From the performance of the 1st Army from the camp near Drissa to the declaration of war

Chapter Eleven The Cudgel of the People's War

Chapter Eleven Club of the People's War Turning to this topic, we have to admit that too many fables have been told to us about the so-called "club of the people's war." In fact, a fair number of residents of the Russian Empire in 1812 did not

XVIII Monarchy as the supremacy of the moral ideal. - The meaning of religion and Christianity. - Independence of the monarchy from the will of the people. - Subjection of the monarchy to popular faith

XVIII Monarchy as the supremacy of the moral ideal. - The meaning of religion and Christianity. - Independence of the monarchy from popular will. - Subordination of the monarchy to the people's faith

It cannot be argued that the most famous and great work of Leo Tolstoy is the novel War and Peace. A variety of topics are connected in it with red threads, but special place takes on the theme of war. The author calls the war terrible thing and he is indeed right. In his novel, some heroes enter the war as if it were a crime, while other characters are forced to defend themselves and loved ones from ruthless attacks. The novel is riddled with deep metaphors. Particularly striking was: "the cudgel of the people's war."
I understand this phrase as a symbol of the weapons of the common people. It is not elegant and noble, like a sword. In order to master a club, one does not need to practice swordsmanship, it is enough just to mindlessly wield a rough physical strength. catchphrase“The cudgel of the people's war,” in my opinion, means that the exhausted people are fighting the furious invaders as best they can, without observing the rules and foundations of martial art. The people fight back without observing military canons and traditions, they are ready to use any means to win, even the most terrible and cruel ones. Moreover, the people will fight to the end, to the last breath, until the enemy is completely defeated.
The war that Tolstoy paints in his work leaves no one indifferent. The author does not ambiguously show that this war was for the most part a people's war. Not only the army defended their native lands from the invader, the entire population actively participated in the defense. Peasants and some nobles fearlessly defended native land, merchants gave most their income to support the mighty Russian army. Many peasants joined the partisans to contribute to the battle. Detachments of partisans covered in their composition, as ordinary people, and representatives of the nobility, but all of them were united by one common and desirable goal - to save the Motherland.
Leo Tolstoy is a master of the pen, he deftly draws the reader a powerful image of a people who are ready to do anything to save their native lands. The people, as a rule, are not educated and do not possess military wisdom, but this does not diminish the desire to do everything to save the Motherland. The people adopt a simple club and confidently march towards the enemies.

"... The cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without understanding anything, nailed the French until the entire invasion died."

L.N. Tolstoy "War and Peace"

Today, on the eve of the 200th anniversary of the Borodino victory, a lot of interesting publications and responses to the events of two centuries ago have appeared in the domestic media. Interest in the war of 1812, oddly enough, never weakened among our compatriots. The memory of the Battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow and the subsequent expulsion of the French is sacredly kept by the Russian people as an unshakable national shrine. This is evidence of the heroic deed of an entire people, which can be considered one of the main, even turning points in the history of Russia.

Throughout the 19th century, Russian historiography, based on the memoirs of direct participants in the events of 1812 - D. Davydov, P. Vyazemsky, the notorious soldier Bogdanchikov and hundreds of other military memoirists - diligently ensured the growth of national historical self-awareness in the circles of an educated society and achieved considerable success in this. Count L.N. Tolstoy is one of the greatest thinkers, later called the "mirror of the Russian revolution" - made an attempt to convey to his contemporaries the obvious idea that the Patriotic War of 1812 forever changed the Russian people, redrawing their self-consciousness. And the "club of the people's war", according to the later interpreters of the works of the universally recognized classic, showed the real driving force world history.

Even during the period of the domination of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, when everything that had ever happened under the tsarist regime was subjected to criticism, the Patriotic War of 1812, called "people's" by L.N. Tolstoy himself, was the only bright and "inviolable" spot on everything space of the historical past of the USSR. Monuments were erected to the heroes of the war of 1812, the central streets of cities and towns were named after them. Teachers in Soviet schools never hesitated to talk about the exploits of Kutuzov, Bagration, Denis Davydov, for the memory of the just, liberation war citizens need great power. The Stalinist leadership quickly adopted this memory into service during the Great Patriotic War. Drawing historical parallels, Soviet ideologists managed to awaken national identity Russian people, largely undermined by communist slogans. The fidelity to the memory of the victory over Napoleon helped the Russian people survive the war against fascism, once again proving to the whole world that Russia, even dressed in red rags, was and remains a great country.

It must be admitted that in our forgetful, indifferent time, when even the most zealous "scribes" national history they begin to get tired, surrendering their positions to jingoistic patriots and nationalists, public interest in the events of 1812 does not weaken. Serious historians are silent: it is almost impossible to add something new to the factual side of the long-studied achievements of two centuries ago. However, in obedience to modern political fashion, well-known journalists, politicians, users of various Internet resources sometimes express directly opposite assessments of the "thunderstorm of 1812". Some, out of false patriotism, unnecessarily exaggerate the people's feat in this war, while others, on the contrary, completely deny its significance, reducing the “nationality” of the war praised by L.N. Tolstoy to a historical and ideological myth.

Undoubtedly, the ideological myth about the "people" of the Patriotic War of 1812 existed long before the appearance of Leo Tolstoy's novel. It began to be created back in those days when Russian hussars and Cossacks turned Parisian restaurants into famous "bistros", and all of Europe applauded Alexander the Blessed - the savior of peoples from the ambitions of a presumptuous Corsican.

The journalistic campaign around the "feats of the people" in the war with Napoleon began long before the end of hostilities. The educated public in St. Petersburg listened with delight to the legends about how one peasant, out of patriotic motives, cut off his own hand, because the enemy had branded “Napoleon” on it, and also about how the Smolensk elder Vasilisa Kozhina dealt with a hundred with a scythe and a pitchfork French marauders. Emperor Alexander I gave very great importance"patriotic" myth-making: almost all famous names folk heroes- Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, Major Emelyanov and others - are mentioned in the periodicals of that time. Two women who participated in the war of 1812 - the noblewoman Nadezhda Durova and the peasant woman Vasilisa Kozhina - were awarded awards during their lifetime. Meanwhile, in folk art, Vasilisa Kozhina became the heroine of various amusing sheets and popular prints "comics". People's rumor depicted her either on a horse and in a sundress armed with a scythe, or in a French overcoat with a saber. Documentary confirmation of her great feats by historians has not been found so far. Only a not entirely reliable story is known about how Kozhina stabbed a captured Frenchman with a scythe, allegedly wanting to avenge him for the death of her husband.

Modern "scribes" of Russian history, trying to radically reshape the historical self-consciousness of the Russian people, often try to present the invader-Napoleon in a progressive apologetic light: they say, that's who was the main guardian of the people's interests! He carried the serf peasant freedom from slavery, and he, out of ignorance, met him with a "club of the people's war." Nevertheless, these Davydovs, Dorokhovs, Figners, Volkonskys and other "army" partisans, in turn, sought to defend their selfish interest - to prevent the liberation of the peasantry, the revolution and the plunder of their own estates. The government, fearing popular riots, ordered not to arm the serfs in any case and not to allow them to participate in hostilities. Because it is not known in which direction the man wants to turn his weapon.

Meanwhile, already on July 6, 1812, Alexander I issued a manifesto and an appeal to the inhabitants of the "Mother-Thrill Capital of our Moscow" with an appeal to act as initiators " people's armament» - i.e. people's militia. It was followed by a manifesto of July 18 (30) "On the formation of a temporary internal militia" by 16 central provinces adjacent to the established theater of military operations. According to this document, each landowner was obliged to deadlines submit to the militia certain number equipped and armed warriors from their serfs. The unauthorized entry of serfs into the militia was a crime, i.e. escape. The selection of warriors was carried out by the landowner or peasant communities by lot. Noble estates that put up warriors in the militia were exempted from recruitment sets until it was dissolved. Other categories of peasants - state, economic, appanage, as well as philistines, artisans and children of clergy, who did not yet have a clergy, were subject to recruitment in the usual manner.

But the realities of wartime and the rapid advance of the enemy deep into the country imposed their own adjustments on government plans. Not all landlords were able to organize resistance. Many, leaving their estates and peasants, fled to the capitals even before the release of the manifesto. The peasants of the western provinces, often left to themselves, simply went into the forests or organized their own self-defense units.

It is known that partisan peasants often attacked detachments of "army" partisans - the hussar and uhlan uniforms are similar to the French ("gentlemen" dressed in the same fashion), and many Russian officers, brought up by French tutors, could hardly speak their native language.

Fair. The abyss between the European-educated nobility and the Russian muzhik, cut off from their roots, was huge. But let us remember that the same Denis Davydov and other, slightly less well-known noblemen-leaders of the partisan movement in the Moscow region and in the Smolensk region, under their responsibility, attracted not only their own, but also other people's serfs into defense detachments. So, in the Smolensk province, the family of retired Major General D.E. Leslie formed from his yard and serfs the "equestrian hundred of the Leslie brothers of the Smolensk militia", which, with the permission of the military command, became part of active army. The noble militias and "army" partisans sought to work together with the people's partisan associations, to find with their leaders mutual language: grew beards, dressed in Russian dress, learned to use everyday speech clear, simple expressions.

L.N. Tolstoy turned out to be right: the war of 1812 was truly a turning point, not so much in political history Russia, how many in the history of relations the supreme political power and the intellectual elite, the monarchy and the enlightened nobility, and most importantly, in the history of relations between the master and the peasant, who, since the time of Peter I, seemed to have lived on different planets.

Coming out of the completely Frenchized St. Petersburg salons, all domestic chers amis - Sergis, Georges, Pierres and Michels - finally saw their people in this war. These were soldiers selflessly saving the lives of their commanders on the battlefield; serfs and peasant women, who, armed with clubs and pitchforks, attacked French carts, resisted robbery and violence, drove the invaders from their native land.

Thanks to, perhaps, the only tragic moment in the history of post-Petrine Russia, when the interests of all strata of society coincided in the fight against an external enemy, in 1812 it becomes obvious that the war that engulfed a significant part of the country's territory can only be a people's war. The “war by the rules”, which Napoleon wanted, who conquered half of Europe, simply did not take place: the Russian peasants, not knowing these rules, played everything according to their scenario ...

And the great "contact" with their own people was not in vain for the European educated people. The birth of the myth of a great people that, with a club in their hands, defeated the best army in the world, led to an unprecedented growth of historical self-awareness. It is no coincidence that already in 1816-1818 the first eight volumes of N.M. Karamzin’s “History of the Russian State” were published. Huge for that time, the three-thousand circulation diverges faster than a month. A second edition was immediately required, which sold out just as quickly. In the same years, as we know, the "golden age" of Russian poetry also falls: Pushkin appears as the creator of the Russian literary language. Experiments with folk art and introduction to the literary language folk words, expressions, folklore elements are actively engaged in P. Vyazemsky - one of the most outstanding poets"Pushkin Pleiades", veteran of the war of 1812.

Only thirteen years pass, and in December 1825 the color Russian nobility- yesterday's partisans and participants foreign campaign against Napoleonic France - with weapons in their hands they demand the release of the monarch Russian people from slavery.

Was it necessary then for the peasant himself? Did he consider himself unfairly deprived, offended or humiliated by the supreme power? Unlikely. The serf traditionally dreamed of a "good master", and not of civil liberties. But the Russian nobility had already managed to cherish in their minds a complex of "historical guilt" in front of the heroic, wise people, which they could not get rid of over the next century.

Gradually, step by step, the image of the suffering people, created through the efforts of the noble intelligentsia, ascends to the pedestal of the only "sower and keeper" of the Russian land. Not so much by historians as by "rulers of thoughts" - writers and journalistic brethren - new legends are actively breeding.

With light hand landowner N. Nekrasov, satirist M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, revolutionary democrats Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, at the forefront in the work of the "populist" intellectuals of the 1860s is almost the deification of the Russian peasantry. Wise, kind, hardworking and at the same time forgiving, humble peasants, suffering from the oppression of unjust rulers, are typical heroes of Russian literature, which was created by the noble landlords of the 19th century. On the pages of the works of I.S. Turgenev, N.N. Nekrasov, M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, S.T. Aksakov we will not find a single negative character from the peasants: as if all drunkards, convinced villains, thieves and immoral types that only exist in the world automatically migrated to other classes.

Further more! Tolstoy and Dostoevsky introduce the fashion of worshiping the peasant, in fact putting an equal sign between the concepts of "peasantry" and "Christianity": the suffering people, the God-bearing people become the idol of the entire educated society of Russia. Totally agree popular ideal theoretically recognized the right to the present future. We must learn from him, we must worship him, because the people are the bearers of a certain “higher truth”, which is inaccessible to thinking intellectuals.

Yes, in 1812 the country had not yet survived the execution of the Decembrists, had not heard Herzen's bloody dissident tocsin, had not lost Crimean War, did not taste the fruits of the tragic divergence between power and society, did not plunge into the bacchanalia of revolutionary terrorism, did not survive the great national catastrophe.

The year 1812 became, as we see, a kind of “moment of truth”, that very small pebble, which, perhaps, entailed an avalanche of more grandiose changes. Saving the country from the invasion of Napoleon, the Russian people accomplished a truly historic, grandiose feat. And it is impossible to deny its significance even after two centuries.

But the second of the ten commandments of the Lord says: “Do not make for yourself an idol and any likeness, a fir tree in heaven, a mountain, and a fir tree on the earth below, and a fir tree in the waters under the earth: do not bow down to them, nor serve them”.

Only the Russian intelligentsia, as well as ruling circles, having once created a legend for themselves about their own people, they began to worship him like an idol. After more than a hundred years, the zealous idolaters who are in power in a state that occupies one-sixth of the land simply laid down all responsibility for the fate of the country: after all, there is real truth among the people, they themselves know what to do ...

It is symbolic that as a result of this tragic delusion, the former horse thief Grigory Rasputin arose in the royal chambers, and the fashion for “muzhikovschihs” - village poets, various “prophets” as carriers of Christian culture from the people - in the 1910s overwhelmed the entire metropolitan beau monde.

"Rasputinism" finally discredited the monarchy in the eyes of society. But the best representatives of the progressive public, once in power, eventually stepped on the same rake. Prophesing about the coming of the "Coming Ham" in 1905-1907, D.S. Merezhkovsky could not even imagine that the very wise, infallible, deified Russian peasant, in whom for a century the democratic intelligentsia saw their moral ideal and salvation, would turn out to be a "boor" in fact. Many beautiful-hearted liberals, out of habit, for some time continued to justify the "people's wrath" with their historical guilt before the Russian peasantry, recognizing only their right to the revenge suffered for centuries:

However, a handful of political adventurers, throwing loud populist slogans in front of them, overnight managed to turn the entire Russian people into a controlled herd of bloodthirsty scoundrels:

None of the newly-minted leaders confessed their love for Russia, no one believed in the purity and high morality of its “sower and keeper”. Despising the stillborn myth of the great and wise people, the Bolsheviks relied only on their ability to control the masses, to play on the darkest instincts, age-old hatred, the desire to "share everything." And they didn't fail.

The idol was overthrown. But the "epiphany", alas, came too late:

First encountered with bloody reality During the Civil War, the Russian intelligentsia was ready, like Bulgakov’s captain Myshlaevsky, to furiously ruffle the shirt-front of that same “God-bearing peasant” who fled “to Petlyura”, joined the ranks of the Red Army, rose to the service of the Soviets and the Cheka.

On the other hand, she had more reason curse yourself for creating a myth about the Russian people, which since the war of 1812 I have not known, not understood and not even tried to see and accept as it really is.

The partisan movement is the "club of the people's war"

“... the cudgel of the people’s war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone’s tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without understanding anything, rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion died”
. L.N. Tolstoy, "War and Peace"

The Patriotic War of 1812 remained in the memory of all Russian people as a people's war.

Don't shut up! Let me come! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

This definition is not accidentally firmly entrenched in her. Not only regular army participated in it - for the first time in the history of the Russian state, the entire Russian people stood up to defend their homeland. Various volunteer detachments were formed, which took part in many major battles. Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov called on the Russian militias to help the army in the field. big development received partisan movement, which unfolded throughout Russia, where the French were.

Passive resistance
The population of Russia began to resist the invasion of the French from the very first days of the war. The so-called. passive resistance. The Russian people left their houses, villages, entire cities. At the same time, people often devastated all warehouses, all food supplies, destroyed their farms - they were firmly convinced that nothing should have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

A.P. Butenev recalled how Russian peasants fought the French: “The farther the army went inland, the more deserted the villages they encountered, and especially after Smolensk. The peasants sent their women and children, belongings and cattle to the neighboring forests; themselves, with the exception of only decrepit old men, armed themselves with scythes and axes, and then began to burn their huts, set up ambushes and attacked the backward and wandering enemy soldiers. AT small towns By which we passed, almost no one was met on the streets: only local authorities remained, who for the most part left with us, having previously set fire to stocks and shops, where this was possible and time allowed ... "

"Punish the villains without mercy"
Gradually peasant resistance took on other forms. Some organized groups of several people, caught the soldiers of the Grand Army and killed them. Naturally, they could not act against a large number of the French at the same time. But this was quite enough to instill fear in the ranks of the enemy army. As a result, the soldiers tried not to walk alone, so as not to fall into the hands of "Russian partisans".

With weapons in hand - shoot! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

In some provinces left by the Russian army, the first organized partisan detachments were formed. One of these detachments operated in the Sychevsk province. It was headed by Major Yemelyanov, who was the first to incite the people to adopt weapons: “Many began to pester him, from day to day the number of accomplices multiplied, and then, armed with what was possible, they chose the brave Emelyanov to be their boss, swearing not to spare their lives for the faith, the tsar and the Russian land and to obey him in everything ... Then Emelyanov introduced there is an amazing order and structure between the warriors-settlers. According to one sign, when the enemy was advancing in superior strength, the villages became empty, according to another, they again gathered in houses. Sometimes an excellent beacon and a bell ringing were announced when going to battle on horseback or on foot. He himself, as a leader, encouraging them by his example, was always with them in all dangers and everywhere pursued the evil enemies, beat many, and took more prisoners, and, finally, in one hot skirmish in the brilliance military action peasants imprinted his love for the fatherland with his life ... "

There were many such examples, and they could not escape the attention of the leaders of the Russian army. M.B. Barclay de Tolly in August 1812 appealed to the inhabitants of Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga province: “... but many of the inhabitants of the province of Smolensk have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the name of the Russian, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign. Your army will not go beyond your borders until it has driven out or destroyed the forces of the enemy. It decided to fight them to the very extreme, and you will only have to reinforce it with the defense of your own houses from raids more daring than terrible.

The wide scope of the "small war"
Leaving Moscow, Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov intended to wage a "small war" in order to create a constant threat to the enemy to encircle him in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.

Being in the Tarutino position, Kutuzov took control of the activities of the partisans: “... I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of allowances in abundance. During a six week holiday main army under Tarutin, the partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food ... ".

Davydov Denis Vasilievich Engraving by A. Afanasyev
from the original by V. Langer. 1820s.

Such actions required courageous and resolute commanders and troops capable of operating in any conditions. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to wage a small war was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, formed at the end of August, consisting of 130 people. With this detachment, Davydov set out through Yegoryevskoye, Medyn to the village of Skugarevo, which was turned into one of the bases of the partisan struggle. He acted in conjunction with various armed peasant detachments.

Denis Davydov did not just fulfill his military duty. He tried to understand the Russian peasant, because he represented his interests and acted on his behalf: “Then I learned from experience that in a people's war one must not only speak the language of the mob, but adapt to it, to its customs and its clothes. I put on a man's caftan, began to lower my beard, instead of the Order of St. Anne I hung the image of St. Anna. Nicholas and spoke in a completely folk language ... ".

Another one was concentrated near the Mozhaisk road partisan detachment led by Major General I.S. Dorokhov. Kutuzov wrote to Dorokhov about the methods of partisan struggle. And when information was received at the army headquarters that Dorokhov's detachment was surrounded, Kutuzov reported: “A partisan can never come to this position, for it is his duty to stay in one place for as long as he needs to feed people and horses. Marches should be made by a flying detachment of partisans secretive, along small roads ... During the day, hide in forests and lowlands. In a word, the partisan must be resolute, quick and indefatigable.

Figner Alexander Samoilovich. Engraving by G.I. Grachev from a lithograph from the collection of P.A. Erofeeva, 1889.

At the end of August 1812, a detachment was also formed Winzengerode, consisting of 3200 people. Initially, his tasks included monitoring the corps of Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutinsky position, Kutuzov formed several more partisan detachments: the detachments of A.S. Figner, I.M. Vadbolsky, N.D. Kudashev and A.N. Seslavin.

In total in September flying units there were 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Kutuzov managed to give the guerrilla war a wide scope. He entrusted them with the tasks of monitoring the enemy and delivering continuous strikes against his troops.

Caricature of 1912.

It was thanks to the actions of the partisans that Kutuzov possessed complete information about the movements of the French troops, on the basis of which it was possible to draw conclusions about the intentions of Napoleon.

Due to the continuous strikes of flying partisan detachments, the French had to always keep part of the troops at the ready. According to the journal of military operations, from September 14 to October 13, 1812, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, about 6.5 thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoner.

Peasant partisan detachments
The activities of the military partisan detachments would not have been so successful without the participation of the peasant partisan detachments, which had been operating everywhere since July 1812.

The names of their "leaders" will long remain in the memory of the Russian people: G. Kurin, Samus, Chetvertakov and many others.

Kurin Gerasim Matveevich
Hood. A.Smirnov

Portrait of partisan Egor Stulov. Hood. Terebenev I.I., 1813

The Samus detachment operated near Moscow. He managed to exterminate more than three thousand Frenchmen: “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages subordinate to him. He performed everything according to the signs that were given by means of bell ringing and other conditional signs.

The exploits of Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment in the Sychevsky district and fought against French marauders, gained great fame.

Vasilisa Kozhina. Hood. A. Smirnov, 1813

M.I. wrote about the patriotism of Russian peasants. Kutuzov report to Alexander I dated October 24, 1812 on the patriotism of Russian peasants: “With martyr firmness they endured all the blows associated with the invasion of the enemy, hid their families and young children in the forests, and the armed themselves sought defeat in the peaceful dwellings of their appearing predators. Often the women themselves caught these villains in a cunning way and punished their attempts with death, and often the armed villagers, joining our partisans, greatly assisted them in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants. These feats are so numerous and admirable to the spirit of the Russian…”.

French historians, describing the situation French troops before leaving Moscow, they claim that everything in the Great Army was in order, except for the cavalry, artillery and carts, but there was no fodder for feeding horses and cattle. Nothing could help this disaster, because the surrounding peasants burned their hay and did not give it to the French.

The battle won did not bring the usual results, because the peasants Karp and Vlas, who, after the French had come to Moscow with carts to rob the city, did not personally show heroic feelings at all, and all the countless number of such peasants did not bring hay to Moscow for the good money that they offered, but burned it.

Imagine two people who went out to a duel with swords according to all the rules of fencing art: fencing went on for quite some time. long time; suddenly one of the opponents, feeling wounded - realizing that this was not a joke, but about his life, threw down his sword and, taking the first club that came across, began to roll with it. But let us imagine that the enemy, having so wisely used the best and simplest means to achieve the goal, at the same time inspired by the traditions of chivalry, would want to hide the essence of the matter and would insist that he, according to all the rules of art, won with swords. One can imagine what confusion and obscurity would result from such a description of the duel that took place.

The fencer who demanded the fight according to the rules of the art was the French; his opponent, who dropped his sword and raised his club, were Russians; people who try to explain everything according to the rules of fencing are historians who wrote about this event.

Since the fire of Smolensk, a war has begun that does not fit under any previous legends of wars. The burning of cities and villages, the retreat after the battles, the blow of Borodin and the retreat again, the abandonment and fire of Moscow, the catching of marauders, the capture of transports, the guerrilla war - all these were deviations from the rules.

Napoleon felt this, and from the very time when he stopped in Moscow in the correct posture of a swordsman and saw a cudgel raised above him instead of the enemy’s sword, he did not stop complaining to Kutuzov and Emperor Alexander that the war was being waged against all the rules (as if there were some rules for killing people). Despite the complaints of the French about non-compliance with the rules, despite the fact that for some reason the Russians, the highest in position, seemed ashamed to fight with a cudgel, but they wanted by all the rules to take the position en quarte or en tierce [fourth, third], to make a skillful fall into prime [first], etc., - the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without analyzing anything, rose, fell and nailed the French to until the whole invasion is gone.

And it is good for the people who, not like the French in 1813, saluting according to all the rules of art and turning the sword over with the hilt, gracefully and courteously hand it over to the generous winner, but good for the people who, in a moment of trial, without asking about how they acted according to the rules others in such cases, with simplicity and ease, pick up the first club that comes across and nail it until the feeling of insult and revenge in their soul is replaced by contempt and pity.

One of the most tangible and advantageous deviations from the so-called rules of war is the action of scattered people against people huddled together. This kind of action always manifests itself in a war that takes folk character. These actions consist in the fact that, instead of becoming a crowd against the crowd, people disperse separately, attack one by one and immediately flee when they are attacked by large forces, and then attack again when the opportunity presents itself. This was done by the Guerillas in Spain; this was done by the highlanders in the Caucasus; the Russians did it in 1812.

A war of this kind was called guerrilla warfare, and it was believed that by calling it that, its meaning was explained. Meanwhile, this kind of war not only does not fit any rules, but is directly opposed to the well-known and recognized as an infallible tactical rule. This rule says that the attacker must concentrate his troops in order to be stronger than the enemy at the time of the battle.

Guerrilla warfare (always successful, as history shows) is the exact opposite of this rule.

This contradiction arises from the fact that military science accepts the strength of troops as identical with their numbers. Military science says that the more troops, the more power. Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison. [Law is always on the side of large armies. ]

In saying this, military science is like that mechanics, which, based on the consideration of forces only in relation to their masses, would say that the forces are equal or not equal to each other, because their masses are equal or not equal.

Force (momentum) is the product of mass and speed.

In military affairs, the strength of an army is also the product of the mass by something like that, by some unknown x.

Military science, seeing in history countless examples of the fact that the mass of troops does not coincide with strength, that small detachments defeat large ones, vaguely recognizes the existence of this unknown multiplier and tries to find it in geometric construction, then in armament, then - the most common - in the genius of generals. But substituting all these multiplier values ​​does not produce results consistent with the historical facts.

Meanwhile, one has only to abandon the established, for the sake of the heroes, false view of the validity of orders higher authorities during the war in order to find this unknown x.

This is the spirit of the army, that is, a greater or lesser desire to fight and expose themselves to the dangers of all the people who make up the army, completely regardless of whether people fight under the command of geniuses or non-geniuses, in three or two lines, with clubs or guns firing thirty once a minute. People who have greatest desire fight, they will always put themselves in the most favorable conditions for a fight.

The spirit of the army is a multiplier for the mass, which gives the product of force. To determine and express the meaning of the spirit of the army, this unknown multiplier, is the task of science.

This task is possible only when we stop arbitrarily substituting, instead of the value of the entire unknown X, the conditions under which force is manifested, such as: the orders of the commander, weapons, etc., taking them as the value of a multiplier, and we recognize this unknown in all its integrity, that is, as a greater or lesser desire to fight and endanger oneself. Then only, expressing the known equations historical facts, from comparison relative value of this unknown one can hope to determine the unknown itself.

Ten people, battalions or divisions, fighting with fifteen people, battalions or divisions, defeated fifteen, that is, they killed and took prisoner all without a trace and themselves lost four; therefore, four were destroyed on one side, and fifteen on the other. Therefore, four was equal to fifteen, and therefore 4a:=15y. Therefore, w: g/==15:4. This equation does not give the value of the unknown, but it does give the relation between two unknowns. And from subsuming various historical units (battles, campaigns, periods of wars) under such equations, series of numbers will be obtained in which laws must exist and can be discovered.

The tactical rule that it is necessary to act in masses during the offensive and separately during the retreat, unconsciously confirms only the truth that the strength of the army depends on its spirit. In order to lead people under the core, more discipline is needed, achieved only by movement in the masses, than in order to fend off attackers. But this rule, in which the spirit of the army is overlooked, constantly turns out to be wrong and especially strikingly contradicts reality where there is a strong rise or fall in the spirit of the army - in all people's wars.

The French, retreating in 1812, although they should have defended themselves separately, according to tactics, huddle together, because the spirit of the army has fallen so that only the mass holds the army together. The Russians, on the contrary, tactically should have attacked en masse, but in reality they are splitting up, because the spirit is raised so that individuals strike without the orders of the French and do not need coercion in order to expose themselves to labor and danger.

The so-called guerrilla war began with the entry of the enemy into Smolensk.

Before the guerrilla war was officially accepted by our government, already thousands of people of the enemy army - backward marauders, foragers - were exterminated by the Cossacks and peasants, who beat these people as unconsciously as dogs unconsciously bite a runaway rabid dog. Denis Davydov, with his Russian intuition, was the first to understand the significance of that terrible club, which, without asking the rules of military art, destroyed the French, and he owns the glory of the first step in legitimizing this method of war.

On August 24, the first partisan detachment of Davydov was established, and after his detachment others began to be established. The further the campaign progressed, the more the number of these detachments increased.

The partisans destroyed Grand Army in parts. They picked up those fallen leaves that fell of themselves from a withered tree - the French army, and sometimes shook this tree. In October, while the French fled to Smolensk, there were hundreds of these parties of various sizes and characters. There were parties that adopted all the methods of the army, with infantry, artillery, headquarters, with the comforts of life; there were only Cossack, cavalry; there were small, prefabricated, foot and horse, there were peasants and landlords, unknown to anyone. There was a deacon head of the party, who took several hundred prisoners a month. There was an elder, Vasilisa, who beat hundreds of Frenchmen.

The last days of October was the time of the peak guerrilla war. That first period of this war, during which the partisans, themselves surprised at their audacity, were afraid at any moment to be caught and surrounded by the French and, without unsaddling and almost dismounting their horses, hid in the forests, waiting for every minute of the chase, has already passed. Now this war was already determined, it became clear to everyone what could be done with the French and what could not be done. Now only those commanders of the detachments, who, according to the rules, went away from the French with headquarters, still considered many things impossible. The small partisans, who had long ago begun their work and were closely looking out for the French, considered possible what the leaders of large detachments did not even dare to think about. The Cossacks and the peasants, who climbed between the French, believed that now everything was possible.

On October 22, Denisov, who was one of the partisans, was with his party in the midst of partisan passion. In the morning he and his party were on the move. He spent the whole day through the forests adjacent to high road, followed a large French transport of cavalry items and Russian prisoners, separated from other troops and under strong cover, as was known from scouts and prisoners, heading for Smolensk. This transport was known not only to Denisov and Dolokhov (also a partisan with a small party), who walked close to Denisov, but also to the heads of large detachments with headquarters: everyone knew about this transport and, as Denisov said, they sharpened their teeth on it. Two of these great detachment commanders - one Pole, the other German - almost at the same time sent an invitation to Denisov to join his detachment in order to attack the transport.