. Glantz "Operation Mars" (November-December 1942) was published in the journal Voprosy istorii. It says that almost simultaneously with Operation Uranus (the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad), Operation Mars was carried out.

The purpose of the latter was to defeat the troops of the Army Group "Center" in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. Like the previous ones, she was not successful.

The last offensive operation, during which the bridgehead was liquidated, is called Rzhev-Vyazemskaya and dates from March 2-31, 1943. Until today, it is not known exactly how many lives the liberation of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead cost. Fifty years after the liquidation of the Rzhev ledge, the book " Classification removed" - a statistical study of the losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. It contains the following data:

Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942):
irretrievable losses of the Red Army - 272320 people,
sanitary - 504569 people,
in total - 776889 people.
Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942):
irretrievable losses of 51482 people,
sanitary - 142201 people,
total -193383 people.
Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (March 2-31, 1943):
irretrievable losses - 38862 people,
sanitary - 99715 people,
in total - 138577 people.
In all three operations:
irretrievable losses - 362664 people,
sanitary - 746485 people,
in total - 1109149 people.

Irretrievable losses include those killed on the battlefield, who died from wounds during evacuation, missing and captured, and sanitary - wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbite servicemen who were evacuated from combat areas to army, front and rear hospitals.

However, if we take into account that it is not known how many wounded returned to duty, how many became disabled, how many died in hospitals, the total figure of irretrievable losses loses its specific shape. military operations on this sector of the front remained out of sight of military historians. A participant in these events, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov, called the approximate figure for the total losses of the Red Army on the Rzhev salient - 2 million 60 thousand people. bridgehead.

And what is the number of losses of the Wehrmacht? One thing is clear here: for all the pedantry and propensity of the Germans for accuracy, they also did not seek to speak frankly on this topic. General X. Grossmann, who commanded a division on this sector of the front, wrote a book called "Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front." Repeatedly and in detail talking about Soviet losses, the general "modestly" evaded specific data on his victims of this massacre, resorting to the definitions of "big", "serious", "heavy", etc. Some data on the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Rzhev ledge fail found in Soviet publications.

So, there is information that in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation of 1942, the Army Group Center lost 330 thousand people in just three months. When describing the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (summer 1942), it is said that the losses of the German army in it amounted to 50-80 percent of the personnel. Thus, it becomes clear that the losses of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in a fierce battle for a bridgehead on the distant approaches to Moscow is not really counted.

However, it is obvious that they were simply gigantic. Comparing this, even very, very approximate information about the fallen, comparing them with the greatest battles of World War II, it becomes obvious that the battle for the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead was the bloodiest not only in the last world war, but in general in the history of mankind. The battle for The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead in the history of the Great Patriotic War occupies a special place for many reasons.

These are repeated offensive operations carried out by groups of fronts; and the monstrous losses in manpower and equipment suffered by both sides (as discussed above). In the same row - a huge number of Soviet armies that took part in the hostilities: there is information about almost twenty armies, including shock and air.

One of the features of this battle is that it lasted 14 months. Of course, in the course of strategic offensive operations, the fierceness and scale of the battle increased, but even in the intervals between mass offensives, the fighting here did not stop for a single day. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead became the site of the largest tank battles of 1942.

During the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the region of Pogorely Gorodishche, from August 7 to 10, a tank battle took place, in which up to 1,500 tanks participated on both sides. And during the autumn-winter operation of the same name (Operation Mars), according to the information of the American researcher Glantz, 3,300 tanks were used from the Soviet side alone. The future marshals of the armored forces A. Kh. Babadzhanyan, M. E. Katukov, General of the Army A. L. Getman fought here. Many outstanding military leaders passed through the Rzhev Academy, and G. K. Zhukov commanded the Western Front until August 1942.

At the same time, for several months, he was the commander of the Western direction. I. S. Konev commanded the Kalinin Front, in August 1942 he replaced G. K. Zhukov as commander of the Western Front. Here is just a short list of military leaders who on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead solved the problem of defeating the enemy:

Colonel General (since 1944 - Army General) M. A. Purkaev - since August 1942, commander of the Kalinin Front;
Lieutenant General (since 1959 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) M. V. Zakharov - from January 1942 to April 1943, Chief of Staff of the Kalinin Front;
Colonel General (since 1946 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) V. D. Sokolovsky - since February 1943, commander of the Western Front;
lieutenant general (since 1959 - army general) D. D. Lelyushenko - commander of the 30th army;
N. A. Bulganin (in 1947 - 1958 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) - Member of the Military Council of the Western Front.

The Rzhev battle became one of the most inglorious pages in the biographies of these military leaders, and in the very history of the Great Patriotic War. That is why they kept silent about it for half a century. But descendants need the truth, no matter how bitter it is.

STALIN AND HITLER IN THE BATTLE OF RZHEV

There is one unique event in the history of the Great Patriotic War: in early August 1943, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin left the capital for the front. Stalin, accompanied by Beria, arrived by train from Moscow first to Gzhatsk (where he met with the commander of the Western Front V. D. Sokolovsky and a member of the Military Council of this front N. A. Bulganin), and then near Rzhev (here he met with the commander of the Kalinin Front A I. Eremenko).

From near Rzhev, from the village with the beautiful name of Khoroshevo, on August 5, Stalin ordered the first victorious salute in Moscow in honor of the capture of Orel and Belgorod. The event is indeed the rarest: during the entire Great Patriotic War, Stalin no longer went to the front (though if To be precise, it was not a trip to the front, in the usual sense of the word, but towards the front: Rzhev was released on March 3, Gzhatsk on March 6).

Therefore, it is probably interesting to find out not only the circumstances, but also the reason for this famous trip. D. A. Volkogonov expressed the opinion that Stalin needed this for his historical reputation. Let's try to take a broader look at this event, moving forward a year and a half ago. As you know, in early January 1942, the Red Army, having defeated the Germans near Moscow, approached Rzhev. The question arose: what to do next? On January 5, this was discussed with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin was impatient and persistent. Here is just one document:

"To the commander of the Kalinin Front on January 11, 42, 1 h. 50 min. No. 170007 ... Within 11 and in no case later than January 12, capture Rzhev. The Headquarters recommends using the artillery, mortar, aviation available in this area for this purpose forces and smash the city of Rzhev with might and main, without stopping before serious destruction of the city. Confirm receipt, convey execution. I. Stalin. "

The receipt of the order, apparently, was confirmed, but its execution dragged on for almost 14 months. The offensive near Rzhev bogged down. Significant forces of the Red Army were surrounded. It is obvious that it was Stalin who personally led this winter-spring offensive on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. In the summer of 1942, the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation was carried out on the bridgehead.

Stalin set the same task: to take Rzhev at any cost. Finally, another major operation on the bridgehead - "Mars".

As already mentioned, its beginning dates back to the end of November. Zhukov cites other facts, he writes about the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 8, 1942. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts were tasked with defeating the enemy grouping in the Rzhev-Sychevka-Olenino-Bely area by January 1, 1943.

The directive was signed by I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov (on August 26, 1942 he was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander). Thus, it is obvious that Stalin attached great importance to the defeat of the Germans in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead and personally made decisions on the majority operations. From a personal and strictly secret message from British Prime Minister W. Churchill to I. V. Stalin: “Please accept my warmest congratulations on the occasion of the liberation of Rzhev.

From our conversation in August, I know how much importance you attach to the release of this item ... March 4, 1943. Stalingrad (February 2, 1943), and March 6, 1943, when Rzhev and Gzhatsk were finally liberated.

And now let's return to the topic of Stalin's arrival in the village of Khoroshevo. In the light of the foregoing, we can conclude: of course, the Supreme Commander needed a trip to the front, first of all, for history. Moreover, he reported this to W. Churchill: “Although we have recently had some successes at the front, it is precisely now that the Soviet troops and the Soviet command are required to exert exceptional effort and special vigilance in relation to probable new actions by the enemy. In this regard, I more often than usual, we have to go to the troops, to certain sectors of our front.

And the choice of the place for the trip was far from accidental: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to see with his own eyes the cities from which for almost a year and a half the threat of a new German campaign against Moscow emanated. This was facilitated by the fact that eyewitnesses of the event at different times spoke differently about what they saw. Thus, Marshal A.I. Eremenko, in the first version of his memoirs, published in No. 8 of the Ogonyok magazine for 1952, spoke about L.P. Beria.

In later publications, Lavrenty Pavlovich is no longer remembered. On the other hand, other facts appear that were absent before. Y. Semenov, the author of the famous "Seventeen Moments of Spring", has a cycle of short stories called "Unwritten Novels". The author himself in the preface to them noted that they would no longer become novels. At the same time, he emphasized that there was no fiction in these plots.

One of the chapters is dedicated to the arrival of Stalin near Rzhev. Yu. Semenov writes that Stalin informed Beria about his departure to the front only a day before - "so that the fact of his trip would not become known to anyone", that "the guards began to patrol all highways and country roads within a radius of one hundred kilometers." A reproduction has been preserved from a painting by an unknown artist depicting Stalin's arrival in Rzhev.

The bridge across the Volga attracts attention, or rather its whole right-bank half. It is known that the left-bank span of the bridge was blown up by ours, leaving Rzhev. Another flight - the Germans, leaving the city. It is not known from which photograph the artist painted the picture. On the shore: I. V. Stalin, A. I. Eremenko, L. P. Beria.

Undoubtedly, the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead was extremely important for Hitler too. The Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces F. Halder made entries in his military diary every day. They detail the events, their assessment of the top of the Third Reich. The index of geographical names speaks about the significance of the battles on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead.

Under 1942, next to Rzhev and Vyazma, there are two words: look everywhere. The correspondent of the English newspaper The Sunday Times and the BBC radio Alexander Werth wrote an interesting book, Russia in the War 1941-1945. Unlike many Soviet publications, a lot of attention is paid to the battles on the Rzhev ledge in it. In particular, it is reported: "It was Hitler, contrary to the advice of many of his generals who offered to retreat a long distance, who insisted not to give up Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, Kaluga, Orel and Bryansk, and all these cities, with the exception of Kaluga, were retained" .

Among the legends stubbornly repeated by many is the story of Hitler's arrival near Rzhev. Front-line soldier D. Shevlyugin even cites the date of this alleged event: “In the early days of our offensive (January 1942) (according to the testimony of prisoners) Hitler flew to Rzhev and demanded from the command of a group of troops defending the Oleninsko-Rzhevsky bridgehead (9th field , 3rd and 4th tank armies), hold it at any cost, considering Rzhev to be the "eastern gate" for a new attack on Moscow"

However, this fact is not confirmed by German sources. It is known that Hitler, like Stalin, often interfered in the actions of military leaders, made decisions on many important operations. X. Grossmann told about one such case: “Once Hitler decided to move the tank corps closer to the Gzhatsk position.

Model (Colonel-General, commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army at the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead - ed.) thought that it would be better to transfer him in the neighborhood of Rzhev.

Both insisted on their point of view. The argument grew louder and Model shouted more and more excitedly. "My Fuhrer, are you in command of the 9th Army or am I?". Struck by this harshness, Hitler wanted to confirm his point of view by order. Then Model said very loudly: "I have to protest." Confused and frightened, the Hitler retinue stood around: they had never heard such a tone in relation to Hitler. But Hitler suddenly relented: "Well, Model, do as you wish, but you will answer with your head if it fails." When the Germans, who were defeated at Stalingrad, were forced to leave the distant approaches to Moscow, Hitler expressed a desire to hear an explosion bridge in Rzhev. The Fuhrer's wish was fulfilled. This symbolic explosion ended the Battle of Rzhev for Hitler.

BATTLE OF RZHEV 1941 - 1943

Rzhev had a special share in the Great Patriotic War: the city was not only under fascist occupation for seventeen months, but for a long time it was a front city.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, the land near Rzhev groaned from the tread of hundreds of tanks, from explosions of bombs, shells and mines, and water red from human blood flowed in small rivers, entire fields were covered with corpses, in several places in several layers. A bitter and harsh truth about the fierce battles near Rzhev, called "battles of local significance", for a long time did not find a worthy place either in journalism or in fiction. Only front-line poets Alexei Surkov, Sergei Ostrovoy, Sibgat Hakim, Viktor Tarbeev and, above all, Alexander Tvardovsky, in his immortal poem "I was killed near Rzhev" could not get around this sad topic. Forty-two mass graves are located on the territory of Rzhev and the region, according to the Rzhev military registration and enlistment office, they contain the ashes of soldiers of more than one hundred and forty rifle divisions, fifty separate rifle brigades, and fifty tank brigades. The fighting on the so-called Rzhev ledge captured the territory of several neighboring regions of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.

According to the published data of the armed forces archive, only in three offensive operations on this ledge, the total losses of our army amounted to more than 1 million 100 thousand soldiers and officers. The 14-month bloody battles in which the armies of several fronts took part were of great strategic importance in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. This was emphasized in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army and Navy on February 23, 1943: “Our people will forever preserve the memory of the heroic defense of Sevastopol and Odessa, of the stubborn battles near Moscow and in the foothills of the Caucasus , in the Rzhev region and near Leningrad, about the greatest battle in the history of wars near the walls of Stalingrad. only half a page, or more precisely, only 23 lines, But for almost a year the author of the memoirs commanded the same 30th army that fought directly under the walls of Rzhev from January 1942 until its liberation on March 3, 1943. The German command in its strategic plans gave The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead is of great, and not "local" importance. Even the title of the book by the German general, former commander of the 6th Infantry Division, Horst Grossmann, about the battles on the Rzhev salient, testifies to the atom: "Rzhev is the cornerstone of the Eastern Front."

The German command and personally Hitler repeatedly demanded that their troops keep Rzhev at any cost. In 1942, we still did not have enough forces, especially military equipment, ammunition, and Soviet military leaders were only gaining experience in conducting large-scale offensive operations. Two offensive operations - at the beginning and at the end of 1942 - with the aim of eliminating the Rzhev bridgehead of the enemy, ended with the encirclement of a significant part of our troops. Rzhev was captured by the Nazi invaders on the 115th day of the war during their "general" attack on Moscow under the code named "Typhoon".

With this ominous word, the fascist leaders emphasized the impetuous nature of the final, as they believed, operation of the "blitzkrieg." The autumn days of 1941 were the most formidable in the course of the entire Great Patriotic War. Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, outnumbered the opposing troops of our three fronts by one and a half to two times in terms of the number of troops and weapons.

On September 30, 1941, the Nazi troops broke through the defenses of the Bryansk Front, and on October 2 they delivered a powerful blow to the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts, surrounding the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies to the west of Vyazma by October 7th. At this time, the 22nd, 29th and 31st armies with battles retreated to the line Ostashkov-Selizharovo-Young Tud-Sychevka. A defensive zone was created at this line for several months. Its construction was supervised by the headquarters of the 31st Army, located since the end of July 1941 in Rzhev. But the threat of encirclement forced us to leave this line as well. Until October, Rzhev did not suffer much from fascist aviation.

With the beginning of the Nazi offensive on Moscow, the city was subjected to almost continuous bombardment from the air: for days and nights, fascist vultures circled over the city, bringing down high-explosive and incendiary bombs on industrial enterprises, the railway and residential areas.

Houses burned, people died. The Nazis, carrying out their plan of taking Moscow "in pincers", threw large forces into the north-western direction. On October 10, by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Western and Reserve Fronts were merged into one Western Front, which was headed by G. K. Zhukov, recalled by Stalin from Leningrad.

Our troops with battles retreated to Kalinin and the Mozhaisk line of defense, which existed only on military maps. West of Rzhev, the 31st Army was defending. In the Olenin area, the Nazis were detained for four days by soldiers of the 119th Infantry Division and artillery units. For 4 days, from October 7 to 10, the enemy was detained near Sychevka. An operational group of troops under the command of Major General V. S. Polenov was deployed here by vehicles, and was ordered to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Rzhev and Volokolamsk.

On October 10, the enemy undertook a bypass of Sychevka from the southwest. From here, the 41st German motorized corps, consisting of two tank and one motorized divisions, moved towards Zubtsov. On October 11, units of the 41st motorized corps of the enemy occupied Zubtsov and Pogoreleye Gorodishche, on October 12, Lotoshino and Staritsa. Thus, the advanced units of the enemy, bypassing Rzhev, advanced to Kalinin. On October 13, German troops landed at the civilian airfield, behind Shikhin. The paratroopers tried to break through Galakhovo and Timofeevo to the Rzhev-Staritsa highway.

But our troops defeated this landing force in a fierce battle. On the same day, Colonel General Konev, Zhukov's deputy, arrived at the headquarters of the 29th Army from the Selizharov region in Rzhev. It was clear that the enemy, bypassing Rzhev from the southeast, was delivering the main blow to Kalinin through Zubtsov and Staritsa, and at the Selizharovo-Rzhev line, the infantry divisions of the 9th and 16th German armies delivered an auxiliary blow.

In his memoirs, Konev wrote: “I ordered the 22nd Army to organize defense on the left bank of the Volga from Selizharov to Bakhmutov, covering the Torzhok direction. The 29th Army, consisting of six rifle divisions, covering Rzhev and bridges across the Volga, was supposed to gather the main forces into a fist, send them to Akishev on the right bank of the Volga and strike at the rear of the enemy group that broke through to Kalinin. I. S. Konev believed that the quick and precise execution of this maneuver could stop the enemy’s advance on Kalinin.

But the commander of the 29th Army, Major General I. I. Maslennikov, not only did not comply with Konev's order, but also secretly appealed against it to L. P. Beria. Konev found out about this only in 1953, when he was chairman of the trial of Beria. At 5 pm on October 13, the advanced units of the Germans occupied the village of Danilovskoye near Kalinin.

On this day, German aerial reconnaissance discovered that long columns of the Red Army were crossing the Volga over the bridge in Rzhev. The command of the 206th infantry division of the enemy received an order to block the withdrawal of our troops in Rzhev. A reinforced reconnaissance detachment of the Germans, still dark on October 14, approached Muravyov, but our units launched a counterattack and threw him back.

Fierce battles with two regiments of the 206th enemy division approaching from the west continued near Muravyevo station and the village of Tolstikovo until October 15. On October 14, formations of the 41st motorized corps of the enemy’s 3rd tank group, supported by aviation, drove back units of the 5th rifle division, which had just begun to organize defense at Migalov, broke into the right-bank part of Kalinin. This day, October 14, 1941, became the blackest day in the centuries-old history of the city of Rzhev.

Our troops were forced to leave Rzhev. They did not go to the east, but to the north-west, towards Lukovnikov-Torzhok. This withdrawal was accompanied by daily fierce battles with the enemy armed to the teeth. For three days, from 17 to 19 October, the 178th Infantry Division, formed in Omsk, held back the onslaught of the enemy on the ancient Mologinsky tract, which leads from Rzhev to Torzhok.

In these battles, near the villages of Kresty-Mologino-Apolevo-Frolovo, the Siberian division lost more than two and a half thousand people. On the marble slabs of the memorial erected in Mologin at the initiative of the Omsk worker Mikhail Borodulin, some names of the heroes who died here are carved: Father Mikhail Borodulin, commander of platoon 693- 1st regiment junior lieutenant Efim Borodulin; Lieutenant Yuri Barbman, who in his last battle blew up the first enemy tank with a grenade, and was crushed by the second himself; battalion commander of the 386th regiment, Lieutenant Nikolai Kargachinsky, (who was barely 20 years old), but already famous for the destruction of the enemy landing at the famous Solovyovskaya crossing across the Dnieper near Smolensk ... At the beginning of the war, your soldiers were armed mainly with rifles.

With the capture of Rzhev and Kalinin by the Nazi troops, there was a threat of an enemy breakthrough in this area of ​​the extended defense of the Western Front and an attack on Moscow from the north. In this tense situation, on October 19, the Kalinin Front was formed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and Colonel General I. S. Konev was appointed commander. Until December 5, the troops of the Kalinin Front fought fierce defensive battles. In late November - early December, the German fascist armies approached Moscow at a distance of 25-30 kilometers. They cut seven of the eleven railroads that connected the capital with the country. But Moscow survived. The counterattacks inflicted on December 5-6, 1941 on the main enemy groupings north and south of the capital developed into a counteroffensive of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts. On December 16, units of the 29th and 31st armies entered Kalinin. On January 1, 1942, the 247th, 252nd and 375th rifle divisions liberated Staritsa. Fighting began on the outskirts of Rzhev.

FIRST RZHEV-VYAZEMSKAYA OPERATION
FIRE CORRIDOR

By the beginning of January 1942, during the counter-offensive of the Red Army, the enemy was driven back from the capital by 100-250 kilometers. It was the area 20-30 kilometers west of Rzhev, where the armies of the Kalinin Front went out in early January 1942, and was located two hundred and fifty kilometers from Moscow. On January 5, 1942, the draft plan of the general offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1942 was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Stalin believed that the most opportune moment had come to launch a general offensive in all main directions - from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea. On January 8, 1942, the Kalinin Front launched the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, which was part of the general offensive of the Red Army and lasted until April 1942. The main role in this operation was assigned to the Western Front, advancing with the forces of nine armies and two cavalry corps and inflicting the main blow in the Vyazma region.

The main blow to the enemy west of Rzhev was delivered by the 39th Army under the command of Major General I. I. Maslennikov. Commander of the Kalinin Front Konev, who arrived at the command post of the army, introduced the army headquarters to the general plan of the upcoming operation, specified the area of ​​the breakthrough on the ground. the villages of Nozhkino and Kokoshkino, located on the left and right banks of the Volga, which within the Rzhev region quickly carries its waters from west to east. Colonel A.V. Egorov, in those days the commander of a tank regiment, which was part of the 8th tank brigade under commanded by P. A. Rotmistrov, he spoke about overcoming the ice-bound Volga near the village of Nozhkino: “It’s not far from the Volga, but we are moving towards it all the time under enemy fire.

Having got out of the snowdrifts, we notice the outlines of the village. This is Nozhkino. Behind her is the bank of the Volga. Let's speed up. The HF of senior lieutenant Lyashenko burst forward. He maneuvers and rushes straight to the firing position of the anti-tank battery. The German infantry, scattered through the forest, retreats. The cannon hit the HF almost point-blank twice. By some miracle, Lyashenko's tank dodged these shells and crushed the gun that was hitting him. The KV, who arrived in time for Lyashenko, completed the defeat of the Nazis and broke into the village ....

Here it is, finally, the banks of the Volga, the great Russian river! We returned to her again. The mere consciousness of this adds strength to us ... That day we crossed the Volga, but then we moved slowly. The Germans daily, several times, went over to violent counterattacks, trying to close the gap in their defenses and prevent our tanks from breaking through around Rzhev from the north-west, "But the enemy could not hold back the onslaught of our units.

The rifle divisions of the 39th Army, with heavy fighting, rushed south, to the Sychevka region, and already in mid-January, advancing 50-60 kilometers, approached it from the west. But take Sychevka, the supply and transport center of the Germans on the Rzhev- Vyazma failed. In the area of ​​the Osuga station and to the south, the road was defended by the group of General Dongauser, the 86th division recalled from the east, an anti-aircraft regiment with an armored train. The German sappers quickly restored the rail tracks blown up by our advanced units. The SS division "Reich" and the 1st Panzer Division, hastily transferred from Pogorely Gorodishche, in fierce battles were able to push back the divisions of the 39th Army that had come out to the Sychevka railway station. January, the 11th Cavalry Corps under the command of Colonel S.V. Sokolov and the 29th Army, Major General V.I. Shvetsov, were introduced.

The 29th Army was tasked with expanding the bridgehead west of Rzhev, holding the flanks at the point of breaking through the enemy defenses, and seizing Rzhev with divisions of the left flank together with the 31st Army. If the divisions of the 39th Army and the cavalry corps advanced directly on Rzhev in early January , then the city, in which there were only German rear units and carts, would have been liberated without significant destruction. These days, German troops fled in panic from Rzhev and the Rzhev villages of Galakhovo, Polunino, Timofeevo and others. General X. Grossmann was forced to mention this flight in his book: “Cars and sledges are loaded. Everyone strives to escape as quickly as he can.

But with almost hungry and driven horses, you can only move in deep snow with a step. "The command of the 9th German army, using the slow advance of our armies on the city, hastily created defensive lines 8-10 kilometers west and northwest of Rzhev. The artillery commander of the 122nd Infantry Division, General Linding, subjugated all the rear supply and construction units, as well as the marching battalions deployed by air and the reserves of the VI Corps alerted to the eastern Rzhev. th Army not only from the east, but from the west, so far unsuccessfully, the SS cavalry brigade "Fegelein" tried to break through to the Volga

Great was the joy of the inhabitants of the liberated villages, who survived the horrors of the three-month fascist occupation. Rzhevityan Gennady Mikhailovich Boytsov, who turned 13 in May 1942, who then lived with his mother, grandfather and 15-year-old brother in the village of Filkovo, located near Pavlyukov, Pyatnitsky, Makarov, Krutikov, recalls how the inhabitants of these villages received the first news from native army: in early January, a "maize" flew in and dropped leaflets. From the text of the leaflet, the following lines were forever remembered: "Mash beer, kvass - we will be with you on Christmas."

The villages were stirred up and agitated; the residents' hopes for a speedy release after Christmas gave way to doubts. They saw Red Army soldiers with red stars on their hats on the evening of January 9. Our skiers were walking through the village, later carts with machine guns passed. And then the artillery moved in. The winter of 1941-1942 was unusually snowy and frosty. Horses with difficulty, exhausted, pulled heavy guns. From the east, the German group "Sychevka" began to attack Osuyskoye, and the first wounded Red Army soldiers appeared in the villages.

Soon the whole village was occupied by cavalry. Horsemen, well-armed, in new short fur coats, in felt boots, confidently told the inhabitants that the Germans should not be afraid now. Unfortunately, the optimism of the cavalrymen was not justified. The 11th cavalry corps advanced 110 kilometers to the south and, having cut the Minsk highway on January 29, went out to Vyazma. He had to overcome a few kilometers to connect with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of General P. A. Belov advancing from the east.

Due to the lack of heavy tanks and artillery, this was not possible. The divisions of the left wing of the 29th Army had been advancing on Rzhev from the west and southwest since January 12. Until January 19, the 174th, 246th and 252nd rifle divisions tried to break through to Rzhev through the villages located on the left and right banks Volga: Lazarevo, Mitkovo, Spas-Mitkovo, Redkino, Burmusovo. Good. But our divisions failed to reach Rzhev, advancing along the Volga under heavy artillery fire, air strikes, repulsing numerous counterattacks of the enemy infantry and tanks. The fierce resistance of the Germans is evidenced by the three-day battles of the 908th Infantry Regiment of the 246th Division for the capture of the village of Nechaevo.

The village street was literally littered with corpses, but the Germans held this point, not retreating even in hand-to-hand combat. The losses of the regiment were enormous. On January 17, the commander of the regiment, Major V. S. Perevoznikov, also died. The 185th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Poplavsky fought for the village of Tolstikovo, from which ten kilometers remained to Rzhev. To the left of it, the 183rd division of Major General K.V. Komissarov was advancing on the villages of Perkhurovo and Shunino in order to break through to Rzhev through Muravyevo, which is located five kilometers west of Rzhev. On the right, the 381st Rifle Division under the command of Major General B.S. Maslov advanced.

In fierce battles on January 17-20, the villages of Tolstikovo, Perkhurovo, Shunino, Muravyevo and others changed hands several times. The offensive of the units of the 29th Army was carried out most often without the support of tanks and aircraft, in incredibly difficult conditions: deep snow, frost reaching 25-30 degrees, the inability to warm up and dry uniforms.

The supply of ammunition, food and medicine from warehouses located tens of kilometers to the north did not meet the needs of the army. Gaps formed between divisions and even regiments weakened in battles, there was no continuous front line, military operations were carried out along roads and around villages. In mid-January, clear frosty days and nights set in, and enemy aircraft bombed and fired at our units almost continuously. It was not possible to expand the breakthrough corridor. This neck in the area of ​​​​the villages of Nozhkino and Kokoshkino was dubbed the "fiery corridor".

SURROUNDED

On January 22, 1942, the Nazis began to implement the plan developed by the commander-in-chief of the 9th Army, Colonel-General Walter Model, to encircle the units of the Red Army that had broken through to the west of Rzhev. Along both banks of the Volga towards each other - from the west, from the side of Molodoy Tud, and from the east, from Rzhev - powerful German groups went on the offensive. Parts of the VI Corps advanced from Rzhev: the group of General Lindig and the group "Center of Gravity" of General Rekke.

The 206th Infantry Division and the SS Cavalry Brigade "Fegelein" made their way towards them. The German offensive was supported by tanks, self-propelled guns, long-range and anti-tank artillery, as well as aircraft of the VIII Flying Corps. Our command underestimated the enemy's strength and overestimated its own. The Germans broke through on the defense sector of the 246th division, whose rifle units, after being transferred from the 29th army to the 39th army of the 252nd division, were stretched along both banks of the Volga.

The German group "Center of Gravity", having occupied the villages of Klushino, Burgovo, Ryazantsevo, Zhukovo, Nozhkino, Kokoshkino and others during fierce, often hand-to-hand fighting, reached the height at the confluence of the Sishka River into the Volga by the evening of January 22. On January 23, the eastern and western groups of Germans continued to push our units and at 12 hours 45 minutes they achieved their goal - they met at the village of Solomino, north of the Rzhev-Molodoy Tud road. Significant forces of the Kalinin Front - the 29th, 39th armies and the 11th cavalry corps - were in a semi-encirclement to the west and southwest of Rzhev and Sychevka.

The commander of the Air Force of the Kalinin Front, General Rudenko, was instructed to organize the delivery of weapons, ammunition, medicines and food to the encircled armies by air. The flights were carried out from the Migalovo airfield near Kalinin. But the front felt a shortage of aircraft: by the end of January 1942, there were only 96 serviceable aircraft of seven different types on the entire Kalinin Front. Very often, food and ammunition dropped by our aircraft ended up on the territory occupied by the Nazis, and vice versa.

Once, a whole detachment of transport aircraft, which dropped provisions, missed, and dropped the entire cargo to the Germans. General Maslennikov, seeing this, gave a desperate telegram: "We are dying of hunger, and you feed the Germans!" The radiogram reached Stalin. Stalin called Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, and Zhigarev, Commander of Aviation, and was so beside himself during the conversation that Vasilevsky was afraid that he would shoot Zhigarev with his own hands right there, in his office.

In the first days of February, the consumption of ammunition in the 29th Army was reduced to one or two shells per day per gun, to two or three mines per mortar. To release the encircled, the front commander I. S. Konev ordered the 30th Army under the command of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko to be transferred to the Rzhev region.

The offensive of the divisions of the 30th Army, weakened by previous battles, transferred from the area of ​​​​the army of Pogoreloe Gorodishche, launched on January 26, took place in the most difficult conditions. There were few tanks, there was almost no air cover for ground forces. During fierce battles, dozens of villages on both banks of the Volga: Klepenino, Solomino, Lebzino, Usovo, Petelino, Nelyubino, Nozhkino, Kokoshkino and others were wiped off the face of the earth. The offensive of our rifle units was carried out mainly at night, since during the day German aviation heavily bombed and shelled the front line.

Every meter of advance came at a heavy cost. In a number of places, the divisions of the 30th Army had only four or five kilometers to overcome before being surrounded. Scouts of the 359th Rifle Division, advancing near the villages of Solomino and Lebzino, managed to penetrate the location of the 29th Army and at night take out more than a thousand wounded soldiers and commanders in carts. But the divisions of the 30th Army could not break through the narrow enemy corridor to join the 29th Army.

In February 1942, the translator of the 30th Army E. M. Kogan (in the future - the writer Elena Rzhevskaya) translated the order of Hitler captured from the Nazis; "Division headquarters. 2.02.1942. Secret. Report immediately to the unit. Order of the Fuhrer. Soldiers of the 9th Army! The gap in your sector of the front northwest of Rzhev is closed. In this regard, the enemy who has broken through in this direction is cut off from his rear communications If you continue to do your duty in the following days, many Russian divisions will be destroyed ... Adolf Hitler."

The fascist German troops gradually tightened the encirclement. The SS Cavalry Brigade "Fegelein" and the von Resfeld group advanced on Chertolino, the Lindig group - on Monchalovo, the 246th Infantry Division advanced from the west, and the 46th Panzer Corps - from the east. all-round defense in the Monchalovsky forests.

All the commanders of headquarters, special and rear units, who were not urgently needed there, were transferred to the infantry. It was necessary to conserve ammunition, there was no fuel for cars and tractors. The warriors were starving. If at the end of January the soldiers received hot food once a day, then from the beginning of February everyone was content with only hot coniferous broth and horse meat.

The local population shared with the fighters their meager food supplies: potatoes, salt, flaxseed. i am the army. At this time, the enemy began a massive offensive from the Osuga station towards the junction of the 29th and 39th armies. On February 5, enemy infantry, cavalry and tanks, with the support of aviation, rammed through the villages of Botvilovo, Mironovo, Korytovo, Stupino and others. At Chertolin, the 1st Panzer Division and the SS Fegelein cavalry brigade, which was marching towards it, met, and this cut off the 29th Army from its southern neighbor, the 39th Army. The 29th Army found itself in complete encirclement west of Rzhev in the Monchalovsky forests in an area of ​​approximately 20 by 10 kilometers.

Having completed the encirclement of the 29th Army, the enemy immediately set about dismembering and destroying it piecemeal. Day and night, from all directions, the Nazis fired, bombed, and attacked our defenses. On February 9, our encircled divisions were forced to retreat to the east in front of superior enemy forces. On February 26, an unprecedented feat was accomplished by a group of 19 soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 940th Regiment, 262nd Infantry Division, 39th Army. All 19 fighters, led by political instructor Grigory Yakovlevich Moiseenko, died, but until the evening they detained the enemy near the small village of Korytse-Poludenny. The Germans went on the attack with a rare chain, and in a psychic one, fired at this handful of fighters from guns, dropped bombs on the brave men four times.

Hero of the Soviet Union G. Ya. Moiseenko and his fighting friends were buried in a mass grave in the village of Pyatnitskoye. The front of defense of each encircled division continued to narrow every day. Great were the losses from the constant bombing. Massed jacks of enemy aviation forced the headquarters and the wounded to be transferred from the villages to the forests. The defense became more difficult with each passing hour.

The aviation of the front could not provide significant assistance to the encircled. On February 10, a fighter unit of the 180th Fighter Aviation Regiment, led by Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Sergei Vasilievich Makarov, patrolled over our positions in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Solomino and Paikovo. Until February, Makarov made 260 sorties, participated in 35 air battles, personally shot down 10 enemy aircraft and 13 in a group with comrades. When the Makarov link had already headed for its airfield, 12 German bombers appeared over the village of Voskresenskoye.

In an unequal battle, Makarov shot down two "Messers", but his plane was also pierced by bullets from enemy aircraft and, engulfed in flames, fell outside the village of Voskresenskoye. A native of the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region, S.V. Makarov was buried in a mass grave in the Rzhev village of Bakhmutovo. In mid-February, the headquarters of the 29th Army received a request from I.V. Commander V.I. Shvetsov replied that two days could be held out with air support. Immediately, the military council of the army sent a directive to the division, which said: “Comrade Stalin became aware of our situation. I.V. Stalin asked: we will be able to Will we hold out. Food and ammunition will be dropped from transport planes.

As you can see. The High Command of the Red Army, personally Comrade Stalin, consider the area we are defending very important and are taking measures to help us. "To help the encircled 29th Army, it was decided to parachute the 204th Airborne Brigade, led by Senior Lieutenant P. L. Belotserkovsky The drop of a battalion of five hundred people was carried out by single heavy transport aircraft on two flights on the night of February 16-17 to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Okorokovo.

The planes took off from the Lyubertsy airfield near Moscow and searched for the landing area west of Rzhev, guided by primitive signals from fires that formed a triangle and a quadrangle. But finding a limited landing area turned out to be so difficult that some crews did not complete the task: about a hundred paratroopers were returned to the airfield.

At the time of the landing, groups of enemy submachine gunners, supported by eleven tanks from three sides - from Startsev, Stupin and Gorenok - broke through to the village of Okorokovo. The paratroopers were supposed to literally join the battle straight from the sky. With the onset of dawn, without stopping the battle, the paratroopers picked up cargo containers, bags of food and ammunition and shared them with the fighters of the encircled units. However, at least half of everything dropped fell into the location of the Germans, since part of the drop area near Okorokovo ended up in their hands.

FOR A BREAKTHROUGH

The decision to withdraw the troops of the 29th Army from the encirclement in the south-western direction, to the location of the 39th Army, was taken at the Military Council of the Army, where all division commanders and commissars were present. From the Erzovsky forest, bypassing Monchalovo, scattered parts of the divisions were pulled into the forests near the village of Okorokovo, 15 kilometers west of Rzhev.

The most combat-ready units and subunits occupied all-round defense, providing the main forces with a way out of the encirclement. The frantic attacks of the Nazis were often repulsed by bayonet counterattacks. On February 18, the fascists especially fiercely throughout the day shelled forests and bushes with artillery and mortar fire, in which the main forces of the encircled were concentrated. The remnants of the army, cut into several parts, by February 18 held only about 12 square kilometers of territory.

Hitler's aviation with 20-30 planes continuously bombed the entire surrounded territory. As the survivors recall, it was "pure hell." The losses were huge. So, 15 bombers bombed the village of Bykovo, in which all the houses were filled to capacity with the wounded and frostbite. After the bombing, only smoking firebrands remained from the village, there was no one to bury. In the first echelon of those leaving the encirclement, the army headquarters, the 185th and 381st rifle divisions and the 510th howitzer artillery regiment moved.

The paratroopers covered the rear and flanks of the formations retreating to the south. We went late at night, the fighters got stuck in the snow up to the waist. The carts with the wounded were in the middle of the column. Hungry horses dragged the overloaded sledges with great difficulty. Having knocked down German pickets, they crossed the Stupino-Afanasovo road. At dawn, aircraft flew in. When they were crossing the Afanasovo-Dvorkovo road on a hill, shots suddenly rang out from the right and left; tanks left the villages towards each other and began to fire from cannons and mortars. A third of the column managed to be drawn into the forest. The main part, stretching out along the road, ended up in a large open field. German submachine gunners cut it off from the forest and destroyed it.

The breakthrough demanded unprecedented self-sacrifice from the fighters and commanders and cost the 29th Army huge sacrifices. Here is what Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General V.R. the blows of the Nazis fell on you, especially on our rear guard.A day later, on the night of February 21, the Nazis managed to block our retreat.

At dawn, we rushed to the last battle. Many in this battle were killed or seriously wounded. The commander of the division, Major General Konstantin Vasilyevich Komissarov, died at a combat post, with whom we shared the hardships of combat life near Rzhev. Parts of the 246th division, covering the withdrawal of the main forces of the army from the north, on the night of February 19 managed to break away from the pressing enemy. Divisional commander Melnikov ordered to break through in groups of 10-12 people.On February 22, a fascist punitive detachment discovered and surrounded a group of divisional commander.

Melnikov was captured, and regimental commissar Dolzhikov was immediately shot by the Nazis. The entire command of the division, commanders of regiments and battalions, commissars of all units and subunits perished. Documents and banners of the division and regiments were lost, therefore, as an independent part, the division was disbanded.

The attempt to liberate Rzhev from the Nazi invaders ended in complete failure for the 29th Army, advancing on the city from the west. In January-February 1942, the 29th Army suffered huge losses. The exit from the encirclement, which began on the night of February 18, was completed, basically, by February 28. 5200 people left the encirclement and joined the 39th Army, of which 800 were wounded, which is approximately half of the personnel of only one rifle division - and this is from 7 divisions of the shock group of the 29th Army, which actually completely died in the Monchalovsky forests .

According to the Germans, in 2 months of fighting, the 29th and part of the 39th armies lost 26647 killed, 4888 prisoners, 187 tanks, 343 guns, 256 anti-tank guns, 68 aircraft, 7 anti-aircraft guns, 439 mortars and 711 machine guns. For a long time in the history of the Great Patriotic War, not a word was said about an entire army that had died in the Rzhev forests.

LOCAL FIGHTS

In March-April 1942, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, trying to fulfill the directives of the Supreme High Command, continued offensive battles. The troops of the 30th, 31st and 39th armies were to defeat the Rzhev group of Germans and liberate the city of Rzhev no later than April 5th.

But instead of an offensive, it was often necessary to repulse fierce counterattacks of a strong enemy, who had a great advantage in tanks and aviation. along the Rzhev-Selizharovo highway, 15-20 kilometers northwest of Rzhev. In these battles, in February, the commander of the 1245th rifle regiment, Major E.F. Rumyantsev, was mortally wounded, and in March, the former commander of the 1243rd regiment and appointed commander of the 1245th regiment, Major S.V. Chernozersky, who returned from the medical battalion, was mortally wounded.

In the city of Staritsa, two commanders of the 1245th regiment were buried nearby: in February - E.F. Rumyantsev, and in March - S.V. Chernozersky. In February 1942, he did everything possible and impossible to break through to the 29th Army surrounded by the Volga. But the enemy was stronger.

In the winter and spring battles of 1942, General Sokolov survived. He died on the outskirts of Rzhev. He was buried on Lenin Square in Tver. One of the streets of the city of Rzhev was named after him. Legendary in the 379th division was the name of the commander of the 1255th rifle regiment, Alexei Alekseevich Minin. This career officer, who was distinguished by exceptional courage and indefatigability, was loved by the soldiers.

For the first time he was wounded in the battle of eastern Zubtsov. In the March battles for the village of Lyshchevo, Minin was wounded a second time, but continued to lead the battle. From here, the soldiers of his regiment rushed to the village of Vaneevo, but Minin received a third wound, which turned out to be fatal. Near Rzhev, all three commanders of the rifle regiments of the 379th division, officers and political workers of the division headquarters, most of the battalion and company commanders were killed. Until the end of March, the enemy did not weaken pressure on parts of the 379th division, and enemy aircraft literally hung over its battle formations. In the reports of the Sovinformburo of those spring days, it was reported that near Rzhev "fights of local significance were going on" or that "there was a lull at the front."

The commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, described this spring offensive in 1942 as follows: “It is probably hard to believe that we had to set the rate of ammunition consumption - 1-2 shots from a gun per day. And this, mind you, during the offensive!” Commanders of the Western and Kalinin Fronts Zhukov and Konev repeatedly asked the Headquarters to stop the fruitless offensive, which turned into a daily senseless self-destruction of our armies. But by a directive of March 20, Stalin demanded a more energetic offensive against the enemy's Rzhev-Vyazma grouping.

The writer Vyacheslav Kondratiev, who participated in the battles near the villages of Chernovo and Ovsyannikovo from mid-March 1942 as part of the 132nd Infantry Brigade, said: “In our area in March-April, our artillery was practically silent. Artillerymen had three or four shells in reserve and took care of them in case of an enemy tank attack. And we were advancing. The field along which we were moving forward was shot from three sides. The tanks that supported us were immediately put out of action by enemy artillery.

The infantry remained alone under machine-gun fire. In the very first battle, we left a third of the company killed on the battlefield. From unsuccessful, bloody attacks, everyday mortar attacks, bombing, the units quickly melted away. We didn't even have trenches. It's hard to blame anyone. Because of the spring thaw, food was bad for us, hunger began, it quickly exhausted the people, the exhausted soldier could no longer dig the frozen ground. At the end of April, I was wounded. By that time, 11 out of 150 people remained in our company.

For the soldiers, everything that happened then was difficult, very difficult, but still everyday life. They did not know that it was a feat. "The armies, especially the Kalinin Front, felt interruptions in the supply of ammunition and food. The soldiers were starving, they were forced to eat the meat of horses killed in winter. When the snow melted, they looked for half-rotten frozen potatoes in piles or on collective farm fields and they made a kind of jelly out of it.

The potatoes were peeled off and the starchy mass was dissolved in hot water. killed on the battlefield - 272350 people and sanitary losses, i.e. 504,569 people who left for medical battalions and hospitals. About the difficult battles at the beginning of 1942 near Rzhev, writer Konstantin Simonov said: “After the December-January defeat of the Germans near Moscow, which turned the tide of the war, the second half of winter and the beginning of spring turned out to be inhumanly difficult for our further offensive on the Western and Kalinin fronts.

And repeated unsuccessful attempts to take Rzhev have become in our memory almost a symbol of all the dramatic events experienced then. The fascist command attached particular importance, considering it as a springboard for a new offensive against Moscow.

It was in the winter of 1942 that on the front line near Rzhev, the statement of one German general was circulated among the enemy soldiers as an appeal: “We must keep Rzhev at any cost. Whatever losses we bear, Rzhev must be ours. Rzhev is a springboard. The time will come and we let's make a jump from here to Moscow." This time has not come for the Nazis. Rzhev did not become a springboard for their new jump on Moscow, although the elimination of the "Rzhev splinter" cost our troops dearly. The white obelisk rises on a hill at the confluence of the Sishka River into the Volga, at its foot is the grave of Major General K. V. Komissarov.

And at the foot of the hill, behind a low fence, there is a modest obelisk, on which is engraved on one side: "Alexander Nikitich Seslavin (1780-1858)", and on the other - poems by V. A. Zhukovsky:

Wherever Seslavin flies With winged regiments, There is thrown into the dust and the sword and shield And the path is strewn with enemies.

Under the obelisk lie the ashes of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, the commander of the partisan detachment and favorite of M. I. Kutuzov, lieutenant general and Rzhev nobleman A. N. Seslavin. Here, near Rzhev, as well as on the field of glory of Russian weapons - the Borodino field, centuries echo and there are monuments to the heroes of two Patriotic wars.

SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE OF 1942

"On the Western and Kalinin fronts, our troops went on the offensive, broke through the line of defense and pushed the enemy back 40-50 kilometers. As a result of a successful offensive, our troops liberated 610 settlements, including the cities of Zubtsov, Karmanovo and Pogorely Gorodishche ... The Germans lost 45,000 soldiers and officers killed. Fighting is taking place on the outskirts of the city of Rzhev. Sovinformburo."

The country learned about the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation of the Red Army when, according to the plans of our command, it was already ending. This is the first major offensive of the Soviet troops in summer conditions since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and one of the most fierce and bloody battles of the war.

In these summer days and months, when the enemy was rushing to the Caucasus and Stalingrad, the Rzhev salient was the only sector on the entire Soviet-German front where our armies were advancing. used to prepare for the upcoming summer battles. "Of the two directions," Zhukov writes in his memoirs, "on which the Germans, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander, could launch their strategic offensive operations, I.V. Stalin was more afraid for Moscow, where they have there were more than 70 divisions ... I believed that in the western direction we must definitely defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping at the beginning of summer, where the German troops held a vast bridgehead and had large forces.

On the Rzhevsky ledge, by the middle of summer 1942, the Nazi troops created a deeply echeloned defense line, firmly buried in the ground. Only in front of the front of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front, which went on the defensive from the end of April 1942, the Germans built more than 500 pillboxes and dugouts along the front line to a visible depth, seven kilometers of anti-tank ditches, three and a half kilometers of forest debris. The defense of the Germans was built with skill.

Each settlement was turned into an independent defense center with pillboxes and iron caps, trenches and communications. In front of the front edge, 20-10 meters, solid wire fences were installed in several rows. Every hill, every hollow, every copse of no man's land was shot down by enemy artillery. In the defense of the Nazis, even a certain comfort was provided: our Russian birch trees were used in the form of railings for stairs and passages, almost every department had a dugout with electrical wiring and two-tier bunks.

In some dugouts, and these were the houses of collective farmers dug into the ground, there were nickel-plated beds, good furniture, dishes, samovars, even rugs. The defensive lines were supposed to make Rzhev impregnable for the Soviet troops from all sides. codenamed "Seidlitz" against the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front, which since January 1942 occupied a ledge southwest of Rzhev.

The 39th Army, which had been fighting in a semi-encirclement for half a year, experienced incredible difficulties, since the supply of ammunition and food with the help of transport aircraft and through the Nelidovsky Corridor could not provide even the most minimal needs of the army. Of course, the German command could not come to terms with the fact that that a whole army was constantly threatening parts of the 9th Army of the Model on the Rzhev salient. They were forced to hold a second front against the 39th Army. Model, who was preparing the Seidlitz operation, was wounded on May 23, 1942 in an airplane fired over a forest southwest of Rzhev. The pilot was also wounded, but managed to land the plane in Bely.

General Scheel took command of the 9th Army. The Nazis launched an offensive at 3 am on July 2 after a short artillery preparation and bombardment by the Junkers. From the north, from Olenin to the south, units of the XXIII Corps under the command of General Schubert, consisting of two infantry (102nd and 110th), two tank (11th and 5th) divisions and cavalry units, went on the offensive. , from Bely, a group of General Esebek moved as part of the 2nd Panzer and 246th Infantry Divisions.

This group moved first to the east, crossed the Nacha River near the village of Bosino and turned north. By the end of the fourth day of fierce fighting, the Germans closed the ring around the 39th Army.

Fierce large-scale fighting in the encirclement lasted 8 days. The Germans, squeezing the encirclement from all sides, were in a hurry, regardless of losses, to eliminate the boiler, because. to help the encircled, the command of the Kalinin Front sent divisions of the 22nd Army in the area south of Nelidovo and north of Bely. Commander I.I. Maslennikov, who was trying to rally the encircled divisions to break through to the west, to the area where the 22nd Army was located, was wounded.

The chief of staff of the army P. P. Miroshnichenko, many commanders and political workers of units and subunits were killed. The group, numbering about five thousand people, was led to the breakthrough by the deputy commander, Lieutenant-General I. A. Bogdanov. This group successfully broke out of the encirclement, but General I. A. Bogdanov was seriously wounded and died from his wounds.

Separately from Bogdanov’s group, consisting of over three thousand fighters and commanders with weapons, with their battle flag and operational documents, the 357th Rifle Division, led by divisional commander General A. Kronik, left the encirclement. Already on July 12, the command of the 9th German Army reported to the group armies "Center" on the completion of the operation "Seidlitz". But for a long time, the German units of the 41st Tank Corps combed the huge space from the Vyazma-Bely road to the south - to Yartsevo and Dukhovshchina, where partisans operated and our fighters and commanders went out in small scattered groups to the location of the 22nd and 41st armies of the Kalinin Front .

By mid-July, the Soviet armies on the Rzhevsky ledge had created strong defensive fortifications. So, in the defense zone of the 30th Army, more than 500 bunkers, three thousand trenches were built, about 28 kilometers of anti-tank barriers were built, more than 11 thousand anti-tank mines were installed. and Kalinin fronts the task of the offensive Rzhev-Sychevsk operation. Through the joint efforts of the left wing of the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the Western Front, which played the main role in the operation, it was necessary "... to clear the enemy from the territory north of the Volga River in the Rzhev, Zubtsov region and the territory east of the Vazuza River in the Zubtsov, Karamzino region , Burnt Gorodishche, capture the cities of Rzhev and Zubtsov, go out and firmly gain a foothold on the Volga and Vazuza rivers ... "On the Kalinin Front, the 30th Army (commanded by Major General D. D. Lelyushenko), the 29th of the second formation (commander Major General V. I. Shvetsov) and 3rd Air (commander Major General Aviation M. M. Gromov) armies; on the western front - 31st (commanded by Major General V. S. Polenov), 20th (commanded by Major General M. A. Reiter) and 1st Air (commanded by Lieutenant General of Aviation S. A. Khudyakov) army.

The commander of the Kalinin Front, I. S. Konev, decided to deliver the main blow to Rzhev from the north with the forces of the 30th Army, the 29th Army delivered an auxiliary blow along the left bank of the Volga to Zubtsov. The most important feature of the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation was to be its surprise.

Only members of the Military Council, chiefs of staff and chiefs of operational departments of the armies knew about the plans for the offensive, radio and telephone conversations and all correspondence were prohibited, orders were transmitted orally. All units and subunits were unloaded at railway stations remote from the front and concentrated in the forests until dawn, traces from caterpillar tractors and tanks were carefully covered, camp kitchens were not heated during the day. July 1942 near Rzhev turned out to be hot, with short thunderstorms. The complete lull on the Rzhevsky ledge contributed to the fact that the enemy did not know about the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops.

In front of the front of the shock group of the 30th Army, the defense was occupied by the 87th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General Studnitz and the 256th Infantry Division under the command of Major General Dongauser, reinforced by motorized infantry of the 14th Motorized Division and tanks of the 5th Panzer Division. These units were part of the Rzhev group of Nazi troops under the command of Colonel-General Model. The advancing side had a great superiority over the defending side in manpower and equipment.

It was necessary to fight in a wooded, swampy area in many places, with small rivers Derzha, Vazuza, Gzhat, Osuga, Boynya, Sishka, which overflow during the rains. At the end of July it started to rain, and the roads became impassable. Many participants in the battles near Rzhev emphasize that they did not have to face such difficult terrain, such impassability throughout the war. On July 26, the troops of the 30th Army received an order to go on the offensive on July 30, which, in particular, said: breaks through the enemy front in the Novo-Semenovskoye, Plotnikovo sector with the task of capturing Rzhev ... "

In the center of the strike force in the direction of the main attack: Deshevki, Rameno, Polunino, Rzhev, three rifle divisions were to break through the enemy defenses - the 379th with the 28th tank brigade, the 16th guards with the 256th tank brigade and the 2nd guards with the 143rd tank brigade. By the end of the first day, these forces, together with the breakthrough development group consisting of the 132nd and 136th separate rifle brigades, the 35th and 240th tank brigades and the army reserve, consisting of the 139th and 52nd rifle divisions, had to leave to Rzhev, take possession of its western and northern parts, and by the end of the third day - the villages of Abramkovo, Domashino, Chachkino, Yuryatino, located south and southeast of Rzhev. On the eve of the Rzhev-Sychev operation, July 28, 1942, I. V. Stalin As People's Commissar of Defense, Order No. 227 was signed, which became one of the most important and cruelest documents of the war.

The order, in particular, said: "From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be a requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command." On the night of July 30, an order from the Military Council of the Kalinin Front , which, in particular, said: "Each blow to the enemy on any sector of the front brings the defeat of the German invaders closer. A strong, decisive blow to the enemy on your sector of the front will affect the south and near Voronezh and will be a direct help to the troops of the Red Army, holding back the onslaught of the German -fascist hordes in the south. "Miners at night made passages in the minefields of the enemy at the forefront - one and a half meters for infantry and three meters for tanks. All our units reached their starting lines, the front of rifle divisions narrowed, and the front line became crowded with new artillery batteries and tank brigades. The fighters and commanders of rifle units and subunits left all their personal belongings in the wagon trains - overcoats, raincoats, knapsacks - everything that could hinder the rapid advance in battle.

"THIS FIGHT IN THE WILD SWAMP..."

On July 30, at 6:30 am, the 30th and 29th armies of the Kalinin Front began an hour and a half artillery preparation. It was a powerful flurry of fire. It was driven by hundreds of guns of various calibers. The front line of the enemy defenses sank in continuous fire. All participants in these events claim that they had never seen such a powerful artillery preparation before.

During the artillery preparation, it began to rain, it then calmed down, then again intensified. When, after a simultaneous salvo of 10 divisions of "Katyushas" on the entire front of the breakthrough, our infantry and tanks went on the offensive, the rain turned into a continuous downpour. The attack aircraft were able to make one sortie, dropped bombs on the enemy, but our planes did not appear again that day because of the rain. About the beginning of the offensive north of Rzhev, Colonel-General N. M. Khlebnikov, commander of the artillery of the Kalinin Front, recalled: It is great that the German artillery fell silent after several hesitant attempts to return fire to the fire.The first two positions of the enemy's main line of defense were destroyed, the troops occupying them were almost completely destroyed.

Only the miserable remnants of the fascist units withdrew to the second line of defense ... Whoever advanced then in the lowlands and swamps near Rzhev is unlikely to forget these days. Water pours in streams from above, water breaks through from below, instantly filling the freshly dug trenches. "There was nothing to support our infantry because tanks and artillery could not overcome impassability and lagged behind. Roads paved by sappers, under the weight of transport and guns, half a meter or more went into muddy earth.

Artillerymen harnessed up to a dozen horses to pull out cannons stuck in the mud. But the horses also drowned, and sometimes they themselves had to be pulled out with ropes. Tanks stuck in the mud, swamps and streams were burned by enemy artillery. Tanks received from the allies turned out to be especially vulnerable. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the strike force of the 30th Army broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive line on a front of 9 kilometers and to a depth of 6-7 kilometers.

Rzhev was 6 kilometers away. On that day, no one imagined that a month of bloody battles would be required to overcome these 6-7 kilometers and that Rzhev would not be liberated on July 31 or August 1, 1942, but only on March 3, 1943. Eight days, from July 30 to August 7, without subsiding for a moment, the battle thundered 6-7 kilometers north of Rzhev. Day and night, the divisions waged offensive battles, several times a day, tank and rifle units went on the attack or beat off repeated enemy counterattacks.

Every day our aviation bombed the defensive lines of the Germans, and most often at night - Rzhev, trying to destroy the Volga bridges. The assault group of the 243rd division, having mastered the swift strike of the village of Kopytikha, repelled 14 counterattacks of the superior enemy in a day, itself went on the attack 8 times and held the line recaptured from the enemy. The 16th and 2nd guards divisions, and from August 5 and the 52nd Rifle Division, fought fierce battles for the capture of the villages of Polunino, Galakhovo and Timofeevo, the 348th division - for the capture of the villages of Kokoshilovo and Kosachevo, the 343rd division - for Burakovo, the 111th, 379th and 78th divisions - for Kharino, Murylevo, Gorbovo, Fedorkovo, the 220th division - for Velkovo and Svinino. One can get an idea of ​​​​the fierceness of the battles that were waged these days by units of the 30th Army, but, of course, far from complete, using examples assault by the 220th Infantry Division on the forever disappeared villages of Belkovo and Svinino.

During four days of offensive battles, the 220th division lost 877 people killed and 3083 wounded. During these battles, the tanker of the 236th tank brigade Grigory Petrovich Eshtokin was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, which at that time was the greatest rarity. He received the second order for the battle, which he carried out on the only serviceable tank in the brigade. On August 9, the second attack was led by the commander of the 220th division himself, Colonel Stanislav Gilyarovich Poplavsky - in the future Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Polish People's Republic. He himself recalled this episode in the following way; “I was called to the phone by the commander of the front, I.S. Konev, who was at the command post of the 30th Army. “Why don’t you use the tank brigade attached to you? - he asked. "Almost all the tanks got stuck in the swamps," I replied.

"So pull them out and lead the attack yourself, and behind them you will bring up the infantry!" Only four vehicles were prepared for a second attack. Fulfilling the order of the commander in the literal sense, I got into the lead tank. "The lead tank with Poplavsky, skillfully led by the tank commander I. Vorontsov, alone quickly reached the western outskirts of Belkov. The Germans cut off our infantry from three tanks, which were still moving along During a turn, the tank with the divisional commander fell into a deep trench with one caterpillar and firmly settled on the ground.Small groups of Nazis began to approach the tank.

Perhaps the Germans decided to capture the crew alive. The commander of a tank company, who was in this tank, volunteered to get to his own, but died on the way. Before dark, three crew members and division commander Poplavsky fought off the attacking Nazis. Just in case, they exchanged addresses and agreed that the one who remains alive will write to the relatives of the victims. It was only in the dead of night that we managed to get close to the tank and bring the crew and the division commander to the location of the division.

A vivid but terrible picture of the field in front of the villages of Belkovo and Svinino is drawn by the former commander of the mortar platoon of the 114th separate rifle battalion, L. M. Volpe, who arrived here in early August; “In front of the front of the battalion lay a large clearing, crossed by ravines and channels of some streams, four kilometers deep and six kilometers wide. At the other end of the clearing, the ruins of the villages of Belkovo and Svinino were clearly visible through binoculars.

We attacked them. Somewhere ahead to the right, the famous Deshevka was guessed, which we got at an extremely high price. I had to go through the whole war, but I have never seen such a number of our soldiers killed. The whole glade was littered with the bodies of the dead, gusts of wind carried a cadaverous smell, there was nothing to breathe.

I remember, for example, the completely dead crew of an anti-tank gun, lying near its cannon turned upside down in a huge funnel. The commander of the gun was visible with binoculars in his hand. Loader with a cord clamped in his hand. Carriers, frozen forever with their shells that never hit the breech. "Not everyone withstood the" Rzhev meat grinder. "Already on July 30, by the end of the day, some fighters left the front line, citing their fatigue and rainy weather.

Political workers and officers of the headquarters of the 220th division, together with the barrage detachment, gathered by 8 o'clock in the morning all those who had gone to the nearest rear and entered into battle formations. In pursuance of Stalin's order No. 227, in addition to a divisional barrage detachment numbering about 150 people, serving one and a half to two kilometers from the front line at the Starshevitsa-Chentsovo line, special groups of submachine gunners were created in each rifle regiment, who received the task of preventing the withdrawal of our fighters.

But it was not the detachments with machine guns and machine guns that disturbed our soldiers and commanders, who daily rushed to Rzhev and did not look back, but the lack of these machine guns and machine guns on the front line and the insulting distrust on the part of the Stalinist special officers. On August 12, by the end of the day, the rifle regiments of the 220th division knocked out the enemy from the villages of Belkovo and Svinino. Even more bloody were the battles that were fought 6-7 kilometers north of Rzhev by the division of the shock group of the 30 Army near the village of Polunino.

With each passing day, the resistance of the Nazis intensified, they repeatedly turned into counterattacks, in a number of areas - into psychic ones. The villages of Polunino, Galakhovo and Timofeevo were a powerful center of resistance. These were continuous minefields, a dense network of bunkers, barbed wire in 3-4 rows. From the neighboring villages of Fedorkovo and Gorbovo, the Germans fired flanking fire at those advancing on Polunino. It is in Polunino that the largest mass grave on the territory of the Rzhev region is located - the ashes of more than 12 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers lie in it. The dead were buried mainly during the fighting, but even after the liberation of Rzhev in the spring of 1943, decomposed corpses, sometimes in several layers, Rzhev fields and bushes are covered.

A participant in the summer battles near Rzhev, the writer A. Tsvetkov, in his front-line notes, recalls that when the tank brigade in which he fought for the villages of Polunino and Galakhovo, after heavy losses, was transferred to the near rear, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Deshevka, then getting out of the car and looking around, our tankers were horrified: the whole area was covered with the corpses of soldiers.

There were so many corpses that it was as if someone had mowed them down and brought them here like grass. “The trouble came from all sides: for the third day we don’t drink, we don’t eat,” writes A. Tsvetkov. “There is a stench and stench all around. Many are sick, many vomit. The commander of the Tarakanov platoon, sighing heavily, says: “Thousands of them are here, corpses ... They fought without mercy, to the death. It seems that it came to hand-to-hand combat ... A terrible picture, I have never seen such a thing ... "In the current situation, having suspended the offensive, the command of the 30th Army on August 7-9 regrouped troops in order to change the direction of the main attack. It was decided to attack the left flank of the army around Rzhev.

FROM HOLD TO VAZUZA

One of the most important reasons for the failure of the assault on Rzhev was heavy rains and heavy mud. Rain replaced the Nazis several divisions. Heavy rains that raised the water level in the Derzha River, the right tributary of the Volga, 40 kilometers east of Rzhev, from 40-70 centimeters to 2-3 meters and turned it into a stormy wide stream that demolished not only the bridges built on it, but also the decks on fords and roads on the approaches to them, forced the command of the Western Front to postpone the offensive of the 31st and 20th armies scheduled for August 2 to August 4.

Thus, the gap between the beginning of the offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached five days. The troops already withdrawn to their original position on the night of August 1 were to partially withdraw to the rear. The bridges prepared by sappers for crossings on the Vazuza and Osuga rivers had to be used on the Derzha River.

From the rumble of guns and guards mortars, ears were blocked, the earth and air trembled, the sky was covered with smoke. At the same time, attack and bomber aircraft attacked the enemy from the air. At 07:45, the strike groups of the 31st and 20th armies, having crossed the Derzha River on assault bridges, on rafts, boats and ford, went over to a swift attack.

This is how the Pogorelo-Gorodishchenskaya operation of the Western Front began within the framework of the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation. "On the breakthrough site of the 118th division," recalls the commander of this division, Lieutenant General A. Ya. "Katyusha" rockets cut through the darkness with hissing hot comets. Here, for the first time, large rocket artillery shells - "Andryushas" were used. It was an avalanche of fire and steel...

Barbed wire melted. The earth itself was on fire. The enemy was mad with terror. Many of the surviving Germans really went crazy ... And here is the signal to attack. Squads, platoons, companies rushed into battle behind the fiery shaft of our artillery." , as well as 400 new motorcycles.

By the morning of August 5, a common breakthrough section of the two armies was formed, 15-16 kilometers wide and 6-9 kilometers deep. In the afternoon, the offensive unfolded with renewed vigor, the breakthrough was expanded, the armies went to the approaches to the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers. cut off the entire northern part of the Rzhev salient.

The Hitlerite command made desperate efforts to prevent the threat of defeat of its grouping split into parts on the Rzhev salient. From Vyazma and Smolensk in the first days of August, several tank and infantry divisions advanced to the ledge. The bulk of the aviation of the Army Group "Center" on August 2-5 relocated to Rzhev and Sychevka. The German military historian Tippelskirch wrote about these events in his book "History of the Second World War": "The breakthrough was prevented only by the fact that three tank and several infantry divisions , which were already preparing for the transfer to the Southern Front, were detained and introduced first to localize the breakthrough, and then to counterattack. Galakhovo and Timofeevo, regrouped troops and changed the direction of the main attack, on the banks of the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers, the 20th, 31st, and from August 8 and the 5th Army of the Western Front fought heavy battles with large enemy forces. In his diary, the chief On August 8, the General Staff of the Land Forces of Nazi Germany, Colonel-General Halder, made the following entry: “The 413th day of the war. Army Group Center. Difficult situation due to the breakthrough of the Russians eastern Zubtsov.

The situation is getting worse. The critical point will soon be reached. The 36th motorized division must be withdrawn back. Not all enemy units lost their combat effectiveness during the retreat. If the soldiers of the 161st Infantry Division, whose commander Lieutenant General Rekke committed suicide, hurried to take cover behind the second defensive line behind Vazuza, and some surrendered captured, then parts of the 36th Motorized Division, whose officers and non-commissioned officers were almost entirely members of the Nazi Party, stubbornly defended themselves, and during the retreat they laid mines everywhere. On August 9, at the turn of the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers from Zubtsov to Karmanov, the battle reached points.

Up to 1,500 tanks took part in it from both sides. Our armies, having committed all their forces into battle, were already losing superiority over the Germans.

The oncoming battle did not bring much results. It was possible to capture only small bridgeheads on the western banks of the rivers. During the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation, German aviation almost continuously bombed the battle formations of our advancing units by 15-20 aircraft. As soon as the shelling ended and our infantry went on the attack, several echelons of enemy Ju-88 bombers appeared over the forward edge, and the bombing began, often frustrating our attack.

Even at night, illuminating the territory with parachute-launched rockets, enemy bombers and attack aircraft bombed and fired at our troops. And although in these August days the dominance of German aviation in the air was indisputable, our pilots never shied away from air combat, often only 4-6 of our aircraft engaged in battle with 20, 30 or more enemy aircraft and sometimes came out victorious .Near Rzhev, many famous Soviet pilots made their first sorties, who later became Heroes and twice Heroes of the Soviet Union; A. A. Shevelev, V. I. Popkov, G. T. Beregovoy, I. F. Pavlov, A. S. Smirnov, S. I. Odintsov, T. Begeldinov, V. A. Zaitsev, A. E. Borovykh and others. To the west of Vazuza lay a treeless area with a significant rise in the direction of the enemy, which they could clearly see and shoot along and across. The battles near the villages of Fomino-Gorodishche, Vysokoye, Pulnikovo, Lesnicheno, Krasnoe, Mikheevo and many others, most of which disappeared forever from the face of the earth, were so bloody that the locals later spoke of a stream called Aksinin and flowing along the bottom of the ravine from Mikheev to Krasny: "It was not water that flowed along the Aksinya stream, but human blood."

So, for example, after 40 days of offensive battles, from August 4 to September 14, 1942, only 138 out of 3600 people remained in the 531st regiment of the 164th rifle division. By mid-August, the command of the Western Front came to the conclusion that the continuation of the offensive on Sychevka cannot lead to success, and the fascist German command, having convinced by this time that the counterattack on the Pogoreleye Gorodishche had not taken place, was forced to prepare its troops for defense at the turn of the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers.

The commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, assessed the current situation as follows: “If we had one or two armies at our disposal, it would be possible, in cooperation with the Kalinin Front under the command of General I. S. Konev, not only to defeat the Rzhev group, but the entire Rzhev-Vyazma group German troops and significantly improve the operational situation in the entire western strategic direction. Unfortunately, this real opportunity was missed by the Supreme High Command.

In general, I must say that the Supreme Commander understood that the unfavorable situation that developed in the summer of 1942 was also the result of his personal mistake made when approving the plan of action for our troops in the summer campaign of this year.

BYPASSING RZHEV

On August 10, the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front began the second stage of the offensive on Rzhev. The main blow was delivered not in the center - on the long-suffering Polunino, but by the left flank of the army in the direction of Gribeevo-airfield-Opoki-Rzhev. The left-flank group included 6 rifle divisions, 3 rifle and several tank brigades. On this day, after being cured, the commander of Colonel-General V. Model returned to the 9th Army of the Germans. At 7 am on August 10, after an hour of artillery preparation, the troops of the 30th Army on the entire front went on the offensive.

The enemy put up fierce resistance. Only in certain areas did our infantrymen manage to penetrate the enemy's front trench in small groups. The Germans brought reserves into battle, went over to counterattacks, accompanied by hurricane artillery and mortar fire. Enemy aircraft activated. There was a continuous roar in the air and a heavy stench from exploding shells, bombs, mines and the decaying corpses of people and horses. All day, until half past seven, there was a battle, but the successes were insignificant. The swampy terrain made it impossible for the tanks to advance, our infantrymen suffered heavy losses.

Particularly fierce battles were waged by the 274th and 375th rifle divisions, which had just arrived from the reserve of the front, behind the villages of Zherebtsovo and Gribeevo. Here, the 6th Infantry Division of General Grossmann stubbornly defended itself, repeatedly turning into counterattacks. In the Boinya River, along the banks of which the 274th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel V.P. Shulga was advancing, water red from blood also flowed these days. The villages of Nakhodovo, Startsevo, Dybalovo, Koshelevo, and Pudovo were liberated.

On August 14, the Chief of the General Staff of Nazi Germany, Halder, wrote in his diary: “The 419th day of the war. Army Group Center. On the front of the 3rd Panzer Army, the enemy achieved a deep and wide breakthrough. In the zone of the 9th Army, the enemy shifts the main efforts the 14th motorized and 256th infantry divisions are being withdrawn back here, from 15 to 18 August, fierce battles were fought in the area of ​​the village of Demkino. This area was the key to the exit of our shock group to the Volga.

Veteran of the 274th Rifle Division A.P. Shibarshin recalls the battles near the village of Demkino: “I really don’t remember how many of us died in those attacks, but it was the rifle battalion that came out with an unfurled banner, and we went after our commanders. Directly at the German trenches, we were hit by German machine guns in the forehead and from the flanks.

When a fighter with a banner fell, knocked down by a bullet, another took it from him. There were no more than a dozen of us left in that battle. "During the night battle for Demkino, several dozen civilians tried to break out of the village of Mosyagino to the advancing units of the Red Army. The Germans drove several hundred inhabitants of the surrounding villages to this village to be sent to Germany. On the night of On August 19, part of the prisoners, crossing the Boinya River, crawled along the ravine from the Mosyaginskaya Church towards the village of Vorobyevo. Noticing them, the Nazis opened deadly fire. Our soldiers saw how enemy mines lay among women and children.

There were screams and moans. When the Red Army broke into the hollow, a terrible picture appeared before their eyes. Dozens of dead and wounded were lying mixed. Women mourned their dead children. Next to the corpse of a young woman are two infants. One child was still alive. It was the wife of a Red Army soldier, Anna Yakovleva, with two four-month-old children. Soon the second child also died. Here the wives of the Red Army soldiers A. I. Kuparev died with their seven-year-old son Sergei, N. I. Vorobyeva, who left four small children, and many others.

The enemy then received severe retribution. Not less than a battalion of the Nazis concentrated in an overgrown ravine not far from the village of Zelenicheno. When this battalion was discovered, measures were taken to destroy it. The battalion was destroyed by massive artillery fire, Katyushas and a raid by IL-2 attack aircraft.

During the shelling, the bell tower was shot down and the Mosyaginskaya church was destroyed. German observers were buried under the rubble of the bell tower, correcting the fire of their batteries. The Germans did their best to hold back the onslaught of our units and enable their retreating troops to cross the Volga. Enemy aircraft hung in the air almost continuously, air battles were going on. So, on August 20, 11 sorties of enemy aircraft were noted, 12-15 aircraft each, the raid lasted 40-50 minutes.

Having captured the villages of Arkharovo, Pudovo, Mosyagino, Pershino, Varyushino and others, the northern part of the suburban airfield, the left-flank divisions of the 30th Army reached the Volga on the Varyushino-Golyshkino front by the evening of August 21. The 965th rifle regiment of the 274th division was the first to reach the Volga in the Gorshkovo-Gorchakovo region. A veteran of the 220th rifle division, a teacher of the Vesyegonsk school A. Malyshev, spoke about the desperate resistance of the Nazis on the left bank of the Volga: "I will never forget the bloody night battle in at the end of August 1942, on the steep bank of the Volga between the airfield and the burned village of Golyshkino. The Nazis firmly entrenched themselves there, and no matter how hard our troops tried to seize this point, nothing worked. Our soldiers broke into German trenches, but the enemies crawled into their own, unknown to us underground burrows, called the fire of their long-range batteries, and the shells swept away all living things from the earth.

Our command created a consolidated Komsomol battalion from volunteers. I also volunteered for it, although I was already the commander of a 45-millimeter gun. An order was given: without any artillery preparation, crawl up to the enemy fortifications and exterminate the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, seize this point. The signal to attack is the explosion of grenades of the one who crawls to the target first. In pitch darkness, the Komsomol soldiers moved to the Nazi trenches without a sound.

Right in front of me is a dugout. A burly German jumped out to meet him. Hand-to-hand combat began. Hatred has multiplied tenfold my not at all heroic strength. Indeed, we were then ready to bite the throat of the Nazis. And then another friend died. I stunned the enemy on the head with the butt... Needless to say, a lot of our guys, 18-19-year-old guys, remained lying in the trenches after that battle. At the cost of enormous losses, we got this fortification."

On August 21, the 29th Army also entered the left bank of the Volga from the village of Varyushino to the town of Zubtsov. Attempts by three rifle divisions of the 30th Army to cross the Volga east of Rzhev on the move failed. Separate groups of 10-15 people managed to land on the right bank, but the Germans threw them into the river with large forces, our soldiers either died or swam back. On August 21, the offensive of the 30th Army was suspended to regroup forces. During the second stage of the offensive on Rzhev, our troops reached the City Forest, to the eastern outskirts of the city, on the left bank of the Volga from Rzhev to Zubtsov.

At the third stage of the assault on Rzhev, the main blow was delivered by the right flank of the army in the direction of the villages of Fedorkovo, Kovynevo, and the Volga region. The task was set to cross the Volga west of Rzhev and continue the offensive on the right bank, covering Rzhev from the south-west. On August 24 at 6 o’clock in the morning after half an hour of artillery preparation, a salvo of two Katyusha divisions and an attack by bomber and assault aircraft on the villages of Fedorkovo, Gorbovo, Kovynevo , Lazarevo and others offensive began.

Exactly at 7 o'clock in the morning, dozens of enemy aircraft appeared over the advancing units and subunits from the direction of Rzhev. "Junkers", having formed a circle, began a massive bombardment. Some tanks were destroyed by direct hits from bombs. The turret gunner of the 339th battalion of the 153rd tank brigade, Sergeant B. G. Melnikov, spoke about this bombardment: “The planes went in battle formation - a “column of links”. Diving Junkers (Yu-87) and heavy bombers (Yu-88 ) - went in groups, each of 25 cars, under the cover of fighters.On the way to our location, the planes began to rebuild in a chain.

First, the bombing was started by Yu-87 dive bombers ("lappers"). Here is the lead, leading aircraft, turning on the siren, went into a dive. Having dropped the bombs, he soared up, a second, a third dived behind him ... The planes, having formed a circle above us, began an ominous round dance. All the tanks knocked out near Fedorkov ended up in this circle. Something unimaginable began... The earth groaned hoarsely. Everything was shrouded in smoke and dust, and more and more gaps flared up brightly in this dark haze.

The planes descended and again went up in a spiral, like a giant carousel, a rumbling wheel of death ... One group of planes, having bombed, flew away, another appeared. And everything repeated ... "The Nazis put up fierce resistance. During the artillery preparation, it was not possible to destroy all the firing points of the enemy's first line of defense. After several unsuccessful attacks in which the rifle units suffered losses, the commander of the 16th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel P. G Shafranov decided to take a bold and unusual step: despite the objections of the representative of the front commander, he planted heavy machine gun crews with their weapons on the tanks of the 35th tank brigade, setting them the task of leaving the tanks, reaching the enemy defenses, and pressing down the enemy infantry with machine-gun fire to the ground to enable our rifle units to advance.

Such an unprecedented tactic brilliantly justified itself: the Nazis could not withstand the shower of machine-gun fire, and soon the enemy’s first line of defense was broken through. On the first day of the offensive, the 16th Guards Division advanced into the depth of the enemy defense up to three kilometers and captured the villages of Fedorkovo and Berdikhino. These days our artillery and Katyushas were shelling Rzhev.

The city was on fire, on August 24 and 25, a wall of fire stood in the place of the city. On August 25 and 26, the 16th Guards and 359th Rifle Divisions, with the support of tanks, captured the villages of Kovynevo, Lazarevo, Stroevo, the Volga region and reached the Volga 5-6 kilometers to the west Rzhev. For almost a month, thousands of soldiers and commanders of the 16th Guards Division, under fire from enemy artillery and aircraft, day and night stormed the ruins of the village of Polunino, whose name few survivors remembered for the rest of their lives. The left neighbor of the 16th Guards Division is the 2nd Guards Division General P. G. Chanchibadze, who unsuccessfully stormed the neighboring village of Galakhovo, already at the beginning of the offensive suffered such huge losses that on August 5, the 52nd Infantry Division was brought into battle through her orders from the army reserve.

In the battles only on August 5-7, she lost 1615 people killed and wounded. In August, four division commanders were replaced in the 52nd division. Regardless of the huge losses, our command continued to send thousands of young guys from all the republics of the country to certain death day after day, although the capture of villages that were away from the main roads did not solve any strategic problem. th army fighter detachment, in which specially trained dogs were used to undermine enemy tanks, transport the wounded from the battlefield and search for mines.

Young guys drafted into the army from the Rzhev villages liberated in January 1942, I. K. Kryuchkov, V. V. Fedorin, A. A. Esipov and others, also served in the company for blowing up tanks. The fighters of the fighter squad were armed with a sniper rifle and two anti-tank grenades, and more than 5 kilograms of tolu were loaded on the dog. In order to prevent the attacking German tanks from reaching our infantry, fighters with dogs often had to be in front of our line of defense. This required not only great courage, but skill, caution, and ingenuity. The Rzhev guys had occasion to undermine German tanks in the battles for the villages of Lazarevo, Kovynevo, the Volga region, Znamenskoye, Spas-Mitkovo, Opoki, Lime Plant. The command of Army Group Center constantly reported to the headquarters of the ground forces about the tense situation near Rzhev, demanded reinforcements. At a meeting at Hitler's headquarters, Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, asked that the commander of the 9th Army, Model, be allowed to retreat, since the German losses at Rzhev were enormous.

So, in one of the regiments, eight commanders were replaced in a week. But Hitler answered Halder with abuse and demanded to keep Rzhev at all costs. On August 24, Halder wrote in his diary: "The 429th day of the war ... On a report to the Fuhrer. An unpleasant conflict over the assessment of the situation in the Rzhev region, where I note the possibility of a complete expenditure of the introduced forces." Units and subunits that came to the Volga west of Rzhev The 30th Army also suffered huge losses in both men and equipment.

Only one 153rd tank brigade, equipped with American M-3 tanks, lost 20 of the 55 vehicles, 15 of them were shot down and burned down near the village of Fedorkovo when breaking through the first line of enemy defense. The armies of the Western Front continued to fight in the second half of August for the expansion of bridgeheads west of the rivers Vazuza and Gzhat. On August 23, the city of Zubtsov was completely cleared of the enemy. On August 26, 1942, the Western Front was headed by I. S. Konev, replacing G. K. Zhukov, who assumed the post of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief and departed for Stalingrad.

Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev was appointed commander of the Kalinin Front. The 30th Army, which had transferred from August 30 by order of the Headquarters to the troops of the Western Front, continued offensive battles and by the beginning of September came close to Rzhev. On August 30, Halder wrote in his diary: "The 435th day of the war. Army Group Center." The 9th Army has a new aggravation of the situation in the area of ​​Zubtsov and north of Rzhev.

Allowed to use the division "Grossdeutschland". The commander of the 30th Army, D. D. Lelyushenko, decided to cross the Volga 5-6 kilometers west of Rzhev in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Semashko rest house and the Volga village in order to attack Rzhev from the west from the captured bridgehead. curtains, assault groups of the 16th Guards and 379th Rifle Divisions crossed the Volga on boats, rafts, wade up to their throats in the water. The enemy dugouts were less than a hundred meters, and the first trenches were two hundred meters from the river.

Our fighters with a quick and strong blow knocked out the Germans from trenches and bunkers, cleared coastal areas, destroyed enemy firing points on the shore. The bend of the Volga River was cleared from the enemy. The 379th division entrenched itself in the northern part of the bend near the village of Znamenskoye, and the 16th guards division in the southern part, north of the village of Redkino. German aircraft bombed crossings all day long, dropping hundreds of bombs on the bridgehead and artillery positions on the left bank of the Volga. For six months at Znamensky and Redkin, the fighting did not stop day or night.

All wooden buildings burned down in the fire of battles. Nowadays, only a dilapidated brick wall of the manor house of the tsarist general Esipov, which housed the veterinary technical school before the war, reminds of these battles. The church, which stands on a high hill not far from the Volga and was in the hands of the enemy, was destroyed to the ground.

The fierceness of the fighting on the bridgehead is evidenced by the fact that the former fighter of the 10th separate penal battalion Fyodor Petrovich Zaichenko cites: in just six days of fighting with the enemy in December 1942, only 11 people survived in the battalion, which consisted of 286 demoted officers. From this wounded, abundantly bloodied, memorable bridgehead near Znamensky and Redkin, our troops proceeded to pursue the enemy who had fled from the Rzhev ledge on March 2, 1943.

ON THE OUTSIDE OF RZHEV

In the last days of August and early September 1942, several rifle divisions fought in the Rzhev City Forest, and the 2nd Guards Division - on the northeastern outskirts of Rzhev, the 375th and 220th divisions - near the military town. Repeated assault attacks by our rifle units were repelled by enemy aircraft and artillery and machine-gun fire from buildings adapted for all-round defense.

The commissar of the 4th battery of the 660th artillery regiment of the 220th rifle division B. Fedotov testifies to the fierceness and bloodshed of these battles: "Fire platoons of the 4th battery, which I was ordered to command, fired at the enemy with direct fire for open position near the eastern outskirts of Rzhev.

We supported numerous unsuccessful attacks by our foot soldiers. In response, we were "ironed" many times by almost all of the German artillery. Still would! In full view of the Germans, some 200-300 meters from their trenches, a five-gun battery stood openly. Destroyed many times, she again came to life, again and again fired crushing fire at the enemy. The battery was bombed by Junkers squadrons, Messerschmitts circling over Rzhev were shot from a strafing flight.

And sometimes, due to the proximity to the German positions, we were bombed, and quite successfully, by our night bombers. The battery suffered huge losses, in the second half of August - the beginning of September, four regular fire platoons were replaced. Every night, firemen from other batteries of the regiment came to replace those who were out of action.

The whole earth was plowed up with bombs and shells. In short, it was a real hell in which I had no idea of ​​staying alive. I must admit, I didn’t see anything worse than this. "In the 220th division in early September, the commanders of the 653rd and 673rd rifle regiments, Lieutenant Colonel I. A. Kurchin and Major A. S. Abramov, the commissars of these regiments V I. Lytkin and I. Nelyubov, Commissar of the 600th Artillery Regiment P. V. Vasiliev. September 1942, unlike rainy August, turned out to be extremely dry and warm. In the 30th Army, intensive preparations were made for the last assault on Rzhev, on September 1 The 78th Rifle Division captured the suburban village of Zelenkino On September 2, an unsuccessful attempt was made to expand the bridgehead across the Volga in the Znamenskoye area. The 2nd Guards Division was immediately brought into action at the junction of the 215th and 369th divisions, and a fierce battle went on all day in the northeastern quarters of Rzhev.

Well-armed assault groups, liquidating pockets of German resistance and clearing houses, slowly moved forward. Each house was turned by the enemy into a fortress adapted to all-round defense. The streets were blocked by various obstacles - gouges, wire barriers, and full-length communication passages with ceilings connected the entire enemy defense system. m quarter and cleared the 23rd and 25th quarters, the 125th division fought in the 22nd and 23rd quarters of the city. On the morning of September 22, the battle in the city resumed. The Germans brought in fresh forces.

By the evening of September 22, the motorcycle battalion "Grossdeutschland" arrived at the location of the 6th Infantry Division from the reserve. In heavy continuous street fighting, more than ten blocks of the city were cleared of the enemy. But the enemy repeatedly rushed into counterattacks, individual houses and entire neighborhoods several times passed from hand to hand.

Every day, German aircraft bombed and fired at our positions. Assault groups of infantrymen were accompanied by 76-millimeter cannons, brought to direct fire. In the 707th regiment of the 215th rifle division, a battery of such guns was commanded by a young Don Cossack, 19-year-old Captain Aseev, who later became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Units of the 220th division arrived at the location of the 707th regiment. The battalion commander of the 673rd regiment, Lieutenant Viktor Gastello, the younger brother of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gastello, led the attack of his fighters.

His battalion captured the 19th quarter, and in a fierce battle for the 24th quarter on September 24, he was struck down by an enemy bullet. Under the walls of Rzhev, senior sergeant Nikita Golovnya performed an immortal feat, who during the attack of the 4th motorized regiment of the 2nd Guards Division on August 23 In 1942, he closed the embrasure of an enemy bunker with his body. Writer Ilya Erenburg wrote in his memoirs "Years, People, Life": "In September, the editor allowed me to go to Rzhev, where, starting in August, there were fierce battles ... Rzhev family is associated with the loss of a loved one - the battles were very bloody.

Rzhev I will not forget. Maybe there were offensives that cost more human lives, but there was, it seems, no other so sad - for weeks there were battles for five or six broken trees, for the wall of a broken house, and a tiny hillock. "In the headquarters there were maps with city squares, but sometimes there was no trace of the streets, the battles went over a tiny piece of land overgrown with barbed wire, stuffed with fragments of shells, broken glass, canned food tins.

But neither the heavy artillery fire, nor the attacks of a large number of tanks, nor the tons of deadly cargo dropped by Yu-87 dive bombers on our lines on the outskirts of the city and in the City Forest, in which not a single whole tree remained - nothing could lead enemy to success. Our units fought to the death. So, on October 3, a small unit, created from the fighters of the 215th and 220th divisions, under the command of the commander of the 707th regiment, Colonel Ya. A. Zubtsov, repelled seven enemy attacks.

On October 7, when repulsing another German attack, Colonel Zubtsov died from a direct hit in the headquarters dugout by a shell. By autumn, the City Forest had turned into a continuous cemetery of dead people, trees and military equipment. . The Nazi troops managed to keep Rzhev. But this offensive pinned down large enemy forces in the western direction, attracted 12 reserve German divisions to itself in the midst of defensive battles near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus. "difficult summer" of 1942, this German bridgehead remained a potential threat to Moscow, but the main concern of the Russians was not so much the prospect of a German offensive on the capital, but the possibility that they would try to hold the "bridgehead" with minimal forces, and the rest of the troops would be transferred to the south, for offensives on Stalingrad and the Caucasus, Therefore, throughout the summer and autumn of 1942, the Soviet command tried at all costs to pin down as many German troops as possible west of Moscow, constantly attacking and exhausting them.The battles near Rzhev were among the most difficult, which ever had to lead the Soviet troops.

They attacked the heavily fortified positions of the Germans and suffered much greater losses than the Germans, the hostilities were of such a fierce nature that there were very few prisoners. August 23, 1942 - 193,383 people were killed and wounded.According to the German command, in the summer-autumn battle on the Rzhevsky ledge, the total losses of the Western and Kalinin fronts amounted to 380 thousand killed and wounded and more than 13 thousand prisoners.But keeping Rzhev and Sychevka cost the enemy dearly .

The bulk of the fascist German units defending the Rzhev salient lost up to half of their personnel. Only 20-30 tanks remained in tank divisions. The total losses of the Nazis near Rzhev in August-September 1942 exceed the losses of the Paulus army for two months of fighting near Stalingrad. Rzhev, who found himself from September 1942 to March 1943 at the forefront of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead held by the Nazi troops, could no longer be used the enemy as a supply base and a railway junction, since it was constantly under fire from artillery and mortars of the troops of the 30th Army. The lines conquered by our troops created such a situation that completely ruled out the possibility of an offensive by the Nazi troops from Rzhev to Kalinin or Moscow.

IN DEFENSE AND OFFENSIVE

In the autumn and winter of 1942-1943, the military-strategic situation near Rzhev reflected the general situation on the entire Soviet-German front. During this period, the victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad began a radical turning point not only in the course of the Great Patriotic War, but throughout the Second World War. And again, the battles on the Rzhev ledge were closely connected with the Battle of Stalingrad.

This was clearly understood by the Germans, who, as Elena Rzhevskaya writes, after the defeat of Stalingrad, renamed Rzhev from a springboard for jumping on Moscow into a "springboard for Russians on Berlin." The German command continued to convince its soldiers of the need to hold Rzhev now under the pretext that surrendering Rzhev meant "opening the way for the Red Army to Berlin." In October-November 1942, our armies were actively defending under the walls of Rzhev.

The defensive lines of the 30th Army, which since November 1942 was commanded by Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi, passed along the left bank of the Volga (with the exception of a bend on the right bank in the Znamensky area) from the villages of Nozhkino and Klepenino, where the right neighbor was 39- I am the army of the Kalinin Front, along the northeastern outskirts of Rzhev and the military town and further along the left bank of the Volga east of Rzhev to the village of Pestovo, where the defense of the left neighbor, the 31st Army, began. . There was always a fight at the forefront. Scouts were active, a wide sniper movement unfolded. In the 30th Army, the sniper Yakushin became famous, having destroyed 138 invaders, he died in the battles for Rzhev in February 1943.

Usually the days were quieter than the nights. With the onset of evening darkness, the enemy became more active. Light rockets continuously rose into the sky, an artillery and machine-gun duel began. Military life was established in the defense. The dugouts were heated at night with cast-iron temporary stoves, on which clothes and footcloths were dried, water was heated from the snow, and frozen bread was warmed up. Food became regular and complete: meat soup, meat, porridge, butter, sugar were received at the front line. At this time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command accepted the proposal of G.K. Zhukov and A.M. "Uranus") offensive operation of the Kalinin and Western Fronts on the Rzhevsky ledge (Operation "Mars"), the main goal of the offensive is to prevent the transfer of troops of the Army Group "Center" to the south, near Stalingrad. A. M. Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of our troops near Stalingrad, and G. K. Zhukov prepared an offensive near Rzhev at the end of November. a few tens of kilometers southwest and southeast of Rzhev.

The Western Front under the command of I. S. Konev, having broken through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolshoi Kropotovo-Yarygino sector, by December 15, seized Sychevka and, together with the 41st Army of the Kalinin Front advancing from the west under the command of General M. A. Purkaev, surrounded the enemy in Rzhev area. The 30th Army was to break through the enemy defenses on its right flank - in the sector of the long-suffering village of Kokoshkino, to reach the railway 30 kilometers west of Rzhev near Chertolin.

The task was to take Rzhev no later than December 23, 1942. The offensive began a day after the complete encirclement of the Paulus army near Stalingrad - November 25, 1942. The Kalinin Front achieved the greatest success at the initial stage. All three armies broke through the enemy defenses: the 41st Army advanced southeast of the city of Bely, the 22nd Army - north of Bely, the 39th Army - eastern Nelidovo. The tanks of the mechanized corps of Generals M. E. Katukov and M. D. Solomatin went far to the east.

The German command hastily transferred large forces from other sectors of the front: the 20th Panzer Division of General Litvits approached from Dukhovshchina, Smolensk Region, the 12th Panzer Division of General Wessel was transferred from Orel, and the SS division of the cautious General Bitrich. Enemy resistance intensified. In fierce battles in the valley of the Luchesa River, Katukov’s corps lost more than 100 T-34 and KV-1 tanks in just two days.

At the end of November, an artilleryman who became famous in the 39th Army, Major Grigory Terentyevich Ilchenko, whose name the village in the Rzhevsky district bears, heroically died near the village of Zaitsevo. In the Nelyubino-Litvinovo sector, the enemy defenses were broken through, two divisions crossed the solid ice of the Volga at the confluence of the Koksha River and advanced for several days fighting. The 2nd Guards Separate Motorcycle Regiment, in which many Rzhevites served, participated in these battles.

Ivan Voronin from the village of Glyadenovo, Ivan Vinogradov from the village of Guzynino, Ivan Samokhvalov from the village of Dybalovo, Alexei Knyazev from the village of Zelenicheno and others died here. In general, more than three thousand Rzhevites participated in the Battle of Rzhev. If the offensive of the armies of the Kalinin Front began successfully, then the Western Front could not immediately break through the enemy’s defenses to its entire depth. On the morning of November 25, heavy snow turned into a blizzard, visibility was no more than 20 meters, and the gunners were forced to fire not at targets, but at squares.

The result of the artillery preparation, as our rifle units were convinced, going on the attack at 09:20, was insignificant: the enemy put up strong resistance. The enemy defense was broken through only in a narrow section of the front, at the Zevalovka-Prudy line. On the afternoon of November 27, units of the 6th Tank Corps of General A.L. Getman and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General V.V. Kryukov were introduced into the narrow gap. And although at that time visibility was poor and it was snowing, several dozen Junkers appeared at low altitude above the tanks and cavalry.

But such a large amount of our anti-aircraft artillery was concentrated at the breakthrough site that in 20-25 minutes the anti-aircraft gunners shot down 13 enemy bombers, which instantly crashed into the ground, and the pilots did not have time to jump out with a parachute. With battles, tankers and cavalrymen broke through the Rzhev- Sychevka and raided the enemy rear. The cavalry, having penetrated deep into the forests southwest of Rzhev, threatened the Rzhev-Olenino railway.

But in the battles in the German rear, our tankers and cavalry lost more than half of the tanks and personnel. Soon they were cut off from the rest of the advancing units of the Western Front and suffered huge losses during the breakthrough from the encirclement on the night of November 30. By early December, the Germans restored the supply of Rzhev via the Vyazma-Rzhev railway.

In the Sychevka-Osuga region, trains painted white for camouflage could only run at night or in snowy blizzard weather, because. were under fire from our artillery. Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zhukov came to the conclusion that under the current conditions, a further offensive by the Western Front would only lead to unnecessary losses. “Understanding the reasons for the failed offensive of the troops of the Western Front,” Marshal Zhukov writes in “Memoirs and Reflections,” we came to the conclusion that the main one was the underestimation of the difficulties of the terrain, which was chosen by the front command for delivering the main blow ...

Another reason for the failure was the lack of tank, artillery, mortar and air assets to ensure a breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses. The front command tried to correct all this during the offensive, but it was not possible to do this. In early December, the situation on the Kalinin front also became more complicated.

The command of the armies, whose mechanized and rifle corps drove deep wedges into the enemy's defenses and continued the offensive, feared for the flanks of these wedges. But the front command did not have time to regroup the artillery on the flanks. The operation to encircle our troops was developed by the commander of the 30th Corps, General Fretter-Pico, whose headquarters was urgently transferred to Bely from Army Group North. This division, reinforced with tanks, panzer-grenadiers and artillery of the 20th Panzer Division, formed an attacking wedge of large forces advancing from the south: the remnants of the 20th Panzer Division defended the flank, and the SS division advanced on the left.

Counting on surprise, 70 tanks painted white for camouflage without artillery preparation broke forward and, without stopping in places of resistance of our units, rushed towards the groups of Kaznitz and Wietersheim advancing from north to south. On the third day, our corps were surrounded southeast of Bely. Some of our units were able to immediately break out of the encirclement. Since the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 8, 1942, signed by Stalin and Zhukov, demanded the defeat of the Rzhev group of the enemy by January 1, 1943, Zhukov decided to leave the encircled units in place in order not only to hold the occupied area, but also to continue the offensive. Delivery of ammunition and food to the surrounded by aircraft was organized.

For several days, the encircled fought bloody battles, but they could not continue the offensive to the east - they did not have enough strength. “I had to urgently,” recalls Zhukov, “to bring an additional rifle corps from the Stavka reserve in order to use it to withdraw our troops from the encirclement. For more than three days, the corps of M. D. Solomatin fought in the most difficult conditions. On the night of the fourth day, Siberians arrived in time broke through the front the enemy and we managed to withdraw the corps of M. D. Solomatin from the encirclement.

By January 1943, the fighting on the Rzhevsky ledge gradually subsided. Our troops again switched to active defense, preparing for new offensive battles. In some sectors of the front, fierce counterattacks of the still strong enemy had to be repulsed. According to German data, during the month-long battles on the Rzhevsky ledge, the Kalinin and Western fronts suffered huge losses: 200 thousand people were killed and wounded, 1877 tanks were shot down by the Germans, 127 aircraft were shot down, more than a thousand cars, more than 8 thousand machine guns and other weapons and military property were seized.

The American historian D. Glantz writes: "Operation Mars cost the Red Army about half a million killed, wounded and captured." The main result of the strategic offensive operation "Mars" was that our troops not only did not allow the Nazi command to transfer reinforcements from the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead to Stalingrad, where the Nazis tried to unblock the Paulus group, but also forced him to concentrate large forces in the Rzhev-Sychevka area .

The second time in 1942, the Rzhev battle was directly connected with the Stalingrad one.

THE EVE

After the liberation by units of the Kalinin Front on January 17, 1943 of the city of Velikiye Luki, located 240 kilometers west of Rzhev, the position of the Nazi troops on the Rzhev ledge worsened even more. The threat of encirclement near Rzhev was becoming real for the Germans. In February 1943, the enemy sharply increased fire activity, almost constantly fired heavily, as if trying to use up more ammunition, often carried out reconnaissance in battle, hoping to determine where the main blow would be struck. In a number of sectors of the front, our troops also struck at the enemy.

On January 25, a private offensive operation was carried out with the aim of completely liberating the City Forest and the left-bank part of Rzhev. For this, part of the forces of the 215th rifle division, which had been stationed on the outskirts of the city since September 1942, the 10th separate rifle battalion and a large amount of artillery were involved. Our fighters could not advance further than the first German trench, and in the evening an order was received to withdraw.

On February 6, 1943, the commanders of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, Generals M. A. Purkaev and V. D. Sokolovsky, received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on preparations for a new Rzhev-Vyazemsky offensive operation. The task was again set to encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center.

4 armies of the Kalinin and 8 armies of the Western fronts were involved in the offensive. The fascist German command, having used up all its reserves in winter battles and fearing after Stalingrad to fall into another "cauldron" near Rzhev, proved to Hitler that it was necessary to leave the Rzhev-Vyazma bag and shorten the front line. It was on this day, February 6, that Hitler gave permission for the withdrawal of the 9th and half of the 4th Army to the Spas-Demensk-Dorogobush-Dukhovshchina line. Here is how the correspondent of the English newspaper The Sunday Times A. Werth assessed the situation for the Germans: "After all the losses that the Germans and their allies suffered in the south, they clearly lacked more and more trained troops. This largely explains their decision in March 1943 to leave the Gzhatsk-Vyazma-Rzhev bridgehead, this" aimed at Moscow dagger, "to which they clung so fiercely after the very first defeats they suffered in Russia in the winter of 1941-42. Now, in March 1943, the Germans, fearing that Russian troops would bypass them with a toga (eventually take the Germans into a large encirclement "between Moscow and Smolensk", which they failed to do in February 1942), simply withdrew from the "Moscow bridgehead", albeit with stubborn rearguard battles, especially near Vyazma; in doing so, they committed as much destruction as time allowed them ". The Germans gave the code name "Buffel" ("Buffalo") to the new defensive line and the operation to withdraw their troops.

For withdrawal, intermediate defensive lines were created, roads were built along which military equipment, military equipment, food, and livestock were exported. Thousands of civilians were driven to the west, allegedly of their own free will. On February 28, Model ordered the withdrawal of all units of the 9th Army to begin at 19:00 on March 1; the rearguard detachments of the cover were to leave the front line and Rzhev at 1800 on March 2. The commander of the 30th Army, V. Ya.

The writer Elena Rzhevskaya, in those days the translator of the headquarters of the 30th Army, vividly spoke about this: “Our offensive was broken so many times about Rzhev, and now, after the victory in Stalingrad, when all Moscow’s attention is riveted here, he could not miscalculate and hesitated. guarantees were needed that this time the charmed Rzhev would succumb, would be taken ... Everything was resolved by Stalin's night call.

He called and asked the commander if he would soon take Rzhev ... And the commander (it is easy to imagine his excitement and the tremor of solemnity in his voice, and the suppressed fear, and the take-off of readiness) replied: "Comrade Commander-in-Chief, tomorrow I will report to you from Rzhev" and moved troops. "Our armies received an order to go on the offensive at 14:30 on March 2, 1943. The German command had already begun a systematic withdrawal of its troops from line to line under the cover of strong rearguards. The last Rzhev-Vyazemsky offensive operation of the Western and Kalinin fronts turned in pursuit of the retreating enemy.

The commander of the 653rd Infantry Regiment of the 220th Division, Captain G.V. Skovorodkin, said: “I could not sleep that night. I leave the dugout at one in the morning: silence, not a single shot and not a single rocket at the forefront. I understood: the Germans retreated. He ordered the orderly to put the horse in the sled, rushed to the front line, jumped into the dugout of the reconnaissance platoon, raised the personnel on alarm and led them straight along the top into the German trench. The Germans were not there: they left. Reported the incident to the division commander Poplavsky, raised a regiment and began the pursuit.

The regiment overtook the enemy at the Monchalovo-Chertolino line, where he put up stubborn resistance. "The Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, Generals V.D. Sokolovsky and M.A. detour maneuver, mobile detachments go to his rear and cut off the path for retreat.

By the end of the day on March 2, the villages of Kokoshkino, Malakhovo-Volzhskoye, Trostino and others were occupied. The advance continued through the night. Separate strongholds of the enemy, offering strong resistance, our units blocked by groups allocated for this and continued to move forward. The 359th division captured the village of Kosterovo at 2 am on March 3 and advanced on Ryazantsevo; under the command of Colonel M. 3. Kazishvili, with a night attack, knocked out the rearguard units of the Germans from the village of Petunovo and a number of other strongholds and also reached the railway line southwest of Muravyevo station, and then occupied the village of Tolstikovo.

By the evening of March 3, units of the army's shock group, clearing the forests south of the railway line from small enemy groups and ambushes, reached the Okorokovo, Stupino, Dubrovka line. The left-flank 215th and 274th rifle divisions of the 30th Army under the command of Major General A.F. Kupriyanov and Colonel V.P. Shulga were advancing directly on Rzhev. went on the offensive as soon as he received intelligence data that on the night of March 1-2, the enemy began to withdraw the main forces of the 72nd and 95th infantry divisions.

The commanders of the 371st and 118th rifle divisions, Major General N. N. Oleshchev and Colonel A. Ya. Vedenin, immediately gave the order to occupy the first enemy trench with reinforced detachments. Due to the fact that Rzhev covered the 215th and 274th rifle divisions of the 30th army from the west and southeast, on the morning of March 3, the direction of the offensive was changed from northwest to south, to Sychevka. On the night of March 3 , having occupied the villages of Muravyevo, Kovalevo, Khoroshevo west of Rzhev and the villages of Pestrikovo, Bykhova Sloboda and Opoki eastern Rzhev, the 215th and 274th divisions approached Rzhev.

On March 2, it was warm during the day near Rzhev, thick sleet was falling, visibility deteriorated, snipers could not operate. On the night of March 3, the snow stopped, the sky cleared of clouds, and the frost intensified. In Rzhev, fires broke out in various places, rare shots were heard, strong explosions, at about 11 a.m. in some areas the Germans opened heavy artillery fire.

RELEASE

The rearguard units of the Germans fled from Rzhev on the morning of March 3. At dawn, a task force of 10 people entered the deserted and quiet city, headed by the senior detective of the special department of the NKVD of the 30th army, P. I. Konovalov. The group was supposed to quietly penetrate Rzhev, block the house and capture the traitor - the mayor V. Ya. Kuzmin. The German trenches of the front line were empty, and an iron stove was burning in one of the dugouts: apparently, the Germans had just retreated.

Already in Rzhev, from the left bank of the Volga, the Chekists saw a German car on the opposite bank, in which, apparently, soldiers from military guards were leaving. Leaving Rzhev, on March 1, the Nazis drove almost all the surviving population of the city to the Pokrovskaya Old Believer Church on Kalinina Street - 248 people - women, old people and children, locked the iron doors and mined the church. Families were brought here, some came with their belongings.

"Those who refused or could not reach the church," the act of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders in Rzhev, - men, women, children - the Nazis shot "for disobedience to the German authorities." not announced or explained.

“They will come in, look,” recalls A. G. Kuzmina, “and, without saying anything, they leave, you just hear the keys rattling.” For two days in hunger and cold, hearing explosions in the city, the Rzhevites were waiting for death every minute. At two o'clock in the morning on March 3, it was not heard how the German sentries were knocking at the door from the cold with their boots. March, 3rd.

At three o'clock in the morning, a battery of heavy mortars under the command of Captain I. A. Anishchenko struck at the basement of a warehouse located 200 meters from the Intercession Church, where, according to our agent, the Nazis with the "infernal machine" were located. Simultaneously with the start of the mortar attack a special-purpose assault detachment, created on the basis of the 2nd rifle company of the 11th battalion, was sent to the city from the 965th rifle regiment, which received an order to break through to the Intercession Church at any cost and save its prisoners.

The detachment was headed by the political officer of the 1st Rifle Battalion, Senior Lieutenant Iosif Yakovlevich Kolin.

When they saw military men in camouflage suits and with machine guns from the church, at first they could not believe that they were our fighters, they said that only the Germans were armed with machine guns, and ours had one rifle for ten. Here is how one of the prisoners of the Intercession Church, M.A. Tikhomirova, recalls the liberation: “It has become lighter, we look - they are walking carefully from the fire tower (it was on the street next to the church) one by one the military and as if looking for something. they don't look like the Germans both in clothes and in their gait. Are they really ours?

Only they heard how they rushed to us, rattling the lock and keys. As we opened the doors, we rushed to each other, it’s impossible to tell what happened: and tears, and fainting, and hugs, and kisses ... "Our sons, dear, desired ..." "Mothers, they finally found you For how long we have been looking for living people, there is no one, the whole city has passed.

The liberated hurried to their homes, but many in their place saw fresh ashes. A. G. Kuzmina walked from the church to her house with seven children. Then she, forty years old, looked like an old woman, from malnutrition she was all covered with boils, and in her arms she carried her youngest two-year-old son, who looked like an old man.

Anna Grigorievna recalled: "Well, I think they were resurrected, I reach the corner and what do I see - my house is burning down, the coals are still smoldering." VF Maslova left the church with her 60-year-old mother and daughter, two years and seven months old. Some junior lieutenant gave her daughter a piece of sugar, and she hid it and asked: “Mom, is this snow?” ... Soon, the task force of P. I. Konovalov’s security officers and a company of the 2nd battalion of the 965th rifle regiment approached the church under the command of Captain A. Nesterov.

The sappers removed explosives from the basement of the church, found and cleared the mine. Senior lieutenant of state security A. Yu. I. Kolin.

Here, at the church, one of the employees of the political department of the 274th division drew up an act on the atrocities of the Nazis. In the front-line diary of the head of the political department of the 274th division, Major Sergeev, a copy of this act has been preserved, hastily rewritten in red pencil, apparently from a draft.

"Act. March 3, 1943 Retreating from the attacks of the Red Army, the Nazi troops, following the order of the cannibal Hitler, gathered on March 1 of this year all the surviving population of the city of Rzhev from infants to the elderly in the amount of 150 people and locked them in a cold church with broken windows. For two days the Soviet people were without a piece of bread and water, considering themselves doomed to death. Early in the morning of March 3, 1943, the Red Army liberated the Soviet people. Signed: representative of military units, old man Kvashennikov, 74 years old, Krachak Lena , 14 years old, Strunina Shura, 12 years old, and others.

The destroyed Rzhev was a continuous minefield.

Even shackled by thick ice and covered with snow dirty from smoke and gunpowder, the Volga was densely littered with mines. Sappers moved ahead of the rifle units and subunits, making passages in the minefields. Next, the artillery crews dragged their "magpies" in their arms. Signs began to appear on the main streets with the inscriptions "Checked. No mines." The 707th rifle regiment of the 215th division, which occupied positions on the northern outskirts of Rzhev until March 3, moved through the city center.

On the night of March 3, the 2nd battalion of this regiment met enemy resistance in the area of ​​the silk-rolling factory, but the Germans quickly retreated. under the command of Major D. F. Burym, after capturing the villages of Kovalevo and Khoroshevo, he went to the area of ​​​​the railway station of the Rzhev-2 station. Soldiers of the 963rd Infantry Regiment of the 274th Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Modin also approached here from the suburban villages of Sboevo, Chachkino and Domashino. Without stopping in Rzhev, units and subunits of the 274th and 215th rifle divisions moved to the south-west following the retreating enemy. The seventeen-month occupation of Rzhev ended.

Silence fell in Rzhev and the region after 14 months of fighting. On March 5, the leading article of the newspaper of the 31st Army, "On the enemy," said: "Quickly, from platoon to platoon, the joyful news of the capture of Rzhev swept through. This ancient Russian city is dear to every Soviet person, his suffering is close ... Far-reaching plans were made fascist generals, clinging to the high banks of the Volga, to the walls of Rzhev.

Many paths converge to it. One of them leads to Moscow. But she goes to Germany. No wonder the possessed Fuhrer shouted to his soldiers that the loss of Rzhev was tantamount to the loss of half of Berlin. Now we can say that since March 3, 1943, Hitler had only half of his capital left. "The news of the liberation of the long-suffering city of Rzhev instantly spread throughout Europe.

Rzhev after the flight of the Germans was a terrible picture; solid ruins, in many places the mutilated corpses of the townspeople lay. Of the 5443 residential buildings, only 297 buildings survived. All 22 schools, 4 technical schools, a teacher's institute, cultural and health institutions, production buildings of a mechanical, distillery, butter factory and agricultural machinery plant, silk-rolling, flax, shoe, button, clothing factories were destroyed, the railway junction, water supply were destroyed, the Volga bridge was blown up .During the withdrawal, the command of the 9th Army satisfied Hitler's desire to hear by telephone the explosion of the Volga bridge in Rzhev.

The writer Vasily Kozhanov vividly spoke about this: “The mutually destructive Rzhev battle, like a fight between two buffaloes, also confirmed the mental squalor of both Fuhrers, the Berlin and the Kremlin, revealed in them the essence of the genius of destruction.

One from afar listened with pleasure to the Rzhev explosion, the other, six months after the end of the battle, wished to see the crater landscape of the same Rzhev, to feel the charming awe from the destructive power of his beloved god of war - artillery. It is no coincidence that, therefore, on August 5, 1943, with many thousands of escorts, he visited the Rzhev ruins. "The total material damage caused by the invaders to the city and the region, according to the definition of the Extraordinary State Commission, amounted to one and a half billion rubles.

But if the material damage can be measured and restored, then it is impossible to assess the suffering of the Rzhevites who suffered fascist occupation in the city and villages, which were front-line for 14 months, it is impossible to make up for the loss of thousands of civilians.

The sappers did not leave the ruined city for a long time. Only on March 19, 1943, on the second day of work of a sapper company under the command of Captain Lassky from the 5th Guards Motor Engineering Brigade of the RGK, 6 anti-tank minefields were discovered in Rzhev, exposed at street intersections and right on the destroyed quarters of the city. A deputy was appointed commandant of Rzhev commander of the 961st Infantry Regiment of the 274th Division, Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Dodogorsky. When pursuing the enemy, our units suffered significant losses from mines.

German sappers laid mines everywhere: on the roads, at the doors of houses, at wells, in furnaces. During the pursuit of the enemy, our losses, according to German data, amounted to more than 40 thousand killed and wounded. The Germans did not know that they underestimated our losses in the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (March 2-31, 1943) by more than three times: they amounted to 138,577 people.

As the company commander of the 215th Infantry Division A. I. Vasilyev recalls, in the second half of March, only 6 people remained in his company of 80 people: “I was in despair, I wanted to shoot myself, considering myself guilty of an unprecedented loss of people, but I found out that my neighbors were no better off than I was, and that brought me out of my shock."

On March 20, the commander of the 215th Infantry Division, Major General Andrei Filimonovich Kupriyanov, died. In the morning of this sunny day, the divisional commander held a meeting with the division commanders at the headquarters located in the village of Novo-Lytkino, then visited the front line.

In the evening, units of two divisions converged on the front road - the 215th and 369th Colonel Khazov. The road passed through the village of Bolshoy Monastyrek, located on a high hill. The rearguard units of the Germans, fortified in the forest two or three kilometers from this village, waited until as many of our troops as possible reached the height. At sunset, 20 enemy batteries unexpectedly hit the village.

General Kupriyanov at that time was in a small house, where the operational group of the headquarters of his division was located. After the first shots, he ran out onto the porch and was immediately wounded by a fragment of a shell that exploded nearby. The wounded general was taken to the medical battalion, but he died on the way. At the request of fellow soldiers and the public of the city of Rzhev, he was buried in Rzhev.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding the Baku plant named after I.I. Lieutenant Schmidt of the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry of the USSR for the exemplary development and production of a new type of ammunition and overfulfillment of the plan for defense orders.

Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were published February on awarding the Order of Lenin to the Baku Oil Refinery, field No. 11 of the Baku Leninneft trust, field No. production of defense oil products.

Chronicle of besieged Leningrad

New rules were put into effect in Leningrad, which set out the duties of the population and administration in the event of an air attack and artillery shelling of the city by the enemy. In 38 paragraphs of the list, everything is described in the most detailed way. And he immediately took action, because the shelling continues. At 11:20 an enemy shell destroyed apartment No. 24 in house No. 52 on Ogorodnikov Avenue. Then for more than two hours the enemy artillery was silent. And at 13 hours 40 minutes it broke through. Three shells exploded near the school in Industrial Lane 1. One person is killed, another is wounded. Two minutes later, 10 shells fell on Kalinina Street in the Kirovsky District. In house number 16, 5 people were killed and 7 wounded. Shells hit eight houses on Narvsky Prospekt...

A delegation from Primorsky Krai arrived in Leningrad from Vladivostok. She brought 40 carloads of gifts to Leningraders. On the same day, the delegation went to the Ust-Izhora region to present gifts to the soldiers of the 55th Army at the forefront.

On February 7, 1942, a man died in Leningrad, familiar to many of us from childhood. Familiar from drawings that have helped more than one generation of readers to imagine the images of the ancient Russian heroes Mikula Selyaninovich, Dobrynya Nikitich, Alyosha Popovich, Ilya Muromets. His drawings brought us even closer to Pushkin's wonderful tales of Tsar Saltan, the Golden Cockerel...

This man is the academician of painting Ivan Yakovlevich Bilibin. He flatly refused to be evacuated from the besieged city and stayed in it to work. Bilibin was going to create a series of posters and postcards dedicated to the Great Patriotic War. He failed to carry out these plans. On February 7, Ivan Yakovlevich died of exhaustion ...

At one time he lived in Paris for a long time. Once in Leningrad he was asked if he regretted leaving France.

“It’s better to die in your native city,” said Bilibin, “than to wander luxuriously in a foreign land.

Memoirs of David Iosifovich Ortenberg,
executive editor of the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda"

We are waiting for news about the capture of new cities. Gzhatsk, Vyazma seemed to be next in line ... It seemed that this was a matter of the next few days. From the positions where Ehrenburg and I arrived on January 21, it is not far from Gzhatsk. I remember that the commander of the 82nd Rifle Division, who liberated these regions, General N. I. Orlov, told us: "You can walk to Gzhatsk in two days." However, the offensive stalled, and I decided to go again to the 5th army of General L. A. Govorov, to see on the spot how events were unfolding on the Western Front. It was for this trip that I demanded Simonov from his vacation.

We left in two cars with a whole team. Photojournalist Mikhail Bernshtein was with us. Riding with Misha was a pleasure. Never discouraged, he could stir up the most boring person with his cheerful character and inexhaustible inventions. The one who went with Misha to the front thought that he was very lucky. He was a punchy guy and he could pull the car out of the traffic jam faster than anyone, get gasoline, “build” an afternoon snack and an overnight stay - everything, it seems, he could. Very stout at twenty-five, with a holster and a "watering can" on his round belly, in an earflap knocked far to the back of his head, he did not sit still for a minute, suddenly disappeared and just as suddenly reappeared, haunting his "watering can" , nor to their companions. Simonov's popular song about a cheerful reporter was inspired by Misha Bernstein.

Among the photographers of the "Red Star" Misha was in a special position - as the only one of his brothers who visited Khalkhin Gol and the Finnish war with us. And then, and now he was sent to the hottest sectors of the front, knowing that no danger or difficulty could stop him if the newspaper needed a "nail" shot. He really was, as Zhukov called him in his memoirs, "omnipresent".

Another of our companions, Boris Efimov, went to the front for the first time. In our editorial office, he was the main and only artist. It was impossible to let Efimov go to the front, where, by the way, he was eager all the time. The only thing I could do was take it with me on the next front-line trip and deliver it back to the editorial office for the release of the issue. That's what I did today...

The night before, I called Boris Yefimov. He showed up at once. Efimov, like all the editorial staff, lived in the barracks in the room where he worked. I showed him the message we had just received from our correspondent on the Western Front: the Germans allocate one or two warm clothes per unit, and the soldiers take turns wearing them. He asked me to make a cartoon on this topic. Forty minutes later he brought a drawing, very funny. A pillar with a sign "On duty coat and muff of the 5th company." In this clothes, chained to a pole, stood a German soldier, and behind him was a line, trembling from the cold: some blow on frozen hands, some dance, and some have icicles under their noses. In the caption, the artist played on the well-known expression: "Warming in the order of half a live queue." I sent the caricature to zincography, and then, as Efimov recalls, the following conversation took place between us:

“And by the way,” said the editor, turning to his deputy, “Efimov has not yet been at the front. BUT?

“Not yet,” I agreed.

“We’re leaving in the morning,” said the editor, again taking up reading the newspaper page, “everyone should be in the collection by seven o’clock ...”

Efimov was glad of the trip. This I saw. True, the front was nothing new to him. During the Civil War, he worked as an artist for the newspaper of the 12th Army. But that is in the past...

In the morning, taking with them two large packs of the published issue, where Efimov's caricature was printed, they set off along the Mozhaisk highway to Govorov's army. Two hours drive, and we are in combat units.

The first stop was the command post of General Orlov's 82nd Rifle Division. When representing Efimov, I invariably opened the newspaper and drew attention to the caricature of a living author. And the author, Boris Efimovich, seeing how cheerfully they looked at her and laughed, tried to pretend to be indifferent, but he did not succeed: a satisfied smile glided over his face.

Simonov's popularity at that time was already considerable, it was felt that everyone was glad to meet the poet. And Misha Bernstein did not need to be introduced. He did it quite well himself, and the “watering can” hanging over the sheepskin coat betrayed his profession.

The division commander was in the same partisan attire in which I had seen him in Borodino: quilted trousers, a sheepskin coat and a tank helmet. Shortly before the offensive, Orlov was promoted to the rank of general, he was given uniforms, but hats with a scarlet top could not be found. I brought him a hat as a gift:

- This is for Borodino ...

Orlov tried it on. He thanked, and then took it off and - either in jest, or seriously - said:

- And for Gzhatsk it should be taken away from me ...

Yes, with Gzhatsk it did not work out either in two days, or in two weeks. To Gzhatsk, as it turned out later, the journey turned out to be more than four hundred days long! Now the division is quiet. The main battles were fought on the flank of the army, bypassing Gzhatsk; the city could not be taken head-on. So Orlov explained to us.

“Still, you can look at something,” Misha, who was looking for objects for his “watering can,” intervened in the conversation.

The divisional commander said that one of the regiments had received the task of conducting a night operation and, if we had a desire, he could lead us there.

"Night!" Misha grumbled. There is nothing for a photographer to do. We decided to see her.

The hospitable divisional commander gave the command - and they brought dinner with a front hundred grams for each and even a little more. Simonov and Bernstein did not fail to raise several toasts - both for military successes, and for Orlov’s general rank, and even to “wash” the donated hat, in a word, they found an excuse to drink an extra cup “in order to warm up,” as Misha explained, intercepting my oblique views. Although, really, everything froze thoroughly.

It did not take long to get to the headquarters of the regiment, along the same Mozhaisk highway. The headquarters was located in a barn, the only building left of the entire village. The regimental commander explained the plan of operation. It was carried out by the forces of one battalion: it had to master some height. Everything down to the smallest detail was written in the order and marked on the kilometer, but we could not figure out what role this played in the capture of Gzhatsk. It seems that this was not entirely clear to Orlov himself and the regiment commander. But the task was received, the plan was drawn up and reported to the top; did not dare to ask for cancellation. More than once during the war - both in the days of defense and in the days of the offensive - I had to deal with similar operations, and it was known how they ended.

We went to spend the night at the command post of the division. And in the morning they learned that this operation also ended in what in such cases is called "partial success", that is, almost almost nothing.

We immediately went to Govorov's command post. The road is hard and narrow. It was possible not to ask, it was enough to peer into the surrounding landscape in order to understand what battles took place here. On the side of the road - lined, crippled, burned cars, guns, tanks - both German and ours. On the whitish field and the highway itself, funnels turn black, slightly powdered with recently fallen snow. A lot of dead horses hardened in the cold. The streets of the villages that we passed were made of some burnt chimneys, twisted with wattle and knocked down gates.

In one of these villages, among the burnt huts, in a dugout with a wooden ceiling, we found the commander. He just moved here yesterday, to his so-called VPU, an auxiliary control post. Although they usually do not expect to sit in such dugouts for a long time, it was made soundly, firmly. They went down the narrow stairs. Govorov conjured over the map. It seemed to Simonov that he was not very pleased with our arrival. The situation in the army is difficult, and he is not up to the guests. But I didn't notice it.

The commander immediately gave us hot tea to drink and began to talk about the affairs of the army. The fighting was heavy, the regiments thinned out, there was little ammunition, the enemy planted reinforcements, managed to create a line of defensive structures, his resistance intensified. Several times the commander came off to the phone, patiently, without interrupting, listened and, without raising his voice, briefly answered some questions and requests: “Yes”, “Do it like that”, “I can’t”, “I will send .. Sometimes he would say: “Wait a minute”, tear himself away from the receiver, lean over the map, draw a pencil over it, then return to the phone again and explain what needs to be done. Operators ran to him, and although their reports were disappointing, the face of the commander remained stone, did not betray internal anxiety, as if human emotions were not inherent in him. His instructions were laconic, calmly business-like.

From what we heard, we realized that the offensive of the army, like that of the entire front, so brilliantly carried out in December and January, has stalled, and we cannot count on serious successes. But Govorov was pressed from above, and he - on divisions, commanders - on regiments. This is such a repeating story!

It was clear that there was nothing more for us to do at Govorov's command post. They asked how to get to Polosukhin's division, which was stationed in the army lane in the main, Gzhatsk direction. Govorov said that it was impossible for us to get to Polosukhin. The division went like a wedge into the German defenses. The corridor, which she punched, a kilometer wide, is being shot from the flanks. We must, they say, wait until the situation clears up. I asked Leonid Alexandrovich if it was possible to get to the division headquarters? Returning to Moscow without having been, if not in the regiments, then at least at the command post of the division, was considered a mortal sin for us. Obviously, Govorov understood our mood and showed on the map the point where Polosukhin's headquarters settled.

He was four kilometers from the army command post - in dugouts, hastily equipped in the basements of burned-out huts. There we met the commissar of the division, Martynov. As elsewhere, we were received in a friendly manner, but one did not have to be an experienced physiognomist to see that the commissar was not very happy about our arrival. The situation here was really difficult: artillery and mortar fire could be heard from different sides, mine explosions were visible on the field, near the blackened edge of the forest not far away. To the left of the road, machine-gun bursts were heard. A staff officer ran up to Martynov and reported something in a half-whisper, after which the commissar asked if everyone had weapons. He explained that a group of German machine gunners had leaked to the road, they, of course, would be beaten off, but one must be prepared for anything. In a word, we gave him a lot of anxiety, and he probably thought: what a hard time it brought them here!

We spent the whole day in the division. Seen a lot, learned a lot. It became clear that we could not wait for the capture of Gzhatsk, and we decided to leave for Moscow.

They returned in complete darkness, got into a severe traffic jam and it was possible to get out of it only by a miracle. This miracle was created by Misha Bernstein. In his thunderous voice, he explained that people making the Red Star were riding in the emk, none other than the famous poet Simonov, that he himself was in a hurry with pictures of the heroes, he seemed to mention the editor, and found some other on the go they invented arguments. It made an impression. With friendly efforts, almost on their hands, they carried our car around the stuck columns through snowdrifts and ditches. Finally we got to the army command post. It took six hours!

The time was late, we sparingly told Govorov about our trip to the division, then asked: what are the prospects with Gzhatsk? The commander spread his hands. Apparently, he did not want to convince us that Gzhatsk would be taken, but he could not say that this nut could not be cracked. It wasn't hard to guess why. The Decision of the Bet is the decision of the Bet; she demanded to move the troops forward, although the forces and means were exhausted.

We said goodbye to Leonid Aleksandrovich and departed for Moscow.

Misha Bernstein managed to do the most for the newspaper. Several issues of the Red Star published his photographs from the 5th Army. I have now reviewed them again. One of the shots showing soldiers advancing across a snowy field behind a barrage of fire from our artillery is simply magnificent. It seems that it was made not by a watering can, but by the hand of a battle painter.

I remember that when I looked at these pictures for the first time, Simonov was in my office. He also praised them, but remarked sadly:

If only that operation had ended successfully...

Simonov brought me a hundred and fifty lines of correspondence, but it was liquid. The essay, for the sake of which I took him with me on this trip, did not work out for him. Yes, and it could not work out: it was not the time to write directly about what we saw. He understood this, and so did I, and therefore, without any hesitation, I had to “chop up” the material.

But still, we learned something for the newspaper from this trip. The commissar of the division, Martynov, handed us a letter found in the possession of a murdered fascist, a certain Franz Weiss, to his fiancee, which he did not have time to send to Germany. “For Ehrenburg,” said Martynov, “the notes of a chicken-eater.”

But, perhaps, the most interesting and important thing that we published after this trip was General Orlov's article, which occupied three columns in the newspaper. This is a story about the battles for Mozhaisk and Borodino.

The trip helped me build materials in the newspaper more correctly. If back in late January and early February we were carried away by articles and editorials under such headings as: "Chasing the enemy without stopping!", "Surround the enemy!" etc., then after returning from the 5th Army, other materials came out that were more in line with the real situation on the Western Front.

In a word, I had no reason to regret this trip ...

Morning message 7 February

During the night of February 7, our troops continued to conduct active combat operations against the Nazi bands.

Our tank unit, operating on one of the sectors of the Western Front, supporting the advancing infantry, suppressed enemy firing points and disabled over 300 German soldiers and officers. On another sector of the front, the guards under the command of Comrade. Beloborodov in the battle for two important settlements destroyed 600 Nazis.

During the last 15 days of fighting, artillerymen of the Guards unit of Lieutenant Colonel Bryukhanov (Western Front), advancing along with the infantry and suppressing enemy defenses, destroyed 15 German mortar batteries, 4 dugouts and other enemy defenses. Well-aimed artillery fire destroyed over 1,000 German soldiers and officers.

A group of Red Army soldiers led by Lieutenant Polenkov, throwing grenades at the retreating German convoy, destroyed 12 enemy soldiers and captured many trophies.

The liaison commissar of the battalion, Red Army soldier Alekhov, returning to his unit after completing a combat mission, noticed German machine gunners entering the rear of the battalion. The brave fighter opened fire from a rifle and shouted: “Forward, comrades, beat the bastards!” rushed at the Germans. Hitler's submachine gunners fled, leaving 2 dead.

In the Ukraine, in the forest near R. station, an Italian cavalry squadron camped. The Soviet partisans, aware of the location of the enemy by their scouts, decided to attack the enemy. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the partisan detachment, the Italians fled, leaving 47 corpses in the forest, many weapons and horses.

The captured soldier of the SS division "Adolf Hitler" Erich Gortwich said: "There were 9,000 people in our division. There are currently between 2,500 and 3,000 left. Of these, the combat strength of 1,500 - 1,600 people. Material losses are also very high. On average, each rifle company lost 10 machine guns. Each company had up to 20 different vehicles. Now there are no more than 4-5 left. Artillery losses are at least 40 percent.”

Friedrich Bauer, a captured soldier of the 10th company of the 523rd regiment of the 297th German infantry division, said: “During the retreat, some soldiers lie down and do not go further. Others, under various pretexts, are detained in huts in order to stay until the arrival of the Russians and surrender. During the battle, the officers no longer go ahead, referring to the fact that there are already few of them left.”

A group of commanders, political workers and Red Army soldiers drew up an act on the monstrous crime committed by the Nazi invaders against the civilian population of the village of Rechitsa, Duminichsky district, Smolensk region. The act establishes that on February 1, having launched a counterattack on the village of Budskie Vyselki, the Germans, under the threat of execution, forced the inhabitants of the village of Rechitsa to go ahead of their advancing units. When peaceful Soviet residents, mostly old people, women and children, approached our positions, the Soviet soldiers heard their cries: “Shoot, the Germans are behind us!” In response, the Germans opened fire on them with machine guns and killed: Anna Yurkova - 14 years old, Zhukovskaya Sofya Iosifovna - 42 years old and her sons Gennady - 15 years old and Valentin - 13 years old, Zaraburkin Ivan Stepanovich - 59 years old, Shishkin Evdokia Ignatievna - 45 years old and her son Yuri - 8 months. The act was signed by: commanders, political workers and soldiers of the Ensky Regiment TT. Ryaguzov, Gusarov, Kozlov, Panov and others (15 signatures in total).

In Schlochau (Germany), a military court dealt with the case of an armed group that carried out a series of raids on food warehouses and shops, as well as on local police departments and headquarters of assault squads. Among the members of the group are 8 soldiers and 1 officer of the German army.

Evening message 7 February

During February 7, our troops fought offensive battles and occupied several settlements. The fascist German troops in some areas went over to counterattacks, which were repulsed.

On February 5, not 34 German aircraft were destroyed, as previously reported, but 46 German aircraft.

On February 6, part of our aviation destroyed and damaged 270 vehicles with troops and cargo, 226 carts with ammunition, 11 guns with servants, 10 anti-aircraft machine-gun points, a fuel depot was blown up, dispersed and partly destroyed up to an enemy infantry regiment.

Our rifle unit (Western Front), developing an offensive against one settlement heavily fortified by the enemy, destroyed 2 enemy tanks, 2 tankettes, and several vehicles. The enemy lost a large number of soldiers and officers. In another section, our guard units occupied the village of X. 270 enemy soldiers and officers were left on the battlefield.

On one of the sections of the Southwestern Front, soldiers under the command of Comrade. Sheiko fought the settlement of T. The Nazis, trying to re-occupy the named point, launched a counterattack, which was repulsed with heavy losses for them. There were 200 enemy corpses left on the battlefield, a lot of weapons and ammunition.

Gun commander Malyshev and gunner Strelnikov, observing enemy firing points, discovered 3 enemy bunkers. Having rolled out the gun to an open position, the Soviet artillerymen destroyed the bunkers with well-aimed shots and destroyed the German soldiers who were there.

The machine-gun section of the junior commander Zholub supported the offensive of the infantry unit with well-aimed fire. Three times wounded comrade. Zholuba, moving forward, changed his firing position five times and destroyed about 20 enemy soldiers and officers.

A scout of the Crimean partisan detachment, comrade R., during a night reconnaissance, stabbed a German sentry, shot two fascist signalmen and a Romanian messenger soldier. The brave partisan delivered to his base the weapons of the enemies he had destroyed.

Below are excerpts from the diary of the commander of the 7th company of the 29th German infantry regiment, Lieutenant F. Bradberg. These notes by a Nazi officer expose the false fables of the German military about the allegedly organized and deliberate withdrawal of German troops to the winter defensive lines.

« Naro-Fominsk, December 5... How much we have experienced during this time. We were already far away, and on December 3 we returned to our original positions again. The general offensive ran out of steam... Many comrades perished. Only 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers and 16 privates remained in the 9th company. It's no better in other companies. On December 1, my company was supposed to approach the 9th company and establish contact with the right wing of the 1st battalion ... The Russians fired at us from all sides. We walked past the corpses of our dead comrades. In one place, in a small space, almost one on top of the other, 25 of our soldiers lay. This is the work of one of the Russian snipers... In the evening, the herd knows that our units have been pushed back. Company after company left their positions. In the moonlight one could see how the remnants of the companies were passing, carrying away their dead ... The offensive, conceived on such a large scale, came to an end ...

Ilyino, December 11. Received orders at dawn to move north. Stop! A telephone message has just been received that our units have been thrown back ... We must remain here awaiting further orders. What will the future bring us?

Bogaevo, December 15. They took positions near Lyzlovo. Here the Russians broke through and pushed ours back. The first battalion advanced somewhat, but was detained 5 kilometers from Isakove. My company was sent for reinforcements. At 15 o'clock she was supposed to launch an attack on the village. The first battalion by this time had lost about 100 people. At about 2 p.m., the Russians again launched an offensive, and we again found ourselves surrounded on three sides. We retreated. What will happen in the coming days, no one knows. Somewhere the Russian units must be stopped, otherwise farewell to the 29th Infantry Regiment!

In the affairs of the headquarters of the defeated German 34th sapper battalion, an order of the German command was found, which says: “One military unit found twisted metal shavings 1-2 centimeters long and 0.23 mm thick in Danish-made canned meat. Clearly there is sabotage. The lids of the cans, in addition to the imprint of the crown, have the inscription "Denmark-210". Canned food of this production may be in other parts and divisions. Quartermasters should pay special attention to them.

On February 2, the German authorities in the Czechoslovak city of Klatovy summoned 450 schoolchildren between the ages of 13 and 16 and sent them to Germany. Teenagers were not given the opportunity to go home and collect things. During the journey, the doors of all the cars were tightly closed. Deprived of water and bread, many schoolchildren fell ill, four of them died. As it turned out, the Nazis, who are experiencing a great shortage of labor, forcibly take away children and adolescents in the occupied countries to work at German enterprises.

At one of the Kuibyshev factories, old cadre workers with 40 years of production experience TT. Farm laborer, Sirotin, Shushkat and Kaganovsky daily perform shift tasks by 300-400 percent. [22; 90-92]

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command again created the Main Command of the Western Direction Troops, headed by General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

In Moscow, in the family of a military man, the most popular pop singer, People's Artist of the Russian Federation Lev Valeryanovich Leshchenko was born (1942). Naturally beautiful voice, soft and unique timbre, breadth of performing range and diversity of creativity, open, friendly manner of communication - all these are the features of L. Leshchenko's creative portrait.

From the book They were sent to death by Zhukov? The death of the army of General Efremov author Melnikov Vladimir Mikhailovich

February 12, 1942 The formations of the western grouping of the army occupied the former lines of defense. The staffing of units and subunits, especially combat ones, was very low, in connection with which some of the fighters of the rear units were sent to replenish rifle

From the book Great Heroes of the Great War [Chronicle of the People's Feat, 1941–1942] author Suldin Andrey Vasilievich

February 13, 1942 In all divisions of the western grouping of the army, work was actively carried out to staff their units at the expense of the local population and fighters and commanders who were surrounded in this area as early as October 1941. As a result of the work carried out in

From the author's book

February 15, 1942 During the night and all day it was restless both in the western and eastern parts of the area occupied by formations of the western group of the army.

From the author's book

On February 16, 1942, the 113th and 160th SDs during the day engaged in a firefight with the enemy on almost the entire line of defense from the village of Malaya Gusevka to the village of Krasnaya Tatarka, without taking active actions with their units. 1136th and 1138th SP 338th SD, having taken in the morning in the area

From the author's book

February 17, 1942 The formations of the western group continued to conduct combat operations with the enemy. The joint attack of one of the battalions of the 1138th joint venture of the 338th SD and a detachment of the 329th SD on Blokino on the night of February 17 again ended in failure. At the same time, the main forces of the 338th SD managed to

From the author's book

On February 18, 1942, the Western Group continued to conduct combat operations with the enemy, being in complete isolation. Taking advantage of the carelessness of individual commanders, the enemy managed to push out some units of the 113th and 160th SDs in some sectors of the defense,

From the author's book

February 20, 1942 There was some lull in the combat zone of the 113th, 160th and 338th SDs. The enemy, without taking active steps, conducted rare artillery and mortar fire.

From the author's book

February 21, 1942 While fierce battles were going on in the combat areas of both groups of the 33rd Army, the command of the Western Front continued to search for those responsible for the incident. Instead of taking effective measures to help those surrounded, the front command

From the author's book

February 22, 1942 Over the past day, there have been no significant changes in the position of the formations of the Western grouping. The enemy did not take active actions, but it became increasingly difficult for the troops to solve rear tasks related to catering for personal

From the author's book

February 23, 1942 In the morning, the enemy resumed the offensive in the area of ​​the combat area of ​​Lieutenant Colonel Stashevsky. Up to 200 enemy infantry launched an offensive in the direction of Prokshino and up to an infantry company with three tanks - on Kolodezki. defenders here

From the author's book

February 24, 1942 At night, unnoticed by the enemy, the 1295th and 1297th joint ventures of the 160th division left their defensive line and concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Gorby, from where they set out along the route Stukolovo, Dmitrovka, Semeshkovo, Belyaevo, Buslav, planning to on the morning of February 25, go to the river. Ugra

From the author's book

On February 25, 1942, the 113th and 338th SDs, together with the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov, continued to defend at the same line. The enemy constantly fired at the positions of our units, without taking any active actions. By 9 o'clock in the morning, the 160th SD went to the indicated area and

From the author's book

February 26, 1942 Early in the morning, an order came to the army headquarters, which plunged brigade commander Onuprienko into despondency: by the decision of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the 93rd SD and the 5th Tank Brigade were withdrawn from the 33rd Army and were ordered to be transferred immediately

From the author's book

February 27, 1942 An ordinary day for an encircled grouping was not quite ordinary for the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Efremov: on this day, Mikhail Grigoryevich turned 45 years old. Taking advantage of some lull, Lieutenant Colonel Rusetsky clarified to the commanders

From the author's book

On February 24, 1942, the soldiers of Lieutenant Kryuchkov's unit fired from anti-tank rifles and shot down two German transport aircraft carrying gasoline and flour for a German garrison blocked in one of the settlements. The crews of both aircraft - 9 soldiers and

From the author's book

February 25, 1942 By the end of February, there were 11 million people in the Red Army. With well-aimed fire, the tank crew of Lieutenant Kreschanovsky destroyed in one battle 2 German anti-aircraft and 2 anti-tank guns and blew up an ammunition depot. Sergeant-gunner Leo

Did Zhukov send them to their deaths? The death of the army of General Efremov Melnikov Vladimir Mikhailovich

February 2, 1942

From the operational summary of the headquarters of the 33rd Army as of 5 o'clock in the morning:

"one. The 33rd Army on its right flank and center continues to fight in the same grouping with the enemy occupying settlements north and northwest of the SHANSKIY ZAVOD - WEAR road.

On the left flank, parts of the main grouping, having reached the line of railway. roads VYAZMA - ZANOZNAYA, advancing on VYAZMA ... "

However, as such, the attack on Vyazma did not work out that day, due to the fact that the army units were simply not ready for this. Being at a considerable distance from Vyazma: 113th SD - 7 km, 338th SD - 11-21 km, 160th SD - 20-22 km, 329th SD - about 35 km, the divisions had no chance go to the suburbs of Vyazma, not to mention the fact that to fight for its mastery. Many regiments (the 1195th and 1197th SP of the 160th SD, the 1138th SP of the 338th SD, all the regiments of the 329th SD) were physically unable to take part in the offensive, due to their remoteness from the city. It was simply unrealistic to make a march 15-30 km long at night along forest roads that were not visible even during the day.

Artillery of units and formations, with the exception of mortars, could not be brought up by morning. Although she could not play a special role in this offensive, due to the lack of a sufficient amount of ammunition. So, according to the report of the acting commander of the 160th SD, Major V.M. Rusetsky, made by him immediately after the end of unsuccessful attempts to attack Vyazma, the capabilities of the division's artillery to engage the enemy by fire were as follows:

"Howitzers arr. 1938 - 4, no shells for them,

howitzer mod. 1910/13 122 mm - 4, shells 80 pieces,

guns 76-mm arr. 1902/30 - 4, shells 170,

regimental guns 76-mm arr. 1927 - 12, no shells for them,

mortars 82-mm - 16, mines to them - 20,

50-mm mortars - 18, mines for them - 50.

What could we talk about if there were 1,25-2,8 mines for each mortar.

Only units of the 113th, 338th and 160th SDs could take part in the simulation of the attack on Vyazma, which they did. Obeying the order, exhausted by a many-day transition in conditions of complete impassability, the fighters and commanders of the forward regiments, without showing much activity, launched an attack on the enemy defending in front of them.

The offensive, or rather, the advance of the divisions towards Vyazma, proceeded in the most disorderly manner, despite the fact that the enemy did not offer strong fire resistance. Having huddled together in the area of ​​Dashkovka, Yurino, the divisions then with difficulty reached their directions, but time had already been lost.

The 1288th and 1292nd joint ventures of the 113th SD, having gone on the offensive from the Yurino-Dashkovka line, with access to the railway leading to Vyazma, were stopped by enemy fire and could not advance further.

The 338th SD, operating as part of one regiment (1134th SP), for some unknown reason, in the Dashkovka region, moved into the combat zone of the 113th SD and, having passed through the battle formations of its regiments, continued the offensive in the direction of Krasny Holm. The overcrowding of battle formations was such that part of the personnel lagged behind their units, being part of other regiments and divisions.

When approaching Krasny Kholm, the 1134th SP was attacked by the enemy with a force of up to an infantry company with two tanks. Leaving two anti-tank guns and two mortars on the battlefield, the regiment's units retreated in disarray to Yurino. The artillery of the division did not support the actions of the regiment with its fire, since at that time it was still in the Aleksandrovka area, 14 km from the combat area.

The 160th SD, changing the direction of its offensive and crossing the route, first in front of the advance front of the 338th SD, and then through the battle formations of the 113th SD, by the end of the day came out 1 km southeast of the settlement of Lyado. Parts of the division were repeatedly bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses. During one of the German air raids, the commander of the 1295th joint venture, Colonel Ogloblin Nikolai Aleksandrovich, was killed.

The actions of extremely small divisions, unprepared and inconsistent in place and time, could not give any positive results. Units of the enemy's 5th TD, pulled together by the command of the 4th Panzer Army to defend Vyazma, repulsed this attack without much difficulty.

The archive has preserved a document written by General M.G. Efremov pencil, in which he assesses the actions of the strike force during the attack on Vyazma on February 2, 1942:

“To the commanders of 113, 338 and 16 °C.

1. My order No. 055 2.2 has not been fulfilled.

2. The division commanders did not understand all the seriousness of the situation and the importance of the task assigned to the troops.

3. I announce a severe reprimand to the commander of the 338th SD and the commissar of the division for unnecessary losses in the RED HOLM area.

How could it happen - one company of the pr-ka counterattacked the division and threw it back to YURINO. This could only happen because the commander of the 338th Rifle Division does not direct the division's combat, the units go into battle without reconnaissance and security, despite the fact that I always demanded that all-round security and reconnaissance be organized.

4. It is not clear why all three divisions (113, 160 and 338 SD) gathered in the DASHKOVKA, YASTREBY, YURINO area.

5. The artillery of the divisions lagged behind not because the roads were so bad, but because the division commanders did not show firmness and did not demand that the artillery commanders bring up artillery in time.

7. The division commanders did not take measures to provide the units with food and fuel, they rely on someone.

I demand, under the personal responsibility of the commanders and commissars of divisions, to establish a normal supply of units with everything necessary.

8. Complete order No. 055.

Commander 33 A Lieutenant General M. Efremov.

General Efremov, of course, understood that it was unrealistic to complete the task of mastering Vyazma with the available forces, but he was most unbalanced by the fact that individual commanders were absolutely indifferent to the organization of the battle, the implementation of combat and logistic support measures, without which success is impossible in modern battle, and suffered needless losses.

Once again assessing the current situation, and in particular the passability of roads in the divisions' zone of operations, the commander came to the conclusion that the 329th SD attack on Vyazma from the east was inexpedient, and ordered Colonel Andrusenko to change the direction of the division's offensive. The division was tasked with moving to the left flank of the strike force and, having crossed the Ugra-Vyazma railway, attacked Vyazma from the south.

All day the division made a march in the direction of the station Volosta - Pyatnitsa, at times fighting with small groups of the enemy.

No less important events took place that day in the combat area of ​​​​the eastern grouping of the army, where units of the 110th, 222nd and 93rd SD were in continuous combat operations with the enemy, who continued to increase his activity. According to intelligence, the enemy, having brought up significant reserves, was preparing to strike in a southerly direction and could at any moment cut off the communications of the army's strike force.

The 1287th and 1291st joint ventures of the 110th SD fought for the second day for Voditskoye, this time bypassing it from the north and south. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, supporting their defending units with fire from Mikhalev and Esovtsy.

The 1289th Rifle Division, holding down the enemy at the line of Pavlishchevo, Kuzov, Glinyevo, with one battalion fought for Yusovo without much success.

Parts of the 222nd SD, occupying their previous position, fought a firefight with the enemy defending the settlements of Voinovo, Krasnovo, Kostino.

The 93rd SD was defending at the same line. The 1293rd SP of the 160th SD, operating as part of the division, unsuccessfully tried to drive the enemy out of Bukanov. In the afternoon, the regiment received the task - in the morning to follow the combat area of ​​\u200b\u200byour division. However, the events of the night dramatically changed the situation in the army zone.

For many fighters and commanders of the shock group of the army, this day has become a kind of reference point for another time, the time of being surrounded. Having started advancing to the division's combat area at night, the 1293rd Rifle Regiment unexpectedly received a new task: to immediately advance to Zakharovo and take up defensive positions on its southern outskirts, but did not manage to do this due to lack of time.

At that time, in the Zakharovo area, the task force of Lieutenant Colonel Vitevsky from the 9th Guards took up the defense. SD as part of a rifle battalion, a battalion of the 1134th SP of the 338th SD with a platoon of 120-mm mortars and a battalion of the 266th SP of the 93rd SD.

From the north, in the area of ​​​​Lushchino and Voskresensk, the army's communications were covered by the 1290th joint venture of the 113th SD. Two battalions of the 131st joint venture of the 9th Guards took up defense there. SD sent there by General Beloborodov. Late in the evening, the enemy made several attempts to dislodge units of the 1290th SP from Lushchihin, but his attacks were repulsed, and he was forced to retreat to his original position in the area of ​​Sobakino, Loma. But this was only a prelude to the events that would unfold in the area in a few hours.

The German troops, having completed preparations for the operation to close the gap in their defense at the junction of the 4th tank and 4th field armies, were already ready to begin the active phase of the operation. The day before, on the morning of February 2, 1942, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Lieutenant General R. Ruoff, received a telegram from the headquarters of Army Group Center containing the order to attack. The troops of the 20th Army Corps were ordered to use the forces of the 20th Panzer and 183rd Infantry Divisions on the night of February 3, 1942 to strike from the north at the units of the 33rd Army operating in the area of ​​​​the station Ugryumovo, Ivanovskoye, Zakharovo, Savino.

From the book They were sent to death by Zhukov? The death of the army of General Efremov author Melnikov Vladimir Mikhailovich

February 12, 1942 The formations of the western grouping of the army occupied the former lines of defense. The staffing of units and subunits, especially combat ones, was very low, in connection with which some of the fighters of the rear units were sent to replenish rifle

From the book Great Heroes of the Great War [Chronicle of the People's Feat, 1941–1942] author Suldin Andrey Vasilievich

February 13, 1942 In all divisions of the western grouping of the army, work was actively carried out to staff their units at the expense of the local population and fighters and commanders who were surrounded in this area as early as October 1941. As a result of the work carried out in

From the author's book

February 15, 1942 During the night and all day it was restless both in the western and eastern parts of the area occupied by formations of the western group of the army.

From the author's book

On February 16, 1942, the 113th and 160th SDs during the day engaged in a firefight with the enemy on almost the entire line of defense from the village of Malaya Gusevka to the village of Krasnaya Tatarka, without taking active actions with their units. 1136th and 1138th SP 338th SD, having taken in the morning in the area

From the author's book

February 17, 1942 The formations of the western group continued to conduct combat operations with the enemy. The joint attack of one of the battalions of the 1138th joint venture of the 338th SD and a detachment of the 329th SD on Blokino on the night of February 17 again ended in failure. At the same time, the main forces of the 338th SD managed to

From the author's book

On February 18, 1942, the Western Group continued to conduct combat operations with the enemy, being in complete isolation. Taking advantage of the carelessness of individual commanders, the enemy managed to push out some units of the 113th and 160th SDs in some sectors of the defense,

From the author's book

February 20, 1942 There was some lull in the combat zone of the 113th, 160th and 338th SDs. The enemy, without taking active steps, conducted rare artillery and mortar fire.

From the author's book

February 21, 1942 While fierce battles were going on in the combat areas of both groups of the 33rd Army, the command of the Western Front continued to search for those responsible for the incident. Instead of taking effective measures to help those surrounded, the front command

From the author's book

February 22, 1942 Over the past day, there have been no significant changes in the position of the formations of the Western grouping. The enemy did not take active actions, but it became increasingly difficult for the troops to solve rear tasks related to catering for personal

From the author's book

February 23, 1942 In the morning, the enemy resumed the offensive in the area of ​​the combat area of ​​Lieutenant Colonel Stashevsky. Up to 200 enemy infantry launched an offensive in the direction of Prokshino and up to an infantry company with three tanks - on Kolodezki. defenders here

From the author's book

February 24, 1942 At night, unnoticed by the enemy, the 1295th and 1297th joint ventures of the 160th division left their defensive line and concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Gorby, from where they set out along the route Stukolovo, Dmitrovka, Semeshkovo, Belyaevo, Buslav, planning to on the morning of February 25, go to the river. Ugra

From the author's book

On February 25, 1942, the 113th and 338th SDs, together with the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov, continued to defend at the same line. The enemy constantly fired at the positions of our units, without taking any active actions. By 9 o'clock in the morning, the 160th SD went to the indicated area and

From the author's book

February 26, 1942 Early in the morning, an order came to the army headquarters, which plunged brigade commander Onuprienko into despondency: by the decision of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, the 93rd SD and the 5th Tank Brigade were withdrawn from the 33rd Army and were ordered to be transferred immediately

From the author's book

February 27, 1942 An ordinary day for an encircled grouping was not quite ordinary for the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Efremov: on this day, Mikhail Grigoryevich turned 45 years old. Taking advantage of some lull, Lieutenant Colonel Rusetsky clarified to the commanders

From the author's book

On February 24, 1942, the soldiers of Lieutenant Kryuchkov's unit fired from anti-tank rifles and shot down two German transport aircraft carrying gasoline and flour for a German garrison blocked in one of the settlements. The crews of both aircraft - 9 soldiers and

From the author's book

February 25, 1942 By the end of February, there were 11 million people in the Red Army. With well-aimed fire, the tank crew of Lieutenant Kreschanovsky destroyed in one battle 2 German anti-aircraft and 2 anti-tank guns and blew up an ammunition depot. Sergeant-gunner Leo