Tank troops of the USSR and Finland ORGANIZATION OF TANK TROOPS OF THE RED ARMY. By the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, the tank forces of the Red Army had a well-developed organizational structure. As of September 1939, they consisted of tank corps, separate

I-16 Type 6 in Finland In October 1939, Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov tried to put pressure on the Finnish government to cede to the Soviet Union a strip of land in southern Finland, near Leningrad. This area should have

I-16 type 18 in Finland During the Winter War with Finland (November 1939 - March 1940), only one I-16 type 18 of early production (equipped with a ski landing gear) was captured, which made an emergency landing on Finnish territory. The aircraft received the registration code " VH-20I. Later he was

Finnish Air Force

Carl-Fredrik GEUST*, translated by I. KUDISHIN

INTRODUCTION - HISTORICAL FLASHBACK

Finnish Air Force. as a separate branch of the military, were formed during the Finnish War of Independence, which then turned into a civil war, in 1918. Thus, the Finnish Air Force is one of the oldest in the world.

The first aircraft of the Finnish Air Force, the Moran Parasol, produced at the Swedish factory Tulin, was presented to Finland by the Swedish Count Erik Fyn Rosen. The day of the official presentation of the aircraft to the Supreme Commander of the Finnish White Army, General Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, March 6, 1918, has since been celebrated in Finland as National holiday, air force day. By the way, the plane donated by Count von Rosen carried on board his heraldic symbol of good luck - a blue swastika, which became the official designation of the Finnish Air Force until April 1, 1945, when a round white and blue cockade was introduced instead, which has survived to this day.

During the war, which lasted from January 28 to May 16, 1918, Finnish aviation did little, sending aircraft mainly for reconnaissance and bombing, since both conflicting parties were armed with a very limited number of different types of obsolete aircraft. These included the devices received from Germany and Sweden, as well as the "legacy" left over from the air units of the Russian Empire. The Finnish Red Guard used only aircraft received from Russia.

In the 20s - 30s. a number of sometimes conflicting doctrines for the development of the Finnish Air Force were put forward. Due to the lack of own aviation personnel, several German and British advisers were invited. According to the officially approved doctrines, aviation development programs were developed. The reputation of the Finnish Air Force at that time was greatly tarnished due to a number of tragic accidents and disasters, showing the lack of professionalism among the pilots and the obsolescence of the material.

Such incidents led to constant changes in the leadership of the Air Force until, in 1932, Colonel J.F. Lundqvist, who led the Finnish aviation until 1945, took the place of the Commander of the Air Force, who led the Finnish aviation until 1945. The fact that the new commander had to be invited from another branch of the military - Lundqvist served in the artillery before his appointment - once again demonstrating the difficult situation in the Finnish Air Force at that time.

With the tremendous growth of the economic and military power The Soviet Union, the closest neighbor of Finland, in the 30s, which was the result of the first five-year plans, the command of the Finnish Air Force faced the urgent task of organizing a well-thought-out air defense system of the country. At the same time, the budgetary financing of military aviation was carried out at an extremely low level, since politicians were sure that in the foreseeable future Finland would not have to participate in serious military conflicts.

In the 20s - early 30s. The development of hydroaviation, as the most appropriate topography of Finland - the "Land of a Thousand Lakes" - type of Air Force, was given the closest attention. The construction of seaplane bases on the coast of the Baltic Sea and on the lakes was recognized as the most optimal and inexpensive solution to the problem of expanding the airfield network. For winter operation, seaplanes were equipped with skis. The difference in performance between seaplanes and land vehicles was simply not taken into account.

But in the 30s, fast development military aviation, the growth of international tension and, in particular, the experience of numerous local wars: the Ethiopian, Spanish, Czechoslovakian crisis, clearly demonstrated the advantages in the performance characteristics of land vehicles over hydroaviation. As you know, it was during this period that views were formed around the world on the use of bomber aircraft as the basis of the air power of the state. But at the same time, in Finland, the Douai doctrine was never recognized as official. Much more attention than in the neighboring USSR and Sweden was paid to the creation of formations of fighter-interceptors.

In 1931 the Council National Defense under the chairmanship of General Mannerheim, who provided all possible assistance to aviation, despite his belonging to the cavalry, met to discuss a long-term plan for the development of Finland's defense capability.

* - Karl Geust - aviation historian from Finland, well known to Russian readers as one of the authors of the book "Red Stars**.

The first plane of the Finnish Air Force - "Moran-parasol" Swedish assembly

Heritage Russian Empire- flying boat Grigorovich M-9 (1922)

A group of Finnish pilots at Grigorovich's seaplane, M-16

Mannerheim very energetically took up the solution of this problem - after all, according to the secret decision of the Defense Council, he became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in case of war

Due to economic difficulties, by 1934 the program was cut to 12 squadrons, which were to be a) legalized by 1938. Five new squadrons were to be completed - 2 - ground support, 1 - fighter, 1 - light long-range and 1 - heavy long-range. But even this truncated plan was not carried out. But still, in 1936-38. licenses were acquired for the production of the Fokker D-21 fighter and the Fokker C.X dive bomber (Holland), the Bristol "Blenheim" bomber (England) and the Bristol "Mercury" engine (England) as standard for these aircraft. Within the framework of the licenses, the Air Force development program was implemented as follows: the Air Force received 99 Fokker D-21-7 fighters were delivered from Holland in 1936, the rest were manufactured in Finland, 39 Fokker S.Kh close support and reconnaissance aircraft (4 were delivered from Holland in 1936, the rest were made in Finland), and 97 Bristol Blenheim strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft (18 were delivered by England in 1937-38, 55 were assembled in Finland and another 24 were delivered from England during Winter War).

The first small batches of aircraft were delivered to Finland, but most of them were produced at the Finnish State Aviation Enterprise. Despite the fact that the purchase of these licenses was strongly criticized in Finland in the post-war years, in particular, the low combat data of the Fokker fighters with fixed landing gear was criticized, the general obsolescence of the Fokker C.X biplane was already at the time of entry into service and high price"Blenheim", instead of which several fighters could be purchased, the total contribution of licensed production to the construction of the Finnish Air Force and the aviation industry is huge. If the choice of aircraft for licensed production and the negotiation process had been delayed by only a couple of months, Finland would have met the attack of the USSR on November 30, 1939 without a single Fokker D-21 fighter and Blenheim bomber.

The training and education programs for all these categories of aviation personnel have been significantly improved. For fighter aviation, special tactical principles were specially developed in relation to the specifics of Finland - huge territories, which needed to be protected by a small number of aircraft - in particular, already in 1935 new types of aircraft formation, an open line of links and "fingertips" were developed.

Seaplane Hansa-Brandenburg W.33 - one of the machines of the interwar

period of development of the Finnish Air Force

The main planes of the Finnish Air Force during the Soviet-Finnish conflict of 1940 - Bristol "Blenheim" -! (top) and Fokker D-2J (bottom)

The combat skills of the pilots were systematically improved through constant training. The main attention was paid to aerial shooting - in particular, fighter pilots were trained not only to fire at an enemy aircraft, but to hit its most vulnerable points first of all. All flight pilots had great tactical freedom, in particular, the wingman not only had to cover the tail of his leader, but also attack on his own, if given the opportunity, using the principle "first saw - first shot", which contributed to a reduction in reaction time. It should be noted here that the Fokker D-21 was a very stable gun platform and in the hands of an experienced pilot became a powerful weapon to fight Soviet bombers during the Winter War.

The main principle was the conquest and retention of tactical initiative - to attack in any balance of power. At the same time, to minimize losses, Finnish pilots were trained to exit the battle in a critical situation, for example, by vertical diving almost to the ground.

The preparation of licensed production also required the modernization of the capacities of the State Aviation Plant. In a few years, from a small workshop, it turned into the only modern high-tech plant in Finland at the start of the Winter War with qualified engineering and technical personnel and the ability to manufacture, maintain and repair aircraft. The experience of maintenance and repair, accumulated by the workers of the plant, was very soon transferred to the technical staff of the Air Force, after which field maintenance and repair were entrusted to aviation technicians, which was especially important in the difficult front-line conditions of the Winter War.

Winter War 1939-40 November 30, 1939 Finland was attacked by the USSR. The ground forces of the LenVO fired on the Finnish fortifications and crossed the border on a long front. SB and DB-3 bombers bombed Helsinki. The winter war, which became an unprecedented tragedy for the Finnish people, was unleashed. Despite the unequivocal warning received by the Finnish side in the form of an "invitation to specific negotiations in Moscow" a few weeks before the start of the war (before that, similar negotiations were held with the Baltic states, after which the Soviet military appeared on their territory, including aviation - bases), no one in Finland believed that Stalin would use military force to solve the problem of "Leningrad's security". Finnish politicians naively relied on the security system of the League of Nations, not realizing the change international position after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on August 23, 1939, which paved the way for the occupation of Poland by Germany and the USSR in September 1939 and the deployment of Soviet military bases in the Baltic countries.

"Gladiator" I Swedish volunteers, March 30, 1940 after the Soviet-Finnish conflict before returning to Sweden. Pay attention to the absence of signs of state affiliation

Fiat G.50 delivered from Italy during the "Winter War" -

"Blenheim" - / V, provided by the British

Despite Finland's seemingly hopeless military situation, the Finnish Air Force did not hesitate to concentrate its limited fighter forces in southeastern Finland to repel Soviet attacks. Unfortunately, this maneuver led to the fact that the Finnish rear and secondary fronts in the area north of Lake Ladoga left without fighter cover.

It should be noted that since January 12, 1940, the Swedish F-19 volunteer air regiment (actually, a squadron), which was armed with 12 Gloucester Gladiator aircraft and 4 Hawker Hart light bombers, fought on the Finnish side. The regiment was responsible for the air defense of half of the geographical territory of Finland.

Against this handful of aircraft, of which only 36 Fokker fighters and 17 Blenheims could be called modern, the Red Army Air Force fielded no less than 1,600 combat aircraft. Most of them belonged to the 7th Army (644 aircraft), which formed the core of the LenVO. This air armada struck in the general direction - Viipuri (Vyborg) on ​​the Karelian Isthmus. The Air Force of the Baltic Fleet had 450 aircraft. Aviation of the 8th, 9th, 14th armies and the Northern Fleet attacked the northern section of the border, from Lake Ladoga to the Arctic regions. They were much weaker, each numbering only about a hundred aircraft, which, however, corresponded to strength all Finnish air forces! In addition, the 1st Army special purpose(AON), numbering 200 DB-3 and TB-3 aircraft and based in the Novgorod-Pskov region, bombed Finnish territory. Soviet fighter aircraft consisted mainly of I-15, I-153 and I-16 aircraft, bomber aircraft - of SB and DB-3, whose characteristics approximately corresponded to the Fokker D-21 fighter and the Bristol Blenheim bomber.

The military situation in Finland deteriorated sharply after the USSR gained access to Estonian airfields and a large number of aircraft, mainly from the 7th Army and the Baltic Fleet, were relocated to them. As a result, all the big cities of Finland along the shores of the Gulf of Finland and in the south-west of the country were under attack from these aviation units.

But at the same time, the concentration of forces in accordance with a clearly formulated air defense scheme was not slow to bring good results even with the small number of aircraft that Finland had at its disposal. About the highest quality of training of Finnish pilots, achieved in the second half of the 30s. and passed the combat test in the Winter War, is evidenced by the following excerpt from the report on the actions of the Baltic Fleet aviation in the Winter War. The report, in a highly abridged form, was published in 1945 and has only recently become available in unabridged form.

Enemy fighters operate in groups of three to ten vehicles. Due to their apparently small numbers, they did not engage the escort fighters, concentrating their efforts on surprise attacks on their main target - the bombers. Their favorite tactic was based on the fact that it is very difficult for a bomber to notice an aircraft flying below it against a background of wooded and snow-covered terrain. The enemy approached the bombers from behind - from below and opened fire from a distance of 50-80 m from all trunks simultaneously. Even a strong fighter escort did not always guarantee the safety of the bombers if such tactics were used, since the cover did not always detect the appearance of enemy fighters in time.

Interned Non-115 "friendly" Norway

And these are Dorns * Do 22K1 went to the Finns from the unrealized order of the Latvian Air Force

The huge losses of the Red Army Air Force required the urgent involvement of reserves from fresh Air Force units. based in Belarus, Ukraine and in the interior regions of the USSR. Aviation of the Baltic Fleet received reinforcements from the Black Sea and even from the Pacific Ocean! A large percentage of losses included losses on the haul, as well as flight accidents resulting from loss of orientation in the Arctic conditions and as a result of poor weather conditions in the Finnish winter.

The losses of the Red Army Air Force and the KBF aviation during the Finnish War amounted to at least 744 aircraft (the exact number is likely even more, since the exact lists of losses of the Red Army Air Force have not yet been declassified. The casualties of the Red Army Air Force amounted to about 1000 people killed and the wounded (including 126 people from the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet).The number of prisoners was 100 people (of which 6 people were from the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet).

The Finnish Air Force reported the downing of 190 Soviet aircraft, anti-aircraft gunners - the destruction of another 300 aircraft. The 129 aircraft lost by the Soviet side are divided in proportion between fighters and anti-aircraft gunners, and the figures have minimal discrepancies with Finnish data, which, in general, is not surprising - most of the air battles took place over Finnish territory and the vast majority of aircraft fell there and were found. In addition to this, a significant number of Soviet vehicles lost for "other reasons" crashed on the way to their bases, being damaged by Finnish aircraft or anti-aircraft fire. In Soviet sources, the loss of an aircraft in this way does not apply to "combat losses". This also clearly illustrates the fact that Finnish fighters concentrated their efforts on intercepting bombers, avoiding air battles with Soviet fighters in every possible way to minimize their own losses. The relatively large percentage of Soviet fighters shot down by anti-aircraft fire is explained by the fact that they were involved in attacking Finnish troops, especially in the last days of the Winter War, while long-range DB-3 bombers approached the target and carried out bombing from greater heights than SB bombers, which explains the difference in the number of aircraft of each of these types shot down by Finnish anti-aircraft fire.

On the other hand, in Shumilin's book "History Soviet Air Force", published in 1986, indicates that the Red Army Air Force destroyed 362 Finnish aircraft during the Finnish War (at the Air Power conference held in August 1996 in Linke Nis, the Russian professor even announced big number- 400 aircraft!) The Finnish Air Force, by the way, never in its history and did not have such or even a close number of aircraft in service, actually lost only 68 aircraft during the Winter War, of which 47 were for combat reasons, moreover, they died or disappeared without lead 72 aircrew.

The main fighter of the Finnish Air Force in the initial period of the "long" war is the Brewster "Buffalo". The picture shows BW-352 from 2/LeLv of the Finnish ace E. Kinunen (22.5 victories in 300 sorties). On the same plane he will be shot down on April 21, 1943

For an explanation of such "highest" achievements of the Soviet side, one can refer to the same report on the actions of the Baltic Fleet Air Force in the Winter War:

*The result of air combat could not always be established with accuracy. Some of our crews, seeing how the enemy plane leaves the battle in a steep dive or maneuvers resembling a disorderly fall, considered it shot down and indicated this in their reports.

The decisive factor that ensured the superiority of the Finnish pilots in the air was the skill and understanding of the main task achieved as a result of long training, as well as confidence in their capabilities. These qualities more than compensated for the lack of material resources. As a result of low losses in the Winter War and supplies from abroad (mainly from England, France and Italy) during the conflict, the Finnish Air Force at the end of the Winter War was even stronger than at its beginning! High level training of pilots made it possible to introduce new types of aircraft - Moran-Saulnier 406 (30 pieces were delivered during the Winter War, another 57 were received later from Germany, which captured the aircraft during the occupation of France), Fiat G.50 (35 pieces were delivered during the Winter War ), Hawker "Hurricane" (12 units delivered during the Winter War), Brewster "Buffalo" (44 delivered at the very end of the war) and others immediately upon receipt, without the usual familiarization and retraining procedure.

The ineffectiveness of the offensive was discouraging news for the ruling circles of the USSR, and they began to look for opportunities for negotiations. On the other hand, with the hostile attitude of Germany (which strictly observed the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact towards Finland), the strictly neutral position of the official Swedish authorities and the weak support from England and France, Finland did not have the resources to continue the war alone. The peace treaty was signed on March 13, 1940 in Moscow.

1941 - 1944 [Initial phase. In 1941, the Baltic countries were already fully incorporated into the USSR, and a separate Baltic military district was created. The military aviation based at the airfields of the PribVO was much superior to those forces that were based at the airfields of the Baltic States during the Winter War. The Red Army Air Force quickly made up for the losses of the Winter War, in addition, mass production of modern MiG, Yak and LaGG fighters, Pe-2 dive bombers and Il-2 attack aircraft was launched. Were intensively studied the strategic and tactical lessons of the Winter War?)

Of the 3,260 combat aircraft based in the north-west of the USSR, about half - 1,592 aircraft, of which 849 fighters and 561 bombers, were based in the immediate vicinity of the Finnish border, on the Karelian Isthmus, in eastern Karelia, in the Murmansk region and on the southern coast of the Finnish bay, from where, during the Winter War, attacks on Finland were carried out. It is especially worth noting that in the immediate vicinity of the new Soviet-Finnish border, on the former Finnish airfields Suulajärvi and Kekisalmi (Kensholm, now Pri-Ozersk), 7 and 153 IAP were based, which were armed with 60 and 45 of the latest MiG-3 fighters, respectively. . In addition, the 1st GA in Novgorod, armed with 174 DB-3, Il-4 and TB-3 bombers, could be deployed against Finland, as was the case in the Winter War.

In Finland, the deliveries of aircraft that began during the Winter War were completed, the Air Force, both numerically and qualitatively, significantly exceeded the pre-war level. But at the same time, many aircraft are already outdated, especially when compared with the latest Soviet fighters.

Dornier Do 17Z, personally donated by Goering to the Finnish Air Force at the end of 1941

A Finnish pilot accepts a captured French Moran-Saulnier MS.406 fighter from the Germans

"Acquired" Curtiss 75 "Hawk", captured by the Germans in Norway

Finland's participation in the "long war" began early in the morning of June 25, 1941, when the USSR attacked 18 major Finnish air bases. 263 bombers and 224 fighters took part in the raids. This massive attack, which was aimed at the complete destruction of the Finnish Air Force on the ground, ended in complete disaster for the Red Army Air Force: the attackers lost 25 aircraft during the destruction on the ground ... only two (!) Finnish aircraft. The greatest losses were suffered by the SB from the 72nd SBAP, based in Petrozavodsk - acting without fighter cover, the regiment in this raid lost 8 bombers shot down by Finnish fighters, and the ninth was shot down by its own interceptors on the way to its airfield.

Unlike the Winter War, the Finnish Air Force immediately gained local air superiority, despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, and the Red Army Air Force began to suffer heavy losses, even taking into account the fact that individual Soviet pilots fought with admirable courage. Ground Finnish troops quite quickly moved deep into the Soviet territory to the river. Svir and Lake Onega. On the Karelian Isthmus, by September 1941, Finnish troops had reached the old border. After the capture of the main cities of Soviet Karelia, Petrozavodsk, Karhumyaki (Medvezh-Yegorsk) and Povenets, in December 1941, the Finnish offensive stopped. From that moment on, for two and a half years, until June 1944, the front line was relatively stable. Aviation activity during this period was moderate. But local air superiority remained with the Finnish Air Force.

[In 1943, the Red Army Air Force began to receive the latest aircraft - Yak and La-5 fighters, Pe-2 dive bombers, as well as Lend-Lease aircraft "Aerocobra", "Boston", "Mitchell", etc. - in large quantities. The level of training of Soviet pilots also increased. Thus, the obsolete aircraft of the Finnish Air Force, delivered during and immediately after the end of the Winter War, could not compete with the latest Soviet aircraft. A qualitative renewal of the aircraft fleet of the Finnish Air Force was required.

In the period 1940-42, the Germans supplied Finland almost exclusively with aircraft captured in the occupied countries: 57 Moran-Saulnier 406 fighters, 42 Curtiss P-36 aircraft captured in France and Norway, 12 SB bombers, 6 Pe-2 dive bombers, 11 fighters I-153 and 15 German bombers Dornier-17Z. During this period of the war, the Finnish Air Force had about 100 captured Soviet aircraft. Most of them were more or less obsolete. Maintaining and procuring parts for this motley fleet of aircraft has been the biggest headache for ground technicians. Only in the spring of 1943 did deliveries of more modern aircraft begin - Messerschmitt-109S-2 (30 aircraft), Junkers-88 (24 aircraft). In 1943-44. deliveries of Messerschmitt-109S-6 aircraft began. In total, Finland received 162 Me-109s of various modifications. A Finnish-designed fighter, Mirski, was also developed. Its deliveries began in the summer of 1944, when the aircraft was already obsolete.

The main fighter of the Finnish Air Force at the end of the "long" war - Messerschmitt Bf 109

In the picture Bf 109G-2 of the best Finnish ace Eino Juutilainen

In February 1944, parts of the Long-Range Aviation of the Supreme High Command of the USSR (ADD) undertook massive strategic bombing the capital of Finland and other targets in the deep rear of the Finns. The strikes were made three times at night, 2120 sorties were carried out. The purpose of these actions was purely political - to force the Finnish leadership to abandon the "brotherhood in arms" with Germany and start peace negotiations with the USSR. It is not known exactly when the order to bomb Helsinki was given. Since the commander of the ADD, Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov participated in the Tehran Conference on November 29 - December 2, 1943, he could receive this order there.

During a relatively quiet period of the war, Finnish radio intelligence achieved great success- the code of encrypted radio communications of the Red Army Air Force was split, which in some cases allowed Finnish interceptors to intercept Soviet bombers and reconnaissance aircraft in advance. Soon, radio intelligence was able to read ADD radio communications as well. Thanks to this, the Finnish Air Force and Air Defense received alerts about the upcoming second and third raids on Helsinki a few hours before the raid. The effectiveness of radio intelligence was so high that before the raids, a message was intercepted and deciphered that Marshal Golovanov was personally in Leningrad in order to manage the operation.

Strategic raids on Helsinki took place at intervals of 10 days - 6/7, 16/17 and 26/27 February 1944, respectively, 773, 497 and 850 sorties were made. Despite the disadvantageous position of the city on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, as well as the lack of warning of the first raid until the discovery of a Soviet weather reconnaissance aircraft, the use of radar-controlled anti-aircraft fire and pre-calculated barrage firing schemes forced most of the attacking aircraft to turn away from the city and drop bombs at sea. Only a few bombers were destroyed - the main task was not to shoot them down, but to force them to turn away from Helsinki. Only 799 of the 10,980 bombs dropped during the raids fell in populated areas of the city, with only 145 casualties among the population. Thanks to the excellent organization of the air defense of the Finnish capital, she withstood the strongest attack of the ADD from all organized up to that time. Without so effective system Air defense and radio intelligence damage to the Finnish capital would be many times greater.

ADD's next strike was aimed at South coast Gulf of Finland - Tallinn became its main target. On the night of March 9/10, 1944, about 300 bombers attacked him. Due to the poor organization of the air defense of the occupied city by the Germans, which had nothing to do with the air defense of Helsinki, the results of this raid were very serious - more than half of the buildings in the Estonian capital were destroyed, about 1300 people died.

Based on radio intelligence data, the Finnish Air Force LeR 4 (4th aviation regiment) prepared an unpleasant surprise for ADD. On the way back from Tallinn to the air bases in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus, Finnish bombers calmly joined the columns of ADD aircraft over the Gulf of Finland - 21 aircraft, mainly captured DB-3 and Il-4, and made the rest of the way to the Soviet bases with them . When the landing lights were lit for the landing of the ADD bombers, the Finns launched bombing attacks on the airfields of Levashovo, Kasimovo and Gorskaya. Photo reconnaissance carried out the next day by captured Pe-2s showed that at least 9 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, and the runways, hangars, warehouses and other structures at the airfields received damage of varying severity. The Finns suffered no losses. ^SH "1 For an analysis of the actions of the air defense of Helsinki during strategic raids, staff officers and commanders of some parts of the Finnish Air Force expressed their opinions about the actions of aviation when they were reflected. The Air Force headquarters decided to form night fighter units as soon as possible and immediately start training pilots. For this purpose, they were the best flight personnel of Finland were involved, as well as a certain number of scarce Messe Rschmitt-109 fighters.The commanders of the front-line units from the Air Force argued that such a decision seriously weakened the Air Force grouping on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main fighter air units were concentrated.On the other hand, staff officers after three raids The ADD on the capital reasonably believed that the success of a further air - and not only air - war would be determined in the skies over Helsinki if the ADD raids continued.

Bf 109G-6 of 11 HLeLv 34 with underwing guns, June 1944

The Finnish Bf 109G-I4 is already in post-war coloring (usually the Finns called them G-6 anyway - the heterogeneity of the Finnish Messerschmitt fleet led to the fact that due to problems with spare parts, by the time of the "Fourth Stalinist strike" almost all Bf-109s were not combat-ready)

A Finnish J and 88 being refueled before a sortie from a captured Soviet tanker based on a ZiS-5

As shown further developments Both of these opinions were equally correct. After the ADD raids on Tallinn and Narva, the ability to repel massive air raids with anti-aircraft artillery and a few night fighters was considered quite modest. On the other hand, the development of events on the Karelian Isthmus and over the Gulf of Finland, with the daily arrival of the latest aircraft in the Soviet air units, forced the Finnish Air Force in this area to be in constant tension. The main mistake was that the possibility of obtaining an additional batch of Messerschmitt-109s in Germany, which the Finnish Air Force needed so much in 1943, was not used.

The retraining of Finnish pilots for night operations was organized in Germany. The first group of 20 pilots went there on June 13, 1944. The program was launched at the least convenient time, when these pilots were so needed at the front. The connection of the Finnish night fighters was never organized - after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish truce on September 4, 1944, all Finnish pilots trained in Germany were interned, and the deliveries of night fighters to Finland were canceled.

On June 9, 1944, Stalin's "Fourth Strategic Strike" began - an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus in the direction of Viipuri (Vyborg) by forces Leningrad front. Air cover for the offensive was provided by the 13th Airborne Armed Forces, reinforced by the 113th and 334th bomber divisions of the Headquarters reserve, which were armed with Il-4 and Tu-2 aircraft, respectively, as well as the 2nd Guards Air Defense Fighter Corps and 220 aircraft from composition of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet, organizationally temporarily subordinate to the 13th VA - a total of 1294 aircraft (489 Yak-9, La-5, Airacobra fighters, the main connection is the 275th I AD with 172 aircraft; 346 Il-2 attack aircraft, 288 Il-4, Pe-2, Tu-2 bombers and 171 reconnaissance, bomber and general purpose aircraft.)

The Finnish Air Force had 51 fighters and 66 bombers in this direction. The structure of the Air Force underwent a rapid reorganization. New Messerschmitt-109 fighters arrived from Germany, often being driven directly to the front; and on June 16, the German Kulmi Command, armed with 44 Junkere-87 dive bombers and 34 Focke-Wulf-190 fighters, arrived at the Imola airbase in the southeast of Finland and immediately took part in the battles. After bloody battles on June 20, 1944, the city of Viipuri was occupied by Soviet troops. After that, thanks to the strengthening of the Finnish troops and the successful counterattacks, the Soviet offensive was slowed down. Due to the fact that the Soviet strikes were concentrated in a small geographical area, the Finnish Air Force, through skillful maneuvering of forces, was able to achieve local air superiority even in the face of a tenfold Soviet superiority in forces! A good example of the successful actions of the Finnish Air Force during this period is the fact that not a single Finnish bomber escorted by Finnish fighters was lost to the actions of Soviet fighters during the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus.

Yu-88 from 3/PLeLv 44 returns to its base after a sortief

In mid-July, part of the Red Army forces required to attack Germany was redeployed to the Estonian direction. The first aviation formation deployed from the Finnish front was the 334th bomber air division, which was armed with top-secret Tu-2 aircraft. Her redeployment began immediately after the capture of Viipuri, on June 20, 1944.

The actions of the main Soviet fighter unit, the 275th IAD, were considered ineffective. The combat report for June 1944, only recently released to the public, states the following:

"AT initial period time, enemy fighters appeared on the probable routes of our aviation, mainly over their own territory, making surprise attacks, not getting involved in open combat, but mainly hunting for single aircraft that had lagged behind the main formation. At the end of June, enemy fighters covered their ground forces in the directions north and northwest of Viipuri in groups of 10-20 aircraft (mainly Me-109 and FV-190), consisting of separate pairs or fours, creating a curtain on possible ways the approach of our aircraft (an indirect indication of the effectiveness of Finnish radio intelligence, which, with ever-increasing accuracy, directed a few Finnish fighters at the points of interception of Soviet bombers - KFG).

... it is interesting that our aircraft are not attacked on the way to the target, but only while they are directly above the target on the combat course and on the return route. The enemy is trying to reduce the accuracy of our bombing and destroy aircraft that have fallen behind during the turn to the return course.

... During the attack of our planes, the enemy tries to approach the minimum distance, camouflaging himself in the clouds or approaching from the direction of the sun. A single attack is carried out, and when our cover fighters counterattack, the enemy goes into the clouds with a climb or, in case of clear weather, dives down steeply, turning into level flight near the ground.

... Air Force command posts located

aviation guidance points located along the front do not always correctly assess the situation, disorienting our fighters and not always giving information about the appearance of enemy aircraft over the battlefield.

... The headquarters of the 275th and AD did not provide any reports on combat experience during the entire operation and did not instruct the flight crew on enemy tactics."

The actions of the Il-2 attack aircraft, which also suffered heavy losses, were severely criticized:

"Enemy fighters attack the Il-2 from angles that exclude the return fire of the shooters, forcing the attack aircraft to line up in a defensive ring or snake.

... Counterattacks by enemy fighters in the second half of June (1944 - KFG) led to the need to increase the fighter cover of our ground forces.

... Attack aircraft, continuing to operate without fighter cover, began to suffer serious losses from enemy fighters, since their main mistake was to stretch the formation when attacking ground troops. At the same time, part of the aircraft lagged behind the formation on turns, not observing a closed formation when trying to break away from the attacking enemy fighters.

This fairly honest and impartial report concludes:

"The increased number of lesions in dogfights and the increased number of losses of (our) fighters indicate that fighter air units Air Army, who did not meet opposition at the beginning of the operation, lost their caution and began to act less coordinated in groups, as a result of which, in many cases, the enemy seized the initiative and gained an advantage in air battles. The leaders of formations and groups of aircraft did not react to changes in the situation with due speed and did not disseminate the combat experience of the best pilots and formations. "

Another significant evidence of the poor combat qualities of the 275th IAD - the main Soviet fighter air formation on the Karelian Isthmus - is indirectly the fact that neither the division itself, nor any of its subordinate IAP received any awards for the summer campaign of 1944, while many other aviation formations of the Red Army Air Force received honorary titles, for example, "Vyborgsky", etc.

Three of the best Finnish aces of the Second World War (from left to right): Eino Juutilainen (94 victories in 437 sorties), Hans Wind (75 victories in 302 sorties), Eino Luukkanen (56 victories in 441 sorties)

The combat qualities of Finnish aviation in the report are presented as follows:

“As a rule, the route of Finnish fighters to the battlefield was not direct, but consisted of short straight sections mating at an angle of 80-90 °, which made it difficult for our pilots to calculate the intercept point.

... Based on the testimony of a captured Finnish pilot, it turned out that enemy pilots fly without maps, knowing the territory by heart. The Finnish KDP send their fighters to intercept our bombers, using the coordinates. Instructions are issued by radio from the respective airfields, which are directly connected to the aviation guidance posts. In a number of cases, (Finnish) bombers received information about our interceptors already in the air on the way to the target, after which they turned away from the route and waited 20-30 minutes before resuming the attack "(another indirect confirmation of the effectiveness of Finnish radio intelligence - KFG).

By the time the armistice was signed on September 4, 1944, the number of aces per capita in Finland was the highest in the world, and the combat characteristics of the main Air Force fighter, the Messerschmitt-109, were not inferior to those of most enemy fighters.

On closer examination, the situation may seem paradoxical: due to high efficiency and minimal losses, the Finnish Air Force by September 1944 was both relatively and in absolute terms stronger than at the beginning of the war, by June 1941. The Finnish Air Force did not undergo such extermination and destruction, like the Luftwaffe.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Finnish Air Force miraculously avoided significant losses in the early days Soviet offensive in June 1944, the beginning and extent of which took Finnish intelligence by surprise. The fact that Finnish intelligence officers knew or did not know about the upcoming strategic offensive of the USSR has been the subject of fierce disputes between historians and veterans in Finland for over 50 years.

In this context, a curious and still inexplicable fact is the absolute non-participation of the ADD in this operation. It was only recently that the author was able to find documents in the Central Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), from which it is clear that at least four ADD air corps (more than 400 Il-4s and Mitchells * 1) took off from their bases in middle lane Russia on the evening of June 9, 1944 to clear the path of advance of the 21st army, which was supposed to crack the Finnish defenses in the area of ​​Beloostrov (Valkyarvi) the next morning.

The task of the Pe-2 and Tu-2 dive bombers and the Il-2 attack aircraft was to strike at leading edge Finnish defense, while the ADD was supposed to destroy the railway junction

Viipuri and the Suulajärvi and Heinioki air bases, where the Finnish Messerschmitts were based. But on the route, fortunately for the Finnish side, the ADD planes met powerful thunderstorm fronts and after 35-40 minutes of flight were recalled to their airfields. The time to divert the bombers of the 13th VA was lost. This aborted ADD aircraft mission was never mentioned in Soviet and Russian publications.

Thus, the Finns got the opportunity to transfer their then invaluable fighters to safe airfields in the rear and begin to intercept the aircraft of the 13th VA on the way to the target.

The provisional peace agreement was signed on September 19, 1944 (hostilities ceased already on September 4). One of his conditions was the help of the Finns in the expulsion of the Germans from Lapland. This sluggish war ended on April 26, 1945 without extensive use of aviation, but accurate German anti-aircraft fire caused relatively heavy losses among the Finns, mainly in bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.

Under the peace treaty, Finland ceded to the USSR part of its territory in Karelia and Pstsamo, returning to the borders of 1940. But even despite this, the results of both the "Winter" and the "Long" war can be interpreted as big wins Finland, since the main goal of both wars - the preservation and guarantee of the independence of Finland - was achieved. In this regard, the following is interesting: only three capitals of European states that participated in the World War were not occupied by the enemy - Moscow, London and Helsinki.

Post-war Finnish Air Force: combat training Fugue Master CM 170R from HavLLv 21, spring 1972

National priorities after the war did not leave large funds on the development of the Air Force, wartime weapons dominated in Finland until the beginning of the 50s. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 set restrictions on the development of the Finnish Air Force - the maximum number of aircraft - 60 pieces, the absence of bombers and missile weapons in service. These restrictions were not critical, since the number of first-line aircraft was indicated. Bomber aviation was considered unnecessary, since the experience of the war and budgetary constraints showed the correctness of building the Air Force on the basis of fighter units. The restriction on missile weapons was lifted in the early 60s, and a few years ago the Finnish government denounced the restrictions Paris Treaty as outdated and out of date.

The Finnish Air Force switched to jet technology in 1953 with the entry into service of 6 single and 9 double De Heaviland Vampire fighters. The supersonic era began in 1958 with the receipt of 13 Folland "Net" aircraft, which, despite their high maneuverability, were by no means a model of technical excellence and therefore underwent a radical modernization in Finland. A Finnish-designed TCB, the piston Vihuri (produced in the amount of 51 pieces in 1951-54) was replaced by the jet Fuga "Magister" in 1958 (18 pieces were delivered from France, another 62 were assembled in Finland).

The double speed of sound was surpassed by the Finnish Air Force in 1963 with the entry into service of the MiG-21F aircraft (22 + 2 aircraft, single and double), which were eventually replaced by the all-weather Saab-35 modifications S and F (total 48 machines, from 12 of them were assembled in Finland, deliveries were made in 1972 - 1977) and MiG-21bis (26 + 4 aircraft, deliveries in 1978 - 1981). late 70s (11 aircraft were delivered from England, 46 were assembled in Finland.) For initial training, an aircraft of the Finnish design Valmet "Vinka" is used (30 aircraft were delivered in the early 80s). The structural organization of the Finnish Air Force was changed in the 50s, when the country's territory was divided into three air defense regions, each of which has a fighter aircraft, as well as maintenance, control, airspace tracking, basing, and maintenance and support structures. In the 50s - 60s. a network of long-range and medium-range radars was created to monitor airspace.

The Finnish aviation industry, in particular Valmet Ltd., which has now changed its name to Finnavitek Ltd., has always been an important part of the technical structure of the Air Force. Licensed production and assembly of aircraft have prepared a good production and repair base.

As noted earlier, the experience of warfare and the limited defense spending of a small country have formed a clear doctrine, implying air superiority, which is cornerstone modern Finnish defense strategy and will continue to be so in the future.

Recently, the Finnish Air Force has undergone an intensive renewal. The radars were replaced with newer, "blind" sections of the air defense system were covered by new radars. The control centers have been upgraded with the installation of a data exchange system, which allows air combat to be controlled, say, over Lapland, from a control center in southern Finland. The Air Force also controls anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, which allows air and anti-aircraft fire to be coordinated in the same area. Target echo tracking is integrated into an airspace tracking system, which in wartime will be supplemented by a wide network of optical observation posts.

The most famous fleet renewal program is the purchase of Hornet fighters. After a long analysis, in 1992 the McDonnell Douglas F-18 "Hornet" aircraft was chosen as the basis of the Finnish Air Force, it will replace the Saab-35 and MiG-21 aircraft. The main selection criterion was the ability to detect a target outside visual contact and the firepower of the aircraft. In addition, the aircraft is flexible in operation and can carry several alternative weapon systems and has a balanced cost. life cycle. A total of 57 single-seat and 7 two-seat aircraft will be delivered, which will be assembled in Finland, continuing the good tradition of licensed production. Deliveries began in June 1996, and all two-seat aircraft are already flying.

Modern Finnish Air Force: MiG-21bis from HavLLv 31

Training combat Hawk Mk 51 from HavLLv 11 (under the fuselage - a container with a cannon "Eden"), June 1986

Finnish Saab 35S "Draken" from HavLLv 21, spring 1991

Almost the entire flight crew of the Finnish Air Force are fighter pilots. In the process of selecting new personnel, one pilot is selected from 50 candidates. All of them are trained as fighter pilots, the cadres of second-line pilots are formed from fighter pilots who are dismissed due to age. Each fighter AKP has an attached squadron of Hawk aircraft used as enemy aircraft simulators in the daily training process.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is responsible for the inviolability of the entire airspace of Finland, as well as for the technical condition of the equipment and training of personnel. This increases the operational readiness of the Air Force. The commanders of the Air Defense Zones are responsible for the respective territories, while the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force has the authority to use all military aviation at his discretion.

Findings:

The development of air doctrine in Finland is based on a thorough analysis of combat use, which indicates the paramount importance of achieving air supremacy and the combat qualities of individual pilots. The specific conditions of Finland require the concentration of the entire available air force fleet in order to achieve air superiority. Taking the qualitative parameter as a basis, it becomes clear from an attempt at combat use that air defense tasks can be solved even in the conditions of a limited military budget, due to the size of the country.

The successful fulfillment by the Finnish Air Force of its functions - ensuring the neutral status of the country by protecting its air borders by all means - is aimed at preventing their violation by anyone and ensuring the successful defense of the country. The Finnish Air Force, with its well-trained pilots, is undoubtedly a stabilizing factor in a rapidly changing world. political map Europe.

Notes on sources.

Most sources on the history of the Finnish Air Force are in Finnish, which makes them inaccessible to most foreign users. Can be recommended the following sources(At the request of the editors, the author prepared this article in English - editor's note), partially or completely in English:

Multivolume "History of the Finnish Air Force" (Finnish Air Force history) (15 volumes published); Memoirs of the Finnish ace Eino Lukkanen "Fighter over Finnland" (Fighter over Finn land); Memoirs of the Finnish ace number 1 Ilmari Juutiläinen "Double fighter knight" (Double fighter knight) Bilingual (Swedish - English) edition of the "Chronicle of the F-19 Corps" (En F-19 Kronika). secrets of the "long war"

In March 1918, the Swedish Count Cravi von Rosen overtook the Morane-Saulnier Type D to Finland, which became the first aircraft of the new Air Force. The plane was marked with a blue swastika on a white circle, which soon became an identification mark - "khakaristi". However, the final organization of the Air Force did not take place until 1919 with the help of France and Great Britain.

On November 30, 1939, as a result of the signing of the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, the country was drawn into a conflict with the USSR.

As a result of this war, Finnish pilots showed their courage and training, winning 207 confirmed victories with the loss of only 48 of their own machines.

However, after 15 months, the Finnish pilots again had to face their former opponents.

The so-called "Continued War" lasted from June 22, 1941 to September 4, 1944. On the ground, Finnish and German troops tried to cut the Murmansk railway line, along which the main stream of "Lend-Lease" was going. However, these attempts failed.

In 1944, after the beginning of the defeat of Germany, the Finns also surrendered. At that time, the first line included Brewster Model 239, 25 Fiat G.50, as well as Curtiss Hawk 75A, Fokker D.XXI, M.S.406.

Of the German vehicles, 30 Messerschmitt Bf 109G-2 and 132 Bf 109G-6, 15 Dornier Do 17Z-2 and the same number of Ju 88A-4 entered service. In total, during this war, Finnish pilots claim 1600 downed Soviet aircraft with the loss of 211 of their own.

In April 1945, the Finnish swastika was replaced by the modern white and blue OZ. By to the world of Paris In 1947, Finland lost 30,000 km2 of its territory and the port of Petsamo in the north.

Moreover, Helsinki was only allowed to have 60 fighters and 3,000 Air Force personnel. Bombers, submarines and everything that could theoretically carry nuclear weapons were banned - only weapons for defense. It is no coincidence that the post-war motto of the Finnish Air Force sounds like "Qualitas Potentia Nostra" (In quality lies our strength).

Post-war rearmament was carried out both from the West and from the East, and on their own. Today, the Paris Agreements have already lost force and the number of fighters is 67. In 1953, the first jet aircraft began to enter service - these were six de Havilland Vampire Mk 52, two years later replenished with nine Vampire Mk 55, which were operated until 1965.

The Air Force received 11 Folland Gnat Mk Is in 1958, which served until 1972. In 1962, all this splendor was supplemented by four MiG-15UTIs. They served as a transitional type to 22 MiG-21F-13s received in two batches (in April and November) of 1963. From 1965 to 1980, two MiG-21Us also performed combat training functions.

MiGs served as fighter-interceptors until 1986. At that time, five MiG-21Fs were lost in accidents, and two became museum samples). In 1956, the Air Force transport capabilities were replenished with a pair of Percival Pembroke (served until 1968).

From 1961 to 1981, three Il-28Rs were engaged in pulling targets. Interestingly, despite the ban, one “clean” Il-28 bomber was also received. In the 1960s and 70s, seven Douglas C-47 Dakotas and two Douglas C-53s were purchased. The Dakotas served faithfully for 24 years, making their last flight on December 18, 1984. Just one year - 1974 - the Finns operated the BN-2A Islander and Piper PA-31-310 Navajo. Two Cessna 402B Businessliners did not last long either.

The functions of initial flight training since 1958 were assigned to 36 Saab 9ID Safir, withdrawn from service only in 1983. In the same year, 18 Fouga CM 170 Magisters also entered service, and the aircraft came to the yard so much that in 1960 another 62 such aircraft were assembled under license. Like other aircraft, these "flying desks" served for two decades, making their last flight on December 19, 1988.

Finnish helicopter pilots different time flew on the WSK SM-lSZ / M (Polish version of the Mi-1), then there were the Alluets. In parallel, from 1962 to 1979, three Mi-4s were operated, which were replaced by AB 206A.

At the end of the 80s, it became necessary to replace the morally and physically obsolete MiG-21s. In 1989, a competition was announced, which included the JAS 39A Gripen, General Dynamics F-16 MLU, McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C, Dassault Mirage 2000-5 and MiG-29. As a result, in April 1992, the Hornets were chosen.

At the moment, the Finnish Air Force is consolidated into three aviation commands, each of which consists of one Havittajalentolaivue (HavLLv, squadron) and a radar station. Each ae consists of four links. The north of the country is under the control of the Lapland Air Command with headquarters in Rovanie, the southeast is covered by the Karelian Air Command (headquarters in Kuopio-Rissala) and finally southwest under the command of Satakunta (Tampere-Pirkkala).

The main headquarters is located in Tikkakoski-Jyaskyla, Air Force Academy(Ilmasotakoulu) - in Kauhava. All units have a high degree of readiness, since there is no such thing as a wartime staff in the country. In total, to replace the MiG-21 and Draken, the Finns bought 64 F-18 Hornets (57 single-seat F-18Cs and seven F-18Ds).

On November 7, 1995, the first four F-18Ds flew to Finland under their own power, and even earlier (in October), the Valmet factories began assembling the first F-18Cs, which began to enter service in June 1996.

For arming the Hornets, the AIM-9M Sidewinder and AIM-120B AMRAAM missiles were purchased. Finland also became the first foreign country to receive fighter jets with the more powerful APG-73 radar.

In addition, Nokia installed systems that fully integrated data from Drakens and MiG-21s.

The first Drakens entered service with the Finnish Air Force in 1972 in the form of six used Saab J 35Bs. They were leased from the Swedish Air Force, and from April 1974 to July 1975, a dozen Saab 35S were built at Valmet.

In total, 47 Draken were received and built, of which 30 have survived to this day. In addition to the built-in 30-mm cannon, these fighters can carry 3 types of SD: AIM-4 Falcon (manufactured under license in Sweden), AIM-9J Sidewinder and R-13M.

F-18s became the first all-weather fighters in the Finnish Air Force.

With the receipt of more Hornets, the Drakens are gradually removed from service

The third flight in each air command is a training flight armed with the BAe Hawk. In 1980, the first four Hawk Mk 51s entered service, after which the remaining 46 vehicles were assembled in Finland. In addition, from 1993 to 1994, 7 more cars were bought. Despite the fact that they are declared as "training" aircraft, they are most likely "light fighters". Judge for yourself: in addition to the 30-mm Aden cannon, aircraft can carry three types of missiles - R-13M, AIM-9J Sidewinder and R-60.

In addition, each command has a liaison link, which, as a rule, has one Piper PA-28
Arrow, one Piper PA-31 Chieftain, two Valmet L-90 TP Redigo and one - two Valmet (L-70)
Vinka.

A young man who wants to become a pilot takes a 4-year course at the Air Force Academy. Initial training takes place on the Valmet L-70 Vinka. On these aircraft, cadets make 45 sorties in 11 months. For the next three years, Vinka and Hawk remain their main machines.

After 60 hours on the Vinck and 100 hours on the Hawk, the student becomes a pilot. After that, he is sent to active units, where over the next year he must make another 150 sorties on the Hawk. And only in the second year he is allowed to fly on the Hornet.

In January 1997, the reconnaissance squadron (Tiedustelulentolaivue) was disbanded, and its six reconnaissance MiG-21bis\T and a number of Hawks capable of carrying reconnaissance containers were transferred in parts.

At the same time, the transport squadron was disbanded and its Fokker F27 and Learjet, together with the "reconnaissance" Hawks, formed a new squadron - Operational Support, which reports directly to the Air Force Commander. Moreover, one of the Fokkers was converted into a kind of flying VKP, and the rest perform transport functions.

Finnish Army Aviation.

On January 1, 1997, the Air Force helicopter unit was disbanded, and its two Hughes 500Ds, five Mi-8Ts and two Mi-8Ps were transferred only to the formed army aviation.

Border troops.

The paramilitary border troops have a large number of armored vehicles and patrol boats. In addition, it has an air patrol squadron, which is based at three airfields - Helsinki, Turku and Rovaniemi.

To date, there are four AB 206s, four AB 412s, three AS 332L1 Super Pumas and two Dornier Do 228s. One AB.206A was transferred from the Air Force and, in addition to patrol functions, performs training tasks.

Of the AV.212s, two are standard AB 412SPs and one helicopter is an AB 212EP equipped with a Bendix 1500 radar. Both the AV.212 and the Super Puma are equipped for search and rescue operations. Dorniers have equipment for naval reconnaissance. All pilots of the Border Troops have previously served in the Air Force, but the aircraft carry civilian registration codes. During the war, the border troops are transferred to the jurisdiction of the fleet.

(c) M. Zhirokhov, 2005

Corner of the sky. 2005 (Page:

Thanks to work Finnish historians Kalevi Keskinen and Kari Stenman, whose books contain the history of the service of almost every aircraft used by the Finnish military aviation during the Second World War, the issues of determining the number of aircraft in the Finnish Air Force at certain date, their losses and replenishment with new aircraft should not cause great difficulties for many years and even decades. To obtain an accurate answer to any such question, it is enough to simply make an aircraft-by-air count from the works of these historians. In recent years, after the State Archives of Finland began to digitize its collections and posted a large number of Finnish Air Force documents relating to the period of World War II for free access on the website http://digi.narc.fi/, it became easy to compare the data given by Keskinen and Stenman directly with the original documents. Nevertheless, even today, even specialists who are seriously interested in the history of the Finnish Air Force experience certain difficulties when addressing these issues. A prime example bad job on this topic was a recent post of the best domestic specialist in the history of the Soviet-Finnish war Oleg Kiselev ( elephant_76 ) "Again, we consider the losses of the Finnish Air Force in the" winter war ". Instead of analyzing the mistakes made by Oleg, I decided to publish my own version of the calculations of the number and losses of the Finnish Air Force during the Soviet-Finnish War. All the necessary information is summarized in the tables below. However, as usual, before proceeding to the consideration of the tables, it is necessary to give some explanations that reveal the meaning of the data given in them.

The number of aircraft indicated in the tables is calculated from the service histories of individual aircraft published in the works of Keskinen and Stenman, with minor additions from other sources. Behind each number given in the tables are specific aircraft with known registration numbers - this is the result of an accurate count by name, and not an impersonal summation of unclearly significant numbers. The following conventions were used in compiling the tables:

1) The date of receipt of the aircraft by the Air Force for aircraft manufactured in Finland (there were no such aircraft during the Soviet-Finnish War) or mobilized from civilian owners is the date of transfer of the aircraft to the Finnish Air Force, and for aircraft received from abroad - the date of arrival of the aircraft to territory of Finland.

2) The date of exclusion of an aircraft from the Air Force is the date of the incident, as a result of which the aircraft was written off from the Air Force, and for aircraft written off due to wear and tear or due to obsolescence, the date the aircraft was transferred to storage, after which the aircraft was written off. In reality, the aircraft could be written off days, months, or even years after the accident or storage.

If we compare the following table of the aircraft composition of the Finnish Air Force on November 13, 1939 with the table stored in State Archive Finland: http://digi.narc.fi/digi/view.ka?kuid=1618567 , then a difference of three aircraft is found - in the archive table the total number of aircraft is 301, and in mine it is 298. This difference is explained by the fact that the archive table includes aircraft that were destroyed in October-November 1939, but were not decommissioned before the start of the war:

1) Gamecock II GA-43, LLv 29 - broken up 10/20/1939, decommissioned 10/11/1941
2) Fokker D.XXI FR-88, LLv 24 - broken up 11/8/1939, decommissioned 03/11/1940
3) Syaski IIA SÄ-148, ISK - broken up 11/23/1939, decommissioned 02/12/1940

In my table, in accordance with rule 2 above, these aircraft are not included. Basically, the difference between the total figure given in my table for March 13, 1940 and the data from the archive table for March 15, 1940 is explained by the same reason: http://digi.narc.fi/digi/view.ka?kuid=1618582 . The only difference is that the number of destroyed but not decommissioned aircraft increased markedly by the end of the war.

The question of the distribution of aircraft between combat units, non-combat units and repair plants is somewhat more complicated. The fact is that in the histories of individual aircraft only known movements of aircraft from one part to another are indicated, in addition, there are cases when an aircraft, officially listed in one part, could be used by another part for some time. All differences in the distribution of aircraft between the archive and my tables have explainable reasons, but here I will not dwell on them in detail, especially since they do not affect the ultimate goal of this work - reduction overall balance aircraft of the Finnish Air Force. I will focus on just one example. The archival table for November 30, 1939 indicates that 16 Blenheim bombers were in combat units, and two more were under repair at the factory. In my table for the same number, 17 Blenheims are listed in combat units, and only one is under repair at the factory. The difference arose due to the Blenheim BL-111, which was damaged on landing in Joroinen on November 23, 1940. When a few days later the LeR 4 bombers moved to the Luonetjärvi airfield, the BL-111 naturally could not fly there, so on November 30 to Luonetjärvi there were only 16 bombers - in full accordance with the data of the archive table. However, by December 3, 1939, BL-111 was restored and became part of 3 / LLv 44. Whether this aircraft was transferred to the factory for repair, as the archive table implies, or whether it was repaired on the spot in Joroinen - one can only guess.

The division of aircraft into combat and non-combat was carried out in accordance with the rules in force at that time in the Finnish Air Force. And these rules were quite simple - if this type of aircraft was used in combat units to perform combat missions, then it was considered combat. As a result, the division into combat and non-combat types was not always obvious, and sometimes curious. Thus, the ancient Junkers F 13, used by T-LLv 39 for anti-submarine patrols over the Aland Sea, were counted as combat aircraft, and the similar F 13, which was part of the Swedish F 19 volunteer air flotilla, was counted as non-combat. Similarly, a transport DC-2 converted into a bomber and made one night sortie with 2 / LLv 44 was considered a combat aircraft. On the other hand, not so old Gauntlet fighters immediately upon arrival in Finland were sent to reserve squadrons for use as training and combat fighter and therefore from the very beginning were taken into account as non-combat aircraft. Even more interesting was the situation with the IVA Bulldogs. By the beginning of the war, they were part of LLv 26 and were counted as combat fighters. However, in early February, after the LLv 26 was re-equipped with Gladiators, the Bulldogs were transferred to the reserve squadron and transferred to the category of non-combat aircraft. This circumstance must be taken into account when determining the balance of income and losses of combat aircraft of the Finnish Air Force, since the number of combat aircraft was reduced not only because of the losses incurred, but also due to the transfer of combat aircraft to the category of non-combat aircraft.

Arrivals and losses of aircraft in the Finnish Air Force during the Soviet-Finnish War

The table of aircraft arrivals in the Finnish Air Force contains information on all aircraft delivered to Finland or lost during the ferry to Finland during the Soviet-Finnish War, as well as all aircraft that arrived in Finland after the war, the decision to deliver which was made before its end. The same table includes captured Soviet aircraft that fell into the hands of the Finns during the war, which were later included in the Finnish Air Force, aircraft that were part of the Swedish volunteer air flotilla F 19, and aircraft mobilized from civilian owners and included in the Air Force after start of the war.

One of the aircraft mobilized after the start of the war was Aero Oy's Ju 52/3m OH-ALK. This aircraft was transferred to the RAF on December 1, 1939, and on the same day its registration number was changed to OH-LAK. On February 21, this Junkers was returned back to Aero Oy, and instead, another Ju 52 / 3m, OH-ALL, owned by the airline, was transferred to the Air Force. Thus, in total, two Ju 52 / 3m were mobilized during the war, but at the same time only one of them was in the Air Force.

The loss table includes all aircraft irretrievably lost by the Finnish Air Force as a result of the Soviet-Finnish War. Combat losses include only those aircraft that were lost as a result of purposeful action Soviet troops. All other losses are classified as non-combat. In particular, the Fokker D.XXI FR-77 from LLv 24, shot down by Finnish anti-aircraft artillery on December 1, 1939, while repelling a Soviet bomber raid, was attributed to non-combat losses, and two Harts from the Swedish F 19, which collided in the air on January 12, 1940, while performing anti-aircraft maneuver under Soviet air defense fire are attributed to combat losses. In total, during the war, the Finnish Air Force (including the Swedish volunteer air flotilla) irretrievably lost 49 aircraft for combat reasons - 41 combat aircraft were shot down in air battles, six combat aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire (including the two aircraft mentioned above that collided in the air) , another combat and one non-combat aircraft were destroyed at the airfields.

Among the irretrievable losses of the Finnish Air Force, two aircraft destroyed by the Finns at the Vartsila airfield on March 15, 1940 before the airfield was transferred were taken into account. Soviet side. Despite the fact that these aircraft were lost after the end of hostilities, their destruction was a direct consequence of the just ended war.

As already mentioned, in early February 1940, the Bulldog VIA fighters were reclassified from combat to non-combat aircraft. In accordance with this, the losses suffered by the Bulldogs were also divided - the BU-64 shot down on December 1, 1939 was attributed to the losses of combat aircraft, and the BU-61, which crashed on February 7, 1940, was attributed to the losses of non-combat aircraft.

Finally, we should mention one feature of accounting for losses incurred during the ferrying of aircraft to Finland from abroad. The fact is that one of the two Hurricanes recorded as lost during the ferry from the UK to Finland was not actually broken. On February 28, 1940, a Hurricane HU-461 (British registration N2325) collapsed on landing at Wick Airfield in Scotland, resulting in moderate damage to the aircraft. After repairs, he was transferred to 11 EFTS (initial flight training school) and later served in various non-combat units of the Royal Air Force until the beginning of 1945. However, for the Finnish Air Force, this aircraft was lost forever. That is why it is included in the number of irretrievable losses of these Air Forces.

The balance of aircraft in the Finnish Air Force during the Soviet-Finnish War

After we have put all the figures in order, the reduction of the balance of aircraft movement in the Finnish Air Force for the period under review comes down to simple arithmetic:

The number of aircraft in the Finnish Air Force on November 30, 1939 and the entry of aircraft into the Air Force during the war are taken directly from the tables. Two aircraft destroyed on March 15, 1940 (77-2=75) are excluded from the total number of aircraft losses in Finland, since they still existed on March 13. In addition, the decrease in the aircraft composition of the Finnish Air Force was taken into account due to the return of the Ju 52 / 3m OH-LAK to the Aero Oyu airline and due to the Aero A-32GR AEj-55 to be written off, which was transferred to storage on January 13, 1940 and was not taken into account in the composition Finnish Air Force on March 13, 1940 in accordance with the rules used in the compilation of the tables.

There is an opinion, especially among Petersburgers, that "there is nothing to see in Finland." Well, except perhaps to live in a cottage, fish on a forest lake or go skiing. Fortunately, this is not the case. In addition to water parks, ski slopes and shops with Fairy and red caviar, there are other attractions in the country of Suomi. One of them is the aviation museum in Tikkakoski, 20 kilometers from the city of Jyväskylä.

Once the aviation museum in Tikkakoski had the status of the "Official Museum of the Finnish Air Force". In the 1970s, this quiet place must have been a dream Soviet intelligence officers. Why? It's simple - the Finnish Air Force Administration, the Air Force Pilot Training Center, the Information Service and the Flight School with a training aircraft base are located here. In addition to the Academy of the Finnish Air Force, Tikkakoski is also home to the largest research and development unit in the country, specializing in the development of aircraft systems ... In general, the place for the museum was not chosen by chance. By the way, another Finnish aviation museum is located near Helsinki in the suburbs of Vantaa, but so far I have not visited it.

But back to Tikkakoski. The first thing that strikes the exposition is the abundance of swastikas. By itself, the swastika does not represent anything negative. This is one of the most ancient graphic symbols denoting the movement of the Sun around the Earth, from east to west. In the European culture of the 19th century, this symbol was very popular in the wake of the fashion of the Aryan theory.

The Finnish swastika “khakaristi” got on the wings of aircraft during the civil war: on March 6, 1918, the Swedish Count Eric von Rosen presented the first aircraft with a swastika on board to the Mannerheim White Army. After that, in general, the Finns had no choice - by order of Mannerheim, this emblem entered the symbolism and badges young republic.

It turns out that the swastika appeared in Finnish aviation long before it became a state symbol. Nazi Germany. However, historically, the Finnish swastika "khakaristi" had nothing to do with the "German-fascist" symbol.

During the Second World War, the Finnish Air Force used "khakaristi" as an identification mark for the aircraft of the Suomi country - a blue swastika in a white circle was applied to the wings and fuselage of the aircraft.

After the Second World War, the swastika of the Finnish aviation had to be abandoned, this symbol, strongly associated with German fascism, became too odious.

Today, the emblem of the Finnish Air Force, instead of "hakaristi", shows a neutral white and blue circle, repeating the colors national flag Finland.

If we talk about the museum building, then this is one reinforced concrete hangar of considerable size, more like a large factory workshop. Probably, due to lack of space, the planes are located very close to each other and sometimes it seems that this is not a museum, but a large warehouse of old aircraft.

Surprisingly, "capitalist" Finland in the 1960-80s actively and with pleasure used Soviet-made military aircraft. For example, in the picture - the Il-28R bomber. From 1961 to 1981, three of these aircraft were used as target tugs, and in addition there was one "real" Il-28R bomber. I assume that this car is in the museum.

"Our" MiG-21s served in fighter aviation. In general, the first MiG aircraft in the amount of 4 pieces entered service with the Finnish Air Force in 1962. These were MiG-15UTI trainers. One of them in a bright green, "acid" color stands in front of the entrance to the museum, and his photo is posted at the beginning of today's post. Later, several dozen more MiG-21s were received. One of the planes is just shown in the picture.

MiG aircraft were in service with the Finnish Air Force until the 1990s (in fighter aircraft - until the end of the 1980s). Today, the cockpit of one of the aircraft is in the museum and anyone who wants to sit in it can feel like a military pilot. It is interesting that most of the inscriptions on the dashboard are quite Finnish, but if you look closely, there are also familiar Cyrillic characters.

Next to the cockpit of the MiG aircraft is a part of the fuselage of the Swedish aircraft SAAB 35 Draken. At a minimum, in terms of the number of instruments, the Scandinavian aircraft loses to “our” MiGs ... An interesting detail is that the on-board systems of the “Soviet” MiG aircraft were finalized by Nokia (yes, yes, the very one ...), which provided a single data format coming from SAAB aircraft and MiG-21.

And this is an American Douglas.

Unfortunately, due to the abundance of exhibits, there is no way to remember them all. However, the overall impression of the museum remained positive - varied, interesting, unusual. For children, it is especially important that you can board some planes and even “steer”, feeling like a real pilot.
Well, as a keepsake you can buy a genuine technical documentation for airplanes of the 50-70s. Instructions, drawings, diagrams, which have already become unnecessary, including those for domestic cars (and even in Russian!) are sold at a reasonable price in a souvenir kiosk at the exit of the museum.