Connection history:

The city was formed in the region of the city of Novograd-Volynsky (Kyiv Military District) in 1935.

Participated in Polish campaign 1939

On the June, 22 45th rifle division was part of the 15th rifle corps(commander Fedyuninsky I.I.). Parts of the division were located 20-60 km from the border in the areas of Shatsk, Lyuboml, Kovel. The division headquarters was in Kovel.

The strength and armament of the division on June 22, 1941: 10,010 people. personnel, 8958 rifles, 351 machine guns, 150 mortars, 442 light and 197 heavy machine guns, 54 units. 45 mm guns, 34 pieces. 76 mm guns, 34 pieces. 122 mm guns, 12 pcs. 152 mm guns, 264 vehicles and 75 tractors.

Raised on combat alert June, 22 By decision of the unit commanders, the army troops advanced to the state border. Before reaching it, 10-15 km, they met with the advanced and reconnaissance units of the enemy and, throwing them to the west, at 11-13.00 started oncoming battles with his main forces that had approached.

The enemy inflicted main blow forces of the 56th and 62nd infantry divisions of the 17th army corps along the railway line Kholm - Kovel on the section Sverzhe-Berezhtse (10 km). After capturing the bridges at Vlodava and Volchiy Perevoz, the enemy threw forward the reconnaissance battalions of the 255th, 56th and 62nd Infantry Divisions in the direction of Pishchev, Lyuboml and Zamlynye (10 km south of Lyuboml).

Parts of the 45th Infantry Division started head-on battles with the enemy 8-10 km from the border. The right-flank 10th Rifle Regiment of Colonel N. A. Guz, who set out at 6-7.00 on June 22 in battalion columns from the settlements of Pisha, Pulmo, Svityaz and Shatsk, reached the border by 11-12.00 and occupied the areas of the foredfield of the Kovel UR only on the left flank of his section - at the turn of Koshary, Grabov, (claim.) Adamchuki (4-8 km southeast of Vlodava). During a skirmish with the enemy in the Melniki area, two enemy armored vehicles were captured.

The most tense battle took place in the Liubovl direction, where the main forces of the 17th army corps of the enemy were advancing. The left-flank 61st Rifle Regiment of the 45th Rifle Division of Colonel G.S. Antonov, when approaching the line of Kuta, Kotsyura (4 km west of Lyuboml) at 8.00, was met by fire reconnaissance battalion 56th Infantry Division and, turning around, threw it back with heavy losses. Continuing to move towards the border, the 61st Infantry Regiment approached the line by 12-13.00 east of height 191.8 (1 km north of Yagotin), the eastern outskirts of Yagotin, in front of which it was met by organized machine-gun and artillery fire from the main forces of the enemy's 56th Infantry Division deployed in battle order. Despite the clear numerical superiority of the enemy forces, the 61st Rifle Regiment decisively attacked the enemy in the afternoon of June 22 and, after a stubborn battle, captured Hill 191.8 and eastern part Yagotina.

As a result of the battle on June 22, units of the 45th Infantry Division reached the border only partially: in the zone of the 10th rifle regiment in the Koshary sector, (claim.) Adamchuki and in the strip of the 61st Infantry Regiment in the Opalin, Goshcha sector - in total on a front 13 km wide. On the rest of the front, 37 km wide, the enemy, having overcome our border defensive line, captured bridgeheads on the right and left flanks of the division, 20 and 8 km deep, respectively.

The commander of the 45th Infantry Division decides by entering the battle in the morning June 23 the second echelon of the division of the 253rd rifle regiment and the 41st motorized rifle regiment of the 41st tank division attached to it, as well as counterattacks of the 10th and 61st rifle regiments, destroy the enemy wedged in on both flanks and completely restore the situation on the border. Fulfilling this order, units of the 45th Infantry Division counterattacked the enemy on the morning of June 23. The counterattack of the 10th Infantry Regiment in the direction of Pishcha was repelled by units of the enemy's 267th Infantry Division, and the regiment's units held their former positions on the line of lakes and the Western Bug River, repelling attempts by mobile intelligence units the enemy to penetrate the right flank and to the rear of the division. The counterattack of the 253rd Infantry Regiment in the direction of Ostrovki, Rovno was also unsuccessful.

During June 24-25 the enemy continued to advance. The 15th Rifle Corps, somewhat pressed in the center, continued to hold its former position on its flanks. The 45th Infantry Division defended the line of Melniki Zalesye, Olshanka, Grabov, repelling attempts by units of the 267th Infantry and 213th Security Divisions of the enemy to penetrate the front line on its right flank, and on the left flank fought a heavy battle with units of the 56th Infantry divisions that captured Lyuboml. On the night of June 25, the commander of the 15SK decided to withdraw the 45th Infantry Division to the line of Staraya Guta, Gorodlo, Skiby, and the 62nd Infantry Division to the line of Mashchev, Radekhov, Chmykoe.

On the night of June 26, the commander of the 5th Army, due to the deep detour of the left flank of the army, decided to withdraw the 15th SC to the Stokhid River. Having evacuated or destroyed the material and technical assets and stocks available in Kovel, under the cover of the rearguards, by the morning of June 29, the corps withdrew to the Stokhid River, where they took up defense. On June 28, the remnants of the 87th Infantry Division under the command of the Chief of Staff Colonel M.I. Blank broke through from the west across the front line into the zone of the 15th Rifle Corps, retaining the Battle Banner and 2 guns. This division in the first days of the war was cut off by the enemy in the region of Vladimir-Volynsky.

However, Stokhod did not manage to stay on the river for a long time. Due to a deep breakthrough at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies, there was a threat of German mechanized forces reaching the line of the old border before the Soviet troops and cutting them off from this line. Therefore, on July 1, an order came to withdraw by July 9 to the line of the old border of 1939 and, relying on fortified areas, to detain the enemy.

With 2 to 5 July forced marches of the 15SK division retreated to the Sluch River, destroying bridges behind them and arranging roadblocks. On July 5, the troops crossed to the right bank of the Sluch River and entered their defense lines: the 15th Rifle Corps - to the line of Berezhki, Bystrich. During the retreat, the 5th Army managed to break away from the enemy and its position was quite stable, however, at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies, the situation could not be normalized. On the evening of July 5, a directive came from the front headquarters: 5th Army (15th, 31st, 27th Rifle Corps, 22nd, 9th MK, 1st 5th Tank Brigade), preventing the enemy from breaking through in the direction of Novograd-Volynsky and firmly ensuring a junction with the 6th Army, withdraw to the line of Rudnitsa, Belokorovichi, Serbs. Those. to the border of the Korosten UR. Before the withdrawal in the period from 5 to 9 July, it was necessary to defend the line of the Sluch River.

The Korostensky UR occupied the front of Rudnitsa, Belokorovichi, Belka, the Fontanka station with a length of 130 km, covering the Kyiv UR from the northwest. In the UR there were 439 long-term structures built in the period 1931-1934, of which the bulk - 427 pillboxes were machine-gun and only 12 artillery. There were also 14 checkpoints and NPs and one shelter. During the period 1938-1939. 14 more artillery pillboxes were built, but they were not armed. Most of the pillboxes were located on the first strip, which had a depth of 1.5 to 3 km, located in one or two, and only in some places in three lines.

At the same time, in the Emilchino area, at a distance of 25 km from the first strip and in front of it, an additional defense unit was built in order to cover the gap between the Korostensky UR and the Novograd-Volynsky UR. underground lines communication was 88.6 km, which was not enough even to ensure reliable control in the battalion - company - pillbox link. The UR was armed with 16 76-mm caliber guns, 919 heavy and 309 light machine guns. The main disadvantage of the Korostepe UR was the poor equipment with artillery weapons, the absence of anti-tank obstacles, and the insecurity of the control system. In general, the Korostensky UR could strengthen the defense of the field troops in anti-personnel terms, but was weak in anti-tank terms, although the wooded area in the UR zone made it difficult for the enemy to use tanks and aircraft.

However, on July 8-9, the German 1TGr managed to break through the defenses of 31SK in Novograd-Volynsky UR and rush to Zhitomir. The counterattack inflicted by 31SK did not bring success. 62sd, together with the 212th and 331st howitzer artillery regiments of the 15th Rifle Corps, was transferred from the northwestern sector of the Korosten UR and put into battle. On July 18, the 45th Rifle Division was withdrawn to the reserve, and on July 22, together with the headquarters of the 15th Corps, it was moved to the left flank of the army.

The main forces of the 5th Army by the evening of July 22 completed the regrouping on its left flank, but did not have time to fully gain a foothold in new positions, as they were attacked by the 113th, 262nd and 296th infantry divisions of the enemy, and fought, occupying the next position. 15th Rifle Corps: The 45th Rifle Division with the 231st Artillery Regiment and the 212th Howitzer Artillery Regiment defended at the line of Guta Lagunovskaya, Malin, Yaltsovka. At 13 o'clock July 22 the enemy on its sector, having introduced a fresh 262nd Infantry Division into battle, went on the offensive and captured Malin, the counterattack of the second echelon of the 45th Infantry Division, undertaken with the aim of dislodging the enemy from Malin, was not successful.

On July 24, the 15th Corps, by order of the army commander, went on the offensive in order to destroy the enemy's Malinsky grouping. The 45th Rifle Division, with its right-flank 10th Rifle Regiment, also went on the offensive on July 24 in the direction of Berkovka, Nyanevka, bypassing Malin from the west. Its central 61st Rifle Regiment, under Colonel Antonov, was advancing, together with units of the 22nd Mechanized Corps, on the northwestern outskirts of Malin. The left-flank 253rd Rifle Regiment, bypassing Malin from the east, by the end of July 24 reached the Fedorovna, Staraya Irsha line. However, as a result of enemy counterattacks, units of the 45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions and the 22nd Mechanized Corps, which had advanced south of Malin, were forced to withdraw on July 26 to the left bank of the Irsha River.

The command of the GRA "South", realizing that it would not be possible to quickly defeat the 5th Army in the Pripyat region, decided to withdraw on July 22 the 29th Army Corps from the front in the Korosten region and as part of four divisions and send it in the direction of Kyiv.

to the end July 31 units of the 15th rifle and 22nd mechanized corps fought intense battles on the lines: The 45th Rifle Division and the 22nd MK, having suffered heavy losses and having mixed up their subunits, by 4 p.m. on July 31 were thrown back to the line of Golovki, Pirushki, (suit.) Lumlya;

In the evening July 31 the army commander made a decision because. in the zone of the 15th Rifle Corps in the Malinsky direction, a threatened situation was created due to the fact that the enemy, having broken through the defenses and wedged to a depth of 10 km, is pulling up reserves there, which indicates his intention to develop a blow to the north here, that is, to the rear 5th Army. Therefore, in the Malinsky direction, one should go on the defensive and throw in for reinforcement its last reserve of the army - the 9th mechanized corps (without 131 md), which has about 40 tanks.

The 51st Army Corps of the enemy (98th, 113th and 262nd infantry divisions), going on the offensive from the Malinsky bridgehead on the morning of July 31, with strong artillery and air support, continued to push our small units and formations for four days, increasing their efforts both in the northern direction to Ksaverov, and in the north-west direction along railway Malin - Korosten. to the end August 4 troops of the 51st army corps of the enemy in both these directions managed to advance to a depth of 20 km and expand the bridgehead to 30 km. A counterattack by the forces of the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions from the west and northwest, by the forces of the 9th mechanized corps from the north and the 22nd mechanized corps from the northeast, undertaken by order of the commander in the period of August 2-3 in the general direction to Malin was repelled by the enemy, and by August 4, the troops of the left wing of the army, with difficulty restraining the enemy’s offensive, were fighting hard. In general, the position of the 5th Army by the end of August 3 was difficult. Despite a number of repeated and well-organized counterattacks and counterattacks by the army formations, the enemy's wedging in the Bondarev and Malinsky directions could not be eliminated, although the further advance of the enemy troops was delayed.

Undertaken 5th of August With formations of the left wing of the 5th Army, a counterattack on the enemy's Malinsky grouping only led to the fettering of its units advancing in the east and north directions, but it was not possible to delay their attack in the northwest direction on Korosten. On the morning of August 5, the enemy resumed the offensive in both directions and by the end of August 5, having advanced up to 10 km, pushed our troops to the lines: the 62nd Infantry Division - Zlobichi, Stremingorod; 45th - Liplyany, Guta Genrikhovskaya; 9th mechanized corps - Skuraty, Vladovka.

Since the troops of the 5th Army are bled dry in continuous battles, physically exhausted and unable to continue to hold such an extended and broken front without reserves. Based on this, the commander in the evening of August 5 decided the following. Withdraw the 15th Rifle Corps to the line of Beloshitsy, Stremingorod, Liplyany, Yuzefovka. Remove weapons from the pillboxes of the southwestern sector of the Korosten UR and withdraw their garrisons to. the above lines, subordinating them to the commanders of the 31st and 15th rifle corps.

to the end 8 August The 45th Rifle Division, after repeated counterattacks by its units, was pushed back by units of the enemy's 98th Infantry Division to the Lipnyaki-Guta Genrikhovskaya line. Thanks to the timely withdrawal of the troops of the 31st, 15th rifle corps and the 19th mechanized corps to the new line, significant army forces avoided encirclement and defeat, however, it was not possible to create a stable defense and withdraw part of the forces to the second echelon and reserve, as the enemy continued offensive, seeking to develop success north of Korosten on Ignatnol and Ksaverov, and our small and exhausted units hardly repelled enemy attacks.

Troops of the 5th Army From August 9 to 14, they improved their positions in engineering terms and improved the fire system, continuing to tie down large forces enemy. 15th rifle. the corps occupied the lines: Bardy, (claim.) Kunech farm; Kunech farm, Subina farm; (claim.) Subina farm, Obikhody. On August 12, the German 2nd field army went on the offensive against Gomel. By August 15, our units in the area of ​​Rogachev and Zhlobin were partially defeated and surrounded. August 19 Gomel fell. In this regard, it was decided to withdraw the 5th Army beyond the Dnieper.

The German command, for its part, did not take active steps in early August. offensive actions expecting the fall of Kyiv and the transfer of two mobile divisions to the 6th Army. However, the assault on the Kiev UR turned out to be unsuccessful, and from the mobile formations the command of the GRA South allocated only the 11th tank division. But because of the successes at Gomel, the possible withdrawal of the Soviet 5th Army beyond the Dnieper became quite expected, and the German command was preparing for it.

On the night of August 21 began to withdraw to loading points for further movement to the east, units transported by rail and road ( 62, 200, 135 sd, control 15 sk). 15SK was transferred to submission Southwestern Front, took up positions 30 km north of Chernigov: the 62nd division - at the turn of Makishin, Veliky Litvyaga, Burovka. Headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps - Chartoriyka (15 km north of Chernihiv). 45 Infantry Division retreated beyond the Dnieper march on foot. On August 24, they crossed the Pripyat, and by August 28, the division, having become part of 31SK (193, 195 and 45 rifle divisions), took up defense along the banks of the Dnieper. On the whole, the withdrawal of the 21st Army across the Dnieper was carried out in a very organized manner. The troops did not lose control, broke away from the enemy and took up defensive positions in a new sector of defense. The only failure was the capture by parts of the 11th Panzer Division of the bridge across the Dnieper near Okuninovo. At the end of August, this threat was localized, but the German bridgehead was not eliminated. In 2 weeks, this will lead to big trouble when the infantry divisions of the 6th German army begin to attack from there.

August 28 fighting began on the northern sector of the front of the 5th army. The enemy forces of the 131st, 260th, 134th and 17th Infantry Divisions went on the offensive along the entire front of the 15th Rifle Corps, striking at Bolshoy Dyrchin; at the junction of the 62nd and 200-1 rifle divisions in the direction of Vykhvostov, Ivashkovka; on Svinazhin, Golubichi, as well as in the gap between the 200th and 193rd rifle divisions in the direction of Kostino, Zadereevka. In the course of two days of fierce fighting, the enemy, relying on his three-four-fold superiority and strong aviation support, by the end of August 29 pushed our units by 8-12 km, which retreated and fought stubborn battles at the lines: 62nd Infantry Division - Makishin, (suit.) Ivashkovka, Semenkov, having in front of him parts of the 131st and 260th infantry divisions.

August 30 General Potapov at 15:30 ordered the 45th Rifle Division to be withdrawn from the Dnieper line and, without waiting for its replacement by units of the 195th and 215th divisions, by forced march by the morning of August 31, to concentrate it in the Novy Belous, Lgovka, Zaitsy area, where she was supposed to come under the command of the commander of the 15th rifle corps, who would push her tentatively to the line of Petrushka, the settlement of Roishche, Osnyaki to close the gap that had formed between the 62nd and 200th divisions. However, the division, brought into battle on August 31, with difficulty held back the advance of units of the enemy's 134th Infantry Division at the Kholyavin-Yurievka line.

to the end September 1 units of the 15th Rifle Corps fought fierce battles. The 62nd Infantry Division operated at the line of Svin, (claim.) Lopatin, (claim.) Kholyavin. Parts of the enemy's 260th Infantry Division, covering the right flank of the 62nd Division, deeply wedged at the junction between it and its neighbor on the right - the 75th Infantry Division of the 21st Army, trying to break through to the Desna southeast of Chernigov. Artillery regiments The 15th corps, returned to the corps, took up firing positions north of Chernigov, supporting the infantry with their fire.

The commander of the 5th Army, realizing that the 15SK units were greatly weakened in previous battles and replenished with a large number of recruits, it is unlikely that during the counterattack they will be able to restore their position on the right flank of the corps and connect with the 21st Army. However, he still hoped for private success. And yet, after going on the attack at 0700 hours on September 2, units of the 15th Rifle Corps and the 1st Airborne Brigade were unable to overcome the enemy's unsuppressed fire system, and the attack bogged down. Soon the enemy, with strong support from artillery and aviation, attacked our units themselves, which with heavy losses were pushed back 2-6 km and fought by the end of the day on September 2: 62nd Rifle Division - at the turn of the eastern outskirts of Bobrovitsa, (claimed) Shevchenko's farm with units 260 front of the enemy; 1 airborne and 45 rifle divisions - at the turn of the Shevchenko farm, Polubotki, the southern outskirts of Kholyavin, Polyanka with units of 134 enemy infantry divisions. In addition to this failure, on the night of September 2, the Germans managed to capture a bridgehead on the Desna near Wibli. The counterattack launched on September 2 against the bridgehead on the Desna, near Wibli, captured by the Germans, was also unsuccessful. During the counterattack, the commander of 15SK, Colonel Blank, was killed.

Both in the Chernigov region and in the Vibla region, the attacks of our units were repulsed by the enemy with heavy losses, and the situation on the right flank of the army worsened more and more. In addition, the Germans went on the offensive from the Okuninsky bridgehead, and several more infantry divisions crossed over to the bridgehead at Wibli. to the end September 5 45th Rifle Division held the line of Pevtsy, Novy Belous.

During September 7 - 8 the main battles unfolded on the Okuninsky bridgehead and the bridgehead on the Desna near Wibli. To the north of Chernigov, the enemy's 134th Infantry Division did not show much activity, and units of the 62nd and 45th Infantry Divisions continued to hold the line of Bobrovitsa, Aleksandrovsky farm, Pevtsy, Novy Belous. However, the troops that had crossed from the bridgehead at Wibli were already reaching the rear of 15SK. By the evening of September 8, the situation became critical. It was necessary to withdraw parts of the army beyond the Desna. And even this withdrawal will be associated with great risks. It is necessary to continue to hold the Chernigov bridgehead with part of the forces, regroup the main forces of the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions southeast of Chernigov and deliver a flank attack from the west against the Gorbov grouping of the enemy. Morovskukh group to tie down the active actions of the 295th and the remnants of the 228th rifle divisions. For the crossing of the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions across the Desna, use permanent bridges south and southeast of Chernigov.

As darkness falls 8 September parts of the 15th and 31st rifle corps began to make their way to the crossings on the Desna. The 62nd and 45th Rifle Divisions of the 15th Rifle Corps, leaving the rearguards at the line of Bobrovitsa, Aleksandrovsky, Pevtsy, Novy Belous, which they occupied, retreated through Chernigov, heading for the road and railway bridges, located 1-3 km south of the city . When approaching the crossing points, it turned out that the bridges had already been destroyed by our sappers. In view of the destruction of these crossings near Chernigov, the commander of the 15th Corps, General K.S. Moskalenko, ordered the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions to break through to the pontoon crossing, induced by our sappers near Slavino (16 km southwest of Chernigov). Moving along the right bank of the Desna to Slavino, the 45th Rifle Division in the Zaitsy, Kiyanka area and the 62nd Rifle Division in the Shestovits area were met by units of the enemy’s 98th Infantry Division advancing from the south and blocking the way to the crossing. A heavy battle in the area of ​​​​Shestovitsy, Kiyanka lasted for two days. The position of the 45th and 62nd divisions was also deteriorating more and more because their rearguards, under the onslaught of the enemy’s 134th infantry division, which went on the offensive, first withdrew to Chernigov, where they fought street battles with the enemy, and then were driven out of the city to the south .

As early as the afternoon of September 9, General Potapov learned that permission had finally been received from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to withdraw the 5th Army beyond the Desna.

Direct wire talks at 24:00 on September 9, 1941 between General Kirponos and General Potapov: ...Potapov. There is very alarming information about the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions, the situation there is very serious. The commander of the 45th Rifle Division, Major General Shertyuk, was wounded, at about 5 p.m. he received the last radiogram from him with the following content: "Help, people can." Nothing more came from him. There is heavy fighting going on in the area where they are believed to be. I think some parts of there should return tonight. After 17.00 I have no contact by radio with anyone. He took all measures of artillery support. Sent all the ships ( river flotilla. - A.V.), which I have, sent enhanced reconnaissance, the task of which he set - to show the way where to go, prepared the crossing. Communication with Tymoshenko (62nd division - A.V.) and Sherstyuk (45th division - A.V.) was interrupted from 17.00 on September 9. A political instructor arrived from them a few hours ago and painted a very gloomy picture. I think he exaggerates a lot. One thing, of course, is certain that the material part, apparently, in its absolute majority, perished.

The next day, 10 September, did not bring any improvement in the position of the 5th Army. Of the surrounded divisions of the 15th and 31st rifle corps, only separate units and groups of our fighters and commanders armed with small arms made their way and crossed the Desna. By the end of September 10, it was already possible to sum up some preliminary results of the losses of the 5th Army for last days. 15th Rifle Corps - Commander Major General Moskalenko. In 135 sd, 1 airborne and 1 aptbr, there were a total of about 1000 people. From the composition of the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions, only about 500 people made their way or left the encirclement. General command over the remnants of the 45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions was entrusted to the commander of the 62nd Rifle Division, Colonel Timoshenko. The artillery regiments of these divisions, having lost their materiel, ceased to exist. In total, the 15th Rifle Corps had no more than 1.5 thousand soldiers and commanders of rifle units and about 90 guns and mortars of various calibers.

to the end 11 September 15th Rifle Corps: the remnants of the 135th Rifle Division and the 1st Airborne Division held the nameless heights 2-4 km south of Kuklin in separate pockets, with difficulty repelling the attacks of the 131st and 260th Infantry Divisions of the enemy, who directed their efforts to the fastest capture of Nezhin. The remnants of the 45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions, which had broken through from the encirclement, were assembled under the general command of the energetic commander of the 62nd Rifle Division, Colonel Timoshenko, in the Mrin area, where they were put in order. The reserve of the commander of the 15th corps -244 joint ventures was concentrated on the eastern outskirts of Nosovka.

to the end 12-th of September The 15th Rifle Corps occupied the northwestern outskirts of Nizhyn with the remnants of the 1st Airborne Corps. 62nd Rifle Division defended on the line the southwestern outskirts of Nizhyn, Sinyaki. The remnants of 135 rifle divisions and 35 rifle divisions occupied Grigorievka, Gat farm, northern. outskirts. Socks. The commander of the 15th Corps ordered the 45th Rifle Division to take the line (claim) Bruises, Sulak farm.

September 13 the troops of the 5th Army, pressed by superior enemy forces, conducting holding battles, retreated to the south. The remnants of the army formations failed to gain a foothold on the Oster River, which the enemy units managed to force on the move in a number of directions. By the end of September 13, the 15th Rifle Corps was engaged in heavy fighting with superior enemy forces, which were striving to envelop its flanks.

to the end September 14 The 15th Rifle Corps with the remnants of the 1st VDK - in the Bezuglovka area; 62nd rifle division - at the turn of Volodkovo, Maiden, (suit) experience, temporary storage; 135 sd - at the turn of experience, temporary storage, rates. 45th Rifle Division withdrew to the Donino area.

By 21 o'clock September 15th 15th Rifle Corps: 45th Rifle Division was held by the southern outskirts of Monastyrishche, Yakhnovshchizna; 62nd Rifle Division - Nadine, southern outskirts of Bogdanovka; 135 sd - (claim.) the southern outskirts of Bogdanovka, Shatura. Units 131 and 134 of the enemy front operated in front of the front of the Corps.

to the end 16 of September 15th Rifle Corps: 45th Rifle Division fought on the southern outskirts of the Petrovsky check-in; 62nd Rifle Division, waging a stubborn battle, retreated to the line (claim.) check-in Petrovsky, Nachvolodovka; 135th Rifle Division withdrew to the line of Nachvolodovka, Cellars.

Already on September 15, the German 2nd and 1st tank groups joined near the Lokhvitsa station. Communications units of the South-Western Front were cut. On September 18, the commander of the South-Western Front, Regiment General. Kirponos gave the order to withdraw units of the front from the encirclement. The commander of the 5th Army, in pursuance of the order received, took next solution: The 15th Rifle Corps of General Moskalenko, having crossed the Uday River near Piryatin, to make their way further through Chernukha to Lokhvitsa. But it turned out that this decision of the commander of the 5th Army could no longer be carried out, since the remnants of formations and units were divided into separate, isolated groups that made their way to the south and east on their own. In fact, all units of the 45sd were defeated when leaving the encirclement. Came out only individual groups fighters and commanders. The division commander, Major General Sherstyuk, went out together with the headquarters of 15SK. The banner of the division was also saved. Because of this, they did not disband the division, but actually recreated it by re-forming it in Voronezh in November-December 41.

More than 8 thousand Voronezh residents joined the ranks of the division. In particular, the 1st regiment was poured militia, formed from the workers of the plant. Dzerzhinsky (it consisted of 2309 people). In addition, the 9th Infantry Regiment in the amount of 2600 people, standing on the defense of the city of Voronezh, was transferred to the division. 22 armored vehicles, 3 tanks, 29 cannons, 70 machine guns, 15 vehicles, 1100 rifles, 365 thousand rounds of ammunition, 13.5 thousand shells were sent to staff the division.

Voronezh 9th Infantry Regiment in the amount of 2600 people. 22 armored vehicles, 3 tanks, 29 cannons, 70 machine guns, 15 vehicles, 1100 rifles, 365 thousand rounds of ammunition, 13.5 thousand shells were sent to staff the division.

December 14, 1941 The newly completed division became part of the 40th Army, on December 18 it landed at the Kastornaya station and took part in the winter offensive against Kursk. In the December counter-offensive of 1941, it broke through defensive lines the enemy in the Tim-Schigry area, deepened 40 km into enemy territory, while freeing more than 30 of our settlements; destroyed 12 thousand Nazis, 20 guns, 7 tanks and 4 enemy aircraft.

From April to June 1942, the division took up defensive positions on the Seim River. 28.6.1942 Operation Blue has begun German advance to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The division took up defensive positions in the center of the 40th Army, while the main blow fell on the right flank of the army. By June 30, the Germans, having broken through the defenses of the 40th Army, captured the crossings on the Kshen River. On the same day, the 6th field army went on the offensive against our 21st army, which occupied the defense to the south. Already on July 1 and 2, the Nazis bypassed Stary Oskol from the south and north with tank wedges. By the end of July 2, the Germans cut the Kastornoye-Stary Oskol railway, deeply covering the 40A left-flank divisions from the north, which continued to fight in the main defense zone, a day later, 24 TD, the enemy reached the Don. On the night of July 1-2, the divisions occupying positions in the center of the 40A formation received an order to withdraw. And at nightfall on July 2, units of the army began to retreat to a new line of defense Yastrebovka, Pokrovka, Krasnaya Zarya, Strekino (25 km northwest and 38 km west of Stary Oskol). However, in the evening July 2 mobile formations of 4TA and 6 of the Paulus army connected at Stary Oskol. The division, along with several other formations of the 40th and 21st armies, was surrounded.

From July 2 to July 6, the division fought hard battles surrounded, where it died most of warriors and com. composition. The 253rd Rifle Regiment of the 45th Division fought back to the east. The commander of the regiment Velichko and the political instructor of the company of submachine gunners selected 150 brave guys, with whom they covered the retreat. They themselves had to break through the Oskol River and the railway near the village of Sorokino. When the machine gunners were pressed to the rye field, there were 25 of them left. In turn, the Nazis mowed down both the bread stalks and the soldiers hiding there.

But the soldiers of the division, who escaped from the encirclement with heavy fighting, broke through to the Don River and on July 7-8, 1942, organized a breakthrough near Korshevo. On July 12, a small part of the people managed to escape from the encirclement (out of 11,000 people, 731 people left the encirclement). The remnants of the division were withdrawn to the Kuibyshev area for reorganization. At the end of July 1942, she was transferred to the Barysh station, Syzran district of the Kuibyshev region, where she departed from the Grafskaya station (near Voronezh).

Having completed the understaffing on October 3, 42. the division is again sent to the front, having unloaded at Elton station. By October 18, concentrated in the area of ​​​​the village of Zaplavnoye, taking up defense on the island of Golodny. By October 30, it concentrated in the Burkovsky area, Gospitomnik on the banks of the Volga, becoming part of 62A Chuikov, which fought in Stalingrad.

On the night of October 31, under heavy artillery mortar fire from the enemy, units of the division began crossing the Volga to Stalingrad. During the crossing, the commander of the 10th joint regiment, Major Mozheiko, was wounded. The task of the division was to take up defense at the turn of Mezinsk and Mirovskaya streets. By this time, the enemy, having broken through the defenses of the 193rd Rifle Division, rushed to the Volga in the area of ​​Stalnaya St., Mirovsk. Having counterattacked the enemy that had broken through, the division restored the situation. Then the division went on the defensive in the Slag Mountain area. On November 3, German troops again launched an offensive in the "Rezets" area. The enemy attack was repulsed. On November 4, the Germans launched a major offensive in an effort to reach the Volga. However, daily attempts to break through the defenses, but all enemy attacks were repelled. On November 23, after closing the encirclement around the army of Paulus, the enemy went on the defensive.

Now parts of the division themselves went on the offensive. In the course of continuous 40 day offensive battles, the division cleared the territory of the "Barrikada" and "Red October" factories from the enemy. by December 29, parts of the division reached the street. Industrial, by December 31, units of the 253rd division reached the office building of the Krasny Oktyabr plant. At the beginning of January 1943 buildings were stormed. By January 10, the entire territory of the plant was cleared of the enemy. By January 11, the division reached the street. Ordzhonikidze, by January 16 on s-w okr. factory village "Red October". On January 31, the division received an order from Commander 62A Chuikov to prepare to storm the last enemy stronghold at the Barrikady plant. On the morning of February 2, artillery preparation began, after which our troops went on the attack. German troops unable to withstand the blow, they rolled back to the territory of the plant. The battle turned into fierce hand-to-hand combat in the workshops of the plant. Soon the columns of prisoners were drawn. At 12 o'clock the fighters of the division met with the fighters advancing from the north. The enemy was completely defeated, and a red flag was raised over Stalingrad!

Sverdlovsk Regional Association search parties"Return" is engaged in establishing the fate of military personnel in the Great Patriotic war and perpetuating the memory of the dead, missing, dead from wounds of soldiers.

We received an application to establish the fate of Mikhail Yudovich Abramov, born in 1901, a native of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Kozlovsky district, the village of Nizovka, mobilized by the Tikhvin RVK of the Leningrad Region.

We have carried out research in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense and found the following:

Abramov Mikhail Iudovich, born in 1904, Red Army soldier, 45th reserve rifle regiment, died on 04/09/42, fracture of the right femur, crush injury of the left shin. He died at the location of the OMSR. The notice was sent on April 18, 1942.

BASE:

TsAMO. Fund 133 medical battalion. Inventory A-71693. Case 578. Sheet 5.

Inventories of the 45th reserve rifle regiment were taken.

F.45 zsp, op.93441, d.1. Lists of used losses. Begin with the letter B.

F.45 zsp, op.93440, d.4. Not in business.

F.45 zsp, op. 93438, d.2. Lists of used losses. They begin from September, October 1942. And he died in April 1942.

It was established that 133 msbats were part of 321 sd 2 formations. (February-March 1942). The medical battalion has documents only from 1943.

The 321st Rifle Division was renamed the 82nd Guards Rifle Division in March 1943, so some of the documents were deposited in this fund.

Fund 82 Guards Rifle Division. Inventory 1. Case 12. Journal of military operations (26.3.42-12.6.45).

Sheet 1.

321st Rifle Division was formed in March 1942. The place of its formation and deployment is determined by junction 77, the railway named after. Molotov, Trans-Balkaysk Military District. From the end of March to May 26, 1942, the division was engaged in combat training. May 26, 1942 the division went to the camp of the village of Tasyrkhoy, where it was engaged in fortification work on the device of the Borda UR. July 12, 1942 321 sd from the village of Tasyrkhoy departed by rail to YES. From 26 to 30 July 1942 on the participation of the Kalinin junction, the Stalingrad region, the division unloaded.

Based on the information received, we assume that M.Yu. Abramov died. in the area where the 321st rifle division is located, i.e. somewhere at junction 77 of the Molotov railway, Trans-Baikal Military District. In this regard, we sent a request to the Trans-Baikal Military District to clarify the fate of Abramov M.Yu.

The headquarters of the Siberian Military District reported that “according to information received from the Trans-Baikal and East Siberian territorial directorates of military communications on railway transport, the location of the 77th siding has not been established. In this regard, it is not possible to provide an answer to the information you requested.

We also report the answer of the Military Medical Museum of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:

“There is no information about Mikhail Iudovich Abramov. Documents of the 133rd medical battalion for 1942 were not included in the archive. The archive does not have information about the location of medical battalions.

We were sent the following message to the site: "I am searching for 321 (2) sd-82gv.sd. I went to ABRAMOV MIKHAIL IUDOVICH, 133msb. There was a question, where is the 77th siding? I answer. Now this is Bezrechnaya station." Andrei.

Extracts from the archive were made personally by Oksana Korneva. If you wish to copy, be sure to read and execute.

01.05.1934 - 1957

The division was formed in Kuibyshev on May 1, 1934 as the 70th Rifle Division. It was part of the Volga Military District. In 1936 she was redeployed and quartered along the Finnish border. As part of the 7th Army, she took part in the Winter War.

On March 21, 1940, the 70th Rifle Division was awarded the Order of Lenin for participation in the Soviet-Finnish War.

On June 22, 1941, it was stationed in Leningrad, organizationally it was part of the 50th Rifle Corps, which covered state border USSR in district of Vyborg. During 1941-1942 he fought on the outskirts of Leningrad.

On October 16, 1942, the 70th Rifle Division of the Order of Lenin was transformed into the 45th Guards Rifle Division, thus becoming the first Guards Division on the Leningrad Front.

In January 1943, as part of the divisions of the 1st echelon of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front.

In the spring of 1943, together with the 63rd and 64th Guards Rifle Divisions, it became part of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps (in which it fought until the end of the war).

From May 8, 1945, the division was engaged in guarding the border area and combing the area in order to capture and capture German soldiers.

In early July, as part of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps, she made a long march from Liepaja to Leningrad. On the morning of July 8, the division solemnly entered Leningrad through one of the three temporary triumphal arches built for the arrival of the corps - in the Kirov region. The division marched to Palace Square, where it took part in a solemn rally.

In the summer of 1945 she was stationed at Karelian Isthmus Leningrad region.

In 1957 it was reorganized into a motorized rifle division. Renamed 45th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in 1965. On December 1, 1997, it was transformed into the 138th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Commanders:

• brigade commander Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich November 1939 to June 1940
• Major General Andrey Egorovich Fedyunin from July 1, 1940 to July 15, 1941
• Colonel Yakutovich Vyacheslav Petrovich from July 16, 1941 to December 21, 1941
• Colonel Tsukanov Evgeny Efimovich from January 9, 1942 to April 7, 1942
• Major General Krasnov Anatoly Andreevich April 8, 1942 to February 13, 1943
• Major General Putilov Savely Mikhailovich from January 16, 1943 to December 1, 1944
• Major General Trusov Ivan Ilyich from December 2, 1944 to May 9, 1945

Division Composition:

• 129th Leningrad Guards Rifle Regiment
• 131st Leningrad Red Banner Guards Rifle Regiment
• 134th Guards Rifle Leningrad Regiment
• 96th Guards Artillery Leningrad Regiment
• 50th separate guards anti-tank battalion
• 43rd Separate Guards Reconnaissance Company
• 49th Separate Guards Sapper Battalion
• 71st Separate Guards Communications Battalion (until 11/14/1944 - 71st Separate Guards Communications Company)
• 521st (52nd) separate medical and sanitary battalion
• 47th Separate Guards Chemical Protection Company
• 605th (48th) motor transport company
• 635th (46th) field bakery
• 638th (51st) Divisional Veterinary Infirmary
• 121st field post station
• 192nd field cash desk of the State Bank

Settlements:

• X. Dizhbrakshi 20-21.02.1945

• X. Bezobi 20-25.02.1945
• X. Exchanges 03/07/1945
• X. Bruvery 20.02-04.03.1945
• X. Guzhi 20-26.02.1945
• X. Degshni 02- 04.03.1945
• X. Kalai 20-26.02.1945
• X. Kaupyi 20.02-04.03.1945
  
• X. Keiri 25-26.02.1945
• X. Mazluki 20-26.02.1945
  
• mz. Mezhenieki 20.02-02.03.1945
• mz. Nodegi 20.02-06.03.1945
• X. Jaunzemye 20.02-03.03.1945

• X. Trumps 20.02-06.03..1945

PERSONNEL

commander of the machine gunners' squad of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment

27.09.1924 - 05.03.1945

Total: 478

Officers:

• guards Art. lieutenant Avramenko Alexey Zakharovich, commander of a sanitary platoon 1919 - 02/25/1945
• guards Lieutenant Aksenov Nikolai Semenovich, commander of a mortar platoon of the 129th GSP 1917 - 06/14/1945
• guards Lieutenant Alekseev Fedor Vasilievich, commander of a machine-gun platoon 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Alekseev Fedor Eliseevich
• guards Captain Andreev Vasily Vasilievich, commander of a rifle battalion 1916 - 02/14/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Antonov Dmitry Vasilievich, commander of a rifle platoon 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Afanasiev Vladimir Mikhailovich, commander of a platoon of submachine gunners 1925 - 03/04/1945
• guards ml. lieutenant Balikoev Shamin Aslangerievich, commander of a rifle platoon 1918 - 02/23/1945
• guards lieutenant Baskakov Sergey Andreevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1923 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Belisov Alexander Afanasyevich, commander of a rifle platoon of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment? - 05/25/1945
• guards Lieutenant Brodsky Vladimir Isaakovich, commander of a mortar platoon 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Vakhidov Khasan Kadirovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1919 - 04/07/1945
• guards lieutenant Vlasov Sergey Alexandrovich, commander of a rifle company 1909 - 03/03/1945
• guards Major Golikhov Anatoly Semenovich, commander of a rifle battalion 1920 - 02/22/1945
• guards Lieutenant Gusev Oleg Aleksandrovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Doroshenko Ivan Mikhailovich
• guards Lieutenant Egoshin Ivan Mikhailovich, commander of a mortar platoon 1907 - 02/24/1945
• guards Lieutenant Yelesin Nikolai Martynovich, commander of a rifle platoon? - 04/01/1945
• guards Lieutenant Ermakov Nikolai Alekseevich, commander of a platoon of submachine gunners 1921 - 02/24/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Zagainov Afanasy Afanasyevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Zedgenazov Pavel Nikolaevich, commander of a machine-gun platoon 1917 - 02/26/1945
• guards Lieutenant Zolotykh Ivan Ivanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1922 - 02/21/1945
• guards Lieutenant Zubarenko Ivan Vasilyevich, commander of a communications platoon of the 129th GSP 1916 - 02/24/1945
• guards ml. lieutenant Idelson Oscar Borisovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1906 - 03/24/1945 (VMN)
• guards Lieutenant Ivanov Leonid Vasilyevich, PTR platoon commander 1919 - 02/26/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Ignatenko Grigory Yakovlevich, commanding platoon commander of the 96th GAP 1919 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Ionov Nikifor Ivanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1901 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Kiryushkin Nikolai Afanasyevich, platoon commander 1917 - 02/23/1945
• guards Lieutenant Knyazhev Fedor Vasilyevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1911 - 03/06/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kobzar Pavel Prokofievich, platoon commander of 50 mm mortars 1908 - 02/21/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kozgov Fedor Vasilyevich, mortar platoon commander 1912 - 03/09/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kolyak Dmitry Ivanovich, commander of a firing platoon of a battery of 45 mm guns of the 134th GSP 1923 - 02/21/1945
• ml. Lieutenant Konin Ivan Vasilievich, commander of a rifle platoon of the 131st GSP 1925 - __.04.1945
• guards Captain Kuznetsov Grigory Ivanovich, pom. Chief of Staff of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1917 - 02/22/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kurkotov Nikolai Timofeevich, commander of a platoon of submachine gunners 1919 - 03/04/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kuskov Alexander Ivanovich, commander of a mortar platoon 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kuskov Petr Alexandrovich, commander of a mortar platoon 1914 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Kuspakov Cuba, commander of a mortar platoon 1923 - 02/22/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Kuettiev Alexey Ivanovich, commander of a platoon of machine gunners of the 129th GSP 1906 - 08/15/1945
• guards Lieutenant Leontiev Mikhail Leontevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1916 - 02/21/1945
• guards Captain Lobastov Vasily Vasilievich, commander of a rifle battalion 1916 - 02/26/1945
• guards lieutenant Maiorov Vasily Antonovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1911 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Markin Daniil Petrovich, commander of a rifle company 1927 - 02/21/1945
• guards Lieutenant Mendakov Alexander Pavlovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1917 - 02/22/1945
• guards Lieutenant Mikhailov Anatoly Petrovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1923 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Mosin Mikhail Ivanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1920 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Moskalev Fedor Timofeevich, platoon commander of the 50th OGIPTD 1924 - 03/04/1945
• guards Captain Nazarov Petr Vasilyevich, commander of the mortar company of the 129th GSP 1920 - 06/13/1945
• guards Captain Nazarov Yusup Pirkazarovich, regimental engineer 1917 - 02/23/1945
• guards lieutenant Naletov Alexey Fedorovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1912 - 03/06/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Nikitin Ivan Ivanovich, commander of a rifle company 1923 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Nikolaev Mikhail Ivanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1908 - 02/24/1945
• guards Lieutenant Panasov Viktor Lukich, commander of a rifle platoon 1924 - 02/22/1945
• ml. lieutenant Rassudovsky Vladimir Vladimirovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1925 - 02/25/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Romanov Mikhail Alekseevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1921 - 03/24/1945

Komsomol organizer

3rd Infantry Battalion, 129th Guards Rifle Regiment

1925 - 01.05.1998

• guards Lieutenant Sazonov Ivan Timofeevich, party organizer of the 1st rifle battalion of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment, born in 1916
• guards lieutenant Samkovich Joseph Nikolaevich, commander of a rifle platoon 1897 - 03/24/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Safronov Konstantin Andrianovich, commander of a rifle company 1922 - 02/21/1945
• guards lieutenant colonel Svirshchev Alexander Nikiforovich, head of the 1st department of headquarters 1914 - 03/28/1945
• guards Lieutenant Secretary Vasily Ivanovich, battery commander of the 96th GAP 1918 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Sergienko Vasily Vasilyevich, Komsomol organizer of the 2nd rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment, born in 1920
• guards Lieutenant Slavinsky Vsevolod Grigorievich, mortar platoon commander 1922 - 03/06/1945
• guards Lieutenant Smelchakov Nikolay Vasilievich, commander of a rifle platoon 1923 - 02/24/1945
• guards lieutenant Smirnov Alexander Ivanovich, communications platoon commander 1915 - 03/02/1945
• guards Lieutenant Smirnov Valentin Sergeevich, commander of a company of submachine gunners 1923 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Starovoitov Evgeny Nikolaevich, commander of a rifle company 1923 - 02/22/1945
• guards Art. Lieutenant Tatarintsev Mikhail Dmitrievich, head of intelligence division of the 96th GAP 1914 - 02/27/1945
• guards captain Timoshpolsky Davyd Semenovich, battery commander of 45 mm guns of the 134th GSP 1920 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Tikhonov Pavel Nikitich, Komsomol organizer of the 1st rifle battalion of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment, born in 1920
• guards Lieutenant Usolkin Georgy Pavlovich, commander of a mortar platoon 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Ushakov Petr Fedorovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1914 - 02/22/1945
• guards Lieutenant Faizulzhanov Khamzya Nugmanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1922 - 02/22/1945
• guards lieutenant Frenkel German Romanovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1901 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Chepurin Victor Alexandrovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1912 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Lieutenant Chirkov Alexander Leonidovich, commander of a machine-gun platoon 1926 - 03/25/1945
• guards Lieutenant Sharypanov Boris Ivanovich, commander of a mortar platoon of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards Lieutenant Shlyk David Samuilovich, commander of a rifle platoon 1918 - 02/21/1945
• guards Lieutenant Shmelev Konstantin Dmitrievich, commander of a mortar platoon of the 134th GSP 1921 - 02/22/1945
• guards Captain Shokilin Georgy Ivanovich, commander of a rifle battalion 1914 - 02/20/1945
• guards Lieutenant Yarosh Vladimir Petrovich, commander of a fire platoon 1911 - 03/03/1945

Private and non-commissioned officers:

machine gunner of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment

1907 - 21.02.1945

• guards Corporal Bezynyan Borukh Moshkovich , sniper of the 131st GSP 1913 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Belenkov Anatoly Pavlovich
• guards Art. Sergeant Beloglazov Mikhail Alekseevich, mortar crew commander of the 129th GSP 1919 - 02/25/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Beloglazov Fedor Vasilyevich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1917 - 02/23/1945
• guards Corporal Biryukov Alexey Petrovich
• guards Red Army soldier Blokhin Sergey Fedorovich, cartridge carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards corporal Bogdanov Ivan Ivanovich
• guards ml. Sergeant Bogdanov Ivan Spiridonovich, gunner 82 mm mortar of the 2nd mortar company of the 131st GSP 1906 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Boglai Vasily Fedorovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1917 - 02/25/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Bogoutdinov Zhefer Abzalovich, commander of the PTR department of the 129th GSP 1919 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Bozhenko Mikhail Ivanovich, numbered PTR 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Bozhev Vasily Dmitrievich, gunner of the RP of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards Sergeant Boldyrev Afanasy Kalistratovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1922 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Bolotov Nikolai Afanasyevich, Art. telephone operator of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Bondarenko Dmitry Afanasyevich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1903 - 02/22/1945
• guards foreman Borisov Mikhail Vladimirovich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1908 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Borisov Nikolay Ivanovich, light machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Borovik Ivan Mikhailovich, fighter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 02/20/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Brovkin Ivan Mikhailovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 03/03/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Bulanov Vladimir Grigorievich, machine gunner of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Bunakin Sergey Leontievich, telephone operator of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards foreman Burmashov Mikhail Ivanovich, foreman of the company of the 131st GSP 1906 - 03/03/1945
• guards Corporal Burmistrov Vladimir Dmitrievich, cartridge carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Butin Vasily Ivanovich, 2nd number of a light machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Buchelnikov Mikhail Alexandrovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vagapov Khamit Zakirovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1909 - 02/22/1945
• guards Corporal Valiev Shamil Asatovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vasiliev Vladimir Vasilievich, orderly of the 131st GSP 1914 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Vasiliev Dmitry Konstantinovich
• guards Art. Sergeant Vasilkov Vladimir Nikovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1921 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vasin Yakov Ilyich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1922 - 02/20/1945
• guards Sergeant Vaulin Mikhail Fedorovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1922 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Vakhrushkin Boris Vladimirovich
• guards red Army soldier Verbitsky Leonid Davydovich, light machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1921 - 02/22/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Viktorov Ivan Egorovich, pom. gunner of a light machine gun of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vildanov Islam Usmanovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Vinogradov Nikolai Ilyich, light machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards Corporal Vlasov Nikolai Grigorievich
• guards Sergeant Volsky Anatoly Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/26/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Voronov Alexey Petrovich, radio operator of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vorontsov Mikhail Aleksandrovich
• guards red Army soldier Gabitov Timir
• guards red Army soldier Gabov Alexander Petrovich, telephone operator of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Gavrish Petr Sergeevich, castle 129th GSP 1913 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Gainulov Shakir Khairulovich
• guards red Army soldier Garya Iovu Platonovich, machine gunner of the 134th GSP 1918 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Gladky Georgy Ivanovich
• guards Red Army soldier Glistyuk Ivan Grigorievich, mortar operator of the 129th GSP 1913 - 02/22/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Golev Ivan Antonovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 03/03/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Golyshev Fedor Sergeevich
• guards red Army soldier Golyunov Alexey Ivanovich, sapper of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards Sergeant Gorbachev Ivan Romanovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1920 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Gorbunov Vasily Ivanovich
• guards Sergeant Gorchakov Pavel Stepanovich
• guards Red Army soldier Grigoriev Mitrofan Mikhailovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1918 - 03/04/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Grigoriev Mikhail Ivanovich
• guards Red Army soldier Grinko Ivan Nikolaevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Vasily Vasilyevich Groshin, radio operator of the 50th OGIPD 1921 - 03/04/1945
• guards red Army soldier Guskov Georgy Arkhipovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1906 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Guskov Pavel Grigorievich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Guchek Anton Anisimovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1912 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Gushchin Anatoly Pavlovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Dakbaev Daba Sambul
• guards red Army soldier Denisenko Vasily Pudovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1908 - 02/28/1945
• guards Sergeant Detkov Vasily Grigorievich
• guards red Army soldier Dilimbetov Kenzhebai, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1921 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Dindin Vasily Semenovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Dmitriev Alexey Alekseevich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Dmitriev Evgeny Grigorievich
• guards ml. Sergeant Dogadin Anatoly Alekseevich
• guards Art. Sergeant Dolotov Vasily Artemyevich, commander of the 134th GSP 1915 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Drozdov Yakov Fedorovich
• guards Art. Sergeant Dubov Nikolai Filippovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Dudenkov Ivan Alekseevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1914 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Dyakiv Mikhail Pavlovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1917 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Dyatkinsky Nikolay Vasilievich, gunner of an easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Evdokimov Dmitry Sergeevich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 03/04/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Egorov Nikolai Mikhailovich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Emelyanov Valentin Ivanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1913 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Eremeev Vladimir Ivanovich, gunner of an easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ermakov Alexander Matveevich, PTR gunner of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Ershov Alexander Fedorovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Zhebrakov Vasily Pavlovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Zherev Fedor Filippovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1901 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Zhiveinov Boris Gavrilovich, pom. gunner of the easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Zhiganov Yakov Ivanovich, commander of the ammunition department of the 129th GSP 1909 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Zhigarin Fedor Ivanovich, telephone operator of the 129th GSP 1920 - 02/21/1945
• guards foreman Zhigach Dmitry Andreevich, gunner of the 134th GSP 1915 - 02/21/1945
• guards foreman Zhidkov Kuzma Nikolaevich, mortar crew commander of the 129th GSP 1915 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Zhilkin Ilya Semenovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1901 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army Zhukov Valentin Semenovich, mortar operator of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment, born in 1926
• guards Red Army soldier Zaplatny Ivan Spiridonovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1913 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Zakharenko Valentin Alekseevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/24/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Zverev Sergey Viktorovich
• guards red Army soldier Zemnitsky Ivan Ivanovich
• guards red Army soldier Ziganshin Zinatma, scout of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/24/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Zimenkov Ivan Grigorievich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 03/04/1945
• guards Sergeant Zimin Grigory Alekseevich, gunner of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Zinchenko Stepan Demyanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1918 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Zorin Ivan Nikolaevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1912 - 02/20/1945
• guards Corporal Zubkov Vasily Ilyich, wagon battery of 76 mm guns 1922 - 06/05/1945
• guards Sergeant Ivanov Vasily Matveyevich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ivanov Dmitry Andreevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1922 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ivanov Ivan Nikitovich, fighter of the trophy team of the 131st GSP 1908 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ivanov Ivan Fedorovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Ivanov Nikolai Ivanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Ivanushkin Semyon Ivanovich, scout of the 92nd GAP 1899 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ivashechkin Alexander Vasilyevich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ilyin Ivan Yakovlevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1905 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Imangulov Yasoviy, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1910 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Isaev Lazar Nikolaevich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1906 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Kazantsev Alexander Mikhailovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1917 - 02/25/1945
• guards Sergeant Kalimbetov Mamagali, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1921 - 02/23/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Kandyba Sergei Lukich, sanitary instructor of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards Corporal Kapitonov Vladimir Yakovlevich
• guards red Army soldier Karakulov Narumashat, shooter of the 134th GSP 1916 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Karachev Sadragis, shooter of the 129th GSP 1913 - 02/25/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Karev Gavriil Petrovich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kasimtsev Nikolai Egorovich, sapper of the 49th OGSB 1913 - 03/01/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kataev Viktor Ignatievich
• guards Red Army soldier Kimlyakov Stepan Vasilyevich
• guards Art. Sergeant Kirdyashin Vladimir Sergeevich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1918 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kirillov Nikolai Dmitrievich
• guards red Army soldier Kirilov Boris Ignatievich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1909 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mikhail Antonovich Kirilov, scout of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/20/1945
• guards foreman Klimenko Grigory Ivanovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1914 - 03/06/1945
• guards red Army soldier Fedor Trofimovich Kozhemyako, shooter of the 129th GSP 1906 - 02/20/1945
• guards corporal Kozak Ilya Stepanovich, mortar operator of the 134th GSP 1909 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kozlov Vasily Iosifovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1905 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kokarev Alexander Mikhailovich
• guards red Army soldier Komarov Nikolai Karpovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1917 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Komisarov Konstantin Grigorievich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards foreman Kondratiev Fedor Egorovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1910 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Kopeikin Andrey Ivanovich, sapper of the 131st GSP 1918 - 03/05/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Koposov Gennady Ivanovich, gun commander of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/26/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Koptelev Malik, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Korabkov Ivan Dmitrievich
• guards red Army soldier Alexei Petrovich Korobkov, mortar operator of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards Sergeant Kostin Nikolai Petrovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Kochenkov Mikhail Alekseevich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kochetov Nikolai Ivanovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 03/04/1945
• guards red Army soldier Fedor Venediktovich Krakov, shooter of the 129th GSP 1909 - 02/25/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Kreventsov Ilya Sergeevich, light machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Krivonos Ivan Vladimirovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1907 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Krizhanovsky Ivan Filippovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1911 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Grigory Prokopevich Krotov, gunner of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Alexei Ilyich Krylov, telephone operator of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards Sergeant Krylov Viktor Sergeevich
• guards red Army soldier Andrey Davidovich Kryukov, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1921 - 02/26/1945
• guards Sergeant Kudryashov Petr Petrovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1909 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Kuzakov Anany Georgievich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1913 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kuznetsov Mikhail Nikolaevich, sniper of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/22/1945
• guards foreman Kulagin Nikolai Antonovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1902 - 02/24/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Kunarbaev Izem, shooter of the 131st GSP 1918 - 02/25/1945
• guards Sergeant Kunumov Vladimir Nikolaevich, light machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Kuporov Sergey Vasilyevich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1908 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kuraev Viktor Pavlovich
• guards red Army soldier Kurchavov Alexander Stepanovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kutiev Alim Khasameddinovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1914 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Kucherenko Vladimir Ivanovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1921 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kuchuk Eremey Vasilyevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1909 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Labkov Nikolai Alekseevich, commander of the department of the 134th GSP 1923 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Lazarev Pavel Alekseevich, orderly of the 131st GSP 1909 - 03/03/1945
• guards Sergeant Laptev Fedor Ivanovich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1912 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Latypov Manzhit, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Lebedkin Stepan Vasilyevich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1895 - 02/26/1945
• guards Corporal Lineitsev Timofey Frolovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Lobanov Ivan Savvateevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1918 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Lobanov Mikhail Vasilievich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Corporal Lukyanov Mikhail Sergeevich, telephone operator of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Lykov Nikolai Timofeevich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/26/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Lyubkin Nikolai Vasilyevich, telephone operator of the 92nd GAP 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Maximov Petr Ivanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1909 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Malodushev Alexey Nikitovich, sniper of the 131st GSP 1908 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Malyshkov Dmitry Vasilyevich, scout of the 43rd ORR 1924 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Malyutin Vasily Semenovich
• guards ml. Sergeant Manushikhin Alexander Mikhailovich, PTR gunner of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Marzabaev Sitabay, shooter of the 134th GSP 1900 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Maslov Nikolai Arsentievich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Matveev Mikhail Matveevich, radio operator of the 131st GSP 1917 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Matveev Nikolai Parfentievich, mortar operator of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Makhov Vladimir Efimovich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Viktor Pavlovich Medvedov
• guards red Army soldier Melnichuk Stepan Evtikhovich, machine gunner of the 134th GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Meltsov Egor Izosimovich, gunner of the RP of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards Sergeant Mikiush Vasily Nikolaevich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Sergeant Minulin Sungai Abdulovich
• guards red Army soldier Miroshnik Shmul Shamovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1905 - 02/21/1945
• guards foreman Mitin Nikolai Pavlovich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1920 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mitichkin Alexei Maksimovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mikhailov Alexei Mikhailovich, mortar operator of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Mikhailov Vasily Ivanovich, pom. gunner of a light machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mikhailov Vasily Mikhailovich
• guards foreman Mikheev Afanasy Ilyich, medical instructor of the 129th GSP 1910 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Miholay Anton Antonovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/27/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Mkrtchyan Zakhar Agabelovich, mortar operator of the 131st GSP 1915 - 02/26/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Yury Dmitrievich Molodtsev, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mordanov Sharifula, shooter of the 129th GSP 1895 - 02/20/1945
• guards corporal Morozov Yuri Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army sailor Nikifor Ivanovich, orderly of the 129th GSP 1911 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Muratov Saparbay, shooter of the 129th GSP 1906 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Mymrin Ivan Panteleevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Myakota Vyacheslav Iosifovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1911 - 02/27/1945
• guards red Army soldier Nedogarsky Efim Andreevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1907 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Neklyudov Alexander Vasilyevich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards foreman Nepomniachtchi Sergey Petrovich, commander of the 131st GSP 1908 - 03/03/1945
• guards Sergeant Nerebaschenko Alexey Vasilyevich, commander of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Neuimin Mikhail Fedorovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1920 - 02/26/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Nechaev Mikhail Ivanovich, gunner 82 mm of the 131st GSP 1907 - 02/26/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Nikitin Ivan Mikhailovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 03/04/1945
• guards red Army soldier Nikitchenko Ivan Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/27/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Nikiforov Dmitry Filippovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Alexei Ivanovich Nikolaev, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards foreman Nikolaev Sergey Ivanovich, commander of the PTR department of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/26/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Novikov Pavel Andreevich, commander of the calculation of the 131st GSP 1918 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Novozhentsev Alexey Fedorovich, squad leader of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Novoselov Nikolay Vasilievich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Novoselov Petr Trifonovich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Noskov Vasily Ivanovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Noskov Mikhail Ivanovich, sapper of the 49th OGSB 1912 - 03/02/1945
• guards Sergeant Nurmatov Saitkul Nazarovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/25/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Ovechkin Makar Nikitovich, commander of the department of the 134th GSP 1911 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Ogurtsov Vladimir Artamonovich, gun number of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Orlov Alexey Stepanovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/26/1945
• guards Corporal Orlov Petr Pavlovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Okhrimenko Alexey Danilovich, telephone operator of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Panasenko Grigory Andreevich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1918 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Paranbaev Samit, shooter of the 129th GSP 1904 - 02/23/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Perov Leonid Stepanovich, mortar crew commander of the 129th GSP 1906 - 02/25/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Petukhov Leonid Mikhailovich, carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Plaksin Alexander Ivanovich, light machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Podrugin Valentin Maksimovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Polukhin Alexander Nikiforovich
• guards red Army soldier Anatoly Kirsanovich Polyakov, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1924 - 03/05/1945
• guards red Army soldier Polyakov Dmitry Dmitrievich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1912 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Polyansky Vasily Kuzmich, light machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1909 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ponachev Fedor Grigorievich, gunner of an easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1921 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ponomarenko Grigory Epifanovich, mortar operator of the 134th GSP 1902 - 02/24/1945
• guards Sergeant Popov Vladimir Sergeevich, scout of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards corporal Portnov Sergey Grigorievich, pom. gunner of the 131st GSP 1923 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Potemkin Viktor Efimovich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Poteryaev Nikolay Vasilievich, pom. machine gun gunner of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Prudnikov Leonty Gerasimovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1912 - 02/27/1945
• guards red Army soldier Pugaev Petr Ivanovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Pukh Ivan Sergeevich, telephone operator of the 129th GSP 1908 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Pinin Alexander Andreevich, telephone operator of the 134th GSP 1924 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Radionov Mikhail Yakovlevich, scout of the 43rd OGRR 1918 - 03/01/1945
• guards Corporal Radionov Nikolai Fedorovich, mortar operator of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards Corporal Radnaev Bata Munko, mortar operator of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Redkin Yuri Nikolaevich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Rovko Ivan Trofimovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/22/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Romanenko Semyon Petrovich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1909 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Rumyantsev Nikolai Pavlovich
• guards Sergeant Rybalko Ulyan Ignatievich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1916 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Ryabov Prokofy Petrovich, gunner of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Savkin Pavel Alekseevich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sadaikin Kym Shakirovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1913 - 02/22/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Sakaev Hadjiamel Khadzhimur, commander of the 131st GSP 1920 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Salinder Yaptoka, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1919 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Samokhvalov Pavel Ilyich, deputy commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1917 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sanikidze Ivan Semenovich, orderly of the 131st GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Sardarov Ibragim Sardarovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 03/02/1945
• guards Sergeant Safronov Veniamin Petrovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Sakharev Ivan Fedorovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1918 - 03/04/1945
• guards Sergeant Sakhat-Muratov Atanbali, orderly of the 134th GSP 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sayanov Galei, gunner of an easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1908 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Andrey Ivanovich Sbrodov, shooter of the 129th GSP 1903 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Sviridov Ivan Matveevich, scout of the 131st GSP 1917 - 02/22/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Semiokhin Alexander Ivanovich, sniper of the 129th GSP 1911 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sergeev Alexei Petrovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sergeev Sergey Alekseevich, sniper of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Seregin Gavriil Vasilievich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1912 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Seredin Nikolay Spiridonovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sivryugin Vladimir Sergeevich, carrier of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Sidorov Leonid Ivanovich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Simonkovich Osip Viktorovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1901 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Skripchenko Oleg Mikhailovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards Corporal Smirnov Viktor Alexandrovich, shell 131st GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Smulyak Anton Fedorovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1904 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Snakin Vasily Abrosimovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1904 - 02/23/1945
• guards Corporal Sobennikov Alexei Vasilievich, light machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards corporal Sobolev Ivan Petrovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1907 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Sokolov Anatoly Aleksandrovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/25/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Sokolov Ivan Ilyich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1909 - 02/28/1945
• guards red Army soldier Soldatov Dmitry Porfireevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1900 - 03/03/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Solovyov Sergey Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Spitsin Leonid Dmitrievich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1918 - 02/22/1945
• guards Corporal Starostin Alexey Dmitrievich, commander of the department of the 129th GSP 1918 - 02/20/1945
• guards Corporal Stepanov Alexander Ivanovich, fighter of the trophy team of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Stepanov Viktor Nikolaevich, carriage PA of the 131st GSP 1911 - 03/06/1945
• guards red Army soldier Stepanov Nikolai Danilovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1914 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Stepanov Yuri Konstantinovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Anatoly Arkhipovich Stolyarov, carrier 82 mm mortar of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Strelkov Grigory Ilarionovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sukach Grigory Ilyich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1906 - 02/21/1945
• guards foreman Suprunov Alexander Nikolaevich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Supryakov Petr Vasilyevich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 03/05/1945
• guards red Army soldier Sutyagin Ivan Nikolaevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1899 - 02/04/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Sukhov Konstantin Alekseevich, squad leader of the 134th GSP 1923 - 02/22/1945
• guards red Army soldier Suchkov Yuri Pavlovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/22/1945
• guards Sergeant Sychev Alexander Antonovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Tasturov Dalash, 2nd number of a light machine gun of the 131st GSP 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Tatarnikov Alexander Vasilyevich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards Corporal Temnikov Ivan Ivanovich, pom. gunner of the 131st GSP 1920 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Terentiev Ivan Stepanovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Terekhin Mikhail Rodionovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1921 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Terekhov Viktor Semenovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 03/02/1945
• guards Corporal Timaikin Nikolay Vasilievich, carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Timoshenko Boris Timofeevich, telephone operator of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Titov Alexey Ivanovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1919 - 02/26/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Tikhonov Konstantin Mikhailovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/20/1945
• guards Sergeant Tokpaev Shaymordan Islamovich, commander of the telephone department of the 129th GSP 1917 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Toropov Mikhail Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1922 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Tikhonovsky Alexander Nikonovich, shooter of the 131st Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Trembachev Dmitry Zakharovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1911 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Tretyakov Alexander Mikhailovich, PTR gunner of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Trusov Vasily Ivanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Tulupov Viktor Fedorovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Tyapin Pavel Vasilyevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/24/1945
• guards foreman Udodov Ivan Ivanovich, foreman of the company of the 134th GSP 1921 - 03/02/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Us Nikolai Alexandrovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/20/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ustyuzhanin Nikolai Konstantinovich, telephone operator of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ukhachevsky Vasily Nikolaevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1903 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Fadeev Nikolai Ivanovich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/22/1945
• guards Corporal Fedin Alexander Vasilyevich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Fedorov Alexei Grigorievich, sapper of the 131st GSP 1926 - 03/03/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Fedorov Mikhail Semenovich, medical instructor of the 129th GSP 1918 - 02/22/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Fedunov Oleg Yakovlevich, gunner of an easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards Corporal Fenin Alexander Matveevich, shooter of the commandant's control platoon 1909 - 03/07/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Frolov Vasily Grigorievich, carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/24/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Khavatov Ivan Vlasovich, squad leader of the 131st GSP 1917 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Khairulin Gallimula, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Khaluev Mikhail Grigorievich, orderly of the 129th GSP 1923 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Kharchugonov Andrey Karpovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Khikhlya Alexander Trofimovich, machine gunner of the 129th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Khlopunov Viktor Arkhipovich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1926 - 03/02/1945
• guards Corporal Khmelev Andrey Alexandrovich, cartridge carrier of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Khodzhaev Saidazim, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Kholyaev Parfen Dmitrievich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1914 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Khrustalev Vladimir Tikhonovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Tsyganenko Sergey Sergeevich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1925 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Chapalyka Leonid Ivanovich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Chebakuchev Osman Topaevich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1907 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Chervyakov Alexey Sergeevich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1914 - 02/26/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Chernykh Arkady Filippovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1907 - 02/20/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Chernykh Ivan Alekseevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1911 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Chizhikov Andrey Alekseevich, shooter of the 129th GSP 1907 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Chirkin Nikolai Alexandrovich, gunner of an anti-aircraft machine gun DShKa OZPR 1926 - 02/25/1945
• guards red Army soldier Chistyakov Konstantin Dmitrievich, numbered PTR of the 129th GSP 1913 - 02/22/1945
• guards Sergeant Chugunov Dmitry Ivanovich, commander of the department of the 131st GSP 1914 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shaidulin Samigulla, shooter of the 134th GSP 1907 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shakirov Abdukaim, shooter of the 131st GSP 1905 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Sharkov Vyacheslav Ivanovich, machine gunner of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shezhemsky Mikhail Konstantinovich, 2nd number of the PTR of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Shelapugin Yakov Demyanovich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1922 - 02/24/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shelkov Petr Kalistratovich, shooter of the 134th Guards Rifle Regiment 1924 - 02/21/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shestakov Ivan Petrovich, sapper of the 129th GSP 1912 - 02/25/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Shipulin Timofey Ivanovich, commander of the rifle squad of the 129th GSP 1915 - 02/21/1945
• guards ml. Sergeant Shishkin Fedor Karpovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1925 - 02/21/1945
• guards Corporal Shkunov Alexander Mikhailovich, pom. gunner of the easel machine gun of the 131st GSP 1926 - 02/23/1945
• guards red Army soldier Shulenin Nikolai Antonovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1914 - 02/26/1945

gunner

1st Infantry Battalion, 134th Guards Rifle Regiment

18.12.1924 - 1999

• guards red Army soldier Shchavlev Nikolai Alekseevich, telephone operator of the 129th GSP 1924 - 02/22/1945
• guards Sergeant Shchurovsky Fedor Ivanovich, Art. scout-observer of the control platoon of the KDA 1920 - 03/02/1945
• guards red Army soldier Ebgazhukov Sikhatkeriy Isufovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1901 - 02/25/1945
• guards Art. Sergeant Yusikov Vasily Vasilievich, scout of the 43rd ORR 1922 - 02/26/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Yavorsky Anton Iosipovich, shooter of the 129th Guards Rifle Regiment 1911 - 03/03/1945
• guards red Army soldier Yakin Ivan Pavlovich, shooter of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/21/1945
• guards Sergeant Yakovenko Ivan Alekseevich, commander of the department of the 134th GSP 1918 - 02/24/1945
• guards Corporal Yakovets Petr Ivanovich, shooter of the 134th GSP 1910 - 02/26/1945
• guards red Army soldier Yakovlev Vladimir Nikolaevich, machine gunner of the 131st GSP 1923 - 02/23/1945
• guards Red Army soldier Yakovlev Nikolai Mikhailovich, machine gunner of the 134th GSP 1926 - 02/21/1945

If in your family archive photos of your relative have been preserved and you will send his biography - this will give us the opportunity to perpetuate the memory of a soldier, a participant in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

The feat that the soldiers performed during the defense and liberation of the Republic of Latvia led to Our Victory, and the memory of the people who gave their lives for this will not be forgotten.

Encyclopedic YouTube

1 / 5

✪ Intelligence questioning: Bair Irincheev about the fighting in the Northern Ladoga region

✪ Intelligence: Bair Irincheev about the battle of Suomussalmi

✪ Intelligence: Igor Pykhalov about the Baltic States before the start of the Great Patriotic War

✪ Intelligence: Igor Pykhalov about the Nazi European Union, part two

✪ Intelligence: Bair Irincheev about penal battalions

Subtitles

I wholeheartedly welcome you! Bair, good afternoon. Hello, Dmitry Yurievich. Good afternoon, dear viewers. About what today? As promised last time, today we will talk about the hostilities in the Northern Ladoga region, which, unfortunately, from my point of view, became the most tragic page of the Soviet-Finnish war, despite the fact that it seems to be the most famous battle, with the encirclement of our units , with the fact that they were cut into boilers, and then gradually destroyed, all this was much further north, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bSuomussalmi and Raata, which we have already briefly talked about. But, from my point of view, the most difficult situation really happened in the Northern Ladoga region, i.e. this is the present Republic of Karelia, this is the region of Pitkyaranta, the now defunct village of Lemetti, and, accordingly, the current village of Loimola. What happened there: well, if you go back to Finnish pre-war plans at all, then the Finns believed that serious fighting , where something needs to be planned, where there will be a large concentration of forces, it will be just the Karelian Isthmus, about which we have already talked quite a lot, and also the Northern Ladoga region, just this very region. And, therefore, picture 1, the plans of the parties for the campaign in the Northern Ladoga region. This means that our plan was such that 3 roads converge in the Pitkyaranta area - one road goes from Lodeynoye Pole along the coast of Ladoga to Pitkyaranta, the second, respectively, goes from Petrozavodsk through Lemetti, and just north of Pitkyaranta it connects to this main road near Ladoga. And the third road, respectively, goes along the railway to Loimola, and through Loimola also connects here. Those. 3 roads converge here, and, again, since our terrain is extremely difficult for the offensive of an ordinary European army, then, in fact, ours were advancing along these 3 roads, the 8th army. This means that the 56th rifle division was advancing on Loimola, the 18th rifle division was advancing along the road from Petrozavodsk, and the 34th light tank brigade supporting it, and from the south Bondarev’s 168th rifle division approached Pyatkiranta. It must be said right away that 56 never reached. That is, again, such a situation was repeated that we already had in the Suomossalmi area, that the Finns simply did not allow our forces to connect. Where were our troops supposed to move if everything really worked out: it means that our troops had to move, in fact, bypassing Lake Ladoga, i.e., united, move to Sortavala, further to Lahdenpokhya, and actually go to the rear Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus, i.e. go to the rear of the Mannerheim line. But, in fact, everything stopped, unfortunately, right here, because, in general, the Finns, one might say, set a trap here, which was worked out a long time ago at staff games in the 20s and 30s years, i.e. in fact, they planned to stop ours somewhere in the Pitkyaranta area and begin to strike from the north, cutting off the communications, respectively, of the division that approached from Petrozavodsk, along the road through Lemetti. And in general, in the same way, they first cut one road from the north, and then generally surrounded the entire group in general, just in the Pitkyaranta area. And, unfortunately, just like in the Suomussalmi area, the situation repeated here that the troops were not quite correctly deployed on the road, yes, back in late December, in general, they were attacking here, but the 168th division was already Finns stopped here. The 18th Rifle Division with 2 regiments tried to break through to the north towards the 56th Rifle Division, but, in general, nothing really worked out, this is our picture 2, the situation at the beginning of the Finnish counteroffensive. Already at the end of December, Finnish ski detachments began to enter the road from Petrozavodsk, and began to operate along the communications, in fact, the 18th rifle division, which in the same way was stretched for many kilometers, and, accordingly, was placed in an incomprehensible way. Those. yes, 2 regiments in front, 1 regiment in the rear, which is trying to guard our communications. And, in fact, on January 6, the Finns gather a large strike force, and begin to actively hit on, in fact, our right flank. And at this time, changes are taking place in our camp, again, due to unfortunate events in the Tolvajärvi region, due to the fact that the 56th division stuck, in fact, in front of the Finnish defense in the area of ​​​​the Kolla River, and cannot come here. And, in fact, go somewhere around 50 km. Our commander is changing, Khabarov is being removed, among other things, because of the defeat of ours at Tolvajärvi, and G.M. becomes the commander of the 8th army. Stern, which, by the way, the Finns immediately noticed, and released a special leaflet dedicated specifically to G.M. Stern, in which they absolutely categorically hinted at his nationality - he was a Jew. Back in the late 90s - early 2000s, I had the honor to meet with our veterans of the Finnish War, and here one of the veterans says - I picked up a leaflet, and it says "Jew, traitor, traitor, cattle - that's who your new commander Stern ". Picture 04 is a Finnish leaflet about Stern. But our veteran said - you know, I fought on the Karelian Isthmus, and this is all happening on the eastern shore of Ladoga, so I didn’t know who Stern was at all, I didn’t know at all where he was fighting at all, what was happening, but I remember it very much I remember, these are very sharp, not politically correct words about Stern. Nazis after all, what do you want from them. Then not quite Nazis yet, but, nevertheless, there really are such words, wow. And when Grigory Mikhailovich arrived at the front, he, in fact, immediately began to very abruptly take our troops into circulation, i.e. threatened with executions, etc., etc., but, in general, this did not help the situation. This did not help the 139th division in any way, although there Stern offered to carry out almost a decimation, i.e. shoot every tenth. Well, actually, gradually, again, using the fact that the main forces of the 168th division were to the west, i.e. they had already set their sights on Sortavala; cut off the 168th Infantry Division from Pitkyaranta. Those. everything, 168 is sitting in the boiler, but, again, it is possible to supply 168 on the ice of the Pitkäranta Bay, but on January 15 and 19, the Finns occupy the islands that control the archipelago, in general. Therefore, it turns out that even this supply route across the ice from Pitkäranta, in general, is under fire from Finnish machine guns and mortars. The distances here, in fact, are not very large. Well, of course, the question may immediately arise why an attempt to deblockade was not immediately made, etc., this is due to the fact that, in general, as in the case of Suomussalmi, there was somehow nothing to deblock, because, in fact , all the reinforcements went, again, from Lodeynoye Pole to Pitkyaranta on foot. Not bad. Those. there was the only road along Ladoga, this, excuse me, is about 150-200 km, the only road that is covered with snow, the road is bad. Therefore, the supply of reinforcements was extremely, extremely difficult in general. And, accordingly, after the encirclement of the 168th Infantry Division, the same situation was repeated on the road that went to Petrozavodsk. Those. the Finns surrounded the 18th rifle division and the 34th light tank brigade, as a result of which we had several boilers, i.e. on the road from Lemetti to Petrozavodsk, 4 boilers formed, which developed very ... Sorry, even 6 boilers would be correct to say if we take Lemetti more. They have very different fates. Those. this is how, in fact, the classic Finnish tactics, the column is cut by blows from the taiga into several parts, and, accordingly, after that it is already broken in parts. Again, creating a local numerical superiority, the Finns crush these boilers one by one. Well, the easternmost cauldron near the village of Uomaa lasted until the end of the war, and, in general, it survived to a large extent due to the fact that there was 1 company of the 4th NKVD border regiment. Those. they were local border guards who were very familiar with local conditions, well equipped, and highly motivated. And, in fact, for these events, 6 of our border guards received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. I would like, in general, to tell you about one. Red Army soldier Samsonov Vladimir Andreevich, born 17, i.e. he is 22 years old, a candidate member of the CPSU (b), a shooter of the 3rd company of the 4th regiment of the NKVD troops. This refers to 4 border regiments, i.e. border guards. But, again, unfortunately, in modern Russia, someone will see the 4th regiment of the NKVD troops there, he probably shot Finnish peasants there, who were no longer there. Well, just now, the idea for the title of Hero sounds enough, it generally sounds like a saga about the Vikings. “In one of the battles on January 17, 1940, repelling the attack of the White Finns, comrade. Samsonov was wounded in the arm by a bullet and a fragment of a mine and was evacuated to a first-aid post. However, he refused to stay in the dugout and, voluntarily returning to the trenches, continued to fight heroically with the enemy. Due to poor treatment, the entire left arm ceased to function and began to fester. Feeling it and making sure that the hand is weak, comrade. Samsonov himself broke it at the wound site and, throwing it out of the trench, in the presence of all the fighters, said: “Now it doesn’t bother me, now it will be easier for me to beat the White Finns.” And in all subsequent battles, up to the release of the garrison after the conclusion of peace, comrade. Samsonov heroically repulsed the onslaught of the White Finnish gangs, throwing grenades at them with one right hand. This is an exceptionally heroic behavior of a candidate member of the party of the Red Army Comrade. Samsonov played a colossal role in inspiring all the other fighters, in rallying them into a strong Bolshevik garrison, impregnable for the enemy. Here is a man who received a “Hero”, and, in fact, everyone who received “Heroes” for all this, for fighting surrounded by these little ones, these are precisely the border guards, because indeed, apparently, they were the most highly motivated, the strongest. Because the really gigantic problem of these small pockets was that there were a lot of supplies there, there were rears, here, in fact, here is the next garrison in the area of ​​the fork in the road, there were 1200 people, 500 of them were wounded. And so the Finns surrounded them, and there were people from different regiments, from different parts , there began, as you understand, some kind of quarrels, something like “you are not from our unit, why are you coming here?” Then, as you understand, people began to starve, people began to hallucinate. There, by chance, someone had hallucinations, shot his own. Those. people have already begun to see some illusions, some kind of ghosts, and they thought that it was only Finns around. But, despite this, the commanders managed to build everyone, and this small garrison, excuse me, 1,200 people, of which 500 were wounded, it lasted until the end of the war, and, accordingly, as a result, those who held out there, they left the encirclement. And how long did it take to stay? Well, they kept, excuse me, from about the 20th of January to March 13th. This, by the way, was the tragedy of the environment, that if on the Raat road, everything ended there in a week, then here people, excuse me, spent the whole of February, and another 2 weeks in March, and it was also frosts of minus 30, there was no food. Those. one can imagine what was generally done there in this taiga, in the middle of the forest, when there was nothing to eat. And, of course, the command understood that if you don’t help, then the people there will simply die of hunger. Therefore, all of our aircraft, simply all that was in this area, from Lodeynoye Pole, from Besovets to Petrozavodsk, they were all sent to supply our units, i.e. for food dumping. But the problem with these small boilers was that the drop zone was very small, and therefore, very often, in general, these packages, bags of food fell either on neutral, or even fell to the Finns. There are rumors that when the next package of food fell to the Finns, there were shouts in Russian from there “thanks to Comrade Stalin for buckwheat porridge!” But, again, it is not clear - rumors, not rumors. But, again, an interesting point, what is really in the combat log of this our garrison, as it was called, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe fork in the road, it directly says that when there was a drop in food, very often it really happened that a bag or container , falling to the ground, it broke, and there biscuits, cookies and everything else scattered, it directly says that as soon as some kind of food package fell on the forest, then the shooting simply stopped, ours and the Finns ran through the forest, collecting these biscuits without shooting at each other. Only when everything was assembled, only after that did they return to their positions again, take rifles, and start shooting at each other. Those. so there was nothing to eat? Otherwise, such peacefulness cannot be explained in any way. In fact, there, too, among the Finns, too, everything could not be said that everything was very simple. If, excuse me, such garrisons held out, again, this is the 2nd garrison that managed to hold out. 3 in the area of ​​​​Lake Suojärvi was very small, there were a couple of hundred people, and, in fact, the Finns crushed them at the end of February, i.e. just from the neighboring garrison, from the fork in the road, they simply said that the radio connection was lost, and we hear that the sounds of battle are dying down. And after the end of hostilities, about 200 dead people were found there. The next garrison, in the west, near the village of Lovajärvi, he was sitting there, and, in fact, fortunately, on February 14 he already received permission to break through, and, in general, by and large, managed to get out of there. Those. here, in fact, when they generalize everything and say that the Finns destroyed all the boilers, this is not entirely true. Those. there, indeed, 2 boilers held out, 1 small one died, 4 escaped. But here, closer to Pitkyaranta, the situation was very, very difficult, because, unfortunately, if we look at picture 6, the encirclement of the 18th division of the 34th light tank brigade, there, again, it turned out very, very unsuccessfully. Those. the Finns cut off the 68th division of Bondarev from the 18th rifle division, and, again, those units of the 18th rifle division that were surrounded were not placed in the same way. And, of course, the worst thing is that the commander of the 18th rifle division, brigade commander Kondrashov, lost his nerve. He had nervous breakdown , he removed himself from command, i.e. simply stopped doing anything, did not organize defense, i.e. how they stood on the road, how, respectively, everything stood, and when, in fact, the Finns surrounded - well, they also dug some trenches near the road, did not even occupy the dominant heights, which were literally 500 meters from the road, and, well, of course, the Finns occupied them, and they simply began to shoot through the entire encirclement area. Well, and the most important thing was that, indeed, it is obvious because Kondrashov blundered, because it was generally not clear what to do, i.e. if in December it was clear that yes, we are advancing, we have now united with the 168th division, 2 regiments are going to Loymola, trying to break through towards 56th, and 168th will now go to Sortavala, i.e. there is an attack going on. But then the Finnish counter-offensive begins, and, obviously, our command simply did not know what to do with it. As a result, I had the honor to communicate with 1 veteran from the 34th light tank brigade, with a Muscovite, he said that we just sat and did not know what to do at all, i.e. it was not clear why we are here, that we are here, what will happen now. Those. this apathy, and indeed in the army, when it is not clear what to do, this does not have a very good effect on the morale of the troops, in the first place. Yes, why is this Comrade. Tverskoy, Arkady Tverskoy, God rest his soul, he died recently, why is he a Muscovite: because the 34th light tank brigade was actually from Naro-Fominsk, it was an elite part of the Red Army, and on May 1, 39, it was their BT tanks that paraded along Red Square, i.e. part was so ... Elite. The part is elite, and, in fact, there are 105 BT tanks in it, and they arrived there in order to enter the gap after the Finnish defense line was broken, but, again, of course, this was an absolutely wrong decision, because everything There is a forest there. And 105 BT tanks, they just blocked the roadsides, and when our units were surrounded, in fact, our tankers simply dug them into the ground and used them as fixed firing points. So, well, actually, the situation is such that our parts are really cut into separate boilers, and, well, the Finns, in fact, are gradually starting to cut it all into pieces. They succeed with the 18th Rifle Division, again, because Kondrashov frankly blundered, and they do not succeed with the neighboring 168th Rifle Division, because Bondarev, the commander of this division, was a much more energetic commander. Those. he immediately said - well, we were surrounded, which means we are narrowing the defense perimeter, i.e. we retreat to more advantageous positions, which means that all regiments stand together, which means that we have placed tanks everywhere. Yes, they had T-37, T-38 wedges, quite weak, but as if buried in the ground, with a machine gun, they showed themselves well even when repelling Finnish attacks. And so Bondarev said that ... i.e. he made it so that the Finns could not even, i.e. they tried to attack them a couple of times, but after that they realized that the commander was energetic, he realized that it was necessary to build a defensive perimeter and not let his division be cut to pieces. Those. The 168th division calmly held out until the end of the war, and their encirclement area was so large that they were there, in fact, on the ice of Pitkyaranta Bay, they made a runway there in general, and planes landed on them surrounded. Those. they didn’t drop bags of food, but sat straight down, and heavy bombers of TB also used them to supply them. Those. everything was more or less normal with them, which, unfortunately, cannot be said about the 2 regiments of the 18th rifle division, because, obviously, they had already lost, in fact, leadership from Kondrashov, who, respectively, was surrounded in Lemetti. (let's better put it here) Do not forget about the numbers of the pictures. And, accordingly, the Finns first began to put pressure on our units, surrounded in the area of ​​the fork in the road, i.e. right here right here. Accordingly, the area of ​​the fork in the road - picture 07, the death of the boiler. And look, please, picture 08, this is the Finns photographed the area where the boiler died, it's just, unfortunately, the entire battlefield is littered with the bodies of our dead. And it is in this place, in the area of ​​​​the death of the “fork in the road” boiler, that the Cross of Sorrow stands, picture 09, this is a joint monument that Russia and Finland erected in the early 2000s. It was in these places that the tanker V.A. died in February 1940. Tereshkov, father of VV Tereshkova, the world's first female cosmonaut. Those. she came there to lay flowers on her father's grave. Those. he was from Yaroslavl region, if I remember correctly, the Finnish war began, he was called up as a driver, and, accordingly, he died there in this place. Well, the next thing is just the death of the so-called regimental boiler. Such, unfortunately, is a classic example of when there was no general guidance , it was not clear what to do, and as a result, in fact, the Finns managed such a huge boiler, where, in general, there were 2 rifle regiments, a howitzer regiment, an artillery regiment, another separate tank battalion, managed to destroy it almost completely. Why did this happen - because Kondrashov from Lemetti contacted them by radio, he says - get through to us. They say - no, let's make our way to the south, to the encirclement area of ​​​​the 168th rifle division. 168 tried to break through to meet them, tried to get them out of there. Unfortunately, it didn't work out. But, in fact, by February 18, the boiler was completely destroyed, the Finns announced trophies of 22 tanks and 36 guns. Wow. Again, ours had a lot of tanks in those places, because there were also 2 separate tank battalions. Those. 1 of the 18 rifle division, plus there was, respectively, the 34 light tank brigade, in which there were 105 BT tanks of various types. Well, having dealt with this large cauldron, the Finns begin to deal, respectively, with the boilers in the Lemetti region, where it is divided into western and eastern Lemetti. This means that in western Lemetti there is one of our tank battalions from the 34th light tank brigade, a bakery of the 18th rifle division, and someone else. Those. it also turns out that somehow everything, i.e. non-combat units are gathered together, and it was in western Lemetti that this tragic situation happened, which is well described, that, in general, the battalion commander, captain Ryazanov, began to prepare the battalion for a breakthrough, because, perhaps, everyone had forgotten, but the tanks have ammunition , and most importantly, there is fuel. If the tank has no fuel, it won't go anywhere. When the battalion still had a sufficient supply of fuel so that the tanks could be withdrawn, so that there was ammunition, which, accordingly, could somehow be fought, Captain Ryazanov said - that's it, we're going, now we'll break through to our own, respectively, right here. Literally between them was ... about 1 km, it was only necessary to break through in order to connect with the encirclement area, where the brigade headquarters was sitting, and, by the way, where Kondrashov was sitting in a tent, having actually removed himself from command. But, again, there was no order, sit and wait. But when Ryazanov began to make orders about the fact that we were going and leaving, the head of the special department of the battalion said that we had no order, so excuse me, we will not go anywhere. Ryazanov said that I was the commander here, I give orders, a quarrel broke out between them, and the head of the special department Ryazanov shot dead on the spot. Yes, and just in the regimental cauldron, there, too, the commanders all quarreled, because some say to go there, others say to go there, i.e. the lack of a unified leadership, this led to chaos and mass deaths of our military personnel. Well, as a result, literally 200 of our people left the western boiler, all the tanks were abandoned, everything was left to the Finns. Intelligent Specialist. Yes, and, accordingly, Finnish trophies amounted to 32 tanks. But time goes by, in fact, there is frankly nothing to eat, i.e. indeed, the encirclement area is small, it’s hard to drop there, very little food falls there, and, accordingly, the head of the special department of the 34th light tank brigade, Doronkin, says that listen, that’s it, the edge has come, because, excuse me, we’re already eating bark from trees, already everyone horses have been eaten, everything is already there, people have been brought to physical exhaustion. Because, again, they got into the cauldron, excuse me, in mid-January, in the 2nd half of January, it was already the 20th of February in the yard. Those. people in the cold -30, with malnutrition have been for more than a month, and in a very crowded, small area. And all this is happening in some, excuse me, 5 km from Pitkyaranta, where our troops are sitting, and where new troops are slowly starting to arrive. And indeed, all these radiograms from the boiler that were going on, i.e. radio communication was maintained, they really show that, probably, those who were in the boiler took a too passive position, because they were told - please come, save us, we cannot believe that the enemy is so strong here. It’s not far at all here, it’s 5 km in a straight line through the taiga to Pitkyaranta, where Stern sits, where all our bosses sit. Well, and, accordingly, the headquarters of the 8th Army and the 15th Army, which began to concentrate here, is already new, and the 15th Army was actually a grouping that came entirely from the Belarusian Military District, i.e. The first commander of the 15th Army was Kovalyov, commander of the Belarusian Special Military District. But, again, due to the fact that there is only one road, the concentration of parts went very, very slowly. And Stern kept pulling and pulling, and said, wait, help is coming, but by February 27 and 28, our people in the boiler said that everything, no strength, we were going to break through. And, accordingly, indeed, please look at picture 12, a breakthrough from eastern Lemetti, they were divided into 2 columns, respectively, and, in general, one column was actually completely destroyed, this is a column, if I remember correctly, Smirnov, moreover most of the patients were sent there. Here one column was completely destroyed, the second managed to somehow reach the Pitkyaranta area, and, accordingly, the column that left was not led by Kondrashov, but by the chief of staff of the 18th rifle division, Colonel Alekseev, because Kondrashov, according to unverified reports, took off commander's uniform, put on the usual Red Army uniform, and left, in general, at the end of the column. He was, apparently, slightly injured during the exit, but remained alive, again, was actually immediately detained and placed under investigation. How did the investigation end? Again, here, the first is the commander of the 18th infantry division Kondrashov, and the commander of the 34th light tank brigade Kondratiev, they were constantly confused, and both ours and Finnish radio intelligence simply constantly confused them. So, it means that the commander of the 34th light tank brigade, the commissar of the brigade, the head of the special department, all shot themselves when they left the encirclement when they realized that they had fallen into a Finnish ambush, respectively. Those. the entire command of the 34th brigade died, but the command of the 18th rifle division managed to get out. When breaking out of the encirclement, the head of the political department died, and, in fact, it is not very clear where the banner went, because the banner of the division was just wrapped around his body, and there is such a version that the battle banner of the division, the Finns have it somewhere , but this is not the banner they display. If you go now to the Central Museum of the Finnish Defense Forces, then in a place of honor hangs a beautiful, silver-embroidered, scarlet banner of the 18th Rifle Division, on which is written "18th Yaroslavl Rifle Division." But researchers from Petrozavodsk claim that this is just the anniversary banner of the division, which was issued to all divisions on the 20th anniversary of the Red Army, i.e. in 38, and the battle banner disappeared somewhere. And allegedly, here it was on the body of the head of the political department, and allegedly, it seems that someone even saw a photograph of the body of the head of the political department, taken by the Finns, but the banner disappeared somewhere. Maybe a fighter, what kind of officer is with him? Nothing is clear at all, absolutely nothing is clear, but the bottom line is that indeed, as you can understand, the situation, in addition to the loss of the banner, the situation here was already extremely difficult, because, excuse me, the 18th Infantry Division because of this sitting surrounded, due to ineffective leadership, due to everything else, suffered the highest losses, in general, among our divisions in the Finnish War. Those. at the beginning of the battle, when they had just been surrounded, there were about 10,000 people in the division. But after all this, when Kondrashov was already placed under investigation, and Colonel Alekseev was appointed acting commander of the division, who led everyone out of the encirclement, so he calculated that the total losses of the division amounted to 8754 people. This is out of 10,000 people, i.e. in fact, there are less than a fifth of them left. Those. heavy losses, the banner was lost, the Finns got virtually all the equipment as trophies, plus BT tanks, so please look at pictures 13, 14, 15 - trophies. Cruel. Yes. Well, it’s clear that all this happens at the end of February 1940, and, again, it was trumpeted again, of course, by Finnish propaganda, indeed, this is a victory, you can’t deny it. Indeed, the defeat of one division and a light tank brigade, and, again, exactly the same thing, in parts, but, again, to our great regret, if everything was fast in the Suomussalmi and Raata area, then here ours were still sitting for a very long time in boilers. Of course, people went through terrible trials, and just physical torment - and hunger, and cold, and night blindness, and illness, anything. It is clear that Kondrashov was placed under investigation. There is a version that after the war was voiced by veterans who left the encirclement. One of them said that I saw that Kondrashov was right ... the NKVD officers came straight to the hospital, they arrested him in the hospital, took him out into the yard, and immediately shot him. But the documents say otherwise, i.e. this is most likely just a legend, because the documents say that he was really arrested, placed under investigation, taken to Moscow, the investigation went on for a long time, he was forced to write a long explanatory note why his division was defeated in this way. The verdict was announced to him - execution, he filed an appeal, and in it he wrote that I do not think that I am a finished person, I believe that I can still serve my homeland. But the investigation considered otherwise, he was shot only in August 1940, i.e. from March to August he was under investigation, there were really legal proceedings, and he even had the opportunity to file a petition for pardon, which did not help. But in this case, it’s probably understandable that such a defeat, again, someone had to be punished, and it was clear that there was a lot of fault here, that for some reason, like Bondarev, he couldn’t organize the defense normally why they didn't occupy the heights right next to the road, where they could sit quietly, repulsing the Finnish attacks, thereby making the area large enough to make it easier for them to drop food, etc. Those. indeed, this is a big failure on our part, big trophies, many dead, wounded were abandoned again. And all the wounded, apparently, were finished off by the Finns in dugouts. Again, this is something that, in general, the Finns somehow don’t really like to remember, but, indeed, there are many sources that indicate that the wounded were abandoned in dugouts, and then, accordingly, the dugouts are just were either blown up with overhead charges, or were burned along with the wounded, or the wounded were finished off, respectively, by blows from rifle butts and bayonets. Those. also a very ugly story, in fact. Here, as you understand, all this place of encirclement remained on our territory after the war, therefore ... Here is a top secret act on March 17, i.e. 4 days after end of the war , this act was compiled by the commission, the chairman of the commission of the military commissar of the 56th rifle corps, brigade commissar Seryakov, acting. commander of the 18th division, Colonel Sokolov, acting military commissar of the 18th division, deputy. Head of the special department of the NKVD, and head of the 2nd department of the 56th rifle corps. What do they write? So... It's quite long, but I'll read the following. Lemetti south. Ours called Lemetti southern, the Finns called Lemetti eastern. “Lemetti South bears the traces of fierce and stubborn battles, representing a continuous cemetery of corpses, broken military and transport vehicles. The entire defense area of ​​the KP 18 SD is pitted with craters from shells, 90% of the trees in the defense area are mowed down art. shells. 10 dugouts were found, destroyed by art. shells of 152 m / m artillery, with people who were there. The remaining dugouts were mostly blown up by the Finns when they occupied Lemetti. 18 corpses of Red Army soldiers were found, burned by the Finns in dugouts, one corpse was found in a dugout, tied with wires to the bunks and shot, and one corpse with a rope tightened around its neck. Cars, trees, iron pipes of dugout stoves and all local objects are riddled with bullets and shell fragments. All military and economic property and personal property was demolished and piled by the Finns along the road. Well, and, accordingly, about the fate of the columns: “In the area of ​​\u200b\u200bbreaking through the enemy’s defense, a column of the head of the headquarters of the 18th SD, Colonel Alekseev, found 201 corpses, mainly in the enemy’s defense area and near wire barriers. In the area of ​​​​breaking through the enemy defenses, a column of the head of the headquarters of the 34th LTBR, ​​Colonel Smirnov, found 150 corpses, and 120 corpses of the remaining seriously wounded were found in hospital dugouts. Finnish corpses were not found, because. those were removed by the Finns between 29.2.40 and 17.3.40." Yes, the actual column that died: “About 400 dead were found in the area of ​​the Finnish camp, which is 2.5 km east of Lemetti, among which were identified: Head of the Political Department of the 18th SD Battalion Commissar. Razumov, Chief Artillery 56 SC - Colonel Bolotov, military commissar 97 OBS - senior political instructor Tyurin, military commissar 56 ORB - Art. political instructor Suvorov, pom. the head of the political department for the Komsomol, political instructor Samoznaev, the instructor of the political department of the 18th SD - political instructor Smirnov and his wife, the representative of the Air Force of the 8th Army, Lieutenant Permyakov, the Head of the Division's Vehicle Fleet and many others. In the area of ​​the death of the Northern Column, the following was established: the trees, for the most part, bear traces of a two-way shootout, which indicates the armed resistance of the Northern Group. During the examination, it was found that, despite the presence of mortal wounds, a significant part of the dead bears traces of shooting in the head and finishing off with rifle butts. One of the victims, shod in Finnish Peksa boots, is put upside down against a tree. The wife of the instructor of the political department of the 18th SD, Smirnova (who worked in the party accounting in the political department) was naked and our hand grenade was inserted between her legs. Buttonholes and sleeve insignia were torn off most of the command staff. The orders that the commanding staff had were pulled out by the Finns with matter. Here is such a document about what happened when you exited the environment. Again, it is clear that it was necessary to do this much earlier, but still, an order is an order, so they really waited a long time, very much. And there are also memories, it is written here that most of the dead were in the area of ​​​​the wire, there many people could no longer even walk from the fact that they were hungry, and simply crawled out of the encirclement. Those. such a tragic fate befell the 18th rifle division and the 34th light tank brigade in the Soviet-Finnish war. It is clear that, once again, I will say that Finnish propaganda has, of course, trumpeted all this very much. A huge number of photographs were taken, and jubilant Finns, and trophies, and, again, our frozen corpses by the road, and so on and so forth. But, at the same time, I really need to say - from my point of view, this played a cruel joke on the Finns, because this all happens on February 27-28, when on the Karelian Isthmus, if we recall the previous story, the intermediate line of defense of the Finns has already been broken through, and ours are already, in general, moving towards Vyborg, and are aiming at the encirclement of Vyborg. Those. if our units are defeated here, then in the key theater of military operations, i.e. this is the Helsinki direction, the Finnish army is defeated. And, of course, the Finnish media and Finnish propaganda, she did not talk about what was happening near Vyborg, she, on the contrary, told what was happening here. And therefore, when after 2 weeks peace was concluded on terms that were not favorable for Finland, they now say that Finland won because it retained its independence, etc., assessments always change. But then, excuse me, all the newspapers came out in a mourning frame, all the flags were at half mast ... As a sign of victory, right? And, in fact, all foreign journalists, too, they regarded it as a victory for Russia. And, in fact, for the Finns it was a huge shock that we are fighting so cool, and it seems that here another 1 division was defeated, and the tank brigade was defeated, and the banner was captured, and in general everything is great, but then after 2 weeks it turns out, that we ended up losing. Those. propaganda is good, but it can, therefore, really public opinion to lure into a certain trap, it can just backfire with a huge shock for people. But this is what is happening in the Lemetti area, and further north, beyond Pitkäranta, the 168th Infantry Division is still holding out, and, accordingly, the new 15th Army is quietly concentrating, which arrives from the Belarusian Military District in order to break through the blockade ring of the 168th Infantry Division . But, again, please look at picture 17, communications of the 8th and 15th army, this is the only road that runs along Ladoga. But the most interesting thing is that much to the south, in the Salmi area, i.e. it is 50 kilometers to the south, near Ladoga there are the islands of Lunkulunsaari and Mantsisaari, where there are 2 Finnish 152 mm cannons, and a separate Finnish battalion is sitting there. And with their fire they periodically shoot through this road. Tov. Stern did not guess to take these islands by storm, and thereby, in fact, remove this obstacle to his only communication. In April 1940, when the commander-in-chief comrade. Stalin gathered all the commanders of the Red Army for a meeting in the Kremlin in order for them to tell how they fought in the Soviet-Finnish war, Stern began to say that the Finns had a giant fort, absolutely impregnable, on this island, and therefore they did not climb there. Stalin interrupted him and said that you know, there were 2 guns and 1 battalion, I don’t need to flood. Those. Stalin was aware that the Finns were not crowded there. But, again, they just left them alone there, calmly sat out until the truce, and until the truce, they, respectively, fired at this only road. And, by the way, it must, of course, be emphasized that after the war, at this conference, which we will discuss separately, our commanders greatly exaggerated the strength of the Finnish fortifications. Of course, it was necessary to somehow justify their not very effective action . So, our reinforcements, in fact, go along this road, including the 204th airborne brigade from Borispol, from Ukraine, arriving on foot in mid-February. And, indeed, they come by train, on echelons to Lodeynoye Pole, from Lodeynoye Pole they walk 200 km, after which they are immediately thrown into battle to take the islands in Pitkyarantsky Bay. And the first battle ended for ours in a complete fiasco, because there was no reconnaissance, and all this only led to very high losses among our paratroopers. I must say that there is also such a stereotype that the Finns, they heard that there were some kind of paratroopers, and they directly thought that the paratroopers parachuted to these islands at night, but this is absolutely not confirmed by our documents. Our documents confirm that the brigade launched a battalion-by-battalion attack in mid-February, and, in general, immediately lost more than half of its personnel on the ice in front of the islands. They were excellent commanders. I'm surprised that special departments, such handsome men, didn't shoot everyone there. How would they shoot there, i.e. so when the command of the 15th army, somehow their first attack on the islands failed in mid-February, the second attack failed on February 23, then Kovalev was removed. After that, Kurdyumov was appointed commander of the 15th Army. And look, please, picture 18, breaking through the blockade of the 168th Infantry Division and the battle for the islands. The situation there was gloomy, in general, for both sides, both for ours and for the Finns, because, therefore, the Finns occupied these islands, at first everything seemed to be fine with them, they fired at our carts, which tried to break through at night on the ice of the Pitkyaranta Bay into the 168th division, shot them from machine guns and mortars. But when they began to put pressure on our islands, then, accordingly, of course, they didn’t do well there, this time. And the second is, in general, when it became clear that it would be very bad now, it was clear that ours attacked once, attacked twice, the attack was unsuccessful twice, but the second time they went somehow with the tanks. It is clear that the third time will be even more and even stronger. In general, those Finns who were on the islands, they were just there, in general, the officers abandoned them, the artillery scouts left, and, in fact, the book that describes the battles for these 2 islands - Lunkulunsaari and Mantsisaari - is in Finnish it is called “Front of the Forgotten”, “Front of the Abandoned”. You could say they were also left there... Commanders? Yeah, like hold on as long as you can. But they could only hold out until March 6, because on March 6, in battle, both garrisons were actually completely destroyed by ours. And in the previous attacks, as it was - our aircraft flies, begins to bomb the islands, and at the same time an artillery raid is launched on the islands, moreover, the islands are completely rocky, and it is clear that there ... You will not burrow. You can't burrow there, and the rocks are damaging factor - when a projectile hits them, there are fragments, granite dust and everything, everything, everything flies. Well, what did the Finns do - they just ran away from the island and lay on the ice. They are in white camouflage robes, they are not visible, then, when the attack begins, the Finns return to the island and open fire from the island. Ours in the 3rd attack, in fact, realized that, in general, the Finns were doing this, and already during the 3rd assault, in fact, it was agreed that our fighters were constantly loitering around the island, and when they saw that someone was there - sometimes he runs around in white camouflage suits, they just open fire on them. Those. and you can’t hide on the island, and, accordingly, you can’t hide on the ice either. Well, there are memories of just one of our paratroopers, who was in the first attack, in the second, in the third, i.e. he saw it all. And, in fact, there are very interesting memories of this third attack. “By 12 o'clock, the battalion units had liberated a third of the island, but were stopped by strong fire from the Finns. The battalion commander Solop reported the situation by telephone to the commander of the brigade I. I. Gubarevich and asked to move the artillery attack on the northern part of the island to 12 hours 50 minutes and attack the Finns at 13. Such a 10-minute artillery attack was carried out, and the fighters shouted "Hurrah!" attacked the enemy and went forward with the support of tanks. But our aviation appeared here and began to impede the advance of the battalion by their actions, firing at their own. Those. well, yes, aviation has an order, if there are some people in white running around, then they need to be shot. “...Captain Solop tried to contact the aviation by radio, but it was useless, he swore at them for what it was worth. At this time, a group of about 10 people in camouflage suits approached us. Solop continued to call for aircraft on the radio. One of the group asked: “Who is the commander here?” "Well, I, what do you want from me?" Solop said angrily. “I, Comrade Commander, Deputy People's Commissar - Kulik. What is holding you back now?" - he asked. I see my battalion commander turned pale from pink, he could not immediately report the situation. “Calm down,” said G. I. Kulik, “does aviation interfere with you?” "Yes, comrade deputy commissar, aviation is firing at its own and preventing it from moving forward." “Now, comrade Solop, I will instruct aviation on my radio to fire on the northern part of the island.” His radio operator was able to quickly contact the aircraft, and she suffered a blow to the northern part of the island of Maximan-Sari. After that, the battalion went forward ... "Ie. you also see that there was still no aircraft controller in combat formations on the ground. And the personal presence of the marshal is required in order to reorient it all. Yes, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, i.e. 2 people in the People's Commissariat. But, it means that when the islands were taken, our official archival documents record that the commanders lost control over the fighters, and, in fact, the fighters were so embittered by the previous unsuccessful assaults on these islands that just all the prisoners, i.e. even those who tried to surrender, the Finns were simply killed on the spot. Plus, again, such a powerful artillery raid was carried out on the islands that when ours entered the island, they saw that many Finnish soldiers were simply torn to pieces by shells. The Finns had something like a dressing station behind one rock, and so, the bomb hit the rock, and the rock just collapsed, they buried everyone alive there. And, in general, virtually no one from the Finns escaped from these islands. Literally a few wounded were saved, who realized that, probably, there was no need to give up, they just crawled away at dusk, in the afternoon, again, in their camouflage suits on the ice, and then crawled for a long time to their own, respectively, to the north. Well, just like in other places, the Finns in these units had a territorial principle for the formation of regiments, they were just from 2 neighboring villages, from Rantasalmi ... no, sorry, not from neighboring ones, there from the area just Savolaksa, from Rantasalmi and from Nilse, from 2 villages, almost everyone died there. Therefore, in the 2000s, they went to these islands, from 2 of their villages they erected monuments there. (picture 19, monument on the islands). Those. this is how, in general, the Soviet-Finnish war in the Ladoga region ended. Initial success, then the Finns stopped ours, launched a counterattack planned long before that, cut off communications, one of our commanders got a nervous breakdown and removed himself from command. Never heard of it. The second commander, on the contrary, gathers his division into a very dense defensive perimeter, arranges supplies, builds a runway on the ice there, and holds on until the end of the war. The 18th Rifle Division is practically completely destroyed, the 34th Light Tank Brigade loses half of its personnel and all tanks. Well, everything ends with the concentration of our new army, and on the third attempt, the capture of the islands of Pitkäranta Bay, heavy losses for the Finns, heavy losses for ours, but the 168th division is released. And, of course, the question may immediately arise, but what, the Red Army seems to be a humane army, all people are brothers ... Komsomol members. Komsomols, yes. We are not fighting against the Finnish people, we are fighting against the White Finnish gangs, we generally wanted to liberate Finland. Why such cruelty, why the prisoners, ie. those who tried to surrender, why were they finished off? Why finished off the wounded? I remember from childhood that they were always called lakhtars, i.e. butchers, these same Finns. You know, there, by the way, in this document, where it is written that they finished off, it is directly stated that when they ran on skis to the island to attack, they ran on skis over the bodies of their comrades who died in previous attacks, and you can imagine how they felt when in mid-February they did not take, put a certain number of their own - young, 20-year-olds, the same Komsomol members, paratroopers, the elite. February 23 is the same. And only on March 6, on the third attempt, they reached these islands, and there really was everything already, they did not give mercy. And this is indeed reflected in our official archival documents, it is directly written down. These are sad places, i.e. no success. Yes, it seems that it was planned to attack, i.e. when 168 is released, attack Sortavala, etc. But, again, the end of hostilities on all these plans put an end to it. Although the Finns also have a legend there that in Sortavala, Finnish reservists are sitting there, and they hear that, accordingly, the Russians have, excuse me, a whole army there, a lot of fresh troops have approached Pitkyaranta, and now they will rush across the ice into Sortavala, and allegedly everyone there just arranged a giant drinking bout in Sortaval that they would not be able to keep the city. Those. already the complete superiority of the enemy. But these are also such legends and tales, of which there are many on both sides. But I would not like to end there, because we have the 56th Infantry Division nearby, literally 50 km away, which is trying to break through to these same places from the side of Loimala, from the side of Solvajärvi. And this is another theater of operations on the river. Calla so-called. Picture 20, the battle on the Kolla River, in December, in fact, everything happens there as follows. The 56th rifle division is advancing, one Finnish regiment is defending, and just on the Kolla River, relying on the dominant heights, the Finns stop ours. That is, again, no encirclement happened there simply because neither ours nor the Finns had the strength to do so. Those. both sides tried to make detours, repulsed each other, after which the front stood up. And he got up, in fact, until March 1940. Why are we talking about this at all - simply because it was there that the Finnish sniper Simo Hyaukha fought (picture 22). Simo Hyaukhya is one of the symbols of the Soviet-Finnish war, and, accordingly, he is probably more famous in Finland than Vasily Zaitsev and others Soviet snipers. And as I said in the last program, in fact, a legend was made from it already during Finnish war , and only increased after the war (picture 21, sniper Simo Hyaukha in mid-February 1940). A positional war is already underway, nothing seems to be happening, a Swedish delegation arrives, gives Khyaukhya a Swedish rifle, Colonel Svensson presents him with a diploma, i.e. there is such a beautiful ceremony that everyone takes pictures of, and, accordingly, that's just how he stands, smiling, in picture 21 with a Swedish rifle presented to him, if I'm not mistaken. And indeed, from mid-December to March, nothing much happens there. Different sources indicate a completely different number of his victories, let's say so. Up to 700 people are attributed to him, but let's have some doubts about this number, which some sources cite, especially Internet sources. The fact is that, again, the front stood up somewhere in the 20th of December, and Simo Hyaukhya was seriously wounded by a hit of either an explosive bullet or a fragment in the jaw on March 5, 1940. Those. he, it turns out, January, February, 2 more weeks, i.e. it turns out somewhere around 70 days ... 10 people a day. Yes, it turns out 10 people a day. Seven days a week. Yes, no days off. It is interesting that he was the first, he showed his position, he returned to these places in 41, and the place where he was is known. Indeed, the position chosen is wonderful, picture 22, Simo Hyaukha shows his firing position, this is a rock, and the rock is such that on the right and left it is covered with rocks, and on the left in front it is also covered with a rock. Simo Hyaukhya was very short, he was himself a peasant, obviously not from a very rich family, i.e. malnourished, so he was 1.55 tall. He was very short, you can see his uniform in the Central Museum of the Finnish Defense Forces, you can see that he was small. Further, he fired from a rifle without a sniper scope, i.e. he had a maximum range of 400-450 meters. And now there are estimates that he may have reached 200 victories as a sniper, but you know, if we know where his firing position was, he crawled out to neutral, i.e. he was not sitting in the Finnish trenches. He crawled out into neutral, even went beyond the Finnish gouges. Here at this position. If we know the radius of destruction of his rifle approximately, and we know the number of the regiment that was stationed there, then if we try to evaluate his victories, his real sniper score, you just need to take the losses of this regiment and see how many were killed there during this time. The whole regiment, apparently, right? To be honest, I have this ... Or else they had to be adjusted to satisfy the bloodthirsty. You know, in fact, they say that we have all sorts of legends here and all that, but in the same place ... It is unacceptable. Only truth. No, no, listen. Finnish tourists, here they are, for them this is really a national hero, i.e. as for us Vasily Zaitsev, or who else is there, Kozhedub, one of the greatest military heroes. And, accordingly, the Finns told me that you know, he was nicknamed "white death" ... Russians? Yes, ours called him "white death". Never met anywhere. Frost was more likely to be called white death. Those. As a researcher, this raises serious doubts for me. The second thing they sent, almost personally, Stalin drove a whole army of snipers to hunt for him. Most importantly, he said, the Finns said they sent 5 female snipers. White tights. Yes, white tights. That they were very cool, but all the same, Hyauhya killed them all, because, like, their optics shone, but mine didn’t. And he had no optics. Finnish trick. Finnish trick, but he also said that he explained after the war, i.e. he died in 2002, sorry, he lived a very long life, and there was a whole pilgrimage to him from Finns, and Americans, and anyone. They went to him, recorded interviews with him, and asked - why like this, why without a sniper scope, etc. He said, firstly, the optics can fog up in winter, that's one thing. The second - from his point of view, through a sniper scope, through an optical sight, you need to aim longer. Well, and the third - after all, if there is a sniper scope, it glares, that’s one thing, and number 2 is that you still need to raise your head literally 2-3 cm higher, because the sniper scope is located higher than a regular scope on the barrel of a rifle. Those. here is his explanation. Sorry, I’ll interrupt, I doubt very much that without a sight at 400 meters you can hit somewhere. Well, supposedly he is a Finnish hunter, etc. With a scope, not everyone hits 400 meters. I do not believe, as Stanislavsky said. Again, if one would like to really do a normal, calm, neutral study, exactly how much, i.e. try to estimate the losses that are in our units ... Is it possible to somehow get the data? So, I'm saying that you just need to take the data on the losses of the regiment that stood against Khyaukhya, and in general see what their total losses were for December, January, February. What happened there? Maybe it will turn out there that 40 people were killed and 100 wounded there. How did they rate it? Well, Khyaukhya came in the evening and said how many he allegedly killed there. But, nevertheless, no matter how much he killed, for the Finns this is one of the symbols of the Soviet-Finnish war. It is clear that now they say that 700 is probably an exaggeration, because already, as in the photo on February 17, he stands like a hero, he is handed a rifle, a diploma, and so on and so forth. Most likely, 200 ... Still a lot. Many, still outstanding, one of the greatest snipers. But the most important thing that is interesting is that an ordinary Finnish resident, a simple Finnish inhabitant, he will not even bother and question this number. A legend and a legend, now the Finns are starting, in my opinion, filming a film about Simo Hyaukha, about the white death, and there no one will count, like with 28 Panfilov’s men, how many there were, how many tanks they knocked out, everything is one way or another, not important - national hero , legend, we are filming, and there are no protests among ... Let's look for documents, shoot a video about Simo Hyaohya. Interesting. But, in fact, how it all ended on the Kolla River. Calmness ended in early March, because at the beginning of the Finnish war there was one of our divisions, then by March ours brought 4 more. 2 of our corps were already standing there, overwhelming superiority in infantry, in everything. And, accordingly, just on March 4-5, our people simply begin to put pressure on the Finns from all sides, i.e. they attack not only along the front just on the Kolla River, but they begin to make detours, now there are more forces, much more forces. And just like that, on March 5-6, March 5, Simo Hyaukha is seriously injured. According to the official version, it was just a duel with our sniper, who hit him in the lower jaw, and because of this, in fact, his entire lower jaw was crushed, so his face was very deformed, i.e. his jaw was pieced together in the hospital. This is one version. Another version is that a shell fragment hit, because the fighting became very, very intense again, but despite the overwhelming superiority, the Finns still managed to hold out there until March 13. Although, indeed, their situation again became difficult, i.e. both flanks are already covered, somehow there are no reserves anymore, i.e. it is not clear how it would all end. But, nevertheless, picture 23, the situation on the Colla River at the end of the war, which completes our today's reconnaissance. All the same, the Kolla River and Simo Hyaukhya for the Finns became a symbol of the Finnish army's resilience in the Soviet-Finnish war, that they broke through the Mannerheim line in Summa, and Kolla resisted. They, in fact, came out right after the war, the book of just one serviceman of the Finnish army, who fought there. He called the book that “Colla survived”, the front survived. Therefore, for them, this is also a certain symbol of their courage and stamina, which indeed was high in the Soviet-Finnish war, this cannot be denied. And, accordingly, if someone travels there, unfortunately, the road from Pitkyaranta to Loimala and Suoyarvi is in a terrible state. Those. if it is repaired, then in general it would give an impetus to tourism in these places, but now you just shake 40 km on some PAZik at a speed of 40 km / h. If anyone is there, the Finns brought the monument there, the top of it was broken off, please do not think about local vandals, it was the Finns who carried it themselves and broke it themselves during transportation. Therefore, there should have been a high obelisk, and it turns out that it was broken in half. But now everyone thinks that everything is so special, that the sculptor so specially conceived. But there, in fact, this Finnish obelisk stands on Finnish positions, and on the other side of the river there is a very large mass grave of our soldiers and commanders who died there. And, by the way, on one side of the road is the grave of our fighters and commanders, and on the other side of the road, 100 meters away, is the position of Hyauhya. Those. he really crawled forward, into neutral, and indeed, probably, the fact that he was very small in stature was a big plus in this regard. Plus, really from one, on the left side it was completely covered by a rock. Strange at all. Those. this is a violation of all the rules in general - to sit in one place. Do you think that no one will notice you? They will notice, and sooner or later they will arrive. Well, roughly speaking, the Finnish version is that he was so cooler than all our snipers that, yes, he almost put them there one by one. And so 2 months. But, again, this is about the question that any war, if it is a domestic war, and for the Finns, the Soviet-Finnish war is regarded precisely as a domestic war, that is how Mannerheim proclaimed it on the very first day of the war, that we are fighting for faith, home , and fatherland. Those. not for the faith, the king, and the fatherland, but for the faith, the house, and the fatherland. This is actually a declaration of patriotic war, i.e. we will fight to the end. In any such war, in general, there always appear their own legends, and, of course, Hyaohya is one of them, and, in general, is known throughout the world. Why, in fact, there was such a pilgrimage to him after the war, already in the 90s, 2000s, they came and met with him. He was buried, in fact, in his native places, in the cemetery of the village of Ruokolahti. You will pass there, you can call in, a very small, modest grave. But there on it is just the silhouette of a Finnish soldier in a white camouflage coat, and there are actually always flowers there. Those. to them he is a hero. Yes, now you can argue, study, etc., but still they will make a film where he is there, probably like 300 Spartans, only he will be there alone. And, indeed, yes, if not 700 ... 800. 800, at least he will certainly put our Red Army men there. Queues. Yes. There, obviously, ours will climb like orcs, but there is no discussion about this, that “maybe he didn’t kill so much?”, “Maybe everything was wrong?” absolutely not in Finnish society. And if someone starts raising his voice, then he will probably immediately begin to receive threats to hack to death with an ax in the street, or to stab him with a Finnish knife, because there they are ... in this regard, they are much more touchy than ours, from my point of view. Lost, yeah. Of course, it's a shame. Good example this is just when 2 young 30-year-old masters of history decided to dig a little into the biography of Lauri Törni, who is another Finnish hero, we need to talk about him separately already in the stories about the second war of 41-44. So they, in general, found documents, and they wrote in the book that he was considered the greatest Finnish warrior, but in fact he was a Nazi, because he, yes, he fought in the Lemetti region in 40 just in 40 Jaeger, then in 41 he went to fight in the SS in the Donbass and in Chechnya, because it was there that the 5th Viking SS division was located, in those parts. Then, in 1943, he returned to Finland, became a Finnish saboteur, left in 1944 after the armistice with the Soviet Union, left Finland for Sweden, from Sweden for the USA, joined the US Army, and only in Vietnam he was calmed down. Only in 65, his helicopter was shot down, he crashed somewhere in the jungle, he was found only in the early 2000s. Well, also in the central museum of the defensive forces of Finland you will see the "Soldier of the 3 armies" - in Finnish uniform, in SS uniform, in American uniform. There is something to be proud of. There is something to be proud of. By the way, he was born in the city of Vyborg, Vyborg, though Finnish. So, these two young people said - and you know that he was a Nazi in general, you know that he was categorically against the truce between Finland and the Soviet Union, he almost planned a military coup in Finland, so as not to reconciled with the USSR, and continued to fight for the Germans. So, these 2 young people began to receive threats to life and health, and were forced to hire security guards for themselves. Not bad. Democracy, yes. 2 years ago, and the book came out on book fair in Helsinki, this is the premiere, when all the new, most important books in Finland come out, this, of course, became a big scandal, that we thought he was good, but he ... He, it turns out, is what he is! Yes. But that, again, is a completely different story. There is a feeling that a certain revision is also beginning in Finland. In general, I look - only while the Soviet Union was alive, all this scum was somehow managed to be kept in check, that everyone was forced to agree that Nazism is bad, that it is impossible to serve in the SS, that this is scum, that cooperation with the Nazi mode is not good. And now, it turns out, everything was fine. Those. there is no one to hit the table with his face, and our handsome men support all this with all their might, but why be shy now. AT Soviet time there was a huge self-censorship in Finland, i.e. yes, there were books, yes, there were studies, but it was rather for, as it were, very right-wingers and for veterans. And now it has become mainstream, I would say. It won't lead to good. Well, alas, I'm afraid it won't. Yes, one should write a study about Simo Häuhä someday, because he is a legendary person and an interesting topic for research. To summarize our conversation today, I would like to say that, oddly enough, it is about tragic events in the Lemetti area, one of the few art books about the Soviet-Finnish war. It is called “Death of the Division,” wrote Petrozavodsk researcher, writer, journalist A.A. Gordienko, who, unfortunately, died in 2010. This is a new posthumous edition. Before the war, the 18th Infantry Division was based in Petrozavodsk, in fact, from there it went to its, unfortunately, death in the Lemetti area. But those who returned, all returned to Petrozavodsk, and all relatives remained in Petrozavodsk, so this book is written as if the diary of one of the employees of the political department of the 18th Infantry Division, i.e. such a story in the form of a diary, based on documents, on interviews. Yes, maybe it is with some excesses, but it’s better that nothing about the Finnish war is written in our works of art at all. Can personnel be purchased somewhere? Yes, in fact, under the video there is a link to opershop, so this book can be purchased at opershop ... Is this this cross? Yes, this is exactly the cross of sorrow, very neutral, i.e. there is such a cross and 2 mothers embrace it from both sides. Those. one mother is Russia, the other is Finland. Those. monument erected in 2000, and on this moment this is the largest monument to the Soviet-Finnish war that we have. It is located just in the very places where our boiler was just destroyed at the Lemetti fork in the road, so if you somehow travel in those parts, stop by and take a look. Unfortunately, there are not a large number of information plates there, but there a huge number of mass graves and monuments reminds of this battle of 40 years, i.e. they literally go along the road every 500 meters, which shows what happens when the commander gives up. In spite of everything, after all, the commander is the captain of the ship, he should even try to do something in a hopeless situation, because the situation, most likely, was not hopeless, which is shown by the situation in the neighboring division of Bondarev. Creepy. Yes. But, of course, it must also be said that, of course, this played a role in raising the morale in Finland, in maintaining the general normal public opinion in Finland. And for the Finns, this is probably such an important and glorious page in military history. For us, this is a very sad and tragic page in our military history, which was forgotten for a very long time, just what it was like. But, fortunately, even though this book was published in the early 2000s, it became a bestseller in Karelia, i.e. this is the 3rd edition. It hasn't been published in paper for a long time, so please, you can buy it in opershop. But I emphasize once again that in general, on the same days, when, in general, when leaving the encirclement, the entire command of the 34th light tank brigade shot themselves, on the same days, when our encircled soldiers simply did not see anything at night, because they started to have night blindness due to malnutrition, and the Finns just approached and threw grenades at them, at the same time the intermediate Finnish defense line was broken near Vyborg, and the situation on the Karelian Isthmus to the west of Lake Ladoga for the Finns is already close to critical. Every day the position of the Finnish army is only getting worse. Therefore, our next story is the end of hostilities in the Soviet-Finnish war. There has already been a request to tell about the locks of the Saimaa Canal, what happened to them - they were really blown up or not blown up, and what was there at all near Vyborg. How the hostilities ended, where our units stood at 12 noon on March 13, when the truce officially came into force, and what lessons did the Red Army, the Finnish Army, and all our Western partners learn from this. Thank you. We look forward to the next one. Thank you. And that's all for today. See you again.

Full name

45th Volyn Order of Lenin Red Banner Rifle Division

Division history

Civil War

From August 14, 1919, she was part of Southern group troops of the 12th Army, defending Odessa. After leaving Odessa in August-September 1919, she made a 400-km crossing behind enemy lines, for which she was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner (1919). In September-October 1919 - in the reserve of the 12th Army and the Southern Front. In November 1919, she was transferred to Petrograd, but was returned to southern front to support the advance of the 14th Army on Kharkov. In December 1919 - January 1920, she pursued Denikin's troops on Right-Bank Ukraine, disarmed the Makhnovists in the Alexandrovsk region.

In January-February 1920, the division took part in the operation to liberate Odessa. Since March 1920 - on the Soviet-Polish front. In May-June, as part of the Fastovskaya group in the battles near the White Church, in June-July it advanced on Shepetovka and Dubno, in August it participated in the Lvov operation, advancing on the Zolochiv and then on the Lvov directions, the division headquarters for some time performed the functions of commanding a group of troops in these directions. In August-September 1920, she fought defensive battles and retreated to the east. In November 1920, she took part in the battles against the Petliura troops and units of the 3rd Wrangel Army in Western Ukraine.

In December 1920 - early 1921, she participated in the fight against gangs and guarded sugar factories.

December 10 Commander Armed Forces Ukraine and Crimea appointed M. V. Frunze. Armed Forces Ukraine and Crimea consisted of two districts, Kiev and Kharkov.

In autumn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea carried out major troop maneuvers. They were held not far from the Romanian border, in Podolia. The maneuvers were led by the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea, M.V. Frunze. These maneuvers are Peaceful time were the first after graduation civil war in Russia. They were attended by the 1st Corps of the Red Cossacks (commander Primakov, Vitaliy Markovich) as part of the 1st Zaporozhye Red Cossack Division and the 2nd Chernigov Red Cossack Division, the Cavalry Brigade (commander Kotovsky, Grigory Ivanovich), as well as 25 -I Rifle Division named after V. I. Chapaev, 24th Rifle Division Ulyanovsk, 44th Rifle Division, 45th Rifle Division. Podolsky maneuvers showed good combat training warriors who glorified their divisions during the years of the civil war in Russia, and reminded the capitalist neighbors of the readiness of the workers and peasants to defend the gains of socialism. (See Dubinsky I.V. “Trumpeters sound the alarm”)

Since September 1921, the 45th Volyn SD was part of the Kiev Military District.

In the fall, the second regular conscription into the army was carried out.

On January 1, the 45th Rifle Division was part of the 14th Sc. Head of division M. I. Vasilenko. Division office in Kyiv.

Division Composition:

• 133, 134, 135th rifle regiments,
• separate cavalry squadron,
• light artillery regiment (two divisions)
• special divisions.

The number of personnel of the division is 6516 people. The armament of the division: 54 guns, 81 light machine guns, 189 heavy machine guns, 243 grenade launchers.

133rd, 134th, 135th rifle regiments consisted of: 1,2,3rd rifle battalions, regimental artillery battery and service units.

In the summer period of training in 1925, commanders paid much attention to tactical training. Tactical training sessions were held with the inclusion of shooting training topics. On the instructions of the commander of the troops of the district A. Egorov, 3-4-day exits of units (companies and battalions) were carried out in the field for tactical exercises. Conducted political literacy classes.

The Red Army soldiers of the division replenished their political knowledge from the district newspaper "Red Army" in Ukrainian and Russian and the military-political magazine "Army and revolution". The district magazine "Red Company" ceased to be published.

At the suggestion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, Soviet and party organizations of Ukraine assisted the troops of the district in the repair and equipment of the barracks, (Party archive of the Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, f. 1, op. 145, d. 11, l. 143) .

The commander of the company of the Poltava school of commanders Bogdanov, Semyon Ilyich was appointed commander of the battalion (09.1925-03.1926) of the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Rifle Division. (See website of the Red Army)

1929 Rearmament of the army 1929-1937

45th Volyn SD (133rd, 134th, 135th rifle regiments), division chief M.I. Vasilenko.

In 1929, Borisenko Anton Nikolaevich was appointed head of the 45th Rifle Division.

On February 25, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopts a resolution “On command and political composition Red Army". The Central Committee directed political workers and communist commanders to educate soldiers to be devoted to Soviet power, to distinguish between the class enemy.

AT mass grave, located at the intersection of Tarashchantsev and Bogunskaya streets, soldiers of the 253rd Tarashchansky, 61st Bohunsky and 10th Donetsk regiments of the 45th rifle division are buried. The names of 80 dead soldiers are known. Total buried is unknown.

The monument was erected in 1950. The text “Here are buried soldiers and commanders of the Bogunsky regiment of the 45th Shchors Rifle Division” is carved on a granite plaque.

Combat path of the 45th Infantry Division

The 45th Rifle Division of the 1st Formation, (since 1/3/1943 the seventy-fourth Guards Rifle Division), was formed on 16/7/1919 in the region of Odessa by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 12th Army from units of the former Ukrainian Army.

I. E. Yakir commanded the division. For successful combat operations in 1919, the division was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner. In 1920, the division took part in the defeat of Wrangel. Dec 17 1921 The 45th Rifle Division is given the honorary title of Volyn.

In 1922 the division was awarded the Order. Labor Red Banner of the Ukrainian SSR. The Great Patriotic War began near Kovel. In August 1941, the 45th Rifle Division retreated to Kiev, and in September 1941, due to heavy losses, it was assigned to Voronezh for replenishment and reorganization. Participates in the battle for Kursk (December 1941). In July 1942, with the start Battle of Stalingrad takes part in the battles on the Don, gets surrounded, breaks through with battles. The remnants of the division are withdrawn to the Kuibyshev area for reorganization: from 1 Aug. to 1 Oct. 1942 in the Volga military

district of st. Barash (Kuibyshev region, now Samara region).

Composition: 10th joint venture (Donetsk), 61st joint venture (Bogunsky), 253rd joint venture (Tarashchansky), 178th art. regiment.

Division 20 Oct. 1942 arrived by railway echelons at the station. Zaplavnoe. On the night of 25 Oct. The 1st Battalion of the 10th Rifle Regiment was transferred to the area of ​​the crossing of the 62nd Army on the right bank of the Volga, where in full force transferred to the 39th division. At dawn, the fighting began here. The remaining two battalions were transferred to the 139th Rifle Division. The enemy went to the Volga in the area of ​​Neftesindikat, Kuporosnoe. There was a threat that the enemy would force the Volga in the region of the islands. By 25 Oct. divisions of the division took up defense on the islands of Sarpinsky, Hungry and Bezymyanny, this area was called combat area No. 2.

Oct 30 The 45th SD, having handed over the defense sector on the islands to the 95th SD, crossed to west coast Volga and entered into defensive battles in order to hold the Krasny Oktyabr plant. From 4 Nov. the division took up defensive positions on the western edge of the park, an open-hearth workshop with the task of preventing the enemy from reaching the Volga. From 22 to 26 Nov. parts of the division are advancing. The enemy broke through the defenses of the 685th Rifle Division of the 193rd Rifle Division and rushed to the Volga. The 61st Rifle Regiment of the 45th Rifle Division pressed the enemy 150 meters in the park area. Nov 11 the enemy went on the offensive. With the start of the counteroffensive on November 19, the division received combat mission clear the territory of the Krasny Oktyabr plant (slag mountain, workshop No. 3, laboratory and service buildings) from the enemy.

For the heroism and steadfastness shown by the division, on March 1, 1943, the 45th Rifle Division was transformed into the 74th Guards Rifle Division.

The 74th Rifle Division took part in the Barvenkovsky-Lozovsky, Vistula-Oder operations. The war ended with the storming of the Reichstag in Berlin.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, the commander - lieutenant colonel, from 1943 Guards. Major V.P. Sokolov. Military commissar (since 10/9/1942 deputy commander for political affairs) regimental commissar N. A. Glamazda. Colonel Chief of Staff I. V. Mileev.

Encyclopedia of the Battle of Stalingrad.