Large submarines of the I series "U-25" and "U-26" were built at the shipyard "Deschimag" and commissioned in 1936. Both boats were lost in 1940. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 862 tons, underwater - 983 tons; length - 72.4 m, width - 6.2 m; height - 9.2 m; draft - 4.3 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 3.1 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 18.6 knots; fuel supply - 96 tons of solarium; cruising range - 7.9 thousand miles; crew - 43 people. Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm gun; 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; 4-6– 533 mm torpedo tubes; 14 torpedoes or 42 mines.

A series of large ocean-going submarines of the IX-A type consisted of 8 units (U-37 - U-44), built at the Deschimag shipyard and commissioned in 1938-1939. All boats were lost during the war years. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.2 thousand tons; length - 76.5 m, width - 6.5 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 18 knots; fuel supply - 154 tons of solarium; cruising range - 10.5 thousand miles; crew - 48 people. Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm gun, 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 22 torpedoes or 66 min.

A series of large ocean-going submarines of the IX-B type consisted of 14 units (U-64 - U-65, U-103 - U-124), built at the Deschimag shipyard and accepted into building in 1939-1940. All boats were lost during the war years. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.2 thousand tons; length - 76.5 m, width - 6.8 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 18 knots; fuel supply - 165 tons of solarium; cruising range - 12 thousand miles; crew - 48 people. Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm gun, 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 22 torpedoes or 66 min.

A series of medium-sized submarines of the IX-C type consisted of 54 units (U-66 - U-68, U-125 - U-131, U-153 - U-166) , "U-171" - "U-176", "U-501" - "U-524"), built at the shipyard "Deschimag" and put into operation in 1941-1942. 48 boats died during the war years, 3 were sunk by crews, the rest capitulated. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.2 thousand tons; length - 76.8 m, width - 6.8 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 18 knots; fuel supply - 208 tons of solarium; cruising range - 13.5 thousand miles; crew - 48 people. Armament: until 1944 1x1 - 105 mm, 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; after 1944 - 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x4 or 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 22 torpedoes or 66 min.

A series of medium submarines of the IX-C / 40 type consisted of 87 units (U-167 - U-170, U-183 - U-194, U-525 - U- 550", "U-801" - "U-806", "U-841" - "U-846", "U-853" - "U-858", "U-865" - "U-870" , "U-881" - "U-887", "U-889", "U-1221" - "U-1235"), built at the shipyards "Deschimag", "Deutsche Werft" and put into operation in 1942- 1944 During the war, 64 boats were lost, 3 were sunk by crews, 17 capitulated, the rest were damaged and not repaired. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.3 thousand tons; length - 76.8 m, width - 6.9 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 18 knots; fuel supply - 214 tons of solarium; cruising range - 13.9 thousand miles; crew - 48 people. Armament: 1x1 - 105-mm gun, 1x1 - 37-mm and 2x1 and 2x2 - 20-mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 22 torpedoes or 66 min.

Medium submarines "U-180" and "U-195" belonged to the type "IX-D" - high-speed submarines. They were built at the Deschimag shipyard and commissioned in 1942. Since 1944, the boats have been converted into submarines. They transported 252 tons of solarium. The boat "U-180" was lost in 1944, and "U-195" was captured by Japanese troops in 1945 and served under the designation "І-506". Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.6 thousand tons, underwater - 1.8 thousand tons; length - 87.6 m, height - 10.2 m; width - 7.5 m; draft - 5.4 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 6 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 9 / 1.1 thousand hp; speed - 21 knots; fuel supply - 390 tons of solarium; cruising range - 9.5 thousand miles; crew - 57 people. Armament until 1944: 1x1 - 105 mm gun, 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes or 72 minutes; after 1944 - 1x1 - 37 mm and 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.

A series of medium-sized submarines of the IXD-2 type consisted of 28 units (U-177 - U-179, U-181 - U-182, U-196 - U-200) , "U-847" - "U-852", "U-859" - "U-864", "U-871" - "U-876"), built at the shipyard "Deschimag" and commissioned in 1942 -1943 The boats were intended for operations in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. 21 boats died during the war years, 1 was sunk by crews, 7 capitulated. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.6 thousand tons, underwater - 1.8 thousand tons; length - 87.6 m, width - 7.5 m; draft - 5.4 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 main diesel engines, 2 auxiliary diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 + 1.2 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 19 knots; fuel supply - 390 tons of solarium; cruising range - 31.5 thousand miles; crew - 57 people. Armament: 1x1 - 37 mm and 2x1 and 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 24 torpedoes or 72 mines. In 1943-1944, some boats were equipped with the FA-330 towed autogyro.

Of the series of large submarines of the IX-D / 42 type, only one submarine, U-883, was built at the Deschimag shipyard and commissioned in 1945. In the same year, the boat capitulated. During the construction process, it was redesigned into transport. The boat was carrying 252 tons of solarium. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.6 thousand tons, underwater - 1.8 thousand tons; length - 87.6 m, width - 7.5 m; draft - 5.4 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 main diesel engines, 2 auxiliary diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.4 + 1.2 / 1 thousand hp; speed - 19 knots; fuel supply - 390 tons of solarium; cruising range - 31.5 thousand miles; crew - 57 people. Armament: 1x1 - 37 mm and 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 2 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 5 torpedoes.

A series of large submarines of the "XXI" type consisted of 125 units ("U-2501" - "U-2531", "U-2533" - "U-2548", "U-2551", "U-2552", " U-3001" - "U-3044", "U-3047", "U-3501" - "U-3530") built at the shipyards "Blohm & Voss", "Deschimag" and put into operation in 1944-1945 . During the war, 21 boats perished, 88 were sunk by crews, the rest surrendered to the allies. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.6 thousand tons, underwater - 1.8 thousand tons; length - 76.7 m, width - 8 m; draft - 6.3 m; diving depth - 135 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines, 2 main electric motors and 2 silent running electric motors; power - 4 / 4.4 thousand hp + 226 hp; fuel reserve - 253 tons of solarium; speed - 15.6 knots; cruising range - 15.5 thousand miles; crew - 57 people. Armament: 2x2 - 20-mm or 30-mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 23 torpedoes or 29 min.

A series of medium-sized submarines of type "VII-A" consisted of 10 units ("U-27" - "U-36"), built at the shipyards "Deschimag", "Germaniawerf" and put into operation in 1936. During the war 7 boats died, 2 - flooded by crews, 1 - capitulated. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 626 tons, underwater - 915 tons; length - 64.5 m, width - 5.9 m; draft - 4.4 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 2.1-2.3 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 17 knots; fuel supply - 67 tons of solarium; cruising range - 6.2 thousand miles; crew - 44 people. Armament: until 1942 1x1 - 88-mm gun and 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; after 1942 - 1x2 and 2x1-20-mm or 37-mm anti-aircraft guns; 5 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 11 torpedoes or 24-36 mines.

A series of medium submarines of the type "VII-B" consisted of 24 units ("U45" - "U55", "U73 - U76", "U-83" - "U-87", "U-99" - "U- 102"), built at the shipyards "Vulcan", "Flenderwerft", "Germaniawerf" and put into operation in 1938-1941. During the war, 22 boats died, 2 were sunk by crews. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.8 thousand tons, underwater - 1 thousand tons; length - 66.5 m, width - 6.2 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 2.8-3.2 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 17-18 knots; fuel supply - 100 tons of solarium; cruising range - 8.7 thousand miles; crew - 44 people. Armament: until 1942 - 1x1 - 88-mm gun and 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; after 1942 - 1x2 and 2x1-20-mm and 1x1 - 37-mm anti-aircraft guns; 5 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 6 torpedoes or 24-36 mines.

A series of medium-sized submarines of the type "VII-C" consisted of 663 units (the designation was within the framework of "U-69" - "U-1310") and was built in 1940-1945. at the shipyards Neptun Werft, Deschimag, Germaniawerft, Flender Werke, Danziger Werft, Blohm + Voss, Kriegsmarinewerft, Nordseewerke, F. Schichau, Howaldtswerke AG. Two modifications of the boat are known: "VIIC / 41" and "U-Flak". Type "VIIC / 41" had an increased hull thickness from 18 to 21.5 mm. This made it possible to increase the working depth of immersion from 100 to 120 meters, and the estimated depth of destruction of the hull - from 250 to almost 300 meters. A total of 91 boats were built ("U-292" - "U-300", "U-317" - "U-328", "U-410", "U-455", "U-827", "U -828", "U-929", "U-930", "U-995", "U-997" - "U-1010", "U-1013" - "U-1025", "U-1063 "- "U-1065", "U-1103" - "U-1110", "U-1163" - "U-1172", "U-1271" - "U-1279", "U-1301" - "U-1308"). One of the modifications of the type "VII-C" were air defense boats, which were designated as "U-Flak". 4 boats were converted: "U-441", "U-256", "U-621" and "U-951". The modernization consisted in the installation of a new wheelhouse with two quadruple 20-mm and one 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. All boats by 1944 were returned to their original state. In 1944-1945. many boats were equipped with a snorkel. Boats "U-72", "U-78", "U-80", "U-554" and "U-555" have only two bow torpedo tubes, while "U-203", "U-331", " U-35", "U-401", "U-431" and "U-651" did not have feed apparatuses. During the war, 478 boats were lost, 12 were damaged and not repaired; 114 - flooded by crews; 11 boats were transferred to Italy in 1943, the rest of the boats capitulated in 1945 and almost all were sunk at the end of the year. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 0.8 thousand tons, underwater - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 67.1 m, width - 6.2 m; draft - 4.7 - 4.8 m; immersion depth - 100 - 120 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 2.8-3.2 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 17 - 18 knots; fuel supply - 114 tons of solarium; cruising range - 8.5 thousand miles; crew - 44 - 56 people. Armament: until 1942 - 1x1 - 88-mm gun and 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; after 1942 - 1x2 and 2x1-20-mm and 1x1 - 37-mm anti-aircraft guns; 5 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 6 torpedoes or 14-36 mines.

A series of underwater minelayers of the X-B type consisted of 8 units (U-116 - U-119, U-219, U-220, U-233, U-234), built at the Germaniawerf shipyard and commissioned in 1941-1944. To accommodate mines, 30 vertical pipes were provided. Boats were mostly used as transports. The boats "U-219" and "U-234" capitulated in 1945, the rest were lost in 1942-1944. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.7 thousand tons, underwater -2.2 thousand tons; length - 89.8 m, width - 9.2 m; draft - 4.7 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.2-4.8 / 1.1 thousand hp; speed - 16 - 17 knots; fuel supply - 338 tons of solarium; cruising range - 18.5 thousand miles; crew - 52 people. Armament: 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 or 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 2 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 15 torpedoes; 66 min.

A series of underwater minelayers of the type "VII-D" consisted of 6 units ("U-213" - "U-218"), built at the Germaniawerf shipyard and put into operation in 1941-1942. The boat "U-218" capitulated in 1945, the rest were lost in 1942-1944. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.1 thousand tons; length - 77 m, width - 6.4 m; draft - 5 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 2.8-3.2 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 17 knots; fuel supply - 155 tons of solarium; cruising range - 11.2 thousand miles; crew - 46 people. Armament: 1x1 - 88 mm gun; 1x1 - 37 mm and 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 5 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 26 - 39 min.

A series of transport submarines of the "VII-F" type consisted of 4 units ("U-1059" - "U-1062"), built at the Germaniawerf shipyard and commissioned in 1943. The boats were intended to carry 26 torpedoes and transmit them at sea to other submarines. However, the submarines were not used for their intended purpose, but served to transport goods. The boat "U-1061" capitulated in 1945, the rest died in 1944. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.2 thousand tons; length - 77.6 m, width - 7.3 m; draft - 4.9 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 2.8-3.2 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 17 knots; fuel supply - 198 tons of solarium; cruising range - 14.7 thousand miles; crew - 46 people. Armament: 1x1 - 37 mm and 1x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns; 5 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 14 torpedoes or 36 min.

A series of transport submarines of the XIV type consisted of 10 units (U-459 - U-464, U-487 - U-490), built at the Deutsche Werke shipyard and put into service in 1941-1943 The boats carried 423 tons of solarium and 4 torpedoes. All boats were lost in 1942–1944. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.7 thousand tons, underwater -1.9 thousand tons; length - 67.1 m, width - 9.4 m; draft - 6.5 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 3.2 / 0.8 thousand hp; speed - 15 knots; fuel reserve - 203 tons of solarium; cruising range - 12.4 thousand miles; crew - 53 people. Armament: 2x1 - 37 mm and 1x1 - 20 mm anti-aircraft gun or 1x1 - 37 mm and 2x2 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.

The boat "Batiray" was built at the shipyard "Germaniawerft" by order of Turkey, but was requisitioned by the German troops and in 1939 was accepted into the Navy under the designation "UA". The submarine died in 1945. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 1.1 thousand tons, underwater - 1.4 thousand tons; length - 86.7 m, width - 6.8 m; draft - 4.1 m; immersion depth - 100 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 4.6 / 1.3 thousand hp; speed - 18 knots; fuel supply - 250 tons of solarium; cruising range - 13.1 thousand miles; crew - 45 people. Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm guns; 2x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 12 torpedoes or 36 min.

A series of small (coastal) submarines of the type "II-A" consisted of 6 units ("U-1" - "U-6"), built at the shipyard "Deutsche Werke" and adopted by the system in 1935. In 1938-1939 . boats have been re-equipped. The boats "U-1" and "U-2" were lost in 1940 and 1944, "U-3", "U-4" and "U6" - in 1944 were flooded by crews, and "U-5" - capitulated in 1943. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 254 tons, underwater - 303 tons; length - 40.9 m, width - 4.1 m; draft - 3.8 m; immersion depth - 80 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 700/360 hp; fuel supply - 12 tons of solarium; speed - 13 knots; cruising range - 1.6 thousand miles; crew - 22 people. Armament: 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; 3 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 5 torpedoes or 18 min.

A series of small (coastal) submarines of the type "II-B" consisted of 20 units ("U-7" - "U-24", "U-120", "U-121") built at the shipyards "Germaniawerft", " Deutsche Werke", "Flenderwerft" and adopted by the system in 1935-1940. During the war, 7 boats died, the rest were flooded by crews. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 279 tons, underwater - 328 tons; length - 42.7 m, width - 4.1 m; draft - 3.9 m; immersion depth - 80 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 700/360 hp; fuel supply - 21 tons of solarium; speed - 13 knots; cruising range - 3.1 thousand miles; crew - 22 people. Armament: 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; 3 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 5 torpedoes or 18 min.

A series of small (coastal) submarines of the type "II-C" consisted of 8 units ("U-56" - "U-63") built at the shipyard "Deutsche Werke" and put into operation in 1938-1940. During the war, 2 boats died, the rest were flooded by crews.

A series of small (coastal) submarines of the type "II-D" consisted of 16 units ("U-137" - "U-152") built at the shipyard "Deutsche Werke" and put into operation in 1940-1941. During the war, 3 boats were lost, 4 - capitulated in 1945, the rest were flooded by crews. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 314 tons, underwater - 364 tons; length - 44 m, width - 4.9 m; draft - 3.9 m; immersion depth - 80 m; power plants - 2 diesel engines and 2 electric motors; power - 700/410 hp; fuel supply - 38 tons of solarium; speed - 12.7 knots; cruising range - 5.6 thousand miles; crew - 22 people. Armament: 1x1 - 20-mm anti-aircraft gun; 3 - 533 mm torpedo tubes; 5 torpedoes or 18 min.

A series of small submarines of type "XXIII" consisted of 60 units ("U-2321" - "U-2371", U-4701-U-4712), built at the shipyards "Deutsche Werft", "Germaniawerft" and put into operation in 1944 -1945 During the war, 7 boats perished, 32 were sunk by crews, the rest surrendered to the allies. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 234 tons, underwater - 258 tons; length - 34.7 m, width - 3 m; draft - 3.7 m; immersion depth - 80 m; power plants - diesel engine and electric motor; power - 580-630 / 35 hp; fuel supply - 20 tons of solarium; speed - 10 knots; cruising range - 4.5 thousand miles; crew - 14 people. Armament: 2 - 533-mm torpedo tubes; 2 torpedoes.

In 1944 at the shipyard Deschimag A.G. Weser, 324 Biber-class midget submarines were built. The British boat "Welman" was taken as the basis for the design. Performance characteristics of the boat: full underwater displacement - 6.5 tons; length - 9 m, width - 1.6 m; draft - 1.4 m; immersion depth - 20 m; power plants - gasoline engine and electric motor; power - 32/13 hp; speed - 6.5 knots; fuel reserve - 110 kg; cruising range - 100 miles; crew - 1 person. Armament: 2 - 533 mm torpedoes or mines.

A series of midget submarines of the "Hecht" type consisted of 53 units: "U-2111" - "U-2113", "U-2251" - "U-2300". The boats were built at the Germaniawerft and CRDA shipyards in 1944 on the basis of the captured British midget submarine Welman. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 11.8 tons, underwater - 17.2 tons; length - 10.5 m, width - 1.3 m; draft - 1.4 m; immersion depth - 50 m; power plants - electric motor; power - 12 hp; speed - 6 knots; cruising range - 78 miles; crew - 2 people. Armament: 533 mm torpedo or mine.

In 1944-1945. at the shipyards "Deschimag" and "AG Weser" 390 single boats were built, which are an enlarged electric torpedo. Performance characteristics of the boat: surface displacement standard underwater - 11 tons; length - 10.8 m, width - 1.8 m; draft - 1.8 m; immersion depth - 30 m; power plants - electric motor; power - 14 hp; speed - 5 knots; cruising range - 60 miles; crew - 1 person. Armament: 2 - 533 mm torpedoes.

In 1944-1945. at the shipyards "Howaldtswerke", "Germaniawerft", "Schichau", "Klöckner" and "CRDA" 285 midget submarines of the "Seehund" type (XXVII-B) were assembled, of which 137 units ("U-5001" - "U- 5003", "U-5004" - "U-5118", "U-5221" - "U-5269") was put into service. The boats were equipped with an automobile diesel engine for surface movement. Gathered at the shipyards from three finished sections. During the war, 35 boats were lost. Performance characteristics of the boat: full surface displacement - 14.9 tons, underwater - 17 tons; length - 12 m, width - 1.7 m; draft - 1.5 m; immersion depth - 50 m; power plants - diesel engine and electric motor; power - 60/25 hp; speed - 7.7 knots; fuel supply - 0.5 tons of solarium; cruising range - 300 miles; crew - 2 people. Armament: 2 - 533 mm torpedoes.

The outcome of any war depends on many factors, among which, of course, weapons are of considerable importance. Despite the fact that absolutely all German weapons were very powerful, since Adolf Hitler personally considered them the most important weapon and paid considerable attention to the development of this industry, they failed to inflict damage on the opponents, which would significantly affect the course of the war. Why did it happen? Who stands at the origins of the creation of the submarine army? Were the German submarines of World War II really so invincible? Why were such prudent Nazis unable to defeat the Red Army? You will find the answer to these and other questions in the review.

general information

Collectively, all the equipment that was in service with the Third Reich during World War II was called the Kriegsmarine, and submarines made up a significant part of the arsenal. Underwater equipment passed into a separate industry on November 1, 1934, and the fleet was disbanded after the war ended, that is, having existed for less than a dozen years. In such a short period of time, the German submarines of World War II brought a lot of fear into the souls of their opponents, leaving their huge mark on the bloody pages of the history of the Third Reich. Thousands of dead, hundreds of sunken ships, all this remained on the conscience of the surviving Nazis and their subordinates.

Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine

During World War II, one of the most famous Nazis, Karl Doenitz, was at the helm of the Kriegsmarine. The Germans in World War II played, of course, an important role, but without this person this would not have happened. He was personally involved in creating plans to attack opponents, participated in attacks on many ships and achieved success in this path, for which he was awarded one of the most significant awards of Nazi Germany. Doenitz was an admirer of Hitler and was his successor, which did him a lot of harm during the Nuremberg trials, because after the death of the Fuhrer, he was considered the commander-in-chief of the Third Reich.

Specifications

It is easy to guess that Karl Doenitz was responsible for the state of the submarine army. German submarines in World War II, whose photos prove their power, had impressive parameters.

In general, the Kriegsmarine was armed with 21 types of submarines. They had the following characteristics:

• displacement: from 275 to 2710 tons;
• surface speed: from 9.7 to 19.2 knots;
• underwater speed: from 6.9 to 17.2;
• diving depth: from 150 to 280 meters.

This proves that the German submarines of the Second World War were not only powerful, they were the most powerful among the weapons of the countries that fought against Germany.

Composition of the Kriegsmarine

1154 submarines belonged to the military boats of the German fleet. It is noteworthy that until September 1939 there were only 57 submarines, the rest were built specifically for participation in the war. Some of them were trophies. So, there were 5 Dutch, 4 Italian, 2 Norwegian and one English and one French submarines. All of them were also in service with the Third Reich.

Navy Achievements

The Kriegsmarine inflicted considerable damage on its opponents throughout the war. So, for example, the most productive captain Otto Kretschmer sank almost fifty enemy ships. There are also record holders among the courts. For example, the German submarine U-48 sank 52 ships.

Throughout World War II, 63 destroyers, 9 cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers and even 2 battleships were destroyed. The largest and most remarkable victory for the German army among them can be considered the sinking of the battleship Royal Oak, the crew of which consisted of a thousand people, and its displacement was 31,200 tons.

Plan Z

Since Hitler considered his fleet extremely important for the triumph of Germany over other countries and had extremely positive feelings for him, he paid considerable attention to him and did not limit funding. In 1939, a plan was developed for the development of the Kriegsmarine for the next 10 years, which, fortunately, never materialized. According to this plan, several hundred more of the most powerful battleships, cruisers and submarines were to be built.

Powerful German submarines of World War II

Photographs of some surviving German submarines give an idea of ​​the power of the Third Reich, but only faintly reflect how strong this army was. Most of all, the German fleet had type VII submarines, they had optimal seaworthiness, were of medium size, and most importantly, their construction was relatively inexpensive, which is important in

They could dive to a depth of 320 meters with a displacement of up to 769 tons, the crew ranged from 42 to 52 employees. Despite the fact that the “sevens” were quite high-quality boats, over time, the enemy countries of Germany improved their weapons, so the Germans also had to work on modernizing their offspring. As a result of this, the boat has several more modifications. The most popular of these was the VIIC model, which not only became the epitome of German military power during the attack on the Atlantic, but was also much more convenient than previous versions. The impressive dimensions made it possible to install more powerful diesel engines, and subsequent modifications also featured strong hulls, which made it possible to dive deeper.

German submarines of the Second World War were subjected to a constant, as they would say now, upgrade. Type XXI is considered to be one of the most innovative models. In this submarine, an air conditioning system and additional equipment was created, which was intended for a longer stay of the crew under water. A total of 118 boats of this type were built.

Results of the Kriegsmarine

German submarines of World War II, photos of which can often be found in books about military equipment, played a very important role in the advance of the Third Reich. Their power cannot be underestimated, but it should be borne in mind that even with such patronage from the bloodiest Fuhrer in world history, the German fleet did not manage to bring its power closer to victory. Probably, only good equipment and a strong army are not enough; for the victory of Germany, the ingenuity and courage that the brave soldiers of the Soviet Union possessed was not enough. Everyone knows that the Nazis were incredibly bloodthirsty and shunned little on their way, but neither the incredibly equipped army nor the lack of principles helped them. Armored vehicles, a huge amount of ammunition and the latest developments did not bring the expected results to the Third Reich.

In December 1941, German submarines set out to sea on a secret mission - undetected they crossed the Atlantic and took up positions a few miles from the east coast of the United States. Their target was the United States of America. The plan of the German command received the code name "Drumbeat", which consisted in delivering a surprise attack on American merchant shipping.

In America, no one expected the appearance of German submarines. The first attack took place on January 13, 1942, and America was completely unprepared. January turned into a real massacre. The wreckage of ships and the corpses of people washed ashore, oil covered the water off the coast of Florida. During this period, the US Navy did not sink a single German submarine - the enemy was invisible. In the midst of the operation, it seemed that the Germans could no longer be stopped, but an unusual reversal occurred - the hunters turned into prey. Two years after the start of Operation Drumbeat, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.

One such lost German submarine was U869. She belonged to the German submarines of the 9th series, which were marked as IX-C. It was these submarines with a long range that were used to patrol the remote coasts of Africa and America. The project was developed in the 1930s during the rearmament of Germany. It was on these boats that Admiral Karl Dönnitz had high hopes with their new group tactics.

IX-C class submarines

In total, more than 110 IX-C class submarines were built in Germany. And only one of them remained intact after the war, and is exhibited at the Museum of Science and Industry (Museum of Science and Industry) in Chicago. The submarine U-505 was captured by the US Navy in 1944.

Technical data of the IX-C class submarine:

Displacement - 1152 tons;

Length - 76 m;

Width - 6.7 m;

Draft - 4.5 m;

Armament:

Torpedo tubes 530 mm - 6;

Gun 105 mm - 1;

Machine gun 37 mm - 1;

Machine gun 20 mm - 2;

Crew - 30 people;

The only purpose of this submarine is to destroy. A look from the outside gives little idea of ​​how she acted. Inside the submarine is a cramped tube filled with weapons and technical devices. Torpedoes weighing 500 kg, aimed at the target, were the main weapons of submarines. About 30 submariners lived in close quarters, sometimes for three months. On the surface, thanks to two 9-cylinder diesel engines, the submarine developed a speed of 18 knots. The power reserve was 7552 miles. Under water, the German submarine was on electric motors that fed batteries located under the floor of the compartments. Their power was enough to cover about 70 miles at a speed of 3 knots. In the middle of the German submarine was a conning tower, below it was a central post with many different instruments and control panels for movement, diving and ascent. The only way to protect the German submarine was the depths of the oceans.

The commander of the submarine fleet, Karl Dönnitz, planned a war only against Britain, but could not imagine that the United States would have to be confronted at the same time. By the end of 1943, the presence of Allied aircraft over the ocean completely changed the situation. Now it was dangerous even at night in dense fog, because an aircraft equipped with a radar could detect a German submarine on the surface of the water.

German submarine U869

After several months of preparation, U869 was ready to go to sea. Her commander, 26-year-old Helmut Noverburg, was appointed captain for the first time. On December 8, 1944, U869 left Norway for the Atlantic. This was her first patrol. Three weeks later, the fleet command sent a radiogram with a combat mission - to patrol the approaches in New York Bay. The submarine U869 had to acknowledge receipt of the order. Several days passed, and the command did not know anything about the fate of the submarine. In fact, the submarine U869 answered, but she was not heard. HQ began to realize that the boat was most likely running out of fuel, and she was assigned a new patrol area of ​​Gibraltar - it was almost a homecoming. The German command expected the return of the boat U869 by February 1, but she never received a new order. The encryption department assumed that U869 did not receive the radio and continues to follow the same course for New York. Throughout February, the command was at a loss as to where the submarine U869 was patrolling. But wherever the submarine went, the decryption department decided that the German submarine was heading home.

On May 8, 1945, the war in Europe ended. The German command signed the act of surrender, and the German submarines at sea were ordered to surface and surrender.

Hundreds of German boats were never able to return to their home base. And U869 has been considered lost since February 20, 1945. The reason for the death of the submarine could be the explosion of its own torpedo, which described the circle and returned. This information was reported to the families of the crew members.

layout at the bottom of the sunken submarine U869

But in 1991, while fishing 50 km from New Jersey, a local fisherman lost his net, which caught on something at the bottom. When divers explored this place, they discovered the missing submarine, which turned out to be the German submarine U869.

There is also another amazing fact about this submarine. One of the submariners who were in the U869 team survived and lives in Canada. Of the 59 people who were part of the crew of the submarine, he survived thanks to an unexpected twist of fate. Shortly before going to sea, Herbert Dishevsky was hospitalized with pneumonia and could not participate in the campaign. Like the families of the dead submariners, he was sure that his submarine had sunk off the coast of Africa until he learned about the true facts.

For most of us, World War II is photographs and newsreel footage. Very distant events in time and space, but the war continues to present scores today, to those who survived, to the relatives of the dead, to those who were still children then, and even to those who were not yet born when the monstrous hurricane raged. World War II scars such as U869 are still hidden under the surface, but much closer than we think.

This text, perhaps, should begin with a small preface. Well, for starters, I wasn't going to write it.

However, my article on the Anglo-German war at sea in 1939-1945 gave rise to a completely unexpected discussion. It contains one phrase - about the Soviet submarine fleet, in which, apparently, large funds were invested before the war, and "... whose contribution to the victory turned out to be negligible ...".

The emotional discussion that this phrase generated is beside the point.

I have received several e-mails accusing me of "...ignorance of the subject...", "...Russophobia...", "...hushing up the progress of Russian weapons...", and ". .. waging an information war against Russia...".

In short - in the end I became interested in the subject, and did some excavations. The results amazed me - everything was much worse than what I imagined.

The text offered to readers cannot be called an analysis - it is too short and shallow - but it can be useful as a kind of reference.

Here are the submarine forces with which the great powers went to war:

1. England - 58 submarines.
2. Germany - 57 submarines.
3. USA - 21 submarines (operational, Pacific Fleet).
4. Italy - 68 submarines (calculated from fleets stationed in Taranto, La Spezia, Tripoli, etc.).
5. Japan - 63 submarines.
6. USSR - 267 submarines.

Statistics are tricky things.

Firstly, the number of these combat units is to a certain extent conditional. It includes both combat boats and training, obsolete, under repair, and so on. The only criterion for a boat to be included in the list is that it exists.

Secondly, the concept itself is not defined - a submarine. For example, a German submarine with a displacement of 250 tons, intended for operations in coastal areas, and a Japanese ocean-going submarine, with a displacement of 5,000 tons, are still not the same thing.

Thirdly, a warship is by no means evaluated by displacement, but by a combination of many parameters - for example, speed, armament, autonomy, and so on. In the case of a submarine, these parameters include diving speed, diving depth, underwater speed, how long the boat can stay under water - and other things that are too long to list. They include, for example, such an important indicator as crew training.
However, some conclusions can be drawn from the above table.

For example, it is obvious that the great maritime powers - England and the United States - were not particularly actively preparing for the conduct of a submarine war. And they had few boats, and even this number was "smeared" over the oceans. American Pacific Fleet - two dozen submarines. The English fleet - with possible hostilities on three oceans - the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian - is only fifty.

It is also clear that Germany was not ready for a naval war - in total, by September 1939, there were 57 submarines in service.

Here is a table of German submarines - by type (data taken from the book "War At Sea", by S Roskill, vol.1, page 527):

1. “IA” - ocean, 850 tons - 2 units.
2. "IIA" - coastal, 250 tons - 6 units.
3. "IIB" - coastal, 250 tons - 20 units.
4. “IIC” - coastal, 250 tons - 9 units.
5. “IID” - coastal, 250 tons - 15 units.
6. "VII" - ocean, 750 tons - 5 units.

Thus, for operations in the Atlantic at the very beginning of hostilities, Germany had no more than 8-9 submarines.

It also follows from the table that the absolute champion in the number of submarines in the pre-war period was the Soviet Union.

Now let's look at the number of submarines involved in hostilities, by country:

1. England - 209 submarines.
2. Germany - 965 submarines.
3. USA - 182 submarines.
4. Italy - 106 submarines
5. Japan - 160 submarines.
6. CCCP - 170 submarines.

It can be seen that almost all countries during the war came to the conclusion that submarines are a very important type of weapon, began to sharply build up their submarine forces, and used them very widely in military operations.

The only exception is the Soviet Union. In the USSR, new boats were not built in the war - it was not before that, and no more than 60% of those built were put into action - but this is explained by many quite good reasons. For example, the fact that the Pacific Fleet practically did not participate in the war - unlike the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern ones.

Germany is the absolute champion in building up the forces of the submarine fleet and in its combat use. This is especially obvious if you look at the payroll of the German submarine fleet: by the end of the war - 1155 units. The big difference between the number of submarines built and the number of those that participated in hostilities is explained by the fact that in the second half of 1944 and in 1945 it was increasingly difficult to bring the boat to combat readiness - boat bases were mercilessly bombed, shipyards were a priority target for air raids, training fleets on the Baltic Sea did not have time to train crews, and so on.

The contribution of the German submarine fleet to the hostilities was enormous. The numbers of losses inflicted by them on the enemy, and the losses suffered by them, vary. According to German sources, during the war years, Doenitz's submarines sank 2882 enemy merchant ships, with a total tonnage of 14.4 million tons of displacement, plus 175 warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers. 779 boats were lost.

The Soviet reference book gives a different figure - 644 German submarines sunk, 2840 merchant ships sunk by them.

The British (“Total War”, by Peter Calviocoressi and Guy Wint) give the following figures: 1162 German submarines built, and 941 sunk or surrendered.

I did not find an explanation of the difference in the given statistics. The authoritative work of Captain Roskill, "War At Sea", unfortunately does not provide summary tables. Perhaps the point is in different ways of accounting for sunken and captured boats - for example, according to which column was a damaged boat, sitting aground and abandoned by the crew, taken into account?

In any case, it can be argued that the German submariners not only inflicted huge losses on the British and American merchant fleets, but also had a profound strategic impact on the entire course of the war.

Hundreds of escort ships and literally thousands of aircraft were thrown into the fight against them - and even this would not have been enough if it were not for the successes of the American shipbuilding industry, which made it possible to more than compensate for the entire tonnage sunk by the Germans.

How were the other participants in the war?

The Italian submarine fleet showed very poor results, completely disproportionate to its nominally high strength. The Italian boats were poorly built, poorly equipped, and badly managed. On their account - 138 targets sunk, while 84 boats were lost.

According to the Italians themselves, their boats sank 132 enemy merchant ships, with a total displacement of 665,000 tons, and 18 warships, in total - 29,000 tons. Which gives an average of 5,000 tons per transport (corresponding to the average English transport ship of that period), and 1,200 tons on average per warship - which corresponds to a destroyer, or English escort sloop.

Most importantly, they did not have any serious impact on the course of hostilities. The Atlantic campaign failed completely. If we talk about the submarine fleet, the greatest contribution to the Italian war effort was made by Italian saboteurs who successfully attacked British battleships in the Alexandria roadstead.

The British sank 493 merchant ships with a total displacement of 1.5 million tons, 134 warships, plus 34 enemy submarines - while losing 73 boats.

Their successes could have been greater, but they did not have many goals. Their main contribution to the victory was the interception of Italian merchant ships going to North Africa, and German coasters in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway.

The actions of American and Japanese submarines deserve a separate discussion.

The Japanese submarine fleet looked very impressive in its pre-war phase of development. The submarines that were part of it ranged from dwarf baby boats designed for sabotage operations to huge submarine cruisers.

During the Second World War, 56 submarines larger than 3,000 tons of displacement were put into operation - and 52 of them were Japanese.

The Japanese fleet had 41 submarines capable of carrying seaplanes (up to 3 at once) - which no other boat in any other fleet of the world could do. Not in German, not in English, not in American.

Japanese submarines were unmatched in underwater speed. Their tiny boats could do up to 18 knots underwater, and medium-sized experimental boats even showed 19, which exceeded the remarkable results of the German XXI series boats, and was almost three times faster than the speed of the standard German "workhorse" - boats of the VII series .

The Japanese torpedo weapon was the best in the world, surpassing the American one three times in range, twice in warhead lethality, and, until the second half of 1943, had a huge advantage in reliability.

And yet they did very little. In total, Japanese submarines sank 184 ships, with a total displacement of 907,000 tons.

It was a matter of military doctrine - according to the concept of the Japanese fleet, the boats were intended to hunt for warships, and not for merchant ones. And since the warships went three times faster than the “merchants”, and as a rule had a strong anti-submarine escort, the successes were modest. Japanese submariners sank two American aircraft carriers, a cruiser, damaged two battleships - and had practically no effect on the overall course of hostilities.

Starting from a certain time, they were completely used as supply ships for the besieged island garrisons.

Interestingly, the Americans started the war with exactly the same military doctrine - the boat was supposed to track down warships, not “merchants”. Moreover, American torpedoes, in theory the most technologically advanced (they were supposed to explode under the ship under the influence of its magnetic field, breaking the enemy ship in half), turned out to be terribly unreliable.

The defect was eliminated only in the second half of 1943. By the same time, pragmatic American naval commanders switched their submarines to attack the Japanese merchant fleet, and then added another improvement to this - now Japanese tankers became a priority target.

The effect was devastating.

Of the 10 million tons of displacement, in total lost by the Japanese military and merchant fleet, 54% were credited to the submariners.

The US Navy lost 39 submarines during the war years.

According to a Russian reference book, American submarines sank 180 targets.

If American reports are correct, then 5,400,000 tons divided by 180 hit "targets" gives a disproportionately high figure for each ship sunk - an average of 30,000 tons. The English merchant ship of the Second World War had a displacement of about 5-6 thousand tons, only then the American Liberty transports became twice as large.

Perhaps the guide took into account only military vessels, because it does not give the total tonnage of targets sunk by the Americans.

According to the Americans, about 1,300 Japanese merchant ships were sunk by their boats during the war - from large tankers, and almost to sampans. This gives an estimated 3,000 tons for each mara sunk - which is roughly in line with expectations.

An online reference taken from a usually reliable site: http://www.2worldwar2.com/ - also gives a figure of 1300 Japanese merchant ships sunk by submarines, but estimates the losses of American boats higher: 52 dead boats, out of a total of 288 units ( including training and not participating in hostilities).

It is possible that boats that died as a result of accidents are taken into account - I don’t know. The standard American submarine during the Pacific War was the Gato-class, 2400 tons, equipped with excellent optics, excellent acoustics, and even radar.

American submarines made a huge contribution to the victory. An analysis of their actions after the war revealed them as the most important factor that strangled the military and civilian industries of Japan.

The actions of Soviet submarines must be considered separately, because the conditions for their use were unique.

The Soviet pre-war submarine fleet was not just the most numerous in the world. In terms of the number of submarines - 267 units - it was two and a half times more than the English and German fleets combined. A reservation must be made here - the British and German submarines were counted for September 1939, and the Soviet ones for June 1941. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strategic plan for the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet - if we take the priorities of its development - was better than the German one. The forecast for the start of hostilities was much more realistic than the one that was determined by the German "Plan-Z" - 1944-1946.

The Soviet plan was made on the assumption that the war could just start today or tomorrow. Accordingly, funds were not invested in battleships that required a long construction. Preference was given to small warships - in the pre-war period, only 4 cruisers were built, but more than 200 submarines.

The geographical conditions for the deployment of the Soviet fleet were very specific - it was necessarily divided into 4 parts - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific - which, in general, could not help each other. Some ships, apparently, managed to pass from the Pacific Ocean to Murmansk, small ships like baby submarines could be transported disassembled by rail - but in general, the interaction of the fleets was very difficult.

Here we run into the first problem - the summary table indicates the total number of Soviet submarines, but does not say how many of them operated in the Baltic - or the Black Sea, for example.

The Pacific Fleet did not participate in the war until August 1945.

The Black Sea Fleet joined the war almost immediately. In general, he did not have an enemy at sea - except perhaps the Romanian fleet. Accordingly, there is no information about successes - due to the absence of the enemy. There is also no information about losses - at least detailed ones.

According to A.B. Shirokorad, the following episode took place: on June 26, 1941, the leaders "Moscow" and "Kharkov" were sent to raid Constanta. While withdrawing, the leaders came under attack from their own submarine, Shch-206. She was sent on patrol but was not warned of the raid. As a result, the leader "Moskva" was sunk, and the submarine was sunk by escorts - in particular, the destroyer "Savvy".

This version is disputed, and it is alleged that both ships - both the leader and the submarine - died in a Romanian minefield. There is no exact information.

But this is absolutely indisputable: in the period of April-May 1944, German and Romanian troops were evacuated from the Crimea by sea to Romania. During April and twenty days of May, the enemy conducted 251 convoys - many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine escorts.

In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 military campaigns damaged one (!) transport. According to the reports of the commanders, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this.

The result is striking in terms of inefficiency.

Summary information on the Black Sea Fleet - the number of boats, the number of combat sorties, the number of targets hit, their type and tonnage - is not available. At least I didn't find them anywhere.
The war in the Baltic can be reduced to three phases: the defeat in 1941, the blockade of the fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt in 1942, 1943, 1944 - and the counteroffensive in 1945.
According to the information found on the forums, in 1941 the Red Banner Baltic Fleet conducted 58 exits to German sea lanes in the Baltic.

Results:
1. One German submarine, U-144, was sunk. Confirmed by the German reference book.
2. Two transports were sunk (5769 brt).
3. Presumably, the Swedish mobilized patrol boat HJVB-285 (56 brt) was also sunk by the S-6 torpedo on 08/22/1941.

This last point is even difficult to comment on - the Swedes were neutral, the boat was - most likely - a bot armed with a machine gun, and was hardly worth the torpedo that was fired at it. In the process of achieving these successes, 27 submarines were lost. And according to other sources - even 36.

Information for 1942 is vague. It is claimed that 24 targets were hit.
Summary information - the number of boats involved, the number of combat exits, the type and tonnage of targets hit - are not available.

Regarding the period from the end of 1942 to July 1944 (the time Finland left the war), there is a complete consensus: not a single combat exit of submarines on enemy communications. The reason is very good - the Gulf of Finland was blocked not only by minefields, but also by an anti-submarine network barrier.

As a result, throughout this period, the Baltic was a quiet German lake - Doenitz's training fleets trained there, Swedish ships with important military cargo for Germany - ball bearings, iron ore, and other things - moved German troops - from the Baltic to Finland and back, and so Further.

But even at the end of the war, when the nets were removed and Soviet submarines went to the Baltic to intercept German ships, the picture looks rather strange. During the mass evacuation from the Courland Peninsula and from the area of ​​the Danzig Bay, in the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-tonnage ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine guards in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 military campaigns sank only one transport, a floating base and a floating battery .

It was at this time that loud victories occurred - the sinking of the Gustlov, for example - but nevertheless, the German fleet managed to evacuate about 2 and a half million people by sea, the largest rescue operation in history - and it was neither disrupted nor even slowed down by the actions of the Soviet submarine.

There is no summary information about the actions of the Baltic submarine fleet. Again - perhaps they exist, but I have not found them.

The situation is the same with statistics on the actions of the Northern Fleet. The summary data is nowhere to be found, or at least not in public circulation.

There are some on the forums. An example is given below:

“... On August 4, 1941, the British submarine "Tygris", and then "Trident" arrived in Polyarnoye. In early November, they were replaced by two other submarines "Sivulf" and "Silayen". In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, it does not matter, the main thing is that during the same period, 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets ... ".

The biggest mystery is obtained with the information from the pivot table:
http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.

According to it, 170 Soviet submarines took part in the fighting. Of these, 81 were killed. 126 targets were hit.

What is their total tonnage? Where were they sunk? How many of them are warships and how many are merchant ships?

The table does not give any answers on this score.

If the "Gustlov" was a large ship, and is named in the reports - why are other ships not named? Or at least not listed? In the end, both a tugboat and a four-oar boat can be counted as a hit target.

The idea of ​​falsification simply suggests itself.

The table, by the way, contains another falsification, this time quite clear.

The victories of the submarines of all the fleets listed in it - English, German, Soviet, Italian, Japanese - contain the sum of the enemy ships sunk by them - merchant and military.

The only exception is the Americans. For some reason, they were credited only with warships sunk by them, thereby artificially reducing their indicators - from 1480 to 180.

And this slight modification of the rules is not even stipulated. You can find it only by doing a detailed check of all the data in the table.

The final result of the check is that all the data is more or less reliable. Except Russian and American. The American ones are worsened by 7-something times through obvious juggling, and the Russian ones are hidden in a thick "fog" - by using numbers without explanation, detail and confirmation.

In general, from the above material it is obvious that the results of the actions of Soviet submarines during the war were negligible, the losses were great, and the achievements did not at all correspond to the huge level of costs that was invested in the creation of the Soviet submarine fleet in the pre-war period.

The reasons for this are understandable in general terms. In a purely technical sense, the boats lacked the means to detect the enemy - their commanders could only rely on not very reliable radio communications, and on their own periscopes. This was generally a common problem, not only Soviet submariners.

In the first period of the war, German captains created an impromptu mast for themselves - the boat in the surface position pushed the periscope up to the limit, and the watchman with binoculars climbed on it, like on a pole at a fair. This exotic method helped them little, so they relied more on a tip - either colleagues in the "wolf pack", or reconnaissance aviation, or the coastal headquarters, which had radio intelligence data and decryption services. Radio direction finders and acoustic stations were widely used.

What exactly the Soviet submariners had in this sense is not known, but if we use the analogy with tanks - where orders were transmitted by flags in 1941 - then we can guess that the situation with communications and electronics in the submarine fleet at that time was not the best.

The same factor reduced the possibility of interaction with aviation, and probably with headquarters on land too.

An important factor was the level of training of the crews. For example - German submariners - already after graduating as crew members from the relevant technical schools - sent boats to training fleets in the Baltic, where for 5 months they practiced tactics, conducted firing practice, and so on.

Particular attention was paid to the training of commanders.

Herbert Werner, for example - a German submariner, whose memoirs provide a lot of useful information - became a captain only after several trips, having managed to be both a junior officer and a first mate, and receive a couple of orders in this capacity.

The Soviet fleet turned around so quickly that there was simply nowhere to take qualified captains, and they were appointed from people who had sailing experience in the merchant fleet. In addition, the guiding idea at that time was - “... does not know the case - it does not matter. Learn in battle ... ".

When handling a weapon as complex as a submarine, this is not the best approach.

In conclusion, a few words about learning from the mistakes made.

A summary table comparing the actions of boats from different countries is taken from the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie "Commanders of Soviet submarines 1941-1945."

It was published in an amount of 800 copies - obviously only for official use, and obviously only for commanders of a sufficiently high level - because its circulation is too small to be used as a training aid for officers-students of naval academies.

It would seem - in such an audience you can call a spade a spade?

However, the table of indicators is compiled very cunningly.

Take, for example, such an indicator (by the way, chosen by the authors of the book) as the ratio of the number of targets sunk to the number of lost submarines.

The German fleet in this sense is estimated in round figures as follows - 4 targets for 1 boat. If this ratio is converted into another factor - say, tonnage sunk per boat lost - it comes out to about 20,000 tons (14 million tons of tonnage divided by 700 boats lost). Since the average ocean-going English merchant ship of the time had a displacement of 5,000 tons, everything fits together.

With the Germans - yes, it converges.

But with the Russians - no, it does not converge. Because the coefficient for them - 126 targets sunk against 81 lost boats - gives a figure of 1.56. Of course, worse than 4, but still nothing.

However, this coefficient, unlike the German one, is unverifiable - the total tonnage of targets sunk by Soviet submarines is not indicated anywhere. And the proud indication of the sunken Swedish tugboat, as large as fifty tons, suggests that this is far from accidental.

However, this is not all.

The German coefficient of 4 goals for 1 boat is the overall result. At the beginning of the war - in fact, until the middle of 1943 - he was much higher. It turned out 20, and 30, and even sometimes 50 ships for each boat.

The figure was reduced after the victory of the convoys and their escorts - in the middle of 1943 and until the end of the war.

That is why it is given in the table - honestly and correctly.

The Americans sank approximately 1,500 targets for the loss of approximately 40 boats. They would be entitled to a coefficient of 35-40 - much higher than the German one.

If you think about it, this ratio is quite logical - the Germans fought in the Atlantic against the Anglo-American-Canadian escorts equipped with hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft, and the Americans waged war against the weakly protected Japanese shipping.

But this simple fact cannot be recognized in any way, and therefore an amendment is introduced.

Americans - so imperceptibly - are changing the rules of the game, and only “military” targets are counted, reducing their coefficient (180 / 39) to a figure of 4.5 - obviously more acceptable for Russian patriotism?

Even now - and even in the narrow professional military environment, for which the book of Platonov and Lurie was published - even then it turned out to be undesirable to face the facts.

Perhaps this is the most unpleasant result of our small investigation.

P.S. The text of the article (the font is better and there are photos) can be viewed here:

Sources, short list of Internet sites used:

1. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - American boats.
2. http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm - submarine warfare.
3. http://www.paralumun.com/wartwosubmarinesbritain.htm - English boats.
4. http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/britsubs.html - English boats.
5. http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm - Japanese boats.
6. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/2270/ww2e.htm - Italian boats.
7. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
8. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/84/84929.htm - Soviet boats.
9. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/255/255106.htm - Soviet boats.
10. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - submarine warfare.
11. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Soviet boats.
12. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/46/46644.htm - Soviet boats.
13. - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
15. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
16. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/ - forum, military equipment. Conducted by Sergey Kharlamov, a very intelligent person.

Sources, a short list of books used:

1. "Steel Coffins: German submarines, 1941-1945", Herbert Werner, translated from German, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2001
2. “War At Sea”, by S.Roskill, in Russian translation, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
3. “Total War”, by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Penguin Books, USA, 1985.
4. “The Longest Battle, The War at Sea, 1939-1945”, by Richard Hough, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.
5. "Secret Raiders", David Woodward, translated from English, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
6. "The fleet that Khrushchev destroyed", A.B. Shirokograd, Moscow, VZOI, 2004.

Reviews

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German submarines made long-distance crossings on the surface of the water, plunging only when the enemy appeared. 33 submarines capable of entering the Atlantic Ocean sank 420,000 tons of merchant tonnage. And this is just for the first four months since the beginning of the war. They stood in the way of the movement of enemy transports and waited for the target to appear, attacked and broke away from the convoy forces pursuing them.

Success in the first months of the war spurred Germany to build new submarines. And this brought even more losses to the merchant fleet of the anti-Hitler coalition. The peak of the submarine war was 1942, when the Germans sank 6.3 million tons of the merchant fleet. And during the entire war, the Allies lost 15 million tons.

The turning point occurred at the end of 1942, which caused panic among the fascist command. Their submarines disappeared without a trace one after another. The commanders of the miraculously returned submarines said that the planes were looking for them when they were on the surface in any weather: in fog, at night. And hit with bombs.

The reason for the increased losses of the Germans was the appearance of radar equipment on aircraft and ships. German submarines had to hide under water, and there they had insufficient sailing time. On the radar screen of an aircraft flying at an altitude of 9750 feet (3000 m), the surfaced submarine was visible at a distance of 80 miles (150 km).

After the start of the use of radar, Allied aircraft were able to constantly monitor the area of ​​​​operation of German submarines. England alone had 1,500 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and the total number of Allied aircraft was more than double that number.

If the plane was flying at a speed of 150 km/h, then he saw a submarine half an hour of flight to her, and she, depending on the weather, 5-7 mi-way under a clear sun and generally could not outline it in clouds and fog. In the best case for her, she managed to dive into the water, but often the dive took place under the bombs bursting nearby. The bombs damaged or sank the submarine.

When land-based aircraft with a range of at least 600 miles (1600 km) appeared, British coastal defense became enemy number one for German submarines.

In response to radar, the Germans invented a radar receiver that informed German submariners that a submarine had been detected by American radar, and in October 1942 they began installing these receivers on their submarines. This invention of the Germans reduced the effectiveness of American radars, since in some cases the submarine managed to submerge under water. However, German detector receivers (from the Latin "detextor" - "opener") turned out to be useless when changing the wavelength at which American radars began to operate.

The US Harvard Radio Laboratory has designed 14 radar installations operating on decimeter waves. They were urgently delivered by aircraft to the British for installation on British aircraft patrolling the Bay of Biscay. At the same time, the production of a similar series for US naval aviation aircraft and a model for army aviation was accelerated.

German location receivers-detectors could not detect exposure to decimeter waves, and therefore the German submariners were completely unaware of how the Anglo-American aircraft detected them. The detector was silent, and air bombs rained down on the head.

Microwave radar enabled Anglo-American patrols in the spring and early summer of 1943 to locate and sink large numbers of German submarines.

Hitler reacted with great irritation to the invention of the microwave radar, and in his New Year's address in 1944 to the German armed forces, he pointed to the "invention of our enemy" that caused such irreparable losses to his submarine fleet.

Even after the Germans discovered a decimeter radar on one American aircraft shot down over Germany, they were not able to detect the operation of these locators.

English and American convoys received "eyes" and "ears". The radar became the "eyes" of the fleet, the sonar added "ears", but this was not enough. There was another way to detect submarines: they were given out by radio. And the allies took advantage of it. German submarines, having surfaced on the surface of the water, were talking among themselves, with the headquarters of the submarine fleet, which was located in Paris, and received orders from the commander, Grand Admiral Doenitz. Radiograms were carried on the air from all points where German submarines were located.

If you intercept any radiogram from three points, determining in each direction from where the radio waves propagate, then, knowing the coordinates of the listening stations, you can find out from which point on the earth the German submarine went on the air, and therefore find out its coordinates: where it is now located.

This method was first used by the British Navy to combat enemy submarines. To do this, high-frequency radio direction finders were installed along the English coast. It was they who determined the place of the enemy submarine, which was negotiating with other submarines and superiors. The direction-finding transmission itself revealed the secret of the submarine's coordinates.

The received bearings were sent by coast stations to the Admiralty, where specialists mapped the location and course of the German submarine in the Atlantic. Sometimes, during the operation of the radio station of the German submarine, up to 30 bearings could be obtained.

The radio direction finder system on the African and American coasts, as well as in the British Isles, was called "huff-duff". How it worked can be seen from the episode where Lieutenant Schroeder sank a German submarine.

On June 30, 1942, at about noon, high-frequency radio direction finders in Bermuda, Hart Land Point, Kingston, and Georgetown registered the operation of the submarine's radio station. Naval base operators plotted bearings on the map and found the submarine to be at 33°N, 67°30W, about 130 miles from St. George.

Lieutenant Richard Schroeder was patrolling in his Mariner aircraft in the Bermuda area 50 miles (90 km) from the discovered submarine. Heading to the place indicated to him, he found the U-158 submarine 10 miles (18 km) from the indicated coordinates. The boat was on the surface, and 50 members of her crew basked in the sun. Schroeder dropped two high-explosive bombs and missed, but two depth charges hit the mark. One depth charge fell close to the hull of the boat, but the second landed directly on the superstructure and exploded at the moment when the submarine went to dive. The boat sank along with the entire crew.

Convinced of the effectiveness of the huff-duff devices, they equipped the ships of the convoy. If the high-frequency radio direction finder "huff-duff" was only on one ship of the convoy, then it turned into a search ship and went at the tail of the middle column.

The Germans did not know for a long time, and then they ignored the ship's huff-duff instruments. Their submarines continued to “talk” among themselves and, when approaching the convoy, exchange information with Grand Admiral Doenitz, thereby revealing their location.

This valuable system, whose name "huff-duff" is untranslatable, served a good service in the fight against German submarines.

In total, during the years of the Second World War, 1118 Nazi submarines took part in the hostilities. Of these, 725 (61%) were destroyed by the Allies. 53 died for various reasons, 224 were sunk by the Nazi crews after the surrender of Germany and 184 capitulated.

Fascist submariners during the Second World War sank 2 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 6 cruisers, 88 other surface ships and about 15 million tons of Allied merchant tonnage.