Poland - Russia. History of relations between Russia and Poland

The disappearance of Poland as a state

The drafted constitution of 1791 was called upon to implement the following transformations on the territory of the Commonwealth:

establishment of centralized power;
curbing gentry anarchy;
elimination of the pernicious principle of "liberum veto";
mitigation of the social inequality of serfs.

However, the Polish magnates could not come to terms with the abolition of liberties in accordance with constitutional norms. the only way out from the current situation for them there was an intervention from Russia. The formation of a confederation under the leadership of Marshal Pototsky, the search for help in St. Petersburg served as a pretext for the introduction of troops into Polish territory by Empress Catherine II. There was a second division of the Commonwealth between Russia and Prussia (whose troops were on Polish territory).

The main prerequisites for the disappearance of Poland as an independent state from the map of Europe:

the abolition of the reforms of the Four-Year Diet, including the constitution of 1791;
turning the rest of Poland into a puppet state;
mass defeat popular uprising 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko;
the third partition of Poland in 1795 with the participation of Austria.

1807 was marked by the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw by Napoleon, which included the Prussian and Austrian lands of Poland. In 1809, the Poles Krakow, Lublin, Radom and Sandomierz, who fought on the side of Napoleon, joined it. The fact that Poland was part of Russia until 1917 brought the Polish people both great disappointments and new opportunities.

The period of "Alexander's freedoms"

After the defeat in the war with Russia, the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon, became Russian property. Since 1815, the reign of Alexander I began, who got a poor country, devastated by military operations, without a single industry, with neglected trade, with devastated cities and villages, where the people suffered from unbearable taxes and extortions. Taking this country under guardianship, Alexander made it prosperous.

All branches of industry have resumed.
Cities were rebuilt, new villages appeared.
The drainage of swamps contributed to the emergence of fertile lands.
The construction of new roads made it possible to cross the country in various directions.
The emergence of new factories brought Polish cloth and other goods to Russia.
The Polish debt was secured, the credit was restored.
Establishment of a national Polish bank with proceeds from Russian sovereign capital helped ensure the rise of all branches of industry.
An excellent army was created with a sufficient arsenal of weapons
Fairly rapid pace of development was gained by education, which was evidenced by: the establishment of the University of Warsaw, the opening of departments higher sciences, sending the best Polish students to study in Paris, London, Berlin at the expense of the Russian government, opening gymnasiums, military schools, boarding schools for the education of girls in regional Polish cities.
The introduction of laws in Poland ensured order, inviolability of property and personal security.
The population doubled during the first ten years of being part of Russia.
The adoption of the Constituent Charter provided the Poles with a special form of government. In Poland, the Senate and the Sejm were created, which were the chambers of the representative assembly. The adoption of each new law was carried out after approval by a majority of votes in both chambers.
Municipal government was introduced in Polish cities.
A certain freedom was given to printing.

The time of the "Nikolaev reaction"

The main essence of the policy of Nicholas I in the Kingdom of Poland was increased Russification and forced conversion to Orthodoxy. The Polish people did not accept these directions, responding with mass protests, creating secret societies to organize uprisings against the government.

The emperor's response was the following actions: the abolition of the constitution that Alexander bestowed on Poland, the abolition of the Polish Sejm and the approval of his proxies for leadership positions.

Polish uprisings

The Polish people dreamed of an independent state. The main organizer of the protests was the students, which were later joined by soldiers, workers, part of the nobility and landowners. The main demands of the protesters were: the implementation of agrarian reforms, the implementation of the democratization of society and the independence of Poland.

Revolts broke out in different cities(Warsaw - 1830, Poznan - 1846).

The Russian government accepts certain decisions, primarily about the introduction of restrictions on the use Polish, on the movement of males.

To eliminate unrest in the country in 1861, martial law was introduced. A recruiting recruitment is announced, where unreliable youth are sent.

However, the ascension to the Russian throne of a new ruler - Nicholas II revived in the souls of the Polish people a certain hope for liberalism in Russia's policy towards the Kingdom of Poland.

In 1897, the National Democratic Party of Poland was created - the main fighter for the independence of the country. Over time, it will take a place in the Russian State Duma as the Polish Kolo faction, thereby designating itself as the leading political force in the struggle for a free, autonomous Poland.

Benefits of Belonging to an Empire

As part of the Russian Empire, Poland had certain advantages:

Possibility of promotion public service.
Supervision of the banking sector by Polish aristocrats.
Get more government subsidies.
Increasing the literacy rate among Polish population thanks to financial support government.
Receiving dividends from participation in rail transportation between Russia and Germany.
The growth of banks in major cities Kingdom of Poland.

The year 1917, significant for Russia, was the end of the history of "Russian Poland". He gave the Poles the opportunity to establish their own statehood, and the country to get freedom. However, the expectations of the Russian emperor about the reality of the union with Russia did not come true.

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Official state relations between Poland and Russia remain chilly. On the state level there is a kind of freezing of contacts. Despite the tactful and rare meetings that concern the most pressing issues, Polish-Russian relations have been bad for many years. This, however, does not mean that such a state should be accepted and left indifferently against the backdrop of the evolution of a ruthless geopolitical conjuncture, in which the leading world powers send impulses, and sometimes just for the usual case. Hence the need to start a discussion and dialogue regarding relationships.

Undoubtedly, cooperation between Poland and Russia in the field of culture, science and youth exchange should be expanded. This is especially important at a time when Polish and Russian young elites, brought up in completely different political and cultural conditions than their parents and grandparents, are deprived of real knowledge about the neighboring country, the political situation, history, or even society itself. The Poles (despite the circle of numerous experts) are not familiar with Russia, and the Russians are still more not familiar with Poland. This does not mean, however, that the latter are somehow particularly prejudiced against the Poles. A multi-ethnic Russian Federation returning to imperialism (albeit with varying results) cannot afford unwarranted ethnic chauvinism on a broad political scale.

Currently, a Polish-Russian "war" is being waged in the economic dimension. The main face of this clash, in addition to sanctions, is, first of all, the “war” for “ white man”, that is, workers from Ukraine and Belarus. There is no doubt that without cheap labor from Ukraine it would be very difficult to achieve and maintain the economic growth of the Polish economy, which we have been seeing for two or three years now. For the Russian Federation, multinational state, a significant part of Ukrainians are culturally, linguistically and mentally close. They are definitely closer than workers from Central Asia or from the Caucasus. Their participation in the Russian economy, although not as significant as in Poland, also plays a significant role in the application softpower in relation to Ukraine and allows for rapid Russification.

Thus, the Polish-Russian conflicts acquire an economic character, which is ignored by many experts and observers. Another bone of contention, integrally related to the above topic, is the civilizational and political-cultural affiliation of Belarus and Ukraine. In Warsaw and Moscow, the boundaries of these values are perceived differently, which creates more and more conflicts, misunderstandings and raises questions about the intentions of the parties. Especially the question of real intentions and their scope is of serious concern to both sides.

The tasks that need to be resolved are complex historical issues. For us, the majority of Poles, the Red Army, the NKVD, the USSR security apparatus and the like since 1944 and their presence on Polish lands since then is associated with the fight against the Catholic Church, landowners, entrepreneurship and the patriotic population. For Poland and most Poles, the most important thing is what happened after 1944, that is, from the moment the Red Army appeared on Polish territory. The period after 1944 typified the absolute loss of independence, subjugation and a complete break with the culture of the broadly understood West, of which Polish culture. Unfortunately, which is the most tragic feature of many years of bloody armed conflicts, the soldiers of the Red Army in Poland committed a number of deeds that still cause Poles to negative emotions. Thus, the memory of the soldiers of the Red Army in Poland has many dimensions and is not based only on cooperation with the Guard / People's Army and the so-called "People's Polish Army".

In my opinion, the liberation of the Polish territories by the Red Army (both those that remained within the borders of Poland in 1945, and those that were taken from us as a result of Stalin's political decision) and its struggle against the forces of the Third Reich remain an indisputable fact. No one should bring arguments to deny it. Due to the fact that this is an integral element of Christian civilization, the cemeteries of Soviet soldiers in Poland must be preserved and looked after. At the same time, everyone should remember that one side should not try to impose its perception of history on the other side. In the speeches of the current authorities, both in Poland and in Russia, one can feel that only their vision remains the only correct one, and the other side must not only accept it, but also implement it. That is why the Poles must renounce the fact of imposing on the Russians how the role of the Red Army and communism in general should be understood, and the Russians must refuse to impose on the Poles their military mythicity, the climax of which falls on May 9th.

Both Polish and Russian authorities, wishing to begin work on rapprochement, must recognize the fact of completely different national and social features residents of Poland and Russia. Post-Soviet nostalgia, which is an expression of various tendencies in Russia, will most likely never be accepted in Poland even in in full. Of course, the fact remains clear and the need to form foreign policy by the authorities and individual political forces Poland and Russia as important element impact on the domestic electorate, but this should have certain limits. Both sides should try to find elements that link Poles and Russians in history.

Authorities in Warsaw, namely political classes who rule in Poland should look at Russia as a state, perhaps a rival at certain levels, but not as a "mystical enemy". On the other hand, the authorities in Moscow should consider Poland as an independent entity international law having strong ties with the EU and NATO, and not as a "passive executor of the orders of these entities." Unacceptable mutual generalizations and slander further increase the hostility. The disaster near Smolensk in 2010, the Polish authorities should stop using for internal impact, and the Kremlin must return the remains of the presidential plane. Implementation details of this latest project we will give it to the discretion of the authorities of the Kremlin and Warsaw.

About the author: Michal Patrik Sadlowski (Michał PatrykSadł owski) - specializes in the study of the history of the Russian Empire, security post-Soviet space. Member of the Board of the Shershenevich Institute of Oriental Law Foundation, post-graduate student of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Warsaw. Collaborates with the military-political magazine RAPORT: Wojsko-Technika-Obronność.

Poland was part of the Russian Empire from 1815 to 1917. It was a turbulent and difficult period for the Polish people - a time of new opportunities and great disappointments.

Relations between Russia and Poland have always been difficult. First of all, this is a consequence of the neighborhood of the two states, which for many centuries gave rise to territorial disputes. It is quite natural that during major wars Russia has always been drawn into the revision of the Polish-Russian borders. This radically affected the social, cultural and economic conditions in the surrounding areas, as well as way of life Poles.

"Prison of Nations"

The "national question" of the Russian Empire caused different, sometimes polar opinions. Yes, Soviet historical science called the empire nothing more than a "prison of peoples", and Western historians considered it a colonial power.

But in the Russian publicist Ivan Solonevich, we find the opposite statement: “Not a single people in Russia was subjected to such treatment as Ireland was subjected to in the times of Cromwell and the times of Gladstone. With very few exceptions, all the nationalities of the country were perfectly equal before the law.”

Russia has always been a multi-ethnic state: its expansion gradually led to the fact that the already heterogeneous composition of Russian society began to be diluted with representatives of different peoples. This also applied to the imperial elite, which was noticeably replenished with immigrants from European countries who came to Russia "to catch happiness and ranks."

For example, the analysis of the "Discharge" lists late XVII century shows that in the boyar corps there were 24.3% of people of Polish and Lithuanian origin. However, the vast majority of "Russian foreigners" lost their national identity, dissolving in Russian society.

"Kingdom of Poland"

Joining as a result Patriotic War 1812 to Russia, the "Kingdom of Poland" (since 1887 - "Privislinsky region") had a twofold position. On the one hand, after the division of the Commonwealth, although it was a completely new geopolitical entity, it still retained ethno-cultural and religious links with its predecessor.

On the other hand, it grew here national identity and sprouts of statehood were breaking through, which could not but affect the relationship between the Poles and the central government.
After joining the Russian Empire, the "Kingdom of Poland" undoubtedly expected changes. There were changes, but they were not always perceived unambiguously. During the entry of Poland into Russia, five emperors were replaced, and each had his own view of the westernmost Russian province.

If Alexander I was known as a "polonophile", then Nicholas I built a much more sober and tough policy towards Poland. However, you will not refuse him the desire, in the words of the emperor himself, "to be as good a Pole as a good Russian."

On the whole, Russian historiography positively evaluates the results of Poland's centenary entry into the empire. Perhaps it was Russia's balanced policy towards its western neighbor that helped create a unique situation in which Poland, not being an independent territory, for a hundred years retained its state and national identity.

Hopes and disappointments

One of the first measures introduced by the Russian government was the abolition of the "Napoleon Code" and its replacement by the Polish Code, which, among other measures, provided peasants with land and financial position the poor. The Polish Sejm passed the new bill, but refused to ban civil marriage, which grants freedom.

This clearly marked the orientation of the Poles to Western values. There was someone to take an example from. So in the Grand Duchy of Finland, by the time the Kingdom of Poland became part of Russia, it was already canceled serfdom. Enlightened and liberal Europe was closer to Poland than "peasant" Russia.

After the “Alexandrov freedoms”, the time of the “Nikolaev reaction” came. In the Polish province, almost all office work is translated into Russian, or into French for those who did not speak Russian. The confiscated estates are complained to by persons of Russian origin, and all the highest positions are replaced by Russians.

Nicholas I, who visited Warsaw in 1835, feels a protest brewing in Polish society, and therefore forbids the deputation to express loyal feelings, "in order to protect them from lies."
The tone of the emperor's speech strikes with its uncompromisingness: “I need deeds, not words. If you persist in your dreams of national isolation, of the independence of Poland and similar fantasies, you will bring upon yourself the greatest misfortune ... I tell you that at the slightest disturbance I will order to shoot at the city, turn Warsaw into ruins and, of course, I'll fix it."

Polish riot

Sooner or later, empires are replaced by national-type states. This problem also affected the Polish province, in which, in the wake of the growth of national consciousness, political movements gain strength and have no equal among other provinces of Russia.

The idea of national isolation, up to the restoration of the Commonwealth within its former boundaries, embraced ever wider sections of the masses. The dispersal force of the protest was the students, who were supported by workers, soldiers, as well as various strata of Polish society. Later to freedom movement part of the landowners and nobles joined.

The main points of the demands made by the rebels are agrarian reforms, the democratization of society and, ultimately, the independence of Poland.
But for Russian state it was a dangerous challenge. On the Polish uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 Russian government replies sharply and harshly. The suppression of the riots turned out to be bloody, but the excessive rigidity that was written about Soviet historians, did not have. The rebels preferred to be sent to remote Russian provinces.

The uprisings forced the government to take a number of countermeasures. In 1832, the Polish Sejm was liquidated and disbanded. Polish army. In 1864, restrictions were placed on the use of the Polish language and the movement of the male population. To a lesser extent, the results of the uprisings affected the local bureaucracy, although there were children of high-ranking officials among the revolutionaries. The period after 1864 was marked by an increase in "Russophobia" in Polish society.

From dissatisfaction to benefits

Poland, despite the restrictions and infringement of freedoms, received certain benefits from belonging to the empire. So, during the reign of Alexander II and Alexander III Poles began to be more often appointed to leadership positions. In some counties their number reached 80%. The Poles had the opportunity to advance in the civil service by no means less than the Russians.

Even more privileges were given to Polish aristocrats, who automatically received high ranks. Many of them oversaw the banking sector. Profitable places in St. Petersburg and Moscow were available for the Polish nobility, and they also had the opportunity to open their own business.
It should be noted that, in general, the Polish province had more privileges than other regions of the empire. So, in 1907, at a meeting of the State Duma of the 3rd convocation, it was announced that in various Russian provinces taxation reaches 1.26%, and in the largest industrial centers Poland - Warsaw and Lodz, it does not exceed 1.04%.

Interestingly, the Privislinsky Krai received 1 ruble 14 kopecks back in the form of subsidies for each ruble given to the state treasury. For comparison, the Middle Black Earth Territory received only 74 kopecks.
The government spent a lot in the Polish province on education - from 51 to 57 kopecks per person, and, for example, in Central Russia this amount did not exceed 10 kopecks. Thanks to this policy, from 1861 to 1897 the number of literate people in Poland increased 4 times, reaching 35%, although in the rest of Russia this figure fluctuated around 19%.

AT late XIX century, Russia embarked on the path of industrialization, backed by solid Western investment. Polish officials also received dividends from this, participating in railway transportation between Russia and Germany. As a result - the emergence of a huge number of banks in major Polish cities.

The year 1917, tragic for Russia, ended the history of “Russian Poland”, giving the Poles the opportunity to establish their own statehood. What Nicholas II promised has come true. Poland gained freedom, but the union with Russia so desired by the emperor did not work out.

Russia's claims to the lands occupied by Poland in the XIV-XVII centuries, where the East Slavic Orthodox population lived. Since 1648, as a result of the war between the Polish crown government and Little Russia (Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv voivodeships, Zaporizhzhya Sich), Poland actually lost control over the latter.

Preparing for war in Russia

The admission of European mercenaries to the Russian service was allowed. In 1653, 20,000 muskets and 30,000 pounds of gunpowder were purchased from the Netherlands, and 20 officers were recruited. In Sweden, another 20,000 muskets were purchased that same year. Shelves began to form intensively European order. Military advisers to Tsar Alexei I Mikhailovich were the European generals de Lorian, de Spemle, Kilseki, Daliel.

The state of the Polish and Russian armies

Both Russian and Polish troops combined two forms military organization- "national", based on various kinds of militias, and European, with constant regular formations. Both armies had a significant number of European mercenaries, and also used numerous cavalry units of Cossacks and Tatars. Tactics organized according to European models military formations both in the Polish and in the Russian army corresponded to the all-European level. The organization of the siege of cities and fortresses also met the latest requirements of that time: blockhouses and trenches were built, tunnels and siege artillery, including mortars, were used. During the movement of troops, mobile camps fortified with wagons - Wagenburgs were widely used.

Reason for war

In response to the delay in the decision at the request of the Little Russian Cossacks and the Orthodox gentry on the accession of Little Russia to Russia in 1651, the hetman of the Zaporizhzhya army, Bogdan Mikhailovich Khmelnitsky, proposed Turkish sultan Mahmed IV to take Little Russia and Zaporozhye into his citizenship. In July of the same year, he agreed and declared them his vassal territories.

The Russian government could not allow Turkish possessions to reach almost the center of Russia. On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided to satisfy the requests of Little Russia for acceptance into citizenship. On October 23, 1653, Tsar Alexei I declared war on the King of Poland, Jan II Casimir Vasa. On January 8, 1654, in the city of Pereyaslavl, representatives of the Zaporizhzhya army, Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv voivodships and five Cossack regiments announced their transition, together with cities and lands, to Russian citizenship. On February 27, 1654, the field army from Moscow began to concentrate near the borders with Poland.

Russia's goals

The annexation of the territories of the Commonwealth, inhabited by the Eastern Slavic Orthodox population, the capture of key positions in the southeastern Baltic.

Command of the Russian army

Tsar Alexei I Mikhailovich, Prince Alexei Nikitovich Trubetskoy, Prince Yakov Kudenetovich Cherkassky, boyar Vasily Borisovich Sheremetev, roundabout Vasily Vasilyevich Buturlin, Prince Grigory Grigorievich Romodanovsky, Hetman of the Zaporizhzhya Host Bogdan Mikhailovich Khmelnitsky, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy.

Command of the Polish Army

King Jan II Casimir, Full Crown Hetman of Poland Stefan Czarniecki, Grand Hetman of Lithuania Pavel Jan Sapieha, Hetman of Lithuania Janusz II Radziwill, Hetman of the Zaporizhia Army Ivan Yevstafievich Vygovsky.

Command of the army of the Crimean Khanate

Khan Mehmed IV Giray.

Territory of hostilities

The territory of the Commonwealth is the western (basin of the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Neman), northwestern (basin of the upper reaches of the Western Dvina) and southwestern (Little Russian) theater of operations.

Feature of the Little Russian direction

In Little Russia fighting between Russian and Polish troops were fought against the backdrop of a local civil war, in which part of the Little Russian Cossacks and the gentry sided with either Russia or Poland, and at the last stage also with Turkey. As an ally of Poland in this war, the troops of the Crimean Khanate were involved.

Periodization of the Russian-Polish war of 1654 - 1667.

In the campaign of 1654, in all directions, Russian troops and detachments of Little Russian Cossacks led offensive action.

In the campaign of 1655, Russian-Little Russian troops fought defensive battles in the south westbound against the Polish-Crimean troops. In the western and northwestern directions, successful offensive operations of the Russian troops continued. In July 1655, Sweden started a war with Poland, which proposed a military alliance with Russia. However, Tsar Alexei I, irritated by the secret negotiations between the Swedes and the Cossacks, not only abandoned this alliance, but also went to a sharp aggravation of Russian-Swedish relations, which on May 17, 1656 led to the beginning Russian-Swedish war 1656 - 1658

Truce 1656 - 1658

In July 1656, the military operations of the Russian troops against Poland were stopped. Peace talks began in Vilna. On July 27, 1657, Bohdan Khmelnitsky died, and on August 26 of the same year, Ivan Vyhovsky was elected hetman, who continued the reorientation of some of the Cossacks and the Little Russian gentry to Poland, which had already begun under Khmelnitsky. In Little Russia began Civil War. On September 6, 1658, Vyhovsky signed a peace treaty with the Poles in the city of Gadyach, according to which Little Russia became a vassal of Poland, which resumed hostilities against Russia.

Campaign of 1658

Passed in the western direction, where the Russian troops successfully resisted the Polish-Zaporizhzhya army.

Campaign of 1659

It unfolded mainly in the southwestern direction, where the Crimean-Polish troops and their Little Russian allies drove the Russian army and its Little Russian allies beyond the former Russian-Polish border. However, the uprising against Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky in Little Russia allowed the Russian troops to regain their lost positions. On October 17, a new hetman, Yuriy Khmelnytsky, was elected.

Campaign of 1660

It began with the offensive of Russian troops in the western direction, which was replaced by Polish counteroffensive which was stopped by the end of the year. On October 8, Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky went over to the side of the Poles. Split between supporters and opponents Pereyaslav Rada led in 1660 to the division of Little Russia into the left-bank (Russian) and right-bank (Polish) parts.

During the campaign of 1661, hostilities unfolded in the northwestern and southwestern directions, unsuccessfully for the Russian army.

Campaign of 1662

Was marked by a successful offensive Polish troops in the western direction and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean troops and the Little Russian allies of Poland in the southwestern direction. Hetman Yury Khmelnytsky fled after the defeat, and his title was arbitrarily appropriated by Colonel Pavel Teterya, who became the “right-bank” hetman of the Little Russian allies of Poland.

The fighting in the campaign of 1663 actively took place in the southwestern direction, where the Polish-Crimean troops and their Little Russian allies launched an offensive against the Russian army and its Little Russian allies. The offensive was stopped at the former Polish-Russian border. The title of "left-bank" hetman was taken by Ivan Bryukhovetsky, a koshevoi of the Zaporizhian army.

The campaign of 1664 was marked by a successful offensive by the Russian army and its Little Russian allies in the southwestern direction.

During the campaign of 1665, the Russian army and its Little Russian allies fought successfully in the southwestern direction. northwest direction was marked by local battles.

The end of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667

On April 26, 1666, in the village of Andrusovo, Mstislav district, peace negotiations began between Poland and Russia. On January 20, 1667, a truce was signed here, according to which Smolensk was returned to Russia, as well as all the lands lost during the Russian-Polish war of 1605-1618. (Dorogobuzh, Belaya, Nevel, Red, Velizh, Severskaya land with Chernigov and Starodub). Poland recognized Russia's right to the Left-Bank Little Russia. According to the agreement, Kyiv temporarily passed to Russia. Zaporizhzhya Sich passed under the joint control of Russia and Poland.

Golitsyn N.S. Russian military history. SPb., 1878. Part II. pp. 594 - 615; 632 - 651.

"You can't market with brothers - it's all okay,

You don’t hang out with them yourself, you don’t invite friends over. (. . .)

For imperial delirium, that idea is not the last -

Whether it's a holiday, whether it's everyday. (. . .)

And it's not at all kaifu that the whole thing -

To whom to go, to whom not - it has grown beyond its size.

These are the lyrics of Kazik Stashevsky's song "Bald Goes to Moscow"(1995). Ten years ago it was discussed whether the then Prime Minister Józef Oleksy should go to Moscow when it is pursuing a policy of genocide in the Caucasus. Now Kazik could write the song "Óle is going to Moscow". Whom will Alexander Kwasniewski represent in Moscow on May 9? One third of the Poles - follows from the survey public opinion, held by order of the weekly "Wprost" by the center "Pentor". 45.8% of respondents believe that he is going there only "in his personal capacity", and only 34.5% believe that he will also represent them.

On May 9, President Kwasniewski and General Jaruzelski will stand together on a marble platform with the inscription "Lenin" in Moscow. The official reason for their trip is to help ensure that Russia looks favorably on Poland and does not trumpet around the world that Warsaw is infected with an anti-Russian phobia. Kwasniewski and Jaruzelski allegedly want to tell the Russians the truth about their history. In fact, they will obediently follow Vladimir Putin's triumphal chariot.

In May 1856 Tsar Alexander II came to Warsaw for a visit. The liberals of Europe at that time loved him just as they loved Gorbachev 130 years later. After all, he was, they say, a liberal and a reformer, completely unlike his predecessor, the bloody satrap Nicholas I. The Poles turned to him with a loyal petition for the return of autonomy to the Kingdom of Poland and restraining the unscrupulous arbitrariness of officials. The king's answer was icy: "Everything that my father did, he did well. I do not intend to change anything. The happiness of Poland depends on its complete unity with the people of my empire. No illusions, gentlemen". It is worth listening to the royal advice. After all, Poland's relations with Russia are determined by illusions or by an ordinary distortion of history.

Myth one - natural allies

It is a dangerous illusion to believe that friendly Polish-Russian relations depend on good will and refusal to "tease Russia." Publicists and politicians (apparently partly working on Russian orders) compete with each other in the belief that the natural Polish-Russian friendship is spoiled by our stupid gestures only on a short time, although we, "Slav brothers", have always been allies, and nothing separates us. It is only necessary to drop the conversation about history and "choose the future." Instead of shunning each other, President Kwasniewski, along with General Jaruzelski, should obediently stand on Lenin's mausoleum and accept the Russian vision of history.

Communist propaganda has been convincing us for decades that Russia and Russians throughout our history have been allies of Poland, intermittently for a few wars (which were often caused by “instigations” from outside, not Polish interests). mythical Smolensk regiments near Grunwald became a symbol of an alleged brotherhood in arms that continued uninterrupted until the Second World War. While even a cursory analysis of history indicates the opposite. It is difficult to find any period of cooperation with Russia in the history of independent Poland. Moreover, there was a fundamental and unchanged over the centuries conflict of interest. The conflict over the territory of today's Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Moldova.

Poland's participation in supporting the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, our active role Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were reminded in their introduction to NATO that this conflict still exists. And even if Alexander Kwasniewski came to Moscow with a portrait of Stalin on the lapel of his jacket, nothing would change until he forgot about pipe dreams on partnership with Ukraine. Even in the days of Boris Yeltsin, who sincerely wanted Russian-Polish reconciliation, any attempt at Polish-Ukrainian cooperation caused an allergic reaction in the Kremlin. Yeltsin's main motive for signing the famous declaration that he had nothing against Poland joining NATO was the conviction that this would put off close cooperation between Warsaw and Kiev. The same Yeltsin hastened to let the President of Ukraine listen to secretly recorded tapes with conversations with Lech Walesa, where it was said that Poland's priority is the West, not Ukraine.

Support for pro-Western tendencies in Ukraine and Belarus has always angered Moscow. Only demonstrative gestures of friendship between Alexander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma were allowed - it was well known that this former director of a nuclear missile plant would not make a political turn to the West. After the "orange revolution" in Kyiv, the state of the cold Polish-Russian world passed into the cold war phase. War, which in Polish-Russian relations is a normal state.

Myth two - the proximity of civilizations

The fallacy, on which the "Moscow party" stubbornly insists in Poland, is the assertion that the civilizations of our peoples are close. Samuel Huntington recalls: "Orthodox civilization, centered on Russia, is distinguished from the West by Byzantine ancestry, a separate religion, two hundred years of Tatar domination, and limited contact with such important Western values as the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment." The dispute between Poland and Russia is a deep conflict of civilizations. On the one hand, individualism, respect for private property and democracy stand out, and on the other, collectivism and total nationalization, "including human soul", as Yang Lehon wrote in his diaries. The young democracies of the West, following the constitution of the United States, declared "We, the people. . .".

The first Russian constitution ("Basic Laws of the Empire"), written at the initiative of the tsar after the revolution of 1905, said in the meantime: "The Supreme autocratic power belongs to the Emperor of All Russia. Submission to his authority is a requirement of conscience, not fear. God Himself commands so." And although the names of the emperor changed - he was the general secretary of the Communist Party, then president - the principle remains deeply rooted in the Russian political system. However, like the close ties between the spiritual and secular power, alien Western culture. These close ties explains the absence of the President of Russia and Patriarch Alexy II at the funeral of John Paul II, which struck all observers.

When Peter I, the model and favorite historical figure of Vladimir Putin, liquidated the institution of the patriarch, transferring power in the Church to the Holy Synod, he argued this as follows: "Ordinary people, seeing one lord of the Church, believe that he is the second sovereign on a par with the monarch, and more that the Church is another, completely separate and better state. This demoralizes simple hearts to such an extent that in any matter they turn to their pastor, and not to a representative of power." If we replace the word "Church" with "Yukos" and "patriarch" with "chairman", then we get the argument that caused the Kremlin's recent favorite and the richest man in Russia, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, to be behind iron bars and have all the prospects spend the next 10 years with her.

Proximity Slavic peoples has only one connotation in Russia - submission. Modern Russian political scientists argue that the Poles, Czechs or Balts, joining the Western world, do not understand at all what they are doing. In Eastern Europe, according to leading Russian political scientist Alexander Panarin, Polish or Czech culture played a leading role. And now these peoples have turned into the "lumpen-proletariat of the West" and a source of cheap labor. rebirth Russian empire(that is, at least the accession of Ukraine and Belarus), according to Panarin, "will allow the Slavs to avoid the fate of blacks in Europe". Summing up the dominant current in Russian political thought, Professor Andrzej Nowak wrote in his "Idea of Empire": "As for the countries of the former external empire, in Europe the concept of a border strip should become a kind of geopolitical compromise." These states should not be integrated with the West, of which NATO was a symbol, "so that the road is not cut off for the return of these countries to the role of a border strip, not of the West, but of the East."

Myth three - Russian liberals

The Poles are looking ad nauseam for partners among the so-called Russian liberals. True, hardheads are now in power, but there is also a powerful pro-Western group in Russia - we read in dozens of articles in Polish and Western press. Despite this, for centuries, admiration for the West and Russia's readiness to join Europe have been conditioned by one condition: Russia can join Europe only as a powerful and equal power. “Yes, we will accept your civilization,” the liberals say, “but on the condition that we, Russians, will “civilize” Ukrainians, Belarusians, as well as Poles and Balts on your behalf.”

Hostility towards Poland united prominent intellectuals in Russian history. Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Bulgakov wrote about the Poles with a mixture of dislike, fear and contempt. In Bulgakov's unfinished story "Pan Pilsudski", Kievan intellectuals, who are afraid of the Bolsheviks, are contemptuously depicted waiting for "Pan Pilsudski" in the salon, and when Polish officers enter, they turn it into a stable. In turn, Pushkin thanks Catherine II for having "defeated Sweden and conquered Poland". All Russian scientific literature - from the 18th century until recently - in its mainstream is built around extremely negative stereotype Pole. According to modern historian Stanislav Kunyaev, Poland was the "special forces of Europe" deployed against Russia.

Myth four - a huge sales market

A harmful and persistently cultivated illusion in Polish politics is the belief in a huge Russian market, which could be a discovery for us, if it were not for "the stupid infliction of insults on Russia." Nothing that this myth loses to logic after reading the first data that comes across, from which it follows that GDP indicators great Russia correspond to little Holland (such, however, is the purchasing power of this state). Moreover, the absurdity of this situation lies in itself. If trade with Russia depends on our political or propaganda actions, then it should be avoided altogether, since it makes us dependent on a large and militarily powerful neighbor. Meanwhile, the "Moscow Party" in Poland calmly proves that the name of the peripheral square in Warsaw named after. Dzhokhar Dudayev, President of Chechnya, is hurting the Polish economy. And at the same time, he believes that the purchase of almost 100% of the energy resources we need from Russia is "pure business" that has nothing to do with politics.

Perhaps the use of the word "illusion" is too flattering for the authors of such statements. AT best case, this is stupidity, at worst - a national betrayal. When various enterprises with the support of special services and government levers are included in Russian plans on the capture of the Polish energy market, it is difficult to talk about pure stupidity. This term should be reserved for politicians who are inclined to make political concessions in exchange for the opportunity to export bad potatoes and fatty pork to Russia.

But naturally, this term should be reserved for numerous representatives of the "Moscow party" who convince society that there is nothing more important than the recognition of a great neighbor and friendship with him. Great by its territory, since the Russian economy is typical example the economy of a third world state that exists solely through the sale of raw materials.

Myth five - willingness to cooperate

The Russians have no illusions. After Viktor Yushchenko came to power in Ukraine and there was a chance to build the Odessa-Gdansk oil pipeline (allowing independent export of this energy carrier from the Caspian Sea region to Europe), Russia immediately signed an agreement with Greece and Bulgaria and began building an oil pipeline bypassing Bosphorus to control the transportation of Caspian oil.

In the field of energy, Russian politics is the best example of when there can be no talk of either sentiment or money. We can only talk about politics and maintaining permanent mechanisms of dependence of the states of Central and of Eastern Europe from Moscow. An agreement signed by President Putin in Germany on the construction of a gas pipeline along the seabed Baltic Sea has no economic justification. But in politically this agreement serves to deepen the Russian-German alliance, which, according to G. Kissinger, has always contributed to limiting the role of Poland.

Forever living imperialism

Perhaps, as the strong “Moscow party” that exists in our country advises, we should calm down in relation to Ukrainians and Belarusians and try to make money on economic and political cooperation with Russia. But the only price that Russia is willing to accept for this is Ukrainian and Polish independence. Russia is consistently building footholds of its economic and political influence, creating the image of the Poles, forever suffering from Russophobia in order to reduce the devaluation of the Polish eastern politics in the eyes of Brussels and Washington. Moscow is expanding its economic influence in the leading European countries and makes an explicit revision of history. The approaching celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of the end of World War II will be subordinated to the idea of "injection" of the Russian, imperial vision of this conflict. Ten years ago Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov stated: "The actions of the Red Army in Poland (after September 17, 1939) can be considered using modern terminology as a peacekeeping operation." In addition, he added that "the Red Army returned lost as a result external aggression land." At present, the Russian authorities accept the vision of Mr. Meltyukhov's history as mandatory.

Russians, like Pushkin and Dostoyevsky once, believe in a tendentious and distorted picture of history. Poland has been a very advantageous external enemy for Moscow for many years. In real politics, our country was not taken into account. As one of President Vladimir Putin's advisers told me, "There is no topic of Polish-Russian cooperation. Economic issues concerning the transit of energy carriers, we decide in Brussels. We will not have a dialogue with you about Ukraine, because we consider your policy to be hostile. There are historical questions left for dialogue - here the conversation will be rather unpleasant. Although it is always worth talking about cultural cooperation. There is more to be done in this area."

There is no point in resisting imperial views in Russia itself. This cold war we can only win in the West. We, however, will not win it by means of a trip to Moscow by A. Kwasniewski with General V. Jaruzelsky, the living symbol of Yalta. We will win it when, together with the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians or Slovaks, we help our allies understand that the policy of "no illusions, gentlemen" has its logical continuation - from Tsar Alexander, through V.I. Lenin, L.I. Brezhnev up to V.V. Putin.

Results of a public opinion poll (Pentor Center):

Question: Whom will Alexander Kwasniewski represent in Moscow at the celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of the end of World War II?

Result: 45.8% - only themselves; 34.5% - me too; 19.7% - it's hard to say.

Result: 38.6% - with the beginning of a new occupation; 49.5% - with the liberation of Poland; 11.9% is hard to say.

Question: With whom did Poland clash more often?

Result: 36.9% - with Germany; 47.1% - with Russia; 16% is hard to say.

Question: What will Poland's relations with Ukraine, Lithuania and Estonia be like after A. Kwasniewski takes part in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow?

Result: 50.7% of respondents believe that relations will remain the same, 21.4% believe that they will worsen, while 6.8% of the opposite opinion. 15.1% of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

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Expert opinions

, Member of the European Parliament, ex-president Lithuania:

"I expected that A. Kwasniewski after closing Russian prosecutor's office case of a crime in Katyn will refuse to travel to Moscow to celebrate Victory Day. The termination of the investigation into the Katyn case is a clear signal that Russia will not be able to admit that it allowed the genocide in Katyn. This indicates the need to look carefully at the future of its relations with neighbors. Katyn is only one of the planes in which the Polish-Russian conflict is developing. It has deeper roots that go back to the perception of human life. In Poland, it is valued - in the individual and national dimension, but in Russia it is completely different. From this point of view this state is still barbaric, nothing has changed in it after the collapse of the USSR".

, historian of Yale University:

"From a historical perspective, Polish-Russian relations have never been good. Tensions have always arisen between your states, although now everything is going well enough. Russia considers Poland a traitor Slavic tradition, because your country has adopted Catholicism. In turn, the Poles do not like the Russians, because they have suffered too much from them. Therefore, friendship between you, in fact, is impossible, but the last disputes will not enter the stage of a more serious conflict.

The positive thing is that Kwasniewski will go to Moscow on May 9, I myself advised him. However, the Polish president should not be somehow "specially" grateful for help in obtaining independence. He should thank, but at the same time make it clear that Poland continues to remember the times of the bloody Soviet dictatorship and is waiting for an apology."

Irina Kobrinskaya, main Researcher IMEMO RAS:

"Warsaw has been suspecting Moscow of imperial ambitions for centuries, and this topic comes up in your mind during important events. So this time - in Poland, the election campaign begins and the discussion about the state of relations with Russia immediately revives. In the context of shared history, Polish concerns about Russian imperialism are well founded, but Russians react poorly to them. They don't understand their meaning.

It's good that Kwasniewski will be in Moscow on May 9th. Only 3 European leaders - Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine - will not get to the celebration of Victory Day. I am glad that Kwasniewski did not join them, although, perhaps, he decided to do so, because he does not participate in the presidential elections. Polish leader should not make sharp political declarations in Moscow, but confine himself to gratitude for the liberation."

, former adviser President B. Clinton in Russia:

“Poland effectively uses its opportunities to influence Moscow, although it does not always do it prudently. It was constructive to be included in the Ukrainian “orange” revolution. It also influenced Moscow: most Russians opposed it, but in the depths of their hearts they knew that they were wrong. Poland forced them to do this. At the same time, the mistake is the name of the square in Warsaw after D. Dudayev. This does not mean, of course, that Russia's policy towards Chechnya is correct. However, if Poland wants to emphasize its disagreement with it, it must do it in a different way. For example, A. Kwasniewski must cancel his trip to Moscow on May 9th. This would be a clear signal that your state does not agree with the actions of Moscow, its unwillingness to admit to the Katyn genocide and apologize for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact." ("Trybuna", Poland)

("Trybuna", Poland)

("Polityka", Poland)

("Nie", Poland)

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.