The note was filed in February 1914, i.e. before the start of the First World War. This document is the most striking proof of the fact that the Black Hundreds monarchists perfectly understood the essence of the events that took place, saw their causes and guessed the consequences. THE RIGHT WAS RIGHT. But they, unfortunately, were in the minority among the political elite on the eve of the revolution, which as a whole craved change. Many saw the light when they were forced to flee from the country engulfed in flames; there, in a foreign land, they understood what the monarchist Durnovo understood back in 1914. The note is also valuable as a geopolitical treatise by a Russian thinker who develops the idea of ​​a continental bloc, which is characteristic of the Russian tradition of geopolitics. The document was first published in the USSR in the journal Krasnaya Nov (1922, No. 6). Biographical sketch PN Durnovo is given at the end of the text.

THE FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL TURN INTO AN ARMED COLLISION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

The central factor in the period of world history we are living through is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the outcome of which, in all probability, will be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as a great power, sooner or later, will turn out to be impossible. Indeed, on the one hand, the island state, global importance which is based on dominion over the seas, world trade and countless colonies. On the other hand, it is a powerful continental power, whose limited territory is not sufficient for an increased population. Therefore, she directly and openly declared that her future on the seas, with fabulous speed, developed a huge world trade, built, for her protection, a formidable navy and the famous Made in Germany brand created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic well-being of her rival. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and a life-and-death struggle is inevitable between her and Germany. The upcoming armed clash as a result of the noted rivalry can by no means be reduced to single combat between England and Germany. Their strengths are too unequal and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany can provoke an uprising in India, South America, and especially a dangerous uprising in Ireland, paralyze English maritime trade through privateering, and perhaps submarine warfare, and thereby create food difficulties for Great Britain, but, with all the courage of the German military leaders, would they risk landing in England, would Lucky case help them destroy or significantly weaken the English navy. As for England, Germany is completely invulnerable to her. All that is available to her is to seize German colonies, stop German maritime trade, in the most favorable case, defeat the German navy, but that's all, and this cannot force the enemy to peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will try to resort to the means, which she has tried more than once with success, and to decide on armed action in no other way than by securing the participation in the war on her side of the strategically stronger powers. And since Germany, in turn, will undoubtedly not be isolated, the future Anglo-German war will turn into an armed clash between two groups of powers, one German, the other English in orientation.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET ANY REAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY RUSSIA AS A RESULT OF APPROACH WITH ENGLAND

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Russian politics followed neither orientation. Since the reign of Emperor Alexander III Russia was in a defensive alliance with France, so strong that they ensured the joint action of both states in the event of an attack on one of them, but at the same time not so close as to oblige them to support with an armed hand all political actions and harassment of an ally. At the same time, the Russian court supported traditionally friendly, based on family ties, relations with Berlin. Precisely, thanks to this conjuncture, for a number of years the peace between the great powers was not disturbed, despite the abundance of combustible material available in Europe. France was provided with an alliance with Russia from an attack by Germany, the latter by Russia's tested peacefulness and friendship from the desire for revenge on the part of France, Russia by the need for Germany to maintain good neighborly relations with it - from the excessive intrigues of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Finally, isolated England, restrained by rivalry with Russia in Persia, the fears traditional for English diplomacy of our offensive movement against India, and bad relations with France, which were especially evident during the well-known incident with Fashoda, looked with alarm at the strengthening of Germany’s naval power, without daring, however , for active performance.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relationship between the great powers and brought England out of her isolated position. As is known, throughout the Russo-Japanese War, England and America maintained a favorable neutrality towards Japan, while we enjoyed the equally benevolent neutrality of France and Germany. It would seem that there should have been the germ of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy took a sharp turn and definitely took the path of rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British politics, a group of powers was formed triple agreement, with the influence of England prevailing in it, and a clash with the powers grouped around Germany became, sooner or later, inevitable.

What benefits, then, have promised and promise us the abandonment of the traditional policy of distrust towards England and the severance of well-tried, if not friendly, then good-neighbourly relations with Germany?

Somewhat carefully thinking and looking closely at what happened after Treaty of Portsmouth events, it is difficult to grasp any real benefits that we have received as a result of rapprochement with England. The only plus - improved relations with Japan - is hardly a consequence of the Russian-English rapprochement. In essence, Russia and Japan were created in order to live in peace, since there is absolutely nothing to share between them. All of Russia's tasks in the Far East, correctly understood, are fully compatible with Japan's interests. These tasks, in essence, are reduced to very modest limits. The too wide scope of the fantasies of presumptuous performers, which had no basis in the real interests of the state - on the one hand, the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, which mistakenly took these fantasies for a consistently pursued plan, on the other hand, caused a clash that more skillful diplomacy could have avoided. Russia does not need Korea or even Port Arthur. Exit to open sea, is undoubtedly useful, but the sea, in itself, is not a market, but only a way for a more profitable delivery of goods to consuming markets. Meanwhile, in the Far East we do not have and will not have any valuables promising any significant benefits from their vacation abroad. There are no markets there for the export of our works. We cannot count on a wide supply of our exports to either developed, industrially or agriculturally, America, or poor and also industrial Japan, or even maritime China and more distant markets, where our exports would inevitably meet with the goods of industrially stronger powers. competitors.

Remains inland china, with which our trade is predominantly carried out by land. Thus an open port would be more conducive to the importation of foreign goods to us than to the exportation of our domestic products. On the other hand, Japan, no matter what they say, will not covet our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese, by nature, are a southern people, and the harsh conditions of our Far Eastern outskirts cannot seduce them. It is known that in Japan itself, northern Iezo is sparsely populated; apparently, the Japanese colonization of the southern part of Sakhalin, which was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth, was not very successful. Having taken possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go north, and her desires, it must be assumed, will rather be directed towards Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra and Borneo. The most they would perhaps strive for is the acquisition, for purely commercial reasons, of some further sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceful cohabitation, I will say more, close rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the Far East is quite natural, apart from any mediation of England. The ground for an agreement suggests itself. Japan is a poor country, content at the same time strong army and a mighty fleet is difficult for her. Its insular position pushes it onto the path of strengthening its naval power. An alliance with Russia will make it possible to concentrate all one's attention on the fleet, which is so necessary in the context of the already emerging rivalry with America, while protecting one's interests on the Russian mainland. On the other hand, we, having the Japanese fleet at our disposal for the naval defense of our Pacific coast, would have the opportunity to forever abandon the dream that is too much for us to create a navy in the Far East. Thus, in terms of relations with Japan, rapprochement with England did not bring us any real benefit. It did not give us anything in the sense of strengthening our position either in Manchuria, or in Mongolia, or even in the Uryankhai region, where the uncertainty of our situation indicates that the agreement with England, in any case, did not untie the hands of our diplomacy. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with a sharp rebuff from England.

Not for the better, since the agreement, our position in Persia has changed. Everyone remembers our predominant influence in this country under Shah Nasr-Edin, that is, just in the period of the greatest aggravation of our relations with England. Since approaching this latter, we have become involved in whole line incomprehensible attempts to impose a completely unnecessary constitution on the Persian population, and, as a result, they themselves contributed to the overthrow of the monarch devoted to Russia, for the sake of inveterate opponents. In a word, not only did we not gain anything, but, on the contrary, we lost all along the line, destroying both our prestige, and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers who were treacherously killed and, for the sake of England, not even avenged.

But the most negative consequences of rapprochement with England - and consequently of a fundamental divergence from Germany - were felt in the Middle East. As you know, even Bismarck owned the catchphrase that for Germany the Balkan question is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. Subsequently, Balkan complications began to attract incomparably more attention German diplomacy, which took the “sick man” under its protection, but, in any case, even then Germany for a long time did not show an inclination because of the Balkan affairs to risk relations with Russia. The evidence is there. After all, how easy it was for Austria, during the period of the Russo-Japanese war and the turmoil that followed in our country, to fulfill their cherished aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia at that time had not yet connected her fate with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to miss the most advantageous moment for her goals.

As soon as we embarked on the path of close rapprochement with England, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately followed, which could so easily and painlessly be carried out in 1905 or 1906, then the Albanian question arose and the combination with Prince Wied. Russian diplomacy tried to respond to Austrian intrigues by forming a Balkan Union, but this combination, as one might expect, turned out to be completely ephemeral. In theory, directed against Austria, she immediately turned against Turkey and broke up on the division of the booty captured from this last booty. The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which she, not without reason, sees her only patroness. Indeed, the Russian-English rapprochement, obviously, for Turkey is tantamount to England's refusal of its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles for us, and the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of the Balkan Union was a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European state. So, the Anglo-Russian rapprochement has not brought anything really useful for us so far. In the future, it inevitably promises us an armed clash with Germany.

MAIN GROUPINGS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this collision occur and what will be its probable consequences? The main groupings in a future war are obvious: these are Russia, France and England, on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey, on the other.

It is more than likely that other powers will take part in the war, depending on one or another of the conditions under which the war breaks out. But whether a new clash of opposing interests in the Balkans serves as the immediate cause for war, or a colonial incident like that of Aljeziras, the main grouping will remain the same. Italy, with her interests at least correctly understood, will not come out on the side of Germany.

Due to political and economic reasons, it undoubtedly seeks to expand its current territory. This expansion can only be achieved at the expense of Austria on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is natural, therefore, that Italy will not take the side that ensures the territorial integrity of the states through which she would like to fulfill her aspirations. Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of Italy acting on the side of the anti-German coalition, if the lot of the war were inclined in its favor, is not excluded, in the form of securing the most favorable conditions for participation in the subsequent division. In this respect the position of Italy agrees with the probable position of Rumania, which, presumably, will remain neutral until the scales of happiness tip to one side or the other. Then she, guided by healthy political egoism, will join the victors in order to be rewarded either at the expense of Russia or at the expense of Austria. Of the other Balkan states, Serbia and Montenegro will undoubtedly come out on the side opposed to Austria, and Bulgaria and Albania - if by that time they do not form at least an embryonic state - on the side opposed to Serbia. Greece will in all likelihood remain neutral or take sides against Turkey, but only when the outcome is more or less a foregone conclusion.

The participation of other states will be accidental, and Sweden should be feared, it goes without saying in the ranks of our opponents. Under such conditions, the struggle against Germany presents us with enormous difficulties and will require innumerable sacrifices. The war will not take the enemy by surprise and the degree of his readiness will probably exceed our most exaggerated expectations. It must not be thought that this readiness stemmed from Germany's own desire for war. She does not need war, as soon as she could achieve her goal without it - the end of her sole dominion over the seas. But since this vital goal for her meets opposition from the coalition, then Germany will not retreat before the war and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most advantageous moment for herself.

THE MAIN WEIGHT OF THE WAR WILL BE LOOKED BY RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on our lot, since England is hardly capable of taking a broad part in a continental war, and France, poor in human material, with those colossal losses that will accompany war under modern conditions military equipment, is likely to stick to a strictly defensive tactic. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the very thickness of the German defense, will go to us, but meanwhile how many factors will be against us and how much we will have to spend both strength and attention on them.

The Far East should be excluded from among these unfavorable factors. America and Japan, the former in essence, and the latter due to their current political orientation, are both hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on her side. Moreover, the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention to the West, which, of course, meets the Japanese and American interests.

Therefore, our rear from the Far East is sufficiently secured and, at the most, any concessions of an economic nature will be torn from us for benevolent neutrality. Moreover, the possibility of America or Japan appearing on the opposite side of Germany is not ruled out, but, of course, only as invaders of one or another poorly lying German colony. On the other hand, an explosion of hostility against us in Persia is undoubted, possible unrest among Muslims in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the possibility of opposing us, in connection with the latter, Afghanistan, and finally, very unpleasant complications should be foreseen in Poland and Finland. In the latter, an uprising will inevitably break out if Sweden is among our opponents. As for Poland, we must expect that we will not be able to keep it in our hands during the war. And now, when it is in the power of the opponents, they will undoubtedly make an attempt to provoke an uprising, in essence not very dangerous for us, but which, nevertheless, will have to be taken into account among the factors unfavorable for us, especially since the influence of our allies can induce us to take such steps in the field of our relations with Poland that are more dangerous for us than any open uprising.

Are we ready for such a stubborn struggle, which, no doubt, will future war European nations? This question must, without hesitation, be answered in the negative. Less than anyone, I am inclined to deny much that has been done for our defense since the Japanese war. There is no doubt, however, that this much is insufficient given the unprecedented dimensions in which the future war will inevitably take place. To a large extent, our young legislative institutions are to blame for this insufficiency, they took an amateurish interest in our defense, but were far from imbued with the whole seriousness of the political situation that was developing under the influence of the orientation that, with the sympathetic attitude of society, adhered to last years our ministry of foreign affairs.

Evidence of this is the huge number of bills that remain unexamined by the military and naval departments and, in particular, the plan for organizing our national defense that was submitted to the Duma even under Secretary of State Stolypin. Undoubtedly, in the field of troop training, according to experts, we have achieved a significant improvement compared to the time preceding the Japanese war. According to the opinions of the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired: the gun is quite satisfactory, the equipment is convenient and practical. But it is also indisputable that there are significant shortcomings in the organization of our defense.

In this regard, first of all, we must note the insufficiency of our military reserves, which, of course, cannot be blamed on the military department, since the planned procurement plans are far from being fully implemented due to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of firepower is all the more important because, in the rudimentary state of our industry, during the war we will not be able to make up for the shortages at home by domestic means, and meanwhile, with the closure of both the Baltic and Black Seas for us, the import of what we lack items of defense from abroad will prove impossible.

Further, a circumstance unfavorable for our defense is, in general, its excessive dependence on foreign industry, which, in connection with the already noted termination of any convenient foreign communications, will create a number of insurmountable difficulties. The amount of heavy artillery we have, the value of which has been proved by the experience of the Japanese war, is far from sufficient, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defense has hardly been started, and even the Revel fortress protecting the approach to the capital has not yet been completed.

The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways have rolling stock, perhaps sufficient for normal traffic, but not corresponding to the colossal requirements that will be presented to us in the event of European war. Finally, one should not lose sight of the fact that the most cultured, technically advanced nations will fight in the forthcoming war. Every war hitherto has been invariably accompanied by a new word in the field of military technology, and the technical backwardness of our industry does not create favorable conditions for us to assimilate new inventions.

VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA DO NOT COLLISION ANYWHERE

All these factors are hardly taken into due account by our diplomacy, whose behavior, in relation to Germany, is not without, up to to some extent, even some aggressiveness, which could excessively bring the moment of an armed clash with Germany, with an English orientation, in essence inevitable. Is this orientation correct, however, and does even a favorable period of war promise us such benefits that would atone for all the difficulties and sacrifices inevitable in a war that is exceptional in its probable intensity?

vital interests Russia and Germany do not collide anywhere and give full grounds for the peaceful coexistence of these two states. The future of Germany is on the seas, that is, where Russia, essentially the most continental of all the great powers, has no interests. We do not have overseas colonies and probably never will, and communication between various parts empire is easier by land than by sea. We do not feel a surplus of population demanding the expansion of the territory, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznan, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when even with Russian Poles it is not so easy for us to manage. Why revive centrifugal aspirations, which have not died out to this day in the Privislinsky region, by attracting Russian state restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles, whose national demands are not able to drown out and firmer than the Russian, German authorities?

The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly unprofitable for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected dimensions. The obvious goal pursued by our diplomacy in approaching England is the opening of the straits, but it seems that the achievement of this goal hardly requires a war with Germany. After all, England, and not at all Germany, closed the way out of the Black Sea for us. Could it be that by enlisting the assistance of this latter, in 1871 we got rid of the humiliating restrictions imposed on us by England according to Paris Treaty?

And there is every reason to expect that the Germans would more easily than the British agree to grant us the straits, in the fate of which they have little interest and at the cost of which they would willingly buy our alliance.

Moreover, one should not have exaggerated expectations from our occupation of the straits. Acquiring them is beneficial for us only insofar as they close the entrance to the Black Sea, which has become from that time on for us inland sea safe from enemy attacks.

The straits do not give us access to the open sea, since they are followed by a sea, almost entirely consisting of territorial waters, a sea dotted with many islands, where, for example, the English fleet does not have to actually close all entrances and exits for us, regardless of straits. Therefore, Russia could boldly welcome such a combination, which, without transferring the straits directly into our hands, would secure us from the enemy fleet breaking into the Black Sea. Such a combination, quite achievable under favorable circumstances without any kind of war, has also the advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan states, which, not without anxiety and quite understandable jealousy, would react to our seizure of the straits.

In Transcaucasia, as a result of the war, we could expand territorially only at the expense of the regions inhabited by Armenians, which, given the revolutionary nature of modern Armenian sentiments and dreams of a great Armenia, is hardly desirable, and in which, of course, Germany is even less than England, has become would hinder us if we were in alliance with her. Territorial and economic acquisitions that are really useful to us are available only where our aspirations can meet with obstacles from England, and not at all from Germany. Persia, the Pamirs, Ghulja, Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Uryankhai Territory - all these are areas where the interests of Russia and Germany do not clash, and the interests of Russia and England have clashed more than once.

Germany is in exactly the same position in relation to Russia, which, in the event of a successful war, could equally tear away from us only regions of little value to her, which, in terms of their population, are not very suitable for colonization: the Vistula region, with the Polish-Lithuanian , and the Ostsee provinces with a Latvian-Estonian population, equally restless and hostile to the Germans.

IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, RUSSIAN BENEFITS AND NEEDS DO NOT CONTRACT GERMAN

But it may be objected that territorial acquisitions, under the modern conditions of the life of peoples, recede into the background and economic interests come to the fore. However, in this area, Russian benefits and needs hardly contradict German ones as much as it is commonly thought. There is no doubt, of course, that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unfavorable for our agriculture and beneficial for German agriculture, but it is hardly correct to attribute this circumstance to the perfidy and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be overlooked that these treaties, in many of their parts, are beneficial to us. The Russian delegates who had concluded treaties in their time were staunch supporters of the development of Russian industry at any cost and, undoubtedly, consciously sacrificed, at least in part, the interests of Russian agriculture in favor of the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany itself is by no means a direct consumer of the greater part of the goods sold abroad by our agriculture. For most of the products of our agricultural industry, Germany is only an intermediary, and consequently it depends on us and on the consuming markets to enter into direct relations and thereby avoid the costly German mediation. Finally, it must be taken into account that the conditions of trade relations may change depending on the conditions of political cohabitation of the contracting states, since it is not to the advantage of any country that the economic weakening of an ally, but, on the contrary, that the ruin of a political enemy is advantageous. In a word, although there is no doubt that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unprofitable for us and that Germany, when concluding them, used the situation that was favorable for her, that is, she simply pressed us, but this behavior cannot be considered as hostile and is worthy of imitation and with on our side, an act of healthy national egoism, which could not be expected from Germany and which had to be reckoned with. In any case, using the example of Austria-Hungary, we see an agricultural country that is incomparably more economically dependent on Germany than we are, which, however, does not prevent it from achieving such a development in the field of agriculture that we can only dream of.

In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany that is quite acceptable for Russia, it would seem, does not at all require the preliminary defeat of Germany. Good-neighbourly relations with her, a thoughtful weighing of our real economic interests in various sectors of the national economy, and long, stubborn trade with the German delegates, undoubtedly called upon to protect the interests of their own, and not our fatherland, are quite enough. I will say more, the defeat of Germany in the field of our exchange of goods with her would be unprofitable for us.

Its defeat would undoubtedly end in a peace dictated from the point of view of England's economic interests. This latter uses the success that has fallen to its lot to the extreme limits, and then we, in a Germany that has been ruined and lost its sea routes, will only lose a consumer market that is still valuable to us for our products that find no other market.

In relation to the economic future of Germany, the interests of Russia and England are directly opposed to each other.

It is to England's advantage to kill the German maritime trade and industry of Germany, turning her into a poor, if possible, agricultural country. It is to our advantage that Germany should develop her maritime trade and the industry she serves in order to supply the most distant markets of the world, and at the same time open up an internal market for the products of our agriculture in order to supply her numerous working population.

But, regardless of trade agreements, it is usually customary to point to the oppression of German dominance in Russian economic life, and to the systematic introduction of German colonization to us, which supposedly poses a clear danger to the Russian state. It seems, however, that such fears are largely exaggerated. The notorious Drang nach Osten was at one time natural and understandable, since the territory of Germany did not accommodate the increased population, the excess of which was forced out in the direction of least resistance, i.e. to a less densely populated neighboring country.

The German government was forced to reckon with the inevitability of this movement, but itself could hardly recognize it as meeting its own interests. After all, after all, from the sphere German statehood the German people left, thereby reducing the manpower of their country. Of course, the German government, making every effort to keep the migrants connected with their former fatherland, went even to such an original method as the admission of dual citizenship. But there is no doubt, however, that a significant part of the German immigrants nevertheless finally and irrevocably settled in their new place and gradually broke away from their former homeland. This circumstance, clearly not in line with the state interests of Germany, was obviously one of the incentives for her to take the path of colonial policy and maritime trade, which were so alien to her before.

And so, as the German colonies multiply and the development of German industry and maritime trade is closely related to this, the German colonist wave is waning, and the day is not far off when Drang nach Osten will recede into the realm of historical memories. In any case, German colonization, which undoubtedly contradicts our state interests, must be stopped, and in this friendly relations with Germany are not a hindrance to us. To speak in favor of a preference for a German orientation does not mean standing for Russia's vassal dependence on Germany, and while maintaining friendly, good-neighbourly relations with her, we must not sacrifice our state interests to this goal. Yes, and Germany will not object to the fight against a further influx of German colonists into Russia. It is more profitable for her to send a wave of resettlement to her colonies. Moreover, even when these latter did not exist, and German industry did not yet provide income for the entire population, it still did not consider itself entitled to protest against the restrictive measures adopted in the reign of Alexander III in relation to foreign colonization. As for the German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly causes the complaints that are usually heard against it. Russia is too poor both in capital and in industrial enterprise to be able to do without a broad influx of foreign capital. Therefore, a certain dependence on this or that foreign capital is inevitable for us until the industrial enterprise and material resources of the population develop to such an extent that they make it possible to completely abandon the services of foreign entrepreneurs and their money. But as long as we need them, German capital is more profitable for us than any other.

First of all, this capital is the cheapest of all, as it is content with the smallest percentage of entrepreneurial profits. This largely explains the comparative cheapness of German works and their gradual displacement of English goods from the world market. The less exactingness in terms of profitability of German capital has as a consequence that it goes into such enterprises, in which, due to their comparatively low profitability, other foreign capital does not go. Owing to the same relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia entails the outflow from Russia of smaller sums of entrepreneurial profits in comparison with English and French ones, and thus a greater number of Russian rubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a significant proportion of the profits received from German capital invested in Russian industry does not leave us at all, but lives in Russia.

Unlike the British or French, the German capitalists for the most part, together with their capital, move to Russia themselves. This property of them largely explains the overwhelming number of German industrialists, breeders and manufacturers, which strikes us, in comparison with the British and French.

Those are sitting abroad, choosing to the last penny from Russia the profits generated by their enterprises. On the contrary, German entrepreneurs live in Russia for a long time, and often settle there forever. No matter what they say, but the Germans, unlike other foreigners, soon settle down in Russia and quickly turn brown. Who has not seen, for example, the French and the English, who have lived in Russia almost all their lives, and yet do not speak a word of Russian? On the contrary, how many Germans can be seen who, even if with an accent, broken language, but still did not explain themselves in Russian? Not only that, who has not seen purely Russian people, Orthodox, devoted to the depths of their souls to Russian state principles and, however, only in the first or second generation descended from German immigrants? Finally, we should not forget that Germany, to a certain extent, is also interested in our economic well-being. In this respect, Germany favorably differs from other states interested solely in obtaining the greatest possible rent on the capital expended in Russia, even if only at the cost of the economic ruin of the country. On the other hand, Germany, as a permanent - although, of course, not disinterested - intermediary in our foreign trade, is interested in maintaining the productive forces of our country, as a source of intermediary operations beneficial to her.

EVEN A VICTORY OVER GERMANY BOUGHT RUSSIA EXTREMELY UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS

In any case, even if we recognize the need to eradicate German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, even at the cost of the complete expulsion of German capital from Russian industry, then the corresponding measures, it would seem, can be carried out apart from the war with Germany. This war will require such huge expenses, which will many times exceed the more than dubious benefits received by us as a result of deliverance from German domination. Moreover, the consequences of this war will be such an economic situation that the oppression of German capital will seem easy.

After all, there is no doubt that the war will require expenditures exceeding the limited financial resources of Russia. We will have to turn to the credit of the allied and neutral states, and it will not be provided in vain. It is not even worth talking about what will happen if the war ends badly for us. The financial and economic consequences of the defeat can neither be accounted for nor even foreseen, and, no doubt, will be reflected in the complete collapse of our entire national economy. But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects: a completely ruined Germany will not be able to compensate us for the costs incurred. A peace treaty dictated in the interests of England will not enable her to recover economically enough to cover our military expenses even later. The little that may be possible to snatch from it will have to be shared with the allies, and our share will be negligible, in comparison with the military costs, crumbs. Meanwhile, war loans will have to be paid not without pressure from the Allies. After all, after the collapse of German power, they will no longer need us. Moreover, our increased political power as a result of the victory will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And inevitably, even after the victorious end of the war, we will fall into the same financial and economic bondage to our creditors, in comparison with which our present dependence on German capital will seem an ideal. No matter how sad, however, the economic prospects that open up to us as a result of an alliance with England, and consequently a war with Germany, may develop, they nevertheless recede into the background before political consequences this essentially unnatural union.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY IS DEEPLY UNWANTED FOR BOTH SIDES, AS REDUCED TO WEAKENING THE MONARCHIC PRINCIPLE

It should not be overlooked that Russia and Germany are representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, opposite to the democratic principle, embodied by England and, incomparably lesser degree, France. Strange as it may seem, England, monarchist and conservative to the marrow of her bones, has always acted in her external relations as the patroness of the most demagogic aspirations, invariably pandering to all popular movements aimed at weakening the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, the struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its outcome, is deeply undesirable for both sides, as it undoubtedly boils down to the weakening of the world conservative principle, the only reliable bulwark of which is the above-mentioned two great powers. Moreover, it is impossible not to foresee that, under the exceptional conditions of an impending all-European war, such, again, regardless of its outcome, will present a mortal danger for both Russia and Germany. It is a deep conviction, based on a thorough long-term study of all modern anti-state trends, that a social revolution will inevitably break out in a defeated country, which, by the force of things, will spread to the victorious country.

Too numerous are the channels by which, over the many years of peaceful cohabitation, the two countries are invisibly connected, so that the fundamental social upheavals that broke out in one of them would not be reflected in the other. That these upheavals will be precisely of a social, and not of a political nature, there can be no doubt about this, and this applies not only to Russia, but also to Germany. Russia, of course, provides a particularly favorable ground for social upheavals, where the masses of the people undoubtedly profess the principles of unconscious socialism. Despite the opposition of Russian society, which is just as unconscious as the socialism of the general population, a political revolution is impossible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement the socialist will inevitably degenerate. There is no one behind our opposition, it has no support among the people, who do not see any difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian commoner, peasant and worker alike does not seek political rights that are both unnecessary and incomprehensible to him.

The peasant dreams of granting him foreign land for free, the worker dreams of transferring to him all the capital and profits of the manufacturer, and their desire does not go beyond this. And as soon as these slogans are widely thrown at the population, as soon as the government authorities allow agitation in this direction without restraint, Russia will undoubtedly be plunged into anarchy, which she experienced during the memorable period of unrest in 1905-1906. A war with Germany will create exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already noted, this war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot turn out to be a triumphal march to Berlin. Military failures are also inevitable - let's hope, partial ones - certain shortcomings in our supply will also be inevitable. With the exceptional nervousness of our society, these circumstances will be given exaggerated importance, and with the opposition of this society, everything will be blamed on the government.

It would be good if the latter did not give up and steadfastly declared that during the war no criticism of the state power was allowed and resolutely suppressed all opposition speeches. If the opposition has no serious roots in the population, this will be the end of the matter. The people did not follow the compilers of the Vyborg Appeal in their time, just as they will not follow them now.

But the worst can happen: the government will make concessions, try to enter into an agreement with the opposition, and thereby weaken itself by the time the socialist elements come out. Although it sounds paradoxical, an agreement with the opposition in Russia certainly weakens the government. The fact is that our opposition does not want to take into account the fact that it does not represent any real force. The Russian opposition is entirely intelligent, and this is its weakness, since between the intelligentsia and the people we have a deep abyss of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. An artificial electoral law is needed, moreover, a direct influence of government power is also needed to ensure the election to the State. Duma even the most ardent defenders of people's rights. If the government refused to support them, leave the elections to their natural course, and the legislative institutions would not see a single intellectual in the very walls, apart from a few agitators-demagogues. No matter how much the members of our legislative institutions swear about the people's confidence in them, the peasant is more likely to believe a landless government official than an Octobrist landowner sitting in the Duma; a worker will have more confidence in a factory inspector living on a salary than in a legislator-manufacturer, even if he professes all the principles of the Cadet Party.

It is more than strange under such conditions to demand from the government that it seriously consider the opposition, for its sake renounce the role of an impartial regulator of social relations and act before the broad masses of the people as an obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectually wealthy minority of the population. Demanding from the government authority responsibility to the class representation and obedience to the artificially created parliament by it (remember the famous saying of V. Nabokov: “Let the executive power submit to the legislative power!”), our opposition, in essence, demands from the government the psychology of a savage, with my own hands making an idol and then worshiping it with trepidation.

RUSSIA WILL BE DRIVED INTO UNREALABLE ANARCHY, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS Difficult To Foresee

If the war ends victoriously, the pacification of the socialist movement will ultimately present no insurmountable difficulties. There will be agrarian disturbances on the basis of agitation for the need to reward soldiers with additional cuttings of land, there will be labor unrest in the transition from the probably increased wartime wages to normal rates - and, hopefully, will be limited to this until the wave of the German social revolution comes to us. But in the event of failure, the possibility of which, in the struggle against such an adversary as Germany, cannot but be foreseen, the social revolution, in its most extreme manifestations, is inevitable with us.

As has already been pointed out, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A furious campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary actions will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can stir up and group broad sections of the population, first a black redistribution, and then general section all valuables and property. The defeated army, which, moreover, during the war has lost its most reliable cadre, and is seized for the most part by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intelligent parties deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people will be unable to restrain the dispersing popular waves, raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen.

GERMANY, IN THE EVENT OF DEFEAT, SHOULD SURVIVE SMALLER SOCIAL ISSUES THAN RUSSIA

Strange as it may seem at first glance, with the exceptional balance of German nature, Germany, in case of defeat, will have to go through no less social upheavals. An unsuccessful war will affect the population too hard for its consequences not to bring to the surface the now deeply hidden destructive aspirations. Peculiar social order modern Germany is built on the actually predominant influence of the agrarians, the Prussian Junkers and the peasant proprietors.

These elements are the bulwark of the deeply conservative order in Germany, under the supreme leadership of Prussia. The vital interests of the enumerated classes demand patronage towards agriculture economic policy, import duties on bread and, consequently, high prices for all agricultural products. But Germany, with its limited territory and increased population, long ago turned from an agricultural country into an industrial country, and therefore the patronage of agriculture comes down, in essence, to the taxation in favor of the smaller half of the population of the larger half. The compensation for this majority is the extensive development of the exportation of the products of German industry to the most distant markets, so that the benefits derived in this way enable the industrialists and the working population to pay higher prices for agricultural products consumed at home.

With the defeat of Germany, she will be deprived of world markets and maritime trade, for the aim of the war, on the part of England, its real instigator, is the destruction of German competition. With the achievement of this, the working masses, deprived not only of a raise, but also of any kind of earnings, suffered during the war, and, naturally, embittered, will become susceptible soil for anti-agrarian, and then anti-social propaganda of the socialist parties.

In turn, these latter, taking into account the offended patriotic feeling and the popular irritation accumulated as a result of the lost war against militarism and the feudal burgher system that deceived the hopes of the population, will turn away from the path of peaceful revolution, on which they have so staunchly kept up to now, and will become purely revolutionary path. The large landless class of agricultural laborers in Germany will also play its role, especially in the case of socialist actions on agrarian soil in neighboring Russia. Regardless of this, the currently lurking separatist aspirations in southern Germany will revive, the hidden hostility of Bavaria to the domination of Prussia will manifest itself in all its fullness, in a word, a situation will be created that will not be much inferior, in its tension, to the situation in Russia.

THE PEACEFUL COHABILITATION OF CULTURED NATIONS IS MOST THREATERED BY ENGLAND’S DESIRE TO RETAIN THE DOMINATION OVER THE SEA, SLAVING FROM IT

The totality of all the above cannot but lead to the conclusion that rapprochement with England does not promise us any good, and the English orientation of our diplomacy is fundamentally deeply mistaken. We have no way with England, she must be left to her own fate, and we do not have to quarrel with Germany over her.

The triple agreement is an artificial combination, having no ground of interest, and the future belongs not to it, but to the incomparably more vital closer rapprochement between Russia, Germany, reconciled with the latter France and connected with Russia by a strictly defensive alliance of Japan. Such a political combination, devoid of any aggressiveness towards other states, will for many years ensure the peaceful coexistence of civilized nations, which is threatened not by the warlike designs of Germany, as British diplomacy tries to prove, but only completely natural desire England at all costs to keep the dominance over the seas eluding her. In this direction, and not in the fruitless search for soil for something that contradicts our very being. state species and the aims of the agreement with England, and all the efforts of our diplomacy must be concentrated.

At the same time, it goes without saying that Germany, too, must meet our aspirations to restore the tried and tested friendly-allied relations with her and to work out, by the closest agreement with us, such conditions for our cohabitation with her that would not give ground for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutionally -liberal parties, by their very nature compelled to adhere not to a conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation.

APPENDIX
Durnovo Petr Nikolaevich (11/23/1842-09/11/1915), secretary of state, real privy councilor, right-wing statesman, minister of internal affairs, leader of the right-wing group of the State Council.

Born in a large family, a representative of the ancient noble family. Father Nikolai Sergeevich Durnovo - Olonetsky vice-governor, mother - Vera Petrovna Lvova - niece of Admiral M.P. Lazarev. Wife - Ekaterina Grigoryevna Akimova (sister of the future Chairman of the State Council M.G. Akimov). Children: Peter (b. 1883) and Nadezhda (b. 1886). He graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps (1860), entered the Navy as a midshipman. After 2 years he was promoted to midshipman, spent about 8 years in long voyages, participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. In the rank of lieutenant, he graduated from the Alexander Military Law Academy (1870), was assigned to the Naval Judicial Administration and was appointed assistant prosecutor at the Kronstadt Naval Court.

In 1872 he went to serve in the Ministry of Justice, appointed comrade. Prosecutor of the Vladimir District Court. In 1873 he was transferred to a similar position in Moscow. From Aug. 1875 Prosecutor of Rybinsk, from Nov. 1875 Vladimir District Court. Since June 1880 comrade. Prosecutor of the Kyiv Judicial Chamber. Oct. In 1881 he became the manager of the judicial department of the State Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and from 1883 the vice-director of the Police Department, being the closest associate of V.K. Pleve. In 1884 he was sent abroad to familiarize himself with the organization of the police in the populous cities of Western Europe. Upon his return, he presented a report to the Minister of the Interior, in which he analyzed the activities of the police in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, considered ways to supervise anti-state elements, showing the possibilities of their use in Russia. In July 1884 he was appointed director of the Police Department, served under the ministers D.A. Tolstoy and I.N. Durnovo ( distant relative). In this position, he achieved a significant expansion of the rights of the police to combat anti-state elements. In 1893, as a result of a scandal with a search of the apartment of a Brazilian diplomat to look for evidence against his mistress, he was forced to resign. Appointed as a senator, he fought in the Senate against attempts by liberal local authorities to repeal or change the laws on the Pale of Settlement. From Feb. 1900 to Oct. 1905 - comrade. Minister of the Interior under D.S. Sipyagin, V.K. Pleva, P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and A.G. Bulygin. In this position, he presided over the Guardianship of the houses of industriousness and workhouses, was a member of the Main Guardianship of orphanages, and from 1903 was the head of the post and telegraph.

Oct 23 1905 appointed manager of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the office of S.Yu. Witte, at the request of the latter. Witte expected that Durnovo would do all the dirty work to suppress the revolution and, being grateful to him for the appointment, would become an assistant in intrigues. Emperor Nicholas II, remembering Durnovo's tarnished reputation, at first objected to his appointment and agreed only on the condition that Durnovo would temporarily act as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Oct 30 1905 he became a member of the State. Council. Durnovo was one of those who, at a critical time in 1905 - n. 1906 did not lose his head and managed to take measures to combat anarchy and revolution. He made a turn towards a more vigorous domestic policy. He began to put things in order in the ministry, dismissed the governors who had made peace with the revolutionaries. In one of the telegrams to the governors, Durnovo demanded: “Take the most vigorous measures to combat the revolution, stop at nothing. Remember! I take full responsibility." By tough measures, he managed to eliminate the postal strike and restore order on the railways. Energetic actions were taken in Moscow. In n. dec. 1905 members of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies of St. Petersburg and other cities were arrested, prohibited big number revolutionary newspapers.

Durnovo approvingly reacted to the creation and actively supported the activities of the Union of the Russian People, he himself was a member of the Russian Assembly, hoping that right-monarchist organizations would take an active part in the fight against the revolution, in assisting law enforcement agencies to restore calm in the state. Durnovo was sentenced to death by the terrorists, and a real hunt was on for him. However, the terrorist T.Leontieva 16 Aug. 1906 killed the French traveler Muller in Interlaken, mistaking him for Durnovo, attempts to organize a terrorist attack in Russia failed. Feb. In 1906, he was approved by the Sovereign as Minister of the Interior, now against the objections of Witte, who realized that Durnovo would not play his games. Moreover, a constant opponent of tough measures against revolutionaries, which Durnovo used, Minister of Justice S.S. Manukhin (Witte’s creature) was replaced by M.G. Akimov, with whom Durnovo could find mutual language.

Just before the opening of the State Duma, on April 22. 1906 Durnovo, along with the rest of the Witte ministry, retired. He was awarded a cash prize of 200 thousand rubles. with the maintenance of the minister. Remaining a member of the State Council, he played there active role, becoming in 1908 the head of the right group. Durnovo believed that only the existing state apparatus could protect the Empire from collapse, that Russian society had not yet reached the degree of maturity that would allow it to create its own governing institutions, that society could not exist without state administration. At the same time, he opposed the hasty and unjustified reform of the authorities. In n. In 1911, he was a resolute opponent of the project of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P.A. Council. Everyone expected Stolypin's resignation, but after long thoughts decided to meet the chairman of the government halfway and on March 12, 1911 signed a decree closing the session of the State for 3 days. Council and State. Duma. At this time, the Zemstvo law was carried out in accordance with Art. 87. Durnovo, together with another active and influential opponent of Stolypin, a member of the State. Council VF Trepov, received, without a request from their side, a vacation abroad, from where he returned only after the death of Stolypin. Upon his return, he again took his place as chairman of the right group of the State. Council.

A prominent figure in the monarchist movement, Fr. T.I. Butkevich described Durnovo as follows: “A smart man, somewhat arrogant, in appearance - nondescript: medium height, round-shouldered, approx. 70; speaks well, sometimes witty, but not in an oratorical way. Even V.I. Gurko, who rarely assessed anyone positively, wrote about Durnovo: undoubtedly head and shoulders above those who held responsible positions in the central administration of the ministry.<…>I will say more, among all the statesmen of that era, he stood out for his versatile knowledge, and independence of judgment, and the courage to express his opinion, regardless of whether it met with sympathy among those present or not.

Seeing the whipping up of military hysteria, realizing that certain forces are pushing Russia onto the path of war with Germany, hoping to eventually destroy the Autocracy, Durnovo in February. 1914 drew up a note addressed to the Sovereign, in which he warned against war with Germany and predicted the victory of the revolution, and specifically the socialist one. This note is unique in that Durnovo's prophecies almost completely came true. As if seeing the events of Feb. 1917, Durnovo warned the government against making concessions to liberal circles. He knew the value of the so-called "society". He understood that the opposition "has no support among the people." Despite the frondism and pompous statements of the Cadets and Octobrists, Durnovo confidently wrote that "a political revolution in Russia is not possible," that "any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into a socialist one." Particularly remarkable is the passage from the note where the author predicts the logic of the development of the revolution: “The main burden of the war will fall to our lot. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the thickness of the German defense, will go to us. This war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot turn out to be a triumphal march on Berlin. Military failures are also inevitable, ... certain shortcomings in our supply will also be inevitable. Given the exceptional nervousness of our society, these circumstances will be given exaggerated significance. It will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. There will be a fierce campaign against him in the legislature. Revolutionary demonstrations will begin in the country. An army that has been deprived of its most reliable cadre and, for the most part, seized by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intelligentsia parties deprived of authority in the eyes of the population will be unable to restrain the divergent popular waves raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen. Instead of the fragile and unreliable structure of the Entente, Durnovo proposed a more stable geopolitical model of world security. The future, he argued, belongs to "a more vital closer rapprochement between Russia, Germany, reconciled with last France and Russia-bound defensive alliance of Japan. Only such a combination "will ensure the peaceful coexistence of cultural nations for many years." It is noteworthy that Durnovo, in fact, proposed to implement the continental geopolitical model, which Western geopoliticians spoke about as a great discovery only a few years later. Unscrupulous historians have enrolled Durnovo in the ranks of the Germanophiles. In fact, as V.I. Gurko noted, he simply “loved Russia and was sick of all its failures.”

In 1915, a number of right-wing figures of the State. Dumas (N.E. Markov, G.G. Zamyslovsky and others) and the State. Council, as well as some nationalists (P.N. Balashev and others) attempted to create a Conservative bloc in opposition to the Progressive Bloc in the Duma. Aug 11 Durnovo had a meeting on this subject. At this private meeting, its participants expressed their confidence that only a right-wing government could save Russia from the coming revolution. I. G. Shcheglovitov was named as the head of such a government. The idea of ​​the Conservative bloc was the subject of a detailed discussion at the Monarchist Conference on November 21-23. 1915 in Petrograd after the death of Durnovo. However, the plan was not carried out, not least due to the fact that with the death of Durnovo, the rightists did not have a leader recognized by all. In the summer of 1915, Durnovo was forced to leave the post of chairman of the right-wing group due to poor health, but even more so because of pressure from the liberals (the more accommodating Count A.A. Bobrinsky was elected instead). In Aug. In 1915 he had an apoplexy, and after 3 weeks of unconsciousness he died. He was buried in the Treskino Serdobsky estate. Saratov province.

(Article by A.D. Stepanov from the book “Black Hundred. Historical encyclopedia» (M., 2008).

Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo- statesman Russian Empire, Minister of the Interior (1905-1906), representative of the noble family Durnovo.

Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo went down in history as an "extreme reactionary" when, as an "acting" Minister of the Interior during the First Russian Revolution of 1905 applied the most stringent measures: any riots - to strangle with an iron fist!

However, today we remember the name - Durnovo Pyotr Nikolaevich - as the name of a brilliant foreseeer of the troubles that will befall Russia if it enters the First World War.

Durnovo's famous memorandum makes it possible to judge how right the Black Hundreds monarchists were, and the rest saw the light only when they were forced to flee from a country engulfed in revolutionary flames, and only there, in a foreign land, did they understand that the monarchist Durnovo understood in 1914. Unfortunately, on the eve of the revolution among the political elite of Russia there are right-wingers, whose leader was Petr Durnovo, were in the minority.

the text of which you will find below, was submitted to Nicholas II in February 1914, i.e. six months before the outbreak of the First World War. characterizes him as a smart political thinker who presented a whole geopolitical treatise on several pages, developing the idea of ​​a continental bloc, characteristic of the Russian tradition of geopolitics, but rejected by Russia's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Beliefs P Durnovo inclined towards Germanophilism, but this position P N Durnovo reflected economic realities, since Russia was firmly part of the German technological zone, and only large loans from France and England persuaded the tsar to join the Entente. “In his note, the dignitary, of extreme right views, accurately predicted the composition of the two main coalitions in the impending world war and indicated that Russia would get the main burden of the war and “the role of a battering ram that pierces the very thickness of the German defense”, just as accurately noting “the insufficiency of our military reserves ”, which in the future gave rise to the “shell hunger” of 1914-1915, and the future blockade of the Baltic and Black Seas.

My comments:

Text Durnovo's notes directed against the expansion of the empire and pan-Slavism, since he considered the "liberation" of the Slavs a harmful idea, but the main thing is, of course, the foresight of a surge of revolutionary uprisings in the event of military failures, for curbing which, as he warned the tsar, the monarchy has no resources. And it said - Durnovo, Minister of the Interior, who in 1905 acted without sentiment. It was he who gave the go-ahead to mass arrests in St. Petersburg, which prevented a revolutionary explosion in the capital. It was he who insisted on the use of artillery in Moscow against the rebellious Krasnaya Presnya ...

However, today, in the light of events in Ukraine, Durnovo's prophetic appeal to Tsar Nicholas II should be noted:

- « Sovereign! Galicia can be the only prize in this war", but " only a fool would want to annex Galicia. Whoever annexes Galicia will lose the empire...»

Prophecy Durnovo about Galicia it was clear:

The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly disadvantageous for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected sizes.

The text of Durnovo's note, in the form of a translation from a German copy, published in the extracts in the article by E.V. Lenin, and at his insistence was reprinted in the USSR, in the journal Krasnaya Nov (1922, No. 6).

However, the political consequences of this note by Durnovo did not take place either under Tsar Nicholas II (there is no reliable information about its reading), or under Stalin, who made a rash decision to annex Galicia to Ukraine, in 1939. Obviously, the latter - either did not read the note at all, or - did not understand the prophetic meaning Durnovo's predictions, which today disentangles both Russia and Little Russia. Little Russia in my sense is Ukraine, minus Galicia, since Galicia is now a definitely Latinized part of Austria-Hungary, and not the Russian world.

Durnovo's note, text

The attached document is a reproduction of a memorandum presented in February 1914 to Nicholas II by a member of the State Council P. N. Durnovo, former Minister of the Interior in Witte's cabinet.

THE FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL TURN INTO AN ARMED COLLISION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

The central factor in the period of world history we are living through is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the outcome of which, in all probability, will be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as a great power, sooner or later, will turn out to be impossible. Indeed, on the one hand, an island state, whose world significance is based on dominion over the seas, world trade and countless colonies. On the other hand, it is a powerful continental power, whose limited territory is not sufficient for an increased population. Therefore, she directly and openly declared that her future on the seas, with fabulous speed, developed a huge world trade, built, for her protection, a formidable navy and the famous Made in Germany brand created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic well-being of her rival. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and a life-and-death struggle is inevitable between her and Germany. The upcoming armed clash as a result of the noted rivalry can by no means be reduced to single combat between England and Germany. Their strengths are too unequal and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany can provoke an uprising in India, South America, and especially a dangerous uprising in Ireland, paralyze English maritime trade through privateering, and perhaps submarine warfare, and thereby create food difficulties for Great Britain, but, with all the courage of the German military leaders, Should they risk a landing in England, perhaps a happy chance will help them to destroy or significantly weaken the English navy. As for England, Germany is completely invulnerable to her. All that is available to her is to seize German colonies, stop German maritime trade, in the most favorable case, defeat the German navy, but that’s all, and this cannot force the enemy to peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will try to resort to the means, which she has tried more than once with success, and to decide on armed action in no other way than by securing the participation in the war on her side of the strategically stronger powers. And since Germany, in turn, will undoubtedly not be isolated, the future Anglo-German war will turn into an armed clash between two groups of powers, one German, the other English in orientation.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET ANY REAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY RUSSIA AS A RESULT OF APPROACH WITH ENGLAND

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Russian politics followed neither orientation. Since the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia has been in a defensive alliance with France, so strong that they ensured the joint action of both states in the event of an attack on one of them, but at the same time not so close as to oblige them to definitely support them with an armed hand. all political speeches and harassment of an ally. At the same time, the Russian court maintained traditionally friendly relations based on family ties with Berlin. Precisely, thanks to this conjuncture, for a number of years the peace between the great powers was not disturbed, despite the abundance of combustible material available in Europe. France was provided with an alliance with Russia from an attack by Germany, the latter by Russia's tested peacefulness and friendship from the desire for revenge on the part of France, Russia by the need for Germany to maintain good neighborly relations with her - from the excessive intrigues of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Finally, isolated England, restrained by rivalry with Russia in Persia, the fears traditional for English diplomacy of our offensive movement against India, and bad relations with France, which were especially evident during the well-known incident with Fashoda, looked with alarm at the strengthening of Germany’s naval power, without daring, however , for active performance.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relationship between the great powers and brought England out of her isolated position. As is known, throughout the Russo-Japanese War, England and America maintained a favorable neutrality towards Japan, while we enjoyed the equally benevolent neutrality of France and Germany. It would seem that there should have been the germ of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy took a sharp turn and definitely took the path of rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British politics, a group of powers of triple accord was formed, with the influence of England predominating in it, and a clash with the powers grouped around Germany became, sooner or later, inevitable.

WHAT BENEFITS HAVE AND SHOULD US BE REJECTED TO THE TRADITIONAL POLICY OF MISCONFIDENCE IN ENGLAND AND THE BREAKING OF TESTED, IF NOT FRIENDLY, THEN NEIGHBORHOOD RELATIONS WITH GERMANY?

Thinking about and looking closely at the events that took place after the Treaty of Portsmouth, it is difficult to grasp any real benefits that we received as a result of rapprochement with England. The only plus - improved relations with Japan - is hardly a consequence of the Russian-English rapprochement. In essence, Russia and Japan were created in order to live in peace, since there is absolutely nothing to share between them. All of Russia's tasks in the Far East, correctly understood, are fully compatible with Japan's interests. These tasks, in essence, are reduced to very modest limits. The too wide scope of the fantasies of presumptuous performers, which had no grounds for the real interests of the state - on the one hand, the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, which mistakenly took these fantasies for a consistently pursued plan, on the other hand, caused a clash that more skillful diplomacy could have avoided. Russia does not need Korea or even Port Arthur. Access to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea, in itself, is not a market, but only a way for a more profitable delivery of goods to consuming markets. Meanwhile, in the Far East we do not have and will not have any valuables promising any significant benefits from their vacation abroad. There are no markets there for the export of our works. We cannot count on a wide supply of our exports to either developed, industrially or agriculturally, America, or poor and also industrial Japan, or even maritime China and more distant markets, where our exports would inevitably meet with the goods of industrially stronger powers. competitors.

What remains is inland China, with which our trade is predominantly carried on by land. Thus an open port would be more conducive to the importation of foreign goods to us than to the exportation of our domestic products. On the other hand, Japan, no matter what they say, will not covet our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese, by nature, are a southern people, and the harsh conditions of our Far Eastern outskirts cannot seduce them. It is known that in Japan itself, northern Iezo is sparsely populated; apparently, the Japanese colonization of the southern part of Sakhalin, which was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth, was not very successful. Having taken possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go further north, and her desires, it must be assumed, will rather be directed towards the Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra and Borneo. The most they would perhaps strive for is the acquisition, for purely commercial reasons, of some further sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceful cohabitation, I will say more, close rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the Far East is quite natural, apart from any mediation of England. The ground for an agreement suggests itself. Japan is not a rich country, it is difficult for her to maintain both a strong army and a powerful fleet. Its insular position pushes it onto the path of strengthening its naval power. An alliance with Russia will make it possible to concentrate all one's attention on the fleet, which is so necessary in the context of the already emerging rivalry with America, while protecting one's interests on the Russian mainland. On the other hand, we, having the Japanese fleet at our disposal for the naval defense of our Pacific coast, would have the opportunity to forever abandon the dream that is too much for us to create a navy in the Far East. Thus, in terms of relations with Japan, rapprochement with England did not bring us any real benefit. It did not give us anything in the sense of strengthening our position either in Manchuria, or in Mongolia, or even in the Uryankhai region, where the uncertainty of our situation indicates that the agreement with England, in any case, did not untie the hands of our diplomacy. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with a sharp rebuff from England.

Not for the better, since the agreement, our position in Persia has changed. Everyone remembers our predominant influence in this country under Shah Nasr-Edin, that is, just in the period of the greatest aggravation of our relations with England. From the moment of rapprochement with this latter, we have become involved in a number of incomprehensible attempts to impose on the Persian population a completely unnecessary constitution, and, as a result, we ourselves contributed to the overthrow of the monarch devoted to Russia, to please inveterate opponents. In a word, not only did we not gain anything, but, on the contrary, we lost all along the line, destroying both our prestige, and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers who were treacherously killed and, for the sake of England, not even avenged.

But the most negative consequences of the rapprochement with England—and, consequently, of the fundamental divergence from Germany—were felt in the Middle East. As you know, even Bismarck owned the catchphrase that for Germany the Balkan question is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. Subsequently, the Balkan complications began to attract incomparably greater attention of German diplomacy, which took the “sick man” under its protection, but, in any case, even then Germany for a long time did not show an inclination to risk relations with Russia because of the Balkan affairs. The evidence is there. After all, how easy it was for Austria, during the period of the Russo-Japanese war and the turmoil that followed in our country, to fulfill their cherished aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia at that time had not yet connected her fate with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to miss the most advantageous moment for her goals.

As soon as we embarked on the path of close rapprochement with England, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately followed, which could so easily and painlessly be carried out in 1905 or 1906, then the Albanian question arose and the combination with Prince Wied. Russian diplomacy tried to respond to Austrian intrigues by forming a Balkan Union, but this combination, as one might expect, turned out to be completely ephemeral. In theory, directed against Austria, she immediately turned against Turkey and broke up on the division of the booty captured from this last booty. The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which she, not without reason, sees her only patroness. Indeed, the Russian-English rapprochement, obviously, for Turkey is tantamount to England's refusal of its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles for us, and the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of the Balkan Union was a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European state. So, the Anglo-Russian rapprochement has not brought anything really useful for us so far. In the future, it inevitably promises us an armed clash with Germany.

MAIN GROUPINGS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this collision occur and what will be its probable consequences? The main groupings in a future war are obvious: these are Russia, France and England, on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey, on the other.

It is more than likely that other powers will take part in the war, depending on one or another of the conditions under which the war breaks out. But whether a new clash of opposing interests in the Balkans serves as the immediate cause for war, or a colonial incident like that of Aljeziras, the main grouping will remain the same. Italy, with her interests at least correctly understood, will not come out on the side of Germany.

Due to political and economic reasons, it undoubtedly seeks to expand its current territory. This expansion can only be achieved at the expense of Austria on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is natural, therefore, that Italy will not take the side that ensures the territorial integrity of the states through which she would like to fulfill her aspirations. Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of Italy acting on the side of the anti-German coalition, if the lot of the war were inclined in its favor, is not excluded, in the form of securing the most favorable conditions for participation in the subsequent division. In this respect the position of Italy agrees with the probable position of Rumania, which, presumably, will remain neutral until the scales of happiness tip to one side or the other. Then she, guided by healthy political egoism, will join the victors in order to be rewarded either at the expense of Russia or at the expense of Austria. Of the other Balkan states, Serbia and Montenegro will undoubtedly come out on the side opposed to Austria, and Bulgaria and Albania, if by that time they do not form at least an embryonic state, on the side opposed to Serbia. Greece will in all likelihood remain neutral or take sides against Turkey, but only when the outcome is more or less a foregone conclusion.

The participation of other states will be accidental, and Sweden should be feared, it goes without saying in the ranks of our opponents. Under such conditions, the struggle against Germany presents us with enormous difficulties and will require innumerable sacrifices. The war will not take the enemy by surprise and the degree of his readiness will probably exceed our most exaggerated expectations. It must not be thought that this readiness stemmed from Germany's own desire for war. She does not need war, as soon as she could achieve her goal without it - the end of her sole dominion over the seas. But since this vital goal for her meets opposition from the coalition, then Germany will not retreat before the war and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most advantageous moment for herself.

THE MAIN WEIGHT OF THE WAR WILL BE LOOKED BY RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on our lot, since England is hardly capable of taking a broad part in a continental war, and France, poor in manpower, with those colossal losses that will accompany the war under modern conditions of military technology, will probably be stick to a strictly defensive tactic. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the very thickness of the German defense, will go to us, but meanwhile how many factors will be against us and how much we will have to spend both strength and attention on them.

The Far East should be excluded from among these unfavorable factors. America and Japan, the former in essence, and the latter due to their current political orientation, are both hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on her side. Moreover, the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention to the West, which, of course, meets Japanese and American interests.

Therefore, our rear from the Far East is sufficiently secured and, at the most, any concessions of an economic nature will be torn from us for benevolent neutrality. Moreover, the possibility of America or Japan appearing on the opposite side of Germany is not ruled out, but, of course, only as invaders of one or another poorly lying German colony. On the other hand, an explosion of hostility against us in Persia is undoubted, possible unrest among Muslims in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the possibility of opposing us, in connection with the latter, Afghanistan, and finally, very unpleasant complications should be foreseen in Poland and Finland. In the latter, an uprising will inevitably break out if Sweden is among our opponents. As for Poland, we must expect that we will not be able to keep it in our hands during the war. And now, when it is in the power of the opponents, they will undoubtedly make an attempt to provoke an uprising, in essence not very dangerous for us, but which, nevertheless, will have to be taken into account among the factors unfavorable for us, especially since the influence of our allies can induce us to take such steps in the field of our relations with Poland that are more dangerous for us than any open uprising.

Are we ready for such a stubborn struggle, which the future war of the European peoples will undoubtedly turn out to be? This question must, without hesitation, be answered in the negative. Less than anyone, I am inclined to deny much that has been done for our defense since the Japanese war. There is no doubt, however, that this much is insufficient given the unprecedented dimensions in which the future war will inevitably take place. To a large extent, our young legislative institutions are to blame for this insufficiency, they took an amateurish interest in our defense, but were far from imbued with the whole seriousness of the political situation, which was developing under the influence of the orientation, which, with the sympathetic attitude of society, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs adhered to in recent years.

Evidence of this is the huge number of draft laws of the military and naval departments that remain unconsidered, and, in particular, the plan for organizing our national defense that was submitted to the Duma even under Secretary of State Stolypin. Undoubtedly, in the field of troop training, according to experts, we have achieved a significant improvement compared to the time preceding the Japanese war. According to the opinions of the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired: the gun is quite satisfactory, the equipment is convenient and practical. But it is also indisputable that there are significant shortcomings in the organization of our defense.

In this regard, first of all, we must note the insufficiency of our military reserves, which, of course, cannot be blamed on the military department, since the planned procurement plans are far from being fully implemented due to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of firepower is all the more important because, in the rudimentary state of our industry, during the war we will not be able to make up for the shortcomings that have become clear by domestic means, and meanwhile, with the closure of both the Baltic and Black Seas for us, the import of what we lack items of defense from abroad will prove impossible.

Further, a circumstance unfavorable for our defense is, in general, its excessive dependence on foreign industry, which, in connection with the already noted termination of any convenient foreign communications, will create a number of insurmountable difficulties. The amount of heavy artillery we have, the value of which has been proved by the experience of the Japanese war, is far from sufficient, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defense has hardly been started, and even the Revel fortress protecting the approach to the capital has not yet been completed.

The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways have rolling stock, perhaps sufficient for normal traffic, but not corresponding to the colossal requirements that will be presented to us in the event of a European war. Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the upcoming war will be fought by the most cultured, technically advanced nations. Every war hitherto has been invariably accompanied by a new word in the field of military technology, and the technical backwardness of our industry does not create favorable conditions for us to assimilate new inventions.

VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA DO NOT COLLISION ANYWHERE

All these factors are hardly taken into due account by our diplomacy, whose behavior, in relation to Germany, is not devoid, to a certain extent, even of some aggressiveness, which could unduly hasten the moment of an armed clash with Germany, with an English orientation, in essence, inevitable. Is this orientation correct, however, and does even a favorable period of war promise us such benefits that would atone for all the difficulties and sacrifices inevitable in a war that is exceptional in its probable intensity?

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not collide anywhere and provide a complete basis for the peaceful coexistence of these two states. The future of Germany is on the seas, that is, where Russia, essentially the most continental of all the great powers, has no interests. We have no overseas colonies, and probably never will, and communication between the various parts of the empire is easier by land than by sea. We do not feel a surplus of population demanding the expansion of the territory, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznan, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when even with Russian Poles it is not so easy for us to manage. Why revive centrifugal aspirations, which have not died out to this day in the Vistula region, by attracting the restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles to the Russian state, whose national demands cannot be suppressed even by a stronger than Russian, German government?

The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly unprofitable for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected dimensions.

The obvious goal pursued by our diplomacy in approaching England is the opening of the straits, but it seems that the achievement of this goal hardly requires a war with Germany. After all, England, and not at all Germany, closed the way out of the Black Sea for us. Could it be that by enlisting the assistance of this latter, in 1871 we got rid of the humiliating restrictions imposed on us by England under the Treaty of Paris?

And there is every reason to expect that the Germans would more easily than the British agree to grant us the straits, in the fate of which they have little interest and at the cost of which they would willingly buy our alliance.

Moreover, one should not have exaggerated expectations from our occupation of the straits. Acquiring them is advantageous for us only insofar as they close the entrance to the Black Sea, which from then on becomes for us an inland sea, safe from enemy attacks.

The straits do not give us access to the open sea, since they are followed by a sea, almost entirely consisting of territorial waters, a sea dotted with many islands, where, for example, the English fleet does not have to actually close all entrances and exits for us, regardless of straits. Therefore, Russia could boldly welcome such a combination, which, without transferring the straits directly into our hands, would secure us from the enemy fleet breaking into the Black Sea. Such a combination, quite achievable under favorable circumstances without any kind of war, has also the advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan states, which, not without anxiety and quite understandable jealousy, would react to our seizure of the straits.

In Transcaucasia, as a result of the war, we could expand territorially only at the expense of the regions inhabited by Armenians, which, given the revolutionary nature of modern Armenian sentiments and dreams of a great Armenia, is hardly desirable, and in which, of course, Germany is even less than England, has become would hinder us if we were in alliance with her. Territorial and economic acquisitions that are really useful to us are available only where our aspirations can meet with obstacles from England, and not at all from Germany. Persia, Pamir, Ghulja, Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, Uryankhai Territory - all these are areas where the interests of Russia and Germany do not clash, and the interests of Russia and England have clashed more than once.

Germany is in exactly the same position in relation to Russia, which, in the event of a successful war, could equally tear away from us only regions of little value to her, which, in terms of their population, are not very suitable for colonization: the Vistula region, with the Polish-Lithuanian , and the Ostsee provinces with a Latvian-Estonian population, equally restless and hostile to the Germans.

IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, RUSSIAN BENEFITS AND NEEDS DO NOT CONTRACT GERMAN

But it may be objected that territorial acquisitions, under the modern conditions of the life of peoples, recede into the background and economic interests come to the fore. However, in this area, Russian benefits and needs hardly contradict German ones as much as it is commonly thought. There is no doubt, of course, that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unfavorable for our agriculture and beneficial for German agriculture, but it is hardly correct to attribute this circumstance to the perfidy and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be overlooked that these treaties, in many of their parts, are beneficial to us. The Russian delegates who had concluded treaties in their time were staunch supporters of the development of Russian industry at any cost and, undoubtedly, consciously sacrificed, at least in part, the interests of Russian agriculture in favor of the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany itself is by no means a direct consumer of the greater part of the goods sold abroad by our agriculture. For most of the products of our agricultural industry, Germany is only an intermediary, and consequently it depends on us and on the consuming markets to enter into direct relations and thereby avoid the costly German mediation. Finally, it must be taken into account that the conditions of trade relations may change depending on the conditions of political cohabitation of the contracting states, since it is not to the advantage of any country that the economic weakening of an ally, but, on the contrary, that the ruin of a political enemy is advantageous. In a word, although there is no doubt that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unprofitable for us and that Germany, when concluding them, used the situation that was favorable for her, that is, she simply pressed us, but this behavior cannot be considered as hostile and is worthy of imitation and with on our side, an act of healthy national egoism, which could not be expected from Germany and which had to be reckoned with. In any case, using the example of Austria-Hungary, we see an agricultural country that is incomparably more economically dependent on Germany than we are, which, however, does not prevent it from achieving such a development in the field of agriculture that we can only dream of.

In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany that is quite acceptable for Russia, it would seem, does not at all require the preliminary defeat of Germany. Good-neighbourly relations with her, a thoughtful weighing of our real economic interests in various sectors of the national economy, and long, stubborn trade with the German delegates, undoubtedly called upon to protect the interests of their own, and not our fatherland, are quite enough. I will say more, the defeat of Germany in the field of our exchange of goods with her would be unprofitable for us.

Its defeat would undoubtedly end in a peace dictated from the point of view of England's economic interests. This latter uses the success that has fallen to its lot to the extreme limits, and then we, in a Germany that has been ruined and lost its sea routes, will only lose a consumer market that is still valuable to us for our products that find no other market.

In relation to the economic future of Germany, the interests of Russia and England are directly opposed to each other.

It is to England's advantage to kill the German maritime trade and industry of Germany, turning her into a poor, if possible, agricultural country. It is to our advantage that Germany should develop her maritime trade and the industry she serves in order to supply the most distant markets of the world, and at the same time open up an internal market for the products of our agriculture in order to supply her numerous working population.

But, regardless of trade agreements, it is usually customary to point to the oppression of German dominance in Russian economic life, and to the systematic introduction of German colonization to us, which supposedly poses a clear danger to the Russian state. It seems, however, that such fears are largely exaggerated. The notorious Drang nach Osten was at one time natural and understandable, since the territory of Germany did not accommodate the increased population, the excess of which was forced out in the direction of least resistance, i.e. to a less densely populated neighboring country.

The German government was forced to reckon with the inevitability of this movement, but itself could hardly recognize it as meeting its own interests. After all, after all, German people left the sphere of German statehood, thereby reducing the manpower of their country. Of course, the German government, making every effort to keep the migrants connected with their former fatherland, went even to such an original method as the admission of dual citizenship. But there is no doubt, however, that a significant part of the German immigrants nevertheless finally and irrevocably settled in their new place and gradually broke away from their former homeland. This circumstance, clearly not in line with the state interests of Germany, was obviously one of the incentives for her to take the path of colonial policy and maritime trade, which were so alien to her before.

And so, as the German colonies multiply and the development of German industry and maritime trade is closely related to this, the German colonist wave is waning, and the day is not far off when Drang nach Osten will recede into the realm of historical memories. In any case, German colonization, which undoubtedly contradicts our state interests, must be stopped, and in this friendly relations with Germany are not a hindrance to us. To speak in favor of a preference for a German orientation does not mean standing for Russia's vassal dependence on Germany, and while maintaining friendly, good-neighbourly relations with her, we must not sacrifice our state interests to this goal. Yes, and Germany will not object to the fight against a further influx of German colonists into Russia. It is more profitable for her to send a wave of resettlement to her colonies. Moreover, even when these latter did not exist, and German industry did not yet provide income for the entire population, it still did not consider itself entitled to protest against the restrictive measures adopted in the reign of Alexander III in relation to foreign colonization. As for the German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly causes the complaints that are usually heard against it. Russia is too poor both in capital and in industrial enterprise to be able to do without a broad influx of foreign capital. Therefore, a certain dependence on this or that foreign capital is inevitable for us until the industrial enterprise and material resources of the population develop to such an extent that they make it possible to completely abandon the services of foreign entrepreneurs and their money. But as long as we need them, German capital is more profitable for us than any other.

First of all, this capital is the cheapest of all, as it is content with the smallest percentage of entrepreneurial profits. This largely explains the comparative cheapness of German products and their gradual displacement of English goods from the world market. The less exactingness in terms of profitability of German capital has as a consequence that it goes into such enterprises, in which, due to their comparatively low profitability, other foreign capital does not go. Owing to the same relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia entails the outflow from Russia of smaller sums of entrepreneurial profits in comparison with English and French ones, and thus a greater number of Russian rubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a significant proportion of the profits received from German capital invested in Russian industry does not leave us at all, but takes root in Russia.

Unlike the British or French, the German capitalists for the most part, together with their capital, move to Russia themselves. This property of them largely explains the overwhelming number of German industrialists, breeders and manufacturers, which strikes us, in comparison with the British and French.

Those are sitting abroad, choosing to the last penny from Russia the profits generated by their enterprises. On the contrary, German entrepreneurs live in Russia for a long time, and often settle there forever. No matter what they say, but the Germans, unlike other foreigners, soon settle down in Russia and quickly turn brown. Who has not seen, for example, the French and the English, who have lived in Russia almost all their lives, and yet do not speak a word of Russian? On the contrary, how many Germans can be seen who, even if with an accent, broken language, but still did not explain themselves in Russian? Not only that, who has not seen purely Russian people, Orthodox, devoted to the depths of their souls to Russian state principles and, however, only in the first or second generation descended from German immigrants? Finally, we should not forget that Germany, to a certain extent, is also interested in our economic well-being. In this respect, Germany favorably differs from other states interested solely in obtaining the greatest possible rent on the capital expended in Russia, even if only at the cost of the economic ruin of the country. On the other hand, Germany, as a permanent - although, of course, not disinterested - intermediary in our foreign trade, is interested in maintaining the productive forces of our country, as a source of intermediary operations beneficial to her.

EVEN A VICTORY OVER GERMANY BOUGHT RUSSIA EXTREMELY UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS

In any case, even if we recognize the need to eradicate German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, even at the cost of the complete expulsion of German capital from Russian industry, then the corresponding measures, it would seem, can be carried out apart from the war with Germany. This war will require such huge expenses, which will many times exceed the more than dubious benefits received by us as a result of deliverance from German domination. Moreover, the consequences of this war will be such an economic situation that the oppression of German capital will seem easy.

After all, there is no doubt that the war will require expenditures exceeding the limited financial resources of Russia. We will have to turn to the credit of the allied and neutral states, and it will not be provided in vain. It is not even worth talking about what will happen if the war ends badly for us. The financial and economic consequences of the defeat can neither be accounted for nor even foreseen, and, no doubt, will be reflected in the complete collapse of our entire national economy. But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects: a completely ruined Germany will not be able to compensate us for the costs incurred. A peace treaty dictated in the interests of England will not enable her to recover economically enough to cover our military expenses even later. The little that may be possible to snatch from it will have to be shared with the allies, and our share will be negligible, in comparison with the military costs, crumbs. Meanwhile, war loans will have to be paid not without pressure from the Allies. After all, after the collapse of German power, they will no longer need us. Moreover, our increased political power as a result of the victory will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And inevitably, even after the victorious end of the war, we will fall into the same financial and economic bondage to our creditors, in comparison with which our present dependence on German capital will seem an ideal. Sadly, however, the economic prospects that open up to us as a result of an alliance with England, and consequently a war with Germany, still recede into the background before the political consequences of this essentially unnatural alliance.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY IS DEEPLY UNWANTED FOR BOTH SIDES, AS REDUCED TO WEAKENING THE MONARCHIC PRINCIPLE

It should not be overlooked that Russia and Germany are representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, the opposite of the democratic principle, embodied by England and, to an incomparably lesser extent, France. Strange as it may seem, England, monarchist and conservative to the marrow of her bones, has always acted in her external relations as the patroness of the most demagogic aspirations, invariably pandering to all popular movements aimed at weakening the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, the struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its outcome, is deeply undesirable for both sides, as it undoubtedly boils down to the weakening of the world conservative principle, the only reliable bulwark of which is the above-mentioned two great powers. Moreover, it is impossible not to foresee that, under the exceptional conditions of an impending all-European war, such, again, regardless of its outcome, will present a mortal danger for both Russia and Germany. It is a deep conviction, based on a thorough long-term study of all modern anti-state trends, that a social revolution will inevitably break out in a defeated country, which, by the force of things, will spread to the victorious country.

Too numerous are the channels by which, over the many years of peaceful cohabitation, the two countries are invisibly connected, so that the fundamental social upheavals that broke out in one of them would not be reflected in the other. That these upheavals will be precisely of a social, and not of a political nature, there can be no doubt about this, and this applies not only to Russia, but also to Germany. Russia, of course, provides a particularly favorable ground for social upheavals, where the masses of the people undoubtedly profess the principles of unconscious socialism. Despite the opposition of Russian society, which is just as unconscious as the socialism of the general population, a political revolution is impossible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into a socialist one. There is no one behind our opposition, it has no support among the people, who do not see any difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian commoner, peasant and worker alike does not seek political rights that are both unnecessary and incomprehensible to him.

The peasant dreams of granting him foreign land for free, the worker dreams of transferring to him all the capital and profits of the manufacturer, and their desire does not go beyond this. And as soon as these slogans are widely thrown at the population, as soon as the government authorities allow agitation in this direction without restraint, Russia will undoubtedly be plunged into anarchy, which she experienced during the memorable period of unrest in 1905-1906. A war with Germany will create exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already noted, this war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot turn out to be a triumphal march to Berlin. Military failures are inevitable, too, let us hope, partial ones, and certain shortcomings in our supply will also be inevitable. With the exceptional nervousness of our society, these circumstances will be given exaggerated importance, and with the opposition of this society, everything will be blamed on the government.

It would be good if the latter did not give up and steadfastly declared that during the war no criticism of the state power was allowed and resolutely suppressed all opposition speeches. If the opposition has no serious roots in the population, this will be the end of the matter. The people did not follow the compilers of the Vyborg Appeal in their time, just as they will not follow them now.

But the worst can happen: the government will make concessions, try to enter into an agreement with the opposition, and thereby weaken itself by the time the socialist elements come out. Although it sounds paradoxical, an agreement with the opposition in Russia certainly weakens the government. The fact is that our opposition does not want to take into account the fact that it does not represent any real force. The Russian opposition is entirely intelligent, and this is its weakness, since between the intelligentsia and the people we have a deep abyss of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. An artificial electoral law is needed, moreover, a direct influence of government power is also needed to ensure the election to the State. Duma even the most ardent defenders of people's rights. If the government refused to support them, leave the elections to their natural course, and the legislative institutions would not see a single intellectual within the very walls, apart from a few agitators-demagogues. No matter how much the members of our legislative institutions swear about the people's confidence in them, the peasant is more likely to believe a landless government official than an Octobrist landowner sitting in the Duma; a worker will have more confidence in a factory inspector living on a salary than in a legislator-manufacturer, even if he professes all the principles of the Cadet Party.

It is more than strange under such conditions to demand from the government that it seriously consider the opposition, for its sake renounce the role of an impartial regulator of social relations and act before the broad masses of the people as an obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectually wealthy minority of the population. Demanding from the government authority responsibility to the class representation and obedience to the artificially created parliament by it (remember the famous saying of V. Nabokov: “Let the executive power submit to the legislative power!”), our opposition, in essence, demands from the government the psychology of a savage who makes an idol with his own hands. and then worshiping him with trepidation.

RUSSIA WILL BE DRIVED INTO UNREALABLE ANARCHY, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS Difficult To Foresee

If the war ends victoriously, the pacification of the socialist movement will ultimately present no insurmountable difficulties. There will be agrarian disturbances on the basis of agitation for the need to reward soldiers with additional cuttings of land, there will be labor unrest in the transition from the likely increased wartime wages to normal rates - and, hopefully, will be limited to this until the wave of the German social revolution comes to us. But in the event of failure, the possibility of which, in the struggle against such an adversary as Germany, cannot but be foreseen, the social revolution, in its most extreme manifestations, is inevitable with us.

As has already been pointed out, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A furious campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary actions will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can raise and group broad sections of the population, first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values ​​and property. The defeated army, which, moreover, during the war has lost its most reliable cadre, and is seized for the most part by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intelligent parties deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people will be unable to restrain the dispersing popular waves, raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen.

GERMANY, IN THE EVENT OF DEFEAT, SHOULD SURVIVE NO LESS SOCIAL ISSUES THAN RUSSIA

Strange as it may seem at first glance, with the exceptional balance of German nature, Germany, in case of defeat, will have to go through no less social upheavals. An unsuccessful war will affect the population too hard for its consequences not to bring to the surface the now deeply hidden destructive aspirations. The peculiar social system of modern Germany is built on the actually predominant influence of the agrarians, the Prussian Junkers and the peasant proprietors.

These elements are the bulwark of the deeply conservative order in Germany, under the supreme leadership of Prussia. The vital interests of these classes demand a protective economic policy towards agriculture, import duties on grain and, consequently, high prices for all agricultural products. But Germany, with its limited territory and increased population, long ago turned from an agricultural country into an industrial country, and therefore the patronage of agriculture comes down, in essence, to the taxation in favor of the smaller half of the population of the larger half. The compensation for this majority is the extensive development of the exportation of the products of German industry to the most distant markets, so that the benefits derived in this way enable the industrialists and the working population to pay higher prices for agricultural products consumed at home.

With the defeat of Germany, she will be deprived of world markets and maritime trade, for the purpose of the war, on the part of England, its real instigator, is the destruction of German competition. With the achievement of this, the working masses, deprived not only of a raise, but also of any kind of earnings, suffered during the war, and, naturally, embittered, will become susceptible soil for anti-agrarian, and then anti-social propaganda of the socialist parties.

In turn, these latter, taking into account the offended patriotic feeling and the popular irritation accumulated as a result of the lost war against the militarism and the feudal burgher system that deceived the hopes of the population, will turn away from the path of peaceful revolution, on which they have so steadfastly kept up to now, and will turn to a purely revolutionary path. The large landless class of agricultural laborers in Germany will also play its role, especially in the case of socialist actions on agrarian soil in neighboring Russia. Regardless of this, the currently lurking separatist aspirations in southern Germany will revive, the hidden hostility of Bavaria to the domination of Prussia will manifest itself in all its fullness, in a word, a situation will be created that will not be much inferior, in its tension, to the situation in Russia.

THE PEACEFUL COHABILITATION OF CULTURED NATIONS IS MOST THREATERED BY ENGLAND’S DESIRE TO RETAIN THE DOMINATION OVER THE SEA, SLAVING FROM IT

The totality of all the above cannot but lead to the conclusion that rapprochement with England does not promise us any good, and the English orientation of our diplomacy is fundamentally deeply mistaken. We have no way with England, she must be left to her own fate, and we do not have to quarrel with Germany over her.

The tripartite accord is an artificial combination that has no ground of interest, and the future does not belong to it, but to the incomparably more vital close rapprochement between Russia, Germany, reconciled with the latter France and connected with Russia by a strictly defensive alliance of Japan. Such a political combination, devoid of any aggressiveness towards other states, will ensure for many years the peaceful coexistence of civilized nations, which is threatened not by the warlike designs of Germany, as English diplomacy tries to prove, but only by the completely natural desire of England at all costs to keep the elusive dominance over the seas. In this direction, and not in a fruitless search for grounds for an agreement with England, which by its very nature contradicts our state views and goals, all the efforts of our diplomacy should be concentrated.

At the same time, it goes without saying that Germany, too, must meet our aspirations to restore the tried and tested friendly-allied relations with her and to work out, by the closest agreement with us, such conditions for our cohabitation with her that would not give ground for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutionally -liberal parties, by their very nature compelled to adhere not to a conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation.

In the original publication of Durnovo's note in the journal Krasnaya Nov. 1922. N 6 prefaced " Introductory article by M. Pavlovich", which I also decided to cite, since text of Durnovo's note more often cited without commentary by this historian.

Introductory article to Durnovo's note

The attached document, which is a reproduction of the memorandum presented in February 1914 to Nicholas II by a member of the State. Council, the former Minister of the Interior in Witte's cabinet, P. A. Durnovo, was published in extracts in the article by E. V. Tarle "The German Orientation and P. N. Durnovo" in No. 19 of Bylogo.

E. V. Tarle accompanied the extracts from this document with comments, the main meaning of which boils down to proving that Germany is the only culprit of the world war. “The absurd aspirations of Wilhelm II and his friends,” says Tarle, “to prove that the Entente (and, in particular, Russia) started the war, precisely because from the very beginning they were condemned to a hopeless failure, that neither the Entente in general, nor especially Russia, in 1914, they did not want war in any case, due to their obviously imperfect preparedness. Germany was in full combat readiness, and it became unprofitable for her to wait further. "

But why refer only to Durnovo? Opponents of the war with Germany, supporters of the "German orientation", as Professor E. V. Tarle reproachfully calls them, were not only in Russia. In all Western European states, on the eve of the World War, there existed a fairly strong bourgeois-pacifist movement that fought against the specter of impending war. Who does not know what role the famous Minister of Finance Cailliau played in France at one time, who was an ardent supporter of an agreement with Germany and an ardent opponent of the idea of ​​​​war with the latter and therefore accused of treason, "German orientation", etc., etc., and so on. And Kayo was by no means alone. He relied on the support of many influential French industrialists and financiers. So, the chief director of the strongest French bank "General Society" (Societe Generale) Dorizon supported Caillaux's policy on the question of Germany and repeatedly played the role of an intermediary in negotiations between the two countries. There was a strong desire for rapprochement with Germany, fear of a future war in the bourgeois circles of England. It is well known what an extraordinary success in these circles Norman Angel's book " The Great illusion" ("Great Illusion"), which proved the danger and "unprofitability" of a war between world powers. It is known that the British Minister of War, Lord Elden, before the war, in 1912, came to Berlin to negotiate with Germany on the mutual limitation of arms in order to avoid However, these "pacifist" tendencies, or the "German orientation," as Professor Tarle calls them, in some circles of the ruling classes of England, France, Italy, and Russia did not at all prevent the Entente from feverishly preparing for war and spending even more than Germany and Austria.

In 1912 they spent on their military budgets (army and navy):

So, in 1912, the powers of the Fourth Agreement spent 3 billion francs on armaments. - almost 2 1/2 times more than Germany and Austria-Hungary combined.

In 1913 the Fourth Accord and the Central Powers spent on their armies and navies:

Consequently, even in 1913 the four powers, which a year later went to war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, spent 2 1/4 times more on their armies and navies than the states hostile to them. Ridiculous are Tarle's remarks that Germany in 1914 was in full combat readiness, unlike her opponents. How Germany was militarily prepared to defeat formidable rivals is proved by the very first defeat of the German troops on the Marne and then a whole series of failed attempts Austro-German troops to finish off the Russian army in order to be able to concentrate all forces on the western front, attempts that completely bled the German and Austrian armies. The truth is that Germany and Austria-Hungary were not prepared in 1914 for victory over the Entente, but since the preponderance of forces every year leaned towards the latter (recall the numerous articles in the Russian, English and French press, for example, articles Sukhomlinova in "Birzhevye Vedomosti": We are ready, articles by Stephanie Lausanne and Jules Heydemann in "Matin", proving that in 1916 it would be possible to smash Germany to smithereens, that Russia by the beginning of 1916 would have armies that outnumbered the armies of all European states combined). The German military decided to play va-banque and hastened the war. The inevitability of war in 1914 was predicted by many military experts.

Thus, the military specialist of "Rech" in an article dated April 28, 1913 argued that Germany was preparing for important events not later than the spring of 1914, for the spring of 1914 will be the culminating point of Germany's military might, and after the spring of 1914 the ratio naval forces Germany and England, as well as ground forces in relation to France, will change to the disadvantage of Germany. The employee of "Rech" was not mistaken by much. The war began not in the spring of 1914, but after the end of spring.

It is possible that a future war will break out under similar conditions. When the government of one of the great powers fighting for world hegemony - England, France, America, Japan - comes to the conclusion that in a short time the superiority of forces militarily will undoubtedly be on the side of the enemy, the power that has some chances of winning in at this moment, will provoke his enemy, so as not to be forced to fight later with an obvious preponderance of forces on the side of the latter.

Returning to the question of the perpetrators of the World War of 1914, it should be noted that the most successful of the bourgeois scholars was the well-known French writer and ardent patriot Gustav Le Bon who characterized the responsibility of the governments of all capitalist powers in this war. Of course, says Lebon, Germany was the first to start the war in 1914. She threw into that cup filled to the brim last drop, thanks to which this cup finally overflowed. But after all, for an objective observer, Le Bon notes, the question is precisely who filled this cup, and not who poured in the last fatal drop. This simple truth is alien to Professor Tarle. But let's leave our professor and move on to the note Durnovo, which we print here because of its extreme importance in extenso (in its entirety), and not in extracts, as in Tarle, extracts separated from one quotation from another by professorial gag, which is of no particular interest and only weakens the impression made by the cited document.

Many passages in Durnovo's note are striking in their correct analysis of the international situation on the eve of the war and bear a "prophetic" character. The author correctly outlines not only the main groupings in the coming war: "Russia, France, England - on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey, on the other," but also unmistakably defines the role of Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Italy in this war, and the hostility of Japan and America towards Germany. Worthy of attention is Durnovo's point about the policy of Japan, which, as an island power and, moreover, a poor country, unable to maintain both a strong army and a powerful navy, will be forced to abandon the advance to the north and to Siberia and will take the path of strengthening, namely, sea power for moving south towards the Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra, Borneo. We know that the Satsu-batsu party, the party of naval armaments, has won in Japan at the present moment, insisting on cutting spending on the land army, on renouncing the occupation of Siberia, and demanding that all of Japan's attention be concentrated on maintaining naval power, namely, for the purpose of expansion in the southern direction.

Durnovo's prediction that the main burden of the war would fall on the lot of Russia, which would have to play the role of a battering ram, breaking through the very thickness of the German defense, turned out to be absolutely correct. The course of the war brilliantly justified Durnovo's prediction. At present, many objective French and German military authorities admit that the Russian army, having played the role of a retractable plaster and taking on the main blows of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies, bled the latter in a series of fierce maneuvering battles and thus saved both England and France , and Italy, and Serbia from final defeat.According to the recognition of the French General Rampon: Russia saved Paris in the August days of 1914, destroying for this purpose its best 500,000-strong army in the Masurian marshes.Equally, it was the Russian offensive, in recognition of that Rampon saved Verdun.To fight the Russian army, the German command transferred 15 infantry divisions and 9 cavalry divisions from the French front to the Russian in just 8 months from the end of November 1914 to August 1915. As a reward for its sacrifices, the Russian army never has not received any serious help for all the time, help that would force the Germans and Austrians at some critical moment for the Russian army throw their forces from the eastern front to the western. Likewise, the allies categorically refused to help the Russian army with weapons from their stocks*1. The Allied tactics were very simple: to force the Russian army to continuously ram the Austrian and German armies, as Durnovo foresaw, in order to be able - while both the Russian and Austro-German armies bleed - to increase the allied forces, prepare thousands of new machine guns, airplanes, tanks and etc., and then go on a decisive offensive when the German army is already sufficiently exhausted.

Worthy of attention are Durnovo's remarks about the straits, remarks that are now acquiring a topical character. Durnovo points out that such a combination is beneficial for Russia, "which, without directly transferring the straits into our hands, would ensure us from breaking into the Black Sea of ​​the enemy fleet." Durnovo quite correctly points out that it was not Germany, but England that blocked the exit from the Black Sea, and that even if Russia took possession of the straits, this would not give the latter a free exit, because England at any moment would be able to actually close all entrances and exits for us. , regardless of the straits.

Particularly remarkable are Durnovo's predictions about the outcome of the war and the nature of the future Russian revolution. Durnovo perfectly understood what our Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks could not comprehend, namely, that the Russian revolution would be a socialist revolution. He correctly noted the groundlessness of our liberal opposition, the distrust of the masses of the people in the intelligentsia... (*1 For more details on this, see our work: "Soviet Russia and Capitalist France").

The final paragraph of Durnovo's note, in which the latter proves that the cause of peace among peoples is most of all threatened by the desire of England to retain dominance over the seas that eludes her, is basically true for the present moment.

During the negotiations we mentioned above in 1912 between England and Germany on the mutual limitation of armaments, Germany proposed to England to establish a balance of forces of 16 British ships of the line to 10 German ones. But England rejected this proposal, believing that such a balance of power would give Great Britain an insufficient advantage. Now the naval power of Germany has been completely destroyed, but we have recently witnessed sharp conflicts between England and France at the Washington Conference and at Cannes over the question of the relationship between the naval forces of England and France, because of Great Britain's desire to achieve a reduction in the submarine fleet of France. And England's current desire to keep the Straits in her hands at all costs, which threatens to provoke a new world war, is explained to a large extent by the same motive pointed out by Durnovo in 1914, namely, by the desire of England to hold on to dominance that eludes her. over the seas.

Durnovo was a member of the Black Hundreds and a reactionary, but, undoubtedly, in assessing the nature of the future war, the role of the Entente, on the one hand, Russia, on the other, in anticipating the outcome of the war, he showed remarkable intelligence and the ability to make correct predictions. Compared with Durnovo, all the luminaries of our liberal opposition and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Milyukovs, Maklakovs, Kerenskys and others, with their Dardanelles project and the war, turn out to be mentally pitiful pygmies, who completely did not understand the meaning of the world war and did not foresee its inevitable outcome. .

Copy of someone else's materials

The note was filed in February 1914, i.e. before the start of the First World War. This document is the most striking proof of the fact that the Black Hundreds monarchists perfectly understood the essence of the events that took place, saw their causes and guessed the consequences. THE RIGHT WAS RIGHT. But they, unfortunately, were in the minority among the political elite on the eve of the revolution, which as a whole craved change. Many saw the light when they were forced to flee from the country engulfed in flames; there, in a foreign land, they understood what the monarchist Durnovo understood back in 1914. The note is also valuable as a geopolitical treatise by a Russian thinker who develops the idea of ​​a continental bloc, which is characteristic of the Russian tradition of geopolitics. The document was first published in the USSR in the journal Krasnaya Nov (1922, No. 6). A biographical sketch of PN Durnovo is given at the end of the text.

THE FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL TURN INTO AN ARMED COLLISION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

The central factor in the period of world history we are living through is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the outcome of which, in all probability, will be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as a great power, sooner or later, will turn out to be impossible. Indeed, on the one hand, an island state, whose world significance is based on dominion over the seas, world trade and countless colonies. On the other hand, it is a powerful continental power, whose limited territory is not sufficient for an increased population. Therefore, she directly and openly declared that her future on the seas, with fabulous speed, developed a huge world trade, built, for her protection, a formidable navy and the famous Made in Germany brand created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic well-being of her rival. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and a life-and-death struggle is inevitable between her and Germany.

The upcoming armed clash as a result of the noted rivalry can by no means be reduced to single combat between England and Germany. Their strengths are too unequal and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany can provoke an uprising in India, South America, and especially a dangerous uprising in Ireland, paralyze English maritime trade through privateering, and perhaps submarine warfare, and thereby create food difficulties for Great Britain, but, with all the courage of the German military leaders, Should they risk a landing in England, perhaps a happy chance will help them to destroy or significantly weaken the English navy. As for England, Germany is completely invulnerable to her. All that is available to her is to seize German colonies, stop German maritime trade, in the most favorable case, defeat the German navy, but that's all, and this cannot force the enemy to peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will try to resort to the means, which she has tried more than once with success, and to decide on armed action in no other way than by securing the participation in the war on her side of the strategically stronger powers. And since Germany, in turn, will undoubtedly not be isolated, the future Anglo-German war will turn into an armed clash between two groups of powers, one German, the other English in orientation.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET ANY REAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY RUSSIA AS A RESULT OF APPROACH WITH ENGLAND

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Russian politics followed neither orientation. Since the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia has been in a defensive alliance with France, so strong that they ensured the joint action of both states in the event of an attack on one of them, but at the same time not so close as to oblige them to definitely support them with an armed hand. all political speeches and harassment of an ally. At the same time, the Russian court maintained traditionally friendly relations based on family ties with Berlin. Precisely, thanks to this conjuncture, for a number of years the peace between the great powers was not disturbed, despite the abundance of combustible material available in Europe. France was provided with an alliance with Russia from an attack by Germany, the latter by Russia's tested peacefulness and friendship from the desire for revenge on the part of France, Russia by the need for Germany to maintain good neighborly relations with it - from the excessive intrigues of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Finally, isolated England, restrained by rivalry with Russia in Persia, the fears traditional for English diplomacy of our offensive movement against India, and bad relations with France, which were especially evident during the well-known incident with Fashoda, looked with alarm at the strengthening of Germany’s naval power, without daring, however , for active performance.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relationship between the great powers and brought England out of her isolated position. As is known, throughout the Russo-Japanese War, England and America maintained a favorable neutrality towards Japan, while we enjoyed the equally benevolent neutrality of France and Germany. It would seem that there should have been the germ of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy took a sharp turn and definitely took the path of rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British politics, a group of powers of triple accord was formed, with the influence of England predominating in it, and a clash with the powers grouped around Germany became, sooner or later, inevitable.

What benefits, then, have promised and promise us the abandonment of the traditional policy of distrust towards England and the severance of well-tried, if not friendly, then good-neighbourly relations with Germany?

Thinking about and looking closely at the events that took place after the Treaty of Portsmouth, it is difficult to grasp any real benefits that we received as a result of rapprochement with England. The only plus - improved relations with Japan - is hardly a consequence of the Russian-English rapprochement. In essence, Russia and Japan were created in order to live in peace, since there is absolutely nothing to share between them. All of Russia's tasks in the Far East, correctly understood, are fully compatible with Japan's interests. These tasks, in essence, are reduced to very modest limits. The too wide scope of the fantasies of presumptuous performers, which had no basis in the real interests of the state - on the one hand, the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, which mistakenly took these fantasies for a consistently pursued plan, on the other hand, caused a clash that more skillful diplomacy could have avoided. Russia does not need Korea or even Port Arthur. Access to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea, in itself, is not a market, but only a way for a more profitable delivery of goods to consuming markets. Meanwhile, in the Far East we do not have and will not have any valuables promising any significant benefits from their vacation abroad. There are no markets there for the export of our works. We cannot count on a wide supply of our exports to either developed, industrially or agriculturally, America, or poor and also industrial Japan, or even maritime China and more distant markets, where our exports would inevitably meet with the goods of industrially stronger powers. competitors.

What remains is inland China, with which our trade is predominantly carried on by land. Thus an open port would be more conducive to the importation of foreign goods to us than to the exportation of our domestic products. On the other hand, Japan, no matter what they say, will not covet our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese, by nature, are a southern people, and the harsh conditions of our Far Eastern outskirts cannot seduce them. It is known that in Japan itself, northern Iezo is sparsely populated; apparently, the Japanese colonization of the southern part of Sakhalin, which was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth, was not very successful. Having taken possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go further north, and her desires, it must be assumed, will rather be directed towards the Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra and Borneo. The most they would perhaps strive for is the acquisition, for purely commercial reasons, of some further sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceful cohabitation, I will say more, close rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the Far East is quite natural, apart from any mediation of England. The ground for an agreement suggests itself. Japan is not a rich country, it is difficult for her to maintain both a strong army and a powerful fleet. Its insular position pushes it onto the path of strengthening its naval power. An alliance with Russia will make it possible to concentrate all one's attention on the fleet, which is so necessary in the context of the already emerging rivalry with America, while protecting one's interests on the Russian mainland. On the other hand, we, having the Japanese fleet at our disposal for the naval defense of our Pacific coast, would have the opportunity to forever abandon the dream that is too much for us to create a navy in the Far East. Thus, in terms of relations with Japan, rapprochement with England did not bring us any real benefit. It did not give us anything in the sense of strengthening our position either in Manchuria, or in Mongolia, or even in the Uryankhai region, where the uncertainty of our situation indicates that the agreement with England, in any case, did not untie the hands of our diplomacy. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with a sharp rebuff from England.

Not for the better, since the agreement, our position in Persia has changed. Everyone remembers our predominant influence in this country under Shah Nasr-Edin, that is, just in the period of the greatest aggravation of our relations with England. From the moment of rapprochement with this latter, we have become involved in a number of incomprehensible attempts to impose on the Persian population a completely unnecessary constitution, and, as a result, we ourselves contributed to the overthrow of the monarch devoted to Russia, to please inveterate opponents. In a word, not only did we not gain anything, but, on the contrary, we lost all along the line, destroying both our prestige, and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers who were treacherously killed and, for the sake of England, not even avenged.

But the most negative consequences of rapprochement with England - and consequently of a fundamental divergence from Germany - were felt in the Middle East. As you know, even Bismarck owned the catchphrase that for Germany the Balkan question is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. Subsequently, the Balkan complications began to attract incomparably greater attention of German diplomacy, which took the “sick man” under its protection, but, in any case, even then Germany for a long time did not show an inclination to risk relations with Russia because of the Balkan affairs. The evidence is there. After all, how easy it was for Austria, during the period of the Russo-Japanese war and the turmoil that followed in our country, to fulfill their cherished aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia at that time had not yet connected her fate with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to miss the most advantageous moment for her goals.

As soon as we embarked on the path of close rapprochement with England, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately followed, which could so easily and painlessly be carried out in 1905 or 1906, then the Albanian question arose and the combination with Prince Wied. Russian diplomacy tried to respond to Austrian intrigues by forming a Balkan Union, but this combination, as one might expect, turned out to be completely ephemeral. In theory, directed against Austria, she immediately turned against Turkey and broke up on the division of the booty captured from this last booty. The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which she, not without reason, sees her only patroness. Indeed, the Russian-English rapprochement, obviously, for Turkey is tantamount to England's refusal of its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles for us, and the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of the Balkan Union was a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European state. So, the Anglo-Russian rapprochement has not brought anything really useful for us so far. In the future, it inevitably promises us an armed clash with Germany.

MAIN GROUPINGS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this collision occur and what will be its probable consequences? The main groupings in a future war are obvious: these are Russia, France and England, on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey, on the other.

It is more than likely that other powers will take part in the war, depending on one or another of the conditions under which the war breaks out. But whether a new clash of opposing interests in the Balkans serves as the immediate cause for war, or a colonial incident like that of Aljeziras, the main grouping will remain the same. Italy, with her interests at least correctly understood, will not come out on the side of Germany.

Due to political and economic reasons, it undoubtedly seeks to expand its current territory. This expansion can only be achieved at the expense of Austria on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is natural, therefore, that Italy will not take the side that ensures the territorial integrity of the states through which she would like to fulfill her aspirations. Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of Italy acting on the side of the anti-German coalition, if the lot of the war were inclined in its favor, is not excluded, in the form of securing the most favorable conditions for participation in the subsequent division. In this respect the position of Italy agrees with the probable position of Rumania, which, presumably, will remain neutral until the scales of happiness tip to one side or the other. Then she, guided by healthy political egoism, will join the victors in order to be rewarded either at the expense of Russia or at the expense of Austria. Of the other Balkan states, Serbia and Montenegro will undoubtedly come out on the side opposed to Austria, and Bulgaria and Albania - if by that time they do not form at least an embryonic state - on the side opposed to Serbia. Greece will in all likelihood remain neutral or take sides against Turkey, but only when the outcome is more or less a foregone conclusion.

The participation of other states will be accidental, and Sweden should be feared, it goes without saying in the ranks of our opponents. Under such conditions, the struggle against Germany presents us with enormous difficulties and will require innumerable sacrifices. The war will not take the enemy by surprise and the degree of his readiness will probably exceed our most exaggerated expectations. It must not be thought that this readiness stemmed from Germany's own desire for war. She does not need war, as soon as she could achieve her goal without it - the end of her sole dominion over the seas. But since this vital goal for her meets opposition from the coalition, then Germany will not retreat before the war and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most advantageous moment for herself.

THE MAIN WEIGHT OF THE WAR WILL BE LOOKED BY RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on our lot, since England is hardly capable of taking a broad part in a continental war, and France, poor in manpower, with those colossal losses that will accompany the war under modern conditions of military technology, will probably be stick to a strictly defensive tactic. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the very thickness of the German defense, will go to us, but meanwhile how many factors will be against us and how much we will have to spend both strength and attention on them.

The Far East should be excluded from among these unfavorable factors. America and Japan, the former in essence, and the latter due to their current political orientation, are both hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on her side. Moreover, the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention to the West, which, of course, meets Japanese and American interests.

Therefore, our rear from the Far East is sufficiently secured and, at the most, any concessions of an economic nature will be torn from us for benevolent neutrality. Moreover, the possibility of America or Japan appearing on the opposite side of Germany is not ruled out, but, of course, only as invaders of one or another poorly lying German colony. On the other hand, an explosion of hostility against us in Persia is undoubted, possible unrest among Muslims in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the possibility of opposing us, in connection with the latter, Afghanistan, and finally, very unpleasant complications should be foreseen in Poland and Finland. In the latter, an uprising will inevitably break out if Sweden is among our opponents. As for Poland, we must expect that we will not be able to keep it in our hands during the war. And now, when it is in the power of the opponents, they will undoubtedly make an attempt to provoke an uprising, in essence not very dangerous for us, but which, nevertheless, will have to be taken into account among the factors unfavorable for us, especially since the influence of our allies can induce us to take such steps in the field of our relations with Poland that are more dangerous for us than any open uprising.

Are we ready for such a stubborn struggle, which the future war of the European peoples will undoubtedly turn out to be? This question must, without hesitation, be answered in the negative. Less than anyone, I am inclined to deny much that has been done for our defense since the Japanese war. There is no doubt, however, that this much is insufficient given the unprecedented dimensions in which the future war will inevitably take place. To a large extent, our young legislative institutions are to blame for this insufficiency, they took an amateurish interest in our defense, but were far from imbued with the whole seriousness of the political situation, which was developing under the influence of the orientation, which, with the sympathetic attitude of society, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs adhered to in recent years.

Evidence of this is the huge number of bills that remain unexamined by the military and naval departments and, in particular, the plan for organizing our national defense that was submitted to the Duma even under Secretary of State Stolypin. Undoubtedly, in the field of troop training, according to experts, we have achieved a significant improvement compared to the time preceding the Japanese war. According to the opinions of the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired: the gun is quite satisfactory, the equipment is convenient and practical. But it is also indisputable that there are significant shortcomings in the organization of our defense.

In this regard, first of all, we must note the insufficiency of our military reserves, which, of course, cannot be blamed on the military department, since the planned procurement plans are far from being fully implemented due to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of firepower is all the more important because, in the rudimentary state of our industry, during the war we will not be able to make up for the shortages at home by domestic means, and meanwhile, with the closure of both the Baltic and Black Seas for us, the import of what we lack items of defense from abroad will prove impossible.

Further, a circumstance unfavorable for our defense is, in general, its excessive dependence on foreign industry, which, in connection with the already noted termination of any convenient foreign communications, will create a number of insurmountable difficulties. The amount of heavy artillery we have, the value of which has been proved by the experience of the Japanese war, is far from sufficient, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defense has hardly been started, and even the Revel fortress protecting the approach to the capital has not yet been completed.

The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways have rolling stock, perhaps sufficient for normal traffic, but not corresponding to the colossal requirements that will be presented to us in the event of a European war. Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the upcoming war will be fought by the most cultured, technically advanced nations. Every war hitherto has been invariably accompanied by a new word in the field of military technology, and the technical backwardness of our industry does not create favorable conditions for us to assimilate new inventions.

VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA DO NOT COLLISION ANYWHERE

All these factors are hardly taken into due account by our diplomacy, whose behavior, in relation to Germany, is not devoid, to a certain extent, even of some aggressiveness, which could unduly hasten the moment of an armed clash with Germany, with an English orientation, in essence, inevitable. Is this orientation correct, however, and does even a favorable period of war promise us such benefits that would atone for all the difficulties and sacrifices inevitable in a war that is exceptional in its probable intensity?

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not collide anywhere and provide a complete basis for the peaceful coexistence of these two states. The future of Germany is on the seas, that is, where Russia, essentially the most continental of all the great powers, has no interests. We have no overseas colonies, and probably never will, and communication between the various parts of the empire is easier by land than by sea. We do not feel a surplus of population demanding the expansion of the territory, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznan, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when even with Russian Poles it is not so easy for us to manage. Why revive centrifugal aspirations, which have not died out to this day in the Vistula region, by attracting the restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles to the Russian state, whose national demands cannot be suppressed even by a stronger than Russian, German government?

The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly unprofitable for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected dimensions. The obvious goal pursued by our diplomacy in approaching England is the opening of the straits, but it seems that the achievement of this goal hardly requires a war with Germany. After all, England, and not at all Germany, closed the way out of the Black Sea for us. Could it be that by enlisting the assistance of this latter, in 1871 we got rid of the humiliating restrictions imposed on us by England under the Treaty of Paris?

And there is every reason to expect that the Germans would more easily than the British agree to grant us the straits, in the fate of which they have little interest and at the cost of which they would willingly buy our alliance.

Moreover, one should not have exaggerated expectations from our occupation of the straits. Acquiring them is advantageous for us only insofar as they close the entrance to the Black Sea, which from then on becomes for us an inland sea, safe from enemy attacks.

The straits do not give us access to the open sea, since they are followed by a sea, almost entirely consisting of territorial waters, a sea dotted with many islands, where, for example, the English fleet does not have to actually close all entrances and exits for us, regardless of straits. Therefore, Russia could boldly welcome such a combination, which, without transferring the straits directly into our hands, would secure us from the enemy fleet breaking into the Black Sea. Such a combination, quite achievable under favorable circumstances without any kind of war, has also the advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan states, which, not without anxiety and quite understandable jealousy, would react to our seizure of the straits.

In Transcaucasia, as a result of the war, we could expand territorially only at the expense of the regions inhabited by Armenians, which, given the revolutionary nature of modern Armenian sentiments and dreams of a great Armenia, is hardly desirable, and in which, of course, Germany is even less than England, has become would hinder us if we were in alliance with her. Territorial and economic acquisitions that are really useful to us are available only where our aspirations can meet with obstacles from England, and not at all from Germany. Persia, the Pamirs, Ghulja, Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Uryankhai Territory - all these are areas where the interests of Russia and Germany do not clash, and the interests of Russia and England have clashed more than once.

Germany is in exactly the same position in relation to Russia, which, in the event of a successful war, could equally tear away from us only regions of little value to her, which, in terms of their population, are not very suitable for colonization: the Vistula region, with the Polish-Lithuanian , and the Ostsee provinces with a Latvian-Estonian population, equally restless and hostile to the Germans.

IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, RUSSIAN BENEFITS AND NEEDS DO NOT CONTRACT GERMAN

But it may be objected that territorial acquisitions, under the modern conditions of the life of peoples, recede into the background and economic interests come to the fore. However, in this area, Russian benefits and needs hardly contradict German ones as much as it is commonly thought. There is no doubt, of course, that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unfavorable for our agriculture and beneficial for German agriculture, but it is hardly correct to attribute this circumstance to the perfidy and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be overlooked that these treaties, in many of their parts, are beneficial to us. The Russian delegates who had concluded treaties in their time were staunch supporters of the development of Russian industry at any cost and, undoubtedly, consciously sacrificed, at least in part, the interests of Russian agriculture in favor of the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany itself is by no means a direct consumer of the greater part of the goods sold abroad by our agriculture. For most of the products of our agricultural industry, Germany is only an intermediary, and consequently it depends on us and on the consuming markets to enter into direct relations and thereby avoid the costly German mediation. Finally, it must be taken into account that the conditions of trade relations may change depending on the conditions of political cohabitation of the contracting states, since it is not to the advantage of any country that the economic weakening of an ally, but, on the contrary, that the ruin of a political enemy is advantageous. In a word, although there is no doubt that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unprofitable for us and that Germany, when concluding them, used the situation that was favorable for her, that is, she simply pressed us, but this behavior cannot be considered as hostile and is worthy of imitation and with on our side, an act of healthy national egoism, which could not be expected from Germany and which had to be reckoned with. In any case, using the example of Austria-Hungary, we see an agricultural country that is incomparably more economically dependent on Germany than we are, which, however, does not prevent it from achieving such a development in the field of agriculture that we can only dream of.

In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany that is quite acceptable for Russia, it would seem, does not at all require the preliminary defeat of Germany. Good-neighbourly relations with her, a thoughtful weighing of our real economic interests in various sectors of the national economy, and long, stubborn trade with the German delegates, undoubtedly called upon to protect the interests of their own, and not our fatherland, are quite enough. I will say more, the defeat of Germany in the field of our exchange of goods with her would be unprofitable for us.

Its defeat would undoubtedly end in a peace dictated from the point of view of England's economic interests. This latter uses the success that has fallen to its lot to the extreme limits, and then we, in a Germany that has been ruined and lost its sea routes, will only lose a consumer market that is still valuable to us for our products that find no other market.

NOTE BY PETER NIKOLAEVICH DURNOVO TO EMPEROR NICHOLAS II
Petr Durnovo

APPENDIX

<...>

Petr Durnovo
April 23, 2008 Source: Russian Line

Pyotr Nikolaevich DurnovoThe note was filed in February 1914, i.e. before the start of the First World War. This document is the most striking proof of the fact that the Black Hundreds monarchists perfectly understood the essence of the events that took place, saw their causes and guessed the consequences. THE RIGHT WAS RIGHT. But they, unfortunately, were in the minority among the political elite on the eve of the revolution, which as a whole craved change. Many saw the light when they were forced to flee from the country engulfed in flames; there, in a foreign land, they understood what the monarchist Durnovo understood back in 1914. The note is also valuable as a geopolitical treatise by a Russian thinker who develops the idea of ​​a continental bloc, which is characteristic of the Russian tradition of geopolitics. The document was first published in the USSR in the journal Krasnaya Nov (1922, No. 6). A biographical sketch of PN Durnovo is given at the end of the text.

THE FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL TURN INTO AN ARMED COLLISION BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

The central factor in the period of world history we are living through is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the outcome of which, in all probability, will be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as a great power, sooner or later, will turn out to be impossible. Indeed, on the one hand, an island state, whose world significance is based on dominion over the seas, world trade and countless colonies. On the other hand, it is a powerful continental power, whose limited territory is not sufficient for an increased population. Therefore, she directly and openly declared that her future on the seas, with fabulous speed, developed a huge world trade, built, for her protection, a formidable navy and the famous Made in Germany brand created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic well-being of her rival. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and a life-and-death struggle is inevitable between her and Germany. The upcoming armed clash as a result of the noted rivalry can by no means be reduced to single combat between England and Germany. Their strengths are too unequal and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany can provoke an uprising in India, South America, and especially a dangerous uprising in Ireland, paralyze English maritime trade through privateering, and perhaps submarine warfare, and thereby create food difficulties for Great Britain, but, with all the courage of the German military leaders, Should they risk a landing in England, perhaps a happy chance will help them to destroy or significantly weaken the English navy. As for England, Germany is completely invulnerable to her. All that is available to her is to seize German colonies, stop German maritime trade, in the most favorable case, defeat the German navy, but that's all, and this cannot force the enemy to peace. There is no doubt, therefore, that England will try to resort to the means, which she has tried more than once with success, and to decide on armed action in no other way than by securing the participation in the war on her side of the strategically stronger powers. And since Germany, in turn, will undoubtedly not be isolated, the future Anglo-German war will turn into an armed clash between two groups of powers, one German, the other English in orientation.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET ANY REAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY RUSSIA AS A RESULT OF APPROACH WITH ENGLAND

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Russian politics followed neither orientation. Since the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia has been in a defensive alliance with France, so strong that they ensured the joint action of both states in the event of an attack on one of them, but at the same time not so close as to oblige them to definitely support them with an armed hand. all political speeches and harassment of an ally. At the same time, the Russian court maintained traditionally friendly relations based on family ties with Berlin. Precisely, thanks to this conjuncture, for a number of years the peace between the great powers was not disturbed, despite the abundance of combustible material available in Europe. France was provided with an alliance with Russia from an attack by Germany, the latter by Russia's tested peacefulness and friendship from the desire for revenge on the part of France, Russia by the need for Germany to maintain good neighborly relations with it - from the excessive intrigues of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula. Finally, isolated England, restrained by rivalry with Russia in Persia, the fears traditional for English diplomacy of our offensive movement against India, and bad relations with France, which were especially evident during the well-known incident with Fashoda, looked with alarm at the strengthening of Germany’s naval power, without daring, however , for active performance.

The Russo-Japanese War radically changed the relationship between the great powers and brought England out of her isolated position. As is known, throughout the Russo-Japanese War, England and America maintained a favorable neutrality towards Japan, while we enjoyed the equally benevolent neutrality of France and Germany. It would seem that there should have been the germ of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy took a sharp turn and definitely took the path of rapprochement with England. France was drawn into the orbit of British politics, a group of powers of triple accord was formed, with the influence of England predominating in it, and a clash with the powers grouped around Germany became, sooner or later, inevitable.

What benefits, then, have promised and promise us the abandonment of the traditional policy of distrust towards England and the severance of well-tried, if not friendly, then good-neighbourly relations with Germany?

Thinking about and looking closely at the events that took place after the Treaty of Portsmouth, it is difficult to grasp any real benefits that we received as a result of rapprochement with England. The only plus - improved relations with Japan - is hardly a consequence of the Russian-English rapprochement. In essence, Russia and Japan were created in order to live in peace, since there is absolutely nothing to share between them. All of Russia's tasks in the Far East, correctly understood, are fully compatible with Japan's interests. These tasks, in essence, are reduced to very modest limits. The too wide scope of the fantasies of presumptuous performers, which had no basis in the real interests of the state - on the one hand, the excessive nervousness and impressionability of Japan, which mistakenly took these fantasies for a consistently pursued plan, on the other hand, caused a clash that more skillful diplomacy could have avoided. Russia does not need Korea or even Port Arthur. Access to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea, in itself, is not a market, but only a way for a more profitable delivery of goods to consuming markets. Meanwhile, in the Far East we do not have and will not have any valuables promising any significant benefits from their vacation abroad. There are no markets there for the export of our works. We cannot count on a wide supply of our exports to either developed, industrially or agriculturally, America, or poor and also industrial Japan, or even maritime China and more distant markets, where our exports would inevitably meet with the goods of industrially stronger powers. competitors.

What remains is inland China, with which our trade is predominantly carried on by land. Thus an open port would be more conducive to the importation of foreign goods to us than to the exportation of our domestic products. On the other hand, Japan, no matter what they say, will not covet our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese, by nature, are a southern people, and the harsh conditions of our Far Eastern outskirts cannot seduce them. It is known that in Japan itself, northern Iezo is sparsely populated; apparently, the Japanese colonization of the southern part of Sakhalin, which was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth, was not very successful. Having taken possession of Korea and Formosa, Japan will hardly go further north, and her desires, it must be assumed, will rather be directed towards the Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra and Borneo. The most they would perhaps strive for is the acquisition, for purely commercial reasons, of some further sections of the Manchurian railway.

In a word, peaceful cohabitation, I will say more, close rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the Far East is quite natural, apart from any mediation of England. The ground for an agreement suggests itself. Japan is not a rich country, it is difficult for her to maintain both a strong army and a powerful fleet. Its insular position pushes it onto the path of strengthening its naval power. An alliance with Russia will make it possible to concentrate all one's attention on the fleet, which is so necessary in the context of the already emerging rivalry with America, while protecting one's interests on the Russian mainland. On the other hand, we, having the Japanese fleet at our disposal for the naval defense of our Pacific coast, would have the opportunity to forever abandon the dream that is too much for us to create a navy in the Far East. Thus, in terms of relations with Japan, rapprochement with England did not bring us any real benefit. It did not give us anything in the sense of strengthening our position either in Manchuria, or in Mongolia, or even in the Uryankhai region, where the uncertainty of our situation indicates that the agreement with England, in any case, did not untie the hands of our diplomacy. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with a sharp rebuff from England.

Not for the better, since the agreement, our position in Persia has changed. Everyone remembers our predominant influence in this country under Shah Nasr-Edin, that is, just in the period of the greatest aggravation of our relations with England. From the moment of rapprochement with this latter, we have become involved in a number of incomprehensible attempts to impose on the Persian population a completely unnecessary constitution, and, as a result, we ourselves contributed to the overthrow of the monarch devoted to Russia, to please inveterate opponents. In a word, not only did we not gain anything, but, on the contrary, we lost all along the line, destroying both our prestige, and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers who were treacherously killed and, for the sake of England, not even avenged.

But the most negative consequences of rapprochement with England - and consequently of a fundamental divergence from Germany - were felt in the Middle East. As you know, even Bismarck owned the catchphrase that for Germany the Balkan question is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. Subsequently, the Balkan complications began to attract incomparably greater attention of German diplomacy, which took the “sick man” under its protection, but, in any case, even then Germany for a long time did not show an inclination to risk relations with Russia because of the Balkan affairs. The evidence is there. After all, how easy it was for Austria, during the period of the Russo-Japanese war and the turmoil that followed in our country, to fulfill their cherished aspirations on the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia at that time had not yet connected her fate with England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to miss the most advantageous moment for her goals.

As soon as we embarked on the path of close rapprochement with England, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately followed, which could so easily and painlessly be carried out in 1905 or 1906, then the Albanian question arose and the combination with Prince Wied. Russian diplomacy tried to respond to Austrian intrigues by forming a Balkan Union, but this combination, as one might expect, turned out to be completely ephemeral. In theory, directed against Austria, she immediately turned against Turkey and broke up on the division of the booty captured from this last booty. The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which she, not without reason, sees her only patroness. Indeed, the Russian-English rapprochement, obviously, for Turkey is tantamount to England's refusal of its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles for us, and the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of the Balkan Union was a direct threat to the continued existence of Turkey as a European state. So, the Anglo-Russian rapprochement has not brought anything really useful for us so far. In the future, it inevitably promises us an armed clash with Germany.

MAIN GROUPINGS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this collision occur and what will be its probable consequences? The main groupings in a future war are obvious: these are Russia, France and England, on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey, on the other.

It is more than likely that other powers will take part in the war, depending on one or another of the conditions under which the war breaks out. But whether a new clash of opposing interests in the Balkans serves as the immediate cause for war, or a colonial incident like that of Aljeziras, the main grouping will remain the same. Italy, with her interests at least correctly understood, will not come out on the side of Germany.

Due to political and economic reasons, it undoubtedly seeks to expand its current territory. This expansion can only be achieved at the expense of Austria on the one hand and Turkey on the other. It is natural, therefore, that Italy will not take the side that ensures the territorial integrity of the states through which she would like to fulfill her aspirations. Moreover, it would seem that the possibility of Italy acting on the side of the anti-German coalition, if the lot of the war were inclined in its favor, is not excluded, in the form of securing the most favorable conditions for participation in the subsequent division. In this respect the position of Italy agrees with the probable position of Rumania, which, presumably, will remain neutral until the scales of happiness tip to one side or the other. Then she, guided by healthy political egoism, will join the victors in order to be rewarded either at the expense of Russia or at the expense of Austria. Of the other Balkan states, Serbia and Montenegro will undoubtedly come out on the side opposed to Austria, and Bulgaria and Albania - if by that time they do not form at least an embryonic state - on the side opposed to Serbia. Greece will in all likelihood remain neutral or take sides against Turkey, but only when the outcome is more or less a foregone conclusion.

The participation of other states will be accidental, and Sweden should be feared, it goes without saying in the ranks of our opponents. Under such conditions, the struggle against Germany presents us with enormous difficulties and will require innumerable sacrifices. The war will not take the enemy by surprise and the degree of his readiness will probably exceed our most exaggerated expectations. It must not be thought that this readiness stemmed from Germany's own desire for war. She does not need war, as soon as she could achieve her goal without it - the end of her sole dominion over the seas. But since this vital goal for her meets opposition from the coalition, then Germany will not retreat before the war and, of course, will even try to provoke it, choosing the most advantageous moment for herself.

THE MAIN WEIGHT OF THE WAR WILL BE LOOKED BY RUSSIA

The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on our lot, since England is hardly capable of taking a broad part in a continental war, and France, poor in manpower, with those colossal losses that will accompany the war under modern conditions of military technology, will probably be stick to a strictly defensive tactic. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the very thickness of the German defense, will go to us, but meanwhile how many factors will be against us and how much we will have to spend both strength and attention on them.

The Far East should be excluded from among these unfavorable factors. America and Japan, the former in essence, and the latter due to their current political orientation, are both hostile to Germany, and there is no reason to expect them to act on her side. Moreover, the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention to the West, which, of course, meets Japanese and American interests.

Therefore, our rear from the Far East is sufficiently secured and, at the most, any concessions of an economic nature will be torn from us for benevolent neutrality. Moreover, the possibility of America or Japan appearing on the opposite side of Germany is not ruled out, but, of course, only as invaders of one or another poorly lying German colony. On the other hand, an explosion of hostility against us in Persia is undoubted, possible unrest among Muslims in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the possibility of opposing us, in connection with the latter, Afghanistan, and finally, very unpleasant complications should be foreseen in Poland and Finland. In the latter, an uprising will inevitably break out if Sweden is among our opponents. As for Poland, we must expect that we will not be able to keep it in our hands during the war. And now, when it is in the power of the opponents, they will undoubtedly make an attempt to provoke an uprising, in essence not very dangerous for us, but which, nevertheless, will have to be taken into account among the factors unfavorable for us, especially since the influence of our allies can induce us to take such steps in the field of our relations with Poland that are more dangerous for us than any open uprising.

Are we ready for such a stubborn struggle, which the future war of the European peoples will undoubtedly turn out to be? This question must, without hesitation, be answered in the negative. Less than anyone, I am inclined to deny much that has been done for our defense since the Japanese war. There is no doubt, however, that this much is insufficient given the unprecedented dimensions in which the future war will inevitably take place. To a large extent, our young legislative institutions are to blame for this insufficiency, they took an amateurish interest in our defense, but were far from imbued with the whole seriousness of the political situation, which was developing under the influence of the orientation, which, with the sympathetic attitude of society, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs adhered to in recent years.

Evidence of this is the huge number of bills that remain unexamined by the military and naval departments and, in particular, the plan for organizing our national defense that was submitted to the Duma even under Secretary of State Stolypin. Undoubtedly, in the field of troop training, according to experts, we have achieved a significant improvement compared to the time preceding the Japanese war. According to the opinions of the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired: the gun is quite satisfactory, the equipment is convenient and practical. But it is also indisputable that there are significant shortcomings in the organization of our defense.

In this regard, first of all, we must note the insufficiency of our military reserves, which, of course, cannot be blamed on the military department, since the planned procurement plans are far from being fully implemented due to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of firepower is all the more important because, in the rudimentary state of our industry, during the war we will not be able to make up for the shortages at home by domestic means, and meanwhile, with the closure of both the Baltic and Black Seas for us, the import of what we lack items of defense from abroad will prove impossible.

Further, a circumstance unfavorable for our defense is, in general, its excessive dependence on foreign industry, which, in connection with the already noted termination of any convenient foreign communications, will create a number of insurmountable difficulties. The amount of heavy artillery we have, the value of which has been proved by the experience of the Japanese war, is far from sufficient, and there are few machine guns. The organization of our fortress defense has hardly been started, and even the Revel fortress protecting the approach to the capital has not yet been completed.

The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways have rolling stock, perhaps sufficient for normal traffic, but not corresponding to the colossal requirements that will be presented to us in the event of a European war. Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the upcoming war will be fought by the most cultured, technically advanced nations. Every war hitherto has been invariably accompanied by a new word in the field of military technology, and the technical backwardness of our industry does not create favorable conditions for us to assimilate new inventions.

VITAL INTERESTS OF GERMANY AND RUSSIA DO NOT COLLISION ANYWHERE

All these factors are hardly taken into due account by our diplomacy, whose behavior, in relation to Germany, is not devoid, to a certain extent, even of some aggressiveness, which could unduly hasten the moment of an armed clash with Germany, with an English orientation, in essence, inevitable. Is this orientation correct, however, and does even a favorable period of war promise us such benefits that would atone for all the difficulties and sacrifices inevitable in a war that is exceptional in its probable intensity?

The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not collide anywhere and provide a complete basis for the peaceful coexistence of these two states. The future of Germany is on the seas, that is, where Russia, essentially the most continental of all the great powers, has no interests. We have no overseas colonies, and probably never will, and communication between the various parts of the empire is easier by land than by sea. We do not feel a surplus of population demanding the expansion of the territory, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznan, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when even with Russian Poles it is not so easy for us to manage. Why revive centrifugal aspirations, which have not died out to this day in the Vistula region, by attracting the restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles to the Russian state, whose national demands cannot be suppressed even by a stronger than Russian, German government?

The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly unprofitable for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected dimensions. The obvious goal pursued by our diplomacy in approaching England is the opening of the straits, but it seems that the achievement of this goal hardly requires a war with Germany. After all, England, and not at all Germany, closed the way out of the Black Sea for us. Could it be that by enlisting the assistance of this latter, in 1871 we got rid of the humiliating restrictions imposed on us by England under the Treaty of Paris?

And there is every reason to expect that the Germans would more easily than the British agree to grant us the straits, in the fate of which they have little interest and at the cost of which they would willingly buy our alliance.

Moreover, one should not have exaggerated expectations from our occupation of the straits. Acquiring them is advantageous for us only insofar as they close the entrance to the Black Sea, which from then on becomes for us an inland sea, safe from enemy attacks.

The straits do not give us access to the open sea, since they are followed by a sea, almost entirely consisting of territorial waters, a sea dotted with many islands, where, for example, the English fleet does not have to actually close all entrances and exits for us, regardless of straits. Therefore, Russia could boldly welcome such a combination, which, without transferring the straits directly into our hands, would secure us from the enemy fleet breaking into the Black Sea. Such a combination, quite achievable under favorable circumstances without any kind of war, has also the advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan states, which, not without anxiety and quite understandable jealousy, would react to our seizure of the straits.

In Transcaucasia, as a result of the war, we could expand territorially only at the expense of the regions inhabited by Armenians, which, given the revolutionary nature of modern Armenian sentiments and dreams of a great Armenia, is hardly desirable, and in which, of course, Germany is even less than England, has become would hinder us if we were in alliance with her. Territorial and economic acquisitions that are really useful to us are available only where our aspirations can meet with obstacles from England, and not at all from Germany. Persia, the Pamirs, Ghulja, Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Uryankhai Territory - all these are areas where the interests of Russia and Germany do not clash, and the interests of Russia and England have clashed more than once.

Germany is in exactly the same position in relation to Russia, which, in the event of a successful war, could equally tear away from us only regions of little value to her, which, in terms of their population, are not very suitable for colonization: the Vistula region, with the Polish-Lithuanian , and the Ostsee provinces with a Latvian-Estonian population, equally restless and hostile to the Germans.

IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, RUSSIAN BENEFITS AND NEEDS DO NOT CONTRACT GERMAN

But it may be objected that territorial acquisitions, under the modern conditions of the life of peoples, recede into the background and economic interests come to the fore. However, in this area, Russian benefits and needs hardly contradict German ones as much as it is commonly thought. There is no doubt, of course, that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unfavorable for our agriculture and beneficial for German agriculture, but it is hardly correct to attribute this circumstance to the perfidy and unfriendliness of Germany.

It should not be overlooked that these treaties, in many of their parts, are beneficial to us. The Russian delegates who had concluded treaties in their time were staunch supporters of the development of Russian industry at any cost and, undoubtedly, consciously sacrificed, at least in part, the interests of Russian agriculture in favor of the interests of Russian industry. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany itself is by no means a direct consumer of the greater part of the goods sold abroad by our agriculture. For most of the products of our agricultural industry, Germany is only an intermediary, and consequently it depends on us and on the consuming markets to enter into direct relations and thereby avoid the costly German mediation. Finally, it must be taken into account that the conditions of trade relations may change depending on the conditions of political cohabitation of the contracting states, since it is not to the advantage of any country that the economic weakening of an ally, but, on the contrary, that the ruin of a political enemy is advantageous. In a word, although there is no doubt that the current Russian-German trade agreements are unprofitable for us and that Germany, when concluding them, used the situation that was favorable for her, that is, she simply pressed us, but this behavior cannot be considered as hostile and is worthy of imitation and with on our side, an act of healthy national egoism, which could not be expected from Germany and which had to be reckoned with. In any case, using the example of Austria-Hungary, we see an agricultural country that is incomparably more economically dependent on Germany than we are, which, however, does not prevent it from achieving such a development in the field of agriculture that we can only dream of.

In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Germany that is quite acceptable for Russia, it would seem, does not at all require the preliminary defeat of Germany. Good-neighbourly relations with her, a thoughtful weighing of our real economic interests in various sectors of the national economy, and long, stubborn trade with the German delegates, undoubtedly called upon to protect the interests of their own, and not our fatherland, are quite enough. I will say more, the defeat of Germany in the field of our exchange of goods with her would be unprofitable for us.

Its defeat would undoubtedly end in a peace dictated from the point of view of England's economic interests. This latter uses the success that has fallen to its lot to the extreme limits, and then we, in a Germany that has been ruined and lost its sea routes, will only lose a consumer market that is still valuable to us for our products that find no other market.

In relation to the economic future of Germany, the interests of Russia and England are directly opposed to each other.

It is to England's advantage to kill the German maritime trade and industry of Germany, turning her into a poor, if possible, agricultural country. It is to our advantage that Germany should develop her maritime trade and the industry she serves in order to supply the most distant markets of the world, and at the same time open up an internal market for the products of our agriculture in order to supply her numerous working population.

But, regardless of trade agreements, it is usually customary to point to the oppression of German dominance in Russian economic life, and to the systematic introduction of German colonization to us, which supposedly poses a clear danger to the Russian state. It seems, however, that such fears are largely exaggerated. The notorious Drang nach Osten was at one time natural and understandable, since the territory of Germany did not accommodate the increased population, the excess of which was forced out in the direction of least resistance, i.e. to a less densely populated neighboring country.

The German government was forced to reckon with the inevitability of this movement, but itself could hardly recognize it as meeting its own interests. After all, after all, German people left the sphere of German statehood, thereby reducing the manpower of their country. Of course, the German government, making every effort to keep the migrants connected with their former fatherland, went even to such an original method as the admission of dual citizenship. But there is no doubt, however, that a significant part of the German immigrants nevertheless finally and irrevocably settled in their new place and gradually broke away from their former homeland. This circumstance, clearly not in line with the state interests of Germany, was obviously one of the incentives for her to take the path of colonial policy and maritime trade, which were so alien to her before.

And so, as the German colonies multiply and the development of German industry and maritime trade is closely related to this, the German colonist wave is waning, and the day is not far off when Drang nach Osten will recede into the realm of historical memories. In any case, German colonization, which undoubtedly contradicts our state interests, must be stopped, and in this friendly relations with Germany are not a hindrance to us. To speak in favor of a preference for a German orientation does not mean standing for Russia's vassal dependence on Germany, and while maintaining friendly, good-neighbourly relations with her, we must not sacrifice our state interests to this goal. Yes, and Germany will not object to the fight against a further influx of German colonists into Russia. It is more profitable for her to send a wave of resettlement to her colonies. Moreover, even when these latter did not exist, and German industry did not yet provide income for the entire population, it still did not consider itself entitled to protest against the restrictive measures adopted in the reign of Alexander III in relation to foreign colonization. As for the German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly causes the complaints that are usually heard against it. Russia is too poor both in capital and in industrial enterprise to be able to do without a broad influx of foreign capital. Therefore, a certain dependence on this or that foreign capital is inevitable for us until the industrial enterprise and material resources of the population develop to such an extent that they make it possible to completely abandon the services of foreign entrepreneurs and their money. But as long as we need them, German capital is more profitable for us than any other.

First of all, this capital is the cheapest of all, as it is content with the smallest percentage of entrepreneurial profits. This largely explains the comparative cheapness of German products and their gradual displacement of English goods from the world market. The less exactingness in terms of profitability of German capital has as a consequence that it goes into such enterprises, in which, due to their comparatively low profitability, other foreign capital does not go. Owing to the same relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia entails the outflow from Russia of smaller sums of entrepreneurial profits in comparison with English and French ones, and thus a greater number of Russian rubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a significant proportion of the profits received from German capital invested in Russian industry does not leave us at all, but lives in Russia.

Unlike the British or French, the German capitalists for the most part, together with their capital, move to Russia themselves. This property of them largely explains the overwhelming number of German industrialists, breeders and manufacturers, which strikes us, in comparison with the British and French.

Those are sitting abroad, choosing to the last penny from Russia the profits generated by their enterprises. On the contrary, German entrepreneurs live in Russia for a long time, and often settle there forever. No matter what they say, but the Germans, unlike other foreigners, soon settle down in Russia and quickly turn brown. Who has not seen, for example, the French and the English, who have lived in Russia almost all their lives, and yet do not speak a word of Russian? On the contrary, how many Germans can be seen who, even if with an accent, broken language, but still did not explain themselves in Russian? Not only that, who has not seen purely Russian people, Orthodox, devoted to the depths of their souls to Russian state principles and, however, only in the first or second generation descended from German immigrants? Finally, we should not forget that Germany, to a certain extent, is also interested in our economic well-being. In this respect, Germany favorably differs from other states interested solely in obtaining the greatest possible rent on the capital expended in Russia, even if only at the cost of the economic ruin of the country. On the other hand, Germany, as a permanent - although, of course, not disinterested - intermediary in our foreign trade, is interested in maintaining the productive forces of our country, as a source of intermediary operations beneficial to her.

EVEN A VICTORY OVER GERMANY BOUGHT RUSSIA EXTREMELY UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS

In any case, even if we recognize the need to eradicate German dominance in the sphere of our economic life, even at the cost of the complete expulsion of German capital from Russian industry, then the corresponding measures, it would seem, can be carried out apart from the war with Germany. This war will require such huge expenses, which will many times exceed the more than dubious benefits received by us as a result of deliverance from German domination. Moreover, the consequences of this war will be such an economic situation that the oppression of German capital will seem easy.

After all, there is no doubt that the war will require expenditures exceeding the limited financial resources of Russia. We will have to turn to the credit of the allied and neutral states, and it will not be provided in vain. It is not even worth talking about what will happen if the war ends badly for us. The financial and economic consequences of the defeat can neither be accounted for nor even foreseen, and, no doubt, will be reflected in the complete collapse of our entire national economy. But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects: a completely ruined Germany will not be able to compensate us for the costs incurred. A peace treaty dictated in the interests of England will not enable her to recover economically enough to cover our military expenses even later. The little that may be possible to snatch from it will have to be shared with the allies, and our share will be negligible, in comparison with the military costs, crumbs. Meanwhile, war loans will have to be paid not without pressure from the Allies. After all, after the collapse of German power, they will no longer need us. Moreover, our increased political power as a result of the victory will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And inevitably, even after the victorious end of the war, we will fall into the same financial and economic bondage to our creditors, in comparison with which our present dependence on German capital will seem an ideal. Sadly, however, the economic prospects that open up to us as a result of an alliance with England, and consequently a war with Germany, still recede into the background before the political consequences of this essentially unnatural alliance.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY IS DEEPLY UNWANTED FOR BOTH SIDES, AS REDUCED TO WEAKENING THE MONARCHIC PRINCIPLE

It should not be overlooked that Russia and Germany are representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, the opposite of the democratic principle, embodied by England and, to an incomparably lesser extent, France. Strange as it may seem, England, monarchist and conservative to the marrow of her bones, has always acted in her external relations as the patroness of the most demagogic aspirations, invariably pandering to all popular movements aimed at weakening the monarchical principle.

From this point of view, the struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its outcome, is deeply undesirable for both sides, as it undoubtedly boils down to the weakening of the world conservative principle, the only reliable bulwark of which is the above-mentioned two great powers. Moreover, it is impossible not to foresee that, under the exceptional conditions of an impending all-European war, such, again, regardless of its outcome, will present a mortal danger for both Russia and Germany. It is a deep conviction, based on a thorough long-term study of all modern anti-state trends, that a social revolution will inevitably break out in a defeated country, which, by the force of things, will spread to the victorious country.

Too numerous are the channels by which, over the many years of peaceful cohabitation, the two countries are invisibly connected, so that the fundamental social upheavals that broke out in one of them would not be reflected in the other. That these upheavals will be precisely of a social, and not of a political nature, there can be no doubt about this, and this applies not only to Russia, but also to Germany. Russia, of course, provides a particularly favorable ground for social upheavals, where the masses of the people undoubtedly profess the principles of unconscious socialism. Despite the opposition of Russian society, which is just as unconscious as the socialism of the general population, a political revolution is impossible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into a socialist one. There is no one behind our opposition, it has no support among the people, who do not see any difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian commoner, peasant and worker alike does not seek political rights that are both unnecessary and incomprehensible to him.

The peasant dreams of granting him foreign land for free, the worker dreams of transferring to him all the capital and profits of the manufacturer, and their desire does not go beyond this. And as soon as these slogans are widely thrown at the population, as soon as the government authorities allow agitation in this direction without restraint, Russia will undoubtedly be plunged into anarchy, which she experienced during the memorable period of unrest in 1905-1906. A war with Germany will create exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already noted, this war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot turn out to be a triumphal march to Berlin. Military failures are also inevitable - let's hope, partial ones - certain shortcomings in our supply will also be inevitable. With the exceptional nervousness of our society, these circumstances will be given exaggerated importance, and with the opposition of this society, everything will be blamed on the government.

It would be good if the latter did not give up and steadfastly declared that during the war no criticism of the state power was allowed and resolutely suppressed all opposition speeches. If the opposition has no serious roots in the population, this will be the end of the matter. The people did not follow the compilers of the Vyborg Appeal in their time, just as they will not follow them now.

But the worst can happen: the government will make concessions, try to enter into an agreement with the opposition, and thereby weaken itself by the time the socialist elements come out. Although it sounds paradoxical, an agreement with the opposition in Russia certainly weakens the government. The fact is that our opposition does not want to take into account the fact that it does not represent any real force. The Russian opposition is entirely intelligent, and this is its weakness, since between the intelligentsia and the people we have a deep abyss of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. An artificial electoral law is needed, moreover, a direct influence of government power is also needed to ensure the election to the State. Duma even the most ardent defenders of people's rights. If the government refused to support them, leave the elections to their natural course, and the legislative institutions would not see a single intellectual in the very walls, apart from a few agitators-demagogues. No matter how much the members of our legislative institutions swear about the people's confidence in them, the peasant is more likely to believe a landless government official than an Octobrist landowner sitting in the Duma; a worker will have more confidence in a factory inspector living on a salary than in a legislator-manufacturer, even if he professes all the principles of the Cadet Party.

It is more than strange under such conditions to demand from the government that it seriously consider the opposition, for its sake renounce the role of an impartial regulator of social relations and act before the broad masses of the people as an obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectually wealthy minority of the population. Demanding from the government authority responsibility to the class representation and obedience to the artificially created parliament by it (remember the famous saying of V. Nabokov: “Let the executive power submit to the legislative power!”), our opposition, in essence, demands from the government the psychology of a savage who makes an idol with his own hands. and then worshiping him with trepidation.

RUSSIA WILL BE DRIVED INTO UNREALABLE ANARCHY, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS Difficult To Foresee

If the war ends victoriously, the pacification of the socialist movement will ultimately present no insurmountable difficulties. There will be agrarian disturbances on the basis of agitation for the need to reward soldiers with additional cuttings of land, there will be labor unrest in the transition from the probably increased wartime wages to normal rates - and, hopefully, will be limited to this until the wave of the German social revolution comes to us. But in the event of failure, the possibility of which, in the struggle against such an adversary as Germany, cannot but be foreseen, the social revolution, in its most extreme manifestations, is inevitable with us.

As has already been pointed out, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A furious campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary actions will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can raise and group broad sections of the population, first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values ​​and property. The defeated army, which, moreover, during the war has lost its most reliable cadre, and is seized for the most part by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intelligent parties deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people will be unable to restrain the dispersing popular waves, raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen.

GERMANY, IN THE EVENT OF DEFEAT, SHOULD SURVIVE SMALLER SOCIAL ISSUES THAN RUSSIA

Strange as it may seem at first glance, with the exceptional balance of German nature, Germany, in case of defeat, will have to go through no less social upheavals. An unsuccessful war will affect the population too hard for its consequences not to bring to the surface the now deeply hidden destructive aspirations. The peculiar social system of modern Germany is built on the actually predominant influence of the agrarians, the Prussian Junkers and the peasant proprietors.

These elements are the bulwark of the deeply conservative order in Germany, under the supreme leadership of Prussia. The vital interests of these classes demand a protective economic policy towards agriculture, import duties on grain and, consequently, high prices for all agricultural products. But Germany, with its limited territory and increased population, long ago turned from an agricultural country into an industrial country, and therefore the patronage of agriculture comes down, in essence, to the taxation in favor of the smaller half of the population of the larger half. The compensation for this majority is the extensive development of the exportation of the products of German industry to the most distant markets, so that the benefits derived in this way enable the industrialists and the working population to pay higher prices for agricultural products consumed at home.

With the defeat of Germany, she will be deprived of world markets and maritime trade, for the aim of the war, on the part of England, its real instigator, is the destruction of German competition. With the achievement of this, the working masses, deprived not only of a raise, but also of any kind of earnings, suffered during the war, and, naturally, embittered, will become susceptible soil for anti-agrarian, and then anti-social propaganda of the socialist parties.

In turn, these latter, taking into account the offended patriotic feeling and the popular irritation accumulated as a result of the lost war against the militarism and the feudal burgher system that deceived the hopes of the population, will turn away from the path of peaceful revolution, on which they have so steadfastly kept up to now, and will turn to a purely revolutionary path. The large landless class of agricultural laborers in Germany will also play its role, especially in the case of socialist actions on agrarian soil in neighboring Russia. Regardless of this, the currently lurking separatist aspirations in southern Germany will revive, the hidden hostility of Bavaria to the domination of Prussia will manifest itself in all its fullness, in a word, a situation will be created that will not be much inferior, in its tension, to the situation in Russia.

THE PEACEFUL COHABILITATION OF CULTURED NATIONS IS MOST THREATERED BY ENGLAND’S DESIRE TO RETAIN THE DOMINATION OVER THE SEA, SLAVING FROM IT

The totality of all the above cannot but lead to the conclusion that rapprochement with England does not promise us any good, and the English orientation of our diplomacy is fundamentally deeply mistaken. We have no way with England, she must be left to her own fate, and we do not have to quarrel with Germany over her.

The triple agreement is an artificial combination, having no ground of interest, and the future belongs not to it, but to the incomparably more vital closer rapprochement between Russia, Germany, reconciled with the latter France and connected with Russia by a strictly defensive alliance of Japan. Such a political combination, devoid of any aggressiveness towards other states, will ensure for many years the peaceful coexistence of civilized nations, which is threatened not by the warlike designs of Germany, as English diplomacy tries to prove, but only by the completely natural desire of England at all costs to keep the elusive dominance over the seas. In this direction, and not in a fruitless search for grounds for an agreement with England, which by its very nature contradicts our state views and goals, all the efforts of our diplomacy should be concentrated.

At the same time, it goes without saying that Germany, too, must meet our aspirations to restore the tried and tested friendly-allied relations with her and to work out, by the closest agreement with us, such conditions for our cohabitation with her that would not give ground for anti-German agitation on the part of our constitutionally -liberal parties, by their very nature compelled to adhere not to a conservative German, but to a liberal English orientation.

APPENDIX
Durnovo Petr Nikolaevich (11/23/1842-09/11/1915), secretary of state, real privy councilor, right-wing statesman, minister of internal affairs, leader of the right-wing group of the State Council.

Born in a large family, a representative of an old noble family. Father Nikolai Sergeevich Durnovo - Olonetsky vice-governor, mother - Vera Petrovna Lvova - niece of Admiral M.P. Lazarev. Wife - Ekaterina Grigoryevna Akimova (sister of the future Chairman of the State Council M.G. Akimov). Children: Peter (b. 1883) and Nadezhda (b. 1886). He graduated from the Naval Cadet Corps (1860), entered the Navy as a midshipman. After 2 years he was promoted to midshipman, spent about 8 years on long voyages, participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. In the rank of lieutenant, he graduated from the Alexander Military Law Academy (1870), was assigned to the Naval Judicial Administration and was appointed assistant prosecutor at the Kronstadt Naval Court.

In 1872 he went to serve in the Ministry of Justice, appointed comrade. Prosecutor of the Vladimir District Court. In 1873 he was transferred to a similar position in Moscow. From Aug. 1875 Prosecutor of Rybinsk, from Nov. 1875 Vladimir District Court. Since June 1880 comrade. Prosecutor of the Kyiv Judicial Chamber. Oct. In 1881 he became the manager of the judicial department of the State Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and from 1883 the vice-director of the Police Department, being the closest associate of V.K. Pleve. In 1884 he was sent abroad to familiarize himself with the organization of the police in the populous cities of Western Europe. Upon his return, he presented a report to the Minister of the Interior, in which he analyzed the activities of the police in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, considered ways to supervise anti-state elements, showing the possibilities of their use in Russia. In July 1884 he was appointed director of the Police Department, served under the ministers D.A. Tolstoy and I.N. Durnovo (a distant relative). In this position, he achieved a significant expansion of the rights of the police to combat anti-state elements. In 1893, as a result of a scandal with a search of the apartment of a Brazilian diplomat to look for evidence against his mistress, he was forced to resign. Appointed as a senator, he fought in the Senate against attempts by liberal local authorities to repeal or change the laws on the Pale of Settlement. From Feb. 1900 to Oct. 1905 - comrade. Minister of the Interior under D.S. Sipyagin, V.K. Pleva, P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and A.G. Bulygin. In this position, he presided over the Guardianship of the houses of industriousness and workhouses, was a member of the Main Guardianship of orphanages, and from 1903 was the head of the post and telegraph.

Oct 23 1905 appointed manager of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the office of S.Yu. Witte, at the request of the latter. Witte expected that Durnovo would do all the dirty work to suppress the revolution and, being grateful to him for the appointment, would become an assistant in intrigues. Emperor Nicholas II, remembering Durnovo's tarnished reputation, at first objected to his appointment and agreed only on the condition that Durnovo would temporarily act as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Oct 30 1905 he became a member of the State. Council. Durnovo was one of those who, at a critical time in 1905 - n. 1906 did not lose his head and managed to take measures to combat anarchy and revolution. He made a turn towards a more vigorous domestic policy. He began to put things in order in the ministry, dismissed the governors who had made peace with the revolutionaries. In one of the telegrams to the governors, Durnovo demanded: “Take the most vigorous measures to combat the revolution, stop at nothing. Remember! I take full responsibility." By tough measures, he managed to eliminate the postal strike and restore order on the railways. Energetic actions were taken in Moscow. In n. dec. In 1905, members of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies of St. Petersburg and other cities were arrested, and a large number of revolutionary newspapers were banned.

Durnovo approvingly reacted to the creation and actively supported the activities of the Union of the Russian People, he himself was a member of the Russian Assembly, hoping that right-monarchist organizations would take an active part in the fight against the revolution, in assisting law enforcement agencies to restore calm in the state. Durnovo was sentenced to death by the terrorists, and a real hunt was on for him. However, the terrorist T.Leontieva 16 Aug. 1906 killed the French traveler Muller in Interlaken, mistaking him for Durnovo, attempts to organize a terrorist attack in Russia failed. Feb. In 1906, he was approved by the Sovereign as Minister of the Interior, now against the objections of Witte, who realized that Durnovo would not play his games. Moreover, a constant opponent of the tough measures against the revolutionaries that Durnovo used, Minister of Justice S.S. Manukhin (Witte's creature) was replaced by M.G. Akimov, with whom Durnovo could find a common language.

Just before the opening of the State Duma, on April 22. 1906 Durnovo, along with the rest of the Witte ministry, retired. He was awarded a cash prize of 200 thousand rubles. with the maintenance of the minister. Remaining a member of the State Council, he played an active role there, becoming in 1908 the head of the right group. Durnovo believed that only the existing state apparatus could protect the Empire from collapse, that Russian society had not yet reached the degree of maturity that would allow it to create its own governing institutions, that society could not exist without state administration. At the same time, he opposed the hasty and unjustified reform of the authorities. In n. In 1911, he was a resolute opponent of the project of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers P.A. Council. Everyone expected Stolypin's resignation, but the Sovereign, after much deliberation, decided to meet the chairman of the government halfway and on March 12, 1911 signed a decree closing the session of the State for 3 days. Council and State. Duma. At this time, the Zemstvo law was carried out in accordance with Art. 87. Durnovo, together with another active and influential opponent of Stolypin, a member of the State. Council VF Trepov, received, without a request from their side, a vacation abroad, from where he returned only after the death of Stolypin. Upon his return, he again took his place as chairman of the right group of the State. Council.

A prominent figure in the monarchist movement, Fr. T.I. Butkevich described Durnovo as follows: “A smart man, somewhat arrogant, in appearance - nondescript: medium height, round-shouldered, approx. 70; speaks well, sometimes witty, but not in an oratorical way. Even V.I. Gurko, who rarely assessed anyone positively, wrote about Durnovo: undoubtedly head and shoulders above those who held responsible positions in the central administration of the ministry.<...>I will say more, among all the statesmen of that era, he stood out for his versatile knowledge, and independence of judgment, and the courage to express his opinion, regardless of whether it met with sympathy among those present or not.

Seeing the whipping up of military hysteria, realizing that certain forces are pushing Russia onto the path of war with Germany, hoping to eventually destroy the Autocracy, Durnovo in February. 1914 drew up a note addressed to the Sovereign, in which he warned against war with Germany and predicted the victory of the revolution, and specifically the socialist one. This note is unique in that Durnovo's prophecies almost completely came true. As if seeing the events of Feb. 1917, Durnovo warned the government against making concessions to liberal circles. He knew the value of the so-called "society". He understood that the opposition "has no support among the people." Despite the frondism and pompous statements of the Cadets and Octobrists, Durnovo confidently wrote that "a political revolution in Russia is not possible," that "any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into a socialist one." Particularly remarkable is the passage from the note where the author predicts the logic of the development of the revolution: “The main burden of the war will fall to our lot. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the thickness of the German defense, will go to us. This war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot turn out to be a triumphal march on Berlin. Military failures are also inevitable, ... certain shortcomings in our supply will also be inevitable. Given the exceptional nervousness of our society, these circumstances will be given exaggerated significance. It will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. There will be a fierce campaign against him in the legislature. Revolutionary demonstrations will begin in the country. An army that has been deprived of its most reliable cadre and, for the most part, seized by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and opposition-intelligentsia parties deprived of authority in the eyes of the population will be unable to restrain the divergent popular waves raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen. Instead of the fragile and unreliable structure of the Entente, Durnovo proposed a more stable geopolitical model of world security. The future, he argued, belongs to "a more vital closer rapprochement between Russia, Germany, reconciled with the latter France, and the defensive alliance of Japan bound to Russia." Only such a combination "will ensure the peaceful coexistence of cultural nations for many years." It is noteworthy that Durnovo, in fact, proposed to implement the continental geopolitical model, which Western geopoliticians spoke about as a great discovery only a few years later. Unscrupulous historians have enrolled Durnovo in the ranks of the Germanophiles. In fact, as V.I. Gurko noted, he simply “loved Russia and was sick of all its failures.”

In 1915, a number of right-wing figures of the State. Dumas (N.E. Markov, G.G. Zamyslovsky and others) and the State. Council, as well as some nationalists (P.N. Balashev and others) attempted to create a Conservative bloc in opposition to the Progressive Bloc in the Duma. Aug 11 Durnovo had a meeting on this subject. At this private meeting, its participants expressed their confidence that only a right-wing government could save Russia from the coming revolution. I. G. Shcheglovitov was named as the head of such a government. The idea of ​​the Conservative bloc was the subject of a detailed discussion at the Monarchist Conference on November 21-23. 1915 in Petrograd after the death of Durnovo. However, the plan was not carried out, not least due to the fact that with the death of Durnovo, the rightists did not have a leader recognized by all. In the summer of 1915, Durnovo was forced to leave the post of chairman of the right-wing group due to poor health, but even more so because of pressure from the liberals (the more accommodating Count A.A. Bobrinsky was elected instead). In Aug. In 1915 he had an apoplexy, and after 3 weeks of unconsciousness he died. He was buried in the Treskino Serdobsky estate. Saratov province.

(Article by A.D. Stepanov from the book "Black Hundred. Historical Encyclopedia" (M., 2008).

History does not tolerate subjunctive mood, and today it is pointless to speculate about whether humanity could have avoided the First World War if, at the beginning of the 20th century, the heads of the great powers, their politicians and military leaders would have been more wise and responsible. On the other hand, it is worth carefully and comprehensively studying the events that preceded the war, analyzing the statements of representatives of the political, business and military elites on the eve of the war in order to draw lessons from them for the future.

It is noteworthy that on the eve of the war, few people imagined that the world conflict would be so long. The headquarters, when developing plans for the upcoming operations, expected to victoriously end the war in a few months, a maximum of a year. They did not prepare for a long war of survival. Only British Minister of War Horace Herbert Kitchener predicted that a future war would last at least three years. In fact, it lasted 1568 days (or 4 years, 3 months and 10 days) and claimed millions of human lives.

Against this background, the deep and comprehensive analysis-forecast given by our compatriot, the leader of the right in State Council Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo. Exactly 100 years ago, in February 1914, he wrote and filed in the name of Emperor Nicholas II his famous Note, which is sometimes called the “Durnovo Memorandum”. This happened two weeks after Nicholas II dismissed Vladimir Kokovtsov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The lengthy document begins with an indication that the upcoming war will be of a coalition nature, with Great Britain and Germany as the main opponents. Durnovo, notes historian Alexander Repnikov, “in full accordance with the opinion of such Russian geopoliticians as Vandam and Dusinsky, he emphasized that the interests of England, an “island state” and Germany, a “powerful continental power,” contradict each other and between them is inevitable "a life-and-death struggle." He wrote:

“The central factor in the period of world history we are living through is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed struggle between them, the outcome of which, in all likelihood, will be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as a great power, sooner or later, will turn out to be impossible. Indeed, on the one hand, an island state, whose world significance is based on dominion over the seas, world trade and countless colonies. On the other hand, it is a powerful continental power, whose limited territory is not sufficient for an increased population. Therefore, she directly and openly declared that her future on the seas, with fabulous speed, developed a huge world trade, built, for her protection, a formidable navy and the famous brand Made in Germany created a mortal danger to the industrial and economic well-being of her rival. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and a life-and-death struggle is inevitable between her and Germany.

Upcoming as a result of noted rivalry armed conflict can by no means be reduced to a single combat between England and Germany. Their strengths are too unequal and, at the same time, they are not sufficiently vulnerable to each other ... There is no doubt, therefore, that England will try to resort to the means she has tested with success more than once and decide on an armed action only by ensuring participation in the war on her own. side of the strategically stronger powers. And since Germany, in turn, will undoubtedly not be isolated, the future Anglo-German war will turn into an armed clash between two groups of powers, one adhering to the German, the other to the English orientation.

The author of the document had no doubts about the composition of the groupings: "Russia, France and England on the one hand, Germany, Austria and Turkey on the other." In his opinion, Italy would rather join the first coalition than the last, just like Serbia and Montenegro. But Bulgaria will take the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. As for Romania, it "will remain neutral until the scales of happiness tip to one side or the other."

The accuracy of the forecast regarding the behavior of Bucharest is amazing. At the beginning of the First World War, the Romanians took a wait-and-see attitude, conducting a long diplomatic bargain with both warring factions. True, Romania signed an agreement with Russia already in September 1914, promising to observe benevolent neutrality. In fact, neutrality in Romanian allowed the transport of Austro-Hungarian and German goods through its territory to Turkey. Only in August 1916 did Romania enter the war on the side of the Entente, declaring war on Austria-Hungary. The troops of the Central Powers very quickly inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romanians, capturing two-thirds of the country. In December 1916 they took Bucharest.

The royal family took refuge in Russia. For the latter, Romania's entry into the war only worsened general environment, lengthening the front by almost half a thousand kilometers. A year later, Bucharest, taking advantage of the revolution that had begun in Russia, “thanked” its saviors by seizing Bessarabia.

However, let us return to Durnovo's Note. Pyotr Nikolaevich did not hide his skepticism about the emerging after graduation Russo-Japanese War rapprochement between St. Petersburg and London, since he did not find any benefits for the Russian Empire in its union with Foggy Albion: rapprochement with England. The only plus - improved relations with Japan - is hardly a consequence of the Russian-English rapprochement ...

It did not give us anything in the sense of strengthening our position either in Manchuria, or in Mongolia, or even in the Uryankhai region, where the uncertainty of our situation indicates that the agreement with England, in any case, did not untie the hands of our diplomacy. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with a sharp rebuff from England ...

From the moment of rapprochement with this latter, we have become involved in a number of incomprehensible attempts to impose on the Persian population a constitution that is completely unnecessary to them, and, as a result, we ourselves contributed to the overthrow of the monarch devoted to Russia, for the sake of inveterate opponents. In a word, not only did we not gain anything, but, on the contrary, we lost everything along the line, destroying our prestige, and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers who were treacherously killed and, for the sake of England, not even avenged. But the most negative consequences of the rapprochement with England - and consequently of the fundamental divergence from Germany - affected the Middle East ...

The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which she, not without reason, sees her only patroness. Indeed, the Russian-English rapprochement, obviously, for Turkey is tantamount to the refusal of England from its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles for us, and the formation, under the auspices of Russia, of the Balkan Union was a direct threat to the further existence of Turkey as a European state. So, the Anglo-Russian rapprochement has not brought anything really useful for us so far. In the future, it inevitably promises us an armed clash with Germany.

And in it, Durnovo predicted further, the main burden “will undoubtedly fall on our lot, since England is hardly capable of taking a broad part in a continental war, and France, poor in human material, with those colossal losses that will accompany the war under modern conditions military equipment is likely to stick to strictly defensive tactics. The role of a battering ram, penetrating the very thickness of the German defense, will go to us ... "

Union with Republican France Durnovo also did not welcome. Germany was clearly closer to him. Moreover, he did not see serious contradictions between the Russian Empire and Germany: “We do not feel an excess of population that requires expansion of the territory, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznan, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when even with Russian Poles it is not so easy for us to manage. Why revive the centrifugal aspirations, which have not died down to this day in the Privislinsky region, by attracting the restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles to the Russian state, whose national demands are not able to drown out even a firmer than Russian, German government? The same is true for Galicia. It is clearly unprofitable for us, in the name of the idea of ​​national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for an insignificant handful of Russian Galicians in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, Ukrainianized Uniates will we get? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepa movement is not terrible with us now, but it should not be allowed to grow, increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, since in this movement there is an undoubted germ of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, under favorable conditions, which can reach completely unexpected dimensions.

Answering the question whether Russia is ready for a confrontation with Germany and its allies, Durnovo categorically stated: “This question must, without hesitation, be answered in the negative. Less than anyone, I am inclined to deny much that has been done for our defense since the Japanese war. There is no doubt, however, that this much is insufficient given the unprecedented scale in which the future war will inevitably proceed.

Peter Nikolayevich was especially worried about the condition of the Russian railways. He stated: "The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways have a rolling stock, perhaps sufficient for normal traffic, but inconsistent with the colossal requirements that will be presented to us in the event of a European war."

And so it happened. However, one clarification is worth making. During the First World War, the lack of railways had a greater impact not on military transportation, but on the transportation of food and other civilian goods within the Russian Empire. Historian Irina Belova recalls: “One of the reasons for the increase in food prices was the congestion of railways with military cargo, which caused long delays in private cargo at departure stations. From the very beginning of the war, literally from its first days, the province faced the problem of food delivery... In general, in Russia, the transportation of civilian goods by rail in 1914 decreased by 17%, and in 1915 - by more than a third compared to pre-war period."

The rapid rise in prices, the increase in signs of economic disorder and the aggravation of socio-economic problems caused the anxiety of the front-line soldiers to grow with each passing day for their relatives and friends. In December 1916, the soldiers of the 17th Siberian Rifle Regiment, who refused to go on the attack, shouted in response to the exhortations of the command: “We are robbed everywhere, family houses are starving, the last is taken away from the poor, everything is left from the rich.”

Not only the defeat, but also the victory of the Entente did not promise Russia, according to Durnovo, any tangible benefits:

“This war will require such huge expenses, which will many times exceed the more than dubious benefits ...
After all, there is no doubt that the war will require expenditures exceeding the limited financial resources of Russia. We will have to turn to the credit of the allied and neutral states, and it will not be provided in vain. It is not even worth talking about what will happen if the war ends badly for us. The financial and economic consequences of the defeat can neither be accounted for nor even foreseen, and, no doubt, will be reflected in the complete collapse of our entire national economy. But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects: a completely ruined Germany will not be able to compensate us for the costs incurred. A peace treaty dictated in the interests of England will not enable her to recover economically enough to cover our military expenses even later. The little that may be able to be snatched from it will have to be shared with the allies, and our share will be negligible, in comparison with military costs, crumbs. Meanwhile, war loans will have to be paid not without pressure from the Allies. After all, after the collapse of German power, they will no longer need us. Moreover, our increased political power as a result of the victory will induce them to weaken us, at least economically. And inevitably, even after the victorious end of the war, we will fall into the same financial and economic bondage to our creditors, in comparison with which our current dependence on German capital will seem like an ideal.

Note that this was written not by a Bolshevik or a Socialist-Revolutionary, but by a Conservative.

The former Minister of Internal Affairs saw the socio-political consequences of Russia's participation in the coming war even more gloomy. He predicted that “in the event of failure, the possibility of which, when fighting such an adversary as Germany, one cannot but foresee, a social revolution, in its most extreme manifestations, is inevitable with us.

As already indicated, it will begin with the fact that all failures will be attributed to the government. A furious campaign against him will begin in legislative institutions, as a result of which revolutionary uprisings will begin in the country. These latter will immediately put forward socialist slogans, the only ones that can stir up and group broad sections of the population, first a black redistribution, and then a general division of all values ​​and property. The defeated army, which, moreover, during the war has lost its most reliable cadre composition, and is seized for the most part by the spontaneously general peasant desire for land, will turn out to be too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. Legislative institutions and oppositional-intelligent parties deprived of real authority in the eyes of the people will be unable to restrain the divergent popular waves raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen.

Very little time will pass, and events in Russia will begin to develop according to this scenario. Durnovo's warning was not heeded by the emperor and his entourage.

Pyotr Durnovo's note, not being known to the general public, has long attracted the attention of serious researchers from different countries. For example, its fragments can be read in Henry Kissinger's book Diplomacy. And the historian Paul Robinson, who teaches at the High School of Public and international relations University of Ottawa, calling the Durnovo Memo "one of the most remarkable conservative anti-war documents." He also noted: “The note to Durnovo did not appear out of nowhere. He wrote it immediately after the resignation of Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov from the post of prime minister in February 1914, and it became part of the deliberate efforts of conservative leaders who sought to reorient foreign and domestic policy ... These efforts were unsuccessful. The alliance with France was actively supported by the bureaucracy and those close to the king, who had good strategic and financial reasons for this ...

The accuracy of Durnovo's assessments in comparison with others is explained precisely by the fact that he refused to subordinate interests to feelings and moods. Supporters of the Russo-French alliance were irritated by the way Germany humiliated Russia (in their view), and in the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 they saw an opportunity to restore Russia's greatness. Durnovo looked at her with more material point view of national interests, made calculations and came to the conclusion that the war is meaningless.

Durnovo's prophecies began to come true during his lifetime. Two months before his death, speaking for the last time in the State Council, the seriously ill leader of the right group stated: “We, as always, were very poorly prepared in the war in all branches of military and civil administration ... We are all to blame for this, literate Russians.” Noting that he would not name the most guilty, Durnovo added that this was not required, “i.e. because the root of evil is not in them, but in the fact that we are afraid to give orders.”

The author of the Note did not have a chance to live up to the most convincing and impressive evidence of the validity of his forecasts and warnings. Perhaps he did not regret it.

PS. Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo died on September 11, 1915. “The reaction has lost one of its most devoted servants, the Russian public sees its worst enemy descending into the grave,” wrote the liberal newspaper Utro Rossii (founded by the Ryabushinsky brothers) without concealing joy. In turn, on the occasion of the death of Durnovo, the former Narodnaya Volya member Lev Tikhomirov, who by that time had become one of the largest conservative thinkers in Russia, noted in his diary that Durnovo was “a remarkably intelligent and insightful person (he had never seen his equal in life)”.

Notes

1. What the “Ukrainian or Mazepa movement” resulted in 100 years later, we can see by observing the events taking place in Ukraine.

Source - http://russkie.o rg/index.php?mod ule=fullitem&id=31802