Losses of Luftwaffe bomber groups on the eastern front. Stalin's falcons against the Luftwaffe

(According to German documents)

The calculation of the Wehrmacht command was clear: to neutralize Soviet aviation, to ensure air supremacy and switch the main efforts of the Luftwaffe to the direct support of ground forces. The implementation of this plan led to the fact that, according to the Germans, on the first day of the war, 888 were destroyed on the ground, and 223 in the air. Soviet aircraft. These data do not differ much from the data contained in Soviet official sources: in total, about 1200 aircraft were lost, 800 of them at airfields.

However, the intentions of the attacking side to defeat Soviet aviation in the border areas with one or two powerful blows, to demoralize personnel units and formations of the Air Force, were not fully implemented. On the first day of the war Soviet pilots completed about 6 thousand sorties, shot down dozens of enemy aircraft.

“Despite the surprise achieved by the Germans,” they admitted German generals and officers - the Russians managed to find the time and strength to put up decisive resistance.

The command and headquarters of the Air Force of the Odessa Military District, for example, relying on intelligence data, on June 21 put aviation units on alert and dispersed them at alternate airfields. During raids German aviation here on the ground and in the air only 6 aircraft were lost, while many more enemy aircraft were shot down. And in other border districts, where combat duty and fighting aircraft were better organized, the attackers met with stubborn resistance.

Between June 22 and July 5, the Luftwaffe lost Eastern Front 807 aircraft (this number includes completely destroyed and requiring overhaul). From July 6 to August 2 - another 843 aircraft. In total, from the morning of June 22 to December 31, 1941 combat losses German aviation amounted to 4,543 aircraft, of which 3,827, or 82%, were on the Eastern Front. According to the flight personnel, the loss of killed, wounded and missing was 7,666 people, of which 6,052 or 79% were on the Eastern Front.

The Luftwaffe command in its reports noted that with the outbreak of war in the East, the gap between the losses of aircraft, flight personnel and the replenishment received was constantly increasing.

Here is the data from genuine German documents. The commander of aviation at Army Group South informed the Luftwaffe headquarters about the losses of reconnaissance aircraft for the period from June 22 to October 4, 1941: “97 of our reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed by the enemy. 92 pilots were killed. 41 wounded. These losses are mainly from enemy fighters. In addition, 27 transport and communications aircraft, which were subordinate to these squadrons, were destroyed. Another 38 aircraft were killed and damaged without enemy action. Note: aircraft that were damaged in battle and restored in parts are not listed in the register. Army Group South.

In fact, it was the failure of the "blitzkrieg" for aviation too.

Comparing the losses of the Luftwaffe for one month on the Eastern Front with those that were available for the same time during the "battle for England" and during the capture by Germany European countries, we come to an unequivocal conclusion: in Russia, the Germans lost more aircraft and pilots.

And two more tables from the report of the leadership of the Wehrmacht to Hitler in February 1945. The data are taken from the book by Fritz Hahn "On the losses of the Wehrmacht in people and equipment", published in Germany.

yFPZY RETCHPZP DOS CHPKOSHCH

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MYYSH PFDEMSHOSHCHE LPNBOYTSCH UHNEMY PTZBOYPCHBFSH YURPMSH'PCHBOYE H VPA OPCHSHCHI NBYO. lTPNE HCE HRPNSOHFSHCHI LPNRPMLCH r. th. rHFYCHLP, h. o. pTMPPB, h. yCHBOPCHB, OBDP PFNEFYFSH RPNPEOYLB LPNBODYTB 28-ZP YBR LBRYFBOB i. h. th. UYDPTEOLP, CHPZMBCHMSCHYEZP 23-K YBR. at VPMSHYPK CHETPSFOPUFSHHA PYO YЪ RPDYOYOEOOOSCHI RPUMEDOEZP MEKFEOBOP h. about. nPOBUFSHCHTULYK UVYM OEDBMELP PF mSHCHPCHB ZHEMSHJEVEMS h. zhTBKFBZB (Fr. Freitag)Ъ II / JG3, LPFPTSCHK DP 2 YAMS ULTSCHCHBMUS CH PDOPC YЪ IBF, DPTSYDBSUSH RTYIPDB UCHPYI CHPKUL.

xCE RETCHSHCHE UFSHCHULY RPLBBMY, UFP H ZTHRRPCHSCHI VPSI VEHUMPCHOPE RTECHPUIPDUFCHP VSCHMP H OENEGLLYI MEFUYLPC. NOPZYE UPCHEFULYE RYMPFSCH VSCHMY PFMYUOSCHNY RYMPFBTSOILBNY, NEFLP UFTEMSMMY RP LPOHUBN Y VEUUFTBYOP VTPUBMYUSH CH UICCHBFLH. OP POI HUFHRBMY OENGGBN CH HNEOYY CHIBYNPDEKUFCHPCHBFSH CH VPA, UMEFBOOPUFY RBT, YuEFCHETPL, ZTHRR. OE FPMSHLP LPNBODOSHKK, OP Y TSDPCHPK UPUFBCH MAZHFCHBZHZHE HUREM OBLPRYFSH VPMSHYPK VPECHPK PRSHCHF CH OEVE rpmshhy, zhtbogyy, bozmyy; CHSHCHHYULB, RPMHYUEOOBS CH VPSI, OBNOPZP PFMYUBMBUSH PF FPK, UFP RTYIPVTEFBEFUS ABOUT RPMYZPOBI. obrtynet, ch ulbdte JG51 L YAOA 1941 wbt (H. Bar), PDETSBCHYK 17 RPVED, B FBLTS PWET-MEKFEOBOPH X. ZTBUUET (H. Crasser) Y MEKFEOBOPSHCH v. zBMMCHYU (Ch. Gallowitsch), h. iHRRETFG (H. Huppertz), h. uEZBFG ( H. Segatz), b. gISCO (e. Fleig) .

oEPTSYDBOOP DMS UPCHEFULPZP LPNBODPCHBOYS 22 JAOS 1941 RP NOOYA THLPCHPDUFCHB MAZHFCHBZHZHE, ZHZHELF NPZ VSCHFSH DPUFYZOHF MYYSH RTY NBUUYTPCHBOOPN YURPMSHЪPCHBOY OPCHSHCHI PZOERTYRBUCH. Rpphpnh l Obushmmh MEFB енеглей Фшкпчистчистчиствствичщич РППДЗПФПчимы ибробрьбучя де 2298500 2-Limpztbnnppy SD-2 th 1152950 SD-10, Chersey PRPPM 10 Lz, h fp knetsu lbmyuye Sing Yurpmshpchbmüsus Mysh Umkhyubsi.

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CHUE LFP UYMSHOP DEPTZBOY'PCHCHCHBMP UYMSCH rchp. oEKHDYCHYFEMSHOP, UFP UPOBOYE NOPZYI MEFUYLPC, OYOYFYULPC (LBL LPNBODYTPCH, FBL Y TSDPCHSCHI) FEN FTBZYYUEULYN CHPULTEUOSCHN HFTPN OE RETEUFTPIIMPUSH ABOUT CHPEOOSHCHK MBD. oBRTYNET, 374-K PFDEMSHOSCHK EOYFOSCHK DYCHYYPO, RTYLTSCHCHBCHYYK ZPTPD lPChEMSh J UYUYFBCHYYKUS UTEDY OBYVPMEE VPEURPUPVOSCHI B vEMPTHUUYY, DPMZPE CHTENS EPC OE PFLTSCHCHBM, DBTSE LPZDB OENEGLYE UBNPMEFSCH YFHTNPCHBMY RPYGYY VBFBTEK. UBFEN PTHDYS DYCHYYPOB OEPTSYDBOOP DMS OENGECH "PTSYMY" Y OBYUBMY UFTEMSFSH ABOUT RPTBTSEOIE. RP PDOIN DBOOSCHN, CHUA PFCHEFUFCHEOOPUFSH CHSM ABOUT UEVS LPNBOYT RPDTBDEMEOYS LBRYFBO Zh. y. DENYO, RP DTHZYN - RTEDUFBCHYFEMY YOURELFITHHAEK LPNYUUYY.

upEDYOEOYS DBMSHOEVPNVBTDYTPCHPYuOPK BCHYBGYY OE RPUFTDBMY PF OBMEFPCH ABOUT BTPDTPNSCH. tBURPTSEOYE LPNBODPCHBOYS hchu P RTYCHEDEOYY YUBUFEK BCHYBLPTRKHUCH CH VPECHHA ZPFPCHOPUFSH VSCHMP RETEDBOP CH 6 Yu 44 NYO. and UFP CE? “ABOUT CHUEI BTPDTPNBI OBYUBMYUSH NYFYOZY, - BRYUBOP CH PZHYGIBMSHOPK ITPOYLE bdd. - MEFUYLYY, YFKhTNBOSHCH, FEIOYLY, NMBDYYE BCHYBUREGYBMYUFSHCH LMSMYUSH UTBTSBFSHUS U CHTBZPN DP RPMOPZP EZP TBZTPNB, BCHETSMY tPDYOKH, RBTFYA, OBTPD ... ". fPMSHLP PLPMP 10 Yu ZEOETBMPN r. well. tsyzbtechshchn VSCHMB RPUFBCHMEOB BDBYUB 3-NH BCHYBLPTRKHUH dd RP HOYUFPTSEOYA ULPRMEOYK CHTBTSEOULYI CHPKUL H TBKPE uHCHBMPL, Y MYYSH H 13 Yu 40 NYO RETCHSHCHE VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLY OBYUBMEFMY. fBLYN PVTBPN, VPMEE UENY YUBUPCH RETCHPK RPMPCHYOSCH DOS PLBBMYUSH HHRHEOSCH.

PUFBMPUSH RPDCHEUFI YFPZY DOS. About PUPCBOCKY UKHFULLY ACHAPDPL, RTBKPOPCH, YFBV TBCTB TBCP, SCH Ltbopk Btniy UFBKM CHHPPD, UFP, RP Ltbcoek Nete, 1136 UBNPMEFPC (H FPN Yuume 10 yd Umpuchb Chech YutopnptulPZP ZHPFB) Rpzimmi h Retchchek Deoshek Chpkosch. pFUADB CHPOYLMP IPTPYP FERESH Y'CHEUFOPE YUYUMP - 1200 RPFETSOOSHCHI UBNPMEFPCH. h OENEGLYI PFUEFBI HFCHETSDBEFUS, UFP 322 UPCHEFULYI UBNPMEFB UVYFP CH CHPDDHIIE Y 1489 HOYUFPTSEOSH ABOUT ENME. CHYDYNP, RPUMEDOSS GYZHTTB RPMKHYUEOB RHFEN RPDUYUEFB PVOBTKHTSEOOSCHI FTPZHEKOSHCHI UBNPMEFPCH ABOUT BTPDTPNBI Y RPUBDPUOSCHI RMPEBDLBI. rPDTPVOPE YHYUEOYE BICHBYUEOOSCHI OENGBNY NBYYO, PRHVMYLPCHBOOSCHE ZHPFPUOYNLY RPLBBMY, YUFP DBMELP OE Chueh UPCHEFULYE YUFTEVYFEMY, VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLY, YFHTNPCHYLY RPMHYUYMY UETSHEOSCHE RPCHTETSDEOYS B TEHMSHFBFE CHPDHYOSCHI OBMEFPCH. yuBUFP UBNPMEFSCH VSCHMY CHBPTCHBOSCHY UPTTSEOSHCHOE OENEGLYNY VPNVBNY, BUCHPYNY TSELLYRBTSBNY RTY PFIPDE YЪ-B OCHPЪNPTSOPUFY ÇBLKHYTPCHBFSH NBFETYBMSHOHA YUBUFSH CHHUME PFUME. eEE PVYDOEE FP, UFP PLBBMYUSH VTPYEOSH DEUSFLY BVUPMAFOP YURTBCHOSHI UBNPMEFPCH, LBL LFP RTPYYPYMP ABOUT BTPDTPNE RPD mHGLPN. FFPF UMHYUBK TBUUMEDPCHBM OBYUBMSHOIL PUVPZZP PFDEMB lTBUOPK bTNYY V. C. bVBLHNPC.

DMS PGEOLY HVSCHMY NBFETYBMSHOPK YUBUFY UPCHEFULYI chchu UTBCHOYN OBMYYUYE UBNPMEFPCH OB 22 JAOS 1941 Z. Y DCHB DOS URKHUFS. plbshchchbefus, YuFP ABOUT UCHETP-yBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY LPMYUEUFCHP VPECCHCHI NBYYO UPLTBFIMPUSH ABOUT 973, ABOUT bBRBDOPN OBRTBCHMEOYY - ABOUT 1497 Y ABOUT AZP-yBRBDOPN - ABOUT 1452 EDOYGSCH. yFPZP 3922 UBNPMEFB. y LFPZP RPDUYUEFB OBRTBYCHBEFUS CHSHCHPD, UFP RB RETCHSHCHK CHPEOOSHCHK DEOSH RPFETY UPUFBCHYMY OE NEOEE 2000 UBNPMEFPCH. ChPF LFP OEEPTSYDBOOPUFSH: H UPPFCHEFUFCHY U RTYCHEDEOOOSCHNY TBUYUEFBNY chchu ltbuopk btnyy OEDPUYUYFBMYUSH DBCE VPMSHIE NBYYO, YUEN HLBBMY OENGSHCH?! CHYDYNP, RPUMEDOYE PVOBTHTSYMY H MEUOSHI Y VPMPFYUFSHCHI TBKPOBI DBMELP OE CHUE UBNPMEFSHCH. p UMHYUBSI RETEDYUMPLBGYY VEPECHI NBYYO U ZHTPOFB CH FSM OYYUEZP OE Y'CHEUFOP. (NETSDH RTPUYN, BOBMPZYUOSCHE DBOOSCHE DPMPTSYMY OENEGLIE YFBVOSHCHE PZHYGETSCH TEKIUNBTYBMH z. ZETYOZKH, LPZDB PO RTYLBBBM RETERTPCHETYFSH YYUMP HOYUFPTSEOOSCHI 22 YAOS UPCHEFUFULYYI UB.)

fBLYN PVTBPN, PVEBS HVSCHMSH UBNPMEFPCH RTECHSCHYBEF UHNNH UVYFSCHI OERTYSFEMSHULYNY YUFTEVYFEMSNY J EOYFLBNY, HOYYUFPTSEOOSCHI BTPDTPNBI ON, OE CHETOHCHYYIUS have VPECHSCHI BDBOYK, B FBLTSE CHSCHYEDYYI UFTPS dv dv-B RPMPNPL, BCHBTYK J LBFBUFTPZH! OBRTYNET, CH 64-K YUFTEVYFEMSHOPK BCHYBDYCHYY YY YNECHYYIUS CH 12-N, 149-N Y 166-N YBR (VEH HYUEFB ZHPTNYTKHAEYIUS 246-ZP Y 247-ZP YBR) 64 NY-15 NY-3, 17 NYZ-3, 17 NYZ-3, 17 VPSI RPZYVMY 5 UBNPMEFPCH Y 75 RPMKHYUYMY ABOUT BTPPDTPNBI RPCHTETSDEOYS TBOPK UFEREOY. eEE 3–4 YUFTEVYFEMS YNEMI TBMYUOSCHE RMPPNLY, OP CH UFTPA L 23 YAOS PUFBMPUSH NEOEE UPFOY NBYO. lhdb

DMS PYASUOEOYS FFPZP RBTBDPLUBMSHOPZP SCHMEOYS CH FP CHTENS CHPKOIL FETNYO "OEHYUFEOOBS HVSHCHMSh". uPZMBUOP PFUEFH, RPDZPPFCHMEOOOPNKH TBVPFOILPN YFBVB hchu lTBUOPK bTNY RPMLPCHOILPN th. well. yChBOPCHSHCHN, L 31 YAMS 1941 Z. OEHYUFEOOBS HVSHCHMSH UPUFBCHYMB 5240 UBNPMEFPCH, YMY VPMEE RPMPCHYOSCH PVEYI RPFETSH. pUPVEOOP NOPZP VPECHSCHI NBYYO PLBBMPUSH URYUBOP RP SFPC ZTBZHE CH RETCHSHCHE DOY CHPKOSHCH; RP NOTE OBCHEDEOYS RPTSDLB OEHYUFEOOBS HVSCHMSH OBYUYFEMSHOP UPLTBFIMBUSH.

RP UKHEFULLYN BTICHOSPSP DOS OBZEME EFFECTED DP 6000 UBNPMEFP-CHISTOPHPH (LFP, LUFGBFI, RTenetop h GEB TB BBP, Yuen Cheyyufphaty Majfchbzhzh) Yajyufptsimy NEMEY 200 oregey UBNPMFL. oENGSCH PVYASCHYMY CH UTEDUFCHBI NBUUPCHPK YOZHPTNBGYY, UFP IB KHUREI YN RTYYMPUSH BRMBFYFSH ZYVEMSHA 35 UBNPMEFPCH . uBNP RP UEVE FBLPE YUYUMP UHFPYUOSCHI RPFETSH SCHMSEFUS LCA MAZHFCHBZHZHE CHEUSHNB OBYUYFEMSHOSCHN, OP PFOPUYFSHUS A GYZHTBN UMEDHEF LTYFYYUEULY, RPULPMSHLH PLBBMPUSH, YUFP A UPUFBCHMEOYA YFPZPCHPK UCHPDLY B 22 YAOS "RTYMPTSYMP THLH" CHEDPNUFCHP DPLFPTB zEVVEMShUB. MEFPN 1944 Z. H UPCHEFULYK RMEO RPRBM MEKFEOBOF X. yFBKO YЪ TPFSCH RTPRBZBODSCH MAZHFCHBZHZHE, RPLBBCCHYYK, UFP RPMKHYUEOOOSCHE YBCHYBLPTRKHUCH DBOOSCHE PVTBVPFBMY OEEPVSHPUOSCHN. eUMMY PYO Y LPTRHUCH RPFETSM 35 UBNPMEFPCH, DTHZPK - 12, B FTEFIK, ULBTSEN, 10, FP CH UCHPLE UPPVEBMPUSH P UHNNBTOSHCHI RPFETSI 35 UBNPMEFPCH. RP Ohoya Yadepprzpch Oeneglpk RTPRBZBodufulpk NbYoshek, LFP OE RPCHPMIMP VSH "YUFPYUOYLBN YozhpTNBGY" HufBopchyfs Yufyokh DPMCOP RSSP R.Dufsechfs LPNBodeTPH H DBMSHEECEN CHPEBSHBFSH in Thulini at the unclear Rapfets. yFBKO UPPVEYM FBLTSE, UFP RPMHYUYM HLBBOYE OE UYUYFBFSH RPFETSOOCHNYE RTPRBCHYE VE CHEUFY LYRBTSY: SING NPZMY EEE CHETOCHFSHUS.

ChPURPMSHJKHENUS NBFETYBMBNY Bundesarchiv PE ZhTBKVKhTZE, J LPFPTSCHI UMEDHEF, YUFP OENEGLIE VECHPЪCHTBFOSHCHE RPFETY (VPECHCHE Y OEVPECHSHCHE) UPUFBCHYMY 78 UBNPMEFPCH, LPFPTSHCHE U TBVICHLPK RP FIRBN RTYCHEDEOSCHCH FBVM. 2.5 :

fBVMYGB 2.5. rPFETY MAZHFCHBZHZHE ABOUT CHPUFPYUOPN ZHTPOFE 22 YAOS 1941 Z.

FYR UBNPMEFB	rtyuyob zyvemy
	pF ChPDEKUFCHYS RTPFYCHOYLB			VE ChPDEKUFCHYS RTPFYCHOYLB
	uFEREOSH TBTHHYEOIS
	100%	≥60%	<60%	100%	≥ 60%	<60%
Bf109	14	0	6	4	6	18
Bf110	5	1	4	0	1	5
Ju88	21	0	11	1	1	6
He111	11	0	6	0	0	2
Ju87	2	0	0	0	0	1
Do17	1	0	3	0	0	0
Hs123	0	0	0	0	0	3
dTHZYE	3	3	20	1	3	4
jFFP	57	4	50	6	11	39

RTYNEYBOYE. y FBVMYGSHCH OE SUOP, HYUYFSHCHCHBMYUSH MY RPFETY CHPKULCHPK BCHYBGYY. OP, RP-CHYDYNPNKH, RTYCHEDEOOOSCHCHCHYE GYZHTSCH CHEUSHNB VMYELY L YUFYOE.

lPNNEOFYTHS DBOOSCHE BTIYCHB, OENEGLYK YUFPTYL y. rTYEO RYYEF, UFP FBLIE RPFETY OE SCHMSMYUSH OBICHSHCHUYNY DMS MAZHFCHBZHZHE. FBL, 18 BTZHUFB 1940 Z. Point Miyamyushush FPMSLP VejacpüchtBfop RPFET-BBB RTPFYCHPDEKUCHYS TYFBOHYS 77 UBNPMEFPCH 163 YEMEPCEL MEFPZP UPUFBCH, B 15 UEOOFSVTS FPZP TSA ZPDB - 61 th 188 Upphefufucopope RETCHSHCHK DEOSH BZTEUUY RTPFYCH UPCHEFULPZP UPAB UFPYM TSOYOY 133 YUMEOBN MEFOSHCHI LYRBTSEK.

IPFEMPUSH VSC PFNEFYFSH, YuFP CHTENS VPEC OBD CHEMYLPVTYFBOYEK H OENEGLYI RPCHTETSDEOOOSCHI UBNPMEFPCH VSMP NBMP YBOUPCH DPMEFEFSH DP UCHPYI BTPDTPPNCH, B bB 22 YAOS 1941 Z. FPMSHLP CH ULBDTE JG3 YEUFSH "NEUUETYNYFFPCH", OEUNPFTS ABOUT RPCHTETSDEOYS, UHNEMI UCHETYFSH RPUBDLKH ABOUT UCHPEK FETTYFPTYY. bOBMPZYUOSCHE UMHYUBY RTPYYPYMY Y CH DTHZYI UPEDYOEOYSI.

h IPDE CHPKOSHCH ABOUT chPUFPL, CHPNPTSOP, VSCHMY PFDEMSHOSHCHE DOY, ULBTSEN, CH DElbVTE 1942 Z. YMYY YAME 1944 Z., LPZDB MAZHFCHBZHZHE FETSMY CH UHFLY RP 50–60 UBNPMEFPCH. OP LFY RPFETY RTYIPDYMYUSH CH PUOPCHOPN ABOUT BTPDTPNSCH Y RPUBDPYOSCHE RMPEBDLY; CHTSD MY LPZDB-MYVP EEE 57 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH HDBCHBMPUSH HOYUFPTSYFSH CH CHPDHIE BL PDYO DEOSH. (N dBOOSchE UVYFSCHI OENEGLYI UBNPMEFBI 23 120 1942 C BCHZHUFB uFBMYOZTBDPN FBS, 145 NBYYOBI 2 YAOS HBS lHTULPN, DRYER VPMEE 400 W OBYUBME VPECH HBS lHTULPK DHZPK CHPPVEE OE RPDFCHETTSDBAFUS LBLYNY-MYVP DPLHNEOFBNY.) FBL YUFP PFDEMSHOSCHE UPCHEFULYE MEFYUYLY HTSE Y RETCHSCHI YUBUPCH UTBTSEOYS RPLBBMY CHTBZH, UFP U OYNY OBDP UYUYFBFSHUS. uPPFOPYEOYE RPFETSH H CHPDHYOSCHI VPSI (VE HYUEFB RPFETSH PF EOYFOPK BTFYMMETYY) RTYVMYYFEMSHOP TBCHOSMPUSH 50 OF 250 YUFP UPPFCHEFUFCHPCHBMP VPECHPNH PRSCHFH, HTPCHOA MEFOPK RPDZPFPCHLY J DTHZYN ZHBLFPTBN, UMPTSYCHYYNUS A OBYUBMH CHPKOSCH.

CHETOENUS UOPCHB L OENEGLYN BTIYCHOSCHN DBOOSCHN. PLBSHCHCHBEFUS, POI LPTTEMYTHAFUS UP NOPZYNY OBYNY PGEOLBNY. fBL, TBUYUEFSHCH, RTPYCHEDEOOOSCHE RPMLCHOYLPN b. about. NEDCHEDEN Y ChPEOOP-CHPDHHYOPK BLBDEN YN. about. f. h RETCHPN UPPVEEOYY UCHPDLY uPChEFULPZP yOZhPTNVATP (PHB FPZDB of the ECE OBSCHCHBMBUSH UCHPDLPK zMBChOPZP lPNBODPChBOYS lTBUOPK bTNYY) HLBSCHCHBMPUSH, YUFP "OBNY UVYFP 65 UBNPMEFPCH RTPFYCHOYLB" B ON UMEDHAEYK DEOSH CHOPUYMYUSH HFPYUOEOYS HOYYUFPTSEOP 76 OERTYSFEMSHULYI NBYYO. eUMMY UYUYFBFSH, UFP RTYNETOP 11 THNSCHOULYI UBNPMEFPCH TBDEMIYMY HYBUFSH 63 UVYFSHCHI OENEGLYI (UFEREOSH TBTHIEOYS OE NEOEE 60%), FP RPMHYUBFUS CHEUSHNB VMYELLE YUYUMB.

rPRTPVKHEN UPRPUFBCHYFSH OENEGLIE RPFETY RP DBOOSCHN RTPFYCHOYLPCH. OBJVPMSHYE TBUIPTSDEOYS, LBL HCE PFNEYUBMPUSH, YNEMY NEUFP ABOUT BRBDOPN ZHTPOFE. dBOOSCHE P 143 UVYFSHCHI DEUSH UBNPMEFBI UP UCHBUFILPK OE RPDFCHETSDBAFUS OY TSKHTOBMBNY VPECHI DEKUFCHYK UTTBTSBCHYIUS OENEGLLYI ULBDT, OH DPRTPUBNY RMEOOSCHI, OY LBLYNY-MYNEFYNEYPYNEYYVP. rPFPNH EUFSH PUOPCHBOYS UYUYFBFSH DPLMBDSCH UPCHEFULYI UPEDYOEOYK MF HOYYUFPTSEOYY DEUSFLPCH CHTBTSEULYI UBNPMEFPCH OEDPUFPCHETOSCHNY (SLPVSCH PDOB FPMSHLP 9-C UNEYBOOBS BCHYBDYCHYYS UVYMB 85 OENEGLYI UBNPMEFPCH. rTY FPN DBEFUS UUSCHMLB ON ZHPOD PRETBFYCHOPZP HRTBCHMEOYS chchu. dYChYYS RTELTBFYMB UCHPE UHEEUFCHPCHBOYE YUETE FTY DOS RPUME OBYUBMB CHPKOSCH, J LBLYI -MYVP BTIYCHPCH UPEDYOEOYS UPITBOYMPUSH OE, P RPFPNH ZPCHPTYFSH DPUFPCHETOPN HYUEFE RPVED OE RTYIPDYFUS.) uMEDHEF RTYOBFSH, YUFP H FYI HUMPCHYSI DPOEUEOYE "MF PZTPNOPN HTPOE, OBOEUEOOPN CHFPTZYENHUS H OBYE OEVP OERTYSFEMA" OETEDLP YNEMP BDBYUH UZMBDYFSH ZPTEYUSH RPTBTSEOYS.

ChPPVEE, RETCHPYUFPYUOILPCH, LPFPTSCHE VSHCHMY OBRYUBOSCH "RP ZPTSUYN UMEDBN", HGEMEMP OENOPPZP, Y FEN GEOOEE POI DMS RPOYNBOIS YUFPTYY. rTYCHEDEN MYYSH PYO RYJPD. h RTBCHDYCHPK CH GEMPN LOYSE "rP GEMSN VMYTSOIN Y DBMSHOIN" NBTYBM o. y. ULTYRLP RYJEF:

“... ABOUT CHPKOE CHUSLPE UMHYUBMPUSH. lPZDB L BYTPDTPNKH, ZDE VBYTPCHBMUS 16-K ULTPUFOK VPNVBTDYTPCHPYUOSCHK BCHYBRPML, RTYVMYYYMYUSH ZHBYUFULYE UBNPMEFSHCH, LPNBODYT ULBDTYMSHY LBRYFBO b. y. rTPFBUCH OENEDMEOOP CHMEFEM ABOUT UCHPEN VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLE (BY RYMPFYTPCHBM uv. - rTYN. BCHF.) Y OEPTSYDBOOP DMS ZYFMETPCHGECH CHTEEBMUS H ZPMPCHOPE ЪCHEOP YUFTEVYFEMEK Bf110. ChPURPMShЪPCHBCHYUSH ЪBNEYBFEMSHUFCHPN, TBVICH YI UFTPC, LBRYFBO rTPFBUCH RKHMENEFOSHCHN PZOEN UVYM PYO "NEUUET". b TBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSHCH, ZETPYUEULYK LLYRBTS FBTBOIM UCHPEK NBYOPK CHFPTPK UBNPMEF ZYFMETPCHGB Y RPZYV ".

dPLHNEOF DBEF VPMEE UHTPCHHA Y OERTYHLTBIEOOHA FTBLFPCHLH OENEGLPZP OBMEFB:

“... h RPML Y zTPDOP RTYVSHM RTEDUFBCHYFEMSH YFBVB hchu 3-K BTNYY. according to UPPVEYM, UFP OBD zTPDOP YDHF CHPDHHYOSCHE VPY, Y RPDFCHEDYM RTETSOEE HLBBOYE: OBDP TsDBFSH VPECHPZP RTYLBB. h 6 Yu 50 NYO LPNBODYT RPMLB TEYYM RPDOSFSH CH CHPDDHI ЪCHEOP UBNPMEFCH uv DMS TBCHEDLY. oP EDCHB UDEMBCH LTKhZ OBD BTPDTPPN, ЪCHEOP VHLCHBMSHOP CHTEEBMPUSH CH LPMPOOKH Bf 110 - SOY ABOUT VTEAEEN RPMEFE ULTSCHFOP RPDPMYY L BTPDTPNKH. yFHTNPCHYLY CHCHYMY L RPMA yETMEOSCH, ZDE VBYTPCHBMUS RPML, YEUFSHHA DECHSFLBNY.
LBRYFBO RTPFBUCH, MEFECHYYK ABOUT CHEDHEEN uv, CHTEBMUS CH RTPFYCHOYLB Y RPZYV CHNEUFE U OIN. UTBKH TS VSHMY UVYFSHCH CHEDPNSHCHE rTPFBUCHB. yFHTNPCHLB RTPDPMTSBMBUSH RTPFYCHOYLPN 32 NYO. Bf110 ЪBUSCHRBMY BTPDTPN NEMLY VPNVBNY Y CHEMY OERTETSCHOSHCHK PVUFTEM ЪBTSYZBFEMSHOSHCHNY RHMSNY. uFPSEYE ABOUT BTPPDTPNE UBNPMEFSHCH UZPTEMY, CHTSCHCHBMYUSH RPDCHEYOOOSCHE RPD OYNY VPNVSCH. chTBTSEULIE YFHTNPCHYLY DEKUFCHPCHBMY VEOBBLBBOOP, FBL LBL OILBLPK RTPFYCHPCHPDHYOPK PVPTPOSCHOE VSCHMP PTZBOYCHBOP.
h CHPDHIE RPZYVMP 9 YuEMPCHEL - ЪCHEOP LBRYFBOB rTPFBUCHB (CH EZP LLYRBTS CHIPDYMY YFKhTNBO UV. rTYN. BCHF.), B ABOUT ENME RPZYVMP 6th TBOEOP 15 YuEMPCHEL. MYUOSCHK UPUFBCH ULTSHMUS ЪB FPMUFSHNY UPUOBNY Y CH OBBYUYFEMSHOPK UFEROOY UHNEH URBUFYUSH PF MYCHOS RHMENEFOPZP PZOS.
LPNBODYT RPMLB NBKPT ULCHPTGPCH RTYLBBM OENEDMEOOP CHPPTHTSYFSH MYUOSCHK UPUFBCH RPMLB CHYOFPCHLBNY Y ZTBOBFBNY Y ЪBOSFSH PVPTPOH BTPDTPNB. VSCHM PTZBOYPCHBO NEDRHOLF ... ".

CHETPSFOP, CH TEEKHMSHFBFE FBTBOB PLPMP 7 Yu HFTB RPZYV U LIRBTSEN Bf110E (No. 3767) Ъ II/SKG210. URHUFS FTY YUBUB VSHCHM UVYF DTHZPK DCHHINPFPTOSHK "NEUUETYNYFF" (No. 4291)

“At DECHSFSH UBNPMEFBNY RTPFYCHOILB CHUFKHRIM CH VPK ЪBN. LPNBOYTB YULBDTYMSHY RP RPMYFYUBUFY UV. RPMYFTHL BODTEK DBOYMPCH (PO RYMPFYTPCHBM "YUBKLH". - rTYN. BCHF.). URHUFS OEULPMSHLP NZOPCHEOYK DCHB YOYI VSCHMY UVYFSHCH. tBUUFTEMSCH CHUE RBFTPOSHCHK, VEUUFTBYOSCHK MEFUYL OBRTBCHYM UCHPA NBYOKH RTSNP ABOUT CHTBTSEOULIK UBNPMEF, BODTEK dBOYMPCH RPZYV UNETFSHHA ITBVTSCHI ".

h FFPN TSE OPNETE ZBEFSH VSCHM PRHVMYLPCHBO HLB RTEYDYHNB CHETPCHOPZP UPCHEFB uuut P OBZTBTSDEOYY b. y. dBOYMPCHB Yb 127-ZP YBR RPUNETFOP PTDEOPN meoyob, B ABOUT EZP TPDYOKH H DETECHOA chSTsMS UBTBFPCHULPK PVMBUFY VSCHMP PFRTBCHMEOP Y'CHEEEOYE P ZYVEMY ZETPS. OP MEFUIL OE RPZYV. at FTSEMSHCHNY TBOEOYSNY EZP RPDPVTBMY LPMIPOYOYLY CHILDREN yuETMEOB Y RETEDBMY UBOYFBTTBN PFIPDYCHYEK UBRETOPK YUBUFY. 'BFEN PO PLB'BMUS H FSCHMPCHPN ZPURYFBME Y RPUME DPMZPZP MEYUEOYS OBHYUYMUS IPDYFSH VE LPUFSCHMEK, B 'BFEN CHETOKHMUS H UFTPC. b. y. dBOYMPCH UTBTSBMUS DP UEOFSVTS 1945 Z., BLPOYUYCH CHPKOH CH BLVBKLBMSHE LPNBODYTPN BCHYBGIPOOPZP RPMLB; ABOUT EZP UYUEFKH OBYUYMPUSH 8 UVYFSHCHI MYUOP CHTBTSEOULYI UBNPMEFPCH Y PYO CH RBTE.

eUMY L ULBBOOPNKH DPVBCHYFSH, YUFP EEE PYO Bf110e No. 2333 - TBCHEDYuYL Y PFTSDB 2 (F) / 33 - VSHCHM UVYF FBTBOOSCHN HDBTPN NM. MEKFEOBOFB d.h. yFP ZPCHPTYMP P NHTSEUFCHE Y UBNPRPTSETFCCHPCHBOY UPCHEFULYI MEFUYLPC Y CH FP CE CHTENS UCHYDEFEMSHUFCHPCHBMP PV YI OEHNEOYY KHOYUFPTSBFSH OERTYSFEMS PZOEN VPTFPCHPZP PTHTSYS. ZETNBOULPNH LPNBODPCHBOYA EEE RTEDUFPSMP UDEMBFSH CHSHCHPDSH P THUULPK FBLFILE CHEDEOYS CHPDHYOSCHI VPEC, RPUFBTBFSHUS OBKFY RTPFYCHPDEKUFCHYE.

chPOYLBEF CHPRTPU: RPYUENH BCHFPT RPMBZBEF, YUFP UBNPMEFSCH dv II / SKG210 VSCHMY UVYFSCH BCHYBFPTBNY 11-K LPP, EUMY OENGSCH PTYEOFYTPCHPYUOP HLBSCHCHBAF TBKPO YEE ZYVEMY PLPMP Z. BNVTHCh, FE HBS BTPDTPNBNY VBYTPCHBOYS 9-K LPP? obPVVPTPF, Bf110 Yb PFTSDB 2(F)/33 RTPRBM OBD ZTPDOP, Y NPTsOP RTEDPMPTSYFSH, UFP EZP KHOYUFPTSYMY MEFUYLY 11-K UBD, B OE 9-K UBD, LHDB CHIPDYM 124-K YBR. oP DEMP CH FPN, UFP NM. MEKFEOBOF d.h. b. LPTPMSH, OSHOE RPMLCHOYL BRBUB. b LBRIFBO b. y. rTPFBUCH Y UV. RPMYFTHL b. y. dBOYMPCH CHEMY VPI U VPMSHYNY ZTHRRBNY OERTYSFEMS, UFP VSCHMP IBTBLFETOP DMS RTYNEOEOYS "NEUUETYNYFFPCH" CH ULBDTE "ULPTPUFOSHCHI VPNVBTDYTPCHEYLPCH" SKG210. PUFPCHSC TBVICHYIUS ACCORDING TO E uETMEOSCH RPUME FBTBOCH UBNPMEFPCH LFPZP UPEDYOEOYS CHYDEMY NOPZYE UPCHEFULYE BCHYBFPTSCH, UFP OE DBEF PUOPCHBOYK HUPNOYFSHUS CH ZYVEMY DEUSH DCHHI "NEFUFUETYNYY".

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On the eve of the outbreak of war in the Soviet Union, there were several different (in structure and order of subordination) "aviation", namely: front-line (or military), subordinate to the command of combined arms armies and districts (fronts), aviation of the Navy, long-range aviation (long-range aviation actions, long-range bomber aviation), directly subordinate to the High Command of the Red Army, air defense fighter aircraft.

In this book, all these structures are presented under the general name "Soviet Aviation", "Soviet Air Force", "Red Army Air Force".

In Nazi Germany, the entire military aviation (Luftwaffe) was a strictly centralized structure; all aviation units and formations (including those responsible for the country's air defense missions or interacting with the Navy), as well as anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight and radar units, were united under common command.

The minimum "cell" of military aviation (both in the Soviet Air Force and in the Luftwaffe) was a "link". A flight usually had 3 or 4 aircraft.

Several links (from 3 to 5) were combined into a squadron, which included 12 (in the Luftwaffe) or from 12 to 15 (as in the Soviet Air Force) aircraft.

The main tactical unit of combat aviation was the military unit, called "regiment" (in the Soviet Air Force) or "group" (in the Luftwaffe). As part of the Luftwaffe group, according to the staffing table, there should have been three squadrons and a headquarters link, a total of 40 aircraft; such a structure existed in all branches of aviation in Germany. In the Soviet Air Force, fighter, assault and various bomber regiments had a different structure, but all of them, according to the staffing table, were supposed to have 62 - 64 aircraft (four or five squadrons and the regiment's control link).

Several regiments (groups) were united into a formation, which was called an "aviation division" (in the Soviet Air Force) or a "squadron" (in the Luftwaffe). On the eve of the war, the Soviet Air Force included “fighter” (IAD), “bomber” (BAD) and “mixed” (SAD) air divisions. Each division had its own number (for example, the 9th SAD, the 13th BAD, the 43rd IAD). The regiments that were part of the division (as a rule, from 3 to 5) had their own numbering, not associated with the division number (for example, the 127th IAP, the 16th BAP, the 61st ShAP). In the documents of the 41st year, bomber regiments were often designated with an indication of their purpose, for example, SBP (high-speed bomber), BBP (close-range bomber), but in this book a single designation system is used for front-line aviation regiments (only the abbreviation BAP); long-range aviation regiments are designated as DBAP or TBAP (respectively, "long-range" or "heavy" bomber regiment).

In the Luftwaffe, squadrons were also subdivided into fighter (JG), bomber (KG), dive bomber squadrons (StG), squadrons of heavy long-range fighters (ZG). The squadron (with rare exceptions) had three groups, and the groups were designated by squadron number, for example II / JG-53 (the second group of the 53rd fighter squadron).

Several squadrons of the Luftwaffe (usually 4 to 6) were reduced to a large structure called an "air corps". The air corps were united into the Air Fleets. In total, three Luftwaffe Air Fleets operated on the Eastern Front (1st V.f., 2nd V.f., 4th V.f.) consisting of five (1, 8, 2, 4, 5th) aviation corps (as well as some units and divisions of the 5th Air Force in the Arctic).

In the Soviet Air Force, the corps link existed only in long-range bomber aviation. By the beginning of the war, four such corps were deployed in the Western theater of operations: the 1st DBAC in the Novgorod region, the 3rd DBAC in the Smolensk region, the 2nd DBAC in the Kursk region, and the 4th DBAC in the Zaporozhye region. Each corps had two bomber divisions (another, separate 18th DBAD, was based in the Kyiv region). The planned inclusion of a fighter division equipped with long-range escort fighters into the DBAK was not practically implemented.

A few days before the start of the war, it was decided to deploy three air defense fighter aviation corps (6th in Moscow, 7th in Leningrad, 8th in Baku), and these corps did not have a divisional link (i.e. fighter the regiments were directly subordinate to the command of the corps and the air defense zone). The formation of the IAK air defense was already carried out during the war that began on June 22, 1941.

Application No. 2

The composition of the grouping and the number of combat aircraft of Soviet aviation as of June 22, 1941

Air Force of the Leningrad Military District (Northern Front) and the Air Force of the Northern Fleet

Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet

Air Force of the Baltic OVO (North-Western Front)

Air Force of the Western OVO (Western Front)

Air Force of the Kiev OVO (South-Western Front)

Air Force of the Odessa Military District (Southern Front)

Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet

Long-range bomber aviation formations at the Western Theater of Operations

TOTAL:

- 4720 fighters, incl. 1030 MiG-3 and Yak-1;

- 3583 bombers, incl. 205 Pe-2 and 9 TB-7;

- a total of 8303 combat aircraft.

Note:

- the total number of aircraft is indicated, including those temporarily out of service;

- combat-ready aircraft accounted for an average of 80-85% of the total;

- a fraction indicates the number of “new types” of aircraft included in the total number (MiG-3 and Yak-1 fighters, Pe-2 and TB-7 bombers);

- about 25 air regiments being formed and the aircraft that were in their arsenal were not taken into account;

- the naval aviation does not include reconnaissance units and the seaplanes they were armed with;

- the composition of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front is indicated according to the report of the commander of the Air Force of the front, other sources give a larger number of aircraft.

Annex 3

The composition of the grouping and the number of combat aircraft of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front on June 22, 1941

Part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet, Arctic

1st Air Fleet (1st Air Corps), East Prussia

2nd Air Fleet (8th and 2nd Air Corps), Poland

4th Air Fleet, 5th Air Corps, Southern Poland

4th Air Fleet, 4th Air Corps, Romania

TOTAL: 2275 / 1779

Fighters - 848 / 683 (633 Bf-109 F + 215 Bf-109 E).

Bombers - 935/732 (528Ju-88 + 281He-111 + 126Do-17).

Dive-bombers (Ju-87) - 309 / 220.

Multipurpose (Me-110) - 183 / 144.

Notes:

- in the first digit - all aircraft, the second - including combat-ready ones; all aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet are listed as combat-ready;

- in the aircraft of the headquarters level are taken into account in the total number of the corresponding squadrons;

- in cases where the fighter group was equipped with Bf-109 aircraft of two modifications (E and F), all fighters were counted as Bf-109 F; this led to some overestimation of the total number of Bf-109 F compared to other sources;

- there were also several Me-110s in the headquarters of the bomber squadrons (they are not taken into account in this table).

Appendix 4

June 22, 1941 The Luftwaffe and the real losses of the NWF and WF Air Force

Notes:

- Group III / JG-53 operated at the junction of the NWF and WF, it can be assumed that about half of all declared victories relate to air battles with units of the NWF Air Force;

- among the declared downed fighters, there are only 14 "MiGs", including at least 6 shot down in the NWF zone.

Annex 5

Irretrievable combat losses of Luftwaffe aircraft

1st Air Fleet

2nd Air Fleet

4th Air Fleet, 5th Air Corps

4th Air Fleet, 4th Air Corps

Cumulative losses for all Air Forces

Notes:

- the initial number is indicated taking into account the defective aircraft;

- the tables take into account the irretrievable (60% damage) losses of combat aircraft "from enemy impact and for unknown reasons";

– cumulative losses for July are indicated taking into account the losses of the 5th V.f. in the Arctic;

- according to other sources, in June 1941, 13 German aircraft were irretrievably lost at the airfields.

The classification of losses adopted by the Luftwaffe:

up to 24% - small and medium damage that can be repaired by ground services;

25 - 39% - major repairs are required in parts;

40 - 44% - replacement of individual units or systems is required;

45 - 59% - numerous damages requiring the replacement of many aircraft units;

60 - 80% - cannot be restored, some units can be used as spare parts;

81 - 99% - completely destroyed, the wreckage fell on the territory controlled by the Germans;

100% went missing, fell on enemy territory or at sea.

Appendix 6

Pilots and commanders of the Soviet Air Force about their aircraft and enemy tactics

From the Report on the combat work of the units of the 6th SAD from 22.6 to 20.9.41

“Very often, even a superior group of enemy fighters evades combat with our fighters, and if it enters into battle, it does not conduct it for a long time and stubbornly. Especially at one time, the Me-109, also the Me-110, evaded the battle with the I-153 of the 38th IAP ...

The equipment in service with the enemy air force (Me-109, Me-110, Xe-113) is good in terms of its performance characteristics, but due to insufficient training of the enemy flight crew and their, apparently, weak moral stamina, all the capabilities of the equipment are not used, as a result of which the enemy suffers heavy losses even in battles, when it significantly outnumbers our fighters.

Enemy bombers act intrusively only when they are covered by fighters and do not see an organized rebuff from the ground or in the air; when resisted, they leave very quickly. Cowardice and unwillingness to engage in battle with our fighters is the main characteristic of the training of the enemy air force flight personnel ... "

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, m. 57-67)

From the Report on the combat work of the 57th SAD from 22.6 to 23.9.41

Not a single case has been recorded of a pair of German fighters engaging in combat with a group of our fighters; in most cases, using speed, they leave the battle ...

Of the 125 air battles, 18 were very fleeting, because. the enemy, having in some cases superiority in speed, after the first attack of our fighters, left the battle using clouds or the sun.

During the three months of the war, the enemy never built up forces in air combat. The battle began in the air with one group, and it ended with her. The main method used by the enemy in air combat with our fighters is, with equal forces or insignificant superiority, not to accept the battle, hide behind the clouds and wait for the separation of our individual aircraft from the group in order to deal with them in an unequal battle ...

If after the first blow to[our] the enemy did not receive opposition from the ground or from the air at or before the airfield, all of his planes stood in a circle and continued bombardment and machine-gun fire with individual aiming until the ammunition was completely used up, sometimes making up to 3-4 attacks. As a rule, the enemy did not make repeated attacks if at least 1 - 2 of our fighters were above the airfield ...

The enemy, fearing the partisans, and at the same time, due to the rapid advance, deployed his aircraft in whole regiments or more at one airfield. He always placed the planes in the center of the airfield in one or two lines. The best target for our aviation could not be found ... "

(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, ll. 84-89)

“At your order, I am reporting the main methods of enemy aviation tactics revealed by the flight crew of the regiment in the course of hostilities.

1. In clear sunny weather, both enemy fighters and bombers always try to approach the target from the side of the sun. Enemy bombers are active during cloudy weather, using the clouds for covert flight.

2. In air combat, enemy fighters Me-109 and Xe-113(as the Soviet Air Force called the Messerschmitt-109 series F at that time) always trying to have an advantage in height over our aircraft. They mainly attack from above and after the attack with a combat turn they go up again. During air combat, our planes are almost never below.

3. In air combat, enemy fighters actively fight only with a large advantage in strength. With an equal balance of forces, and even with their double advantage, they often evade the battle or quickly leave it. After the first attack, they gain altitude and, during a second attack, they try to attack our individual aircraft located on the flanks or at the end of the battle formation.

4. Avoid frontal attacks.

5. Often single fighters "tie" to the tail of the aircraft coming from the mission, and attack them during the landing approach.

(TsLMO, f. 20076, on. 1, d. 8A, l. 16)

From the Report on the combat operations of the 11th SAD for the period from June 22 to December 19, 1941.

During the period of hostilities, the LaGG-3 aircraft has established itself as one of the best fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In terms of its flight and tactical data and armament, it far surpasses all modern types of enemy fighters. The enemy, even with a significant numerical superiority, does not enter into battle with fighters. When attacking the LaGG-3, enemy fighters, as a rule, evade the battle. The LaGG-3 aircraft is equally maneuverable at all altitudes and has a large speed range.

The MiG-3 aircraft in use as an attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft did not prove itself due to insufficient training of the flight crew. In air battles, carried out mainly at altitudes of 500 - 1500 m, the MiG-3 proved to be less effective than the old I-16 type. In addition to low maneuverability at low altitudes, the MiG-3 has insufficiently strong weapons, mainly cannon(so the text may have meant that the absence of a gun reduces the effectiveness of the armament of this aircraft).

The I-16 aircraft, thanks to its great experience in piloting technology and combat use in the past, proved to be quite effective in the fight against the latest types of enemy fighters. The big drawback of the I-16 fighter is the relatively weak armament, and most importantly, the depreciation of the weapon, which very often failed in air combat and during assault operations. With the installation of a more powerful engine and strengthening of weapons, the I-16 may well compete with new types of fighters, both friendly and enemy ... "

(TsAMO, f. 20054-A, on. 1, d. 12, ll. 27-28)

Brief information: The 123rd IAP met the war at the border airfields in the Brest-Kobrin area, on June 27 it was withdrawn for reorganization to Monino near Moscow; the pilots of the regiment mastered the new Yak-1 fighter in 12 days, since July 15, the regiment as part of the 6th IAK PVO has been fighting in the sky of Moscow (480 sorties have been completed), since September 21, as part of the 7th IAK PVO (Leningrad), it covers from the air Road of life. In total, in the first 12 months of the war, 3,010 sorties were made with a total flight time of 2,431 hours, 199 air battles were conducted, 102 enemy aircraft were declared shot down, and 27 aircraft were lost in the air. Subsequently, the regiment was transformed into the 27th Guards.

Captain Zhidov G.N., squadron commander, conducted 33 air battles, shot down 4 aircraft personally and 12 in the group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner:

“What gives us the opportunity to emerge victorious? The first is that we fly on the Yak-1 aircraft, which in terms of its flight data is superior to the enemy Me-109 aircraft, with which we mainly have to conduct air combat. The second is that our pilots, skillfully using the machine, boldly enter the battle and win ...

Air combat on the Yak-1 aircraft with the Me-109 aircraft is easy, because. the Yak-1 is not inferior in speed, has a smaller turn radius, catches up with the Me-109 both in a dive and when climbing - in these cases, you only need to use the R-7 correctly(screw pitch adjuster): when diving, it is necessary to make the pitch of the screw heavier, and when climbing, lighten the screw.

Pidtykan I. D., conducted 60 air battles, shot down 8 aircraft personally and 6 in a group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (hereinafter - Hero of the Soviet Union):

Air combat on the I-16 aircraft can be successfully carried out with any type of enemy aircraft due to the good maneuverability of the I-16. True, air combat sometimes takes the form of defense (especially with enemy fighters at altitudes above 2,000 m), but defense can also be very active and successful. Air combat is almost safe if you have developed good powers of observation.

The most important moment in air combat is the beginning of the battle, i.e. it is necessary to be the first to detect the enemy or to see in time the moment when the enemy wants to attack our planes, and the second especially important moment is the exit from the battle ...

The best combat altitude for the I-16 is up to 3000 m, and the combat altitude is 1000 - 2000 m. At this altitude, the I-16 aircraft will have maximum maneuverability and speed ... same direction, only with slight slip(maneuver in a horizontal plane, carried out with a minimum roll), in order to prevent him from conducting aimed fire. As you get closer, you need to move from defense to offensive, i.e. make a quick 180-degree turn, and fire, going into the frontal ...

Conducting air combat with enemy fighters on turns on the I-16 aircraft is successful, because. The I-16 turns better than any enemy aircraft... After the first successful attack, the German pilot is lost and will "dangle" in the sight until you shoot him down.

"Junkers-87" has good maneuverability - the turn radius is almost equal to the turn radius of the I-16. The plane in the air does not go in a straight line, but, as it were, “dances”, thereby making it impossible to conduct aimed fire at it, but after the first attacks of our I-16s, all resistance almost ceases, and[enemy pilot] goes in a straight line and does not try to position his aircraft so that the pilot himself can fire from a cannon or give the gunner-radio operator the opportunity to fire. Ju-87 is an easily shot down aircraft with skillful attacks ...

Fight I-16 with Me-110. As in any air battle, here it is necessary to try to go into the tail, have an advantage in height and hit mainly from behind and in the tail, initially at the arrow, and then at the engines and cockpit. It is inappropriate to become in a turn, because The Me-110 turns very well on one engine, and its turn is equal to that of the Yak-1, and also because the gunner-radio operator will fire throughout the turn ... With a good engine on the I-16 aircraft, you can successfully go to the tail of the Me- 110 provided that he will not dive, but will go along the horizon ... "

(TsAMO, f. 123 IAP, on. 459716, d. 1, ll. 1-3)

Annex 7

Soviet Air Force through the eyes of a Wehrmacht General

This report was written in the late 1940s. as part of the US Army program to study and systematize the experience of the war. The author of the report is Colonel-General Erhard Rauss of the Wehrmacht.

“In terms of numbers, the Russian Air Force was greatly underestimated by the Germans before the start of the Eastern campaign. But, despite their numbers, which increased significantly during the war, they could not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the battles in the East.

Russian Air Force tactics were inflexible and strictly limited to fixed patterns. They lacked tactical flexibility. Only at the end of 1944 and at the beginning of 1945 could the first sprouts of a strategic air war be observed. Russian long-range aviation, which was monitored by German radio intelligence since 1941, carried out mainly transport operations. Although the Air Force was an independent part of the Russian armed forces, it was used almost exclusively on the battlefield, in joint operations with the army.

The Germans identified impending Russian attacks, among other signs, by the early collection and concentration of combat aircraft on airfields near the front line. In this regard, the Russians proved to be great experts in the construction of auxiliary airfields. Ruthlessly exploiting local labor resources and using the most primitive equipment, they were able to fully prepare the airfields in an amazingly short time. Neither winter, nor periods of rain or mudslides could interfere with their work. The Russian Air Force made extensive use of false airfields and mock-ups of aircraft, as well as numerous camouflage methods.

In combat, the direction of air strikes and the degree of its participation were controlled by command posts located near the front line, one of the most well-executed operations in this regard was the control of fighters from the ground. On the other hand, the interaction between fighters and attack aircraft or bombers left much to be desired. Fighters rarely accompanied them during combat missions, and if there was an escort, it usually dispersed at the first contact with the enemy.

The Russians proved to be excellent pilots in bad weather. Although their aircraft were not equipped for instrument flight, fighters and attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield in the worst weather. In order to take the enemy by surprise, they liked to use low clouds and snowstorms. Russian night fighters tended to limit themselves to attacking only targets they were ordered to destroy, and were only instrumented for the most basic navigation. The Germans were surprised to find that Russian night lights almost always flew with side lights on.

Air formations concentrated for operations always found a rapid drop in combat potential as soon as they entered combat. The number of combat-ready aircraft was rapidly declining, and it took quite a long time to bring them back into combat-ready condition.

The Russians made extensive use of artificial smoke to camouflage and protect industrial plants, railway junctions, and bridges against strategic air attacks. The rapid repair of bombing damage was particularly noteworthy, especially in the case of railroad facilities. And again, for these purposes, labor from the local civilian population was ruthlessly involved.

During the war, air supply operations reached significant proportions. Aircraft either delivered supplies to airfields or dropped them by parachute. Dropping agents and saboteurs behind the front line played a special role.

At the beginning of the war, Russian ground forces were extremely vulnerable to air attacks. However, things changed very soon. Russian troops became less vulnerable to the attacks of German dive bombers and attack aircraft. The Russians paid much attention to preparing troops for defense against low-altitude attacks. All weapons available to the troops turned against the attacking aircraft, thereby forming a dense defense. When the weather allowed, the Russian troops avoided settlements and masterfully hid in the area. If, in exceptional cases, they took refuge in populated areas, they received strict orders not to go outside during the daytime.

As part of the Soviet ideology, as the war went on, the Russians used an increasing number of female pilots and other crew members. Women not only flew transport aircraft, but also flew combat vehicles.

In conclusion, we can say that the Russian Air Force, although large in number and built on a grand scale, was prepared very primitively. Their will to fight, aggressive spirit and mastery of the technical aspects left much to be desired. Constantly outnumbering the Luftwaffe, they always underperformed when it came to combat. Usually a small number of German fighters were enough to clear the skies of Russian aircraft.

Translation by Evgeny Kovalev

One of the little-known fighter formations of the Luftwaffe was the 4th Fighter Squadron (German: Jagdgeschwader JG.4). And although, unlike many other elite squadrons, its combat score was not so impressive (only about 600 air victories), nevertheless, the pilots of the squadron deserve the attention of military history lovers, since in the final battles of 1945 on the outskirts of Berlin they fought with famous Soviet aces from the 2nd and 16th Air armies.

The squadron was not created immediately, its groups were formed gradually. First, in August 1942, I. / JG.4 was formed in Mizile (Romania), whose task was to protect the Ploiesti oil region. June 15, 1944 in Ansbach on the basis of Jagdgeschwader z.b.V. the squadron headquarters was formed (Stab / JG.4). On July 12, 1944, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was formed in Salzwedel from the remnants of I./ZG.1. This assault group (Sturmgruppe) was specifically intended for assault attacks by formations of heavy four-engine bombers of the Anglo-American aviation. Armored and well-armed heavy Focke-Wulf groups were engaged in direct combat with enemy bombers, while lighter Messerschmitts of other groups tied up escort fighters in battle. Also on July 12, III./JG.4 was formed from the personnel of III./ZG.1 in Rothenburg. The last, on October 20, 1944, IV./JG.4 was formed from the former II./JG.5 in Finsterwalde. The emblem of the squadron was a blue shield with the image of a "Silver knight's helmet with red plumage".

All groups of the squadron participated in bloody battles in Italy, in the defense of the Reich from attacks by Anglo-American aircraft armadas and in the Ardennes counteroffensive. At the same time, the squadron pilots achieved tangible success in the fight against enemy four-engine bombers, but they themselves lost many of their comrades. The JG.4 suffered especially huge losses during the infamous Operation Bodenplatte on January 1, 1945 - 23 pilots were killed and missing at once, which amounted to almost 42% of the total number of the squadron's flight personnel!

But let Western historians study the actions of the 4th squadron on the Western Front against the Anglo-Americans. We are traditionally much more interested in the actions of the Luftwaffe against our aircraft and troops. And since in the future, from the end of January to the end of April 1945, JG.4 participated in the battles on the Eastern Front over the Oder and in the Berlin area, we will pay attention to this particular period and sector of the front. True, due to the lack of complete documentary data on the losses of the fleet of the squadron, we will have to limit ourselves to listing only the irretrievable losses of flight personnel and the successes of the squadron pilots, which, by the way, also need to be clarified. To begin with, however, let's get acquainted with the command staff of the 4th squadron at the time of its appearance on the Eastern Front.

So, since August 1944, the squadron commander was the well-known ace knight of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, 27-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalsky, who accounted for 72 air victories he had previously won as part of the JG.53 "Ace of Spades" squadron.

The first group of the squadron was also commanded from August 1944 by the 33-year-old Major Wilhelm Steinmann, recently awarded the German Gold Cross for 35 downed aircraft, most of which he shot down as part of JG.4. Later, in March 1945, he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

The commander of the second group since September 1944 was 33-year-old Major Gerhard Schroeder, a former navigator of transport and bomber aviation. Having become a fighter pilot, he managed to win only 3 air victories.

The third group was commanded from January 1945 by an experienced pilot, 28-year-old captain Gerhard "Gerd" Strasen, on his combat account there were 6 downed enemy aircraft, which he shot down while fighting as part of JG.26 "Shlageter" and JG.77 "Red Ace" .

Since December 1944, the commander of the last fourth group of the squadron was a veteran of the Condor Legion in Spain, 28-year-old captain Ernst-Albert Laube, who scored 22 air victories, mainly in the JG.26 Schlageter, JG.77 Red Ace and JG.3 "Udet".

Unlike experienced commanders, most of the ordinary pilots of the squadron were very young graduates of flight schools who had recently come to the front. Some of the pilots even consisted of retrained crew members of the bomber, reconnaissance, naval and other aviation, who, however, had difficulty getting used to their new role as a fighter pilot. Of course, it was not because of the good life that these ersatz pilots were recruited to serve in fighter aviation, but the leadership of the Luftwaffe at that time had no choice: in the most difficult battles, in conditions of overwhelming superiority, German fighters suffered and continued to suffer devastating losses. And if the aviation industry still produced a sufficient number of aircraft, then there were no longer enough qualified fighter pilots ...

And in mid-January 1945, after the start of a major offensive by the Soviet troops, it was decided to send this squadron, barely replenished with a young squadron hastily, to the area southeast of Berlin. I./JG.4 was the first to arrive there - on January 22, Bf 109G / K aircraft of this group landed at the Guben airfield. It was followed on January 23 by Stab/JG.4 and 11.(Sturm)./JG.4, which landed on Neuhausen airfield southeast of Cottbus on Fw 190A aircraft, as well as III./JG.4, but its Bf 109G/ K settled north of Cottbus - at the Drewitz airfield. Three days later, on January 26, Bf 109G from IV./JG.4 landed at the same airfield. It is characteristic that the main task of the squadron pilots was assault raids on Soviet columns on the roads, although the squadron fighters were poorly adapted as attack aircraft, and the pilots were not trained in this. There were no massive air battles here, as on the Western Front, but the pilots had to make several sorties a day, which still led to heavy losses in the end. Especially when very heavy and bloody air battles began over the Oder bridgehead ...

Shortly after the flight to the Soviet-German front, the squadron suffered its first loss: on January 24, during the flight to the new airfield, the Bf 109 G-14 785714 “Gelbe 7” of the Fanejunker non-commissioned officer Klaus Eckard from 15./JG.4 caught fire in the air according to unexplained reasons, the pilot jumped out with a parachute, but crashed and died 10 km from Halle northwest of Leipzig.

Two days later, on January 26, the squadron began hostilities on a new front for it and made 82 sorties for attack and reconnaissance in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area. At the same time, four pilots were lost at once:
The first - non-commissioned officer Wilhelm (Willi) Gausten from 1./JG.4 (who had 2 air victories), on a Bf 109 G-10 491177 "Weisse 1" was shot down in an air battle in the Neutomischel - Pinne - Posen area, hit captured and later died in captivity.
The second - Lieutenant Ulrich Blaese (06/09/1924) from 5. (Sturm) / JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 961138 "Weisse 8" during the attack on Soviet convoys on the roads was shot down in an air battle and died south of Neutomishel.
The third was Oberfenrich Herbert Schön from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, who, during the assault on the Soviet troops on the roads, hit a tree with his Fw 190 A-8/R2 682665 (982665) "Weisse 16" and died in the Schleptzig area near Lübben.
And the fourth - Fanejunker non-commissioned officer Günter Wahl from 7./JG.4 (or II. (Sturm) / JG.4) on Fw 190 A-8 961102 "Gelbe 5" crashed and died due to snowfall in the Herzig area near Grossenhain.
In addition, five more aircraft received minor damage.
Needless to say, the beginning was depressing ...
On the same day, the first air victory on the Russian front was recorded at the expense of the squadron pilots - at 12 hours 45 minutes, Lieutenant Lothar Wolff from 15./JG.4 shot down a Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Scharfenort area. "Stalin's Falcon" made an emergency landing and disappeared into the forest...

The next day, January 27, the squadron made 72 sorties and missed three of its pilots:
Feldwebel Heinrich Kamel (12/14/1918) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 during the assault on Soviet convoys northwest of Graz - Neutomischel near Kirchplatz, sank too low on his Fw 190 A-8 696095 "Weisse 6", touched the car on the road and crashed.
Killed in aerial combat on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682224 "Gelbe 4" in the Posen area, Fahnejunker non-commissioned officer Fritz Hopfenmüller of 7./JG.4.
Feldwebel Arno Pochmann from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 783989 "Weisse 2" during the attack of the Soviet troops was shot down by fire from the ground (or died in an air battle), fell and died 3 km east of Lake Bentschener.
Three aircraft were lightly damaged.
In turn, non-commissioned officer Völkel from II.(Sturm) / JG.4 reported the destruction of one Yak-9, however, the victory was not credited to him ...

On Sunday, January 28, JG.4 pilots made 36 ground attack sorties, while four aircraft received minor damage, but there were no casualties.

Nevertheless, flights to attack Soviet troops, well covered by anti-aircraft weapons, were expensive for German fighters. On January 29, the squadron made 104 sorties for reconnaissance and attack in the Scharnikau-Wolstein area, but two squadron pilots did not return from these deadly flights:
Oberfenrich Heinz Seeberger of 15./JG.4 was shot down by fire from the ground during the assault, along with his Bf 109 G-14 413791 "Gelbe 14" fell and died in the Köpnitz-Unrustadt area.
Non-commissioned officer Maximilian "Max" Huber from 16./JG.4 in Bf 109 G-14 462756 "Blaue 9" also did not return from the attack of the Soviet troops, this time in the Kustrin area.
Eight more aircraft were damaged, including five in air battles.

On January 30, the squadron pilots flew 121 times for reconnaissance and attack in the Scharnikau-Wolstein-Züllichau-Meseritz area, and three pilots died in air battles:
Lieutenant Hans Roscher of 1./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 130362 "Weisse 7" in the Züllichau-Bomst-Wolstein area.
Non-commissioned officer Rudolf Seebacher of 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332302 "Gelbe 4" in the Züllichau area west of Grünberg.
Fanenjuncker Chief Sergeant Joachim Goltzbecher of 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8/R2 682767 "Gelbe 16" in the Vanden area.
In air battles in the areas of Nidritsa, Oderekk and Züllichau, three more aircraft were lost (the pilot escaped by parachute from one of them) and three aircraft were damaged in the areas of Guben, Drevitsa and Frankfurt an der Oder.
But the persistent non-commissioned officer Völkel from II.(Sturm) / JG.4 was finally lucky and he was credited with the first air victory over the Yak-9, shot down that day.

The last day of January - the 31st - passed without losses for the squadron: having made 22 sorties for reconnaissance and assault operations in the Kustrin area, all the pilots returned safely from their missions, only one Fw 190 was slightly damaged.

In total, over the course of almost a week of hostilities on the Eastern Front, JG.4 pilots destroyed 395 vehicles, one tank, three Katyusha rocket launchers, one multi-barreled anti-aircraft gun, three aircraft at airfields and other military equipment during assault raids.

The squadron's losses were very high: in just January, JG.4 lost (including three weeks of fighting on the Western Front, before flying to the Eastern Front) 26 pilots dead and missing, as well as 14 wounded. 57 aircraft were irretrievably lost (20 Fw 190 and 37 Bf 109), 39 aircraft were damaged (14 Fw 190 and 25 Bf 109).

The squadron suffered even greater losses in February. Already on the first day of the month, Corporal Hubert Gesterkamp from 6. (Sturm) / JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 / R2 682207 "Weisse 2" did not return from a flight north of Kustrin.

Two days later - on February 3 - two pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Wagner (07/19/1911) from 6.(Sturm) / JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 960328, while landing at the Neuhausen airfield near Cottbus, fell into a funnel, rolled over and died.
And a fairly experienced pilot Ober-Fenrich Heinz Kühne (he had 3 air victories on his account) from 10./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332651 "Schwarze 1" was shot down in an air battle in the Züllichau-Blumberg area and was captured . He later died in captivity.

Two more pilots were captured the next day, 4 February:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Niggl from 7./JG.4 on the Fw 190 A-9 205056 "Gelbe 13", having flown to attack the Soviet troops on the roads in the Zielenzig - Meseritz region, was shot down and taken prisoner. A few years later he returned from captivity and died on October 6, 1950 in Germany.
Another pilot - Fenrich Wilhelm Dim from 15./JG.4 - on Bf 109 G-10 490419 "Gelbe 1" as part of a pair flew out for reconnaissance, but due to engine failure he was forced to land on the territory occupied by Soviet troops 3 km northeast of Frankfurt an der Oder and was taken prisoner. Nevertheless, he was lucky, and on May 9, 1949, he returned from captivity.

On February 7, two pilots also did not return from their missions:
The first - Ober-Fenrich Hans Till from 13./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490169 "Weisse 1" stormed the Soviet troops in the Aurit-Balko-Ziebingen area, was shot down and captured. As it turned out later, he died in captivity.
The other - non-commissioned officer Helmut Neumann from 15./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 490428 "Gelbe 10" also stormed the Soviet troops in the Kurtschow - Ziebingen - Gross - Gandern area, was shot down and died.
One Yak-9 in the Furstenberg area at 11 hours 45 minutes was shot down on the same day by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4. (Sturm) / JG. 4, but against the backdrop of ever-growing losses of the squadron, this was little consolation ...

The next day, February 8, the squadron stubbornly continued to storm the advancing Russian troops, but it cost the squadron three more pilots:
Ober-Fenrich Martin Otto Stegmann from 2./JG.4 during an attack on Soviet convoys in the Eichberg area, 12 km northwest, Grossen was mortally wounded, on his Bf 109 K-4 332376 "Schwarze 6" made an emergency landing near the column and died.
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gebauer of 12./JG.4 in Bf 109 K-4 332912 "Blaue 4" was shot down, probably by anti-aircraft fire in the Drebiszow area, and taken prisoner. He later died in captivity.
Non-commissioned officer Johannes Bintrim from 16./JG.4 in a Bf 109 G-14 462777 "Blaue 11" stormed the Soviet convoys in the Wolnitz area, was shot down and taken prisoner. The fate of this pilot was also sad, and he also died in captivity.

On February 9, the 2nd group of the squadron moved to the Guben airfield, where the 1st group of the squadron had already been located since January 22.
On the same day, Lieutenant Dietrich Bartsch (12/29/1923) from 11./JG.4 on Bf 109 G-14 465330 "Schwarze 6" stormed Soviet convoys in the Drewitz area north of Cottbus, was shot down in an air battle and died.

On Saturday, February 10, three pilots were lost:
Feldwebel Wilhelm "Willi" Becker (had 1 air victory) from 3./JG.4 on Bf 109 K-4 332897 "Gelbe 9" returning from armed reconnaissance, in the Schiedlo area southeast of Frankfurt an der Oder was shot down and disappeared without a trace.
Non-commissioned officer Ernst Steingilb (had 1 air victory) from 12./JG.4, who was taking off from the airfield on Bf109 K-4 332485 "Blaue 6" with a bomb under the fuselage, fell and exploded 5 km east of Drewitz near Potsdam.
Corporal Harald Bankk of 13./JG.4 in Bf 109 G-14 785917 "Weisse 4" was hit and badly wounded by anti-aircraft fire, made an emergency landing in the Kotzenau area and died of his wounds in the hospital on February 14, 1945.
On the same day, at 14:15, in an air battle west of Luben, Lieutenant Karl-Heinz Messer of IV./JG.4 managed to shoot down one La-5.

The squadron lost another three pilots on February 11:
On the Bf 109 K-4 332858 "Schwarze 5" crashed and died during takeoff from the Guben airfield, Corporal Robert Mayrhofer from 2./JG.4.
Non-commissioned officer Franz Kaicher from 3 / JG.4 on Bf 109 G-10 491375 "Gelbe 3" was shot down, made an emergency landing on the fuselage in the Lübben - Steinau area near the Oder River, after which he went missing.
The experienced commander of the 10./JG.4 detachment, Captain Bernhard Hasenberg (01/27/1913), who had 3 air victories to his credit, also died. On Bf 109 G-14 462968 "Schwarze 4" he crashed during takeoff, probably due to sabotage and crashed 3 km northwest of Drewitz.
And the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, shot down one Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft on the same day.

February 12 II. (Sturm) / JG. 4 relocated to the Berlin-Schoenfeld airfield, having suffered heavy losses before this:
Non-commissioned officer Gerhard Grahl from 4.(Sturm)/JG.4 in Bf 109 K-4 331336 "Blaue 2" exploded and died in an air battle south of Naumburg-Bober.
Non-commissioned officer Herbert Brooksch from 5. (Sturm) / JG.4 on Fw 190 A-9 980208 "Weisse 12" was shot down in the Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau area and was taken prisoner, in which he died after the war on August 3, 1946 .
Lieutenant Heinz Schmeling (10/07/1911) from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 was killed in an air battle east of Primkenau. He was a very experienced pilot who had previously flown as a navigator in reconnaissance aircraft, and was awarded the German Gold Cross, the Honorary Silver Cup for distinction in air combat, the Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, and the Gold Badge for sorties.
Feldwebel Friedrich Baere-Steingraf of 6.(Sturm)/JG.4 in Fw 190 A-9 980570 "Schwarze 11" went missing in the area of Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau.
In the same area of Naumburg - Sagan - Sprottau on Fw 190 A-8 / R2 681356 "Schwarze 4" the very young Fenrich Karl Urban (06/19/1925) from 6.(Sturm) / JG.4 went missing.

On Wednesday, February 14, the almost complete squadron relocated to other airfields. The squadron headquarters and the 3rd group settled at the Uterborg-Damm airfield, the 1st group at the Berlin-Schoenfeld airfield, and the 4th group settled at the Mark Tsvuschen airfield. Despite the hassle associated with the redeployment, the squadron continued to carry out combat missions and suffered heavy losses:
Corporal Wilhelm Falenti of 7./JG.4 in Fw 190 A-8 739202 "Gelbe 18" went missing in the area of the Sommerfeld-Pförten highway.
On Bf 109 K-4 332658 "Weisse 7", NCO Kurt Mendel of 11./JG.4 was badly wounded and shot down in a dogfight. Despite prolonged treatment, he died of his wounds on April 20, 1945.
One of the best aces of the squadron, sergeant major Erhard Mekka (02/26/1921) from 14./JG.4, who had 12 air victories and was awarded the Honorary Silver Cup for distinction in air battles and Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degree, was fatally unlucky. On Bf 109 G-10 491440 "Schwarze 11" he was accidentally shot down by German anti-aircraft artillery 30 km west of Kustrin (according to other sources, he was shot down in an air battle in the Fürstenwalde area), jumped out with a parachute, but he did not open up and the pilot died .
Oberfenrich Hans-Günter Lachmann (had 1 air victory) from 16./JG.4, on Bf 109 G-14 784988 "Weisse 7" stormed the columns of Soviet troops in the Forst-Sommerfeld-Sorau area, was shot down and captured . Fortunately for him, he returned from captivity a few years later.
On the same day, the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, again distinguished himself, shooting down one Yak-3.

Against the backdrop of depressing losses in previous days, the results of the fighting on February 16 were more favorable for the squadron.
On this day, only one pilot was lost, Corporal Günther Pöland from 6.(Sturm)/JG.4. In the Landsberg-Fitz area northwest of Leipzig, a shell from its own anti-aircraft artillery hit his Fw 190 A-8 738202 "Schwarze 2", as a result of which the right wing came off, the pilot fell along with the plane and died.
But in air battles, the JG.4 pilots achieved significant success, shooting down four Soviet aircraft. One Yak-9 in the Kustrin area at 16 hours 50 minutes was shot down by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4. (Sturm) / JG.4, two Yak-9s were shot down by non-commissioned officer Kurt Scherer from II. (Sturm) / JG.4 and one Po -2 shot down by non-commissioned officer Gerhard Walter also from II. (Sturm) / JG.4.

The results of the hostilities on February 17 were just as favorable.
Only one pilot, non-commissioned officer Egon Kolias from 10./JG.4, was shot down during ground attack (or in air combat), fell along with his Bf 109 G-14 456317 "Schwarze 13" north of Seelow southwest of Kustrin and died.
But the pilots of JG.4 won three air victories over the Soviet pilots. Fenrich Gunther Wittbold of 1./JG.4, who already had four downed Anglo-American aircraft to his credit, shot down this time one Russian Yak-9 at 10 hours 21 minutes, and the next minute the commander of the 1st group, Major Wilhelm Steinmann, struck immediately two Yak-9s.

February 18 was marked by heavy losses and decent successes. Three pilots were lost, including two experienced squad leaders:
The commander of 2./JG.4 Lieutenant Werner Gerhartz (01/07/1921), who had 1 air victory, while attacking Soviet convoys in the Posen-Schwiebus-Steinberg area, was hit in the radiator, on his Bf109 K-4 333886 "Schwarze 4" made an emergency landing on the territory captured by the Soviet troops, and was taken prisoner. Later, in 1949, he returned from captivity.
Fenrich Hans-Joachim Schmidt from Stab III./JG.4 was also captured, who on Bf 109 K-4 332483 "Rote 1" was shot down in an air battle by Russian pilots in the Frankfurt an der Oder area.
A heavy blow for the squadron was the death of the commander of 7./JG.4 Lieutenant Erhard "Maxe" Nize (03/16/1910), who accounted for 570 sorties and 23 air victories, for which he was awarded the German Golden Cross, Honorary Silver cup for distinction in air combat, Iron Crosses of the 1st and 2nd degree, Gold badge for sorties, Badge for wounds (10/30/1942, 04/24/1944). During a test flight for stability, his Fw 190 A-9 980576 "Gelbe 1" lost control at 16 hours 12 minutes, the ace could not jump out with a parachute, fell along with the plane and died in the Schoenfeld area southeast of Berlin.
In turn, the pilots of the squadron shot down seven planes of "Stalin's falcons". Two Il-2 attack aircraft were destroyed in the Schwibus-Steinberg area at 15 o'clock by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4. (Sturm) / JG. 4, the remaining five aircraft were shot down by pilots whose names have not yet been clarified. Including two Il-2s shot down by pilots from I./JG.4, one La-5 and one R-5 by pilots from II.(Sturm)/JG 4, and one Yak-9 was destroyed by a pilot from III./JG .4.

The results of the day on February 20 can be called a “combat draw”. The squadron lost one pilot:
Non-commissioned officer Eduard Jungvirt (12/27/1922) from 16./JG.4 was seriously wounded and hit by anti-aircraft fire, was forced to land his Bf 109 G-14 / ASM 781174 "Gelbe 13" in the Mukbarup area north of Flensburg and sent to the hospital , where, despite the efforts of doctors, he died of wounds on May 2, 1945. It is only unclear how the pilot received his mortal wound in the indicated area, very far from the front line and the base of his group?
And the squadron’s combat score was replenished with one air victory: sergeant major Josef Weichmann from 6./JG.4 shot down one Il-2 ...

In March, the number of casualties dropped sharply, in addition to routine ground attack flights, completely unusual tasks appeared. So, on March 6, the squadron pilots took part in a combat operation to destroy pontoon bridges on the Oder River. Two flights of four Bf 109s from I./JG.4 escorted two groups of four He 111s from I./KG.200, with Hs 293 guided jet bombs suspended under the fuselage. On approach to the target, German aircraft were attacked by a group of Soviet fighters Yak-9. In the ensuing air battle, the Russians shot down one He 111, and Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4. (Sturm) / JG. 4 at 17 hours 25 minutes and non-commissioned officer Walter Shoula from I. / JG. 4 at 17 hours 37 minutes shot down one Yak-9. In addition, according to the reports of the Heinkel pilots, they managed to hit the bridge in the Göritz area, where the bridgehead of the Soviet 8th Guards Army was located. By the way, one of the missiles that fell into the water and did not explode aroused the keenest interest on the part of the leadership of the Soviet Air Force. Army sappers were ordered to raise the rocket and organize its delivery to Moscow...

The next day, March 7, nothing special happened, except for the fact that Sergeant Major Kurt Goppe (1920) from III./JG.4 on Bf 109 did not return from air combat ...

On March 8, JG.4 pilots again had to take part in a raid on crossings over the Oder in the area of Göritz, Reitwein and Neu Manshnov. This time the group of German planes was even more impressive and unusual than the previous time. Along with conventional bombers - five Ju 188s and two Ju 88s from 5./KG.200 - the strike group also included four Mistel-type aircraft from 6./KG.200. True, one aircraft filled with explosives, due to technical problems, immediately fell off the control aircraft and crashed into the field. The remaining aircraft were escorted by sixteen Bf 109s from III./JG.4 and two Fw 190s from Stab/JG.4, led by the squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Michalski. At about 10 hours and 20 minutes at an altitude of 3,000 meters, German planes approached the crossings. Anti-aircraft artillery, guarding the crossings, opened furious fire, in turn, the Junkers bombarded the positions of Russian anti-aircraft gunners. However, another "Mistel" was hit by an anti-aircraft shell and, engulfed in flames, collapsed to the ground far from the crossings. The remaining two "Mistels" disengaged in the normal mode, but, despite the impressive explosions, there was no significant damage to the crossings. According to other German reports, two direct hits on the bridge and one hit on the position of anti-aircraft batteries were achieved. The Germans also lost one Ju 188 from anti-aircraft fire, its crew was captured. And in the air battle, the Soviet Air Force lost one Yak-9, shot down at 10 hours and 27 minutes by the commander of JG.4, Lieutenant Colonel Michalski. It was his 73rd aerial victory...

On Monday, March 19, I. / JG. 4 located at the Berlin-Schoenfeld airfield was disbanded, and its pilots were sent to other squadron groups.

On March 25, a young pilot in the rank of pilot Manfred Werle (06/14/1925) from 5. (Sturm) / JG.4 (by the way, he was characterized extremely negatively as a liar and a thief, which was a rare exception among Luftwaffe pilots) on the Fw190, released out of repair, took off for a test flight, but crashed along with the plane and died in the Wassmansdorf area south of Berlin. Well, as they say, he atoned for his sins with blood ...
And the commander of IV./JG.4, Captain Ernst-Albert Laube, was awarded the German Gold Cross on the same day.

A little later, on March 28, the former commander of I./JG.4, which had already been disbanded, Major Wilhelm Steinmann received the Knight's Cross, thus becoming the only ace of the 4th squadron who deserved this highest award.

Unfortunately, due to the lack of accurate data, the dates of some losses of squadron pilots in March are unknown. At least six deadweight losses are known:
The pilot with the rank of airman Bernhard Fichte from III./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Soviet fighters in the Küstrin area and taken prisoner. He later died in captivity.
Corporal Veit from 11/JG.4 on Bf109 G-14 "Gelbe 9" was also shot down in an air battle, but not by Russians, but by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Kyffhäuser area west of Leipzig and was captured by the Americans.
Oberleutnant (or Oberfeldwebel) Berg from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A crashed while landing at the Schönefeld airfield southeast of Berlin and burned out.
Non-commissioned officer Helmut Piermann of 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in a dogfight in the Werneuchen-Strausberg area near Berlin and went missing.
Feldwebel Manfred Joschlägel of III./JG.4 in a Bf 109 did not return from the flight and, as it became known later, was taken prisoner. According to some reports, he was in the Kharkov POW camp.
Hermann Klotz of IV./JG.4 in a Bf 109 G did not return from a flight to the Berlin area. There is information that he was later seen in the Moscow POW camp.

April 4 II.(Sturm) / JG.4 located at the airfield Mörtitz, northeast of Leipzig. And already in the evening of that day at 16 hours 30 minutes, the pilot of the group, Lieutenant Wolfgang Gankner, shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter in the Halberstadt area.

The next day, Fenrich Karl Josef Hyde of 15./JG.4 in a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Zahn area southwest of Berlin and taken prisoner by American troops.

The fate of Chief Sergeant Fritz Sterker from 7./JG.4 remained unclear, who on April 7, either on the Fw 190, or on the Bf 109 K-4, participated in an air battle with the Anglo-American aircraft in the Eisenach-Bad area Langensatz north of Erfurt. According to some reports, he did not return from the battle, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

Around 15-16 hours the next day, non-commissioned officer Kurt Blumenberg (04/00/1923) from 14./JG.4, who had 1 air victory on his account, was shot down in a Bf 109 G-14 / AS in an air battle by American P-47 fighters "Thunderbolt" north of Günzerode west of Leipzig and died.

On April 9, Stab / JG.4 began to be based at the Mark Tsvushen airfield.
As of that day, Stab./JG.4 had 6 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 61 Bf 109s.

On the evening of April 11, the pilots of III./JG.4, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski, distinguished themselves: at 19 o’clock they shot down one American P-51 Mustang fighter in the area of Bücheln and Tilled ...

Another redeployment took place on April 12: II.(Sturm)/JG.4 was sent far to the north-west of Germany and began to be based at the Glucksburg airfield in the Flensburg area, and III./JG.4 flew to the Mark Zwuschen airfield.
As of that day, Stab./JG.4 had 7 Fw 190s, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 had 50 Fw 190s, and III./JG.4 had 62 Bf 109s.
Captain Günther Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 replenished his combat account by shooting down a Yak-3 at 12:40...

On Black Friday, April 13, the squadron lost two pilots:
Non-commissioned officer Günther "Splinter" Gallas from 7./JG.4 on the Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Elbe-Elster region southwest of Jüterborg and went missing. True, there is evidence that he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.
In the evening, during an emergency landing in the Jüterborg area, he rolled over several times on his Fw 190 "Schwarze 13" and killed Sergeant Günther Ebergard from 6. (Sturm) / JG.4.

Two days later, on April 15, non-commissioned officer Max Miller (03/12/1924) from III./JG.4 on Bf 109 flew to attack the Anglo-American troops, was shot down in an air battle in the Glücksburger Heide area near Jüterborg, fell along with aircraft and burned down.

On April 16, the number of aircraft in the squadron was: Stab / JG.4 - 5 Fw 190, II. / JG.4 - 55 Fw 190, III. / JG.4 - 52 Bf 109.
On this day, a powerful offensive of Soviet troops on Berlin began (Berlin offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in order to complete the complete defeat of the German armies). Hundreds of Soviet aircraft were constantly in the air, there were almost 200 air battles in which the Germans and Russians suffered very heavy losses. In addition to the usual battles and attack, the pilots of JG.4 again had a chance to participate in a completely unusual Luftwaffe operation. This time, the German air force, following the example of the Japanese "kamikaze", used the tactics of suicide pilots. About sixteen Bf 109 K-4s from JG.4 from 1715 to 1800 escorted eight Bf 109s and one Fw 190 with 500-kg bombs under the fuselage and suicide pilots in the cockpits, who were ordered to send their aircraft to the crossings across the Oder and blow them up. At least one of these volunteers - Fenrich Ernst Beichl from SG.104 - managed to crash into one of the pontoon crossings in the Cellin area, in the band of the 47th Soviet army, and destroy it at the cost of his life. True, in the documents of the 47th Army it was not possible to find any mention of the destruction of the crossing, but in the band of the 69th Army that day a crossing with a carrying capacity of 30 tons was indeed destroyed.
A little later, from 19:15 to 20:30, several Bf 109s from III./JG.4 escorted several Mistel squadrons to the crossing area. There are no details of this raid, but it is known that there were no meetings with Soviet fighters.
And, of course, in several heavy battles of that day with Russian pilots, as well as with Anglo-American aviation, JG.4 suffered significant losses:
Non-commissioned officer Hans Richter from 5.(Sturm) / JG.4 on Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle by American P-51 Mustang fighters in the Halbe region near Brandenburg, jumped out with a parachute, but died.
An Estonian volunteer (former pilot of the Estonian NSGr.11), Lieutenant Karl Lumi from 7./JG.4 on the Fw 190 A-8 was shot down in an air battle by Anglo-American aircraft in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area and went missing.
Also in the air battle with the Anglo-American aviation in the Mühlhausen-Leipzig area, Fenrich Hans-Martin Delkmann from 6.(Sturm) / JG.4 was shot down on the Fw 190 and went missing.
Lieutenant Horst (Herbert) Peschel (15.02.1923) of 7./JG.4 (had 2 air victories) in an Fw 190 was shot down in a dogfight by American fighters and went missing. True, according to other sources, he was only wounded.
At about 15:00 on a Bf 109 G in an air battle with a group of Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft and Yak-9 fighters in the Bukov-Zeelov area, non-commissioned officer Max Kolb from IV./JG.4 was shot down and captured, who later died in captivity.
The fate of non-commissioned officer Günther Schneider from 11./JG.4 was also sad (he had at least 1 air victory). On the Bf 109, he was shot down by Russian pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt an der Oder region, captured and also died in captivity.
In battles on both sides with Soviet and allied aviation, the squadron pilots achieved some success:
Captain Johannes Kaufmann of 9./JG.4 shot down one Soviet P-39 Airacobra fighter in the Kustrin area at 11 hours 15 minutes, and non-commissioned officer Hans Seepunkte from 5. (Sturm) / JG.4 at 12 hours 15 minutes - one American P-51 Mustang, however, the victory was not credited to him. One Yak-9 at 15 hours 15 minutes in the Bukov-Zeelov area was destroyed by Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from 4. (Sturm) / JG.4. One P-51 "Mustang" was shot down by non-commissioned officer Weber from JG.4 ...

April 17 was also marked by a large number of battles and the associated losses and successes.
Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Messer of IV./JG.4 was the first to score an aerial victory at 11:15, having shot down a Soviet Boston bomber east of Podeltsig.
At about 2 pm, one Il-2 attack aircraft in the Oder region was shot down by Captain Günter Schwaneke from Stab./JG.4 and non-commissioned officer Heinz Zimmer from III./JG.4. Probably in the same battle, the former navigator of naval and bomber aircraft, Captain Rudolf Schroeder (1912) (1914) from 7./JG.4 (8./JG.4), who had 3 air victories, was shot down on his Fw 190 A in air combat in the Gorgast-Lebus area near Kustrin and died. Although according to other sources, he survived.
It is quite possible that Fenrich Wunsche of 7./JG.4 was shot down and killed in the same battle in the Küstrin area with an Fw 190 A. True, according to other sources, he died in the Elbe-Elster region southwest of Jüterborg.
Already returning from the mission, at 14 hours 20 minutes, when landing at the Mark Tsvushen airfield southwest of Juterborg, the Bf 109 group from III./JG.4 was suddenly attacked by American P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, while three pilots were killed:
Feldwebel Fritz Lehmann parachuted out but died.
Non-commissioned officer Karl Ripe fell along with the plane and died (according to other sources, he survived).
Ober-sergeant major Fritz Tzarske (10/19/1922) from 9./JG.4, who had 1 air victory, also died heroically: covering the landing of his commander, Captain Gunther Schwaneke, he shot down one American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter, but he himself was shot down by another Thunderbolt. He jumped out with a parachute, but the parachute did not open.
Around 19:00, several Bf 109 squadrons again escorted about 30 aircraft with suicide bombers on board to the crossings on the Oder. At the same time, in an air battle with Russian aviation, the pilots of 9. / JG.4, Captain Johannes Kaufmann and Fenrich Oskar Butenop, shot down Yak-3 and Yak-9, respectively, in the Frankfurt an der Oder area at 19:30.

Several air battles conducted by the squadron during April 18 cost her two pilots:
Fenrich Rudolf von Baumgarten from II.(Sturm)/JG.4 on Fw 190 A-8 was shot down in the Obisfeld-Magdeburg area, escaped by parachute and was taken prisoner by Anglo-American troops.
Around 14:00 Fenrich Rainer Kletzl of IV./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down by Soviet pilots in an air battle in the Frankfurt an der Oder region and went missing.
However, the squadron pilots also won several air victories:
At dawn at 0650 hours, accompanied by a group of Ju 87 dive bombers, Lieutenant Karl-Heinz Messer from IV./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3 in the Seelow area.
At 1300 in the Fürstenwalde area, Captain Johannes Kaufmann of 9./JG.4 shot down an Il-2 attack aircraft, and the pilot of the same detachment, Sergeant Major Ottokar Bente, shot down a MiG fighter, and noted that the Russian pilot did not jump out of the falling aircraft.
A little later, at 13:30, the same sergeant major Ottokar Bente shot down an American P-47 Thunderbolt fighter near Jüterborg.
Other pilots from III./JG.4 also distinguished themselves: at 1745 hours, Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach shot down a Yak-3 in the Bukov-Zeelov area, and non-commissioned officer Rudolf Kozlowski shot down a Yak-3 in the Müncheberg area. One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen.
On this day, 31-year-old Major Wilhelm Moritz, holder of the Knight's Cross, was appointed commander of II./JG.4, who shot down 44 aircraft, mainly when he fought as part of JG.51 "Mölders" and JG.3 "Udet" ...

Thursday, April 19, was again a relocation day: Stab / JG.4, II. (Sturm) / JG.4 and III. / JG.4 flew to the new Rechlin-Roggentin airfield northwest of Berlin. At the same time, the Estonian volunteer Chief Fenrich Axel Meingart Kessler (05/28/1916) from 6.(Sturm) / JG.4 deserted: at 10 hours 50 minutes, taking off from the airfield Mark Tsvushen on Fw 190 A-8 961076 "Schwarze 10" he flew over to Sweden, landed at the Bulltoft airfield and was interned.
Two more pilots of the same detachment died, having fulfilled their military duty to the end:
Non-commissioned officer Philipp Köhler on an Fw 190 did not return from an air battle with British Spitfire fighters in the Neuruppin area.
The former pilot of the Fw 189 in (H) / Aufkl.Gr.10 Lieutenant Franz Roleder, who was awarded the German Gold Cross, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for sorties, also died. When, on the Fw 190, he, as part of a flight, stormed Soviet tanks north of Berlin, the left wing of the aircraft was torn off by a direct hit by an anti-aircraft shell, and the aircraft, together with the pilot, crashed to the ground.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach of III./JG.4 won his fifteenth aerial victory, shooting down a Yak-3 near Berlin at 1530 hours.

On April 20, 1945, several Fw 190 D-9s from III./JG.4 escorted a group of He 111 conventional bombers and eight Ar 234 jet bombers from KG.76, which attacked Soviet troops in the vicinity of Berlin. All Ar 234s returned safely from their mission, but five He 111s and three Fw 190s were shot down.
In just a day, JG.4 lost two pilots:
Oberfeldwebel Herbert Rinkleb of 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, a former bomber airborne radio operator and participant in the intervention in Spain, was awarded the Cross for Spain, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, and the Gold Badge for sorties , on the Fw 190 was shot down in an air battle in the Berlin area and went missing.
Fenrich Helmuth Klapprott of 6.(Sturm)/JG.4, who was shot down in an air battle east of Bernau, northeast of Berlin, was killed. Perhaps he was a victim of the Soviet Yak-9 pilot, Captain P.F. Lavrikov from the 812th Fighter Aviation Regiment.
In the battles, Lieutenant Gottfried Morio from 7. (Sturm) / JG. 4, non-commissioned officer Valentin Scheurmann from III. / JG. 4 were also shot down, but escaped by parachute, Fenrich Oscar Butenop from 9. / made emergency landings on wrecked planes. JG.4, Sergeant Major Franz Sischka from 5.(Sturm)/JG.4, Sergeant Horst Heifrich from III./JG.4…
For their part, the III./JG.4 pilots were able to bring down four enemy aircraft in the Berlin area:
At 1300, Captain Gunther Schwaneke of Stab/JG.4 destroyed the English Spitfire.
Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach of III./JG.4 won his 16th and 17th air victories, shooting down a Yak-9 fighter and a Boston bomber at 1345 hours.
One La-5 was shot down by Captain Gerhard Strasen from III./JG.4...

On Saturday, April 21, the main task of the squadron was bombing and assault raids on Soviet troops, as well as sorties for "free hunting", while two more pilots were lost:
Non-commissioned officer Walter Gausdörfer of 5.(Sturm)/JG.4 in an Fw 190 was shot down in a dogfight near Berlin and went missing.
And Fenrich Erich Gifer from 7./JG.4, piloting the Fw 190 A-9, crashed and burned down at the Rechlin airfield.
According to some reports, the squadron pilots scored several air victories in the Berlin area, but only two of them were credited to Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III. / JG. hours 30 minutes also La-5.

The next day, the squadron pilots again scored several air victories in the Berlin area, but again only Lieutenant Hans Klaffenbach from III./JG.4 was credited with one Yak-9, shot down at 13 o'clock.

On April 23, the main task of JG.4 was again bombing and assault raids on Russian troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Together with attack pilots from SG.1, pilots of JG.4 with bombs suspended under the fuselage attacked Russian equipment and infantry from strafing flight, and also fought grueling air battles, which again cost them two comrades:
Fenrich Winfried Brahler of 7/JG.4 flying an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in a dogfight near Kustrin and went missing. True, according to other sources, he died in the Eisenach area.
At 1330 hours in the Oranienburg area northwest of Berlin, Sergeant Major Hans Gohleitner from IV./JG.4 on a Bf109 fighter was shot down in an air battle by Soviet Yak-3 fighters, escaped by parachute, but was taken prisoner. However, we can say that he was lucky, because a few years after the end of the war he returned from captivity.
Even more fortunate was Captain Johannes Kaufmann of 9./JG.4, who shot down one Yak-9 at 13:40 in the same battle near Oranienburg. It was his 7th aerial victory...

On Wednesday, April 25, Soviet troops completely surrounded Berlin, the capital of the Third Reich was doomed. However, Luftwaffe pilots, including JG.4, continued to fight. In one of the sorties, Sergeant Major Ahlers of 7./JG.4 flying an Fw 190 A-9 was shot down in a dogfight near Berlin. According to some sources, he went missing, according to others, he was only wounded in the Eisenach area.

On April 26, the squadron lost Lieutenant Friedrich Pullmann of 9./JG.4. A fairly experienced pilot, he already had 3 air victories on his account, was awarded the Iron Cross of the 2nd degree, the Badge for sorties and the Badge for wounds (09/12/1944, 12/05/1944). But the data on the reasons for his death differ: according to one information, he was shot down on a Bf 109 in an air battle in the Rossov area near Pasewalk, and according to another, he died in the Wittstock area when he was flying as a passenger on a Ju 52 transport aircraft.

The next day in the Berlin area was unfavorable weather: rain and cloudy. There were few sorties, even fewer fights. In one of them, at 4 pm, Captain Johannes Kaufmann of 9./JG.4 shot down one Yak-3. Captain Gerhard Strasen of III./JG.4 won his 9th aerial victory, shooting down La-5 ...

On Sunday, April 29, aircraft of the 6th Luftwaffe Air Fleet were able to make only 74 sorties in support of German troops in Berlin. Several JG.4 pilots stormed the Russian troops in the central zone of the city and near the Reich Chancellery.
At 08:45, Sergeant Manfred Kudell (09/02/1924) from 8./JG.4 flew in a Fw 190 D with a suspended 250-kg bomb as part of a pair on his last 29th sortie to attack tanks. After dropping a bomb on a target, in an air battle with Soviet fighters, he was set on fire and shot down, landed by parachute on one of the streets in the Weissensee district in Berlin and was taken prisoner by Soviet soldiers. After returning from captivity, he lived in Germany, died quite recently - on April 17, 2012.
Some time later, III./JG.4 pilots shot down three of them in a battle with a large group of Russian fighters: at 11:30, non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4 shot down two Yak-9s in the Schönewald area at once, winning thus their first two aerial victories. And Captain Johannes Kaufmann of 9./JG.4 scored his ninth aerial victory, at 11:45, shooting down one Yak-3 in the Berlin area ...

On April 30, Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 moved from the Rechlin-Roggentin airfield to the Parchim airfield northwest of Berlin. And again, during the flight, another case of desertion occurred: an Estonian volunteer, a former navigator in Aufkl.Gr.127, Lieutenant Anatol Rebane (03/04/1915), by the way, a native of the glorious Ukrainian city of Poltava, from 6. (Sturm) / JG.4 on his Fw 190 A-8 739136 "Weisse 15" flew to Sweden, landed at the Bulltoft airfield and was interned. After the end of the war, he lived first in the United States, then in Estonia, where he died on October 16, 2007.

On Tuesday, May 1, the pilots of JG.4, together with the pilots of JG.26 and SG.1, continued to attack the Soviet troops on the streets of Berlin and even destroyed several tanks. In addition, the pilots of JG.4 reported several aerial victories, but only one Yak-9 was credited to them, which at 1640 hours was shot down by non-commissioned officer Erwin Teske from 8./JG.4. Apparently, this was the last success of the squadron ...

The next day, May 2, the last redeployment was made by Stab/JG.4, II.(Sturm)/JG.4 and III./JG.4 - they moved even further to the West, to the Lek airfield northwest of Flensburg. This was the end of the squadron's stay on the Eastern Front. Only a few days remained until the end of the war and the surrender of the German armed forces. Finally, we will report on the latest battles and losses of the 4th squadron.
During the day on May 2, the losses of JG.4 amounted to four pilots:
At about 8 o'clock, Sergeant Major Karl Eilitz from 9./JG.4 on a Bf 109 was shot down in an air battle by British Spitfire fighters in the Parchim area and died.
Corporal Ernst of 7./JG.4 on Fw 190 was shot down in a dogfight with Anglo-American aircraft in the Dass area northeast of Lübeck and died.
In an air battle with Anglo-American aircraft in the Bad Godesberg area southeast of Bonn, non-commissioned officer Matthias van der Velden from Stab III./JG.4 was also shot down, who parachuted out of his Bf 109 K-4 and was taken prisoner Americans. After the end of the war, he returned from captivity to Germany.
Lieutenant Franz Malsch of III./JG.4, who had 11 (14) air victories on his account, was awarded the Honorary Silver Cup for distinction in air combat, Iron Crosses 1st and 2nd class, as well as the Gold Badge for sorties, on a Bf 109 was shot down, made an emergency landing in the Prague region and was taken prisoner.
True, the places of capture of the last two pilots are surprising, since they are too far from the airfields from which the squadron was operating at that time. It is possible that these data are erroneous.

The last loss of the squadron was non-commissioned officer Helmut Lauer from JG.4, who was killed on May 5 in a Bf 109 in an air battle in the Landsberg an der Warth area. And in this case, as in the previous two, the place of his death is in doubt.

Here, practically, is all that is known about the actions of JG.4 on the Eastern Front ...

In total, according to available data (far from complete!) During the fighting against Soviet aviation, pilots shot down at least 50 aircraft, including 38 fighters, 8 Il-2 attack aircraft, 2 Boston bombers, 1 Po-2 and 1 R -5. In addition, they won at least 8 air victories in battles with Anglo-American aircraft. The losses of the squadron amounted to almost 90 pilots, however, these data, as mentioned above, need to be clarified. 12 pilots died in air crashes. 12 pilots were also shot down by anti-aircraft fire. For unknown reasons, 26 pilots were lost. 2 pilots deserted. 39 pilots were lost in air battles, of which 23 were shot down by Soviet pilots and 16 by allied aircraft. There are no definitive data on aircraft losses, however, given that there are an average of two aircraft lost per lost pilot, it can be assumed that the squadron's losses amounted to at least 270 aircraft. The balance of victories and losses is clearly not in favor of the 4th squadron, but one could not expect otherwise in 1945: the multiple superiority of Soviet and Anglo-American aviation over the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. Many German poorly trained young “yellow mouths” in the very first battles fell victim to experienced “Stalin's falcons” and Allied pilots, who had hundreds of hours of flight time and sorties. You can even say that the example of JG.4 is typical, because the rest of the Luftwaffe squadrons were also in agony ...
By the way, the appearance of ersatz newcomers from JG.4 on the Soviet-German front remained unnoticed. In any case, in the memoirs of the former Soviet pilots there is absolutely no mention of meetings in the air with "Messers" and "Fokkers" with the emblem of the "Knight's helmet with red plumage" ...

Igor, Oleg writes about kamikaze pilots. Read his article carefully. As for the appeals of Nazi propaganda, this is highly doubtful. At least, this does not follow from the two-part film that you probably watched about the last days of the fascist regime. This is all from the realm of conjecture, what the defenders of Berlin were thinking about.
I don’t feel any hatred of the Western democratic layman, neither on TV, nor on the radio, nor in communication. But the hatred in Russian TV, the press, and even Prozera for the West, for those compatriots who live in other countries, for those who do not share their ardent love for the president, is indeed abundant.

Vladimir, one can, of course, doubt how and what the defenders of Berlin thought. In such cases, if there is interest, it is necessary to delve into the literature on this issue. We learn, for example, about the direct appeals of the Fuhrer, recorded in the documents. We learn that such a crazy idea was adopted, that this is a historical fact, repeatedly confirmed.

The “yellow-mouthed pilots” of the Luftwaffe were “kamikazes” to a much lesser extent than the “Volkssturm” or Wehrmacht soldiers on a Berlin street, than thousands and thousands of military personnel and civilians loyal to the call - “Wir kapitulieren nie - Sieg oder Tod!” And hoping for a miracle.

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Last edited on 12/12/2011 17:06

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Since the summer of 1944, the Third Reich and its allies have gone into "deaf protection". The catastrophe in Belarus, the transfer of hostilities on the eastern front beyond the borders of the USSR, the opening of a second front, the massive bombing of German territory: everything suggested the imminent and imminent collapse of the "eternal" Reich. Separate local successes of the German armed forces simply prolonged the agony. Germany and its allies were forced to wage war on two fronts: from the east, the Red Army approached the primordially German territories, whose military power increased every day, from the west the Anglo-American troops advanced, having a "big tooth" on the Nazis and a huge technical superiority.

In the context of the conduct of hostilities between June 1944 and May 1945, several rather interesting questions arise. How great were the losses of the Reich in the personnel of the armed forces and in the main types of military equipment during this period? How were they distributed among the theaters of operations? Which direction (western or eastern) was a priority for the leadership of the Reich? For those who live in the territory of the former USSR, it would seem that the answer is obvious. But is he true? After all, for those who today live in the West and in the United States, the correct answer seems to be quite different.

On the one hand, there is a “canonized” opinion, the source of which lies in the Soviet interpretation of the events of the Second World War: the main efforts of the Reich Armed Forces and the allies of the Germans concentrated against the Red Army, and they considered the western front as secondary. On the other hand, there is a directly opposite opinion, especially in the English-language "pop" historiography, regarding the eastern front as "secondary".
Let's try to abstract from personal predilections, preferences and patriotism, and analyze the distribution of resources in the Reich by theaters of war and their losses during the last year of World War II in Europe. Based on these statistics, we will see which of the fronts was considered by the German leadership to be a higher priority. Simply put, whom Hitler was "more afraid of." Let's start with military equipment.

AVIATION

Combat aviation played a huge role in the Second World War. Air superiority allowed the opposing sides to inflict significant losses on the enemy, in turn greatly reducing their own. Moreover, the aircraft industry was a kind of "litmus test" for each of the warring countries, showing both the industrial and intellectual potential of the country, and the ability to put it into practice.
You need to start with statistics on the production of aviation equipment during the Second World War:

According to German data, from September 1, 1939, until the end of the war, the German aviation industry and the industry of the countries occupied by Germany produced 113,515 aircraft of all types, of which 18,235 bombers, 53,729 fighters, 12,359 attack aircraft, 11,546 training aircraft, 1,190 naval aircraft , 3145 airborne gliders.

In Soviet times, it was claimed that the Germans lost 77,000 aircraft on the eastern front. The classic work "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Figures" gives more modest figures for the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4200 aircraft, 1942 - 11,550, 1943 - 15,200, 1944 - 17,500 , 1945 - 4,400. In total: 52,850 aircraft.

In the monograph "Secrecy Removed" by a team of authors led by G.F. Krivosheeva contains other data on the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4,000 aircraft, 1942 - 11,500 aircraft, 1943 - 19,000, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 7,500. Total: 59,500 aircraft of all types. This is, so to speak, the official Russian point of view at this moment.

There is a point of view different from our official one. For the first time, the numbers of irretrievable / total losses of the German Luftwaffe were made public by a well-known aviation historian O. Groyler(Gröller) in the 3rd issue of the magazine "Militaergechichte" back in 1972, based on the daily reports of the 6th department of the Quartermaster General of the Reich Air Force. To say that these data differ from those circulating in Soviet historiography is to say nothing. So the loss of aircraft in 1941 on the eastern front is, according to these data, 2213 aircraft irretrievably and 1435 heavily damaged. For the period from January to August 1942, 4,561 were destroyed and 3,740 were damaged.

But the fact is that the documents of the 6th department were not completely preserved, since the Luftwaffe archive was mostly destroyed by the Germans themselves. More or less complete data were preserved until December 1943, partly until December 1944, and fragmentary for 1945. The rest of the documents were mostly taken to the United States, and only in the 1970s were returned to the military archive of the FRG.

Thus, there is no reliable data on the losses of the German Air Force over the last year of hostilities in Europe. However, the irretrievable losses on the eastern front suffered precisely during the performance of combat missions were known quite accurately. According to Groyler, in 1944 they amounted to: 839 fighters, 1342 bombers and attack aircraft, 376 reconnaissance aircraft. Some domestic "historians" happily clung to these figures and, based on the known losses of the Soviet Air Force, deduced the loss ratio of 6:1 in favor of the Germans, and some even managed to get 8:1. However, these "historians" forgot to take into account that all the belligerents suffered significant non-combat losses in aviation throughout the Second World War. The figure of non-combat losses ranges from 40% in the German Air Force, to 50-55% in the Soviet. In addition, Greuler wrote his work back in 1972, since then several more very detailed studies have been published on the issue of the losses of the German Air Force in the period from 1940 to 1945.

At the moment, the most complete and reliable information on the losses of the Luftwaffe and on the layout of these losses in the theater of operations is contained in the works of Professor Murray and aviation historian Michael Holm.

According to these data, the losses of the Luftwaffe are: on the Eastern Front for the period February - December 1942, 2,955 aircraft were destroyed directly in battle, 2,308 aircraft were lost "outside the enemy's influence" and 1,806 aircraft were damaged. The total losses of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet-German front amounted to 5263 aircraft destroyed plus 1806 damaged, and in total 7069 combat vehicles, which is 58% of all Luftwaffe losses in 1942 in relation to all theaters of operations. On all other fronts, 3,806 aircraft were lost irrevocably and 1,102 damaged, or 4,908 combat vehicles. Data on training units for 1942 are not available.

Application No. 2

Annex 3

Appendix 4

Annex 5

Appendix 6

Annex 7

AVIATION

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