On July 29, 1941, Georgy Zhukov was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and appointed commander of the Reserve Front. There was a quarrel between him and Stalin.

Zhukov did not always agree with this assessment of Stalin, and on July 29 announced his resignation from the post of chief of the general staff. Zhukov was offered some time to wait in another office for Stalin's decision.

Some time later, Zhukov was asked to enter Stalin's office, who announced that Zhukov's request had been granted and he was relieved of his post as Chief of the General Staff.

Although there is another version - Zhukov was removed by Stalin on his own initiative, because he was not adapted to staff work. Zhukov revealed his military talents directly at the front

Zhukov was offered to lead the Reserve Front

SMOLENSK

During the Battle of Smolensk, A. Eremenko and K. Rokosovsky showed themselves well. Then the first significant victory was won.

The Yelninskaya operation is an offensive operation of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. It began on August 30, 1941 with the offensive of two armies (24th and 43rd) of the Soviet Reserve Front. It ended on September 6 with the liberation of the city of Yelnya and the liquidation of the Yelnya ledge.

It is now believed that this offensive was an accidental victory on an insignificant sector of the front .... but this is not at all the case

In this operation, the Soviet guard showed itself for the first time.

YELNINSKY PROPERTIES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

On July 19, 1941, the 10th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, marching at the forefront of the 46th motorized corps of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, occupied Yelnya, but its further offensive in the direction of Spas-Demensk was stopped by divisions of the reserve front of the Red Army.

The enemy was forced to go on the defensive.

The so-called Elninsky ledge was formed, deeply going into the Soviet defense and creating a threat to the Red Army units in the Vyazma direction. In July-August, formations of the 24th Army several times unsuccessfully tried to cut off this ledge and level the front.

According to the chief of the German General Staff, Colonel General F. Halder, the battles in the Yelnya region became a typical example of a positional war.

On August 15, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. von Bock, wrote in his diary:

“... It is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of which is better: to hold the ledge or leave it. If the Russians continue to attack the salient, then it is not profitable to hold it. If they stop attacking, which may well be, then the salient should be retained, since it will not only become a stronghold for our further attacks in the east, but will also provide an opportunity to provide some cover for the Smolensk railway junction and the Smolensk-Moscow highway ».

The Yelnsky bridgehead was extremely important for the Wehrmacht command ...

PREPARATION

On August 21, 1941, after another unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the enemy’s Elninsk bridgehead, the commander of the Reserve Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, ordered Major General K.I. Rakutin to stop attacks and begin preparing a new, stronger and more organized strike.

On July 30, Major General L. A. Govorov was appointed chief of artillery of the Reserve Front, who made a great contribution to the preparation and artillery support of the upcoming offensive operation.

Zhukov also correctly caught the moment to defeat the enemy grouping in this area, when the main forces of the Nazi troops were tied up in other sectors of the Smolensk battle, the main forces of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group had already moved south, and there were no large mobile units in the depths of the German defense. reserves.

Based on this, Zhukov suggested to Stalin that before the start of the decisive battles for Moscow, the Yelnin bridgehead of the enemy should be eliminated. During August, our troops launched an offensive several times, but made no progress.

Zhukov recalled it this way:

“The Elninsk operation was my first independent operation, the first test of personal operational and strategic abilities in the big war with Nazi Germany. I think everyone understands with what excitement, special care and attention I set about organizing and conducting it.

Having been in the very first days of commanding the front at the command post of the 24th Army, which was assigned the main role in the upcoming operation, in the battle formations of formations and units, he was convinced that the enemy had managed to thoroughly fortify himself on the Yelnin ledge and therefore, instead of demanding to continue the offensive at any cost, as it was before his arrival at the front that he, in order to avoid unnecessary losses and in order to ensure the success of the operation, decided to temporarily stop offensive operations, regroup forces and more carefully prepare a new offensive operation.

The concept of the operation provided for a decisive operational maneuver - a two-sided envelopment of the salient in order to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in this area with strikes from the north and south under the base of the Yelnin salient. At the same time, active offensive actions from the east were envisaged in order to forge it, dismember it and destroy it piece by piece. Despite the approximately equal balance of forces, the commander of the front troops managed to create a significant superiority over the enemy in terms of forces and means on the axes of strikes.

On his initiative, a powerful artillery group was created in the 24th Army, consisting of a long-range army group and infantry support groups in divisions. Artillery support of the advancing troops was planned to be carried out by the method of successive concentration of fire, as well as by fire from individual batteries and guns operating in infantry combat formations.

RELATION OF FORCES

Red Army

In the first echelon, the Reserve Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov) included 2 armies: the 24th and 43rd.

The troops of the Soviet 24th Army (Major General K.I. Rakutin) were involved directly in the attack on Yelnya: 19th, 100th, 106th, 107th, 120th, 303rd and 309th rifle divisions, the 6th rifle division of the people's militia, the 103rd motorized division, the 102nd and 105th tank divisions, as well as 10 corps artillery regiments, RGK and PTO regiments

Initially, about 60 thousand people, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations of 76 mm caliber and above, and 35 tanks. The 43rd Army included 4 rifle divisions (53rd, 149th, 211th and 222 -i), two tank (104th and 109th), 6 corps artillery regiments, regiments of the RGK and PTO

WEHRMAHT

The formations of the German 4th Army opposed the Soviet Reserve Front. They were commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge. One of the best Wehrmacht generals

By the beginning of the operation, the German 20th Army Corps (commander Friedrich Matern) was defending in the Yelnin ledge on a front more than 70 km long, consisting of: 78th, 292nd, 268th and 7th infantry divisions. In total, about 70 thousand soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars of 75 mm caliber and above, and about 40 tanks.

To the north of the Yelnisky ledge, the 9th Army Corps (G. Geyer): the 15th, 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions held the defense. To the south, in the Roslavl direction, the 7th Army Corps (W. Farmbacher): 267- I, 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions.

The 10th Panzer Division was located in the reserve of the German command behind the Elnin ledge, and the 252nd Infantry Division of the 53rd Army Corps was located in the Roslavl region.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and the Germans had a natural advantage of the defenders.

PLAN

The plan of the Elninskaya operation provided for a breakthrough of the defense by counter strikes from the troops of the 24th Army from the north and south under the base of the ledge and the development of an offensive with the aim of encircling the main enemy forces. At the same time, it was planned to cut the German grouping with a strike from the east and destroy it in parts.

The defeat of the Yelninskaya group was supposed to be completed by September 3. In the future, building on success, the army was to capture the city of Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line of Dolgie Niva, Khislavichi.

OFFENSIVE

August 30, 1941 at 7.30 am, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket launchers rained down fire on the enemy defenses. At 0800, the offensive of the 24th Army began, but in two days the Soviet troops deepened in some areas by only 2 km.

In the next two days, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks in order to prevent the development of the offensive and to hold the mouth of the Yelny ledge.

On September 3, Soviet troops resumed the offensive. By the end of the day, the formations of the northern and southern groups narrowed the neck of the Elninsk ledge to 6–8 km. On the same day, under the threat of encirclement, the enemy began to withdraw his forces from the Elninsk ledge, hiding behind strong rearguards in all directions and putting up stubborn resistance.

By the end of September 5, the 100th Rifle Division occupied Chantsovo (north of Yelnya), and the 19th Rifle Division broke into Yelnya. Other divisions also acted on the approach to the city. On September 6, Yelnya was liberated by Soviet troops.

The Chief of the German General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General F. Halder wrote in his diary:

“Our units surrendered to the enemy the arc of the front near Yelnya. For a long time, after our units had already been withdrawn, the enemy fired on these positions we had abandoned and only then cautiously occupied them with infantry.

The hidden withdrawal of troops from this arc is a good achievement of the command.

By the end of September 8, the divisions of the 24th Army completely liquidated the Yelnin bridgehead and reached the defensive line along the Nov. Yakovlevichi, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuyevo.

Actions of the 43rd Army

On the first day of the offensive, the Soviet 109th Panzer Division broke through the defenses of the German 23rd Infantry Division, advanced 12 kilometers and reached Kostyry.

On August 31, the Germans transferred the 267th Infantry and 10th Panzer Divisions to the breakthrough area, which launched a counterattack on the flanks of the 109th Division, encircling it.

On September 1, commander G.K. Zhukov arrived at the command post of the 211th Infantry Division, who led the battle on the outskirts of the Stryan River.

The battles for the withdrawal of units of the 109th Panzer Division from the encirclement west of the Desna continued until September 5th. Most of the fighters and commanders died or were captured, and the division ceased to exist as a military unit (and was disbanded on September 16).

Only on September 7, the divisions of the 43rd Army crossed Stryan and developed an offensive to the west, but on September 8 the enemy launched a counterattack, after which the Soviet troops went on the defensive. On September 12, the enemy resumed counterattacks, pushing the Soviet troops back beyond Stryan the next day and occupying its western bank, after which the fighting in this direction subsided.

Simultaneously with the offensive near Bogdanov, the 43rd and 50th armies were to carry out an offensive south of the Warsaw highway from the Ivanovsky area to Koski and further to Roslavl. The attack here began on 2 September. The Soviet troops of the 50th Army met stubborn resistance and were unable to break through the enemy defenses.

THE END

The result of the Yelnin offensive operation was the elimination of the Yelnin ledge. This improved the operational position of the troops of both the 24th Army and the Reserve Front as a whole. The threat of an invasion by German troops into the operational depth of the Soviet defense and a blow to the flank of the Western and Reserve fronts was removed.

The Yelninsk offensive operation was one of the first in the Great Patriotic War, during which a strong focal defense of the enemy was broken through, his group was defeated and expelled from a significant part of Soviet territory.

Despite the lack of overall superiority in forces, the command of the Soviet 24th Army managed to covertly create strike groups and achieve superiority in breakthrough areas in the main directions.

THE BIRTH OF THE SOVIET GUARD

On September 18, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Stalin, the 100th (Major General I.N. Russiyanov) and 127th (Colonel A.Z. Akimenko) rifle divisions of the 24th Army were the first to be awarded the title of Guards, respectively receiving the name 1- 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Divisions.

On September 26, 1941, the ranks of the guards were assigned to the 107th and 120th rifle divisions - they were transformed into the 5th and 6th guards rifle divisions, respectively.

LOSSES

The Wehrmacht lost 45,000 soldiers, of which about 30,000 were irretrievable.

Losses in the Yelninskaya offensive operation of the Soviet troops amounted to 31,853 people, of which 10,701 were killed or missing and 21,152 were wounded.

Previous events

By the beginning of the operation, the German 20th Army Corps (commander Friedrich Matern) was defending in the Yelnin ledge on a front more than 70 km long, consisting of: 78th, 292nd, 268th and 7th infantry divisions. In total, about 70 thousand soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars of 75 mm caliber and above, and about 40 tanks.

To the north of the Elnisky ledge, the 9th Army Corps (G. Geyer) held the defense: the 15th, 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions.
To the south, in the direction of Roslavl, - the 7th Army Corps (V. Farmbacher): 267th, 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions.

The 10th Panzer Division was located in the reserve of the German command behind the Elnin ledge, and the 252nd Infantry Division of the 53rd Army Corps was located in the Roslavl region.

Side Plans

The idea of ​​the Yelninskaya operation provided for the breakthrough of the defense by counter strikes of the troops of the 24th Army from the north and south under the base of the ledge and the development of the offensive in order to encircle the main enemy forces. At the same time, it was planned to cut the German grouping with a strike from the east and destroy it in parts. The defeat of the Yelninskaya grouping was supposed to be completed by September 3rd. In the future, building on success, the army was to capture the city of Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line of Dolgie Niva, Khislavichi.

The ratio of forces in the zone of the 24th Army was approximately equal: in people - 1.1: 1 in favor of the German grouping, in artillery - 1.6: 1 in favor of the Soviet 24th Army. Tanks were used to a limited extent on both sides - after unsuccessful attempts by the Red Army to break through the German defenses, the OKW withdrew 19 TD and 1 regiment of 7 TD, in the amount of 212 tanks, to the central direction. The infantry formations of the 292nd and 268th infantry divisions, 2 regiments each, were also withdrawn. Of the 7 infantry divisions, divisional control, an artillery regiment and 2 infantry regiments were transferred to the central direction. After that, the ratio of attackers and defenders was: Germany - USSR - in terms of manpower 1 - 6.21, in tanks 0-196, in artillery 1.1-1. Aviation was not used due to the workload of German aviation in the central direction and due to the lack of aviation in Zhukov in this direction due to the fact that all combat-ready aircraft were transferred to the Bryansk Front by the beginning of the local (according to Zhukov) operation at the direction of the Headquarters of the High Command.

To the north of the 24th Army against the German 9th Army (the Dukhovshchina group), the troops of the Western Front acted.

South of the 24th Army, the Soviet 43rd Army was advancing towards Roslavl.

Further south, the troops of the Bryansk Front (50th, 3rd and 13th armies) carried out the Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya offensive operation (August 30 - September 12).

In July 1941, after the capture of Yelnya during the attack on Moscow, German troops met stubborn resistance from the Soviet army. Unable to overcome it and move closer to Moscow, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive.

At this time, a plan for the Yelninskaya offensive operation was developed at the headquarters of the Reserve Front of the Soviet Army. The operation began on August 19, 1941. Due to the lack of military equipment and aviation, Soviet troops advanced slowly and unevenly in different sectors of the front. As a result, the so-called Elninsky ledge was formed, which created a threat to the Soviet troops in the Vyazma direction. From this bridgehead, the German command planned to deliver the main blow to Moscow.

Repeatedly during July-August, units of the 24th Army tried to level the front, but the enemy steadfastly held the line.

The chief of the Hitlerite General Staff, Colonel-General F. Halder believed that battles in the Yelnya region became a typical example of positional warfare. The relative calm at the front allowed the German command to replace mobile troops with infantry divisions on the territory of the Yelnin ledge.

By order of the commander of the Reserve Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, about units of the 24th Army, weakened in previous battles, ceased active hostilities in the Yelnya area and began preparing for a new, powerful blow.

The fighting of the Soviet troops inflicted significant damage on the enemy, although it was a time when the enemy still completely dominated the air and had a huge superiority in technology. The German formations suffered the greatest losses from our artillery strikes, which had a strong psychological impact on the Wehrmacht soldiers. Particularly destructive, both physically and morally, were the reactive guards mortars.. Thus, a battery of rocket-propelled mortars under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov moved through the positions of divisions conducting combat operations in the Yelnya region, inflicting terrible blows on the enemy. However, the Germans stubbornly rushed forward. During the next attack, the enemy tanks in an unstoppable avalanche went to our positions and almost came very close to the observation post of the battery of rocket-propelled mortars. When Captain Flerov transmitted the data for the salvo to the battery, the radio operator, thinking that he had misunderstood the command, asked again: Flerov again transmitted the coordinates of positions that were very close to his observation post. During the volley, the dugout was shaken, the stereo tube was overturned by the blast wave, the earth fell from the ceiling and filled up the front door. The gunners, who had experienced the blow of rockets and deafened by the roar, with difficulty got out of the dugout. The charred corpses of enemies lay around, the whole earth was covered with craters from explosions, tanks were blazing with bright fires. Having called fire on himself, Captain Flerov did not allow the German tanks to break through to our positions.

On August 25, 1941, the 24th and 43rd armies launched an offensive. Having divided into three groups of troops - Northern, Southern and Central - the units of the Red Army were supposed to liberate Yelnya by September 8 to reach the Khislavichi-Petrovichi region.

On August 30, 1941, after intensive artillery preparation, the 24th Army began fighting for Yelnya. Each unit stood to the death at its line, even the wounded did not leave their positions. Mass heroism and courage were manifested everywhere, in every sector.

So, the soldiers and commanders of the regiment of I.M. Nekrasov, being surrounded in the village of Voloskovo near Yelnya, fought for three days, and managed not only to break through, but also to take possession of the railway station.

And the fighters of one of the rifle regiments more than once captured prisoners from selected Wehrmacht formations sent to the Yelnya region: "Great Germany", "Viking", "Fuhrer". During one of the interrogations of the prisoners, it became known that a convoy of 25 vehicles with infantry was to arrive in the battle area. The reconnaissance platoon was tasked with blocking the road along which reinforcements should pass.. Commander Calabun with eight fighters made their way behind enemy lines and took refuge in a fork in the road. After a while, cars appeared around the corner and began to descend into the hollow. One of the fighters deftly threw a grenade. From the explosion, the lead car turned around. The movement has stopped. The soldiers, taking advantage of the delay, hit the Nazis with machine guns. Panic arose, but the German officer managed to lead the soldiers on the attack. The forces were unequal. The platoon commander quickly made a decision. He quietly made his way to a frozen truck, on which there was a machine gun, and opened fire on the Nazis. The first burst killed an officer and several soldiers. Deprived of a commander, the enemy soldiers could not offer decisive resistance and began to surrender.

The German defense was broken through, the Soviet troops advanced 12 kilometers, but were stopped by the Nazis. On the morning of the next day, the enemy's counterattack on the flanks forced our units to retreat to the Desna, but there, in the Bogdanov area, the German divisions had already closed the encirclement.

Meanwhile, the enemy, thrown back to the Stryan River, launched a series of counterattacks that stopped the advance of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces.

The retreat of 5-6 kilometers of the 211th division, which operated in the Roslavl region, greatly complicated the situation in the main offensive sector.

The liquidation of the Yelninsky ledge was Zhukov's first independent front-line operation. Therefore, the delay in the advance of the Southern Group of Forces, which threatened the complete failure of the operation, forced the front commander to personally go to the 211th division and from September 1 to 9 take over the leadership of its military operations instead of the commander arrested for panic. Zhukov's decision "...to go to the site of the 211th division at night and restore order there ..." was approved by Stalin in their telephone conversation on September 1.

On September 3, after restoring order in the 211th division and stabilizing the general situation on this sector of the front, the offensive of the divisions of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces was resumed. By the end of the day, the distance between the troops of the Northern and Southern groups reached 6-8 km, German troops were threatened by the environment. autogyros - prototypes of the first helicopters. They were used to correct artillery fire and reconnaissance. Autogyros flew behind enemy lines to the partisans. They also scattered leaflets over the positions of the Germans.

On September 5, 1941, Soviet troops broke into Yelnya. In the forefront was the 19th Rifle Division. Yelnya was released the next day. The liberation of Yelnya was the first major victory of the Red Army over the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War.

Operation name

Yelninskaya offensive operation of the Red Army

It began on August 30, 1941 with the offensive of two armies (24th and 43rd) of the Soviet Reserve Front (commander - General of the Army G.K. Zhukov). It ended on September 6 with the liberation of the city of Yelnya and the liquidation of the Yelnya ledge. In accordance with Soviet historiography, it is part of the Smolensk battle.

Side forces

Red Army

In the first echelon, the Reserve Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov) included 2 armies: the 24th and 43rd. The troops of the Soviet 24th Army (Major General K.I. Rakutin) were involved directly in the attack on Yelnya: 19th, 100th, 106th, 107th, 120th, 303rd and 309th rifle divisions, the 6th rifle division of the people's militia, the 103rd motorized division, the 102nd and 105th tank divisions, as well as 10 corps artillery regiments, RGK and PTO regiments; initially about 60 thousand people, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations of 76 mm caliber and above, and 35 tanks. The 43rd Army (Major General D. M. Seleznev) included 4 rifle divisions (53rd, 149th, 211th and 222nd), two tank divisions (104th and 109th) , 6 corps artillery regiments, RGK and anti-tank regiments.

Wehrmacht

The formations of the German 4th Army (Field Marshal G. von Kluge) opposed the Soviet Reserve Front. By the beginning of the operation, the German 20th Army Corps (commander Friedrich Matern) was defending in the Yelnin ledge on a front more than 70 km long, consisting of: 78th, 292nd, 268th and 7th infantry divisions. In total, about 70 thousand soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars of 75 mm caliber and above, and about 40 tanks. To the north of the Elnisky ledge, the 9th Army Corps (G. Geyer) held the defense: the 15th, 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions. To the south, in the direction of Roslavl, - the 7th Army Corps (V. Farmbacher): 267th, 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions. The 10th Panzer Division was located in the reserve of the German command behind the Elnin ledge, and the 252nd Infantry Division of the 53rd Army Corps was located in the Roslavl region.

"Commanders and Chiefs

№	USSR/FULL NAME	Rank at the time of the battle		Germany	Rank at the time of the battle
	Zhukov G.K.	army General		Gunther von Kluge	field marshal general
	K.I.Rakutin	major general		Friedrich Matern	commander of the 20th army corps
	D.M. Seleznev	major general		G. Geyer	Commander of the 9th Army Corps

Side Plans

Soviet side

The idea of ​​the Yelninskaya operation provided for the breakthrough of the defense by counter strikes of the troops of the 24th Army from the north and south under the base of the ledge and the development of the offensive in order to encircle the main enemy forces. At the same time, it was planned to cut the German grouping with a strike from the east and destroy it in parts. The defeat of the Yelninskaya group was supposed to be completed by September 3. In the future, building on success, the army was to capture the city of Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line of Dolgie Niva, Khislavichi. The ratio of forces in the zone of the 24th Army was approximately equal: in people - 1.1: 1 in favor of the German grouping, in artillery - 1.6: 1 in favor of the Soviet 24th Army. Tanks on both sides were used to a limited extent. Air support was not planned, since all combat aircraft of the front were transferred to the Bryansk Front by the beginning of the operation at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Elninsk operation was part of a large-scale offensive by the Soviet troops on three fronts: Western, Reserve and Bryansk. To the north of the 24th Army against the German 9th Army (the Dukhovshchina group), the troops of the Western Front acted. South of the 24th Army, the Soviet 43rd Army was advancing in the direction of Roslavl. Even further south, the troops of the Bryansk Front (50th, 3rd and 13th armies) carried out the Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya offensive operation (August 30 - September 12).

German side

The general plan of the enemy's actions in the Smolensk direction was to cut the defenses of the Western Front into three parts, encircle and liquidate his Nevelsk, Smolensk and Mogilev groupings and thereby create favorable conditions for an attack on Moscow.

The course of hostilities

On August 30, 1941, the offensive of the 24th Army began, but in two days the Soviet troops deepened in some areas by only 2 km. In the next two days, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks in order to prevent the development of the offensive and to hold the mouth of the Yelny ledge. On September 3, Soviet troops resumed the offensive. By the end of the day, the formations of the northern and southern groups narrowed the neck of the Elninsk ledge to 6–8 km. Under the threat of encirclement, on September 3, the enemy began to withdraw his forces from the Yelnin sack, hiding behind strong rearguards along the entire front of the salient. The fascist German troops sought to avoid encirclement and put up stubborn resistance. By the end of September 5, the 100th Rifle Division occupied Chaptsovo (north of Yelnya), and the 19th Rifle Division broke into Yelnya. Other divisions also acted on the approach to the city. On September 6, Yelnya was liberated by Soviet troops. Colonel-General F. Halder, Chief of the German General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote in his diary: Our units surrendered to the enemy the arc of the front near Yelnya. For a long time, after our units had already been withdrawn, the enemy fired on these positions we had abandoned and only then cautiously occupied them with infantry. The hidden withdrawal of troops from this arc is a good achievement for the command. By the end of September 8, the divisions of the 24th Army completely liquidated the Yelninsk bridgehead and reached the defensive line along the Nov. Yakovlevichi, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuyevo.

Actions of the 43rd Army

On August 30, the offensive of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front also began. On the first day of the offensive, the Soviet 109th Panzer Division broke through the defenses of the German 23rd Infantry Division, advanced 12 kilometers and reached Kostyry. On August 31, the 267th Infantry and 10th Panzer Divisions were transferred to the breakthrough area, which launched a counterattack on the flanks of the 109th Division, which was surrounded. On September 1, commander G.K. Zhukov arrived at the command post of the 211th Infantry Division, who led the battle on the outskirts of the Stryan River. The battles for the withdrawal of units of the 109th Panzer Division from the encirclement west of the Desna continued until September 5th. Most of the fighters and commanders died or were captured, and the division ceased to exist as a military unit (on September 16 it was disbanded). Only on September 7, the divisions of the 43rd Army crossed Stryan and developed an offensive to the west, but on September 8 the enemy launched a counterattack, after which the Soviet troops went on the defensive. On September 12, the enemy resumed counterattacks. The next day, he pushed back the Soviet troops behind Stryan and occupied the western bank of the river, after which the fighting in this direction subsided. Simultaneously with the offensive near Bogdanov, the 43rd and 50th armies were to carry out an offensive south of the Warsaw highway from the Ivanovsky area to Koski and further to Roslavl. The attack here began on 2 September. The Soviet troops of the 50th Army met stubborn resistance and were unable to break through the enemy defenses. Fighting near Ivanovsky and to the south continued until September 15. By the beginning of the operation, the 137th, 78th, 292nd, and 268th infantry divisions of the enemy were defending in the Elninsk ledge on a front of more than 70 km. In total, the enemy grouping consisted of about 70 thousand soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars of 75 mm caliber and above, and about 40 tanks. The Military Council and the headquarters of the Reserve Front, after a comprehensive study of the situation, developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist group, which was defending itself in the Elninsk ledge. The plan of the operation was to break through the enemy defenses with counter strikes from the north and south under the base of the ledge and, developing the offensive, encircle the main forces of the 20th Army Corps. At the same time, it was planned to cut the enemy grouping with a strike from the east and destroy it in parts. Thus, taking into account the configuration of the front line, the concept of the operation was based on a decisive form of operational maneuver - two-sided envelopment with the aim of encircling and defeating the enemy piece by piece. At the same time, it was planned to complete the defeat of the Yelninskaya group by September 3 and reach the line of temporary storage. Carefree, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuyevo. In the future, building on success, the army was to capture Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line of Dolgie Niva, Hislovichi. The commander of the army, General K. I. Rakutin, in pursuance of the operational directive of the front, after clarifying the task and assessing the situation on August 26, made a decision and assigned tasks to the formation commanders. The idea of ​​the solution corresponded to the idea of ​​the operation. It was planned to break through the defense, encircle and defeat the enemy with the forces of nine rifle divisions out of thirteen available in the army (four divisions defended at the turn of the Uzha River, north of the Elnin ledge). They numbered about 60 thousand people, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket artillery installations of 76 mm caliber and above, and 35 tanks. To break through the defense and encircle the enemy, two strike groups consisting of five divisions were created - the northern (two rifle and one tank divisions) and the southern (rifle and motorized divisions). They were supposed to deliver counter blows under the base of the ledge in the general direction of Vys. Leonov to a depth of 10 km. At the same time, two divisions (102 TD and 303 RD), having closed the encirclement, formed the outer front, turning to the west, and three (107, 100 RD and 106 MD) formed the inner front, turning to the east. The decisive role in the operation was assigned to the northern strike group consisting of the 102nd tank, 107th and 100th rifle divisions, which received the largest number of forces and reinforcements and advanced in narrower lanes. So, the 107th rifle division (commander Colonel P.V. Mironov, commissar regimental commissar V.D. Stolyarov) was reinforced by the 275th corps, 573rd cannon and 544th howitzer (without one division) artillery regiments and two batteries of rocket launchers (BM-13). The division operated in a zone up to 4 km, breaking through the defenses in a section up to 2 km. The 102nd Tank (Commander Colonel I.D. Illarionov, Commissar Regimental Commissar V.A. Semenov) and 100th Rifle (Commander Major General I.N. Russiyanov, Commissar Senior Battalion Commissar K.I. Filyashkin) divisions were advancing respectively, in bands up to 4 and 8 km, making a breakthrough in sections of 1.5 and 3 km. In total, the northern group had about 400 guns and mortars of 76 mm caliber and above, almost half of which were reinforcement artillery. This amount of artillery made it possible to create a density of more than 60 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area. The southern strike group, consisting of the 303rd rifle and 106th motorized divisions, received about 100 guns and mortars for reinforcement. The main role was assigned to the 303rd Rifle Division (commander Colonel N.P. Rudnev, Commissar Regimental Commissar A.A. Golubev), which was given: a rifle regiment from the 106th division, two divisions of the 488th corps artillery regiment, 24th th mortar battalion, a battery of rocket launchers (BM-13), and later the 103rd separate tank battalion. She advanced in a strip of 8 km, breaking through the defenses in a section of 3 km. The 106th motorized division (commander Colonel A. N. Pervushin, commissar regimental commissar Ya. E. Agronik) had an offensive zone of about 10 km, broke through the enemy’s defenses in a 2 km sector. Soviet 102 TD, 103 and 106 MD, having no materiel, in fact, served as rifle divisions, 102 TD consisted of only 20 serviceable tanks, most of them with limited motor resources. Subsequently, the 103th detachment arrived, which had about 15 tanks. An important role, according to the decision of the army commander, was assigned to the central group, which included the 19th (commander Major General Ya. G. Kotelnikov, commissar brigade commissar A. P. Volov) and 309 senior battalion commissar M. I. Volostnikov) rifle divisions. They were supposed to, advancing from the east to Yelnya, cut the encircled troops into pieces and, in cooperation with other divisions, destroy them. These formations had offensive zones up to 6 and 4 km wide, respectively, making a breakthrough in sections of 3 and 2 km. However, to accomplish the assigned tasks, the forces and means in this group were clearly not enough. It consisted of only about 100 guns and mortars, and had no tanks at all. 103rd motorized (commander Major General I. I. Birichev, commissar battalion commissar F. F. Malinin) and 120 rifle (commander Major General K. I. Petrov, commissar regimental commissar I. B. Bulatov) divisions it was necessary to pin down the enemy in their lanes (10 and 15 km, respectively) and prevent the maneuver of his forces and means in other directions. The ratio of forces was approximately equal: in people - 1.1: 1 in favor of the enemy, in artillery - 1.6: 1 in favor of the 24th Army. Tanks on both sides were used to a limited extent. For the period of the operation, an artillery group was created in the army, consisting of an army long-range group (ADD) and infantry support groups (PP) in divisions. Artillery preparation was planned to last one hour. It was envisaged to reduce the duration of artillery preparation if the infantry reached the attack line, 300-400 m away from the enemy front line, earlier than the set time. However, in all cases, the last 10-minute, most powerful fire attack on the objects of attack and enemy artillery firing positions should not have been reduced. Artillery support was supposed to be carried out by the method of successive concentration of fire, as well as by the fire of individual batteries and escort guns operating in infantry combat formations. Air support was not planned, since all combat aircraft of the front were transferred to the Bryansk Front by the beginning of the operation at the direction of the Supreme Command Headquarters, with the exception of 20 aircraft left in the interests of the 24th Army for reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment. This circumstance, of course, significantly weakened the force of the blow of the army troops. During the preparation of the operation, the military councils and staffs of the front and the army made great efforts to take measures to ensure combat operations (combat, political, engineering, logistics, etc.). However, it was not possible to fully resolve all the issues due to the very limited period of preparation for the operation (only about 4 days) before the start of hostilities. For example, if the divisions were manned by 70-80%, then the material part of the artillery was only 25-50% (except for the 107th division, which had 90%). It was also not possible to accumulate the required amount of ammunition, as a result of which, as subsequent events showed, on the second day of the operation there was an acute shortage of them. All this required additional preparation time. But it was impossible to postpone the start of the operation. The offensive of the 24th Army was supposed to contribute to the success of the counterattacks of the Bryansk Front, inflicted on the 2nd tank group of the enemy advancing in the south. From the point of view of planning and preparing the Yelnin offensive operation, the creation of shock groups and the concentration of the main efforts at the base of the ledge in the main directions should be noted as a positive development. The groups included all serviceable tanks and about 80% of artillery. The operational formation of the army was one-echelon. This was due to the relatively shallow depth of the combat missions of the northern and southern strike groups (up to 10 km). It was supposed to complete the task by delivering a strong initial blow. The battle formations of many divisions were built in two echelons. In the course of hostilities, the Yelninsk offensive operation can be conditionally divided into three stages: the first - a breakthrough of organized defense in the directions of the main attacks (August 30-31); the second - the reflection of fierce counterattacks of the enemy, who sought to disrupt the offensive of the 24th Army (September 1-3); the third - the development of the offensive, the pursuit of the retreating enemy and the elimination of the Yelnin ledge (September 4-8). Scheme of the Elninsk operation At 7 am on August 30, 1941, about 800 guns, mortars and rocket launchers of the 24th Army, despite heavy fog and poor visibility, rained fire on the enemy defenses. Artillery preparation began. On this day, only the southern strike group achieved success, its divisions advanced up to 1.5 km in the breakthrough area. The formations of the northern strike group advanced less successfully. At 0800, the tanks of the 102nd Panzer Division successfully attacked the enemy, but the infantry fell behind and did not use their success. Instead of suppressing firing points with fire from a place before the infantry approached, the tanks retreated. The enemy took advantage of this, put himself in order, and in the course of subsequent attacks put up stubborn resistance to the division. In addition, due to the weakness of reconnaissance, the system of fire in the enemy defenses was not fully opened, especially in anti-tank respect. This, in particular, is evidenced by the fact that in the course of our two attacks alone, up to 10 anti-tank guns, 12 machine guns and 2 fascist gun bunkers were destroyed. Separate units of the regiments of the first echelon of the 107th Infantry Division did not have time to take their starting position, as a result of which a simultaneous strong attack did not work out. The second echelons of regiments, and then divisions, introduced into battle also failed to achieve significant results. In general, the formations of the northern group advanced only 500 meters on the first day of the battle. The divisions of the shock groups fought at night as well. In some areas they broke the resistance of the Nazis. The aviation did not provide significant assistance to the army formations either (by the beginning of the offensive, four aviation regiments arrived at the disposal of the front commander of the Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which supported the combat operations of the army formations). On the first day of the offensive, due to fog and poor knowledge of the area of ​​operations, she was able to strike at only two enemy airfields. At 0930, five PE-2s escorted by six MIG-3s bombarded the Selescha airfield, and at 1030 nine IL-2s and twelve Yak-1s bombarded Olsufievo. In the next two days, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks up to an infantry battalion with tanks, supported by artillery and aviation, against units of the 102nd Panzer, 107th, and 303rd Rifle Divisions, trying to prevent the development of the offensive and hold the mouth of the Yelnin ledge. The following example testifies to the stubbornness of our troops and the intensity of the fighting. The 586th Rifle Regiment of the 107th Rifle Division, which had penetrated the enemy's defenses, was counterattacked from several directions. The commander of the regiment, Colonel I. M. Nekrasov, being wounded, skillfully led the battle of his units. He ordered to organize an all-round defense, the personnel to dig into the ground, and all the artillery of the regiment was put forward for direct fire at. tanks. And it gave its results. The regiment withstood and successfully repulsed all attacks, and the soldiers of the 1st battalion captured two guns with ammunition during the battle and opened fire from them. . As early as August 31, the commander of the 24th Army, in order to develop the emerging success of the offensive, decided to create from the units of the 102nd, 107th and 100th divisions "a consolidated detachment consisting of a tank group, an airborne company, a motorized battalion and an artillery group of 10 guns (the formation area is a forest south of Monino , the detachment is called the "Ivanov Detachment"). It was supposed to be a swift blow in the direction of Sadki, Bol. Nezhod to go to the area of ​​Novo-Tishovo, Petrovo, cut the highway Elmya - Baltutino, organize all-round defense and prevent enemy reserves from approaching Elie. It was planned to bring him into battle in the band of the 107th Infantry Division, which had the greatest advance in depth. It had 20 tanks and a rifle company as a tank assault force. It was a kind of improvised mobile army group. Courage and courage were shown by the soldiers of the 100th Infantry Division. For example, the 355th Infantry Regiment of this division attacked a strong Mitino stronghold on September 3rd. The enemy, relying on pre-prepared positions, put up stubborn resistance. The first two frontal attacks were unsuccessful. Then the commander of the regiment, Major 3. S. Bagdasarov, decided to seize this stronghold with a simultaneous attack from three directions; from the west, north and southeast. The 1st rifle battalion operated most successfully, which, with the support of artillery fire, quickly broke into the village of Mitino from the west. During the battle, the soldiers of the 1st company, having mastered the enemy trenches, destroyed the Nazis in hand-to-hand combat and captured three machine guns. On the morning of September 3, the offensive and divisions of the southern group resumed. Despite the difficulties of the wooded and swampy terrain, they captured the settlements of Leonovo and Shcheplevo. Due to poor reconnaissance of the area, 15 tanks of the 103rd separate tank battalion, advancing with the infantry of the 303rd rifle division, got stuck in a swamp south of Leonov. By the morning of September 4, only 9 cars had been removed from the swamp. Thus, by the end of the day, the formations of the northern and southern groups, showing mass heroism, courage and determination, narrowed the neck of the Yelny ledge to 6-8 km. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow of the troops of the 24th Army and being under the threat of encirclement, on September 3 began to withdraw his forces from the Yelnin sack, hiding behind strong rearguards along the entire front of the ledge. The front commander demanded the shortest possible time to complete the encirclement of the enemy and capture Yelnya. To build up the strike of the northern group, he ordered the commander of the 24th Army to bring into battle one rifle regiment of the 127th rifle division, which was defending at the turn of the river. Already. The regiment rapidly attacked the enemy in the zone of the 102nd Panzer Division. The formations of the army along the entire front went over to the pursuit of the enemy. But on the flanks there were fierce battles. The fascist German troops tried to avoid encirclement and put up stubborn resistance. Our units, though slowly, but continued to move forward. By the end of September 5, the 100th Rifle Division occupied Chaptsovo (north of Yelnya), and the 19th Rifle Division broke into Yelnya. Other divisions also acted on the approach to the city. On September 6, Yelnya was liberated by Soviet troops. By the end of September 8, the divisions of the 24th Army completely liquidated the Yelninsk bridgehead and reached the defensive line along the Nov. Yakovlevichi, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuyevo. Repeated attempts made by the army to break through this line of the enemy did not yield significant results, and it was forced to move on to consolidating the success achieved.

However, it was not possible to fully implement the plan to encircle the entire Yelninskaya grouping of the 24th Army. The main reasons for this were: the general lack of forces and means in the army, the lack of clear interaction between infantry and tanks, the poor supply of ammunition to the troops and the inability of the commanders of the units to organize an offensive battle in a short time.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Yelninskaya offensive operation was one of the first in the Great Patriotic War, during which the enemy’s strong focal defenses were broken through, his group was defeated and expelled from a significant part of Soviet territory. From the experience of the operation, such issues as the preparation of the operation in a short time deserve attention; planning an operation with decisive goals; the use of such a form of operational maneuver as two-sided envelopment of a large enemy grouping with the aim of encircling it with its simultaneous dismemberment; massed forces and means. Despite the lack of general superiority in the sips, the army command managed to covertly create strike groups and achieve superiority in the breakthrough areas in the main directions. The lessons of breaking through the enemy's prepared focal defenses confirmed the need to have NPP tanks in infantry combat formations.

The experience of the operation carried out showed once again that the success of an offensive depends decisively on carefully thought-out and correctly organized cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation, as well as on firm continuous command and control.

For steadfastness in defense, courage and courage in the offensive, mass heroism, discipline and resourcefulness shown by the personnel of units and formations, many of them were awarded high government awards. The 100th and 127th rifle divisions of the 24th Army were the first to be awarded the title of guards, receiving the names of the 1st and 2nd guards rifle divisions, respectively. The ranks of the guards were then assigned to the 107th and 120th rifle divisions, which on September 26, 1941, were transformed into the 5th and 6th guards rifle divisions, respectively. Thus, here, in the battles near Yelnya, in 1941, the pride of our Armed Forces was born - the Soviet guard.

Fearless Commissar Shcherenko

The history of the Elninsk battle also included information about our countryman Commissar P.Ya.Shcherenko. A note from the divisional newspaper of that period under the title "Courageous Commissar".

Here is what it says:

“Together with the fighters, Commissar Comrade Shcherenko is on the front line. Fearlessness, contempt for death, courage, firm confidence in victory over the rabid bands of fascists - these are the features that are inherent in this genuine Bolshevik, glorious son of the Motherland, a real combat commissar.

Commissar Comrade Shcherenko remembers well that the place of a communist is in battle, where the success of this battle is decided, where the weakest sector is. On the position and in the trenches, he always raises the morale of the Red Army. They loved him like a father.

There was a hot fight. On one of the sectors of the front, the enemy had accumulated fresh forces. The enemy was overpowered. And here, at this critical moment of the battle, a commissar appears among the fighters of the unit. "Forward, against the damned enemy!" - I heard his battle call. The fighters, seeing their commissar near them, quickly rushed to the attack. In hand-to-hand combat, the fascist cannibals could not withstand the pressure of the red fighters and fled, covering the path with the corpses of their warriors. Together with the brave fighters, the fearless Commissar Comrade Shcherenko mercilessly destroyed the Nazis.

In the Engels Museum of Local Lore, in the exposition of the participants of the Great Patriotic War, there is a photograph of the commissar of the regiment Pyotr Yakovlevich Shcherenko.

On the back of the photo is written: “The picture was taken for the album and history of 309 s.d. 09/12/41 I am sending you that I am still alive today. Greetings, your husband and father."

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, P. Shcherenko was sent to the front in the Riga region, and three weeks later he was recalled to the Leningrad Military-Political School. F. Engels and from there sent to Kursk to participate in the formation of the regiment.

His colleague A. Belous wrote about the death of Commissar P. Shcherenko on October 5, 1941, in the area of ​​the state farm "Carefree" near Yelnya.

In response to a request to the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense from the Central Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense (ref. No. 6 / 735056 of February 12, 1986) they reported:

“... by order No. 66434 (whose order is not indicated) dated 07/15/1941, he was appointed deputy commander for political affairs of the 1957th rifle regiment;

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The withdrawal (withdrawal) of troops is one of the types of hostilities, as well as a military operation, as a rule, meaning that the retreating forces continue to maintain contact with the enemy. Withdrawal or withdrawal of troops may be carried out as part of a general retreat, to save strength, to take up positions that are easier to defend or to direct the enemy into an ambush.

Withdrawal or withdrawal is considered a relatively risky military operation that requires preparation so that it does not turn into a disorganized rout. Or in the most extreme case - did not produce a serious drop in the morale of the troops.

The Second World War, especially on the Soviet-German front, shows us some of the most beautiful withdrawal operations. These operations are divided into operations:

- tactical level- for example: the withdrawal of German troops near Yelnya in July - August 1941;

• - operating level- for example, the withdrawal of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht from the Rzhev region in the period from March 1 to March 22, 1943;
• - strategic level- for example, the withdrawal of the army group " BUT from the Caucasus in January - February 1943.

Soviet and modern Russian historiography deals exclusively with operations carried out by Soviet troops, of which there is not a single one that could be called a successful operation to withdraw Soviet troops. As always, we are not going to review the operations of the Second World War based on any Soviet sources.

The main Soviet sources of the Second World War are still closed, no one is going to digitize them, and most importantly, even if they are ever open, they will still require registration. The German sources of World War II have been discovered and digitized for a long time, any researcher can watch and study them.

Recently, since 2010, there have been some archival soviet maps dated 1941, and which, for example, show " Breakthrough of the Germans and the encirclement of the Bryansk Front"(Figure 1st). You can pay attention to the poor quality of the map.

Soviet military headquarters always and at all times (taking their continuity from the Russian imperial army) were distinguished by a special reverence for art, in terms of working out any cards. Because looking at this map environment”For 1941, displayed carelessly, it becomes surprising and incomprehensible, where did the artistic talent of Soviet staff workers go? Other Soviet maps depicted in Figures 2 and 4 are also not distinguished by the beauty of staff culture.

Figure 1st. Part of a Soviet map showing the breakthrough and encirclement of the Bryansk Front in October 1941 (the authenticity of the map is doubtful).

Figure 2. Working map of the head of the operational department of the Western Front with the situation on the front of the 20th and 24th armies, in the period from September 1 to September 6, 1941. (Compare it with figure 3, part of the German map for September 4, 1941 - the Soviet command does not know which German divisions were in the Yelnin ledge on September 4).

Figure 3. Part of the German map for September 4, 1941. Compare the data on the situation in the area of ​​the Elninsk ledge with the Soviet map, in Figure 2.

Figure 4th. Work map of senior lieutenant Antonov, data on the situation in the area of ​​the Elninsk ledge on August 22, 1941.

The data on the German units located in the ledge also do not correspond to the actual ones. Most likely, Senior Lieutenant Antonov was a scout if he uses a 1:100,000 scale map, in which case the result of the work of Soviet intelligence is very revealing. For comparison, figure 5 shows a part of the German map for August 22, 1941, please note that the numbering of the Soviet units fully corresponds to the Soviet map.

Figure 5. Part of the German map for August 22, 1941. This situation on the German map is more than a clear indicator of the work of their intelligence.

The tactical level of the operation to withdraw troops - the withdrawal of German troops near Yelnya in August 1941

On the outskirts of Yelna, the German units left on July 18, 1941 (Figure 6). On July 19, 1941, German units of the 10th Wehrmacht Panzer Division entered Yelnya (Figures 7 and 8). On July 20, 1941, the German Elninsk defensive and distracting operation begins (Figure 9). For parts of the Soviet army in 1941 (RKKA) the Elninsk operation was an offensive operation.

Figure 6. Part of the German map for July 18, 1941, the advanced units of the German 10th Panzer Division, 2nd Panzer Group (not getting involved in battles with Soviet units) are on the outskirts of the city of Yelnya.

Figure 7th. Part of the German map for July 19, 1941. Part of a map showing the general situation in the Smolensk region on July 19, 1941, the beginning of the formation of the Smolensk encirclement of the Red Army in July 1941.

Figure 8. Part of the German map for July 19, 1941. The advanced - the reconnaissance battalion of the German 10th Panzer Division captured the city of Yelnya.

Figure 9. Part of the German map for 20 July 1941. The actual beginning of the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya.

The German defensive operation continued until September 4, 1941 (Figure 3) inclusive. German map dated September 5, 1941 (Figure 10), which shows that the Germans are no longer in the Yelny ledge. However, the Soviet troops still surround him, that is, this map confirms that the Soviet intelligence did not notice the German withdrawal.

Just think about it, from July 20 to September 4, 1941, ‒ 47 days, the Soviet command every day conducts an offensive in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Yelnya. Four - six attacks per day, let's average, let there be 5 attacks per day, so for 47 days the German units (on average) withstood ‒ 235 Soviet attacks (Figures 11 to 19 ).

Figure 10. Part of the German map for September 5, 1941. Please note that there are no German units in the Yelninsky ledge, and the Soviet units are still in their positions.

Figure 11. Part of the German map for July 31, 1941. Please note that the Germans use Soviet defensive positions to defend Yelnya.

Figure 12. Part of the German map for August 1, 1941. The Germans completed the encirclement of the Soviet units (begun in July) near Smolensk. Please note that the Soviet command does not attempt to help its own encircled units.

Figure 13th. Part of the German map for August 3, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​​​the Elninsky ledge (and the Smolensk battle in general).

Directly near Roslavl, the encirclement of units of the Soviet 28th Army is observed: 4 rifle divisions: 135th, 145th, 149th and 222nd; 3 rifle brigades: 132nd, 160th and 162nd, as well as 5 tank brigades (222nd tank division): 6th, 65th, 55th, 129th and 133rd th.

Figure 14th. Part of the German map for August 5, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​​​the Elninsky ledge and the entire Smolensk battle.

Figure 15th. Part of the German map for August 5, 1941. The position of the Yelny ledge is unchanged.

Figure 16th. Part of the German map for 23 August 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​​​the Yelninsky ledge and the beginning of the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian in the direction of the settlement of Lokhvitsa (on September 16, 1941, one of the greatest encirclements in world military history, Soviet troops near Kyiv, will take place).

Figure 17th. Part of the German map for August 30, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​the Smolensk battle. The Germans leveled (since July 19) the front line, in addition, it can be observed that on August 30 the Germans entered the settlement of Pochep.

Figure 18. Part of the German map for September 1, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​the completed Smolensk battle. The German units completely leveled the front line.

Figure 19. Part of the German map for September 2, 1941. The position of the Yelnin ledge is unchanged, however, the German command no longer needs it. The risk that was offered at the headquarters of the army group " Center"(Günther von Kluge) fully justified itself. From September 2, the preparation of German units to leave the Yelninsky ledge begins.

Now, seeing from the maps the situation in the Smolensk region, we will analyze three questions when studying the Yelnin battle. The first question is - Why did the Germans need the settlement of Yelnya at all? The second question - Why did the Germans capture it, as they say on the move, and then, in the course of leveling their own front line from north to south, they stubbornly hold it, and then, also quickly leave it? The third question - Was the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya really as important as it is presented to us?

First question: Why did the Germans need Yelnya at all??

The settlement of Yelnya (Smolensk region) is a nodal settlement, not only a railway, but also a junction of ordinary roads in the Smolensk region, to the present. The next junction station after Yelnya (along the same railway line) is Spas-Demyansk.

On ordinary roads, Yelnya (through Dorogobuzh) has access to Vyazma (further on to Moscow). That is, Yelnya is not just a settlement, Yelnya is, first of all, a settlement that is of the greatest interest in terms of operatives. That is, the implementation of logistics.

But in the existing operation of the summer of 1941, Yelnya did not represent any tactical or operational interest, since several Soviet armies were surrounded in the Smolensk region, the 2nd Panzer Group pulled far ahead, it was the Yelninsky ledge that was at its peak. At the same time, the right flank for the 2nd Panzer Group, the 1st Panzer Group was located on the Dnieper in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Kremenchug. Between the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group and the 1st Panzer Group, a giant funnel was formed by the bend of the Dnieper River.

Second question: Why did the Germans capture him, as they say, on the move, and then, in the course of leveling their own front line from north to south, they stubbornly hold him, and then leave him?

An analysis of the German maps of the Soviet-German front of World War II for the end of July, the whole of August, and the beginning of September 1941 shows that the Germans most likely carried out the defense of Yelnya solely as a distraction operation against the Soviet troops. And what is most surprising is that the Soviet high command does not notice this German trick, does not want to pay attention to the ongoing German operations in the south (south of Kyiv), as well as in the north (near Leningrad). As a result, the settlement of Yelnya for the Soviet command turned not just into a goal, but into a goal for the sake of a goal. It is simply impossible to explain this from the point of view of normal logic.

It is difficult for us people of the 21st century to understand the need for everyday offensive operations carried out according to the same scenario, day after day. And every day for 5 - 6 times. The Soviet command, focusing its attention on the village of Yelnya, completely ignores the fact that on August 3, 1941, German units of the 4th Panzer Division, for example, capture the city of Roslavl.

But the most important thing is not even that. To the greatest regret for the dead Soviet servicemen during the Second World War (no matter how we treat them), the Red Army was commanded by not quite developed militarily " commanders", who did not understand at all the actions that the Germans carried out in 1941.

After all, the Soviet command was well aware that the initial stage of the German offensive in 1941 - it lost. Therefore, in the current situation of the ongoing German offensive, there is only one method of deterrence - it is called - defense. However, the Soviet command was not going to defend.

For the success of leveling the font line (and diverting the attention of the Soviet command from the events south of Smolensk), the headquarters of the army group " Center"under the leadership of Günther von Kluge, offered to take a certain risk (in carrying out a distraction operation). Günther von Kluge knowing commitment and " love"The Soviet command to converging operations deliberately offered to hold the Yelnin ledge.

And so it happened, this ledge fettered the attention of the Soviet command, and literally diverted many reserves from other equally significant operations in 1941. By holding the Yelninsky ledge, that is, holding it with small forces against several Soviet armies, the 4th Army received a strategic alignment of the front line, and the 2nd Panzer Group developed an offensive to encircle the Soviet troops near Kyiv.

Therefore, the abandonment of the key settlement occurs with such ease, after the German units have leveled their own front line from north to south, which indicates that they were not tied to settlements. Binding to them was only in the case when one or another offensive operation took place.

Ultimately, the village of Yelnya was captured by the Germans in the same 1941, on October 4, 1941.

Third question: Was the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya really as important as it is presented to us?

The Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya, which lasted from July 20 to September 4, 1941, was completely pointless. Successful, she became only for the reason that the Germans left her. Moreover, the Germans left it only after they completed other operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. In addition to wasting their own resources and pathetic explanations that " during that operation, the Soviet guard was born»Soviet historiography has nothing more.

However, all this born Soviet guard» On October 4, 1941, he was surrounded, and in the period from October 7 to 11, 1941, he was taken prisoner.

« Greatness» Yelninskaya offensive operation of 1941 Soviet « historiography” was created only to lead any researcher into a dead end. Second " purpose of greatness"of this offensive operation, so that people get the impression that absolutely no other operations, except for the offensive near Yelnya, were carried out in July, August and early September 1941 on the Soviet-German front.

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