Strategy

Blitzkrieg is based on the close interaction of infantry and tank formations with the support of aviation. The blitzkrieg strategy is similar to the theory of a deep offensive operation adopted in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (S. N. Ammosov, V. K. Triandafillov, K. B. Kalinovsky and others). According to the blitzkrieg strategy, tank units, supported by infantry, break through behind enemy lines, bypassing and surrounding heavily fortified positions. Encircled enemy formations that are experiencing difficulties with the supply of ammunition, equipment and food are easily achieved by the advancing or surrendered.

An important feature of the blitzkrieg is that the main enemy forces are not the main targets of the offensive. After all, the battle with them gives the enemy the opportunity to use most of his military potential, which means unjustifiably dragging out the military operation. The priority task of the blitzkrieg is to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to continue successful combat operations even while maintaining manpower, equipment and ammunition. And for this it is necessary, first of all, to capture or destroy control systems, transport infrastructure, supplies and transport hubs.

Practical use

One of the first attempts to conduct a blitzkrieg was made by German troops during the First World War on the Western Front. According to the Schlieffen plan, it was supposed to deliver a lightning strike on France, end the war with her by signing a victorious peace in 1.5-2 months, and then switch to the Eastern Front. However, the resistance of the French and Belgian troops thwarted these plans, the lack of tanks and the imperfection of aviation of that era, as well as the successful offensive of the Russian army in East Prussia, played a role, which required the transfer of part of the forces to repel it. All this led to the fact that the German troops advanced too slowly, and the Allies managed to pull up their forces and win the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. The war took on a protracted character.

For the first time, a blitzkrieg in practice was brilliantly carried out by German military strategists (Manstein, von Kleist, Guderian, Rundstedt and others) at the beginning of World War II during the capture of Poland: by the end of September, Poland ceased to exist, although more than a million non-mobilized people of military age remained in it. In France, the manpower reserves were also not exhausted by the time the armistice was signed. The entire campaign in France took only 6 weeks: from May 10 to June 21, 1940, and in Poland - 5 weeks from September 1 to October 5 (the date the resistance of the last regular units of the Polish army ceased) 1939. At the beginning of World War II, the blitzkrieg strategy allowed the Nazi Germany to quickly destroy the Soviet troops in the strip 100-300 km east of the border between the USSR with Germany and its allies. However, the loss of time by the Nazis to destroy the encircled Soviet troops, the wear and tear of equipment and the resistance of the defenders ultimately led to the failure of the blitzkrieg strategy on this front.

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See what "Lightning War" is in other dictionaries:

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"Lightning War"- LIGHTNING WAR, blitzkrieg (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning, Krieg war), a theory of aggressive warfare developed by the German. militarists in the early 20th century and underlying the military. Germany's strategy in the 1st and 2nd world wars ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia

- “blitzkrieg” (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), a theory of warfare created by German militarists with the aim of achieving complete victory over the enemy in the shortest possible time, calculated in days or months. German calculations... Great Soviet Encyclopedia

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Books

• Blitzkrieg Hitler. "Lightning War", Baryatinsky Mikhail Borisovich. This book is the most profound study of the "lightning war" strategy, the story of the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, of the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg. …

The main method of war of the Third Reich, due to lack of resources and the fact that Germany began to form its military power relatively recently, due to the prohibitions of the Versailles Treaty, until 1933, its capabilities were limited, was the "blitzkrieg".

The Wehrmacht tried to crush the main enemy forces with the first strike, by achieving the maximum concentration of forces in the main directions of attack. On April 3, 1939, the original plan for the war with Poland, the Weiss plan - the White Plan, developed by the headquarters of the German Armed Forces, was sent to the commander of the ground forces, air force and navy. By May 1, the commanders had to give their opinion regarding the war with Poland. The date of the attack on the Polyakov was also named - September 1, 1939. By April 11, the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) developed the "Directive on the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for the war for 1939-1940", it was signed by Adolf Hitler.

The basis of the White Plan was the "blitzkrieg" plan - the Polish armed forces intended to dismember, surround and destroy with swift deep blows. Armored units and the Luftwaffe were to play a big role in this. The main blows were to be delivered by the Army Group "North" from Pomerania and East Prussia and "South" from the territory of Moravia and Silesia, they were supposed to defeat the main forces of the Polish army west of the Vistula and Narew rivers. The German Navy was supposed to block the Polish bases from the sea, destroy the Polish Navy, and support the ground forces.

The defeat and capture of Poland was planned not only in order to solve the problem of Danzig and connect the territories of the two parts of the Reich (East Prussia was an enclave), but also as a stage in the struggle for world domination, the most important step in the implementation of the "Eastern program" of the Nazis, the expansion of "living space" Germans. So, on May 23, 1939, at a meeting with the military, Hitler said: “Danzig is by no means the object because of which everything is being done. For us, it is about expanding living space in the East and providing food, as well as solving the Baltic problem.” That is, there was no talk only about the defeat of Poland and the solution of the Danzig problem, there was no “Polish corridor”, from the very beginning they planned to deprive Poland of statehood, they were waiting for a policy of genocide and plunder of resources in favor of Germany.

In addition, the territory of Poland was to become an important springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union. The defeat of Poland was to be the first step in preparing an attack on France.

Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Walter Brauchitsch.

Hitler and Brauchitsch at the parade on October 5, 1939.

The capture of Czechoslovakia and Memel by Germany sharply complicated the military-strategic position of Poland, the Wehrmacht got the opportunity to strike from the north and south. With the capture of Czechoslovakia, the Wehrmacht and its capabilities strengthened, capturing a powerful Czech industry and a lot of equipment.

The main problem for the military-political leadership of Germany was the need to avoid a war on two fronts - an attack by the French army from the west, with the assistance of England. In Berlin, it was believed that Paris and London would continue to adhere to the course of "appeasement", the Munich course. So, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, wrote in his diary that Hitler was sure that England would threaten, stop trade for a while, maybe recall the ambassador, but would not enter the war. General K. Tippelskirch confirms this: “Despite the existing Franco-Polish alliance and the guarantees that England gave Poland at the end of March ... Hitler hoped that he managed to limit himself to a military conflict with Poland alone.” Guderian: "Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop were inclined to believe that the Western powers would not dare to start a war against Germany and therefore they had a free hand to carry out their goals in Eastern Europe."

In principle, Hitler was right, Paris and London "saved face" by declaring war on Germany, but in reality they did nothing to help Poland - the so-called "strange war". And the opportunity was left to settle the bloodless "war" between Germany and France, England.

Hitler also played on the anti-Soviet sentiments of the elite of France and England, presenting the attack on Poland as a preparation for a strike against the Union, hiding his next stage on the path to dominance in Europe - the defeat of France. In addition, a quick, lightning-fast defeat of Poland was supposed to prevent the Anglo-French forces from actually being drawn into the war with Germany. Therefore, to cover the western border of Germany, a minimum of forces and means was allocated, without tanks. Only 32 divisions were deployed there, with 800 aircraft - Army Group "C", of which only 12 divisions were fully equipped, the rest were sharply inferior in their combat capabilities. They could only be used for positional warfare, and then only in secondary areas. These divisions were supposed to keep the defense on the border with a length of about 1390 km, with Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the fortified line "Siegfried" was still under construction and could not be a reliable support.

By the beginning of the war in Poland, France alone had 78 divisions on the eastern border, more than 17 thousand guns and mortars, about 2 thousand tanks (excluding light armored vehicles), 1400 first-line aircraft and 1600 aircraft in reserve. In the very first days, this grouping could be significantly strengthened. Plus the support of the Navy and the British Air Force.

The German generals were aware of this and were very nervous, as Manstein wrote: “The risk taken by the German command was very large ... there is no doubt that the French army from the very first day of the war was many times superior to the German forces operating on the Western Front” .

German soldiers on the border of Poland.

The task of crushing the defeat of the Polish army, the maximum concentration of forces and means

The task of the total defeat and destruction of the Polish troops was finally formulated by A. Hitler at a meeting with the highest generals on August 22, 1939: “Goal: Destruction of Poland, elimination of its manpower. This is not about reaching some line or a new border, but about destroying the enemy, which should be steadily strived for by any means ... The winner is never judged and never asked ... ". The Directive on the plan of attack on Poland by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Colonel General Brauchitsch, begins with these words: "The purpose of the operation is the destruction of the Polish Armed Forces."

To do this, the Wehrmacht concentrated its forces and means against Poland as much as possible: all the most trained divisions, all tanks, the 1st and 4th air fleets were directed against it. By September 1, 1939, 54 divisions were concentrated in full combat readiness (a few more were in reserve - a total of 62 divisions were put up against the Poles): in the North Army Group, 3 and 4 armies, in the South Army Group, 8, 10 , 14th Army. The total number of invasion forces totaled 1.6 million people, 6 thousand. artillery pieces, 2,000 aircraft and 2,800 tanks. In addition, the Polish command made it easier for the Wehrmacht by dispersing its forces along the entire border, trying to cover the entire border, instead of trying to tightly close the main directions of possible strikes, concentrating on them the maximum possible number of forces and means.

Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, had: 21 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized, 4 light, 3 mountain rifle divisions; there are 9 more divisions in reserve, more than 1000 tanks. The commander of Army Group North, Theodor von Bock, had 14 infantry divisions, 2 tank, 2 motorized, 1 cavalry brigade, 2 divisions in reserve. Both army groups attacked in a general direction towards Warsaw, towards the Vistula, at Army Group South the 10th Army advanced on Warsaw, the weaker 8th and 14th supported it with offensive actions. In the center, the Wehrmacht concentrated relatively small forces, they had to distract the enemy, misleading him about the main directions of attack.

Gerd von Rundstedt, led Army Group South.

As a result, the Wehrmacht managed to concentrate overwhelming superiority on the directions of the main attacks: 8-fold in tanks, 4-fold in field artillery, 7-fold in anti-tank artillery. In addition, measures were successfully taken to camouflage large forces, including mechanized ones.

The maximum rate of advance of tank and motorized divisions was planned, they were assigned not to be distracted by the final destruction of the defeated Polish units, assigning this task, as well as covering the flanks and rear to the infantry divisions. They were supposed to prevent the Polish command from carrying out measures to mobilize, concentrate, regroup troops, and capture the most important economic regions intact. On August 14, Hitler set the task of defeating Poland as soon as possible - 8-14 days, after which the main forces were to be released for possible actions on other fronts. On August 22, Hitler declared: “A quick outcome of hostilities is necessary ... The main thing is speed. persecution to the point of complete annihilation."

An important role in disrupting the enemy’s mobilization measures was assigned to aviation, it was supposed to strike at Polish mobilization centers, disrupt traffic on the railways, along the highway, and prevent the Poles from concentrating the grouping of forces in the offensive zone of the 10 Army, in Western Galicia, west of the Vistula ; disrupt the organization of defense measures in the offensive zone of Army Group North at the Vistula-Drevenz line and on the Narew.

Destruction of the enemy by envelopment and encirclement: The White Plan was based on the idea of ​​deep encirclement, encirclement, and destruction of the main forces of the Polish armed forces west of the Vistula and Narew rivers. This plan was brought to life by a successful strategic position - the ability to deploy troops on the territory of the former Czechoslovakia. By the way, Slovakia also allocated a couple of divisions for the war with Poland. The Poles angered them so much with their territorial claims.

As a result, the Wehrmacht attacked with two flank groups that were far from each other, almost completely abandoning major operations in the center.

Theodor von Bock, commander of Army Group North.

Diplomatic cover, disinformation measures

In order to be able to strike as suddenly as possible, Berlin hid its intentions even from its allies, Rome and Tokyo. At the same time, secret negotiations were held with England, France, Poland, declarations of commitment to the idea of ​​peace were proclaimed, even the party congress scheduled for September was called the “peace congress”.

To intimidate the French to keep them from entering the war, Hitler defiantly visited the "Siegfried Line" at the end of July, although the command and Hitler knew that she was not ready to raise a fuss on the radio in the media, about her complete readiness and "impregnability". Even the photos of the "new" defensive structures were still old fortifications - until 1933. Rumors spread about the concentration of large forces in the West. As a result, in Warsaw they “pecked” and believed that if the war did start, the main forces of Germany would fight in the West, there would be auxiliary forces against it, and that they would even be able to carry out an offensive operation against East Prussia themselves.

Putting pressure on Warsaw over Danzig and the construction of a railway and a highway in the "Polish corridor", Berlin at the same time spoke about the general direction of the struggle - against the USSR, about a possible joint campaign to the East, the Poles were promised Ukraine and access to the Black Sea. Depriving Poland in this way of the only opportunity to survive, it will agree to the help of the USSR, which it has repeatedly offered, until the conclusion of a pact with Germany.

On the border with Poland, the construction of defensive structures was launched, lulling the vigilance of the Poles. This was one of the largest and most costly measures to mislead Poland. Since the spring of 1939, the so-called "Eastern Wall" was being built and the pace of construction was quite high, entire divisions of the Wehrmacht participated in the construction. At the same time, the construction also explained the high concentration of Wehrmacht forces on the border with Poland. The transfer of additional units to East Prussia was disguised by preparations for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the victory over the Russian army near Tannenberg in August 1914.

Polish prisoners of war in a temporary German camp in Poland, September 1939.

Even covert mobilization began only on August 25, it was considered that there would be enough available forces and therefore the full deployment of all forces could be neglected. Therefore, we decided to temporarily refrain from creating a reserve army. Territorial divisions of the Landwehr. The deployment of aviation was planned only on the very first day of the war.

As a result, even before the official mobilization, Berlin was able to transfer and deploy for the invasion 35% of the wartime ground forces, 85% of armored, 100% of motorized and light divisions, only 63% of the forces allocated for the war with Poland. In the first operations against Poland, 100% of motorized and 86% of tank forces and only 80% of the forces planned for the entire military campaign against Poland were able to participate. This made it possible to carry out the first strike with all the might of the main forces, while by September 1 the Poles had completed only 60% of the mobilization plan, deploying 70% of the troops.

Campground of German troops in front of the border with Poland shortly before the German invasion. Shooting time: 08/31/1939-09/01/1939.

German dive bombers Junkers Ju-87 (Ju-87) in the skies of Poland, September 1939.

Outcome

In general, the plan was carried out, but the reasons for this were not only that the Wehrmacht was magnificent, there are other fundamental reasons: the weakness of Poland itself. The Polish elite completely failed the pre-war stage, both politically and diplomatically and militarily. They did not seek an alliance with the USSR, they finally became its enemy, they did not make concessions on the issue of Danzig and the construction of a highway and a railway to East Prussia - although there was a possibility that Berlin would limit itself to this and, as a result, Poland would, as it wanted, become a satellite of Germany , in the war with the USSR. They chose the wrong defense strategy - dispersing forces along the entire border, before the war they did not pay enough attention to aviation, air defense systems, and anti-tank artillery.

The Polish military-political leadership behaved disgustingly, not using all the possibilities for the struggle, they abandoned their people and the army, when they were still fighting, fled, thus finally breaking the will to resist.

Berlin was lucky that people not like de Gaulle were sitting in Paris, a blow from the French army would have put Germany on the brink of disaster, the way to Berlin was actually open. It would be necessary to urgently transfer forces to the West, stopping the offensive of the French army, the Poles would continue to resist. Hitler would have received a real war on two fronts, a protracted one, for which Germany was not ready, she would have had to look for a way out in diplomacy.

German soldiers inspect an abandoned single-turret Polish Vickers tank; it is distinguished from the usual one by a large air intake casing with a grill

Polish 7TP tanks, captured by the Germans, pass by the main stands at the parade on the occasion of the first anniversary of the surrender of Polish troops on October 6, 1940. The high stands are attended by Governor Hans Frank and Field Marshal Wilhelm List. Shooting time: 10/06/1940. Location: Warsaw, Poland.

The German army marches through the captured Warsaw, the capital of Poland.

Sources:
Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 1937-1939. In 2 vols. M., 1981.
Kurt von Tippelskirch. Second World War. Blitzkrieg. M., 2011.
Manstein E. Lost victories. Memoirs of a Field Marshal. M., 2007.
Solovyov B.G. Surprise of an attack is a weapon of aggression. M., 2002.
http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html
http://waralbum.ru/category/war/east/poland_1939/

Most military historians are inclined to think that if the plan of the Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen had been implemented, the First World War could have gone completely to the scenario. But back in 1906, the German strategist was removed from his post and his followers were afraid to implement Schlieffen's idea.

Lightning war plan

At the beginning of the last century, Germany began planning for a major war. This was due to the fact that France, defeated several decades earlier, was clearly hatching plans for military revenge. The German leadership was not particularly afraid of the French threat. But in the east, Russia, which was an ally of the Third Republic, was gaining economic and military power. For Germany, there was a real danger of a war on two fronts. Well aware of this, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered von Schlieffen to develop a plan for a victorious war under these conditions.

And Schlieffen, in a fairly short time, created such a plan. According to his idea, Germany was to start the first war against France, concentrating 90% of all its armed forces in this direction. Moreover, this war was supposed to be lightning fast. Only 39 days were allotted for the capture of Paris. For the final victory - 42.

It was assumed that Russia would not be able to mobilize in such a short time. German troops, after the victory over France, will be transferred to the border with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm approved the plan, saying at the same time the famous phrase: "We will have lunch in Paris, and we will have dinner in St. Petersburg."

Failure of the Schlieffen Plan

Helmuth von Moltke, who replaced Schlieffen with the Chief of the German General Staff, took the Schlieffen plan without much enthusiasm, considering it too risky. And for this reason, he subjected him to a thorough processing. In particular, he refused to concentrate the main forces of the German army on the western front and, for reasons of precaution, sent a significant part of the troops to the east.

But Schlieffen planned to cover the French army from the flanks and completely encircle it. But due to the transfer of significant forces to the east, the German group of troops on the western front simply did not have enough available funds for this. As a result, the French troops not only were not surrounded, but also managed to launch a powerful counterattack.

The calculation of the slowness of the Russian army in terms of protracted mobilization also did not justify itself. The invasion of Russian troops into East Prussia literally stunned the German command. Germany found itself in the grip of two fronts.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

The Barbarossa plan is a plan for Germany's attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to be ended by November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, a 12th century emperor who became famous for his conquests. This traced elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany prepared 190 divisions for war and 24 divisions as a reserve. For the war, 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated. The total number of the contingent that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in the technology of the USSR should not be taken into account, since by the beginning of the wars, German technical tanks and aircraft were superior to Soviet ones, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

The Barbarossa plan defined 3 main directions for the strike:

• Army Group South. A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group Center. Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, leveling the line "Wave - Northern Dvina".
• Army Group North. Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance towards Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the army "Norway" was to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to the Barbarossa plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic States, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
population	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29 division + army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Approximately by the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga-Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan of the blitzkrieg. After the blitzkrieg, the lands beyond the Urals should have remained, which, without the support of the center, would quickly surrender to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that only a few weeks were left before the end of the war with the USSR is the speech of Goebbels. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans additionally collect warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army advanced rapidly, winning victories, the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 disabled.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

During the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops inland was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the army group "North" occupied almost the entire territory of the Baltic states, providing access to Leningrad, the army group "Center" reached Smolensk, the army group "South" went to Kyiv. These were the last achievements that fully corresponded to the plan of the German command. After that, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

German failures in the North

The army "North" occupied the Baltic states without problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. It turned out that the Wehrmacht was not capable of this task. The city did not capitulate to the enemy, and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany failed to capture it.

Failures of the Army Center

The "Center" army reached Smolensk without any problems, but got stuck under the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advance of the troops, since such a delay under the city, which was planned to be taken without heavy losses, was unacceptable and cast doubt on the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the battle for Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, as they managed to stop the advance of troops on Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army of the South

The "South" army reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like the "Center" army near Smolensk, got stuck in battles. In the end, it was possible to take the city in view of the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance, and made a significant contribution to the disruption of the Barbarossa plan.

Map of the advance plan of the German troops

Above is a map showing the plan of the German command for the offensive. The map shows: green - the borders of the USSR, red - the border to which Germany planned to reach, blue - the deployment and the plan for the advancement of the German forces.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• In the Center, with great difficulty, we managed to get to Moscow. At the time the German army entered the Soviet capital, it was clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South, they failed to take Odessa and capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, the Nazi troops had only captured Kyiv and launched an offensive against Kharkov and the Donbass.

Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?

Germany failed the blitzkrieg because the Wehrmacht was preparing the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, on false intelligence. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The lightning war tactics were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was sure that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then rapidly move inland without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed, and Germany could not win the war. The fact that World War II lasted until 1945 only proves that the Germans fought very organized and brave. Due to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they managed to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(landmark - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, because the lightning war did not work, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark - intelligence data) - the plan was implemented. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan on the basis that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country's border, there were no additional defense echelons. There are no reserves and reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command has reserves, not all troops are located on the border, mobilization brings quality soldiers into the army, there are additional lines of defense, the "charm" of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kyiv.

Therefore, the disruption of the Barbarossa plan must be regarded as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians associate this person with the agents of England, but there is no evidence for this. But if we assume that this is indeed the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris slipped an absolute “linden” to Hitler that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

In the early 40s of the twentieth century, the main leadership of Germany tried to develop its own unique plan to take over the Soviet Union. The uniqueness of the idea was its time frame. It was assumed that the seizure would last no more than five months. The development of this document was approached very responsibly, not only Hitler himself worked on it, but also his inner circle. Everyone understood that if they did not quickly occupy the territory of a huge state and did not stabilize the situation in their favor, many adverse consequences could occur. Hitler clearly understood that he had already begun the Second World War and quite successfully, however, in order to achieve all the goals set, maximum resources should be attracted, including mental ones. In the event of a failure in the plan, the Union can be provided with a variety of assistance by other countries that are not interested in the victory of Nazi Germany. Fuhrer understood that the defeat of the USSR would enable Germany's ally to completely untie his hands in Asia and prevent the insidious United States of America from interfering.
The European continent was firmly in Adolf's hands, but he wanted more. Moreover, he was well aware that the USSR was not a powerful enough country (yet) and I. Stalin would not be able to openly oppose Germany, but his interests were in Europe and, in order to eliminate any inclinations, it was necessary to eliminate the opponent undesirably in the future.

Adolf Hitler planned to end the war against the Soviet Union before he could end the war against Great Britain. It was going to be the fastest company ever to conquer vast territory in such a short time. The ground forces of Germany were planned to be sent to conduct combat operations. The Air Force will have to fully provide any necessary support in order to cover and protect its military. Any actions that are planned to take place on the territory of the Soviet Union must be fully coordinated with the command and must not interfere with the established interests of capturing Great Britain.
It was said that all large-scale actions aimed at the thorough preparation of a lightning capture against the USSR should be carefully disguised so that the enemy could not find out about them and not take any countermeasures.

Hitler's Biggest Mistakes

Many historians, who have been studying the situation with the development and implementation of a plan for the instant capture of the Union for several decades, come to one single thought - regarding the adventurousness and senselessness of this idea. The commanding fascist generals also gave an assessment of the plan. They considered it the main, one might say fatal mistake - the Fuhrer's keen desire to occupy the territory of the country of the Soviets until the final end of the war with England.
Hitler wanted to start action in the fall of the fortieth year, but his military leaders were able to dissuade him from this crazy idea, citing a lot of convincing arguments. The events described suggest that Hitler had an obsessive obsession with establishing complete world domination and a crushing and intoxicating victory in Europe did not give him the opportunity to thoughtfully make some of the most important strategic decisions.
The second, most important, according to historians, mistake in the plan was that they constantly retreated from it. Hitler changed his instructions several times, because of which precious time was lost. Although he surrounded himself with excellent commanders, whose advice would help him achieve what he wanted and conquer the territory of the country of councils. However, they were opposed by the personal ambitions of the dictator, which were higher for the Fuhrer than common sense.
In addition, an important mistake of the Fuhrer is the involvement of only part of the combat-ready divisions. If all possible forces were involved, the consequences of the war could be completely different, and now history would be written completely different. At the time of the offensive, part of the combat-ready divisions were in Great Britain, as well as North Africa.

Hitler's main idea regarding the lightning speed of the work of the plan

He believed that the important point was the ability to break ground forces with the help of active tank attacks. Adolf saw the purpose of the operation solely as the division of existing Russia into two parts along the Volga and Arkhangelsk. This would allow him to keep the main industrial region of the country in operation, but have full control over it, as well as create an unprecedented shield dividing the country into European and Asian parts.
In addition, the first priority was to deprive the Baltic Fleet of its bases, which would allow the Germans to exclude Russian participation in the battles.
Complete secrecy was given regarding future actions of conquest. Only a certain circle of people were privy to this. They were charged with coordinating actions in preparation for the invasion without unnecessary dissemination of information. It got to the point that the whole country was closely involved in the preparation, and only a few knew exactly what was to happen and what tasks were assigned to the fascist army.

Outcome

The plan failed. In fact, this happened with the consent of Hitler, when he began to retreat from his intended goals. This is a huge plus for the entire Russian people, we don’t know how we would live now if the legendary plan for the instantaneous conquest of Russia, created in the fortieth year of the twentieth century, became successful and achieved all the goals set in it. One can only be glad that the commanders-in-chief of the German troops made several cardinal mistakes that did not allow him to achieve world domination and establish his ideology throughout the globe.