Mazepa, Ivan Stepanovich - Hetman of Little Russia. Came from Belaya Tserkovskaya ( Kyiv province) Orthodox nobility.
The exact year of his birth is unknown (1629, 1633, 1639, 1644). Mazepa was brought up at the court of the Polish king Jan-Kazimir and was on the list of "resting nobles" (a kind of chamber junkers). They think that Mazepa's unsuccessful assignment in 1663 to Hetman Tetera interrupted his court career. In 1665, after the death of his father Adam-Stepan Mazepa, Mazepa received the title of Chernihiv sub-chalice. By this time, his love affairs with Falbovskaya and Zagorovskaya are also attributed, with which some associate Mazepa's transition to the Cossacks. Subsequently, Mazepa married the widow of the White Church Colonel Fridrikovich. Whether Mazepa had children from this marriage is unknown. Going to the Cossacks, Mazepa entered the service of Hetman Doroshenko and rose to the rank of general clerk. When Mazepa saw that Doroshenko's case was lost, he went over to Samoilovich's side and became close to him. There is news that Mazepa was the teacher of Samoilovich's children. Under Samoilovich, Mazepa became the general captain. Mazepa's participation in the intrigues and denunciation of Samoilovich has not been proven. After the overthrow of Samoylovich at the Kolomatska Rada in 1687, Mazepa was elected hetman. He owed his election to the bribery of Prince V.V. Golitsyn and generous promises given to the foreman. Mazepa rewarded the latter with the distribution of estates and colonel and other posts. As a hetman-administrator, Mazepa did not stand out in any way. It rose up against him popular uprising in 1692, under the command of Petrik Mazepa, they managed to pacify him. Mazepa relied on the foreman, generously distributed estates to her; the rights of peasants under Mazepa were interpreted in a restrictive sense. Mazepa also patronized the clergy, churches and monasteries. Mazepa's relationship with Moscow was for a long time quite correct. A trip to Moscow, a meeting with Peter in Kyiv, unquestioning execution of the orders of Peter I - everything gave the latter reason to consider Mazepa among the people devoted to himself. Mazepa knew how to use his position and remove dangerous and popular people from the road. So, he ensured that the organizer of the Cossacks on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Belaya Tserkov colonel Semyon Paly, who was very popular, was exiled to Tomsk. It is believed that the first thought about treason came to Mazepa in 1705, when he discussed it with the widow Princess Dolskaya, nee Vishnevetskaya. Later, Mazepa negotiated with her and with Polish king Stanislav Leshchinsky, and in October 1707 it opened to its general clerk Philip Orlyk. The negotiations were conducted in secret, and their content remains unknown. All the way last moment Mazepa managed to keep Peter's trust. Denunciations of Mazepa were repeatedly sent to Peter from Ukraine. He ignored them. In the spring of 1708, a denunciation of Mazepa was sent through his relative, Colonel Iskra, Judge General Vasily Kochubey. Kochubey was annoyed with the hetman for Mazepa's romantic relationship with Kochubey's daughter (new data on this in the book by F.M. Umanets and in "Notes" by A.M. Lazarevsky). Peter gave the scammers into the hands of Mazepa, and they were executed. The story that Mazepa called Karl to Ukraine has no solid grounds. So far, nothing is known about Mazepa's negotiations with Karl himself. The movement of Karl to Ukraine for Mazepa was, apparently, unexpected. When the Swedish king entered the territory of Ukraine, Mazepa with some colonels transferred to his side. What agreement was reached between them is unknown. From the later acts, one can conclude that Ukraine had to remain free, preserve the integrity of its borders and the inviolability of its privileges. Having received the news of Mazepa's betrayal, Peter immediately ordered the election of a hetman. Ivan Skoropadsky was elected hetman. Mazepa was anathematized. With the Battle of Poltava, Mazepa's cause was lost. He fled with Karl and died on March 18, 1710 in Bendery. His body was transported to Galati and buried in the monastery of St. George. Some of the historians consider Mazepa's transfer to the side of Sweden to be an accidental fact, a matter of Mazepa's selfish aspirations. But in recent times another point of view has also been put forward. The union of Ukraine with Sweden has been brewing and prepared for a long time, and
Mazepa's step was not only an egoist's step, but a political step, calculated only incorrectly, and therefore not successful. The personality of Mazepa was of interest to many writers and poets, such as Pushkin, Byron, Gottshall, Slovak. Their poetic images are very far, however, from historical reality.
Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa is a famous Ukrainian hetman, commander and politician. He is known primarily for the fact that more than others he tried to unite under his command both the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine. For a long time he was considered the best friend of Peter I. But because of his betrayal, he lost not only his former trust, but also his good name.
Pedigree and early years
The roots of Ivan Mazepa stretch to the famous gentry family. His great-grandfather Nikolai Koledinsky served at the court of King Sigismund II. For his services, he received as a gift a whole farm near Kyiv. Later, the great-grandfather changed his surname to Mazepa, and the village given to him was renamed Mazepintsy.
It was here that Ivan Mazepa was born on March 20, 1639. The biography of the future hetman tells us that Stepan Mazepa, an associate of Bohdan Khmelnitsky himself, was his own father. The boy's mother, Marina Mokievskaya, also came from a noble family: her father and brother were foremen in Zaporozhye.
Youth and training at the court of the king
Ivan Mazepa received his first education at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium. Further, thanks to the efforts of his father, he entered the Jesuit Collegium in Warsaw. It should be noted that the boy's pedigree allowed him to stay at the court of the Polish king Jan Casimir, as a nobleman.
Using his father's money, Ivan Mazepa acquired new knowledge and skills day by day. At the same time, he studied not only with Polish teachers, but also quite often went abroad. By his age, the young man knew more than six foreign languages. In addition, Mazepa read hundreds of books on history, military affairs, economics and philosophy.
However, despite his education, the future hetman often followed his emotions. This repeatedly put him at a disadvantage. Once he even slandered his friend before the king just because he spoke badly about him. Subsequently, the lies of Ivan Mazepa surfaced, and his reputation suffered greatly.
Start of military service
In 1663, the Polish king Jan Casimir set out on a military campaign against Ukraine. For Ivan Mazepa, this was a turning point, as he had to decide which side he would stay on. Having gone through all the pros and cons in his head, the young man joined Ukrainian army hetman Petro Doroshenko.
Here the young Cossack quickly rose in the ranks. This was due to the fact that father Doroshenko served for many years in a row. In 1669, Ivan Mazepa achieved the rank of captain, and then became the chief clerk altogether. Thus, from a Polish nobleman, the young man turned into a real Ukrainian Cossack.
However, in 1674, another twist of fate awaited Mazepa. By order of the hetman, he is sent as a diplomat to the Crimean Khanate. The main goal of the campaign was to establish a military alliance with the Turks. But on the way, their detachment stumbles upon an ambush of the left-bank Cossacks and eventually loses the battle to them. Ivan Mazepa himself is captured and miraculously escapes the death penalty.
From prisoner to hetman
Mazepa survived only thanks to his education. Being interrogated by the left-bank hetman Ivan Samoylovich, he demonstrates extraordinary intelligence and knowledge. Impressed by such erudition, the leader of the Cossacks entrusts the captive with the upbringing of his own children. Subsequently, Ivan Mazepa not only earns freedom, but also goes over to the side of former enemies as a captain.
Being on business trips, he meets Prince Vasily Golitsyn. Soon a fleeting meeting develops into friendship. And it was thanks to the influence of his comrade that in 1687 Ivan Mazepa achieved the post of hetman at the Rada near Kolomak. It should be noted that the opinions of historians regarding the relationship between Mazepa and Golitsyn differ greatly: some believe that the prince helped the Cossack for good reasons, while others argue that the reason for everything is a solid bribe from the hands of the captain.
For the benefit of the Russian Empire
The reign of Hetman Ivan Mazepa was aimed at strengthening friendship with Russia. In addition, the Ukrainian voivode counted on the fact that the coming to power of Peter I in 1689 would be favorable for Little Russia. To do this, he tried with all his might to get the favor of the new emperor.
And Mazepa did it quite well. In peaceful hours, the hetman gave good advice to Peter I, and in dashing times he acted as his punishing hand. So, it was the army of the left-bank Cossacks that strangled the Petrik uprising, which raged for more than five years on the territory of Ukraine. In addition, Ivan Mazepa took part in military campaigns against Azov, undertaken by Peter I in 1695.
Ultimately, this commitment led to Russian tsar began to perceive the Ukrainian hetman as his best friend. He even awarded the Cossack with the honorary title of the second holder of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. Moreover, by decree of the ruler of the Russian Empire, Ivan Mazepa became the hetman of both sides of the Dnieper.
Beginning of the Northern War
The Northern War began in 1700. The aggressor in it was Sweden, led by Charles XII. The main goal of the Swedes was to seize the Baltic lands, which was not part of Russia's plans. In this difficult battle, Ivan Mazepa took the side of Peter I. He swore to him that he would not let the enemy into the lands of Little Russia.
However, soon the Northern War sowed discord not only between the Swedes and Russians, but also between the tsar and the hetman. During the war years, Peter I severely curtailed the freedom of Ukrainian military leaders, which affected the authority of Mazepa. In particular, in 1704 the Cossack army could easily capture Polish part Ukraine and join it to Russia, but the sovereign forbade doing this. Because of this order, the hetman held a grudge against his friend, as he did not allow him to unite the country.
The betrayal of Ivan Mazepa
Today there are many versions about when exactly the hetman began to build a plan of betrayal. However, most likely, this happened in 1706. After all, it was during that period that the Swedish troops won the greatest number of victories. Then many believed that the army of Charles XII was invincible.
Since 1707, Ivan Mazepa has been in active correspondence with the vassals of the Swedish king. In it, he discusses a plan for a future attack. Even then, those close to Peter I warned that the hetman was ready to betray him. But because of his friendship, the king could not believe these words. Until the last day, he hoped that Mazepa would remain faithful to him.
And only in the autumn of 1708 did the whole world see true face Ukrainian governor. From that moment on, the leader of the Cossacks began to act openly. He fully supported the Swedish troops: he gave them provisions, acted with them under the same banner and destroyed everyone who opposed the new government. And the final stage of their union was that in April 1709 they signed a formal agreement, according to which, after the victory of Sweden, Little Russia receives full autonomy.
But their plans did not come true. June 27, 1709 Russian army inflicts a stunning blow to enemies near Poltava. After him, the Swedish army quickly loses its positions, and Charles XII is forced to retreat to his homeland in a hurry. As for Ivan Mazepa, he is also fleeing the country. becomes his new home Ottoman Empire. However, due to great mental shock, the hetman begins to wither before his eyes, and on September 22, 1709 he dies in the city of Bender.
Finally
Today you can tell a lot about what kind of person Ivan Mazepa was. The history of his life is a series of dizzying changes. Most of them could have killed the Ukrainian, but in the end they only hardened him. And all because Mazepa knew how to bribe people with his charisma. It was this gift that made him a hetman Left-bank Ukraine.
However, the inconstancy of the governor played with him bad joke. Being confident that all his decisions are correct, he completely forgot about honor. He betrayed many people in order to achieve his own goals and ambitions. This is what eventually led to his failure. And being on the edge, Ivan Mazepa turned into an outcast. Everyone hated him: his own people, loyal allies, the Orthodox Church, and even the man who believed in their friendship for a long time.
Ministry of Science and Education of Ukraine
Sevastopol National Technical University
Department of Philosophy and social sciences
abstract
theme: "Hetman Ivan Mazepa"
Student of MO-12d group, Faculty of Economics and Management
Polkovnikov Yuri Vladimirovich
Head: associate professor Firov Petr Timofeevich
Sevastopol
Introduction.
I. I. Mazepa as a personality. Path to power.
II. Domestic policy of hetman I. Mazepa. His relationship with the Zaporozhian Sich.
III. The activities of I. Mazepa during the years of the Northern War (1700 - 1709).
IV. Hetman I. Mazepa - a traitor or a fighter for national liberation?
Conclusion.
Introduction.
The topic of the essay interested me in that the main figure, the figure of Ivan Mazepa, is one of the most mysterious in Ukrainian history, which inspired me a lot and directed me to detailed study personality of Ivan Mazepa and the atmosphere surrounding him. The Hetman was loved and hated, respected and feared, valued and feared, glorified and condemned both during his reign in Ukraine and later, in subsequent centuries. This continues to this day.
The personality of I. Mazepa was of interest to many writers and poets, however, their poetic images are often far from historical reality. He was different, but in general - the son of his class and his time, reflecting in himself all the contradictions of his era. He came to us from his time with the stigma of a traitor and anathematized Orthodox Church, "damned Mazepa", as the Ukrainian people themselves called him. Our time has reversed its sign. No longer a traitor and a miserable fugitive who ingloriously ended his days at depth, but a hero Ukrainian people, a fighter for the unity of the Ukrainian land, its defender, who gave his life for the freedom of his people and for the dream of "a great independent independent Ukrainian state."
My task is to analyze and compare all the facts surrounding this mysterious person. And on the basis of this, draw your own conclusions. To understand why he went to betrayal and what he sacrificed, and for what all this.
I . Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa as a personality. Path to power.
I. Mazepa was born in 1639 in the Kiev region, in the family of a Ukrainian gentry. He received an excellent education - first at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, he was an artillery specialist, so he spoke several languages, wrote poetry, and owned musical instruments. He was simply a very talented person. Being in the service at the court of the king of the Commonwealth, Jan Casimir in 1659 - 1663, he carried out important diplomatic assignments in France, Italy, Germany, and Spain. He spent his youth at the Polish court as a page: later he was used for diplomatic missions in Ukraine. In the 1660s he retired from court service, presumably as a result of a publicized romantic adventure.
In 1669, having returned to the Right Bank, I. Mazepa entered the service of the Hetman of the Right Bank of Ukraine, Doroshenko. However, his very first diplomatic mission here ends with the fact that he is captured by the Cossacks, who extradite him to the left-bank hetman Samoylovich. Mazepa was in mortal danger, but, being a subtle politician, he emerged victorious from this situation. Having conquered Samoylovich with his impeccable manners and diplomatic experience, he became a confidant of the left-bank hetman. The same qualities soon helped Mazepa to establish close ties with high-ranking tsarist officials. I. Samoilovich, knowing Mazepa since the time of negotiations for the annexation of the Right Bank to the Left Bank, brought him closer to himself, repeatedly instructed his nominee important diplomatic missions to Moscow. A few years later, a talented right-banker becomes the chief captain.
In 1687, after the unsuccessful First Crimean campaign, thanks to the actions of the opposition foreman, who wanted the redistribution of governments and the new hetman Vasily Borkovsky, Ivan Samoylovich was removed. He was replaced by none other than Mazepa with the support of Russian nobles. The absurd legend that V. Borkovsky allegedly lent Mazepa 10 thousand rubles to bribe V. Golitsin is far from the truth, if only because the general convoy hardly had such an amount, because. his annual income was only 200 rubles.
The new hetman, like his predecessor, was a very dubious acquisition for the Hetmanate in its then very serious position. A capable and ambitious man, but too evasive and cautious, a bureaucrat and diplomat by temperament and conception, he was not well suited for an independent, responsible role of ruler.
Arrived in August 1689. on a visit to Moscow, Mazepa prudently avoided participating in the conspiracy of Princess Sophia against Peter I, while strengthening his power, the hetman made the main bet on the foreman, the gentry, and the clergy. He handed over thousands of peasants of free military villages to his supporters, but he also forbade the transfer of Cossacks to the Commonwealth class. Mazepa himself owned more than 120,000 peasants, mostly in the ranks.
Mazepa's policy was no different from the traditional policy of the left-bank hetmans.
In order to establish himself in office and gain the confidence of Moscow, Mazepa, during the 21 years of his hetmanship, impeccably carried out all the instructions and orders of Tsar Peter I: he participated in the Crimean and Azov military campaigns, fought against Poland and Sweden, suppressed the uprisings of I. Bolotnikov, S. Paliy, P. Ivanenko in Russia and Ukraine. By his actions, Mazepa impressed Peter I, and the tsar made him one of the first holders of the newly established Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. To please Peter, the Polish King Augustus sent Mazepa his Order of the White Eagle. Thanks to constant gifts from the tsar, the hetman acquired more than 20,000 estates.
II .Domestic policy of Hetman I. Mazepa. His relationship with the Zaporozhian Sich.
In internal relations the new hetman at the outset quite clearly outlined his political course bloody repressions, which were pacified by riots against the foreman, which broke through during the overthrow of Samoylovich, and were restored, according to a modern chronicler, "silence and fearless people there meshkane." With the hetman's force and power, Mazepa, like his predecessor, supported with all his energy the prestige of the foreman and her claims in relation to the "subject" population and helped the foreman to consolidate into a close-knit hereditary privileged class. In this regard, the reign of Mazepa was, as in foreign policy, a direct and continuous continuation of the reign of Samoilovich.
As if, in order to dispel prejudice against his person, as a stupid person, Mazepa from the very first years of his reign, with unprecedented energy and generosity, creates a number of luxurious and majestic buildings for his time. A zealous champion of Orthodoxy, Mazepa built many churches throughout the Hetmanate, designed in that ornate style, which is sometimes called the Cossack, or Mazepa, baroque. With his own funds, new buildings of the Kyiv Academy were erected, and the number of its students reached 2 thousand under him. In addition, he founded many new schools and printing houses, "so that the Ukrainian youth to the fullest extent of their capabilities enjoy the benefits of education." All these generous sacrifices and the magnificent praises and panegyrics they evoked were unable to reconcile the lower strata of the Ukrainian population with the policy of the Hetman's government, which made itself felt so tangibly by precisely every "mob" of Cossacks and non-Cossacks.
Distant uninterrupted annual campaigns in wars that did not affect the interests of Ukraine at all and were completely new to Ukraine. His servility to the feudal desires of the elders extremely armed the people against him. All the unattractive situation of Peter's soldiery aroused strong displeasure in Ukraine not only against the Moscow government, but also against its zealous henchman, the hetman.
Denunciations of Mazepa, starting from the first years of his hetmanship, almost did not stop during the entire period of his reign. A characteristic symptom of the attitude of the people towards him is the agitation of the last Ukrainian demagogue, Petrik Ivanenko. Peter I himself did not believe, and their authors in Moscow or in Baturin were subjected to terrible torture, were executed.
Mazepa gave a powerful impetus to the elders' elitism, and the further he went on, the more he turned against himself the ordinary Cossacks of the Hetmanate, as well as the principled Cossacks. In 1692 Ukraine was already on the verge of a social explosion when the clerk Petro Ivanenko-Petryk fled to the Sich to raise an uprising against the hetman there.
The Sich, both under Samoilovich and under Mazepa at the end of the 17th century, was hostile to the hetman and foremen's rule and to the Moscow government, on which he relied new system. Koshevoy, a Zaporizhzhya Husak, complained in letters to Mazepa that now in the Hetmanate it became worse for poor people than under the Poles, because whoever doesn’t need it got subjects for himself, so that they would carry hay and firewood, heat stoves, clean stables ( exactly the same complaints that were heard against the Polish regime before the Khmelnitsky uprising).
Petrik, knowing the mood of Zaporozhye, hoped to raise the Cossacks and, in addition, to receive help from the Crimean Khan. Khan recognized Petrik as Ukrainian hetman and promised help for the liberation of Ukraine, so that the principality of Kiev and Chernigov with the entire Zaporizhian army and the Little Russian people, with Slobozhanshchina and the Right Bank, would become separate state; Crimea will protect him from enemies, and for this the Cossacks will not prevent the Crimeans from attacking Moscow lands.
Petryk said to the Zaporozhians: “I stand for the Commonwealth people, for the poor and simple – B. Khmelnytsky freed the Little Russian people from Lyadsky captivity, and I want to free him from new captivity: from Muscovites and his lords.” He promised that the entire Ukrainian people would rise from him.
From these news about Petryk, gossip spread throughout Ukraine, seriously alarming the hetman and the foreman. The people boasted: when Petrik comes with the Zaporizhian army, we will land on him, beat the foreman, the tenants and do it in the old way, so that everyone is Cossacks, and there are no lords. Mazepa was worried, asked to send Moscow army, because he fears that if he moves himself, an uprising will begin. But the fears were not justified. The Cossacks did not have great desire go with Petrik to Ukraine; in addition, the idea of becoming allies of the Crimeans was abhorrent. In the summer of 1692, Petrik received help from the khan and went with the Tatars to Ukraine. He also invited the Cossacks to go to the liberation of Ukraine from Moscow. But the Sich "comrades" did not join Petrik, they only allowed those who wished to go, and there were not many of them. Appeals of Petrik, sent to the border Ukrainian cities, also had no effect: the hetman's troops were already on the border, and when the population saw how weak forces goes against them Petrik, it did not dare to rise. Petrik was forced to return from the very frontier, and after this unsuccessful start, faith in the possibility of an uprising among the people fell even more. In 1693 and 1696, Petrik again made attempts to raise Ukraine, but he had only Tatars with him. And in last trip he was killed by a Cossack in order to receive the reward promised by Mazepa for the head of Petrik - a thousand rubles.
However, threats continued to be heard from the Sich that the Sich would go to Ukraine to beat the lords and tenants, and Mazepa admitted to the tsar that “the Cossacks are not so terrible as the whole Ukrainian Commonwealth people”, all imbued with a masterful spirit, not wanting to be under the hetman’s power and every minute ready to go to the Cossacks.
The population also left for the Dnieper to the Paliev Cossacks, who from 1689 began to rise against the neighboring gentry, threatening to "drive the Poles across the Vistula so that their foot would not stop here." The Poles tried to pacify this Cossacks. But Paliy and the other colonels disobeyed, seized the most important Polish fortresses in the area—Nemirov and Bila Tserkva—and seriously intended to fight Poland. And this attracted people who were dissatisfied with the order in the Hetmanate. Mazepa wrote to Moscow: “Both the Cossacks and the Commonwealth are all angry with me, they all shout with one voice: we will completely disappear, the Muscovites will eat us.”
Probably, Mazepa did not look very hopelessly at the state of affairs in Ukraine and believed that with Moscow's help and his companions he could hold on without worrying about the mood of the people. Meanwhile, his faithful service to the Moscow government really imposed unbearable burdens on the Cossacks and the entire Ukrainian people, and because of this, the people not only “fell away the heart for the great sovereign” - as contemporaries said, that is, all trust and disposition towards the Moscow government disappeared, but against the hetman, a faithful servant of the Muscovites, the irritation and anger of the people rose.
The new Moscow government of Tsar Peter resumed the war with Turkey and the Crimea in 1695, and for four years the Cossack army from year to year had to go on campaigns according to the instructions of the tsar, then on Turkish cities, then against the Tatars, and at the same time Ukraine suffered greatly from the Tatar attacks because of this war. But, as it turned out later, it was not the worst. Then it got worse. Having ended the war with Turkey, Tsar Peter joined the war with the Swedes in order to open the way for Moscow to the Baltic Sea.
Summing up in domestic politics Mazepa can be said that he relied on the foreman, a number of laws singled out the Cossacks as a separate class (not the best). Assistance in the strengthening of the foreman, reforms in the field of legal proceedings and taxation testified to the hetman's desire to create a national aristocracy in Ukraine in order to rely on it in the struggle for the full autonomy of Ukraine.
As for Mazepa's relations with the Zaporizhzhya Sich, she was hostile to the hetman and, of course, also to the elders' rule. One gets the feeling that Mazepa himself treated the Sich people as a foreign people. He was only worried that the entire Ukrainian people could at any time go over to the side of the Cossacks.
III .Activity of I. Mazepa during the Great Northern War (1700-1709)
Starting in 1700, the Northern War continued for 21 years. The main opponent of Peter I in this grueling battle for access to the Baltic Sea was his peer, the young Swedish king Charles XII, a gifted commander. Peter demanded unconditional obedience central government, its officials controlled every aspect of people's lives.
Under such conditions, the ancient autonomy of the Hetmanate, whose inviolability was promised to the Ukrainians in 1654 by Peter's father, was also in danger.
During the war, the tsar made unheard of demands on Ukraine. Cossacks - for the first time in their history - had to fight exclusively for the interests of the sovereign. Instead of protecting own land from their original enemies - the Poles, Tatars and Turks, they had to fight the Swedes in distant Livonia, Livonia and Central Poland. During these campaigns, it became absolutely clear that the Cossacks could not cope with the regular European army. The Ukrainian Cossacks suffered serious losses in heavy battles with the well-trained troops of Charles XII, suffered from severe northern climate disease, poor food supply. Since the Cossack units belonged to irregular troops, the loss of personnel (50-60 percent or more) did not worry the command of the Russian armed forces, which also consisted largely of foreigners.
From all sides, the "weeping and groaning" of the Cossacks and the whole people rose, and even the most obedient to Moscow domination people began to declare that this could not go on any longer.
In the summer of 1704, Peter instructed Mazepa to go to the right-bank regions to ruin the magnates who held out Swedish army. At that moment, Mazepa was thinking about taking possession of the Right-Bank Ukraine. But he was afraid that Paliy might turn out to be a dangerous opponent due to his popularity among the Cossacks. Mazepa, having made a cunning move, grabbed Palia.
Thus, Mazepa took possession of the Right-Bank Ukraine. This was the first case where he dared to diverge so sharply from the royal will, but at first this divergence did not cause complications. Mazepa justified himself that as long as the Swedish party remained in power in Poland, the right-bank lands should not be given to the Poles, and the tsar accepted this explanation.
The morale of the Cossack army fell significantly after in 1705 Peter I, in order to better coordinate the actions of his armies, put Russians and German officers.
At the end of 1705, the position of Moscow in Swedish war started to get worse. During this time, the Swedish king put an end to other participants in the war, the Danish and Polish kings. Having defeated the party of King Augustus in Poland, he achieved the election of his protege, and forced Augustus to renounce the Polish crown (1706), and so Peter alone against this terrible enemy, who gained the glory of an invincible warrior.
When the threat of occupation by the troops of Stanislav Leshchinsky (a Polish ally of Charles XII) hung over Ukraine, Mazepa turned to Peter for help. But the king, who at that time was expecting the attack of the Swedes, replied: "I will not give even ten soldiers. Defend yourself, as you know."
By breaking the tsar's promise to defend Ukraine from the hated Poles—a promise that formed the very basis of the agreement of 1654—Peter I thus freed the Ukrainian hetman from his obligations.
Until 1708, I. Mazepa rejected all the proposals of the supporters of the bloc with the Commonwealth, as well as the intentions of S. Leshchinsky to push Ukraine towards Swedish patronage. Moreover, he, as a rule, reported them to Peter I, who, largely for this reason, did not believe the denunciations of the hetman, which reported I. Mazepa's intention to change Russian crown(there were about twenty of them).
Anxiously following the successes of Charles, Mazepa had already provided for himself from two sides for quite a long time: continuing to lead the line of a faithful Moscow servant, he maintained relations with the Swedish party through his acquaintances, and through them in 1707 he started negotiations with the new Polish king, appointed by Charles. Mazepa conducted these negotiations in great secrecy. Peter didn't suspect anything.
In the spring of 1708, military judge Kochubey, irritated with Mazepa for romantic story with his daughter, sent with his relative, Colonel Iskra, a denunciation to the tsar and revealed Mazepa's relations with the Swedish party; but the tsar did not believe the denunciation and betrayed Kochubey and Iskra to the military court, and he condemned them to death. All this did not bring great benefit Mazepa's plans.
King Charles XII of Sweden, after victories in Poland, which was an ally of Russia in the Northern War, decided to turn the main forces to Moscow. In the summer of 1708, a 50,000-strong army of Swedes launched an offensive against Moscow through Belarus. The army of Peter, not speaking out in a decisive battle, continuously smashed, separate detachments Swedes, causing significant damage to the enemy. The resistance to the enemy was local population. It abandoned its dwellings, stole livestock, hid or destroyed food, destroyed bridges, and so on.
In such circumstances, Charles XII in the early autumn of 1708 was forced to abandon the offensive against Moscow, through Belarus and turn his army to Ukraine. He was also prompted to this decision by the fact that he was counting on help from Hetman Mazepa, with whom he had already conducted secret negotiations. The essence of the negotiations was to unite the forces of Sweden and Ukraine in the fight against Russia and the creation of an independent Ukraine. Karl also hoped to provide his troops in Ukraine materially and strengthen them at the expense of the Cossack regiments.
The logic of the hetman’s thoughts and the part of the elders opposed to Peter I, apparently, was as follows: if tsarism had won in the Swedish-Russian war, the Ukrainian lands (from the summer of 1704 to the beginning of 1708 the Right Bank was actually under the rule of I. Mazepa) could be divided between Russia and its ally the Polish king August II. In the event of the victory of Sweden, on the side of which the pretender to the throne of the Commonwealth S. Leshchinsky acted, Ukraine could become part of Poland. Not later than the summer of 1707, I. Mazepa began to get stronger the idea of leaving the Moscow patronage and moving to the camp of Charles XII.
In October 1708, when Charles XII deviated from the direct route to Moscow and turned his troops to Ukraine, Mazepa, quite openly, hoping first of all to save his country from devastation, went over to the side of the Swedes. He was followed by 3 thousand Cossacks and many prominent foremen.
This step was largely due to the fact that the hetman and a part of the Cossack foreman from the very beginning of the Northern War were convinced that the tsarist government did not take into account the interests of Ukraine and pursued a course aimed at eliminating the political autonomy of Ukrainian lands. Under these conditions, they were looking for a way out in order to preserve the statehood of Ukraine and their power. Ultimately, Mazepa came up with a plan to liberate Ukrainian lands from Russian rule with the help of the Swedes.
Similar relationships were characteristic of that time in Europe. If the suzerain did not fulfill his obligations towards the vassal, then the latter left his patron-suzerain and passed under the protection of another.
In 1708, Mazepa signed an agreement with Charles XII, which stated the following: 1) the Swedish king was obliged to protect Ukraine, which was to become an independent power with the title of principality; 2) the territory of independent Ukraine was to be the Ukrainian lands conquered from Russia; 3) the hetman and all classes of Ukrainian society retained their rights; 4) Mazepa was recognized as the lifelong ruler of Ukraine, and after his death the general council had the right to elect a new hetman; 5) for the duration of the war, the following cities were transferred to the Swedes: Poltava, Gadyach, Baturin, etc.
During the campaign, Mazepa addressed the people of Ukraine with an appeal. The essence of the call:
The continuation of the war will have a negative impact on the situation in Ukraine. If Sweden wins, then Ukraine can be returned to Poland. If Peter I wins, he will finally eliminate the autonomy of Ukrainian territories.
In the current situation, it will be beneficial for Ukraine to avoid a battle. This is possible if the Cossacks stop supporting the tsar and go over to the side of the Swedes, but it is not necessary to fight on their side. This transition will force Peter I to go to peace talks.
If peace is signed, Ukraine will be able to achieve independence, which Sweden recognizes and Germany and France are ready to support.
Mazepa emphasized that he was not looking for any personal benefit in this. Most of the Cossacks did not understand Mazepa's plans, left the hetman and went to join the army of Peter I. Several thousand people remained with the hetman.
In October 1708, Mazepa, the general foreman, 7 out of 12 colonels and 4 thousand Cossacks moved to the camp of the Swedes.
Peter I, of course, was very surprised and in response, in a manifesto to the Ukrainian people, he accused Mazepa of betrayal, allegedly in his intention to return Ukraine under the rule of Poland. At the same time, the tsar called on the population of Ukraine to fight against the Swedish interventionists. A few days later, the commander of Russian troops in Ukraine, Prince Menshikov, attacked the hetman's capital of Baturyn and massacred all 6,000 of its inhabitants, including women and children. Rumors of the Baturyn massacre and a campaign of terror staged by Russian troops throughout Ukraine (on the slightest suspicion of sympathy for the "rebel" anyone could be arrested and executed) changed the plans of many alleged supporters of Mazepa. Meanwhile, Peter I ordered that foreman who did not follow Mazepa to elect a new hetman, and on November 11, 1708, I. Skoropadsky became the hetman.
One way or another, many Ukrainians did not follow Mazepa. The terrible fate of Baturin frightened them. large sole power, which immediately and unconditionally went over to the side of the hetman, oddly enough, were the Cossacks: the hated elitist Mazepa still seemed to them a lesser evil than an even more hated tsar. And they paid dearly for their decision. In May 1709, Russian troops destroyed the Sich. The tsar issued a permanent decree: every Cossack caught was to be executed on the spot. Part of the Sich survived by founding the New Sich, in the Oleshki tract, controlled by the Crimean Khanate.
The clergy anathematized Mazepa, following the instructions of Peter I. All these measures of the tsarist government were aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian separatism and final conquest population of Ukraine.
The hopes of Charles XII to give rest to his troops in Ukraine, to provide them with everything necessary and to strengthen them with Cossack troops, did not come true. The bulk of the Cossacks, peasants and philistines did not understand and did not support Mazepa's intentions. Moreover, they started guerrilla war against the Swedes, together with Russian troops defended cities and villages.
In the spring of 1709, Charles XII decided to launch an offensive against Moscow through Kharkov and Kursk. Poltava became a serious obstacle on this path. The Battle of Poltava, one of the most decisive battles in all of European history, was won by Peter I. Having gained access to the Baltic Sea, Russia began to turn into one of the great European powers. As for the Ukrainians, the Battle of Poltava put an end to their attempts to break with Russia. From now on, the complete absorption of the Hetmanate by the growing strength of the Russian Empire became only a matter of time.
The events that took place in the last half of the year destroyed all the hopes of I. Mazepa.
Mazepa and Charles XII with the rest of their troops were forced to flee to Moldavian soil. Here, in Bendery, on September 22, 1709, the seriously ill, 70-year-old Ivan Mazepa, dejected by the misfortunes that befell him towards the end of his life, died.
Thus, the war laid a heavy burden on the shoulders of the working people, was completely alien in its content and goals to the interests of Ukraine, and destroyed its economic potential, especially trade. It can also be said that the numerous reforms carried out by Peter I also had positive influence for the development of the national economy of Ukraine. And the appearance of the Swedes on Ukrainian lands and their defeat near Poltava became a turning point in the Northern War in favor of Russia. At the same time, the Battle of Poltava was a disaster for Mazepa, the collapse of his plans to achieve the independence of Ukraine.
IV .Hetman Ivan Mazepa – a traitor or a fighter for national liberation?
The Russian government used Mazepa's alliance with the Swedish king as a convenient excuse to accelerate the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy, as an excuse for drastic and decisive actions that did not take into account any rights and applicants.
For this, Mazepa's political step was exaggerated as an unprecedented and extraordinary act. But in reality, there was nothing extraordinary, nothing new in this act of Mazepa and his associates. This was just one of the very numerous attempts by Ukrainian autonomists to find support in some external force to break free from the fetters of Moscow centralism. Sweden was among those powers that Ukraine tried to rely on even under Khmelnytsky, only thanks to a long break in this policy, followed by thirty years of loyalty to the Ukrainian foreman of the Hetmanate, the act of Mazepa and his comrades could seem something special.
Representatives of the central government tried, perhaps, to inflate this event, in order, using it, to pronounce the death sentence on the entire old system of the Hetmanate, its autonomy and Cossack self-government, which allegedly discredited itself with the “treason” of Mazepa. In fact, this "treason" discredited only the centralist policy of the government, which endlessly tested the patience of even the most undemanding representatives of the Ukrainian elders and the Ukrainian population in general. In more deep reasons and there was no shortage of immediate motives for Mazepa's act.
Basically, what is cheating? The dictionary of ethics gives a definition - this is a violation of the oath, loyalty to class and national interests, going over to the side of the enemy, issuing comrades-in-arms to him. You can go on and on, but I don't think it makes sense. And it is so obvious that Mazepa had no such plans, and he was thinking about something completely different.
The Hetman of Ukraine dreamed of liberating his land from tsarist despotism and was looking for allies for this. The Ukrainian people, which for half a century "cave" under tsarism, also waited for liberation and more than once rebelled against their robbers, first the Polish, then the tsarist feudal lords. Mazepa, by his actions, did not violate the class and national interests of the Ukrainian people, although he could not defend them. Mazepa was convinced that, as part of the Russian Empire, Ukraine would not return, would not renew its autonomy, would lose its language and values. national culture, and the Ukrainian people will eventually be Russified.
This is what prompted the hetman to conclude an agreement with the Swedes. Let's not interpret his retreat from Tsar Peter I, the strangler of the Ukrainian people, as treason.
Tsar Peter, continuing the policy of his predecessors, enslaved Ukraine more and more, robbed the Cossacks, which was the reason for Mazepa's decision to join Charles XII, together with the Swedish troops to oppose tsarist Russia.
Thus, we can say that Mazepa is not a traitor and not a selfish person, but a man who followed the voice of the people, gave everything, like his like-minded people, for the “bright ideal national independence».
When Mazepa died, the idea of creating a Ukrainian, independent state also died with him. The performance of the Mazepovites showed Muscovy that Ukraine is not a province where governors can rule. This is the Cossack region. And here they respect freedom, traditions, they take up arms, if they are ignored, human rights are destroyed.
Conclusion.
Mazepa is a talented person and a subtle politician. None of the hetmans did as much as Mazepa to develop the culture and spirituality of the Ukrainian people. The desire of the hetman to wrest Ukraine from under the yoke of Moscow, to realize the great idea of independence, independence Ukrainian state, was not crowned with success, but throughout those centuries this desire, the idea lingered in the hearts of the best sons of the Ukrainian people.
The roots of modern independent Ukraine lie entirely in the great idea of Mazepa. The name of Mazepa after his death remained for future generations a symbol of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine.
Mazepa was simply tired of putting up with how Peter I continued the policy of his predecessors, enslaved Ukraine more and more, robbed the Cossacks. And this was precisely the reason for Mazepa's decision to join Charles XII, together with the Swedish troops, to oppose Tsarist Russia.
The tragedy of the hetman was that his plan was not understood and supported by all the Cossacks.
Bibliography:
1. Grushevsky M. Illustrated history of Ukraine. - Kyiv, 1997.
2. Hrushevsky M. Essay on the history of the Ukrainian people. - Kyiv, 1991.
3. Semenko V., Radchenko L. History of Ukraine. - Kharkov, 1999.
4. Subtelny O. Ukraine: history. - Kyiv, 1994.
5. Socks. A course of lectures on the history of Ukraine.
6. Hetmans of Ukraine. - Kyiv, 1991.
1. Plan ………………………………………………………………………………… 2
2. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………..3
3.1.I. Mazepa as a person. The path to power…………………………………………..4
3.2. Domestic policy of Hetman I. Mazepa. Its relationship with the Zaporozhian Sich…………………………………………………………………....5
3.3. Activities of I. Mazepa during the Great Northern War (1700-1709) ……………..9
3.4. Hetman I. Mazepa – a traitor or a fighter for national liberation? ................................................. ........................fourteen
4.Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….....17
5. References …………………………………………………………………...18
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One of the most "argued" figures in Russian-Ukrainian history remains to this day Hetman Mazepa. According to the tradition coming from Peter I, it is considered to be almost a fiend. Another trend has recently appeared - to glorify Mazepa; this is especially characteristic of today's Ukraine, which is looking for historical bonds. Both of these are blatant lies. The famous hetman was not a demon in the flesh. But, undoubtedly, some pathology in behavior Hetman Mazepa in relation to associates can be traced.
Hetman Ivan Mazepa, youth
Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa came from an Orthodox gentry family. He was born in 1639 in the Mazepintsy family estate near the White Church. According to his status, he received an excellent education - first at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, then at the Jesuit Collegium in Warsaw, and later studied in Italy, Holland, France and Germany. Fluent European languages and Latin.
It is known that in his youth, Hetman Mazepa was at the court of the Polish king Jan Casimir, where he was listed among the "resting nobles." The court fate of the young "schismatic" was, of course, unenviable. N. I. Kostomarov writes:
"Peers and comrades of his, courtiers catholic faith, mocking him, teased him to the point that against one of them Mazepa drew his sword in vehemence, and the exposure of weapons in the royal palace was considered a crime worthy of death. But King John Casimir reasoned that Mazepa acted unintentionally, and did not execute him, but only removed him from the court. Mazepa went to his mother's estate, to Volhynia.
Careerist
Whether this incident actually took place, we do not know. The further personal fate of Mazepa developed quite safely and sensibly - until the fatal story with Motreya Kochubey. In 1665, after the death of his father, he received the post of subchaser of Chernigov, in 1668 he married the widow of the White Church colonel Anna Fridkevich, probably not losing sight of the benefits that his father-in-law, the convoy general Semyon Polovets, could bring him in his career. The calculation turned out to be correct. It was under the patronage of Polovtsy that Mazepa entered the inner circle of Hetman Petro Doroshenko and relatively soon rose to the rank of general clerk.
In 1674, Doroshenko sent Mazepa to Constantinople to ask for help from Turkish Sultan(and a few months before that, on his own behalf, Ivan Mazepa was in Pereyaslavl at the Cossack Rada, where he testified about the hetman's desire to go under the hand of the Moscow Tsar; such is the "school of treason").
Mazepa changes tall friends
With a trip to Turetchina, a sharp change in Mazepa's biography is connected. True, he never made it to Constantinople. Kostomarov says:
“The ataman Ivan Sirko caught Mazepa on the road, took Doroshenko’s letters from him and sent the messenger himself to Moscow. Mazepa was taken for interrogation to the Little Russian order, which was then in charge of the famous boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev. Mazepa, with his testimony during interrogation, managed to please the boyar Matveev: he introduced himself as personally disposed towards Russia, tried to justify and shield Doroshenko himself from the Moscow government, was admitted to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and then released from Moscow with draft letters to Doroshenko and to the Chigirinsky Cossacks. Mazepa did not go to Doroshenko, but stayed with Hetman Samoylovich, having received permission to live on east side Dnipro, along with his family. Shortly thereafter, he lost his wife.
He also knew how to gain confidence in Samoylovich. He put him to oversee the upbringing of his sons, and then bestowed the rank of general captain. On behalf of the hetman, Mazepa visited Moscow more than once, where he made a close acquaintance with. Golitsyn, with his polonophilia, could not help but be fascinated by the hetman's educated and courteous envoy in the Polish manner. And it was to him that Mazepa owed his election to hetman. When after an unsuccessful Crimean campaign(of the first) Samoilovich turned out to be “to blame for everything”, Golitsyn arranged for the hetman to be exiled to Siberia and his courteous friend to be promoted to his place. Did Mazepa himself intrigue against Samoilovich, who, to be honest, once did him a favor? Unknown. But he took advantage of the fruits of intrigue. And, as far as one can judge, not without pleasure.
During his next visit to Moscow, Hetman Mazepa discovered changes here. And, easily renouncing the Golitsyn-Sofya party, he charmed the young Peter.
"Mazepa knows love"
Already from these successes of Hetman Mazepa one can conclude something about his character. But on Petra, he seems to have calmed down. However, only until the time.
As for the situation in Little Russia, completely subject to Mazepa, it was very difficult. Mazepa "panic", the people grumbled. Denunciations were constantly drawn up against the hetman. But the king did not have faith in them, relying entirely on his comrade-in-arms. The same one skillfully supported in him the conviction of his own indispensability, constantly emphasizing the slyness and unreliability of the Cossacks. Even Kochubey's denunciation was not dangerous for him.
In fairness, it should be said that anyone would have doubts about the veracity of this denunciation: the enmity between Mazepa and Kochubey was too well known, whose daughter Matryona (in Pushkin's "Poltava" - Maria) fled in 1704 to the hetman "without a crown." The hetman was not averse to getting married, but Motria was his goddaughter. He sent the girl to her parents, but continued to write love letters, where he called her his "heart". It was clear that the disgraced Kochubey would do anything to get revenge. But revenge went sideways to him: in 1708, the former general clerk of the Zaporizhzhya Army, after being tortured, was executed by decapitation.
Hetman Mazepa - Cavalier of the Order of Judas
In 1708, Hetman Mazepa, taking with him the hetman's treasury, fled to Charles XII, who was encamped near Novgorod-Seversky. For Peter I, who was expecting military aid from the hetman, the news of his betrayal was a deafening blow. Until the troops converged in decisive battle, tricks were launched information war. Having brutally ruined the hetman's capital Baturyn with the hands of Menshikov, Peter appointed the election of a new hetman in Hlukhiv. It was publicly announced that:
“John Mazepa betrayed and attached himself to the heretical king of Sweden, he alienated the Little Russian homeland, although he turned the temples of God under the yoke of the work of the Lyadsky slave and the temples of God to the accursed unya”,
Mazepa, in turn, taught Charles XII to spread the rumor that Peter himself was negotiating with Rome about the eradication of the right faith and the planting of “Latinism”. But few believed in it.
In general, the alliance between Mazepa and Karl turned out to be unhappy for both. The people, who had never seen anything good from the hetman, did not follow him. Those few Cossacks that stuck to him quickly came to their senses and came to Peter with repentance. Almost only the most desperate Cossacks remained under the former hetman. But no one could expect good from them. It is known that at dinner in Mazepa's tent (almost in the presence of the king), some of them got so drunk that they began to rob dishes from the table. Someone made a remark to them. And immediately he was stabbed to death.
After Battle of Poltava Mazepa fled with Charles XII to Bender, where he soon died. He no doubt knew that Peter was trying to ransom him from the Ottomans, wanting to put him to shameful execution. He also knew that the silver order of Judas was made especially for him in a single copy ...
State and political figure of Ukraine Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa (Mazepa Koledinsky) was born on the farm of Kamenets (later the village of Mazepintsy) near the White Church (Rzech Commonwealth), in the family of the Ukrainian gentry. The exact year of his birth is unknown (1629, 1633, 1639, 1644). Ivan Mazepa as a child mastered riding and saber skills, studied European sciences, and over time, at the insistence of his mother, he went to study at the Kiev-Mohyla Collegium, which he transformed into an academy during the years of his hetmanship. Later he studied at the Jesuit Collegium in Warsaw.
Later, his father sent Ivan Mazepa to the court of the Polish king Jan II Casimir, where he was among the "resting" nobles. Then, as a talented nobleman, he was sent to Western Europe to complete his education. Holland, France, Germany, Italy expanded the outlook of the young man. He thoroughly studied the basics of fortification, cannon making and other sciences. Ivan Mazepa was a very enlightened person for his time: in addition to Ukrainian, he spoke Russian, Polish, Latin, German and Italian, knew Dutch, French, Tatar, was well versed in philosophy and history, music and poetry, wrote poetry.
In 1665, after the death of his father Adam-Stepan Mazepa, Ivan Mazepa received the position of Chernihiv subchaster. This position was held by his father from 1662 until his death. In 1669 Ivan Mazepa entered the service of the hetman right-bank Ukraine Petro Doroshenko and rose to the rank of general clerk. In 1674, he passed to the hetman of the left-bank Ukraine, Ivan Samoylovich.
In 1682 - 1688 he was General Yesaul, carried out important diplomatic missions.
After an unsuccessful Crimean campaign In 1687, hetman Samoylovich was removed from his post as hetman and exiled to Siberia. With the support of the favorite of Princess Sophia, boyar Vasily Golitsyn, on August 4 (old style July 25), 1687, Ivan Mazepa was elected hetman of the left-bank Ukraine.
Officially, his title was "hetman of the Zaporizhian troops on both sides of the Dnieper". Ivan Mazepa was married to a wealthy Polish widow and was himself one of the largest landowners in Ukraine.
For a long time Ivan Mazepa was one of the closest associates and did a lot for the economic recovery of the Left-bank Ukraine. For numerous services to Russia, Mazepa (the second in the empire) was awarded the highest Russian award- Order of St. Andrew the First-Called.
Ivan Mazepa took part in the campaign of 1705 against King Charles XII of Sweden in support of King Augustus II of Poland, at that time an ally of Peter I. In 1706, Mazepa undertook the strengthening of the Pechersk fortress in Kyiv. In 1707, wanting to tear Ukraine away from Russia, he entered into secret negotiations with Charles XII and the new Polish king Stanislav Leshchinsky. In 1708, Mazepa made an agreement with King Stanislav Leshchinsky, promising Kyiv, Chernigov and Smolensk to Poland; for himself, he wanted to receive the title of prince and the rights to Vitebsk and Polotsk. In October 1708, in Novgorod-Seversky, Mazepa openly joined the enemy of Russia in the Northern War. Swedish king Charles XII. Later, about 3 thousand more went over to the side of Mazepa Zaporozhye Cossacks. In response, Peter I liquidated Mazepa's headquarters, stripped him of all his titles and elected a new hetman, and on November 12, 1708, the Metropolitan of Kyiv declared Mazepa a church anathema. AT next months many of Mazepa's supporters went over to the side of the Russians. Thus, by the time
