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Since the summer of 1944, the Third Reich and its allies have gone into "deaf protection". The catastrophe in Belarus, the transfer of hostilities on the eastern front beyond the borders of the USSR, the opening of a second front, the massive bombing of German territory: everything suggested the imminent and imminent collapse of the "eternal" Reich. Separate local successes of the German armed forces simply prolonged the agony. Germany and its allies were forced to wage war on two fronts: from the east, the Red Army approached the primordially German territories, whose military power increased every day, from the west the Anglo-American troops advanced, having a "big tooth" on the Nazis and a huge technical superiority.
In the context of the conduct of hostilities in the period from June 1944 to May 1945, there are several rather interesting questions. How great were the losses of the Reich in the personnel of the armed forces and in the main types of military equipment during this period? How were they distributed among the theaters of operations? Which direction (western or eastern) was a priority for the leadership of the Reich? For those who live in the area former USSR It would seem that the answer is obvious. But is he true? After all, for those who today live in the West and in the United States, the correct answer seems to be quite different.
On the one hand, there is a “canonized” opinion, the source of which lies in the Soviet interpretation of the events of the Second World War: the main efforts of the Reich Armed Forces and the allies of the Germans concentrated against the Red Army, and they considered the western front as secondary. On the other hand, there is a directly opposite opinion, especially in the English-language "pop" historiography, regarding the eastern front as "secondary".
Let's try to abstract from personal predilections, preferences and patriotism, and analyze the distribution of resources in the Reich by theaters of war and their losses during the last year of World War II in Europe. Based on these statistics, we will see which of the fronts was considered German leadership more priority. Simply put, whom Hitler was "more afraid of." Let's start with military equipment.
AVIATION
Combat aviation played a huge role in the Second World War. Air superiority allowed the opposing sides to inflict significant losses on the enemy, in turn greatly reducing their own. Moreover, the aircraft industry was a kind of "litmus test" for each of the warring countries, showing both the industrial and intellectual potential of the country, and the ability to put it into practice.
Let's start with release statistics aviation technology During the Second World War:
According to German data, from September 1, 1939 and until the end of the war, the German aviation industry and the industry of the countries occupied by Germany produced 113,515 aircraft of all types, of which 18,235 bombers, 53,729 fighters, 12,359 attack aircraft, 11,546 training aircraft, 1,190 naval aircraft , 3145 airborne gliders.
AT Soviet time it was claimed that the Germans lost 77,000 aircraft on the eastern front. In the classic work "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 in numbers" gives more modest figures for the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4200 aircraft, 1942 - 11,550, 1943 - 15,200, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 4,400. total: 52,850 aircraft.
In the monograph "Secrecy Removed" by a team of authors led by G.F. Krivosheeva contains other data on the losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front: 1941 - 4,000 aircraft, 1942 - 11,500 aircraft, 1943 - 19,000, 1944 - 17,500, 1945 - 7,500. Total: 59,500 aircraft of all types. This is, so to speak, the official Russian point of view at this moment.
There is a point of view different from our official one. For the first time, the numbers of irretrievable / total losses of the German Luftwaffe were made public by a well-known aviation historian O. Groyler(Gröller) in the 3rd issue of the magazine "Militaergechichte" back in 1972, based on the daily reports of the 6th department of the Quartermaster General of the Reich Air Force. To say that these data differ from those circulating in Soviet historiography is to say nothing. So the loss of aircraft in 1941 on the eastern front is, according to these data, 2213 aircraft irretrievably and 1435 heavily damaged. For the period from January to August 1942, 4,561 were destroyed and 3,740 were damaged.
But the fact is that the documents of the 6th department were not completely preserved, since the Luftwaffe archive was mostly destroyed by the Germans themselves. More or less complete data were preserved until December 1943, partly until December 1944, and fragmentary for 1945. The rest of the documents were mostly taken to the United States, and only in the 1970s were returned to the military archive of the FRG.
Thus, there is no reliable data on the losses of the German Air Force during the last year of hostilities in Europe. However, the irretrievable losses on the eastern front suffered precisely during the performance of combat missions were known quite accurately. According to Groyler, in 1944 they amounted to: 839 fighters, 1342 bombers and attack aircraft, 376 reconnaissance aircraft. Some domestic "historians" happily clung to these figures and, based on known losses Soviet Air Force, brought the loss ratio of 6:1 in favor of the Germans, and some even managed to get 8:1. However, these "historians" forgot to take into account that all the warring parties suffered significant losses. combat losses in aviation throughout World War II. The figure of non-combat losses ranges from 40% in the German Air Force, to 50-55% in the Soviet. In addition, Greuler wrote his work back in 1972, since then several more very detailed studies have been published on the issue of the losses of the German Air Force in the period from 1940 to 1945.
On the this moment most complete and reliable information on the losses of the Luftwaffe and on the layout of these losses in the theater of operations is contained in the works of Professor Murray and aviation historian Michael Holm.
According to these data, the losses of the Luftwaffe are: on the Eastern Front for the period February - December 1942, 2,955 aircraft were destroyed directly in battle, 2,308 aircraft were lost "outside the enemy's influence" and 1,806 aircraft were damaged. Total losses of the Luftwaffe Soviet-German front amounted to 5,263 aircraft destroyed plus 1,806 damaged, and in total 7,069 combat vehicles, which is 58% of all Luftwaffe losses in 1942 in relation to all theaters. On all other fronts, 3,806 aircraft were lost irrevocably and 1,102 damaged, or 4,908 combat vehicles. Data for training units for 1942 are missing.
Air victories
As already noted in the 1st part, the number of air victories won by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front was calculated from the multi-volume "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" by the team of authors headed by Johan Prien. Drawing up the most complete and reliable list of air victories German fighters in WWII is one of the main tasks that the authors of this study set themselves. And they really managed to achieve great success in solving it, significantly clarifying and supplementing the previously published data. However, in order to fill all the gaps in this issue, the array of documents available to the authors was not enough.
Experts of 6./JG 5 at the Bf 109F-4 "yellow 12" aircraft of the commander of the detachment, Lieutenant Heinrich Erler, Petsamo airfield (Soviet name - Luostari), late August - early September 1942.
From left to right - sergeant major Albert Brunner (53 air victories, shot down and killed in dogfight near Murmansk 05/07/1943); unknown; probably sergeant major Rudolf Muller (94 air victories, shot down in an air battle near Murmansk 04/19/1943 and captured, died in captivity 10/21/1943); Lieutenant Heinrich Erler (208 air victories, killed in an air battle near Stendal 04/04/1945 while repelling a daytime raid by American heavy bombers); non-commissioned officer Hans-Heinrich Döbrich (65 air victories, shot down and seriously wounded in an air battle west of the Rybachy Peninsula on 07/16/1943, did not participate in hostilities after being cured).
Of all the units of the German fighter aviation operating on the Soviet-German front in the period 1941-1943, the victories won by the pilots of JG 5 are the least known. part of the victories of this squadron, and most of the documents operating on the Soviet-German front Stab / JG 5, II. / JG 5 and III. / JG 5 were destroyed at the end of the war. The most important source of information about the victories of these units are the daily reports of the Luftwaffe liaison officer at the headquarters of the 20th mountain army (until June 1942 - the Lapland army). Unfortunately, these reports report only the total number of victories won during the day; the names of the victorious pilots are not included in them.
The process of officially confirming air victories in the Luftwaffe was multi-stage and took quite a lot of time. After, on the basis of the pilot's application, a report was drawn up on the destruction enemy aircraft(Abschussmeldung), it had to be signed by the direct commander of the victorious pilot (in the case of an ordinary pilot, the squad leader) and sent for approval to a higher headquarters. If the report was approved at all higher headquarters, then it eventually ended up in the personnel department of the Luftwaffe High Command (OKL), where it was accepted final decision and, if it turned out to be positive, a formal victory confirmation notice was issued. It is quite natural that at each level of command their own lists were kept, which included all the victories approved at this level and transferred to the higher headquarters for consideration. In the event that a higher authority made a decision to refuse to confirm a victory, information about this was transmitted along the chain to subordinate headquarters, and the corresponding victory was excluded from their lists. The whole process could take anywhere from a few weeks to a year or more. There are cases when the refusal to confirm the victory came from Berlin a year after the date when it was announced.
Unfortunately, not all lists of OKL air victories survived after the war and are available for study. Therefore, to obtain the missing data, the authors of the study used a large number of surviving documents. various parts, formations and associations of the Luftwaffe - lists of victories of fighter squadrons, air divisions, corps and air fleets, their railroad tracks and daily reports, etc. The lists compiled based on the results of this work include the following number of victories won by combat units of single-seat Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front:
These lists include only those applications that have been reported to the OKL. Applications that have not been confirmed at the level of the headquarters of the group, squadron, formation or association in the lists should not be present (but may be there due to the incompleteness of the information available to the authors of the study and the errors caused by this). The minimum necessary information about an aerial victory that must be known to be included in the list is the date it was won and the part that claimed it. Unfortunately, this is not known about some victories. The number of such, not in the lists of victories, declared by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front in the period under consideration can be estimated at several hundred - or no more than 1-2% of the total number of declared victories (in particular, the study provides data about 212 victories known to the authors, won in 1941-1942, which were not included in the lists). In the future, in this work, these victories that are not included in the lists of victories are not taken into account by me anywhere.
The total number of aerial victories (second column) includes all German fighter claims known to the authors of the study, with the exception of claims that were denied approval indicated in the fourth column. The third column - victories confirmed by OKL - includes only those victories for which confirmation information is contained in the documents available to the authors of the study. The difference between the numbers in the second and third columns consists of:
Applications that have been confirmed by OKL, but the authors do not have information about the confirmation of which;
Applications, the decision on which was not made at the time of preparation of the documents available to the authors. As already noted, the process of confirming an air victory could take more than a year. So, in the lists of air victories of the OKL, dating from the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945, there are victories declared as early as 1942 and still under consideration. This is what explains big difference between the figures in the second and third columns for 1943. Of the large number of victories claimed during that year, no final decision was made;
Applications for which a decision was made to deny approval, but information about this is not available in the documents available to the authors or it is not enough to identify the application for which this decision was made and exclude it from the total number of victories.
In the column with applications for which confirmation was refused, only those applications for which the authors had sufficient information to identify them are taken into account. It also takes into account applications for which, according to the authors, the OKL should have made a negative decision, but direct instructions there is no documentation for this in the documents available to them. The table shows that the number of applications for which the OKL made a decision to refuse was small - 1-2% of the number of confirmed ones.
As an example, explaining the meaning of the numbers indicated in the table, consider several applications submitted by Hans Philipp, who during the period described was the commander of I./JG 54:
In January-February 1943, the OKL decided to refuse confirmation of three applications made by Philip in the first half of 1942. Since the authors of the study do not know which of Philip's applications were refused, these applications are included in the list total wins (second column of the table) and, accordingly, are not included in the number of rejected applications (fourth column of the table);
02/11/1943 Philip claimed one air victory, but the squadron headquarters refused to confirm it. The same thing happened with another of his applications, made between February 15 and 18, 1943. Since both of these applications were refused at the squadron headquarters level and reports about them were not sent to OKL, they are not in the lists of air victories, and, accordingly, not included in any column.
The dynamics of changes in the number of victories claimed by German fighters is an excellent indicator of the intensity of air battles on the Soviet-German front, and, consequently, the level of activity of both German fighter aircraft and Soviet aviation with which she fought. The degree of reliability of the air victories of German fighters, in other words, the extent to which the claimed victories correspond to the losses of Soviet aircraft, is not considered within the framework of this work.
Losses
As you know, the main source of information about the losses of combat units of the Luftwaffe are the lists of losses of combat units (Flugzeugunfälle und Verluste bei den Fliegende Verbänden), compiled by the 6th Department of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. The huge amount of information contained in them allows you to get a fairly complete and detailed picture of the losses suffered by the combat units of the Luftwaffe throughout the Second World War. But, as in most other consolidated documents drawn up on highest level commands based on data provided by many lower headquarters, the information provided in these lists is not 100% complete, reliable, and uniform. In order to identify and fill in the gaps in the lists of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, the authors of the multi-volume "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" processed a large number of other documents, which allowed them to somewhat expand the list of losses suffered by units of single-seat fighters. In the tables below, loss figures have been calculated from lists from this study. I did not carry out a complete check of the information presented in the study against the lists of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe and other sources, only individual accidentally discovered errors were corrected, in addition, episodes of losses were rechecked for which incomplete information was indicated in the study.
Messerschmitt Bf 109F-2 "White 1", presumably WrNr. 9619, commander of 7./JG 54 Lieutenant Günter Scholz after a forced landing on August 1, 1941, Luga area.
On the evening of August 1, 1941, fighters from 7./JG 54 intercepted six Soviet bombers and claimed the destruction of three of them. The engine of Scholz's aircraft was damaged by the return fire of the shooters, and he had to land on the first suitable site in the middle of a dense forest. As a result, the plane was crashed, and Scholz himself received a compression fracture of the spine. In the same fight Soviet fighters the escorts set fire to Lieutenant Max-Helmut Ostermann's Messerschmitt. Fortunately for the German pilot, after the protector of the punctured gas tank tightened the hole, the fire stopped, and he managed to return to his airfield, successfully landing the plane. It is interesting that in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe there are no records of the losses of III./JG 54 for 08/01/1941. At the same time, they have two Bf 109F-2s from 3./JG 54: WrNr. 9619, lost in combat with fighters in the Luga region (damage rate 95%) and WrNr. 5697, damaged by enemy fire and landing at Spindle airfield (damage rate 20%). Considering the circumstances of the losses of 7./JG 54 described above, as well as the fact that III./JG 54 was based at Vereteni airfield at that time, it can be assumed that the losses from the list of the Quartermaster General are the desired losses of 7./JG 54 - it's just that at some stage the 3rd group (III./JG 54) mistakenly turned into the 3rd detachment (3./JG 54). True, according to Ostermann's diary, after the battle he landed at the airfield near Luga, to which 7./JG 54 relocated on the morning of 1 August. As for I./JG 54, it was based that day at the Ovsishche airfield, 70 km northwest of Luga, so that its aircraft could well have participated in the battle in the Luga area. But why would a damaged aircraft from 3./JG 54, instead of returning to its airfield, fly more than 100 km south to Vereteni? In the study "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" the issue with these two losses is resolved as follows: WrNr. 9619 is listed as Scholz's aircraft, crashed on landing in the Luga region after an air battle, the degree of damage is not indicated; WrNr. 5697 (in the study - 9697) is listed as a 3./JG 54 aircraft damaged by enemy fire and made an emergency landing in the Spindle area, having received 20% damage; additionally, in the losses of III./JG 54, Ostermann's Bf 109F-2 is indicated, which sat on its stomach in the Luga region after an air battle, the serial number and the degree of damage are not indicated. In my calculations, both losses from the Quartermaster General's lists are attributed to III./JG 54, and the additional loss introduced in Prien's study is not taken into account.
The battle path of Gunther Scholz deserves to be given a few lines to him. Scholz received his baptism of fire in Spain as part of 3.J / 88 under the command of Adolf Galland, and then Werner Mölders. In the same place, he won the first victory, shooting down the Republican I-16 on 08/19/1938. By the beginning of the Second World War, Scholz was the commander of 1./JG 21 and already on September 1st completed his first sortie in Polish campaign. Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, he participated in the defeat of France, the Battle of Britain, the Balkan campaign, scoring 8 air victories. All this time he remained the commander of the same detachment, which in the summer of 1940 was renamed 7./JG 54. spent on treatment in Germany. 09/18/1941 he returned to the unit and the next day he replenished his combat account with another victory. In February 1942, Hauptmann Scholz was appointed commander of IV./JG 1, shortly thereafter renamed III./JG 5, which in the spring of 1942 was transferred to northern Norway, to the northernmost sector of the Soviet-German front. 08/18/1943 Scholz scored his last air victory - the 34th in WWII, the 35th, taking into account the victory in Spain, and in September he was appointed commander of JG 5. At the end of the war, Oberstleutnant Scholz combined the posts of commander of the Fighter Command Norway (Jafü Norwegen) and commander of JG 5. After the war he lived in the GDR. He died in the fall of 2014 at the age of 103.
As part of this work, I did not set myself the task of dividing the losses into categories depending on the reasons that caused them and the circumstances in which they were incurred (combat / non-combat, lost in air battles / shot down by anti-aircraft fire / lost in accidents, etc. ), since it is impossible to correctly make such an allocation only on the basis of the information provided in the lists of the Quartermaster General. You can try to do this only on the basis of the results of a full analysis of each episode with the search for all the information necessary for this. How much time and effort is required to perform such work, I think, is clear without my explanations. Therefore, the tables only show general figures losses, which include all the losses of combat aircraft suffered by combat units of single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front - in the air, on the ground, abandoned and destroyed during the retreat, etc. The only exceptions are reliably known cases of flight (desertion) of the crews of the Croatian and Slovak detachments to the side of the Soviet troops. Aircraft lost as a result of this are not included in the total loss figures, but are instead listed in the notes.
The loss figures given in the tables were calculated using the same criteria as those used in calculating the number of combat units of single-seat fighters operating on the Soviet-German front, which were described in the "Conditions and Exceptions" section of the 2nd part of this work. At the same time, in those cases when an aircraft was lost while flying to a theater of operations from airfields located outside it, or vice versa, when relocating outside the theater of operations, the issue of their accounting was decided depending on where the incident occurred - in the number of losses on the Soviet Union. -On the German front, only those incidents that occurred on the territory specified in paragraphs 2-4 of the above section were included.
The methodology used in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe to present the severity of damage received by an aircraft as a percentage of damage is widely known and there is no need to dwell on it in detail. The only moment which I would like to draw attention to is that there was no direct relationship between the percentage of damage assigned to the damaged car and its future fate. There are cases when aircraft that received 60-70 percent or more of damage underwent factory repairs and continued to fly, and under other circumstances they could write off an aircraft that was assigned a much lower percentage of damage. The same applies to the possibility of repair by the unit - in some cases, a unit / field workshops could repair a car that received 30% damage, while aircraft with 20% damage were often sent for factory repair. At the same time, the aircraft sent for repair could receive additional damage / be destroyed during transportation or dismantled for spare parts for the repair of other aircraft at the plant, which neither the headquarters of the combat unit nor the employees of the 6th Department of the Quartermaster General's Directorate, compiling their lists of losses based on reports of these units, in principle, could not be recognized. However, the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General's loss listers themselves, for accounting purposes, used a damage rate of 60% as a conventional boundary between destroyed and damaged aircraft. We will follow the same rule. In all the following tables and diagrams, the term "destroyed" refers to an aircraft whose damage level lies in the range of 100-60%, and the term "damaged" refers to an aircraft whose damage level lies in the range of 59-10%. Information about aircraft that received less than 10% damage to the control of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, as a rule, was not submitted. Nevertheless, the lists of losses compiled by this department include a small number of entries with an aircraft damage rate of less than 10%. Most of them are related to the submission of information about cases of death or injury of crew members in which the aircraft received only minor damage. Information about these recorded cases with a damage level of less than 10% is given in the table with monthly data on victories and losses of combat units of single-seat fighters, but they are not taken into account either in calculations or in other tables and diagrams.
In the lists of losses compiled by the authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945", there are a small number of entries in which the letter b (short for the German bruch - broken) is indicated instead of the percentage of damage, which means that the level of damage to this aircraft is unknown to the authors of the study. In some cases, this is due to the lack of relevant information in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, but more often this is due to the fact that the authors took information about this loss from some alternative source (for example, a flight book), from which the degree of damage cannot be determined even approximately . For the purposes of this work, all such records are conditionally classified as damaged, i.e. it is believed that their level of damage lies in the range of 59-10%.
Since the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe were compiled on the basis of reports of losses received from the headquarters of aviation units, it is quite obvious that their completeness and reliability, first of all, depended on the conscientiousness and qualifications of the relevant employees of these headquarters. A careful study of these lists shows that approaches to the preparation of reports differed from part to part. So, for example, if some units reported every case of even minor damage, then in others they preferred not to include in the reports most of the damage that could be repaired by the unit. As a visual confirmation of this statement, below are diagrams of the distribution of levels of damage received by aircraft of some units of single-seat fighters in 1943. To plot the diagrams, all their known losses were divided into ten groups depending on the degree of damage received: 100%; 99-90%; 89-80% and further up to 19-10%. Cases of damage less than 10% and those for which the level of damage is unknown were not taken into account. The most striking picture can be seen in the diagram illustrating the distribution of damage levels for the three groups of JG 52. If the distribution of damage levels for I./JG 52 and II./JG 52 is very close to the average for all combat units of single-seat fighters operating in the Soviet-German front in 1943, III./JG 52 has an abnormally low amount of damage in the 19-10% group and a noticeably higher proportion of 100% damage. If we conditionally add 20 aircraft damaged by 19-10% to the losses of III./JG 52, then we get a curve (III./JG 52 corr.), which corresponds much better to both the graphs of the other two groups of the squadron, and the average for the theater. It is worth adding to the above that in the lists compiled by the authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" there are 9 losses of aircraft III. / JG 52 for 1943, for which the level of damage is unknown (in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, most of missing) - it is likely that most of them were damaged by 19-10%. However, in the other two groups of the squadron, the number of losses with an unknown level of damage is not much less (3 for I./JG 52 and 8 for II./JG 52). In the diagram of the distribution of damage levels built for two groups of JG 54, the lack of cases with a damage level in the range of 29-10% in II./JG 54 is also clearly visible.
From the above feature of the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, it follows important conclusion that a comparison of the number/level of losses suffered by different units and/or in different periods time, it is better to do it by the number of destroyed aircraft, since a comparison by the sum of destroyed and damaged aircraft will give a distorted result.
In some parts there were much more serious problems with loss reporting. The most egregious example in this regard is 15.(span.)/JG 51. For the period since recent months 1942 and until the very end of 1943, in the lists of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, you can find the losses of this unit only with a damage level of 100%! The authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945" managed to increase the list of unit losses by several aircraft with an undetermined level of damage, but, apparently, a significant number of unit losses still remain unknown. Another indisputable example is the deliberately incomplete data on the losses of III./JG 52 for November-December 1943.
However, in the lists of losses of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, one can find errors in the other direction. The most characteristic of them are associated with the problem of 100% damage. Typically, this level of damage was assigned to aircraft that crashed or made an emergency landing in enemy territory, at sea or in inaccessible terrain, as well as missing aircraft, the fate and location of which could not be established. The problem with these seemingly irretrievably lost aircraft is that sometimes they were found and evacuated, while corrections to the lists of losses were not always made. As typical example you can bring the plane of the commander of II. / JG 53, Hauptmann Heinz Bretnutz, who was shot down in an air battle on the morning of 06/22/1941 and made an emergency landing on Soviet territory. The wounded Bertnutz died of gangrene on 06/27/1941, and his aircraft, which was included in the list of losses of the Luftwaffe Quartermaster General as 100% destroyed, was soon found, evacuated and repaired (subsequently crashed on 10/23/1942 as part of Erg. JGr Süd). In the lists of losses of the study "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945", the degree of damage to this aircraft is not indicated. In the tables below, it is considered as damaged (damage level 59-10%).
Despite all the shortcomings noted above, the lists of losses of combat units of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, corrected and supplemented by the authors of "Die Jagdfliegerverbände der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945", give a fairly complete picture of the losses of combat units of Luftwaffe single-seat fighters on the Soviet-German front in the Soviet-German front under consideration time period. According to my estimate, the error in the total loss figures for all warheads of single-seat fighters is no more than a few percent and changes little over the period under review, which allows them to be used to analyze changes in the intensity and effectiveness of the combat work of German fighter aircraft. As for the loss figures for separate parts, then for them the magnitude of the error can be much larger, and the completeness of data on losses can change noticeably from part to part.
Required disclaimer
One of key indicators to assess the effectiveness of fighter aircraft in carrying out its main task - gaining air supremacy - is the ratio of the number of enemy aircraft shot down to its own losses incurred in air battles. Unfortunately, the data given in this work allow us to calculate only the ratio of the number of air victories to the total losses, which, both in numerical value and in meaning, differs significantly from the ratio of losses of the parties in air battles.
The number of air victories, as is known, rarely corresponds to the actual losses suffered by the opposing side. The ratio of claimed victories to actual enemy losses in aerial combat is commonly referred to as the victory overstatement ratio. And this ratio is not constant. It can change noticeably depending on the period of time, unit, nature of the tasks performed, the quantitative and qualitative composition of the opposing aviation, the scale of air battles, etc. So, for example, the average overestimation coefficient for victories declared by Luftwaffe fighters on the Soviet-German front in 1943 was noticeably higher than in 1941.
On the other hand, the ratio of losses of German fighters in air battles to their total losses was also not the same for different parts and periods of time. It is quite natural that during periods of low combat activity, the share of combat losses in general and losses in air battles in particular will be noticeably lower than during periods of intense air combat. It is this circumstance that explains the noticeable decrease in the ratio of the number of air victories to total losses during periods of low activity of the Luftwaffe fighter units on the Soviet-German front.
Nevertheless, with a correct understanding of the meaning of the ratio of the number of air victories to total losses and competent consideration of the circumstances and limitations described above, it is quite acceptable to use it to analyze the effectiveness of fighter aircraft combat operations.
Barbarossa and the Citadel
From the tables and diagrams presented above, it is clearly seen that the intensity of the combat operations of the aviation of both sides on the Soviet-German front varied greatly from month to month. At the same time, it is quite predictable that the maximum activity of aviation falls on periods of the most intense hostilities on the land front. During the period under consideration, three pronounced peaks of activity can be distinguished - June-July 1941 (invasion), August 1942 ("Not a step back") and July 1943 ("Citadel"). At the same time, the greatest losses (both absolute and relative, reduced to the average monthly number) of the German fighters suffered during the first month of the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and during the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. The table below compares the generalized results of combat actions of units of single-seat Luftwaffe fighters achieved during the first 30 days of the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 and for the corresponding period of time in the summer of 1943, starting from the first day of Operation Citadel. Below are charts illustrating the results of the daily comparison. The average monthly number of single-seat fighters in the combat units of the Luftwaffe in the Soviet-German for the period 06/22 - 07/21/1941 was calculated on the basis of the weekly reports of the Einsatzbereitschaft der Fliegende Verbände in the manner described in the "Method of calculation" section of the 2nd part of this work. For the period July 5 - July 3, 1943, the arithmetic mean of the numbers on July 1, 1943 and August 1, 1943 was taken as the average monthly population.
Bf 109 vs Fw 190
I./JG 51 became the first fighter group on the Soviet-German front to receive the Fw 190A. . Several more fighter units operating in the East received Fw 190A in November-December and barely had time to start them by the end of the year. combat use. During the last months of 1942, the Focke-Wulf pilots on the Soviet-German front scored only 97 air victories, while their own losses for all reasons amounted to 8 destroyed and 17 damaged aircraft. These fighters became truly widespread on the Soviet-German front only in 1943. Below is a comparison of the main results of the combat work of units armed with Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190A fighters for 1943.
All aerial victories are divided into three groups - victories won on the Bf 109, victories won on the Fw 190 and victories for which it is impossible to determine exactly which type of aircraft they were won. The third group includes victories won by the pilots of I./JG 54 in January-February and II./JG 54 from May to August 1943. During the indicated periods of time, these groups rearmed from Bf 109G to Fw 190A and fought combat work on both types of fighters. At the same time, as in the case of I./JG 54, and in the case of II./JG 54, the main part of the combat work was carried out on Fw 190, they also won most of air victories. Indirect confirmation of this can serve as the losses shown in the table, suffered by these groups in the indicated periods of time.
In January-February 1943, a significant part of the losses of the fighter units operating on the southern sector of the Soviet-German Front were aircraft destroyed or abandoned on airfields abandoned during the retreat. Since all the fighter units operating in the south were armed with Messerschmitts, taking into account these losses puts the compared types of aircraft in unequal conditions. In order to exclude the influence of this factor, the total losses were divided into two parts - losses incurred in the air and losses on the ground. At the same time, all cases of losses and damage to aircraft that occurred to them in the time interval from the start of the takeoff run to the end of the run after landing are attributed to air losses. All other aircraft losses, including those crashed/damaged while taxiing on the airfield, destroyed as a result of enemy air strikes, lost as a result of emergencies on the ground, abandoned and destroyed during the retreat, are attributed to losses on the ground.
The charts below compare the monthly results of the combat performance of single-seat fighter units armed with Bf 109 and Fw 190 aircraft - the total number of air victories and the ratio of air victories to losses (total and in the air). Additionally, there are charts with the results shown by some of the most effective groups.
Based on the data presented, it can be concluded that the rearmament on the Fw 190 led to a qualitative strengthening of the units of single-seat fighters operating on the Soviet-German front, which made it possible during 1943 to maintain the ratio between air victories and the losses incurred are practically at the same level that was achieved in 1942.
We want, to the best of our knowledge, to give an overview of modern sources on the losses of the Luftwaffe, which are available to ordinary Russian amateur historians, to which we include ourselves. True, it should be noted with regret that today there are somehow no professionals.
Let's move on, however, to the essence of the issue. So, what reliable mass sources covering the losses of all German front-line aviation do we have today? It should be recognized that at present there is only one such source. These are the daily reports of the 6th Department of the Service of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe (files of the Military Archive of Germany RL 2 III / 1177-1196). These materials have been fully preserved up to December 1943, plus fragmentary data for December 1944 and the first months of 1945. Taking into account the specifics of the original (more precisely, the fact that the documents were compiled at the same time as the events mentioned in them), it is possible to big share confidence to assert that the documents of 1944 and 1945 are not complete. With a certain degree of assumption, the same can be said about the reports of the last months of 1943. What do you mean? The fact is that in these documents the corresponding entries were made as information was received from the front-line units. Sometimes, for reasons that are not very clear to us, such records could be delayed relative to the event itself for a very long period (sometimes even with a six-month delay!). Those. the reports for 1944 and 1945 are by definition incomplete.
How well do they display real situation cases documents of the 6th department for the rest of the year? We do not dare to give any quantitative criterion, but we can state with confidence: scope for further research(and accordingly new finds) is. This is confirmed by a number of cases when the data of the reports can be verified by other materials (in particular, documents that are available to the authors).
Example one. We have received from the Military Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany "Battle Action Diaries" of the airfield commandant's office of the Gostkino airbase (north-western sector of the Eastern Front), relating to the period of February-May 1942. Comparison of the results of Soviet air raids on Gostkino according to the reports of the 6th department and the "Diary" clearly shows that in a number of cases the actual losses were higher than it is reflected in the reports. True, only due to damaged aircraft.
Second example. A similar picture is observed in the results of a very successful Soviet air raid on the Banak polar airfield on June 30, 1942. According to the reports of the 6th department, five Junkers-88 bombers were lost there (one burned out and four damaged). According to the ╚Diary of the leadership of the war at sea╩, the number of damaged vehicles was 14.
Those. it can be assumed that the service reports of the Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe quite fully reflect the irretrievable losses in the material part of the German Air Force, but only partially - the situation with damaged vehicles.
It should also be noted that the reports of the 6th department contain information not only on the losses and damage to the materiel (i.e., aircraft), but also provide extensive data on the losses of personnel of the Luftwaffe units. It must be said that Goering's department had a very branched structure, and not all of the Luftwaffe wearing uniforms were really pilots. And this whole colossus was reflected in the reports, ranging from the losses of airfield divisions and anti-aircraft units, and ending with the losses of personnel of construction, security and other service units. Reports for any month of 1942 represent a weighty "brick" five hundred sheets thick.
However, let us return to the losses of aviation itself. Whether someone conducted a mass sample on the specified documents, we do not know
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Nevertheless, the total figures for the losses of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet-German front have been put into circulation in our country for quite some time. This refers to the publication of 1972 in the third issue of the East German magazine ╚Militaergeschichte╩. Renowned historian Aviation O. Groyler presented in it selections from the documents of the same Military Archive of the FRG. At that time, it was the only publication on the topic of interest to us (in the literature available to us), based on archival sources. Existing at that time in the Soviet historical literature the figure of 77,000 destroyed "fascist" aircraft had no real basis. Anyone who is interested in its origin can enjoy the elegant logic of the author of the calculations by reading the corresponding issue of the ╚Military History Journal╩
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In no way should our passage be understood as a mockery. Every time has its own songs!
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So, the historians of the GDR published the following data:
- general data on the loss of the German Air Force aircraft fleet from January 1942 to March 1945;
- data on losses on the Soviet-German front from June 22, 1941 to March 14, 1942 (see selection in table 1);
- losses in equipment and personnel in the same place from January 1 to August 31, 1942 (see table 2);
- losses in equipment on the Soviet-German front from September 1943 to October 1944 (see table 3).
All tables are based on data from the German Military Archive.
Table 1
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Losses of the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front
from 06/22/1941 to 03/14/1942
irrevocably
Damaged
% to all fronts
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irrevocably
Damaged
29.06-05.07. 1941
27.06-02.08. 1941
31.08-06.09. 1941
28.09-04.10. 1941
26.10-01.11. 1941
30.11√06.12. 1941
28.12.1941-03.01.1942
table 2
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Losses of Luftwaffe aviation formations in personnel and equipment from January 1 to August 31, 1942
Aircraft
Missing
irrevocably
Damaged
Soviet-German front
During combat missions
During non-combat missions
Total
On all fronts
During combat missions
During non-combat missions
Total
Table 3
Losses of the Luftwaffe in technology on the Soviet-German front
from September 1943 to October 1944
irrevocably
Damaged
% to all fronts
September 1943
October 1943
November 1943
December 1943
January 1944
February 1944
March 1944
April 1944
June 1944
July 1944
August 1944
September 1944
October 1944
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Greuler did not cite case material RL 2 III /1198 in his publication. This document contains summarizing data for 1944 (see Table 4). A significant disadvantage of this document: losses are given only when performing combat missions.
Table 4
Losses of the Luftwaffe on the Soviet-German front in 1944
Union
Fighters
Bombers, attack aircraft
Scouts
Number of sorties
Aircraft lost
Number of sorties
Aircraft lost
Number of sorties
Aircraft lost
Air Command
╚Finland╩
Total:
Are there any other documents besides the ones we have listed above? Undoubtedly. Highly interesting information, are contained, for example, in reports on the air situation of Army Group North, located in the US National Archives.
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Their value lies in the fact that the period covered by the reports, in to some extent supplements the data of reports of the 6th department. Below is a summary table compiled from these reports.
Period
Aircraft lost
Period
Aircraft lost
Period
Aircraft lost
Period
Aircraft lost
Period
Aircraft lost
Period
Aircraft lost
Bf-109-4
Bf-110 - 1
Fw-190 - 3
Ju-87-8
Ju-52 - 1
Fw-190 - 2
Ju-87-3
He-111 - 1
Fi-156 - 1
W-34 - 1
Ju-188 - 1
Bf-109 - 1
Fw-190 - 1
Ju-87-4
Ju-88 - 1
W-34 - 1
Fw-190 - 2
Ju-87 - 1
Go-145 - 1
Bf-109 - 1
Fw-190 - 1
Do-217 - 1
Go-145 - 2
The figures, at first glance, are small, but it should be noted that only irretrievable losses in the direct performance of combat missions are clearly taken into account here. In fact, the total number of losses will be higher due to damaged and decommissioned vehicles, as well as due to losses during non-combat sorties. It is likely that further searches in the archives of current "probable friends" may yield Additional materials on the topic of interest to us.
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According to an oral report by Yuri Rybin (Murmansk), similar figures are also given in intelligence reports. Northern Fleet
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Questions of unbiased analysis and comparison of the effectiveness of the use of fighter aircraft of the warring parties, primarily on the Soviet-German front, have been repeatedly raised in recent years on the pages of domestic printed publications, including Aviamaster.
However, the problem is often considered only through the prism of the personal accounts of pilots - aces, while the reasoning goes at the level of finding out who is “worse” and who is “better” counted their victories, completely bypassing the issue of the availability of a documentary base and its quality. Conducting a discussion in this way, we doom ourselves to a kind of "flying in a circle", to the use of the same argument repeated many times.
There is a proposal to still get off the “trodden path” and, finally, digress from the endless comparisons of Kozhedub with Hartman, and first deal with the numbers of total aviation losses of the warring parties and their ratios, then, if possible, determine the structure of losses. And, finally, move on to the most difficult thing - identifying each declared victory or finding out the cause of the death of each particular aircraft.
A small digression. The authors do not consider themselves to be the truth in last resort, therefore, always open to criticism, corrections and additions. We would be especially grateful for the correction of the tables below based on the materials of the Russian military archives.
However, back to the issue under discussion. Let's start with total losses. It is probably logical to assume that the total losses of Soviet aviation are known more or less accurately. The funds of the central military archives must be in complete safety, and the size of the total loss in people and equipment must be known. Another question is how these figures correspond to those published in domestic press data.
However, you can doubt as much as you like, but there will be no benefit from this if there are no serious arguments. The authors have no arguments that could testify to the unreliability of these figures. Therefore, we will consider the information from the work that has become almost a classic, “Secrecy Removed,” to be approximately true. Why is it still "about"? Yes, because with the complex system of distribution and subordination of the aviation fleet that existed during the war years (Red Army Air Force and Navy, Civil Air Fleet, Air Defense, ADD, Airborne Forces), it was apparently impossible to avoid mistakes. But it is unlikely that this could seriously affect the overall result.
Now let's move on to opposite side and see how fully accounted for the loss of the Luftwaffe. From modern foreign literature you can understand that now materials of the 6th department of the service are available to historians Quartermaster General Luftwaffe, who was in charge of accounting for losses.
Again, based on these publications, we can conclude that if the documents for 1941-1943 are well preserved, then for 1944 their safety is somewhat worse, and for 1945 the information is simply fragmentary. Copies from the relevant materials for 1943, which one of the authors managed to get acquainted with, allow us to judge their sufficient completeness, at the same time not excluding individual errors. But, probably, the proportion of these errors is very small.
When studying data on German losses and comparing them with domestic ones, it is necessary to take into account the difference in the approach to the very definition of this term in the Soviet and German Air Forces.We have, according to the documents, how the losses were lost or decommissioned for one reason or another car. In the Luftwaffe, any damage that needed repair was considered a loss. Even the one that the aircraft technician was able to eliminate in a few hours. Therefore, when analyzing German losses, in some cases there are difficulties in separating irretrievably lost vehicles and those that were subsequently returned to service.
Having made these introductory remarks, let's move on to the numbers. The first table, based on materials from the "Secret Classification..." contains data on the losses of the USSR Air Force (in thousands of aircraft).
Losses of the USSR Air Force from 06/22/1941 to 05/09/1945
|
1941 |
1942 |
1943 |
1944 |
1945 |
total |
|
|
Total losses |
21,2 |
14,7 |
26,7 |
30,5 |
13,3 |
106,4 |
|
Incl. combat |
10,6 |
11,7 |
10,4 |
46,1 |
The second table gives an idea of the losses of the Luftwaffe (also in thousands of aircraft) for certain periods for which this information was found.
Losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front (for certain periods)
|
22.06.1941 03.01.42 |
01.01.1942 31.10.1942 |
1943 |
01.01.1944 31.10.1944 |
|
|
Total losses |
2213 |
3623 |
3940 |
3771 |
|
Incl. combat |
1173 |
1908 |
2185 |
2280 |
The number of losses includes both aircraft that did not return from a combat mission, as well as those damaged (not subject to repair).
Given the lack of accurate data on the ratio of combat and non-combat losses on the Eastern Front, we have established the amount of combat losses based on the share in the total loss for the corresponding period on all fronts. This share, calculated from published data, is 53% for 1942, 55% for 1943, and 60% for 1944. For 1941, the percentage of combat losses was taken equal to that of 1942.
Since the data we know about German losses for 1942 and 1944 are incomplete, we conditionally define final figure losses for these years as the sum of losses for January-October plus one fifth of that amount. Thus, the table of losses of the Luftwaffe in the East will take the following form (in thousands of aircraft).
Losses of the German Air Force on the Eastern Front
|
1941 |
1942 |
1943 |
1944 |
|
|
Total losses |
2213 |
4348 |
3940 |
4525 |
|
Incl. combat |
1173 |
2304 |
2185 |
2715 |
Taking into account the losses of Germany's allies will give an increase of about 10%, but for us this is not very significant.
Of course, these figures can and should be refined and supplemented, but as initial data for work, in our opinion, they are quite suitable. Therefore, an approximate ratio of losses can be presented (data in the table, in thousand aircraft).
The ratio of losses of the USSR and German Air Forces
|
1941 |
1942 |
1943 |
1944 |
|
|
Total losses of the USSR Air Force |
21,2 |
14,7 |
26,7 |
30,5 |
|
Total losses of the German Air Force |
4,35 |
3,94 |
||
|
Ratio |
9,6:1 |
3,4:1 |
6,8:1 |
6,7:1 |
|
Combat losses of the USSR Air Force |
10,6 |
11,7 |
10,4 |
|
|
Combat losses of the German Air Force |
1,17 |
|||
|
Ratio |
3,9:1 |
5,3:1 |
3,8:1 |
As can be seen from the table, if we exclude the tragic year 1941, then the ratio of Soviet and German combat losses fluctuates between 4-5 to one. What is most interesting is that this ratio does not change much during 1942-1944.
Now let's see if it is possible, with these general data at hand, to identify the structure of losses. It is possible, but only approximately enough. We use the figures published in the journal "Aviation and Cosmonautics" for March 2000, the losses of the Red Army Air Force in 1944. However, in the data presented, most of the losses are classified as those who did not return from a combat mission. Therefore, we will conditionally attribute this part to the account of certain combat means of the enemy in a proportion similar to known cases.
As a result, it turns out that out of the number of combat losses, 40% are accounted for by fighter aircraft, 58% - by ground-based air defense systems, and the rest are destroyed at airfields. With considering same conditions conduct of hostilities, we will extend this ratio to 1945.
To establish similar relationships for the remaining years of the war, we will make a number of assumptions. First, it is logical to assume that the number of losses from the impact of ground-based air defense systems should increase. This was a consequence of the growth of the offensive activity of Soviet aviation, which increasingly carried out its flights behind the front line, in the zone of enemy air defense.
Secondly, this phenomenon should have accelerated from the second half of 1943, when the Germans had to transfer a significant part of fighter aircraft from the Eastern Front to other theaters. So we consider it possible to establish for 1943, an almost equal distribution of losses between fighter aircraft and ground air defense, and for 1942, a mirror image of the situation in 1944.
For the first year of the war, we will set the ratio between the successes of German fighters and anti-aircraft gunners in the proportion of 50 to 30, but at the same time we will allocate 20% to aircraft destroyed on airfields. For the remaining years of the war, the number of Soviet vehicles lost on the ground is small and is taken similarly to 1944, that is, 2%. The calculation results are shown in the table below.
The general structure of losses of the USSR Air Force
|
Lost |
1941 |
1942 |
1943 |
1944 |
1945 |
Total |
|
In air battles |
22,4 |
|||||
|
From ground air defense |
22,4 |
|||||
|
Lost on the ground |
||||||
|
Total |
10,6 |
11,7 |
10,4 |
46,1 |
For all its approximateness, the table allows you to make one simple calculation: to estimate how much an average German fighter (not a pilot, but a machine) of Soviet aircraft could shoot down before its own death.
The authors have at their disposal data on irretrievable losses, including non-combat ones, of German fighters for January-November 1943. This figure is 1084 cars. It is legitimate to assume losses for the year equal to 1100 fighters.
A simple calculation shows that before his death, a German fighter could destroy 5-6 Soviet vehicles. After that, he was shot down or the pilot himself crashed his plane.
You can check this ratio for 1944, especially since for it there are the most reliable data on Soviet losses. During January-October 1944, 1824 German single-engine fighters plus 25 Me-110s, not counting 112 night fighters, were shot down, crashed in accidents and damaged on the Soviet-German front. Irretrievable losses of their number are probably about half, i.e. about 900 cars. At the same time, we do not take into account assault squadrons armed with aircraft FW -190, but for our reasoning it is not so important.
For 900 lost fighters, 4200 Soviet aircraft were shot down, that is, again the same maximum - 5 victories. Consequently, simple arithmetic operated in the air war on the Eastern Front. In order to shoot down 50 Soviet aircraft during the year, the average German pilot had to parachute out of a downed aircraft ten times or land “on his belly” due to combat damage, or after an air battle “decompose” a fighter when landing on his airfield. So the Germans, of course, were strong opponents and fought very well, but they themselves got pretty bad ...
On the eve of the start of the war in the Soviet Union, there were several different (in structure and order of subordination) "aviation", namely: front-line (or military), subordinate to the command combined arms armies and districts (fronts), aviation of the Navy, long-range aviation (aviation long range, long-range bomber aviation), directly subordinate to the High Command of the Red Army, air defense fighter aircraft.
In this book, all these structures are presented under common name"Soviet Aviation", "Soviet Air Force", "Red Army Air Force".
In Nazi Germany, the entire military aviation (Luftwaffe) was a strictly centralized structure; under the general command all aviation units and formations were united (including decisive tasks air defense of a country or interacting with Navy), as well as anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight and radar units.
The minimum "cell" of military aviation (both in the Soviet Air Force and in the Luftwaffe) was a "link". A flight usually had 3 or 4 aircraft.
Several links (from 3 to 5) were combined into a squadron, which included 12 (in the Luftwaffe) or from 12 to 15 (as in the Soviet Air Force) aircraft.
The main tactical unit of combat aviation was military unit, called "regiment" (in the Soviet Air Force) or "group" (in the Luftwaffe). As part of the Luftwaffe group of staffing there were supposed to be three squadrons and a headquarters link, a total of 40 aircraft; such a structure existed in all branches of aviation in Germany. In the Soviet Air Force, fighter, assault and various bomber regiments had a different structure, but all of them, according to the staffing table, were supposed to have 62 - 64 aircraft (four or five squadrons and the regiment's control link).
Several regiments (groups) were united into a formation, which was called an "aviation division" (in the Soviet Air Force) or a "squadron" (in the Luftwaffe). On the eve of the war, the Soviet Air Force included “fighter” (IAD), “bomber” (BAD) and “mixed” (SAD) air divisions. Each division had its own number (for example, the 9th SAD, the 13th BAD, the 43rd IAD). The regiments that were part of the division (as a rule, from 3 to 5) had their own numbering, not associated with the division number (for example, the 127th IAP, the 16th BAP, the 61st ShAP). In the documents of the 41st year, bomber regiments were often designated with an indication of their purpose, for example, SBP (high-speed bomber), BBP (short-range bomber), but in this book for front-line aviation regiments, one system designations (only abbreviation BAP); long-range aviation regiments are designated as DBAP or TBAP (respectively, "long-range" or "heavy" bomber regiment).
In the Luftwaffe, squadrons were also subdivided into fighter (JG), bomber (KG), dive bomber squadrons (StG), squadrons of heavy long-range fighters (ZG). As part of the squadron (for rare exceptions) there were three groups, and the groups were designated by the squadron number, for example II / JG-53 (the second group of the 53rd fighter squadron).
Several squadrons of the Luftwaffe (usually 4 to 6) were reduced to a large structure called an "air corps". The air corps were united into the Air Fleets. In total, three Luftwaffe Air Fleets operated on the Eastern Front (1st V.f., 2nd V.f., 4th V.f.) consisting of five (1, 8, 2, 4, 5th) aviation corps (as well as some units and divisions of the 5th Air Force in the Arctic).
In the Soviet Air Force, the corps link existed only in long-range bomber aviation. By the beginning of the war, four such corps were deployed in the Western theater of operations: the 1st DBAC in the Novgorod region, the 3rd DBAC in the Smolensk region, the 2nd DBAC in the Kursk region, and the 4th DBAC in the Zaporozhye region. Each corps had two bomber divisions (another, separate 18th DBAD, was based in the Kyiv region). The planned inclusion of a fighter division equipped with long-range escort fighters into the DBAK was not practically implemented.
A few days before the start of the war, it was decided to deploy three air defense fighter aviation corps (6th in Moscow, 7th in Leningrad, 8th in Baku), and these corps did not have a divisional link (i.e. fighter the regiments were directly subordinate to the command of the corps and the air defense zone). The formation of the IAK air defense was already carried out during the war that began on June 22, 1941.
Application No. 2
The composition of the grouping and the number of combat aircraft of Soviet aviation as of June 22, 1941
Air Force of the Leningrad Military District ( northern front) and the Air Force of the Northern Fleet
Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet
Air Force of the Baltic OVO (North- Western Front)
Air Force of the Western OVO (Western Front) 
Air Force of the Kyiv OVO (South-Western Front) 
Air Force of the Odessa Military District (Southern Front) 
air force Black Sea Fleet
Long-range bomber aviation formations at the Western Theater of Operations 
TOTAL:
- 4720 fighters, incl. 1030 MiG-3 and Yak-1;
- 3583 bombers, incl. 205 Pe-2 and 9 TB-7;
- a total of 8303 combat aircraft.
Note:
- the total number of aircraft is indicated, including those temporarily out of service;
- combat-ready aircraft averaged 80-85% of total number;
- a fraction indicates the number of “new types” of aircraft included in the total number (MiG-3 and Yak-1 fighters, Pe-2 and TB-7 bombers);
- about 25 air regiments being formed and the aircraft that were in their arsenal were not taken into account;
- the naval aviation does not include reconnaissance units and the seaplanes they were armed with;
- composition of the Air Force Southwestern Front listed according to the report of the front air force commander, other sources give a larger number of aircraft.
Annex 3
The composition of the grouping and the number of combat aircraft of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front on June 22, 1941
Part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet, Arctic
1st Air Fleet (1st Air Corps), East Prussia
2nd Air Fleet (8th and 2nd Air Corps), Poland
4th Air Fleet, 5th Air Corps, Southern Poland
4th Air Fleet, 4th Air Corps, Romania
TOTAL: 2275 / 1779
Fighters - 848 / 683 (633 Bf-109 F + 215 Bf-109 E).
Bombers - 935/732 (528Ju-88 + 281He-111 + 126Do-17).
Dive-bombers (Ju-87) - 309 / 220.
Multipurpose (Me-110) - 183 / 144.
Notes:
- in the first digit - all aircraft, the second - including combat-ready ones; all aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet are listed as combat-ready;
- in the aircraft of the headquarters level are taken into account in the total number of the corresponding squadrons;
- in cases where the fighter group was equipped with Bf-109 aircraft of two modifications (E and F), all fighters were counted as Bf-109 F; this led to some overestimation of the total number of Bf-109 F compared to other sources;
- there were also several Me-110s in the headquarters of the bomber squadrons (they are not taken into account in this table).
Appendix 4
June 22, 1941 The Luftwaffe and the real losses of the NWF and WF Air Force
Notes:
- Group III / JG-53 operated at the junction of the NWF and WF, it can be assumed that about half of all declared victories relate to air battles with units of the NWF Air Force;
- among the declared downed fighters, there are only 14 "MiGs", including at least 6 shot down in the NWF zone.
Annex 5
Irretrievable combat losses of Luftwaffe aircraft
1st Air Fleet
2nd Air Fleet
4th Air Fleet, 5th Air Corps
4th Air Fleet, 4th Air Corps
Cumulative losses for all Air Forces
Notes:
- the initial number is indicated taking into account the defective aircraft;
- the tables take into account the irretrievable (60% damage) losses of combat aircraft "from enemy impact and for unknown reasons";
– cumulative losses for July are indicated taking into account the losses of the 5th V.f. in the Arctic;
- according to other sources, in June 1941, 13 German aircraft were irretrievably lost at the airfields.
The classification of losses adopted by the Luftwaffe:
up to 24% - small and medium damage that can be repaired by ground services;
25 - 39% - major repairs are required in parts;
40 - 44% - replacement of individual units or systems is required;
45 - 59% - numerous damages requiring the replacement of many aircraft units;
60 - 80% - cannot be restored, some units can be used as spare parts;
81 - 99% - completely destroyed, the wreckage fell on the territory controlled by the Germans;
100% went missing, fell on enemy territory or at sea.
Appendix 6
Pilots and commanders of the Soviet Air Force about their aircraft and enemy tactics
From the Report on the combat work of the units of the 6th SAD from 22.6 to 20.9.41
“Very often, even a superior group of enemy fighters evades combat with our fighters, and if it enters into battle, it does not conduct it for a long time and stubbornly. Especially at one time, the Me-109, also the Me-110, evaded the battle with the I-153 of the 38th IAP ...
The equipment in service with the enemy air force (Me-109, Me-110, Xe-113) is good in terms of its performance characteristics, but due to insufficient training of the enemy flight crew and their, apparently, weak moral stamina, all the capabilities of the equipment are not used, as a result of which the enemy suffers heavy losses even in battles, when it significantly outnumbers our fighters.
Enemy bombers act intrusively only when they are covered by fighters and do not see an organized rebuff from the ground or in the air; when resisted, they leave very quickly. Cowardice and unwillingness to engage in battle with our fighters is the main characteristic of the training of the enemy Air Force flight personnel ... "
(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, m. 57-67)
From the Report on the combat work of the 57th SAD from 22.6 to 23.9.41
Not a single case has been recorded of a pair of German fighters engaging in combat with a group of our fighters; in most cases, using speed, they leave the battle ...
Out of 125 air battles 18 were very fleeting, because. the enemy, having in some cases superiority in speed, after the first attack of our fighters, left the battle using clouds or the sun.
During the three months of the war, the enemy never built up forces in air combat. The battle began in the air with one group, and it ended with her. The main method used by the enemy in air combat with our fighters is, with equal forces or insignificant superiority, not to accept the battle, hide behind the clouds and wait for the separation of our individual aircraft from the group in order to deal with them in an unequal battle ...
If after the first blow to[our] the enemy did not receive opposition from the ground or from the air at or before the airfield, all of his planes stood in a circle and continued bombardment and machine-gun fire with individual aiming until the ammunition was completely used up, sometimes making up to 3-4 attacks. As a rule, the enemy did not make repeated attacks if at least 1 - 2 of our fighters were above the airfield ...
The enemy, fearing the partisans, and at the same time, due to the rapid advance, deployed his aircraft in whole regiments or more at one airfield. He always placed the planes in the center of the airfield in one or two lines. best goal for our aviation it was impossible to find ... "
(TsAMO, f. 221, on. 1374, d. 16, ll. 84-89)
“At your order, I am reporting the main methods of enemy aviation tactics revealed by the flight crew of the regiment in the course of hostilities.
1. In clear sunny weather, both enemy fighters and bombers always try to approach the target from the side of the sun. Enemy bombers are active during cloudy weather, using the clouds for covert flight.
2. In air combat, enemy fighters Me-109 and Xe-113(as the Soviet Air Force called the Messerschmitt-109 series F at that time) always trying to have an advantage in height over our aircraft. They mainly attack from above and after the attack with a combat turn they go up again. During air combat, our planes are almost never below.
3. In air combat, enemy fighters actively fight only with a large advantage in strength. At equal ratio forces, and even with their double advantage, they often evade the battle or quickly leave it. After the first attack, they gain altitude and, during a second attack, they try to attack our individual aircraft located on the flanks or at the end of the battle formation.
4. Avoid frontal attacks.
5. Often single fighters "tie" to the tail of the aircraft coming from the mission, and attack them during the landing approach.
(TsLMO, f. 20076, on. 1, d. 8A, l. 16)
From the Report on the combat operations of the 11th SAD for the period from June 22 to December 19, 1941.
During the period of hostilities, the LaGG-3 aircraft has established itself as one of the best fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In terms of its flight and tactical data and armament, it far surpasses all modern types of enemy fighters. The enemy, even with a significant numerical superiority, does not enter into battle with fighters. When attacking the LaGG-3, enemy fighters, as a rule, evade the battle. The LaGG-3 aircraft is equally maneuverable at all altitudes and has a large speed range.
The MiG-3 aircraft in use as an attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft did not prove itself due to insufficient training of the flight crew. In air battles, carried out mainly at altitudes of 500 - 1500 m, the MiG-3 proved to be less effective than the old I-16 type. In addition to low maneuverability at low altitudes, the MiG-3 has insufficiently strong weapons, mainly cannon(so the text may have meant that the absence of a gun reduces the effectiveness of the armament of this aircraft).
Aircraft I-16, thanks to great experience piloting techniques and combat use in the past, in the face of latest types enemy fighters proved to be quite effective. The big drawback of the I-16 fighter is the relatively weak armament, and most importantly, the depreciation of the weapon, which very often failed in air combat and during assault operations. With the installation of a more powerful engine and strengthening of weapons, the I-16 may well compete with new types of fighters, both its own and the enemy ... "
(TsAMO, f. 20054-A, on. 1, d. 12, ll. 27-28)
Brief information: The 123rd IAP met the war at the border airfields in the Brest-Kobrin area, on June 27 it was withdrawn for reorganization to Monino near Moscow; the pilots of the regiment mastered the new Yak-1 fighter in 12 days, since July 15, the regiment as part of the 6th IAK PVO has been fighting in the sky of Moscow (480 sorties have been completed), since September 21, as part of the 7th IAK PVO (Leningrad), it covers from the air Road of life. In total, in the first 12 months of the war, 3,010 sorties were made with a total flying time of 2,431 hours, 199 air battles were conducted, 102 enemy aircraft were declared shot down, and 27 aircraft were lost in the air. Subsequently, the regiment was transformed into the 27th Guards.
Captain Zhidov G.N., squadron commander, conducted 33 air battles, shot down 4 aircraft personally and 12 in the group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner:
“What gives us the opportunity to emerge victorious? The first is that we fly on the Yak-1 aircraft, which is superior in its flight performance to the enemy Me-109 aircraft, with which we mainly have to conduct air combat. The second is that our pilots, skillfully using the machine, boldly enter the battle and win ...
Air combat on the Yak-1 aircraft with the Me-109 aircraft is easy, because. the Yak-1 is not inferior in speed, has a smaller turn radius, catches up with the Me-109 both on a dive and when climbing - in these cases, you only need to use the R-7 correctly(screw pitch adjuster): when diving, it is necessary to make the pitch of the screw heavier, and when climbing, lighten the screw.
Pidtykan I. D., conducted 60 air battles, shot down 8 aircraft personally and 6 in a group, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (hereinafter - Hero Soviet Union):
Air combat on the I-16 aircraft can be successfully carried out with any type of enemy aircraft due to the good maneuverability of the I-16. True, air combat sometimes takes the form of defense (especially with enemy fighters at altitudes above 2,000 m), but defense can also be very active and successful. Air combat is almost safe if you have developed good powers of observation.
The most important moment in air combat is the beginning of the battle, i.e. it is necessary to be the first to detect the enemy or to see in time the moment when the enemy wants to attack our aircraft, and the second especially important point is the exit from the battle...
The best combat altitude for the I-16 is up to 3000 m, and the combat altitude is 1000 - 2000 m. At this altitude, the I-16 aircraft will have maximum maneuverability and speed ... same direction, only with slight slip(maneuver in horizontal plane, carried out with a minimum roll), in order to prevent him from conducting aimed fire. As you get closer, you need to move from defense to offensive, i.e. make a quick 180-degree turn, and fire, going into the frontal ...
Conducting air combat with enemy fighters on turns on the I-16 aircraft is successful, because. The I-16 turns better than any enemy aircraft... After the first successful attack, the German pilot is lost and will "dangle" in the sight until you shoot him down.
"Junkers-87" has good maneuverability - the radius of the turn is almost equal to the radius turn I-16. The plane in the air does not go in a straight line, but, as it were, “dances”, thereby making it impossible to conduct aimed fire at it, but after the first attacks of our I-16s, all resistance almost ceases, and[enemy pilot] goes in a straight line and does not try to position his aircraft so that the pilot himself can fire from a cannon or give the gunner-radio operator the opportunity to fire. Ju-87 is an easily shot down aircraft with skillful attacks ...
Fight I-16 with Me-110. As in any air battle, here it is necessary to try to go into the tail, have an advantage in height and hit mainly from behind and in the tail, initially at the arrow, and then at the engines and cockpit. It is inappropriate to become in a turn, because The Me-110 turns very well on one engine, and its turn is equal to that of the Yak-1, and also because the gunner-radio operator will fire throughout the turn ... With a good engine on the I-16 aircraft, you can successfully go to the tail of the Me- 110 provided that he will not dive, but will go along the horizon ... "
(TsAMO, f. 123 IAP, on. 459716, d. 1, ll. 1-3)
Annex 7
Soviet Air Force through the eyes of a Wehrmacht General
This report was written in the late 1940s. as part of the US Army program to study and systematize the experience of the war. The author of the report is Colonel-General Erhard Rauss of the Wehrmacht.
“In terms of numbers, the Russian Air Force was greatly underestimated by the Germans before the start of the Eastern campaign. But, despite their numbers, which increased significantly during the war, they could not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the battles in the East.
Russian Air Force tactics were inflexible and strictly limited to fixed patterns. They lacked tactical flexibility. Only at the end of 1944 and at the beginning of 1945 could the first sprouts of a strategic air war. Russian long-range aviation, which was monitored by German radio intelligence since 1941, carried out mainly transport operations. Although the Air Force was an independent part of the Russian armed forces, they were used almost exclusively on the battlefield, in joint operations with the army.
The Germans identified impending Russian attacks, among other signs, by the early collection and concentration of combat aircraft on airfields near the front line. In this regard, the Russians proved to be great experts in the construction of auxiliary airfields. Ruthlessly exploiting local labor resources and using the most primitive equipment, they were able to completely prepare airfields in amazingly a short time. Neither winter, nor periods of rain or mudslides could interfere with their work. The Russian Air Force made extensive use of false airfields and mock-ups of aircraft, as well as numerous camouflage methods.
In combat, the direction of air strikes and the degree of its participation were controlled by command posts located near the front line, one of the most well-executed operations in this regard was the control of fighters from the ground. On the other hand, the interaction between fighters and attack aircraft or bombers left much to be desired. Fighters rarely accompanied them during combat missions, and if there was an escort, it usually dispersed at the first contact with the enemy.
The Russians proved to be excellent pilots in bad weather. Although their aircraft were not equipped for instrument flight, fighters and attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield in the worst weather. In order to take the enemy by surprise, they liked to use low clouds and snowstorms. Russian night fighters tended to limit themselves to attacking only targets they were ordered to destroy, and were only instrumented for the most basic navigation. The Germans were surprised to find that Russian night lights almost always flew with side lights on.
Air formations concentrated for operations always found a rapid drop in combat potential as soon as they entered combat. The number of combat-ready aircraft was rapidly declining, and it took quite a long time to bring them back into combat-ready condition.
The Russians made extensive use of artificial smoke for camouflage and protection. industrial enterprises, railway junctions and bridges against strategic air attacks. The rapid repair of bombing damage was particularly noteworthy, especially in the case of railroad facilities. And again, for these purposes, labor from the local civilian population was ruthlessly involved.
During the war, air supply operations reached significant proportions. Aircraft either delivered supplies to airfields or dropped them by parachute. Dropping agents and saboteurs behind the front line played a special role.
At the beginning of the war, Russian ground forces were extremely vulnerable to air attacks. However, things changed very soon. Russian troops became less vulnerable to the attacks of German dive bombers and attack aircraft. The Russians paid much attention to preparing troops for defense against low-altitude attacks. All weapons available to the troops turned against the attacking aircraft, thereby forming a dense defense. When the weather allowed, the Russian troops avoided settlements and masterfully hid in the area. If in exceptional cases they took refuge in settlements, then received strict orders not to go outside during the daytime.
As part of the Soviet ideology, as the war went on, the Russians used an increasing number of female pilots and other crew members. Women not only flew transport aircraft, but also flew combat vehicles.
In conclusion, we can say that the Russian Air Force, although large in number and built on a grand scale, was prepared very primitively. Their will to fight, aggressive spirit and mastery of the technical aspects left much to be desired. Constantly outnumbering the Luftwaffe, they always underperformed when it came to combat. Usually a small number of German fighters were enough to clear the skies of Russian aircraft.
Translation by Evgeny Kovalev
