Originally posted by beam_truth at 1812: Napoleon's preemptive strike.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 was a forced measure - otherwise the offensive in opposite direction Alexander I would have started. Napoleon planned to defeat Russia in two years, in 1812 limiting himself to wintering on the Riga-Smolensk line. Having changed this plan, Napoleon was finished off by Russian open spaces, impassability and a bad climate.

Belarusian historian Anatoly Taras in his book “1812. The Tragedy of Belarus” tells what was the reason for Napoleon to attack Russia:

“The peace of Tilsit was beneficial for Russia. And Napoleon never planned to destroy the Russian Empire, including during the invasion in 1812. He did not even abolish serfdom in the territory he occupied, although the personal freedom of the peasants was one of the main provisions of his Civil Code, introduced in Northern Italy, the countries of the Rhine Union and Poland. The collapse of the Romanov Empire did not give any benefits to Napoleon.

First of all , he rightly considered Russia an extremely backward country, absolutely unsuitable for involvement in the pan-European system of economic, political and military relations he was creating.

Secondly , a powerful source of instability would inevitably arise on its ruins. It is more than likely that France would have had to participate in the wars for the "Russian inheritance" for decades.

Thirdly , he had long dreamed of going to India, following the example of his idol Alexander the Great. But such a campaign, taking into account the dominance of the British fleet in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, was possible only through the territory of Russia. Let me remind you that in 1800 Napoleon (at that time the first consul) had already agreed with Tsar Paul I on a joint campaign. In January 1801, the tsar appointed cavalry general Matvey Platov as ataman of Donskoy. Cossack army and ordered him to lead the Cossacks in the summer to conquer India. Only the assassination of the king on March 12 (24) of the same year canceled this enterprise.

Russian historians traditionally denounce the treachery of the "Corsican usurper", who allegedly "for no reason" attacked Russia in 1812. But at the same time, they are silent about the systematic attempts of Alexander I to interfere in the affairs of Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Oldenburg, not to mention the preparation of an attack on Poland (the Duchy of Warsaw).

For example, some Russian authors mention as one of the reasons for the war the occupation by the French in December 1810 of the county of Oldenburg, dynastically associated with Russia. Napoleon took this step with the aim of finally undermining English smuggling in the North and Baltic Seas. But the fact that he was painfully received in St. Petersburg is exclusively the problem of the Holstein-Gottorp dynasty, which retained the Romanov family name, which had nothing to do with it for a long time. The country itself, called Russia, from the “offense” inflicted on the Oldenburg relatives of the German tsar on the Russian throne, was neither cold nor hot.

Do not like such authors and economists' calculations, proving the inconsistency of statements about the "tremendous harm" to the Russian economy of participation in the continental blockade. They prefer demagogic arguments about the "forced" nature of Russia's accession to the continental blockade of England - solely because of the "humiliating" Treaty of Tilsit, to concrete figures. Allegedly, participation in the blockade caused widespread dissatisfaction among the highest officials, merchants, and especially among the noble landlords, who allegedly suffered huge losses due to the cessation of the export of bread (grain), flax, hemp (hemp) and lard to England.

In fact, such explanations are "far-fetched." The overwhelming majority of Russian landlords did not conduct a highly productive commodity economy, not only at the beginning of the 19th century, but even at its end. The main part of the production of landowners was absorbed by the domestic market (cities, armed forces, other government services), everything else was successfully sold in neighboring countries (Swedish, Danish and Prussian kingdoms, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires).

The point is different. The English king George III and his government, left one on one with Napoleon, decided to fight to the last soldier - of course, Russian, not English. British diplomats and secret agents in St. Petersburg were ordered to change the course of the Russian state ship at any cost.

All means were used: bribing representatives of the court aristocracy, spreading through them and other "agents of influence" fictions about the "humiliation" for Russia of the "shameful" Tilsit world, about the "terrible damage" to the Russian economy as a result of joining the continental blockade, finally, about Napoleon's sinister plans to "destroy Russia as a state", and at the same time the Orthodox Church.

For five years of invisible painstaking work, the British managed to achieve the desired result. In what, in what, and in secret diplomacy they are great masters. It is enough to recall just one well-known fact: the initiator of the conspiracy, the victim of which was Emperor Paul I, was British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Whitworth (or Winworth). Emperor Alexander Pavlovich could indulge in any illusions about his role in European and world history. In fact, he did not play, but he was played. He was just one of the important figures in chessboard British government.

It goes without saying that as soon as the news of Napoleon's invasion of Russia reached London at the end of June 1812, all members of the British government instantly turned into "the best friends" of the Russian Tsar. It was immediately announced that the war with Russia would be stopped and that financial assistance would be provided to it to fight the "Corsican monster".

So, Napoleon was provoked to war with Russia by three interrelated reasons:

1) cooking Russian troops to the invasion of the Duchy of Warsaw (recognized by Russia under the Tilsit Treaty);

2) the systematic attempts of Tsar Alexander to interfere in the affairs of the German states, which was directly prohibited by the secret part of the Tilsit Treaty;

3) the actual refusal of Russia to participate in the "continental blockade"

It was required to “beat off the desire” of the Russian despot to “poke his nose” and “stretch out his hands” beyond geographic line, clearly indicated to him in Tilsit. In other words, Napoleon planned a war with a limited purpose and in a limited area. He wanted to defeat the Russian troops in one or two general battles in the western part of the Russian Empire and after that conclude a new peace treaty along the lines of Tilsit, but with tougher guarantees that all its conditions would be met.

As for the territories, Napoleon planned the restoration of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the form of an autonomy (or protectorate), i.e. initially, his appetites were limited to the notorious "Polish provinces".

Napoleon did not do much of what he could well have done. I didn’t do it precisely because I didn’t want to “drive into a corner” the Russian tsar and his government.

Yes, he disagreed. numerous requests Poles about the reconstruction of the Commonwealth within the borders of 1772, i.e. including Courland, Belarus and Right-bank Ukraine. And here the entire Polonized gentry would have taken up arms in this case and would have fought on the side of the French.

Napoleon did not extend the effect of his Civil Code to Russia. But this meant not only the liberation of the serfs, but also peasant war more terrible than the uprising of Yemelyan Pugachev.

Finally, he did not send Murat's cavalry to surround and set fire to Moscow, when all its streets were clogged with retreating Russian troops, tens of thousands of carriages and carts of evacuated city residents.

However, the great commander made two very serious mistakes in his plans. First, he planned a "limited" war within a two-year campaign, while Russia responded to him with a "total" war of annihilation. And to win such a war, other means were required than those used by Napoleon. Secondly, he allowed himself to be "carried away" and reached Moscow - well beyond the line of advance set by his own plan. Ultimately, it was the “Moscow sitting” that became the main reason for the defeat of the “Great Army”.

As already mentioned, from the beginning of 1810, Alexander I was preparing for war against the Duchy of Warsaw. He instructed military experts to develop strategic plan offensive war. The author of the offensive plan was General L.L. Bennigsen.

By February 1811, Bennigsen completed the detailed development of the plan. It provided for the exit of Russian troops to the Oder River and a general battle in the Vistula-Oder interfluve. Minimal amount troops needed to carry out offensive operation, Bennigsen determined 160 thousand people, the optimal one is 200 thousand. He considered Prussia as an ally. As for the army of the Duchy of Warsaw, it, in case of refusal of an alliance with the Russians, was subject to destruction. Bennigsen wrote:

“... One offensive war it is possible for us to bend the king of Prussia to our side, who otherwise would certainly be forced to act against us with his troops; Let us add to this that, remaining in a defensive position, we will allow the Poles to increase their troops, while by offensive actions, if we do not have time to exterminate or disperse Polish army, then at least reduce it much - by disarming it at least in part.

The general considered an important advantage of offensive operations to be the fact that the theater of war would be transferred "to such land, on which it would be possible to obtain everything necessary for the maintenance of troops, at least until the funds for transportation were taken by requisition." Even in the event of the defeat of the Russian army in the general battle for the Vistula, according to Bennigsen, "Russia would not be in such a disadvantageous position as it can fall into at the very opening of the war, if we wait for the enemy, standing on our borders."

For the successful implementation of this plan, it was necessary to attract Prussia to its side, or rather, to use its army. From the summer of 1811 there were secret Russian-Prussian negotiations. In September, the Prussian government secretly sent General G.I. Scharnhorst to St. Petersburg to agree on a plan for a joint action by Russia and Prussia against France. Scharnhorst left Königsberg under the name of Lieutenant Colonel Menin and arrived in Tsarskoye Selo on September 12 (24). However, negotiations began only on September 22 (October 4). On the Prussian side, Lieutenant Colonel R. Scholler, an employee of the Prussian diplomatic mission in St. Petersburg, also participated in them, and on the Russian side, Emperor Alexander I, Chancellor N.P. Rumyantsev and Minister of War M.B. Barclay de Tolly.

Scharnhorst argued that success in the war could only be achieved if Russian troops suddenly invaded Poland. Such an invasion will allow Prussia, firstly, to use its 8 fortresses and the 40,000-strong army allowed by the Tilsit Treaty against the French and Poles, and secondly, it will create the possibility of more than doubling the number of its troops. Then Prussia will be able to divert up to 100 thousand French soldiers, and Napoleon will have to fight simultaneously in two directions. In addition, Scharnhorst convinced his Russian interlocutors that if Prussia came out on the side of Russia, then the population of northern Germany would rise up against France and England would enter the war. In the event of the occupation of Prussia by France, its resources will be in the hands of Napoleon and will be used to fight against Russia.

Emperor Alexander had little confidence in the Kaiser and his government, knowing the instability political course Prussia. And if the Prussian government sought the conclusion of a military convention, then Alexander was much greater value attached to a secret alliance treaty with Prussia. However, Scharnhorst made it clear to him that Prussia only offered him a choice between two solutions: either to act in concert with her, or to look at her as an enemy.

The king was well aware that well-armed and trained prussian army very useful to him. If she ends up on the side of Napoleon, this will allow the Emperor of France to create an anti-Russian coalition. So he relented and agreed to conclude military convention based on the Scharnhorst plan. On October 5 (17), 1811, the convention was signed. According to it, Russia and Prussia pledged to provide military assistance to each other in the event of a war against Napoleon. Russia undertook to put up 17 divisions (200 thousand people), Prussia - 7 divisions (80 thousand soldiers and officers).

The joint operation plan provided for the occupation by Russian and Prussian troops of approximately two-thirds of the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw ( southern regions The duchies were considered by the allies as a zone of Austrian interests). As planned by Bennigsen's plan, the general battle with the French was to take place somewhere between the Vistula and the Oder.

The invasion plan provided for the destruction of resources on the territory of the Duchy (the total destruction of cities, villages and bridges, the destruction of stocks of gunpowder, provisions and fodder, theft of livestock) - in order to make it as difficult as possible to supply the French army when it moves to help the Poles, and thereby prevent its invasion into borders of the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. Here is such a wonderful plan: to destroy Poland to the ground, and doom its inhabitants to death from hunger, cold and disease. Looking ahead, I will say that this is exactly how the Russian troops acted on the territory of Belarus during their retreat.

Prussian troops were to occupy the entire northern part of the Duchy of Warsaw and, like the Russians, turn it into a deserted desert.

By October 15 (27), 1811, all preliminary preparations were completed. Minister of War Barclay de Tolly began to send out to the commanders of the troops stationed along western border, a secret order of the emperor on readiness for the start of hostilities. On the morning of 15 (27) October, the orders (together with the routes of movement of troops) were sent to the commanders of the corps, Generals P.Kh. Wittgenstein, K.F. Baggovut, I.M. and Prince P.I.Bagration, who commanded the Podolsk army.

When sending out the order, Barclay de Tolly ordered that it be kept under "the strictest and most impenetrable secret." The Minister of War hypocritically assured the commanders that "there is no reason to expect that there could be a gap between us and the French", but at the same time demanded that the troops entrusted to them be brought to full combat readiness. They were instructed to expect conditional news from General Wittgenstein that his corps had crossed the borders of Prussia. This was to serve as a signal for everyone else to march along the routes indicated on the maps in sealed envelopes.

So everything was ready for war. Emperor Alexander I, in a letter dated November 22 (December 4), wrote to his sister Catherine:

"Fighting could start any minute now."

But still, the joint operation did not take place. Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm III, who did not forget the lesson of 1806, did not sign the military convention of 5 (17) October. Not having received from him the text of the convention signed and state seal, Alexander realized that the Kaiser did not dare to oppose Napoleon. The French historian, Count Albert Vandal wrote in this regard:

“Not yet allowing a complete betrayal of Prussia, the emperor reconciled with the decision of the weak-willed king relatively easily ... and froze in a motionless pose.”

Napoleon's offensive plan provided for the concentration of the main forces in East Prussia and an attack in the direction of Vilnius. If successful, this allowed him to surround the 1st Army with his left (northern) flank and defeat it in a border battle, simultaneously encircle and destroy the southern grouping (2nd Army), and then advance on Vitebsk - Smolensk.

According to this plan, Napoleon expected to limit himself in 1812 to advancing to conditional line Riga - Dinaburg (Dvinsk) - Vitebsk - Smolensk, then arrange your rear, and in 1813 make a throw to Moscow.

Napoleon had no doubt that in this case the tsar would have no choice but to capitulate. Having occupied Vilna, Napoleon said to General Sebastiani:

But, as you know, the “emperor of all the French” allowed himself to get carried away and violated his own plan, which led to the failure of his “enterprise”.

So - the main (and, I think, the only) reason for the invasion of the territory of the Russian Empire is Alexander's failure to fulfill the terms of the Tilsit agreement on joint actions against Britain. That is, Britain, not Russia, is the main thorn that needs to be neutralized. Russia is just a tool. If we consider the intentions of Emperor Napoleon as a policy, then his goal was not the complete defeat of the Russian Empire and the Russian army, but pressure on Emperor Alexander I to force further coordinated actions according to Napoleon's scenario.

The conclusion of peace with Alexander the First after the defeat Russian army Napoleon had already passed and it was the negative results of this experience that led to a new war. These negative results did not allow to deal with Napoleon's main competitor - the British Empire.

There is no doubt that from the point of view of French interests, a military invasion of Asia with the ultimate goal of conquering Hindustan would be strategic important step. This would lead to the complete collapse of Great Britain and change the geopolitical balance of power in the world. The idea of ​​an Indian campaign was first expressed by Bonaparte in 1797, even before his expedition to Egypt.

Bonaparte in front of the Sphinx. Baron Jean-Leon Gerome

Napoleon and his General Staff in Egypt. Jean-Leon Gerome

The death of Paul I in 1801 crossed out Napoleon's plans for a while. However, he did not stop thinking about projects Eastern expeditions and prepare the ground for them. In 1805, the emigrant Verneg reported to the Russian government about the plan of the French emperor “with the help of a crowd of his agents, intrigues and the strongest means to get to the English colonies in Great India. This is the only way to hit this power at the very source of its credit and wealth and hit it, so to speak, from the rear ”(Sbornik RIO. T. 82. St. Petersburg, 1892.)

Even before the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon sent Romier and Jaubert missions to Asia with reconnaissance purposes, then sent an embassy of General J. M. Gardan to Iran. In May 1807, an agreement was signed between France and Persia in Finkenstein, one of the articles of which confirmed the consent of the Shah to ensure the French army unimpeded passage to India through its possessions. It is doubtful that Napoleon would waste time discussing this issue in the midst of a war with the anti-Napoleonic coalition.

Apparently, he did not doubt the victorious end of the 1807 campaign and hoped to conclude an alliance, as a result of which French troops could enter Iran through Russian territory. (hereinafter, citing facts about the work of Russian and French intelligence, I will rely on materials Viktor Mikhailovich Bezotosny )

Napoleon receives the Persian embassy on April 27, 1807. Engraving. Early 19th century

In the embassy of General Gardan in Persia, there were many officers who were legally engaged in topographic surveying of the area. The result of their activities was a detailed project of a campaign through Iran to India with a detailed indication of the roads and the calculation of the time of everyday crossings.
(Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. T. III. M., 1963. S. 761, edited by Antyukhin)

Even in Tilsit, Napoleon tried to seduce Alexander I with plans to divide the Ottoman Empire. Later, he repeatedly returned to the idea of ​​a joint Franco-Russian campaign through Turkey to Iran. In a letter to the Russian sovereign dated February 2, 1808, the French emperor put forward the following program: “If an army of 50 thousand Russians, French, perhaps even a few Austrians, went through Constantinople to Asia and appeared on the Euphrates, then it would force would tremble England and would plunge her to the feet of the mainland ”(Collection of RIO. T. 88. St. Petersburg, 1893.)

In a conversation with L. Narbonne in April 1812, he predicted the development of events as follows: “... to get to England, you need to go to the rear of Asia from one side of Europe ... Imagine that Moscow is taken, Russia is broken, peace has been concluded with the king, or he fell victim to a palace conspiracy ... and tell me, is there any way to block the path of the great French army sent from Tiflis and the allied troops to the Ganges; Isn't the touch of the French sword enough to bring down the stage of mercantile grandeur throughout India?

Louis-Marie-Jacques-Almaric de Narbonne-Lara. diplomat and general. Adjutant of Napoleon

On April 14, 1812, the head of French intelligence in the Duchy of Warsaw, Baron E. Bignon, presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs G. B. Mare a lengthy note on the main tasks of the upcoming gigantic expedition. Analyzing the extensive preparatory measures and the forces gathered, the author poses, in his opinion, reasonable questions: “What could be a worthy prize for such a huge effort? What goal is grand enough... to merit such a deployment of funds?” And, in his opinion, only "the weakening of Russia, the restriction of this power by the borders of the old Muscovy will not be a sufficient reward for the losses of excessive movement."

L.P.E. Bignon (1771-1841) - French diplomat, spy, historian

Thus, the purpose of the campaign of 1812 was clearly defined - the preparation of an expedition to India. Russia to Napoleonic army"will join either voluntarily, or as a result of the laws of victory, will be drawn to the great movement that is to change the face of the world." Bignon even gave a detailed picture of future actions - a contingent "from a third or a quarter European army going to deliver a mortal blow to England, while the rest will be located on the banks of the Vistula, Dvina and Dnieper to guarantee the rear of those who will participate in the expedition. (Handelsman M. Instrukcje i depesze rezydentow francuskich w Warszawie. T.II. Warszawa, 1914.)

In 1811, an agent group consisting of Colonel A.S. Platter, Major Picornel and topographer Krestkovsky secretly entered Russia. Under the guise of retired Russian officers, equipped with the relevant documents, they made a long voyage - they visited Moscow and nine provinces. After that, Krestkovsky was sent back with the information received, and the other two continued their journey through the Volga region to Orenburg - again, to find out the possibilities of a campaign in India. This route was by no means random. Pursuing the same goals, it was through the Orenburg steppes in 1801 that Emperor Paul I ordered the 41st Don regiment under the command of the military ataman V.P. Orlov to go.

The poison of failures and accidents prevented the Napoleonic emissaries from reaching their intended goal, and they were forced to turn to the Don, where on August 5, 1812, Platter was arrested. Picornel managed to escape. (Collection historical materials extracted from the archives of His Imperial Majesty's own Chancellery. Issue. 2. St. Petersburg, 1889.)

Napoleonic plans were not a secret in Russia either. In March 1812, through General P.K. Sukhtelen, the heir to the Swedish throne and former French marshal J.B. Bernadotte conveyed to Alexander I that Napoleon expected to defeat the Russian troops and make peace within two months. Under the terms of which the combined Russian-French army will first go against the Turks, then enter Iran, and subsequently penetrate into India. Moreover, he plans to accomplish this in just three years (Collection of RIO, Vol. 6, St. Petersburg, 1871). It is not surprising that many of the soldiers of the Great Army, even before crossing the Neman, believed that they were being led "into the depths of fabulous Asia" (Tirion, 1812. Memoirs of an officer of the French cuirassier regiment No. 2 about the campaign of 1812.)

Jean Baptiste Bernadotte

The implementation of the Indian project primarily depended on success in Russia. “It was assumed that I had the intention to go to India through Persia, and I do not deny: the possibility of such an expedition occurred to me; but this expedition was a secondary circumstance, completely subordinate to the relationship in which we will remain with the St.

In the same spirit, the French emperor spoke to the Marquis A. Caulaincourt, Bonaparte's ambassador to Russia, who wrote in his Memoirs that during the war Napoleon "did not doubt that the Russian nobility would force Alexander to ask him for peace, because such a result lay in basis of his calculations” (Caulaincourt A. Memoirs. Napoleon’s Campaign in Russia. M., 1943.) What kind of calculations were these, where the support was precisely the nobles, and not the royal family?

France deliberately and persistently tried to destroy the colonial gains, and with them the economy of Britain. The raid into Egypt, the liquidation of all the British Mediterranean bases in the Mediterranean, the aid of the American colonists and the rush to India are consecutive moves in this game of chess. But for the latter, a reliable land route was required, and for him, a reliable ally in the rear.

Marshal Berthier began his military career in America...

How to ensure this reliability? Take Alexander hostage and carry him around like Cortes Montezuma? The English party among the Russian nobility will remain in the capital and will gladly exchange one Romanov for another, which they have done more than once over the past 100 years.

Yes, if only English. Since the time of Peter 1, the royal house has established with enviable constancy family ties with the German principalities, so there were also enough representatives of the still unformed Germany in power and they also did not have any tenderness for the French.

Occupy Russia entirely? The great army will dissolve in it like a grain of salt in the ocean. Needed a remote control urgently vast territory, which will work at least for the duration of the solution of the British question.

And Napoleon stubbornly searched for this remote control.

We constantly and fairly note the merits of Russian intelligence in the person of Colonel Chernyshev, who recruited a whole crowd of Napoleon's top officials. But why don't we mention the French, which also felt at ease in Russia. Shortly before the war, French intelligence, for example, managed to steal the engraving boards of the "stolist" Russian map. Subsequently, the inscriptions on this map were translated into French, and this map was used by the French command during the war.

It has been described and repeated many times how, from various sources, the Special Office received irrefutable information about Napoleon’s strategic plan: After a military victory, dictate peace to Alexander I, turning him into an obedient vassal. But at the time of the beginning of the 1812 campaign, all this was already there! The defeat of the army (near Friedland) and the dictated peace (Tilsit) already existed, but it categorically did not grow together with vassalage. New, stronger trump cards were needed.

The same Bezotosny, and not only him, not once or twice repeats information about great interest Napoleon to Russian history, both to the latest (in the investigation of the murder of Paul 1), and more distant, starting with Peter 1 and extending to the last peasant uprisings. Emperor was especially interested secret protocols interrogations of Pugachev. Why would?

So, once again on the goals and objectives of 1812:
The target is India. The task is the vassalage of Russia

And the confidence of Napoleon, who "had no doubt that the Russian nobility would force Alexander to ask him for peace ..." Where?

Version:

Napoleon was well aware of the illegality of the accession of Alexander the 1st himself, his participation in the palace coup and parricide, and was extremely interested in obtaining Russian archival documents. And not only (and not so much) state. He was well aware of the fierce struggle in Russia for the Russian throne between various hostile clans.

Undoubtedly, in the caches of the nobles, especially those in Moscow, unique archival documents were kept, which, if necessary, could confirm the illegality of the rule not only of Alexander, but also of many other Russian sovereigns from the Romanov family.

This is probably why so many were desecrated. Orthodox churches and monasteries in Moscow, in the buildings of which, perhaps, the documents necessary to Napoleon were hidden. Traditionally, Russian tsars kept their most important documents in churches and monasteries. Alexander I, for example, kept his will about the heir to the throne in the Assumption Cathedral in Moscow, believing that this is the safest place.

Incidentally, working in secret archives and in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, A.S. Pushkin understood how the supreme power was seized illegally in Russia. He wanted to write about this in his historical writings, but did not have time ... Maybe it is this excessive awareness in state affairs that is real reason untimely death of the poet?

On the basis of which A.S. Pushkin in the 10th chapter of "Eugene Onegin" described Alexander I as follows:

"The ruler is weak and crafty,
Bald dandy, enemy of labor,
Inadvertently warmed by glory,
He reigned over us then?

Archival documents about other reigns, in particular Peter I, Catherine II and Emelyan Pugachev, were in the Moscow archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. These archives also interested Napoleon! Here, perhaps, is the answer to the question why Napoleon had to take Moscow by all means. He needed documents with which to prove the illegality of the power of the Romanovs in general and Alexander 1 in particular, and if he was lucky, then his involvement and imperial family Britain - to the murder of Paul 1st.

Undoubtedly, Alexander I also did not want archival documents compromising him to fall into the hands of the nobility opposed to the government.

But with the nobility itself, as they say, there were options. When, at the direction of Nicholas 1, the revision and systematization of archives began, it turned out that “only in Lithuania and Belarus there were 40,000 “nobles”, of which only 16,000 owned land, and most of received the nobility under forged documents. By the 1830s, the identification of falsifications had become widespread, and barely 4% of the submitted documents turned out to be genuine ...

At the same time, entire workshops for the manufacture of fake documents were revealed, where letters of nobility could be bought for a ruble apiece. Act books (they entered public and private legal acts drawn up), scattered around the castles and institutions, were subjected to a real attack by forgers: non-existent documents were entered in the empty places, whole notebooks of genuine acts were torn out of the bindings and new ones were inserted - fake. (Changes in archiving Russia and the process of collecting documents in the first half of XIX in. ESGAO (IGPU).

I remind you that five historical archives functioned in Moscow: the Moscow Archive of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs (MA-KID). Archive of the survey office, Archive of the patrimonial department, Moscow State Archive of Old Cases (MGASD), Razryazno-Senatsky, as well as the Moscow Provincial Archive and archives of institutions that could give Napoleon invaluable compromising evidence to put pressure on many families at the court of the "chicks of Petrov's nest" or who think they are."

In a word, the possession of the necessary papers and the necessary witnesses (who will confirm anything under the pressure of the necessary papers) made it possible for their owner to gently hold on to the causal place and imperial family. The presence on the throne of which could end at any moment after the publication of the history of their accession, and a noble society that risked changing its pillar rights to serf duties at any moment.

Well, now, if we take this version as a working one, it will become clear that Napoleon's desire to reach Moscow:

1. Moscow is a logical and very convenient transit point if you are going to go to the East later, and not return to Europe.

2. Moscow is a reconnoitered depository of an unmeasured amount of compromising evidence, which will give the most serious trump cards for successful negotiations on vassalage with ANY representative of the Russian elite.

3. Moscow is also a rich trophy (according to the results of the revision of 1813, only state and church property was taken out of Moscow and then lost for 2 annual budgets of the entire empire)

The genuine interest of the French in the archives can be illustrated by the following report from the county archivist of the city of Bogorodsk (60 km to the East beyond Moscow):

“On September 22, at 11 o’clock in the evening, the city was unexpectedly occupied by enemy troops, who remained there until October 9. After the liberation of Bogorodsk, officials found a complete mess in the rooms of the district court: the shelves in the archives were torn off and the old solved cases were all untied and scattered, and the lock was knocked down and the lid was broken near the state chest, where the secret files were kept, and the secret files were scattered all over the place. chambers and in the yard. After the inspection, it turned out that 3 ordinary and 13 secret cases were stolen.

Of all three components of the dangers for the Russian imperial family, of course, the second one (compromising evidence in private and state archives) is a priority. It was necessary to do something energetically, but there were a number of restrictions for this:

- If the seizure of state archives rested only on the lack of time, material resources and reliable executors, then the situation with private repositories was very bad.

- To announce the seizure of private archives under any pretext means not to find them at all, or to find only what they want to show you.

- To say directly what documents you are looking for is suicide.

“And even announcing that Moscow will be surrendered means not even having an idea how and where these archives will be hidden, where they will be evacuated, where and how they may later surface.

The difficult task of seizing, or at least preventing the hidden documents from falling into the wrong hands, could only be entrusted to an absolutely trusted courtier, politician and diplomat, that is, a person whose characteristics fully corresponded to Kutuzov.

The decision, which was the only possible one and was dictated by external circumstances and wild time pressure - not to allow evacuation, if possible - to withdraw, if impossible - to destroy.

From this point of view, Kutuzov’s numerous assurances that he “will lie down with his bones, but will not give up Moscow to the enemy”, complete silence during the retreat to the walls of the city, a resolute refusal to give battle under its walls and an order to retreat without fail through him, and not into in no case bypass, with the mandatory evacuation of living potential witnesses - nobles and all documents that can be found in their empty houses.

Then the meaning is completely different. key phrase in Kutuzov's report: “The arsenal and almost all property, both public and private, were taken out and not a single nobleman remained in it.” Read - "All compromising materials found have been seized, witnesses have been neutralized". But this was not enough. "Almost" is not "everything"! In this case, "Plan B" was prepared, which went down in history as the famous Moscow fire.

Judge for yourself: there was no time to look for documents in the abandoned houses and institutions, and there was no time to sort the found ones. There was no way to take everything out, and it was dangerous - no one knew what was waiting for the "liquidation commission" around the nearest corner. Fire is the most reliable and easiest way to solve unsolvable documentation problems - any experienced warehouse manager will tell you that.

“The idea of ​​a fire in Moscow belonged to Alexander I himself,” testifies D.P. Runich , - for this measure could be conceived and prescribed ONLY by the emperor himself. It was ordered to be executed only in the last extreme, when the danger would threaten the entire empire. The execution of this measure could only be entrusted to Rostopchin and Kutuzov ... ”(RA 1885 No. 3 p. 605)

Compromising evidence on the royal family in the hands of Napoleon - what could be more dangerous for the empire?

It is not for nothing that Alexander himself, the 1st fire in Moscow, in his rescript to M.I. Kutuzov called God's Providence saving for Russia and Europe. (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1954. T. 4. Part 2. P. 149-152.). In the same document, Alexander I reported: "Russia, through her harm, bought her peace and glory of being the savior of Europe." Last words suggest that compromising evidence was seized and (or) destroyed not only on the name of the Romanovs, but also on many of the reigning families of Europe.

1. Having calmed the nobility with militant rhetoric and, without giving rise to drastic actions, then, unexpectedly, just a day "before", Kutuzov announced the surrender of Moscow and the requisition of transport for the needs of the army. In addition, the advance of the army itself through the city made it much more difficult to export anything. And at the same time it became an excellent cover for searches of private houses, which, under the guise of looting, could be carried out by special teams from the department of the Minister of War.

2. After the dissemination of correct information about the atrocities of the French, where Smolensk, which died in the fire, was perhaps the main scarecrow, the voluntary forced evacuation of the nobles followed. As a result, Napoleon was deprived not only of private archives, but also of the opportunity to find out from anyone where to look for them and what interesting things can be found there, as well as to replace the lack of papers with the testimony of living witnesses.

3. The fire reliably concealed even what the “Kremlin agents” could not find and take out, and the responsibility for this fire was divided equally between the irrepressible Russian patriotism and the unbridled desire of the Great Army for primitive barbaric enrichment.

This is called "checkmate". Not only did Napoleon not solve any of his tasks, but also, as a real master of jiu-jitsu, using his own strength, Kutuzov solved the problem of curbing his own noble freemen, which is incredibly difficult for the autocracy, which:

1. They elegantly seized or destroyed part of the compromising evidence in private hands,

2. They significantly cut down economic independence, forcing, after the end of the war, to beat the forehead before the sovereign about at least some compensation for damage after the fires and robberies of 1812.

3. Responsibility for both was shifted onto the shoulders of an external aggressor who could no longer object.

It was the sharp weakening of the opposition nobility in 1812 that made it possible to suppress the next Guards rebellion in December 1825.

And Napoleon, instead of compromising the Russian nobility and royal family, received such a compromise of himself and his army, from which he could not wash himself until his death.

However, this was far from the end of the chess game. The meaning of such strange, at first glance, moves as deliberate creation situations that increase losses and reduce the combat effectiveness of the Russian army, the repeated refusal to inflict a decisive defeat on Napoleon, strange illogical maneuvering when pursuing a retreating enemy.

Questions are also awaiting answers - why, despite the direct ban of Alexander the 1st, Loriston and Kutuzov met in Tarutino, what they talked about tete-a-tete and what they agreed on, why Napoleon left Moscow and went the most unfavorable route for himself, that he waited and what he left in the capital, and finally, where did the innumerable Moscow treasures go. But more on that next time...

The Patriotic War of 1812 was the greatest test for the Russian people and at the same time a turning point in the spiritual life of the entire vast country.

The enemy's invasion of Russia, the battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow, the tense - and finally victorious - struggle against the armies of Napoleon caused a mighty popular upsurge, and did not affect only the "upper floors" of society. “This people,” Herzen wrote about Russia, “is convinced that they are invincible at home; this thought lies in the depths of the consciousness of every peasant, it is his political religion. When he saw a foreigner on his land as an enemy, he threw down his plow and grabbed his gun. Dying on the battlefield “for the White Tsar and the Most Holy Theotokos,” as he said, he actually died for the inviolability of Russian territory.”

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon June 12, 1812 Napoleon's "Great Army" (649 thousand people), having crossed the Neman, invaded Russia. Its invasion can hardly be called unexpected. Two weeks before it, Paris notified the European treaties of the rupture diplomatic relations with Russia, and on June 22, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg presented the corresponding note to the manager of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

capture Russian territory and joining it to his possessions were not included in Napoleon's plans. He hoped to defeat the Russian army in a number of border battles and force Alexander I to conclude a peace treaty beneficial to France.

M. B. Barclay de Tolly

The Russian army numbered 590 thousand people, but a little more than 210 thousand could be put up against Napoleon. It was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration and A. P. Tormasova).

Yielding to the French army in numbers, organization, management, the Russian army had no less combat experience. The Russian soldier was rightfully considered the best in Europe. Many generals in training and talents could compete with the famous Napoleonic marshals.

The "Great Army" had great virtues. But there was a serious flaw in it, which was clearly revealed during the war. Variegated by national composition, she was deprived of cohesion, unity, moral superiority, which distinguished the Russian army.

The first stage of the Patriotic War of 1812 includes the retreat of the Russian army from the Neman to Borodino. This retreat was not a simple retreat of some troops under pressure from others. It largely determined the further course of events.

First, Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian armies in one or more pitched battles.

Secondly, by conducting constant rearguard battles with the French, the Russian troops gained experience, learned strong and weak sides enemy, showed miracles of heroism. Near Mogilev, near the village of Saltanovka, during a fight with parts of Marshal Davout, Lieutenant-General N.N. N. N. Raevsky himself was not inclined to exaggerate the significance of this episode, but admitted that he was ahead of the soldiers in that battle and that his sons were nearby.

Thirdly, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies managed, despite the desperate efforts of the French, to unite near Smolensk. Now they could more successfully resist Napoleon and prepare for a serious battle with him. The retreat showed the inconsistency of mediocrity, such as the author of the extremely unsuccessful war plan, General E. Ful. They were replaced by talented generals like A.P. Yermolov.

Fourthly, the "great army" lost its fighting qualities as it moved inland. The population fought the enemy. Suffering from hunger and thirst, Napoleon's soldiers looted and pillaged. French morale steadily declined.

Battle of Borodino.

In August 1812, a new commander-in-chief, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, arrived in the Russian army. He replaced M. B. Barclay de Tolly in this post.

M. I. Kutuzov

In 1812, Mikhail Illarionovich was the oldest in age and time of service from the "full" generals. His family goes back to the 13th century. M. I. Kutuzov was a combat ally of P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V. Suvorov (out of his 67 years, he spent 50 in military campaigns). He successfully served under Catherine II and Paul I, was not only a respected general, but also a cautious courtier. With Alexander I, his relationship was not so successful, the emperor could not forgive him for the defeat at Austerlitz.

The masses of the nobility and soldiers saw in him "their own", in contrast to the foreigner and man of the dispossessed M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Back in June, the Moscow and St. Petersburg nobility chose M. I. Kutuzov as the head of the militia.

The question of the appointment of the commander-in-chief was decided by an emergency committee, which consisted of the most prominent dignitaries of Russia. Having considered a number of candidates, the committee settled on M. I. Kutuzov and voted for him almost unanimously.

On September 3, the commander-in-chief decided to give a general battle near the village of Borodino, 110 kilometers from Moscow. In the famous Battle of Borodino, sung by A. S. Pushkin, M. Yu. Lermontov, L. N. Tolstoy, 125,000 Russian and 134,000 French troops met. On September 7, the battle began with an attack by the French on the first flank of the Russian position and the capture of the village of Borodino by them.

P. I. Bagration

As it turned out, it was a distraction. Napoleon intended to break through the Russian positions in the center, bypass the left flank, push the Russian army back from the Old Smolensk road and free his way to Moscow. Napoleon directed the main blow to the opposite flank, to the Bagration flushes. The battle raged for more than 5 hours. During the eighth attack, General Bagration was mortally wounded. The command of the flank passed to General P.P. Konovnitsyn. Around noon, at the cost of huge losses, the French captured the fortifications. Russian troops retreated to the nearest hills. An attempt by the French cavalry to drive the Russians from their new position failed.

At the same time, two French attacks on Raevsky's battery were repulsed. While the third attack was being prepared, the Russian cavalry, led by Cossack ataman M. I. Platov and General F. I. Uvarov. Several hours passed before the French organized a rebuff. During this time, Kutuzov transferred reinforcements to the places of the main battles. The third, decisive attack on Raevsky's battery was made at about two o'clock in the afternoon. The fight lasted over an hour and a half. Under the pressure of superior forces, the Russians were forced to withdraw. Napoleon sent cavalry after them. But the Russian cavalry responded with a counterattack, and the French were stopped. Wedged into the defense of the Russian troops, they could not achieve a breakthrough. The day ended with the roar of artillery. With the onset of darkness, Napoleon ordered to leave a number of captured points, including the Raevsky battery.

The attacking side usually suffers larger losses. In battles, Napoleon lost 58.5 thousand soldiers and officers. However, in the course of the battle, the armies repeatedly changed roles - the Russians knocked out the French from the captured positions. Russian troops suffered heavy losses from enemy artillery. The Russian army had a slight advantage in the number of guns, but the French fired more concentrated fire. The actions of the Russian artillery were affected by the death of its commander, General A.I. Kutaisov, in the midst of the battle. Later, the brave Bagration died from a wound.

Five horses were killed that day under M. B. Barclay de Tolly, 9 or 12 of his adjutants were wounded.

Neither Napoleon (the defeat of the Russian army) nor M.I. Kutuzov (the salvation of Moscow) managed to achieve the main goals of the battle. The Russians lost 45,600 killed and wounded (including 29 generals), the French lost about 60,000 people (including 49 generals). Militarily, the Napoleonic troops were perhaps more trained; they were managed in a more professional manner. But in a moral and even political sense, Borodino was a victory for Russia. This battle broke the spirit of the conquerors, their confidence in final victory, weakened the offensive activity of the French.

The turning point in the war was, however, ahead. The Napoleonic troops were still advancing, the Russians were retreating.

Moscow fire.

The beginning of the turning point was the abandonment of Moscow by M.I. Kutuzov - the most dramatic event of the war of 1812. The decision to give ancient capital to the enemy was adopted on September 13 at a military council in Fili. Kutuzov convened a military council and raised the question of whether to give a new battle near the walls of the ancient capital or retreat without a fight. Some generals (Bennigsen, Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn, Yermolov) insisted on a battle. Barclay objected, pointing out that in the event of an unsuccessful outcome, the army would not be able to quickly retreat through the narrow streets. big city and disaster will happen. Kutuzov was also not pleased with the position taken by the Russian army. “As long as the army still exists and is able to resist the enemy,” he said, “until then there will still be hope to end the war with honor, but with the destruction of the army, not only Moscow, but all of Russia would be lost.”

The question arose which way to retreat. Barclay suggested going to the Volga: "The Volga, flowing through the most fertile provinces, feeds Russia." If this proposal were accepted, they would have to retreat Vladimirskaya road. But Kutuzov did not agree: “We should now think not about the regions that feed Russia, but about those that supply the army, and therefore we should take a direction to the midday (southern) provinces.” It was decided to go along the Ryazan road. Closing the council, Kutuzov said: "Whatever happens, I accept responsibility to the sovereign, the Fatherland and the army."

Task number 1. Choose the correct answer

Napoleon aimed his main blow at:

a) St. Petersburg

b) Moscow

Task number 2. Match correctly

The command of the Russian army at the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

Commander-in-Chief → Alexander 1

Commander of the 1st Army → M. V. Barclay de Tolly

Commander of the 2nd Army → P. I. Bagration

Commander of the 3rd Army → A.P. Tormasov

Task number 3. Choose the correct answer

Meaning Smolensk battle is that:

a) Napoleon's initial plan to defeat one by one the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies was thwarted

b) the main forces of the French army were defeated

c) the Russian army managed to defend Smolensk

d) the Russian army launched a counteroffensive

Task number 4. On the map on p. 14, mark the places of concentration of Russian armies the day before Napoleonic invasion and the actions of the parties before the Battle of Borodino (dates are in the new style)

Task number 5. Choose the correct answer

The battle of Borodino ended:

a) the victory of the Russian army

b) the defeat of the Russian army

c) that did not bring victory to either side

d) the retreat of the French army

Task number 6. Place in chronological order events of the Patriotic War of 1812:

a) Battle of Borodino

b) the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief

c) Battle of Smolensk

d) crossing the Berezina

e) the battle of Maloyaroslavets

Task number 7. Indicate the wrong answer

The most famous leaders guerrilla war were:

a) D. I. Davydov

b) A. S. Figner

c) P. I. Bagration

d) V. Kozhina

Task number 8. Choose the correct answer

The main reason for the victory over Napoleon:

a) the national, domestic character of the struggle

b) support for allied countries

c) severe winter

d) Russia's economic power

Task number 9. On the diagram of the Battle of Borodino, make the necessary signatures for the symbols

Task number 10. Prepare a report on the topic "Heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812." Make a detailed report plan

Report plan:

1) Introduction (memory of the war)

2) The beginning of the war

3) Bagration and Barclay de Tolly

4) Smolensk and the appointment of Kutuzov

5) Kutuzov

6) Borodino and the heroism of the Russian army

7) Generals of the Russian army

8) Guerrilla warfare

9) "Cudgel of the People's War", Kurin and Kozhina

10) Dashing hussars (Denisov, Figner, Seslavin, Dorokhov)

11) Conclusion

Task number 11. What do you see as the reasons that, unlike other occupied by French troops European capitals, Moscow was burned and looted?

In Europe, none of the capitals was left by the population, city services did not stop working, there was no chaos and there was no such bitterness shown by both sides.

Task number 12. Define the concepts

Infantry - one of the military branches, infantry

Militia - auxiliary military units created for the duration of the war from civilian population not in military service

Forage - vegetable food intended for feeding horses (oats were of paramount importance)

Fleches - a field fortification in the form of an angle, with its apex facing the enemy and open from the rear

Redoubt - a closed square or polygonal field fortification with an outer moat and parapet, designed for all-round defense

Partizan - a participant in the armed struggle in the territory occupied by the enemy, acting as part of voluntary detachments, relying on the support of the local population

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war continued until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied troops. This is a nice page Russian history, which we will consider, referring to the official textbooks of the history of Russia and France, as well as to the books of the bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.

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The beginning of the war

Causes of the War of 1812

The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the reasons from France and the reasons from Russia.

Reasons from France

In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own view of Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor). In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:

1. Breaking the Tilsit Accords: Weakening continental blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. In fact, this made the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined the plans of France.
2. Failures in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry the imperial court of Russia in order to become "God's anointed". However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 the French emperor married an Austrian princess.
3. The transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising in Poland, which could be transferred to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for a war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.

Soldiers! A new one begins, the second in a row, Polish war! The first ended in Tilsit. There Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but she broke her promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they think that we have become different? Are we not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia put France before a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French weapons. It will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on the affairs of Europe.

Thus began a war of conquest for France.

Reasons from Russia

On the part of Russia, there were also weighty reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation state. Among the main reasons are the following:

1. Great losses of all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but only its elite, which, as a result of the lack of the possibility of trade with England, was losing money.
2. The intention of France to recreate the Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate the ancient state in its true size. Perhaps this was only in the case of the seizure of Russia's western lands.
3. Violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by Napoleon. One of the main criteria for the signing of this agreement - Prussia must be cleared of french troops, but they never did, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded of this.

For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on the independence of Russia. Always we tried to be meek, thinking so to deflect her attempts at capture. With all our desire to keep the peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend the Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict with France, which means that only one thing remains - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from the invaders. I do not need to remind commanders and soldiers of courage, it is in our hearts. In our veins flows the blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs. Soldiers! You are defending the country, defending the religion, defending the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.

The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman took place on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200,000 people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on the part of both sides, then the total number of the French army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 was 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland) fought on the side of France. However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who won many victories with their emperor.

Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the size of the army was 227 thousand people, and they were divided along three fronts:

• Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. The population is 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
• Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number - 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
• Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. The number is 58 thousand people. They were located in Volhynia, covering the attack on Kyiv.

Also in Russia, partisan detachments were actively operating, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.

The first stage of the war - the offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)

At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War began for Russia with Napoleonic France. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the strike was supposed to be in Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the legs, I will capture St. Petersburg, I will take it by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”

The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very helpful to the aggressors. However, on initial stage Barclay de Toli played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and retreat inland. This was necessary in order to combine forces, as well as to pull up reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed cattle, poisoned water, burned fields. In the literal sense of the word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and were not behaving according to the rules.

North direction

32 thousand people, led by General MacDonald, Napoleon sent to St. Petersburg. The first city on this path was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and go further.

The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18,000 soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. MacDonald by this time captured Dinaburg (the Russians left the city with the outbreak of war) and did not conduct further active operations. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and was waiting for the arrival of artillery.

General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toli. However, on July 18, Wittenstein delivered an unexpected blow to Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by the corps of Saint-Cyr who came to the rescue. As a result, a balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.

South direction

General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.

On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where the main forces of Ranier gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - 5 thousand people were killed in the battle in 1 day, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred the troops of General Schwarzenberg there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. In the future, the French did not undertake active offensive operations in the southern direction. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.

The course of events of the offensive company

On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, tasked by Alexander 1 to engage in battle with the main enemy forces in order to wear them out. Everyone was aware of the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17 the emperor was finally dissuaded from this undertaking. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.

On July 6, the large number of Napoleon's troops became clear. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signs a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all the inhabitants of the country are recorded in it - in total, there were about 400 thousand volunteers.

On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army consisted of 150 thousand soldiers.

On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to go on the counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with the enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a grand failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.

On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover, occupying the village of Krasnoe, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.

On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were made with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired.

August 5 is one of the important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its mass retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only 1 plan - to wear down the enemy and take the decisive battle when the balance of power was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had the advantage.

On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army, who took command. This candidacy did not raise questions, since Kutuzov (a student of Suvorov) was highly respected and considered the best Russian commander after the death of Suvorov. Arriving in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: "The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army or give up Moscow."

On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby introducing an initial turning point in the battle of 1812.

September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history books. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals, on the wave of success, demanded a battle in order to defeat Napoleon as soon as possible. Opponents of such a development of events were Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly. The military council in Fili ended with the phrase Kutuzov “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only the ancient capital, but the whole of Russia.”

September 2 - following the results of the military council of the generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave the ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, even this is not the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set fire to the city. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. Most importantly, literally all food depots were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French did not get anything from what the enemies could use for food, movement, or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.

The second stage of the war - the retreat of Napoleon (October - December)

Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission accomplished. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Russia would break the victorious spirit, and the leaders of the country had to come to him with a request for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov stationed himself with an army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself introduced a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for an offer of peace from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.

Napoleon's Desire for Peace

According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to play a decisive role. Here it was possible to deploy a convenient bridgehead, including for a trip to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who literally fought for every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies was actually equal to death. This became clear by the end of September, when it started to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that he himself big mistake there was a trip to Moscow and a month spent there.

Understanding the severity of his position, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with her. Three such attempts have been made:

1. September 18th. Through General Tutolmin, a message was sent to Alexander 1, which said that Napoleon honored the Russian emperor and offered him peace. Russia is only required to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
2. September 20th. Alexander 1 was delivered a second letter from Napoleon with an offer of peace. The conditions were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not answer these messages.
3. The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to the fact that Napoleon literally begged for peace. Here is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the prominent French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, no matter what, just save the honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the emperor of France did not wait for an answer.

The retreat of the French army in autumn-winter 1812

For Napoleon, it became obvious that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and to stay for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians, retreating, burned down, was recklessness. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since the constant raids of the militias caused great damage to the army. So, for a month, while the French army was in Moscow, its number was reduced by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.

On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Luckily, he didn't succeed. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to the high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.

On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to get to Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but this direction was blocked by Kutuzov. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to get around. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. During the day, this small town passed 8 times from one side to the other. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take up fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the plans of the French were frustrated, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already scorched earth - without food and without water.

Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with the army of Kutuzov, one also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially his trailing units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not make a radical change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.

Crossing the Berezina River

The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) in order to force the river and go to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured actively loomed for him, since he was surrounded.

On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to simulate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began the transfer of troops. At that moment, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28 did Chichagov realize his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit with a loss huge amount human lives. When crossing the Berezina, 21,000 Frenchmen died! The "Great Army" now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of whom were already unfit for combat.

It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts set in, to which the French emperor referred, justifying the huge losses. In the 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the French newspapers, it was said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that very severe cold came, for which no one was ready.

Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)

The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed for Paris.

On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left the territory of Russia. Its number was only 1600 people. invincible army, which inspired fear throughout Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.

Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on a map.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon great importance for all countries involved in the conflict. Largely due to these events, the undivided dominance of England in Europe became possible. Such a development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war must be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial for strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not heed the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war

Determining the main reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic army, it is necessary to dwell on the most important ones, which are most often used by historians:

• The strategic mistake of the emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for the representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and to run out of provisions, and constant raids partisan movements made a difference in the war.
• Unity of the Russian people. As usual, in the face of a great danger, the Slavs rally. So it was this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that main reason France's defeat lies in the mass nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - both women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The emperor of France did not break him.
• The unwillingness of the Russian generals to accept decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration's army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand army of Bagration against 400 thousand army of aggressors. It would be an unconditional victory, and after it they would hardly have had time to recover. Therefore, the Russian people must express their gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order to retreat and unite the armies.
• Genius Kutuzov. The Russian general, who learned well from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but he managed to win the Patriotic War tactically and strategically.
• General Frost is used as an excuse. In fairness, it must be said that no significant impact on final result frost did not have, because at the time of the beginning of abnormal frosts (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.