“Keep in mind that ignorance never does evil; only delusion is harmful. People err, not because they do not know, but because they imagine themselves to be in the know.”
(J.J. Rousseau)

Either God intended it this way, or the matrix “hangs”, but the phenomenon of historical twins haunts researchers. Here and there, people are strikingly similar to famous historical characters. Trying to unravel the riddle of the legendary Huns, I came to amazing conclusions. No Atilla is a Mongol.

Dmitry Nagiyev is a descendant of Attila. (joke)

They say Attila lived in the 5th century. I wonder if there were already engravings then? Or is it a copier from a bas-relief on copper?

Many European and Christian priests of those years tried to understand how it was that the people who suddenly appeared out of nowhere rose above everyone. Attila they called the "Scourge of God." “For the debauchery that prevailed in Europe, God sent the Huns and their lord against us,” they said. And some blessed the arrival of Attila. For example, Lou, the Archbishop of Troisses, left the following words about him: "Blessed be your coming, the Scourge of God whom I serve. And it is not for me to stop you."

“Let your spirit rise, let your rage boil.”
"He who goes to victory is not reached by arrows."
"Whoever is at rest when Attila fights is already buried"

It's just that fear has big eyes, but in Europe they still scare kids with terrible cruel barbarians. But here's the question: - Why didn't he touch Russia? He didn’t kill anyone and didn’t destroy the city? The answer suggests itself. Russia is his home. However, this is not a secret. Everyone knows that he was born in the glorious city of Itil (Atil) on the banks of the RA River - Mother Volga. Here is the first discovery. Attila is not a name at all. This is a misreading of his title - ATILLE HUN (later the spelling changed to ATTILA REX, and to this day there are two spellings - ATTila and Atilla, this is due to the fact that different scribes wrote as they hear) - Khan of Atilsky. So the city in the Volga delta gave the name to both the khan himself and the whole people in the mouths of "enlightened" Europeans. KHAN (HUN) was transformed into "HUNN", or "Hun-Aryan" - HUNGARI.

It is Attila who is the only character that fits the definition of " Great Khan". Why am I convinced of this? Yes, because the biography of Attila coincides in detail with the legend of the "ruler of the Great Moguls." Even the rite of burial of these historical twins is described almost word for word. The same three coffins, the diversion of the riverbed, the subsequent flooding of the grave, and the killing of everyone who participated in the burial and who knew the burial place. By the way, this is just a beautiful legend. In fact, the Great Khans were buried in the most ordinary way, only the grave was dug under the roots of the oldest tree in the forest. And it was not one and a half thousand years ago, but only about eight hundred. Once I figured that out, everything else fell apart.

Country of the Huns.

And here's another trick ... Volgars (Bulgars) called Atilla Mstislav! Well, that's all. Now there is nothing to argue about. Why so many myths? What was Attila doing in Europe? And what did the Russian army do in the Caucasus? The same! Establishing constitutional order. The Italians, Gauls, Franks and Nibelungs lived for themselves, did not interfere with anyone, they themselves did not want to join Tartaria, but they regularly paid tribute. Then someone in Iberia (Spain) began to incite everyone, saying that let's "reign" ourselves, without the Tartars. I had to go to war, and put things in order. Too bad Rome was spared. The pope paid off Atilla with a huge tribute. Oh sorry! If the king had burned this infection in the bud then, we would now live in a different world.

Hungarians and Bulgarians all consider themselves descendants of the Huns. Is it clear now why the Chuvash understand Hungarian without an interpreter?

But how did it happen that in the descriptions of contemporaries about the Huns they say: - "black, with slanted eyes, with cheeks speckled with scars so that the beard does not grow. "It's simple.

Let's remember June 1941. When the Wehrmacht soldiers saw the first Russian prisoners, they were horrified. Heralds of Goebbels did not lie to them that the Russians are narrow-eyed barbarians, not even people, but like that ... Something like monkeys. Why did it happen so? Everyone who served in Soviet army will understand: - Recruits from fraternal republics such as Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, etc., who could be sent to the army? Shepherds and cotton growers. These fighters, who do not even know the Russian language, went to the most unskilled positions. Construction battalion, support units, rear services, etc.

It was these "knights" who were the most unprepared for combat operations. That is why they were captured en masse. Look at these "Russians" for yourself. True, it is impossible to look at these photos without pain. I found them on one of the German war forums.

We were not shown such horrors. I selected the most "traumatic" pictures for the Russian soul. And the Germans have it there ... even the half-eaten corpses of their comrades, who were allowed to eat in order to survive for others, in a prisoner of war camp. The camp is a clean field fenced with thorns, and SS men with sheep dogs along the perimeter. It was funny for them to watch how hungry people devoured their own compatriots. Enlightened Europe well... Look:

Russian "Finno-Ugric-Mongols"

Russian "Finno-Ugric-Mongols"

Russian "Finno-Ugric-Mongols"

ITALIAN HIKING

“An avalanche of Huns descends from the slopes of the Alps. You are the commander-in-chief of the Empire and you alone can save it,” wrote Emperor Aetius. The patrician saddled a war horse and galloped to Rome, where he asked the emperor to move from Ravenna with the entire court under the protection of the powerful fortress walls of the ancient capital.

Immediately upon arrival, he sent a letter to Marcian, in which he announced that he intended to draw a line of defense along the southern bank of the Po, and asked the Byzantine emperor to block Attila's retreat and invade the Hun lands on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Aetius sent another letter to Avita with a request to convince the Visigoths to come to the aid of Rome again, but Avitus, knowing about the turbulent situation in Aquitaine, did not even begin to take on the case, which was doomed to failure in advance.

Aetius stationed his legions on the banks of the Po. All measures to strengthen the defense of the lands north of this line were reduced to strengthening the garrisons of Aquileia and a number of other cities. The north of Italy, therefore, was not covered by troops, and the inhabitants were restless, which turned into panic after the fall of Aquileia.

It was about the northern provinces, apparently, that the contemporary of the events Prosper of Aquitaine recalled, who wrote in his Chronicle for 452: "The inhabitants, crushed by fear, were unable to defend themselves."

Departing from Sirmium, Attila passed through Mona and Nauport, located on the site of modern Ljubljana. Both cities were sacked. The Huns then crossed the Alps. On the Italian slope, the path was blocked by a Roman camp called the "Camp on the Cold River." One vanguard of the Huns was enough to cut the garrison to the last man. They killed everyone, even those who laid down their arms.

Attila then moved towards the "barrier" of Sontia, which was supposed to repel any possible blow from behind the Cold River. This camp was more fortified than the first, and was located on both banks of the Sontia stream, saddling its channel. Sontius today has become the Isonzo, and the camp has become modern Gorizia, which went down in history as the Austrian fort Goritz - one of the deadliest sites on the Italo-Austrian front in the First World War.

Edecon's ballista destroyed the camp's fortifications. The Ripuarian Franks and foot Hun warriors, joined by dismounted horsemen, burst into the gaps and dealt with the Roman garrison.

The army of the Huns crossed the bridge over the Isonzo and spread across the rich Venetian plain. Contrary to the seemingly already developed own strategy of conquest, Attila did not restrain his people, and they quenched their thirst for destruction with might and main.

Finally, a general collection was announced, and the army moved to Aquileia.

Aquileia is, or rather was, to the west of the Istrian peninsula - a small ledge in the Adriatic Sea between the northern coast of Dalmatia and the Gulf of Venice, on which Trieste is located.

Aquileia stood very close to Trieste, then Tergestum, almost on the site of modern Gradiska Postojna, south of Gorizia. To the west, towards Padua, is now Venice, which also owes its birth to Aquileia and the Huns.

Aquileia was considered impregnable, although in 361 Julian managed to capture this city and deal with the garrison that swore allegiance to his rival Constantius. The decisive role in the siege was then played by a special floating machine, hoisted onto three giant ships, connected by a common deck-flooring. But Aquileia was indeed a hard nut to crack. The Visigoth Alaric, who sacked Rome in 410, was defeated under its walls. Aquileia was a fortress of fortresses. It was surrounded by a wide moat with water and high walls with towers. In Aquileia there was the largest and most beautiful port on the Adriatic, the base of the military fleet was located here, clearing the sea from pirates. Along with the strategic, the city was also of great economic importance, being at the crossroads of trade routes connecting various cities of Italy, on the one hand, and Illyria, Pannonia and the Transdanubian barbarian lands, on the other. Two civilizations converged here. The city housed an elite garrison, but the entire male population was at the same time warriors, sailors, merchants and bankers. The city was ruled by "senators", who were responsible, but the common people, very active, were also not without rights. It was a city with respected matrons, skilled artisans and merchants, luxurious courtesans and countless whores. The guard city and the city are the focus of luxury, the city of generals and merchants, shipowners and gladiators, the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat that does not live in poverty. Ancient and modern. Rich and impregnable. The crossroads of two Empires, protecting them from worries, confident in their fate.

That is why Attila wanted to capture him.

This is not Metz, not Orleans, not Reims and not Paris! This is a trump card of trump cards - the key to Rome, to Ravenna, Constantinople - and Gaul. This is the path to anywhere - and first of all to glory.

A leisurely methodological preparation to the siege. No premature assaults, no attempts to block access to the sea.

A week later, without even once using his ballistas and catapults, Edekon put teams of sappers and rammers into action. A hail of arrows and a rain of boiling oil forced them to retreat. Getting ready for new attack, they stopped quite far from the location of the main forces, which the besieged were not slow to take advantage of. At night they made a sortie and killed the careless Hun sappers.

A few days later, Edekon ordered a ballista bombardment of the city while new sappers dug trenches and assault teams with hooks and chains tried to climb the walls.

And this time it was a complete failure. Undermining failed to bring down the walls, and those who climbed the walls lay at their foot.

The raids of the besieged became more frequent, catching up more and more fear on the Huns.

Catapults were rarely used - it seems that Attila hoped to starve the city out. But by the end of the first month of the siege, famine threatened the Huns themselves. Ruining the neighborhood, they themselves deprived themselves easily available sources food. Now it was necessary to weaken the army, sending special teams to distant lands, which supplied the troops with sin in half. Epidemics have begun. The spirit of the warriors fell, and - an unprecedented thing - the usually staunch nomads began, as Jordan reports, to grumble and complain about their fate. The camp buzzed and worried.

According to legend, Attila was about to lift the siege, but then he saw a flock of storks flying from the city. It was a sign: the storks are leaving the doomed city, which means that the time has come for a decisive assault.

But this is a legend. Whether there were storks or not, the siege continued for another month without any attempts at a massive assault. Attila sent food teams even further, waited for the enteritis epidemic to subside thanks to the abundant consumption of koumiss, and made sure that the city was able to withstand a long blockade. He fought against the night attacks of the townspeople, using more and more new military tricks: he ordered to set up false camps near the very walls, even with the tents of the leaders, but only without people, he ordered to fire at the city from all sides at night with ballistae and the like.

The shelling was carried out for several days, while the city guns only occasionally responded. Undermining was done again, and this time with some success: the wall collapsed, but it was just the outer layer, practically the lining of a real powerful fortress wall. The dig had to continue.

Disturbing news began to reach: Marcian decided to enter the war and moved the legions to Moesia. It was necessary to finish with Aquileia as soon as possible in order to avoid an unexpected attack from the east. The siege dragged on, three months is too long.

So everything is at stake. Six hours of continuous shelling from catapults with simultaneous sapper work. The walls are crumbling. Large masses the besieged flee along the coast of the sea to the west. Onegez orders not to interfere with them and not to waste time on unnecessary pursuit: now the main thing is to take the city. These fugitives took refuge on islands in the lagoon and founded Venice.

Fortifications are cracking, crumbling under the blows of stones and battering rams. Attila gives the order to attack.

He had his own reasons, not humane, but reasonable. The fate of the “impregnable city” should become indicative so that others surrender to the mercy of the winner out of sheer fear of experiencing such a nightmare.

The Huns, Franks and other barbarians allied with them burst into the defeated city. Massacre of men and children, rape and murder of women. History has preserved the memory of a certain Digna, the young wife of one of the city senators. Pursued by these bandits, she wrapped her head in a scarf and threw herself into the moat from the fortress wall.

Robbery, division of booty and destruction for the pleasure of destroying. Nothing remains of Aquileia.

Why did this madness reappear? Where does this rage come from? Why did Attila return to barbarism, the perniciousness of which he was aware of and tried to overcome?

The fact is that, returning to the Danube after the defeat on Catalaunian fields, Attila decided to revise his policy to the detriment of humanism.

You can't force people to fight just for the idea of ​​creating an empire, for a better future. You can't explain to them military necessity strategic retreat, not accompanied by the capture of prey. People must be accepted as they are, and led not by promises of future blessings, but by the satisfaction of their momentary desires. They can be placed in the service of high ideals without them even realizing it. This is how a person works, and all brilliant minds know how to use it, forcing people unconsciously to serve their goals.

Italian cities empty. Residents fled, most often by sea. Immigrants from Altinum - today Altino - settled the islands of Torcello and Murano. The people of Padua took refuge on the Rialto. The inhabitants of Vicenza, Mestre, Arcol, Este, Rovigo, and even Ferrara, south of the Po, fled, wherever their eyes looked, mainly into the lagoons.

Those who remained dutifully opened the gates of almost deserted cities, but, with the rarest exception, they could not avoid beating, despite the promise to save their lives. Scourge of God!..

Devastating procession through Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria. But why was Attila in no hurry to go to Rome? Not in a hurry, he thought. Aetius will not cross the Po, and if Marcianus invades Moesia, he will run into the resistance of the Pannonians. There is time. Let's sow panic, let the Romans with the Ravens lessen their arrogance.

The victorious march continued. Mantua, Verona, Castillo, Cremona, Brescia, Bergamo, Lodi, Pavia, Milan, Como, Novara, Trecate, Vercelli, Chigliano, Mortara, Magenta, Vigevano... Troops under the personal command of Oneges easily crossed the Po between Cremona and Piacenza! The defense line of Aetius was not as continuous and dense as it seemed!

Attila concentrated his troops south of Mantua at the confluence of the Po and Mincio, on a wide road that led to Rome through the Apennines. Gathering together the army, who had scattered in search of prey, turned out to be no easy task, but it was done. And now, admiring his cohorts, Attila declared that he did not intend to go further!

Edekon and Orestes did not understand anything.

It was a brilliant move. Attila kept the planned maneuver a great secret, having developed it together with Oneges. The fact that he did not reveal the cards to his other associates did not at all mean distrust of them, he simply wanted them to act naturally, he wanted to impress them, to further strengthen their faith in the wisdom and visionary gift of the leader. He could not deny himself the pleasure of surprising his friends and making them scream with delight!

It wasn't gambling but a well thought out strategy. Oneges crossed the Po, which means that Aetius will decide that the vanguard of Attila's army has crossed, and will remove a significant part of his defensive barrier in order to push the Huns across the river. Attila, however, will not follow Oneges, but will calmly cross the Po in a completely different place, where the defense will be weakened.

Edecon and Orestes were truly amazed at the visionary wisdom of their emperor and were noisily enthusiastic about his genius.

In confirmation of the correctness of his plan, Attila told them the latest news: having learned about the breakthrough of Oneges, Aetius hastily withdrew part of the troops in order to concentrate significant forces south of Cremona and Piacenza and push the Huns to the other side. But as long as the troops gather, Onegez will already go further south. The plan is this: while Aetius prowls along the banks of the river, looking for Attila's army, Oneges with his army will attack his rear, and Aetius will be forced to repel the attack, leaving part of the legions as a barrier against the expected approach of Attila. The Roman forces will be dispersed. Oneges, having put to flight the rearguard of Aetius, will go to Pisa, from where the Aurelian road leads along the coast to Rome. Aetius would have to hasten to block the path of the Huns to the capital and further weaken his line of defense. And then Attila will cross the Po, reach Mantua and Florence, and from there, along the Cassian Way, he will reach Rome!

Such was the plan that strategists still admire to this day. The plan was doomed to success, and in the part that depended on Onegez, the results even exceeded expectations. However - truly miracles! - main part the "genius plan" was never implemented because its developer changed his mind!

The great military talent of Onegez made it possible to solve the main tasks taking into account real conditions and provided the Huns with a strategic advantage.

Indeed, Aetius, searching the banks of the river in search of the Huns, had no idea which way Oneges had gone, since he ordered the troops to retreat in a variety of ways, some of which deliberately led away from the main goal.

Aetius had to pursue these detachments and scattered groups, fanning out in many directions. Success was not always with the Romans, for the Huns were masters of insidious ambushes. Aetius found himself embroiled in a sort of debilitating guerrilla war, for which the tactics adopted by the disciplined heavily armed legions were little suited. The warriors could not use the acquired skills, and the bulky luggage made it difficult to maneuver. Aetius called to himself almost all the cavalry at his disposal, further weakening the cordon of troops along the Po River. The Roman cavalry could hardly keep up with the born horsemen-Huns, and, of course, there could be no question of encircling the enemy or creating conditions for a frontal battle. By order of Oneges, the detachments first grouped, then separated again, disappearing from under the very noses of the Romans, who had not yet parted with the vain hope of catching the Huns in a bag.

Finally, Oneges made a concentration of forces and took the direction of Carrara, Massa, Pistoia and Pisa. Aetius was forced to transfer to Etruria the best part of their strength. Onegez's troops concentrated between Massa and Carrara. Aetius believed that he had guessed the enemy's plan: from the Moon, the enemy army would move along a short and wide road leading from the Po to the Tiber valley, and from there to Rome. This could not be allowed. Oneges pretended to follow this path, then disbanded the troops in all directions from Massa and Carrara to Pisa and Florence, reassembled them and disbanded them again, making it look like he was plundering the country, before reaching military road, which attracted the watchful attention of the patrician, who did not want to allow Attila to her, while all this was just a game of hide and seek and a distraction, and Attila's large army did not leave Mantua.

What happened? Why did Attila abandon his plan, which his comrades-in-arms found excellent, and why, while Oneges was leading Aetius, did he not, taking advantage of the opportunity, force the Po and go through the Tiber valley to besiege Rome?

The second half of June came, and the heat was suffocating. The sickness started again. Part of the army was struck by epidemics, the other suffered from the consequences of the excesses of a successful campaign in rich country. In addition, the wagon train was bursting with loot and many heroes complained of fatigue, which was the harder, the stronger their desire to deliver the booty home as soon as possible was bursting.

An epidemic raged all around, and there was a misconception that it was stronger south of the Po than north, and therefore the tempting idea of ​​​​continuing the war on the other side of the Po now did not bode well.

In addition, Aetius wasted his strength chasing the shadow of Oneges, and did not know where to expect the main blow. This means that tomorrow the crossing will be even easier than today, and the enemy will quickly lay down their arms.

But it was necessary to put the last point in this campaign. And Attila appeared new idea: But is it possible, instead of an offensive, to create only the appearance of an offensive, to sow such a panic that fear will force Rome to capitulate and there will be no need for battles?

Attila summoned Oneges to him, and he returned the same way he had left. Aetius could not fail to understand that a concentration of forces was being carried out before a decisive offensive. He began to gather all his legions to protect the Apennines at any cost.

But in Rome, having learned about the preparation of the general offensive of the Huns in the region of Po and Mincio, everyone lost their heads with fear and could not even imagine that the Huns would linger for a long time in their march on the capital along main road Apennines.

Valentinian III gathered his ministers and advisers. I had to choose the lesser of the evils. It was necessary to find out from Attila on what conditions he agreed to spare the city, send ambassadors with gifts, go to any humiliation, promise an annual tribute, which could be very large if the Hun did not also put forward territorial claims.

Maximus Petronius objected that this would lead nowhere. All that Attila wants is military victory, the defeat and death of Aetius, the joy of robbery and massacre. Imperial ambassadors? Yes, they will not even be accepted! .. But what if Aetius himself is sent to Attila?

The emperor replied that Aetius would certainly not agree. Yes, even if he had agreed, he would still not be accepted, like any other ambassador.

Then what's left, Senate delegation? Gathered the Senate. The Senate unanimously decided to appoint several senators who, on his behalf, would ask for peace at the price that Attila would appoint.

But what will the people think? Will he take this as cowardice and betrayal on the part of the emperor and the nobility?

Announced a general meeting of the townspeople. Senators reported on the danger hanging over Rome. The city could have been completely destroyed. All northern Italy is plundered, the legions can only briefly delay the formidable enemy, who will soon be under the walls of the city.

So what does the people want, peace or war?

Peace! Peace!

What would the citizens of Rome prefer: wait for the arrival of the Huns or send ambassadors?

Ambassadors! Ambassadors!

The Senate met again, in the presence of the emperor, his ministers and high dignitaries. Who will lead the embassy? Who is sure to be accepted? It is impossible, after all, to ask the emperor himself? And will they even accept the emperor? Then the most famous senator, Gennady Avien, got up and said: "Send the pope, he will be accepted."

Dad! Nobody thought about it. Many did not even dare to think about it. Dad! He was deeply respected by all. He was appreciated by intellectuals, respected by dignitaries, loved by the people. Even the pagans approved of his devotion to the common good. In addition, while still a simple deacon, in 440, he proved himself a skilled diplomat. Galla Placidia sent him to Gaul to settle the conflict between Aetius and the Roman prefect.

The pope then was Leo I, the same one who is known in History as Leo the Great, and in the Church as Saint Leo.

What a man! While still in the low rank of deacon, he was already a prominent theologian and philosopher. He was elected pope in 440, when he had not even been ordained a priest. Leo waged war on the main heresies of the time - Manichaeism in Italy, which opposed the good God evil god and tried to combine Christianity and Eastern pagan beliefs, Priscillianism in Spain, which, recognizing in a single abstract God higher power, distributed it among the whole pantheon of deities, and Monophysitism in Constantinople.

The fight against the latter was the most difficult. Archimandrite Eutyches of Constantinople opposed the doctrine of the Church Fathers, who recognized in Jesus Christ two principles, one but not identical: the divine and the human. For Eutyches and the followers of Monophysitism human nature absorbed divine essence by creating the unity of the nature of the Messiah. Leo opposed this interpretation. Under the chairmanship of the Patriarch of Constantinople, a synod met, which confirmed the falsity of the provisions of Monophysitism. Leo I wrote then, in 449, his Dogmatic Letter, in which he set out the Catholic doctrine of the unity of the person and the dualism of the nature of Jesus. In response, Theodosius II, who was considered a theologian who knew no equal, supported Eutyches and opposed the pope. With his power, he convened another synod in Ephesus, at which the basic principles of Monophysitism were proclaimed, and the pope was defrocked! Leo I replied: "History will not speak of the Synod of Ephesus, but of the Ephesian robbery." Then Leo convened the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451, at which the provisions of the Dogmatic Letter were approved and Monophysitism was finally exposed.

It was to this holy man, a seventy-year-old Tuscan with a long gray beard (who would die in Rome nine years later), that the senator Gennady Avien turned, fulfilling the instructions of the emperor and the Senate.

The pope, whom Prosper of Aquitaine elegantly called "health of mind," accepted the offer and immediately sent a bishop and several deacons to Mantua, in clerical vestments, but on horseback. The ambassadors departed without armed guards, but with a papal standard and a high silver cross, which were supposed to provide them with protection.

The bishop, the only one who knew the text of the message, was instructed not to speak to anyone until he had obtained an audience with Attila or one of his ministers. The embassy reached the Po without incident, and not far from the Mantua bridge met with Aetius, who greeted the papal legates, not hiding his surprise. What's the matter, gentlemen? Pope's embassy to the emperor of the Huns. What other embassy? But God knows, they sent everything, a secret report, it was said to hand over to Attila personally.

Aetius was familiar with the pope and, like no one else, could appreciate his talent as a diplomat. He considered that a last attempt was being prepared to end the war and move on to peace negotiations. Aetius offered the bishop an escort and a herald who would inform the Huns in advance of the visit of papal ambassadors. The bishop declined the offer and headed for the bridge.

From the other side the embassy was seen by the post of the Huns. The legates were ordered to stop. After fifteen minutes of fuss, Orestes appeared on the Hun coast. He immediately appreciated the standard, and clothes, and the cross. He posted a guard of honor at the exit from the bridge and personally went out to meet the ambassadors, giving them a sign to approach.

The bishop dismounted. Orestes also dismounted - a rare occurrence. Mutual greetings followed. The bishop said that he had been sent by the pope with a personal message to the emperor of the Huns. Orestes placed the ambassadors in a tent and ordered to feed them. He took the sealed letter and asked him to wait until he delivered the message to the emperor.

He returned two hours later and informed the legates that the emperor of the Huns conveyed his best wishes to the pope and thanked him for the initiative. The Pope and the Roman delegation will be received on July 4th. The negotiations will take place on the Ambouleian field, at the ford across the Mincio. Until the arrival of the pope, no military action will be taken, provided that the Roman legions do not move from their place, even under the pretext of accompanying the embassy of the pontiff on his return to Rome.

The bishop promised to fulfill all the conditions, thanked for the reception and got up to leave. Then Orestes gave him a letter sealed with a seal and set the last condition: no one should find out the answer of the emperor of the Huns, which is intended for the pope and only him.

The ambassadors mounted their horses. The bishop avoided the need to lie, because at the exit from the bridge he did not meet with Aetius. With a sigh of relief, he sent to inform the commander-in-chief on behalf of the pope and the Roman emperor that no military action should be taken without an order from Rome and that the troops should not change their deployment.

The details of the meeting became known to historians thanks to Prosper of Aquitaine. On July 4, at about eleven o'clock in the morning, accompanied by ten deacons in white robes with a papal standard and a silver cross, and ten legionnaires in ceremonial vestments and ceremonial weapons, a delegation consisting of the pope, Avien and Trigetius arrived at the Mantua bridge. Prosper of Aquitaine was also part of the embassy as a secretary. Avien received a letter of credence from the emperor as a plenipotentiary ambassador.

Aetius received the ambassadors and kissed the pontiff's ring. He began to ask questions, but Avien showed him the letter:

I can't tell you anything.

But on at least can you tell me what i should do?

Stay put.

So I won't accompany you as part of the embassy?

No. You will stay with the troops.

May I not leave my assistant here and go to Rome to greet the emperor and give him a full account of everything that has happened during this time?

No. You will stay with the legions.

Aetius escorted the ambassadors to the entrance to the bridge and, having said goodbye, withdrew.

Orestes met them on the other side of the river and escorted them to a tent, where tables were waiting for them. Another tent was prepared for the escort.

Dad asked when the first meeting would take place. Orestes replied: “My master will receive you today, at the hour you specify. He gives you time to rest and wishes you to rest well. He asks you to honor him with his hospitality tonight, and wants to seat you across from him, not side by side, so that both of you can lead the meal. Negotiations, if you do not mind, will begin only tomorrow at a convenient time for you.

An unexpectedly pleasant and promising welcome!

Dad was even a little touched. He agreed to all proposals. Orestes was supposed to pick him up at five in the evening. The pope donned festive clothes to honor the emperor of the Huns. He agreed to dinner, saying that he was flattered by the offer to sit at the head of the table, and, since it was left to him to set the time for negotiations, he scheduled a meeting for nine o'clock in the morning the next day.

The deacons and soldiers brought large leather bags with the ceremonial vestments of the pope and senators.

Amédée Thierry, based on materials from the opening of the tomb of Leo I, describes his clothes as follows: “The lion wore a miter made of silk embroidered with gold, rounded in an oriental style, a burgundy cassock with a pallium decorated with a small red cross on his right shoulder and another, larger, on left side of chest.

The senators were dressed in white togas bearing the insignia of their high dignity. Avien, for example, wore a gold collar with a medal with the image of the emperor suspended from it - a sign of the most complete authority.

Orestes called for the ambassadors at the appointed time and led them to the meeting place in a spacious tent embroidered with gold. Attila was dressed in the Roman fashion: a long white toga, but with an ermine collar, and expensive necklaces falling over his chest.

In honor of the arrival of papal ambassadors, a festive dinner was given. The high delegation was represented by the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Leo I, the senators Avien and Trigetius, and the secretary of the embassy, ​​Prosper of Aquitaine. The guests were received by the emperor of the Huns Attila, the ministers Onegez, Edekon and the secretary… Orestes! Yes, Attila wanted to observe the equality of the parties in the negotiations. There are three ambassadors, and three receivers. Orestes accepted the role allotted to him. Attila seated Avienus on the right hand and Trigetius on the left. To the right of Leo sat Onegez, to the left - Edekon. At the end of the table, Prosper and Orestes nestled opposite each other. The dishes were delicious, the wines aged. They talked about the weather, complained about the heat, frequent thunderstorms and pestilence. Papa spoke about Asia Minor, Attila shared his impressions about Far East. The incredible happened, but Attila was filled with admiration for the noble and wise old man, and the pope could not resist the charm of the invincible and famously civilized leader!

The negotiations were postponed from the fifth to the sixth of July. On the fifth, the pope and the emperor agreed to meet alone, face to face.

It will never be known what Leo I and Attila were talking about. Prosper of Aquitaine recorded only the following: "The pope relied on the help of the Lord, who does not leave those who serve a just cause, and his faith brought success."

Negotiations took place on July 6th. Attila himself announced that the parties had come to an agreement. He will begin withdrawing troops from Italy on the 8th of July and will choose the path that suits him. The Emperor of the Western Roman Empire will pay a reasonable tribute within five years. He renounces henceforth all attempts to invade Gaul and Italy, provided that he is not attacked elsewhere and Rome refrains from any incitement that sows confusion and undermines the order of her empire. He expects Valentinian to urge Marcian to pay the tribute promised by his predecessor and also not to disturb the emperor of the Huns. Otherwise, he will consider himself free from obligations and Constantinople will be under attack. At the end of the speech, he thanked the pope, saying that it was a great honor for him to host "himself wise man in the world," and wished him years life. Dad was so moved that he couldn't answer. They embraced silently.

Dad retired to his room and changed into simple white clothes. They brought the horses.

Attila, recollecting himself, wanted to leave the last word to himself and mockingly threw parting words to Trigetius: “And remind your emperor that I am still waiting for my bride Honoria!”

The ambassadors have left. Orestes accompanied them to the bridge. Aetius met them on the other side. Bowing to the pope, he turned to Avien:

What should I do?

Prepare to leave.

When should I check out?

Tomorrow night.

Leaving Attila here?

Leaving it here. He will leave tomorrow.

Which way?

Whatever you wish.

Are you sure he will leave?

I'm sure he will leave.

Watch out! I know his cunning, I know him better than you!

You know him less than I do.

Is my departure an order?

This is an order from your emperor.

Where should I go?

I will meet you there.

In complete confusion, not understanding anything, Aetius reluctantly carried out the order. He gathered troops. The next day they were ready to set out. He arrived in Rome. Avien was waiting for him at the city wall:

Today we dine together at the Emperor's.

What does he want?

To congratulate you. And tomorrow we are having dinner with dad, who also wants to congratulate you.

And so it happened.

Valentinian III poured praise: “You survived, and we were able to negotiate, as the pope wanted. You - supreme commander my troops. Send the legionnaires on vacation, they deserve it, and stay by my side, your advice is always dear to me.

The people of Rome rejoiced and praised Aetius! The Pope gave him the warmest welcome. If not for a great sad experience, Aetius would have thought that his finest hour had come. True, he struck very late and at the wrong time, since this time he, Aetius, did absolutely nothing outstanding, on the contrary, he did not understand at all what was happening, stood aside from all political decisions and did not participate in the negotiations. But he is in honor, and this is the main thing. The intrigues of Maximus Petronius very quickly showed him that he had no reason to rejoice. He left the yard several times. They said - why didn’t they just talk about him? - that he could not hold back his tears when he learned of the death of Attila, and suspicion of conspiracy again fell on him. But time will pass, and he will again be called to court: Valentinian so needed his advice! We know what happened next and how it ended.

Attila began to withdraw on the eighth of July. The troops were in high spirits: peace had been concluded, the enemy had agreed to pay a large tribute, and now it was possible to dispose of the good that had been obtained during the entire campaign. Attila did not follow the old path. He knew that Marcian not only deployed large forces in Moesia, but also sent a whole army to Pannonia under the command of Mark Julius Aetius, who had no family ties with Flavius ​​Aetius. This army could be waiting for the Huns on the Alpine slopes of Bavaria or Salzburg.

Therefore, Attila, having risen up the Adige, chose the more difficult route through the Rhaetian Alps. Through Innsbruck, past Lake Constance, along the Wertach valley, he went to Augsburg, then Augusta Vendelikorum. It only remained to go down the Jlexy, and there is already the native Danube! But near Augsburg, the soldiers asked him to allow one more, last robbery. Attila hesitated, because this did not go well with the commitments made. After some thought, he agreed. While crossing the Lekh, some ugly woman - a real witch - threw herself into the water and, grabbing his horse by the bridle, shouted three times: “Back, Aggila!”

The warriors wanted to deal with her, but Attila released the woman in peace. He reached the Danube, crossed it and ordered to pitch a tent. All night he was tormented by bouts of vomiting and blood was coming from his throat.

Why did Attila leave Italy? Can you give an answer to this? There were many attempts. Here is the first explanation: the miracle of St. Leo.

Prosper of Aquitaine brings us to this conclusion: "Let us give thanks to the Lord who has saved us from a great disaster!" So, according to him, the pope said to the emperor on his return to Rome.

The miracle of St. Lou, the miracle of St. Anian, the miracle of St. Genevieve and, finally, the miracle of St. Leo. Aren't there too many miracles to take back the Scourge of God?

Another explanation, close to the first, but not so mystical, but rather psychological: the great power of Leo's persuasion, which Attila could not resist.

Yes ... yes, but ... Attila did not succumb so easily to anyone's influence. In the cases of Lou, Anian and Genevieve, it was only about ordinary cities, but to abandon Rome! And then leave - leave, abandoning Italy and Gaul! .. Lev, probably, really knew how to convince!

Option: Attila for the first - and only - time in his life met with the pope, and with the pope, who was revered by the entire Christian world, not just with the bishop of Rome. Attila was flattered to speak with him on an equal footing, and sometimes even show him his own superiority. He was delighted, he was at the height of his fame, it was a brilliant end to his life path he wanted nothing more!

The version is interesting, but it was not so easy to delight Attila. He interacted with the Roman emperors and had no special reverence for them. He was an atheist, and the vicar of God on earth was for him the vicar of someone who did not exist, at least for him. It cannot be assumed that the pope converted him to his faith in ten minutes! .. Attila saw a great man who made a strong impression on him, this is undoubtedly. But there was no question of humble obedience.

Another option: Leo helped Attila find peace with himself, awakening in him a sense of humanity.

It also looks like a miracle. Attila already had glimmers of humanism between two extermination campaigns. There were Troyes, Orleans and Paris, but they did not prevent the Catalaunian fields, and Leo's sermons did not save Augsburg!

No, the clue is not here...

There was another explanation, poetic, sentimental, charming, idyllic: a gift to Elena. An explanation offered in Italian legend and not supported by any historical document.

In the vicinity of Mantua lived a young Roman woman, beautiful and pure, pious and merciful. Her faith conquered all fears, and she was left alone in the family villa when her parents fled when they learned of the approach of the Huns. Attila was passing by, accompanied by a very small escort - this happened often - and wanted to stop, have a bite to eat and rest a bit. The young girl went out to unexpected guests, with a sweet smile invited Attila into the house and began to serve him. Attila was so fascinated by her that he asked to feed his people in the next large room and stay to talk to him alone. The girl agreed and they started talking. She immediately realized that before her was the terrible emperor of the Huns, and was amazed at his courtesy.

She told him that she was a Christian and intended to devote her life to the service of the Lord. Her God is the God of Peace, Goodness and Forgiveness. Why does he, Attila, bring war, torment and death to people? Feeling embarrassed in front of such innocence and courage, the emperor replied that he behaved this way only because he was the Scourge of God and had to fulfill his destiny. She understood him, and the explanation seemed convincing to her, but only the Scourge of God is not yet the Archangel of Death. Torn between kissing her on the forehead and laughing, he asked her to continue. The girl spoke about mercy following revenge, about a humble and happy old age, about the joys of a peaceful life and the rest of a warrior, about a fulfilled destiny. Attila was delighted. Here the legend begins to diverge: according to one version, he seduced a Christian woman who gave herself up, either succumbing to his irresistible charm, or from the spirit of self-sacrifice; according to another, he decided to become a friend of this simple-hearted child and promised her to think, after which he went to sleep alone. In both versions (physical and platonic love), Attila meets her again, allows himself to be convinced, abandons all his plans for her sake and is now looking only for an opportunity to leave without paying off his reputation. And then the father - the father of the Christian Elena! - asks him to meet with him: the die has already been cast.

Sweet, sweet story. It's all too pretty to be true.

The fact that Attila had an affair with a beautiful Mantuan woman is quite likely, and given his passion for beauties in all the countries he has visited, there is little doubt. But his respect for her is unlikely, and the power over him is generally from the realm of fantasy. Besides, Elena was never mentioned again.

What then? An explanation of a purely military nature? Or rather, military explanations?

Explanation one: after thinking it over, Attila decided that continuing the campaign would lead to his defeat. He devastated northern Italy, seized more booty than he bargained for, and this, he believed, would be enough.

This explanation does not stand up to scrutiny.

Attila knew, and knew well, that none of his generals even considered defeat. Edecon was confident that he could handle the fortifications of Rome, and the achievements of his modernized artillery gave him enough reason to be optimistic. Onegez and Orestes for the first time in their lives literally rebelled: they did not even want to hear about unconditional surrender, insisting on conquest. They resigned themselves only because the emperor is the emperor and his will is the law. In addition, Attila began the campaign, pursuing quite specific purpose: to capture Italy, and then Gaul. An excess of booty in the train could not make him abandon his plan.

The second explanation: low morale of the troops. Let's say. But how could it happen that it was Attila who was seized by the spirit of defeatism when his commanders and advisers were eager to fight? This could hardly have happened. Better than they felt the mood of the fighters? Unlikely. He stood even further from ordinary warriors than his commanders.

The third explanation: the threat from Marcian, who was going to ravage the Hun lands and could block Attila's retreat. But significant forces were left in Pannonia that could defend themselves, and there were allies who pledged to come to the rescue in case of real danger. In Mantua, the question was not about a retreat that Marcian could prevent, but about an advance further south! In addition, Attila's first concern, even before descending the alpine slopes, which Marcian could protect, was to provoke him to speak out and threaten the worst if the Byzantine did not join the treaty and continued to refuse to pay tribute.

No, it cannot be that Attila really feared Marcianus. Once he had already stood at the walls of Constantinople and now preferred to set himself more difficult tasks.

So? The explanation - ultimately also military - is that he was worried about the fate of the central and eastern parts of the empire?

This explanation, although it cannot be the only one, is closest to the truth.

Attila established a postal service so well that he always and everywhere was aware of events taking place in the most remote corners of his empire. He knew that the expedition of Orestes had not solved all the problems in Central Asia and the East. "Fortified points" were again wiped off the face of the earth, and the Caucasian Alans could take over Ellak. Was it necessary, under these conditions, to continue the struggle, striving to expand the limits of the empire, if it was impossible to firmly hold it in the hands and such as it was?

To complete the picture, it is worth mentioning another hypothesis put forward by some researchers. It again features the "pact of two friends". Aetius helped Attila get out of a difficult situation near Orleans and on the Catalaunian fields, and now Attila could destroy Aetius's entire brilliant career in one fell swoop, but did not, since the debt was a red payment. But under the current conditions, and especially given the scale of the goals set by Attila, such an assumption looks clean water romance.

And still? Another explanation: Attila's health.

Attila's poor health alone cannot explain everything either, but this factor should not be discounted.

Attila lost his strength and was afraid of the end. Vomiting, headaches, bleeding and fainting. He could no longer play.

He hid his illness, but he knew that soon he would no longer be able to do so. Then why persist? Why try to complete a conquest he would never see the end of, why keep going on and on when he could die along the way? Wouldn't it be wiser to abandon past plans and devote the rest of your days to strengthening the already established empire in the hope that it will remain strong for many years to come?

This state of mind is understandable. It is known that upon returning from the campaign, Attila was inaccessible to everyone for many days, except for the doctors, who swore to keep everything a secret. He did not allow himself even Onegez, who at that time was forced to rule on his behalf.

Feeling better, Attila left Oneges as the de facto ruler and made several decisions aimed at simultaneously strengthening his own prestige and strengthening alliances in the event of a possible resumption of hostilities. Whether there were reasons for it or not, however, they saw this as a sign of his oppressive fear, believing that the emperor wanted to remind himself, hide his illness from everyone and show that he himself deals with the most important political issues and hatches new grandiose plans.

It was during this period that he sent to Pannonia an "expeditionary force" under the command of Orestes, who threw Marcian's mercenaries into Moesia. Fulfilling the order of the emperor, Orestes sent ambassadors to Constantinople, who were received by one of the Byzantine ministers. The ambassadors asked whether the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire intended to pay the tribute promised by Theodosius II or not? If not, then he must prepare for the worst. There was no answer, but Marcian became worried. He strengthened his troops in Moesia, appointing the commander of the "other" Aetius, who has already been mentioned.

Attila also sent a delegation to Rome, which reached their destination safely. The envoys arrived to receive the tribute agreed with the pope and authorized representative emperor, as the payment was delayed in an unacceptable way. Valentinian III immediately granted the demand and apologized for the delay, which occurred due to "circumstances beyond his control."

In addition, Attila sent a shipment of weapons to the Ripuarian Franks as a sign of friendship and an alliance dear to him, which he wanted to further strengthen in case of a possible war.

He also tried, but unsuccessfully, to renew relations with the Burgundians.

With particular joy, he learned about the death of Sangiban, who still did not escape the weapons of the Visigoths. But with the Alans, things definitely did not go well. The Western Alans in Gaul and Spain were almost completely killed, the Eastern Alans made Ellac's life unbearable. In addition, a split occurred among the Akatsirs, and some of them joined the recalcitrant Alans, while usually these peoples did not get along well with each other. The appearance of new tribes was noticed, which, apparently, were related to the Akatsirs. Wild aliens invaded the valleys from almost all sides eastern rivers in the east and in the regions of the Urals.

The emperor gathered, trying to make this meeting as solemn as possible, his main generals and ministers and announced to them that his health was in perfect order and that he intended to personally restore order in the empire up to the farthest eastern outskirts, and then undertake the most grandiose campaign against the "Roman empires" in his life.

Is it possible, given the above, to explain the departure from Italy by poor health?

It is possible, since some of Attila's actions testify to this, without a doubt, to assume that an unexpected deterioration in well-being played a role in the decision to abandon the capture of Rome, but it was not the only reason.

The need to pacify the rebels in the central and eastern parts empire served as an additional motive. But it must be admitted that Attila did not immediately rush to conquer the rebellious provinces and that he could entrust the implementation of the punitive expedition to Orestes, providing him with the necessary instructions and additional troops.

Barely recovering his failing health, Attila immediately announced his desire to restore order in the empire and assert his authority throughout the Roman world - a goal that he first declared officially.

With this in mind, it can be assumed that the rejection of Rome was dictated by the circumstances. Attila doubted his physical strength and pretended to give in to the requests of the pope, but in fact he only wanted to rest and heal and then resume the fight with renewed vigor. However, knowing about the readiness of Rome to capitulate, it is difficult to imagine that Attila could deprive himself of such glorious victory, which would be a brilliant end to his career. To die in Rome, conquered Rome, which opened its gates to him - that would be a real apotheosis!

Some researchers argue that he considered this triumph useless, since after his death no one would be able to save his empire. Such an assumption is justified, but at the same time it inevitably leads to the conclusion that Attila did not believe in the possibility of the existence of his vast and diverse empire (with or without Rome) after his own death, and this seems completely impossible, since it was during this period that he manifested great attention to his heirs and transfers more and more powers to Oneges.

So, we are again forced to consider the issue of mental disorder. The unexpectedness of decisions, the change of phases of composure and neurasthenia, decisiveness and uncertainty have already been repeatedly noted. Attila could develop one of the forms of schizophrenia.

Some researchers tend to see in Attila an adventurer, an adventurer. For him, they say, the game had more value than winning, therefore, having realized that he would win this game, he was no longer interested in bringing the matter to the end. He threw everything and rushed in search of new adventures, already satisfied that he had amazed the whole world. Others, like G. Homeyer and Helmut de Boor, went even further along the path of psychoanalysis, arguing that Attila was a victim of the instinct of destruction and that it was the genius of destruction that determined all his actions, whether he erased the city from the face of the earth or crushed the hopes of his entourage by refusing to destroy him.

You can think whatever. Attila was a complex nature and often almost unpredictable. But many of his decisions, orders and statements prove that all these unexpected turns were born not by a sick, but by a brilliant mind.

Attila declared his intention to bring order to his entire empire. He waited for the time needed to recover his health in order to prepare his departure. He took with him only the cavalry, and in a relatively small number, knowing that he would have to pursue the nomads, who would not be able to oppose him with significant forces. The artillery consisted only of light ballistae drawn by horses. He again openly, if not ostentatiously, hands over the reins of government to Oneges, while again publicly instructing him to prepare everything necessary for a grandiose campaign, which he intends to carry out a few months after his return, that is, next spring. He explicitly stated that he would attack Eastern empire and that all Italy and all Gaul will submit to him.

An assumption arises that praises the genius of Attila: he made campaigns in Gaul and Italy only in order to show his strength and leave an indelible memory of himself there; he refused to repeat the battle on the Catalaunian fields, to capture Rome and continue the conquest of Italy, because he was sure that he had already shown his power enough and later Italy and Gaul would surrender to him without a fight; he spared Rome and succumbed to the persuasion of the pope in order to give himself greatness and enlist the support of the Church; he deliberately allowed the Byzantine emperor Marcian to think that he was afraid of him and would not attack, while he was going to inflict a mortal blow on him and capture the Eastern Roman Empire, after which the Western Empire, including Gaul and Italy, would fall to its knees before him; and, finally, he understood that a decisive assault on the entire Roman Empire would be possible only after the restoration of order throughout the empire of the Huns.

There are too many explanations, even too many. Attempts to explain Attila's actions by the paradoxical nature of his mindset, which goes against logic, should not be discounted, although some historians, such as Eduard Troplong and Rashid Saffet Atabinen, admit that his diplomatic genius was based on a thorough analysis of all possible development options events.

Performance European nations about the king of the Huns, Attila, is based mainly on legends and traditions and has little in common with historical figure Attila. The historical Attila is practically unknown to us, although more evidence from his contemporaries has survived about him than about most other historical characters of that era. The creation of the myth of Attila began in antiquity, continued successfully in the Middle Ages and, it seems, has not been completed to this day, with the only difference being that modern myth-making acts in the form of hypotheses, with more or less solidity claiming to be scientific. It is not difficult to be convinced of this by reading the book by M. Bouvier-Azhan, which is now offered to the Russian reader. I hasten to be clear: this book is not a contribution to mythology, but to the library of popular literature about remarkable personalities, among which it is permissible to include Attila (remarkable in the sense of famous, but not necessarily glorious). It's just that M. Bouvier-Azhan is fascinated by these hypotheses and generously shares them with the reader, unobtrusively leading to the idea of ​​preferring one or another of them. After all, his book is not scientific monograph, but rather a historical and biographical novel, and with this in mind, one must approach it. The author of the novel is in a different relationship with the reader than the scientist who published the monograph: his goal is to captivate, and not to convince with strictly scientific arguments. authentically known facts are presented in the book just as reliably, and where the author steps on the shaky ground of hypotheses, he can be refuted, unless by proposing one more hypothesis ...

It's hard to say obvious things without risking banality (because it's banal because it's obvious), but sometimes it's even harder not to say them. I would venture to remind you that Attila was the son of his people (not the most meek) and his time (not the most blessed). What is the people, such is the leader. For about eight decades, from 375 to 453, of which nineteen years under the leadership of Attila, the Huns plunged Europe into horror. The suffering they inflicted during this time on various peoples was indelibly imprinted in the memory of their descendants. The very name "Huns" conjures up frightening images to this day, and even historical research based on the study of sources has not been able to make these images more attractive. The Hun is a wild and ferocious barbarian. The judgment of serious researchers about the role of the Huns in the history of Europe has never changed. It generally coincides with folk tradition, even if it differs in the assessment of individual events and facts. One thing is certain: the hordes of the Huns sowed death and destruction everywhere in their path. None of the reliable sources informs about the liberation or cultural mission of this nomadic people, even about one beneficial deed that survived their stay in Europe.

Far from being as simple as with the assessment of the Huns as a whole, the situation is with judgments about their famous leader Attila. His image seems to continue to live, constantly changing, now and then acquiring a certain romantic coloring in biographical writings. So in the book by M. Bouvier-Azhan, Attila does not look so scary and, most definitely, not as bad as people used to think about him. If the “Scourge of God”, then the scourging according to his deserts ... However, you can love anyone, love does not understand. Although no, Atgila, in my opinion, cannot be loved, and the attitude of the author of the presented book towards him is rather not love, but, at the most, sympathy, respect, for which one can find justification. All sources testify that Attila in his private life was simple and restrained. Not being an ascetic by his habits and inclinations (according to the Hun custom, he had numerous wives and did not shy away from certain luxury at his court), at the same time he never forgot that he must preserve royal dignity. In public, during feasts and when moving, he was exceptionally restrained, which became his second nature. On the whole, on the basis of ancient evidence, an image is created of a man who, as the leader of the barbarian hordes, although he inspired horror, did not personally make an unfavorable impression on those who met him.

Both in legend and in historiography, Attila is portrayed as an undeniably outstanding ruler, as, for example, Alfred the Great appears to the English or Otto the Great to the Germans. Was Attila really a great ruler? Contemporary authors characterize him as undoubtedly strong personality. Attila was the only king of the Huns who managed to unite under his own sovereignty the individual Huns and many others conquered by them. barbarian tribes and put them at the service of their political goals. In foreign policy he demonstrated amazing insight and prudence, skillfully combining strength and cunning. His conduct of military campaigns reveals in him considerable talent as a strategist. Statesmen Rome, he seemed to be what he could seem to be - a daring upstart and a gambler. While venturing into large-scale promotions, he never lost sight of the opportunity to at least acquire something. In relations with opponents, he became, as soon as he felt rejection on their part, irreconcilable and arrogant to the point of fanfare. Intractable and wary in negotiations with enemies, he cunningly exploited any of their weaknesses. On the other hand, he could demonstrate his generosity to a defeated enemy, he even knew how to win him over to his side, giving him confidence. The good mutual understanding that existed for many years between him and the leaders of the Ostrogothic tribes is explained by the exceptionally generous and intelligent political position of Attila. In a word, an outstanding personality, which in itself is beyond doubt, but isn’t M. Bouvier-Ajan overdoing it, with obvious pleasure painting how Attila deftly leads both Caesars, western and eastern, by the nose? Of course, Valentinian III and Theodosius II are far from the most glorious characters in Greco-Roman history, but you have to choose the lesser evil. However, let the readers decide.

True, Attila was considered a great man only within his own world, among his kindred nomadic tribes, who lived by robbery, not knowing high demands and not striving for that which would give their lives permanence and more deep meaning. Historical greatness is acquired not only by military successes: an outstanding person must also exert some spiritual influence on those around him.

Attila's contemporary Greeks and Romans, who remained committed to paganism, saw in him an extremely dangerous enemy to be reckoned with, but otherwise despised him as a barbarian, a man who was in every way inferior to them. All authors, not excluding the prudent Greek Priscus, unusually restrained and impartial in his statements, almost always speak of him as a "barbarian." It is known that the Greeks and Romans called everyone barbarians except themselves (and the Greeks also called the Romans), but Attila, in their opinion, concentrated barbarism immeasurably more than any Visigoth or Vandal.

Roman and Greek Christians despised Attila as a non-Christ. They considered him unworthy of God's mercy, and therefore predestined to commit devilish deeds. It is this meaning that is embedded in his nickname "Scourge of God." The nickname of a person always reflects his place in the system of value ideas of society. In the Christian world, focused on the salvation of the soul and the acquisition of eternal bliss, Attila could only be considered an instrument of the Devil.

“The scourge of God” is a terrible definition, but in relation to Attila as a person who, according to contemporaries, did not differ in pathological cruelty and did not persecute according to religious or ethnicity(as did, for example, the king of the Vandals Geiseric or the king of the Goths Eurych), perhaps too harsh. If we consider Attila as the king of the Huns, then he is quite deservedly branded with this nickname. The Huns turned out to be one of the most difficult trials for the peoples of Europe in that era so abundant in terrible disasters. And how did Attila himself relate to this nickname? And in general, did he know that the Christian world placed such a stigma on him? Evidence from sources on this score is quite fabulous and therefore does not seem convincing. Ancient authors liked to embellish their story with deliberately fictitious episodes, fables and anecdotes, which not only entertained the reader, but also worked for the author's concept. The fable about how a certain Christian ascetic threw right in the face of Attila: “The scourge of God!”, And how the leader of the Huns reacted to this, is to some extent plausible, and M. Bouvier-Azhan willingly uses this, forcing the fable to work for own concept. The author's gain is obvious: historical falsification no, thanks to this simple trick, Attila appears even more mysterious and complex personality intriguing the reader.

Ross Laidlaw

Attila, Scourge of God

Margaret, my wife, Kenneth, my son, Ruth, my daughter, Bill, her husband, and their son, William McKinley

To Bill Paget, Dr. Alberto Massimo, Roy Ellis, and Barbara Haley for their invaluable help finding information on the Internet, and to Helen Simpson for excellent editing. Special thanks to my publishers Hugh Andrew (who planted the seed and did everything he could to make it grow) and Nevil Moir for their continued support and encouragement.

History reference

In 376, exactly one hundred years before the end of the Western Roman Empire, something out of the ordinary happened. Whole german nation, the Visigoths, gathered along the banks of the Danube River and sent ambassadors to the Roman emperor Valens with a humble request to receive her, promising that she would behave calmly and supply, if circumstances so required, auxiliary detachments. The Visigoths had a good reason for this: from the east they were suddenly attacked by a terrible tribe of nomadic warriors, the Huns, so cruel and numerous that the Germans fled in fear to the Roman border. The Romans treated the intruders favorably, and everything seemed to go well - the Goths peacefully cultivated the land or were recruited into the legions - but only as long as the merciless exploitation of the Visigoths by corrupt Roman officials (it came to the point that the Goths dying of hunger were forced were selling their sons into slavery in exchange for miserable handouts) did not inspire the proud Germanic tribe to revolt. In August 378, in the vicinity of the Thracian Adrianople, they utterly defeated the huge Roman army of the Eastern Emperor Valens, who met his death on the battlefield (by that time the empire had already been divided into two parts, with capitals in Milan and Constantinople). Rome has not suffered such serious defeats since 216 BC, when the formidable Roman army was completely defeated at Cannae by Hannibal's significantly inferior Carthaginian army.

The tough but diplomatic Theodosius I Flavius, the last great Roman soldier-emperor, managed to rein in the Visigoths. Having made peace with the Goths, he settled them in Moesia as federates. The empire, again, it would seem, having gained strength and tranquility, for some time (in last years reign of Theodosius I) regained its former integrity, but as soon as he died in 395, the young and weak-willed sons of the emperor Honorius and Arcadius again allowed it to be divided into two parts, this time completely (the first began to rule in the west, the second in the east ).

Soft-bodied Honorius was far from the laurels of his deceased father, and the Western Roman Empire plunged into crisis. In 395, the Visigoths, led by Alaric, left Moesia and moved first to the Balkans, and then to Italy, where, starting from 401, they invaded repeatedly. headed an outstanding commander Stilicho (who actually ruled in the West as the guardian of the young emperor Honorius), the Romans managed to defeat the barbarian army of Alaric several times, but he always successfully avoided capture or death, perhaps due to the fact that Stilicho had a certain respect for the leader of the Goths. AT last days In 406 disaster struck. Gathered together Germanic tribes - Vandals, Sueves, Burgundians and others - crossed the frozen Rhine and invaded Gaul, and then settled in Spain. Stilicho, who at that time was hatching grandiose plans to take the Balkans from the Eastern Roman Empire, allowed fatal mistake, not deeming it necessary to go into conflict with the Germans; as a result, he lost power and was executed. The Visigoths again filled Italy; the culmination of their invasion was the sack of Rome in 410, but Alaric did not revel in his triumph for long - a few months later he died a natural death. Soon the Goths left Italy, taking with them Honorius' sister, Galla Placidia, who was captured during the fall of Rome (eventually the Romans ransomed her for half a million measures of grain). Britain, deprived of troops by the usurper, received advice from Honorius to defend herself against the attacks of the Saxons, Picts and Scots (from Ireland) on their own.

The situation, which was so critical for the West, was stabilized and, to some extent, changed by the outstanding Roman general Constantius. His peaceful policy of persuasion resulted in the Visigoths returning to the Roman Empire and settling in a number of imperial provinces. Honorius appreciated the efforts of his general, appointing him co-ruler of the Western Roman Empire in 421 (under the name of Constantius III) and sanctioning his marriage to Placidia, who gave birth to a son, the future emperor Valentinian III, and a daughter, Honoria, whose scandalous relationship with the leader Huns, Attila, led Western empire to a premature end. (Plans to retake Britain had to be put on hold indefinitely.)

Unfortunately, Constantius died just a few months after receiving the imperial dignity. But the great work he did, aimed at ensuring that the Romans and their German "guests" (as the federates were euphemistically called) harmoniously coexisted within the Roman Empire, became the life work of another Roman commander, Flavius ​​Aetius. His task was complicated by a religious problem. By that time, Catholic Christianity had already been recognized as the official religion of the Roman state. The Germans who settled in the empire were also Christians, but considered themselves Aryans. According to their beliefs, God the Son stood in the heavenly hierarchy below God the Father, which completely fit into the traditions of the German paternalistic society. In the eyes of the Romans, this fact turned the Visigoths into heretics who had crossed all the boundaries of decency.

In the year 423 from the birth of Christ - namely, from this time our narrative begins - Honorius died without leaving any offspring, which immediately created a vacuum of power. Eastern Emperor, Theodosius II, son of Arcadius, renounced claims to the western throne in favor of the next legitimate heir, Valentinian, the minor son of Constantius III and Galla Placidia (the empress and her young son were visiting Theodosius in Constantinople at that time). Meanwhile, all power in the West was usurped by John, who proclaimed herself emperor in Ravenna, then the capital of the Western Roman Empire. Immediately, an expedition was sent from Constantinople to Ravenna (among others, it included Placidia and Valentinian), whose task was to depose John. With pleas for help, the usurper turned to Aetius. Wanting to prevent Placidia's rise to power as Valentinian's regent—which he thought would be disastrous for the West—Aetius agreed to give John his support. With a huge army gathered on the other side of the Danube, the bulk of which were his friends and allies, the Huns (among them he lived as a hostage in his childhood), Aetius went to Italy. In recent spring days In the fateful year 425, the two armies came face to face at Ravenna.