AT Eastern Europe Gradually, dissatisfaction with repressions and the ideological diktat of the authorities grew. It first manifested itself in the GDR, where success in economic recovery was very modest compared to West Germany. In 1953, after the death of I.V. Stalin in the GDR, demonstrations began demanding better living conditions and a change in the political regime. They were accompanied by the seizure of government and party institutions. The speeches were suppressed with the help of Soviet troops.
In 1956, after Stalin's personality cult was exposed by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Information Bureau was dissolved. USSR and Yugoslavia restored diplomatic relations. This gave rise to Eastern European countries ah hope that Soviet leadership relinquish tight control over their domestic politics.
The theorists of the communist parties (Milovan Djilas in Yugoslavia, Leszek Kolakowski in Poland, Ernst Bloch in the GDR) tried to rethink new phenomena in socio-economic life developed countries West. Demands began to be put forward for an end to repressions, the resignation of the leaders of the ruling parties, appointed at the direction of I.V. Stalin.
In most states, the removal of the Stalinists from power was peaceful. However, Poland was not without strikes by workers who protested against wage cuts.
Most acute situation formed in Hungary. In 1956, mass rallies in Budapest grew into an anti-communist democratic revolution. A wave of reprisals against communists and employees of state security agencies swept across the country. Imre Nagy, who headed the government, did not object to the restoration of a multi-party system, announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. The USSR intervened in the Hungarian events. Budapest was taken by storm, more than 200 thousand people fled the country. I. Nagy was arrested and executed in 1958 for "organizing a conspiracy and betraying the Motherland." This sentence was declared illegal only in 1989.
After the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet leadership became very suspicious of any changes in the Eastern European countries. As a result, economic reforms aimed at increasing the flexibility of the planning system, expanding the economic independence of enterprises, and deepening participation in the international division of labor were carried out indecisively, inconsistently, and steadily lagged behind. The CMEA mechanisms worked less and less effectively.
An extremely complex system of mutual settlements, the need to approve any transaction at the level of top political leadership hampered the development of integration. The results were not slow to tell. If in the 1950s the average annual GDP growth rate in Eastern European countries reached 6.9% (only Japan and the USSR had the best performance), then in the 1960s. they amounted to 3.6%, in the 1970s - 2.3%, that is, less than in most Western European states.
Especially a difficult situation formed in the GDR in the early 1960s. Conducted in 1957-1960. forced collectivization, attempts by the authorities to "catch up and overtake" the FRG by increasing labor productivity led to mass discontent. In 1961, about 207 thousand people, mostly young specialists, left the country through the territory of West Berlin. To stop this, on August 13, 1961, the construction of the Berlin Wall began, dividing the Eastern and West Berlin. Relations between the USSR and the GDR with Western countries became aggravated. The wall has become a symbol of lack of freedom in the eyes of Europeans.
The Soviet leadership again showed a negative attitude towards any changes in Eastern Europe in 1968. At the initiative of the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, an attempt was made to move to human face". She was also stopped by force. In a country where freedom of speech appeared, independent political parties began to take shape, the prospects for holding economic reforms, entered the troops of the ATS countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland). A. Dubcek and his supporters were removed from all party and government posts many of them emigrated.
After the events of the Prague Spring Soviet government declared the "right" of the USSR to interfere in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies in order to defend socialism. In Western countries, this approach is called the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Its proclamation was due to two reasons.
First, ideological considerations. Recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU among the peoples of the USSR as well.
Secondly, in the context of the Cold War and the split of Europe into two military-political bloc the weakening of one of them turned out to be a gain for the other. The exit of Hungary or Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact (and this was one of the demands of the reformers) would lead to a violation of the balance of power in Europe. The historical memory of invasions from the West prompted the Soviet government to strive to ensure that the troops of a potential enemy, which was considered the NATO bloc, were as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. Many Eastern Europeans felt like hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation. They understood that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the USA, the territory of Eastern Europe would become a battlefield for interests alien to them.
Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia remained difficult. During the years of "excommunication" from socialism, this country has established economic ties with Western states. It was not part of any military blocs, declaring itself a neutral state. After the restoration of relations with the USSR, Yugoslavia again began to be recognized as a socialist country. However, the economic independence of enterprises, a high degree of ideological freedom still caused Soviet leaders discontent.
almost immediately after its establishment. Death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, which gave rise to hopes for change in the socialist camp, caused an uprising in the GDR. The debunking of the personality cult of Stalin by the 20th Congress of the CPSU was followed by the replacement of the leaders of the ruling parties in most Eastern European countries, nominated by him, and the exposure of the crimes they had committed.
The liquidation of the Cominform and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over the internal. Politics of Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, the new leaders and theorists of the communist parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Hungary took the path of rethinking the experience of developing their own countries, the interests of workers. Movement. However, these attempts irritated the leaders of the CPSU. The transition to a pluralistic democracy in 1956 in Hungary developed into a violent anti-communist revolution, accompanied by the defeat of the state security agencies. The revolution was suppressed by Soviet troops, who took Budapest with battles. The captured leaders of the reformers were executed. The attempt made in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to move to the model of socialism "with a human face" was also thwarted by armed force. After the events in Czechoslovakia, the leadership of the USSR began to emphasize that it was their duty to defend "real socialism." The theory of “real socialism”, which justifies the “right” of the USSR to carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the “Brezhnev doctrine” in Western countries. Many Eastern Europeans felt like hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation. They understood that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the USA, the territory of Eastern Europe would become a battlefield for interests alien to them. In the 1970s In many countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were gradually carried out, some opportunities for free market relations opened up, and trade and economic ties with the West became more active. Changes, however, were limited, carried out with an eye on the position of the leadership of the USSR. They acted as a form of compromise between the desire of the ruling parties of Eastern European countries to maintain at least a minimum internal. Support and intolerance of the CPSU ideologists to any changes in the allied countries. The turning point was the events in Poland in 1980-1981, where an independent trade union "Solidarity" was formed, which almost immediately took an anti-communist position. Millions of representatives of the working class of Poland became its members. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. The crisis found a temporary solution with the imposition of martial law and the establishment of the General's authoritarian rule. Jaruzelsky, who combined the suppression of protests with moderate economic reforms. A powerful impetus to transformations in Eastern Europe was given by the processes of perestroika in the USSR. In some cases, the leaders of the ruling parties themselves initiated the changes, fearing innovations, but considering it their duty to follow the example of the CPSU. In others, once it became clear that Soviet Union no longer intends to guarantee the inviolability by force of arms ruling regimes in Eastern Europe, advocates of reforms became more active. Opposition, anti-communist political parties and movements arose. Political parties, for a long time who played the role of junior partners of the communists, began to leave the bloc with them.
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General "diseases"
Of course, such heated clashes as in Budapest are rare. But, on the other hand, in Lithuania, for example, relatively recently it came to the impeachment of the president. In Poland were mass actions disobedience, covering entire regions. All Eastern European countries are of the same type and suffer from approximately the same diseases. And the political systems of all are built in approximately the same way: post-communists who have grown out of the former Soviet era of the “nomenklatura” oppose right-wing nationalists.
Back in the early 1990s. in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic countries, easier access to the markets of Western Europe was opened, which allowed them to sufficiently compensate for the losses from the loss of the Russian market. The states of Central and Eastern Europe were admitted to the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF. However, as soon as Western companies mastered new markets, they immediately captured all the leading industries, pushing local manufacturers into the background. As a result, the prices of everything from food and clothing to gasoline and the price of a room in hotels of any number of stars have risen in the new EU member states.
At the same time, all (without exception) countries of Eastern Europe lost almost all of their large-scale industry and, as a result, received very high level unemployment, which, after joining the EU, "results" in the mass migration of cheap labor from Eastern Europe to "old Europe". In some cases (as in Lithuania and Estonia, for example), over 10% of the population has already migrated. Almost all Eastern European youth are "sitting on their suitcases" ready to fill vacancies in Paris and London as plumbers and taxi drivers. As a result, in all Eastern European countries, the authority nation states and especially the national elites are shockingly low.
Anti-system sentiment
So, the Eastern European countries are struck by a deep moral and systemic crisis. There is also a crisis of European institutions of power, which are not able to insure the citizens of the EU member states against the loss of real controllability. As a result, “anti-systemic” protest moods are trying to break through to the surface everywhere in Eastern Europe in one form or another. Usually politicians who use them are called "populists". Paksas and Uspaskikh in Lithuania, Lepper and both Kaczynski brothers (according to at least, before coming to power) - in Poland, the current nationalists in power in Slovakia - everywhere the forces that play on the distrust of the people in relation to their elites and institutions of power in general take over. While there is no single ideology for this social protest. In some countries, this protest takes the form of left-wing populism. In others, the right. Often people withdraw into private life and become fundamentally apolitical. But in every country there is already a noticeable electoral field, which of the same type demands that politics be carried out in the interests of their nations seriously, and not in the interests of abstract liberal values or some corporate groups that are almost everywhere called the same - "mafia". The problem, however, is that, having come to power, the “populists” very quickly adopt the leadership style of the very “pragmatists” whom they previously so zealously criticized and accused of corruption ...
There is another important internal factor for all Eastern European countries: the most dynamic of them left for the old Europe, those who remained at home - or at least show some activity - mainly those who could not leave. In a sense, these countries have become socio-cultural "sumps". The level of political culture and understanding of one's place in the world in the societies of these countries has really fallen very much. In the wake of instability, the voices of the ultra-right, in fact, outright neo-Nazis, are being heard louder and louder.
Second class countries
As for the migration sphere, there have been no visible changes at all. Visas for citizens of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were canceled back in 1990, and for the Baltic states and Slovenia - a year later, after the recognition of their independence. The main thing that the new member countries hoped for in this part was the free search for work in Western Europe. However, nothing happened here. Thanks to the efforts of Germany and Austria, full-fledged work visas have been preserved for those who want to find work in Western Europe, which must be issued at consulates. Of course, it is much easier for a Pole to do this than for a Russian, but still. They were not accepted into the Schengen Agreement either - border control both on the old border of the European Union and between the new countries was preserved, and in some places, like on the Czech-Slovak border, it even intensified, because the Czech Republic and Slovakia were ordered to break the customs union, concluded immediately after the collapse of the united Czechoslovakia. These half-hearted decisions of the European Union once again prove that the majority of Eastern European countries in the EU are not ready to be treated as equals.
An unpleasant surprise
But besides this, the Eastern Europeans were in for another unpleasant surprise - from 2006 they will be obliged to accept some of the refugees from third world countries that were previously in Western Europe. In all cases it will be 2% of total strength the population of the country. Most of the Arabs, Afghans, Negroes, Hindus and Chinese will go to Poland - up to 750 thousand. Czech Republic and Hungary - more than 200 thousand, Slovakia - over 100 thousand, Lithuania - 75 thousand, Latvia - 55 thousand, Slovenia - 40 thousand, Estonia - 35 thousand. national minorities in some of them, new citizens will become for them a real "tub of cold water".
The most telling thing here is the numbers. Thus, according to the European Commission, only 4 newcomer countries exceeded the 50% threshold of the average EU standard of living: Slovenia - 69%, Cyprus - 63%, the Czech Republic - 59% and Malta - 53%. But the indicators of the rest of the former socialist countries fluctuate around 40%. Hungary and Estonia are slightly above this bar, Poland and Lithuania are slightly lower. And Latvia and Slovakia generally have per capita income levels of 30 and 28% of the EU average. So, having expanded, the European Union noticeably became impoverished, and the obstacles remaining in the way of citizens of the countries of the "New Europe" only confirm this.
Shadows of the past
The enlargement of the European Union has once again placed on the agenda in Eastern Europe "sore issues" stemming from the past. Thus, Hungary is considering the possibility of expanding its borders at the expense of adjacent territories inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. In addition to the 11 million Hungarians in Hungary, another 2 million live in Romania, over 600,000 in Slovakia and over 400,000 in Serbia. In the first two cases, they make up to 10% or more of the population of these countries. Considering that ex-Prime Minister Viktor Orban, known for his nationalist statements, receives more than 40% of the votes in each election, it is easy to guess that the Hungarian voter is not opposed to using EU membership to expand the borders of his own country.
Much more serious is the fact that the European Union can become a tool for revising the results of the Second World War for Germany and Austria. Even at the stage of negotiations, both of them, especially Austria, demanded that Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia cancel the decrees according to which millions were evicted from their territory 60 years ago as Nazi accomplices. ethnic Germans. The issue of compensation for their lost property or even their return to the homeland of their ancestors is one of the main points of the program not only of the radical Austrian Freedom Party or the German National Democrats, but also of the respectable German CDU / CSU and the Austrian People's Party. The latter is already in power, and the return to power in Germany of the Christian Democrats is likely to happen as early as next year.
And the question of the eviction of the Germans will certainly come up very quickly, because after Angela Merkel, the head of the government of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, the representative of the land that accepted the largest number settlers. It is the Bavarian Christian Socialists, among whom Stoiber, who are already now the main heralds of the revision " eastern politics". And not only Austria, but also Italy, which puts forward the same demands on Slovenia, can become their ally. It turns out that instead of being included in a single European family, Eastern Europe can get a new “Drang nach Osten - an onslaught to the east” with a possible revision of the borders of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and Slovenia in favor of Germany and Austria. In general, the new EU members did not become subjects in the global political process, remaining its object. The United States, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, argued for their inclusion in their sphere of influence. This is where the main problem of the EU lies - double and triple standards, the absence of a clearly defined goal of uniting Europe and its future borders. Energy without a vector almost always leads to destruction. Whether this vector will appear, only time will tell.
Causes of the crisis: Adoption of plans for the construction of socialism since 1945. Dissatisfaction with the control over civil society, deteriorating living conditions Thaw in the USSR. Liberalization of foreign policy. The policy of public diplomacy. The systemic crisis of socialism, suppressed attempts at reform and democratization. Increased debt to Western banks. Perestroika in the USSR
Hungary 1956 November 4 began Soviet operation"Whirlwind". The main objects in Budapest were seized, members of the government of Imre Nagy took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. However, the detachments of the Hungarian national guard and individual army units continued to resist the Soviet troops.
Hungary 1956 Soviet troops carried out artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent sweeps by infantry forces with the support of tanks. The main centers of resistance were the working-class suburbs of Budapest, where the local councils were able to lead a more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.
Hungary 1956 By November 10, workers' councils and student groups appealed to the Soviet command with a proposal for a ceasefire. Armed resistance ceased. Marshal Georgy Zhukov "for the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion" received the 4th star of the hero of the Soviet Union.
« Prague Spring”- uprising in Czechoslovakia In the 60s. The world communist system entered a period of protracted crisis. In 1968 Czechoslovakia entered the path of reforms. A. Dubcek announced the promotion of market mechanisms, self-management of enterprises, restructuring within the HRC
Albania withdrew from the ATS, and China, Romania, SFRY and North. Korea moved even further away from the USSR. Soon the "Brezhnev Doctrine" was born - it provided for the strengthening of the role of the USSR and the limitation of the sovereignty of the socialist countries. But that didn't solve the problems. In 1979, war broke out between China and Vietnam, and in 1981 martial law had to be introduced in Poland to prevent the coming to power of the leaders of the Solidarity trade union. Tanks in Warsaw. The crisis of socialism in the 70s
"Revolutions" "Velvet Revolutions" In the 1980s, a wave of "velvet revolutions" swept across Eastern Europe... Democratic elections were held in Poland, and in 1990 L. Walesa became president. In 1990, K. Gross became the leader of Hungary. He transformed the Communist Party into a socialist one. The Democratic Forum won the 1990 elections
Berlin Wall Foreign political tensions and higher wages in West Berlin encouraged thousands of GDR citizens to leave for the West. In total, over 207,000 people left the country in 1961. In July 1961 alone, more than 30,000 East Germans fled the country. They were predominantly young and skilled professionals.
Berlin Wall Outraged East German authorities accused West Berlin and the FRG of "human trafficking", "poaching" personnel and attempts to disrupt them economic plans. In the context of the aggravation of the situation around Berlin, the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries decided to close the border. On August 13, 1961, the construction of the wall began. August 13, 1961
"Velvet revolutions" In 1990, the dissident J. Zhelev became the president of Bulgaria. In 1989, V. Havel came to power in Czechoslovakia. In 1989, E. Honecker retired from the GDR. The CDU won the elections in 1990 In December 1989, the Romanian dictator N. Ceausescu was overthrown In Albania, democratic reforms began in the late 1980s. Romanian Rebels 1989
Many segments of the population lost from the reforms that had begun, and Eastern Europe turned out to be dependent on the West - yes. In August 1990, G. Kohl and L. de Maizieres signed an agreement on the unification of Germany. The new governments demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories. As a result, in 1990 Warsaw Pact and CMEA were disbanded. and in December 1991 Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich dissolved the USSR. Map of Europe in n. 90s "Velvet Revolutions"
As a result of the reforms, age-old conflicts were revealed. In 1993, Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1990, the disintegration of the SFRY began, which took on a military character. Serbia, headed by S. Miloshevich, advocated the preservation of unity, but in 1991 Slovenia and Croatia left the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of war. In 1992, religious clashes broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SFRY President Slobodan Milosevic. "Velvet Revolutions"
The FRY supported the Bosnian Serbs, and the West supported the Muslims and Croats. Both sides carried out ethnic cleansing. In 1995, NATO intervened in the war, bombing Serb positions. In 1995, as a result of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed single state. All peoples could elect their own administration, but could not secede from the republic Refugees from Sarajevo "Velvet revolutions"
As a result " shock therapy» The Czech Republic and Hungary overcame the crisis, but Bulgaria and Romania failed to do so. In Poland, L. Walesa lost in the elections to the socialist A. Kwasniewski. In 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia want to follow their example, which Russia opposes. Building of the Hungarian Parliament "Velvet Revolutions"
In 1875, one of the cardinal problems became aggravated international politics- Oriental, or, better to say, the Middle East question. It was "the question of maintaining Turkish rule in the Slavic, Greek and Albanian regions, as well as the dispute over the possession of an entrance to the Black Sea." In the mid-70s, Turkish oppression caused another explosion of national protest. A new one has begun political crisis Turkish Empire, which lasted about three years - until 1878.
In the summer of 1875, in the Slavic regions in the extreme North-West of the Ottoman Empire, first in Herzegovina, and then in Bosnia, there was an uprising of the Christian population, mostly peasants, against the feudal-absolutist and national-religious oppression of Sultan Turkey. The rebels fought for national independence. They demanded the land, which was in the hands of the Muslim nobility. The uprising met with warm sympathy in Serbia and Montenegro.
However, the outcome of the struggle Balkan peoples depended not only on their own efforts, but also on the international situation, on the clash of interests of the major European powers in the so-called Eastern question. These states primarily included England, Austria-Hungary and Russia.
British diplomacy still acted as a defender of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but this traditional means of counteracting Russia's foreign policy plans also served as a cover for its own English plans territorial expansion in the Middle East.
The South Slavic national movement was directed primarily against Turkey. But it also posed a danger to Austria-Hungary. Several million South Slavs lived under the scepter of the Habsburgs. Every success in business national liberation of the southern Slavs from the oppression of Turkey meant the approach of the day when the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary was to be accomplished. Dominating vast territories with a Slavic and Romanian population, the Austrian bourgeoisie and Hungarian landlords, in the event of the triumph of the Slavic cause, risked losing most their lands, markets, wealth and power. The mass movement of peoples, which undermined the empire of the sultans, was one of the manifestations bourgeois revolution and struggle against feudalism. It caused the intervention of the great powers and vigorous activity their diplomacy. The goals of the powers were different.
To prevent release Slavic peoples Slavic peoples, the Austro-Hungarian government, under the influence of the Austrian bourgeoisie and the Magyar nobility, sought to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and hinder the liberation from under its yoke of both the southern Slavs and Romanians.
On the contrary, Russia patronized the Slavic national movement. The real basis of this policy was that the Russian government saw the Slavs as allies against the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. These two multinational states were the enslavers of the southern Slavs. But they were also Russia's opponents in the struggle for dominance in the Middle East and especially in the Balkan Peninsula. Russian influence in the Balkans was the most important obstacle to the success of the Austrian-Magyar expansion in the area. It was main threat for the dilapidated power of the sultans.
The most important interests of the tsarist government in the Middle East were concentrated on the question of the straits. In this era, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles were of the greatest importance for the entire south of Russia. passed through them the only way out for the entire maritime trade of South Russia and through them the enemy navy could penetrate to the South Russian coast - following the example of how this happened during the Crimean War. If the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, the straits would have lost their age-old master, weakened and therefore safe for tsarist Russia.
Who would become the new ruler of this key strategic point and the most important trade route? The pretender to dominance in the straits was England, which aspired to prevailing influence in the Ottoman Empire on the routes from Europe to India that passed through its lands. The main rival of England was itself royal Russia. Each of the contenders sought to establish his dominance in the straits and not allow his opponent to do so. These goals could be achieved either through the direct capture of the straits, or through a deal with the Sultan, who was ready for a lot at a critical moment in order to maintain power or its semblance. Examples of such a decision were given by the Treaty of Unkiar-Iskeles or the leading position occupied by England in Constantinople during the Crimean War.
The dominant influence in the Balkans ensured strategic dominance over the European coast of the straits, or at least made it possible to keep them under threat and, therefore, under some control. In view of this, tsarist Russia did not intend to allow Austria-Hungary or England to dominate the Balkans, and they, in turn, did not want the establishment of the predominant influence of Russia there. But if Austria-Hungary opposed the liberation of the Slavs from the Turks for fear of a precedent for their own Slavic subjects, then Russia supported the Slavic peoples in their struggle for liberation. The level of support, however, has changed. Its intensity largely depended on changes in Turkey's position and the atmosphere of Russian-Turkish relations.
For Austria-Hungary, the significance of the Balkan Peninsula was different than for Russia. For its ruling classes, it was not so important that the Balkans constituted approaches to the straits and to the Turkish capital. First of all, influence there was necessary to curb the national liberation movement, and then in view of the growing importance of the market of the Balkan countries for Austrian industry.
There was also a difference in the nature of Balkan interests between the various ruling classes of Austria-Hungary. Fighting against Slavic freedom and Russian influence in the Balkans, the Magyar nobility did not particularly strive at that time for the direct annexation of the Balkan regions. The Magyar nobility saw its main task on the Balkan Peninsula in strangling the national liberation movements.
As for the Austrian bourgeoisie, it shared with the Magyar landlords the hatred of the Slavs and the fear of growing specific gravity Slavs within the dual Austro-Hungarian state. But, on the other hand, Austrian capital embarked on the path of expansion in the Balkans. Perhaps the main means of penetration there in the early 70s was for him to obtain railway concessions and build railways - first of all, big highway to the Turkish capital.
Of all the Balkan countries, Serbia was in the greatest economic dependence on Austria-Hungary in the 70s. The bulk of Serbian exports went either to Austria-Hungary or through Austro-Hungarian ports. Serbia had no access to the sea. To influence Serbia, Austria-Hungary had strong means pressure: how to build railway to the Aegean Sea, to Thessaloniki? Through Bosnia or through Belgrade? This or that decision of many similar questions was of vital importance for little Serbia. The Serbian government sought help against the Austro-Hungarian dominance from Russia.
When the Herzegovina uprising began, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Gyula Andrássy, told the High Port - that was the name of the government of the Ottoman Empire - that he considered these riots as an internal Turkish affair, so he did not intend to interfere in it or to embarrass the military in any way. actions of the Turks against the rebels.
However, Andrássy failed to hold on to this position. There were influential elements in Austria who hoped to solve the South Slavic question differently: they intended to include the South Slavic regions western half The Balkans became part of the Habsburg state, starting with the capture of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, along with Austria and Hungary, these regions would be included as the third component to the Habsburg monarchy. From a dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary would have turned into a triune state. The replacement of dualism by trialism was supposed to weaken the influence of the Magyars in the empire.
The supporters of this program, unlike the Hungarians and Germans, were ready to agree that eastern part Russia received the Balkans. They recommended making a deal with her. This point of view was supported by the military, clerical and feudal circles of the Austrian half of the empire.
The Emperor of Austria-Hungary, Franz Joseph, really wanted to at least somehow compensate himself for the losses suffered in Italy and Germany, so he accepted the ideas of annexation with great sympathy. The politicians who preached these ideas vigorously encouraged the national liberation movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. German government, which at that time was preparing an alliance with Austria-Hungary, also supported its expansionist aspirations in the Balkans. At the same time, it pushed against Turkey and Russia, because. hoped that if Russia concentrated its attention on the Balkans, as well as in the Transcaucasus, and if, as Bismarck put it, "the Russian steam locomotive will release its steam somewhere far from the German border", then Germany will have a free hand in relation to France.
However, the Eastern crisis also posed a certain danger to Bismarck. It consisted in the possibility of an Austro-Russian war. Bismarck really wanted Russian-Turkish, and even more Anglo-Russian war, but he was afraid of a complete rupture between Russia and Austria. This would force him to make a choice between them. Bismarck considered it impossible to take the side of Russia or simply observe neutrality. In this case, Austria-Hungary, as the weakest side, would either be defeated, or would go to complete capitulation to Russia. In both cases, this would mean the strengthening of Russia, which in no way satisfied Bismarck.
On the other hand, he did not want to take the side of Austria against Russia either. He was firmly convinced that the Russo-German war would inevitably be complicated by the intervention of France and turn into a difficult war on two fronts.
Bismarck worked hard to achieve an Austro-Russian agreement based on the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary. At the same time, Austria could round off its possessions by capturing Bosnia, while Russia would regain Bessarabia, and at the same time would somewhat weaken its forces by a war with Turkey.
Bismarck believed that England would agree to such a solution, provided that she herself received Egypt. By pushing England to seize Egypt, Bismarck hoped to quarrel her with France. This prevented the possibility of a repetition of British interference in Franco-German relations. So, behind the scenes, Bismarck carefully weaved an intricate diplomatic web.
The Russian government considered it necessary to help the rebellious Slavs. It hoped in this way to restore among them its prestige, undermined by the defeat in the Crimean war. However, the Russian government was by no means willing to start serious conflict with Austria-Hungary. In an effort to maintain the authority of Russia among the Slavs and at the same time not to quarrel with Austria-Hungary, the Russian government decided to intervene in Balkan affairs in contact with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
This policy was in line with the principles of the agreement of the three emperors - Franz Joseph, Wilhelm I and Alexander II (1872).
Joint actions began with the fact that Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, with the consent of the other three great powers of Europe, proposed to Turkey to send an international commission consisting of consuls of six powers to the rebel areas to mediate between the Turkish government and the rebels. Turkey agreed. However, the mediation activity of the consuls did not lead to reconciliation of the parties.
In the Russian ruling circles, as well as in the Austro-Hungarian ones, there was no unity. They had a grouping that gravitated toward Slavophilism and opposed Gorchakov's policy of the "Union of Three Emperors" and the agreement with "Europe" on the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula. The Slavophiles, acting as friends of the Slavs, hoped to complete the liberation of the Slavic peoples with the help of Russia and rally the young states around her. Support for the "Slavic cause", according to the leading figures of Slavophilism, was supposed to "unite Russia" around the tsarist throne, in other words, weaken the opposition to tsarism and the revolutionary movement that was rapidly growing under the banner of populism.
A different position in Balkan affairs was taken by the moderately liberal bourgeoisie, the big St. Petersburg banks and the stock exchange. Associated with railway grunderism and foreign capital and interested in attracting it to Russia, these circles stood at that moment for the preservation of peace and for actions in the Balkans only in agreement with "Europe", which doomed Russian diplomacy to extreme moderation in the sense of supporting the Slavic movement. The poor state of the state treasury demanded from the tsarist government exactly the kind of policy that the St. Petersburg stock exchange wanted.
There were also opponents of the Slavophile policy in reactionary circles. In the ranks of Russian diplomacy, a typical representative of conservative reactionaries was former boss"Third Branch" Ambassador to London Count Pyotr Shuvalov. The Slavophils considered the ambassador in Constantinople, Count Ignatiev, to be their support. He flaunted "Slavic sympathies," but his real policy was far from truly Slavophile. Ignatiev sought to resolve Middle Eastern problems, including the question of the Bosnian-Herzegovina uprising, through a separate Russian-Turkish agreement. He thought of a Russian-Turkish alliance, like the Unkiar-Iskeles Treaty, as the basis of Russian influence in Turkey and the Balkans. It was not without the influence of Ignatiev that the Sultan issued a firman dated December 12, 1875, in which he announced reforms, including the equalization of Christians in rights with Muslims, the reduction of taxes, etc., which was supposed to calm the rebels without the help of the great powers. This policy was also unsuccessful, as were the mediation attempts of the consuls: the rebels did not trust the promises of the Turkish government.
Tsar Alexander II and Gorchakov, his foreign minister, shared the fear of war and its possible consequences. It seemed to Gorchakov that something could be done for the Slavs, and at the same time to increase the prestige of Russia without the risk of war, if we acted in concert with Austria-Hungary.
Andrássy also considered it necessary to do something in favor of the Slavs in order to prevent the intervention of Serbia and the sole actions of Russia. But if Gorchakov sought to expand the scope of concessions on the part of Turkey, Andrássy intended to limit himself to the most minimal measures. In the end, he got Gorchakov to significantly narrow down the original Russian program. The patronage of Christians was reduced to a plan of administrative reforms, the implementation of which the powers were to demand from the Sultan.
On December 30, 1875, Andrássy handed over to the governments of all powers that signed the Treaty of Paris of 1856 a note outlining the project of reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All powers expressed their agreement with Andrássy's proposals. On January 31, 1876, the Andrássy project was handed over to the Porte by the ambassadors of all the powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris.
Turkey accepted the "council" of the powers and gave its consent to the introduction of the reforms proposed by the ambassadors. But the rebel leaders decisively rejected the Austro-Hungarian project. They declared that they could not lay down their arms until the Turkish troops were withdrawn from the rebellious regions and until there was only one unfounded promise from the Porte, without real guarantees from the powers. They put forward a number of other conditions.
Russian diplomacy supported the demands of the rebels, but they were rejected by Turkey. Then Gorchakov invited Andrassy and Bismarck to discuss the situation at the meeting of the three ministers, timed to coincide with the tsar's forthcoming visit to the German capital. Gorchakov's proposal was accepted. The meeting took place in May 1876. It coincided with the resignation of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha. Mahmud was a conduit for Russian influence, his fall meant that the Turkish government was now leaning towards an English orientation. Of course, such a change in course Turkish politics could not but affect the attitude of the Russian government to the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the uprising against the Turkish yoke was expanding. It also covered Bulgaria.
The Russian government, as before, preferred to demand from Turkey the granting of autonomy to all Slavic regions Balkan Peninsula. It was with this idea that Gorchakov came to Berlin.
However, the Austro-Hungarian minister did not even allow the thought that the liberation of the Slavs would be crowned with significant success, and the influence of Russia would triumph over at least part of the Balkans. Andrássy made so many amendments to Gorchakov's drafts that they completely lost their original character and turned into an extended note of Andrássy himself dated December 30, 1875. What was new in comparison with the note was that now some semblance of the guarantees demanded by the rebels were provided. The finally agreed proposal of the three governments, known as the "Berlin Memorandum", consisted of a statement that in the event that the steps outlined in it did not give the desired results, three imperial court agree to take "effective measures ... to prevent further development evil." In what these "effective measures" will be expressed - the memorandum was silent about this.
The Berlin Memorandum was accepted by the three powers on May 13, 1876. The next day, the English, French and Italian ambassadors were invited to German Chancellor; here they found Andrassy and Gorchakov. The governments of France and Italy immediately replied that they agreed with the program of the three emperors. But England, represented by the Disraeli cabinet, spoke out against a new intervention in favor of the Balkan Slavs. England, like Austria-Hungary, did not want to allow either their release or the strengthening of Russian influence in the Balkans. British leaders foreign policy considered the Balkans a springboard from where Russia could threaten the Turkish capital, and, consequently, act as a rival to England, challenging her primacy in Turkey and the entire East. After the canal was dug through the Isthmus of Suez (in 1869), the main communication lines of the British Empire ran through the Mediterranean Sea. In this regard, the British government sought to bring under its control not only Egypt, but the whole Turkish empire. This would ensure England's dominance over the entire Middle East. The predominant influence in Turkey would allow England to lock Russia even more firmly in the Black Sea. Thus, not only were the most important imperial communications protected from her, but Russia itself would be made dependent on England as the actual mistress of the straits.
The British government also had other considerations. In connection with the aggression planned in London against Afghanistan, complications with Russia in Central Asia. However, it was incomparably more profitable for England to unleash a struggle with Russia not in Central Asia, where England alone stood face to face with her competitors, but in the Middle East, where it would be possible to fight by proxy - with the help of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. By his refusal to accept the Berlin Memorandum, Disraeli won the dominant influence in the Turkish capital, made new step to turning Turkey into an instrument of British politics, upset the "European concert" in Constantinople, further weakened the "alliance of the three emperors" and encouraged Turkey to resist their demands.
Meanwhile, new developments were taking place in the Balkans. Almost simultaneously with the advent of the Berlin Memorandum, the Turks crushed the uprising in Bulgaria. The pacification was accompanied by wild atrocities. In total, at least 30 thousand people were killed in Bulgaria. In addition, new complications were brewing. It became increasingly difficult for the Serbian and Montenegrin governments to resist the national demands of their peoples. Both Serbia and Montenegro were already preparing for an armed intervention in favor of the Bosnian-Herzegovina rebels. The representatives of Russia and Austria in Belgrade and Cetinje officially warned against this. But the Serbs were sure that if Serbia and Montenegro started a war, Russia, despite official warnings, would not allow them to be defeated by the Turks.
On June 30, 1876, the Serbian Prince Milan declared war on Turkey. The same was done by Prince Nikolai of Montenegro. 4,000 Russian volunteers went to Serbia, including many officers, led by General Chernyaev, whom Milan appointed as commander-in-chief of the Serbian army. Significant financial aid also came from Russia.
