3 Baltic countries. Geography

More recently, Russia and the Baltic countries were part of the same state. Now everyone follows their own historical path. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the economic, political and social realities of neighboring states. Let's figure out which countries are part of the Baltics, learn about their population, history, and also follow their path to independence.

Baltic countries: list

Some of our fellow citizens have a reasonable question: “The Baltics are what countries?” To some, this question may seem silly, but in fact, not everything is so simple.

When the Baltic countries are mentioned, they primarily mean Latvia with its capital in Riga, Lithuania with its capital in Vilnius and Estonia with its capital in Tallinn. That is, the post-Soviet state formations located on east coast Baltics. Many other states (Russia, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland) also have access to the Baltic Sea, but they are not included in the Baltic countries. But sometimes the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation belongs to this region.

Where is the Baltic located?

Which Baltic countries and their adjacent territories are located on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The area of the largest of them - Lithuania is 65.3 thousand km². Estonia has the smallest territory - 45.2 thousand square meters. km. The area of Latvia is 64.6 thousand km².

All Baltic countries have land border With Russian Federation. In addition, Lithuania neighbors Poland and Belarus, with which Latvia also borders, and Estonia has a maritime border with Finland.

The Baltic countries are located from north to south in this order: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Moreover, Latvia has a border with two other states, but they do not adjoin each other.

Population of the Baltics

Now let's find out what categories the population of the Baltic countries consists of according to various demographic characteristics.

First of all, let's find out the number of inhabitants who inhabit the states, the list of which is presented below:

Lithuania - 2.9 million people;
Latvia - 2.0 million people;
Estonia - 1.3 million people

Thus, we see that Lithuania has the largest population, and Estonia has the smallest.

With the help of simple mathematical calculations, comparing the area of the territory and the number of inhabitants of these countries, we can conclude that Lithuania has the highest population density, and Latvia and Estonia are approximately equal in this indicator, with a slight advantage of Latvia.

The titular and largest nationalities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are, respectively, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. The first two ethnic groups belong to the Baltic group of the Indo-European language family, and the Estonians belong to the Baltic-Finnish group of the Finno-Ugric language tree. The most numerous national minority in Latvia and Estonia are Russians. In Lithuania, they occupy the second largest place after the Poles.

History of the Baltics

Since ancient times, the Baltics have been inhabited by various Baltic and Finno-Ugric tribes: Aukshtaits, Zheimats, Latgalians, Curonians, Livs, Ests. In the struggle with neighboring countries, only Lithuania managed to formalize its own statehood, which later, on the terms of the union, became part of the Commonwealth. The ancestors of modern Latvians and Estonians immediately fell under the rule of the German Livonian Order of the Crusader Knights, and then, the territory in which they lived, as a result of the Livonian and Northern Wars, was divided between the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden and the Commonwealth. In addition, a vassal duchy, Courland, was formed from part of the former order lands, which existed until 1795. The ruling class here was the German nobility. By that time, the Baltic states were almost completely part of the Russian Empire.

All lands were divided into Livonia, Courland and Estlyad provinces. The province of Vilna stood apart, populated mainly by Slavs and having no access to the Baltic Sea.

After the death of the Russian Empire, as a result of the February and October uprisings of 1917, the Baltic countries also gained independence. The list of events that preceded this result is too long to enumerate, and it will be superfluous for our review. The main thing to understand is that during the years 1918-1920 independent states were organized - the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics. They ceased to exist in 1939-1940, when they were annexed to the USSR as Soviet republics as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This is how the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR were formed. Until the beginning of the 1990s, these state formations were part of the USSR, but among certain circles of the intelligentsia there was a constant hope for independence.

Declaration of Independence of Estonia

Now let's talk about a period of history closer to us, namely, about that period of time when the independence of the Baltic countries was proclaimed.

Estonia was the first to take the path of secession from the USSR. Active protests against the Soviet central government began in 1987. Already in November 1988, the Supreme Council of the ESSR issued the first Declaration of Sovereignty among the Soviet republics. This event did not yet mean secession from the USSR, but this act proclaimed the priority republican laws over the all-Union. It was Estonia that launched the phenomenon, which later became known as the “parade of sovereignties”.

At the end of March 1990, the law “On the state status of Estonia” was issued, and on May 8, 1990, its independence was declared, and the country returned to its old name - the Republic of Estonia. Lithuania and Latvia adopted similar acts even earlier.

In March 1991, a consultative referendum was held in which the majority of citizens who voted voted for secession from the USSR. But in fact, independence was restored only with the beginning of the August coup - August 20, 1991. It was then that the resolution on the independence of Estonia was adopted. In September, the government of the USSR officially recognized the branch, and on the 17th of the same month, the Republic of Estonia became a full member of the UN. Thus, the independence of the country was fully restored.

Formation of independence of Lithuania

The initiator of the restoration of independence of Lithuania was the public organization "Sąjūdis", founded in 1988. On May 26, 1989, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR proclaimed the act "On the State Sovereignty of Lithuania". This meant that in the event of a conflict between republican and all-Union legislation, priority was given to the former. Lithuania became the second republic of the USSR to pick up the baton from Estonia in the “parade of sovereignties”.

Already in March 1990, an act was adopted to restore the independence of Lithuania, which became the first Soviet republic to declare its withdrawal from the Union. From that moment on, it became officially known as the Republic of Lithuania.

Naturally, the central authorities Soviet Union recognized this act as invalid and demanded its annulment. With the help of individual units of the army, the government of the USSR tried to regain control over the republic. In its actions, it also relied on those who disagreed with the policy of secession of citizens within Lithuania itself. An armed confrontation began, during which 15 people were killed. But the army did not dare to attack the parliament building.

After the August coup in September 1991, the USSR fully recognized the independence of Lithuania, and on September 17 it became part of the UN.

Independence of Latvia

AT Latvian SSR The independence movement was initiated by the organization "People's Front of Latvia", which was established in 1988. On July 29, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, following the parliaments of Estonia and Lithuania, proclaimed the third Declaration of Sovereignty in the USSR.

At the very beginning of May 1990, the Republican Armed Forces adopted the Declaration on the Restoration of State Independence. That is, in fact, Latvia, following Lithuania, announced its withdrawal from the USSR. But in reality it happened only a year and a half later. On May 3, 1991, a referendum-type poll was held, in which the majority of respondents voted for the independence of the republic. During the coup of the GKChP on August 21, 1991, Latvia actually managed to achieve independence. On September 6, 1991, she, like the rest of the countries that make up the Baltic states, was recognized by the Soviet government as independent.

The period of independence of the Baltic countries

After the restoration of their state independence, all the Baltic countries chose a Western course of economic and political development. At the same time, the Soviet past in these states was constantly condemned, and relations with the Russian Federation remained quite tense. The Russian population of these countries is limited in rights.

In 2004 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were admitted to the European Union and military-political bloc NATO.

Economy of the Baltic countries

At the moment, the Baltic countries have the most high rate in terms of the standard of living of the population among all post-Soviet states. Moreover, this happens despite the fact that a significant part of the infrastructure left after the Soviet era was destroyed or stopped functioning for other reasons, and after the global economic crisis In 2008, the economy of the Baltic countries is going through far from the best of times.

The highest standard of living of the population among the Baltic countries is in Estonia, and the lowest is in Latvia.

Differences between the Baltic countries

Despite the territorial proximity and common history, one should not forget that the Baltic countries are individual states with their own national characteristics.

For example, in Lithuania, unlike other Baltic states, there is a very large Polish community, which is second in number only to the titular nation, but in Estonia and Latvia, on the contrary, Russians predominate among national minorities. In addition, all persons residing on its territory at the time of independence received citizenship in Lithuania. But in Latvia and Estonia, only the descendants of those people who lived in the republics before joining the USSR had such a right.

In addition, it should be said that Estonia, unlike other Baltic countries, is quite strongly oriented towards the Scandinavian states.

General conclusions

All those who carefully read this material will no longer ask: "The Baltics - what countries are these?" These are the states that had quite complex history filled with the struggle for independence and national identity. Naturally, this could not but leave its mark on the peoples of the Baltics themselves. It was this struggle that had a key influence on the current political choice of the Baltic states, as well as on the mentality of the peoples who inhabit them.

The article tells about the states that are part of the Baltic countries. The material contains data on the geographical location of countries, their economies and ethnic composition. Forms an idea of the trade and economic relations of the Baltic states with neighboring countries.

List of Baltic countries

The list of Baltic countries includes:

Lithuania,
Latvia,
Estonia.

Three sovereign states were formed in 1990 after the collapse of the USSR. Countries are quite small in terms of area and population. Almost immediately after the proclamation of sovereignty, the Baltic states set out to integrate into the pan-European economic, political and cultural space. Today the countries are members of the EU and NATO.

Geographical position of the Baltics

Geographically, the Baltic countries are located in the southeastern part of the coast Baltic Sea. They are located on the border of the East European Plain and the Polish Lowland. On the western borders, the countries of this region are neighbors with Poland, in the south - with Belarus, in the east - with Russia.

Rice. 1. Baltic countries on the map.

In general, the geographical position of the Baltic States is quite advantageous. They are provided with access to the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea has always played an important role in the international relations of European countries.

The peoples of the Baltic countries

The demographic situation in these countries is far from favorable. There is a process of natural outflow of the population. In addition, the death rate exceeds the birth rate. The result of this is a reduction in the population of all three countries.

The average population density of the Baltic countries is significantly lower compared to other European countries.

The distribution of the population in all countries is also quite uneven.

The most densely populated coasts and areas around the capitals. Everywhere there is a high level of urbanization, which reaches a figure close to 70%.

In terms of population, the Baltic capitals are in the lead:

Riga;
Vilnius;
Tallinn.

Rice. 3. Old Riga.

The ethnic groups are predominant in the national composition. In Lithuania, the percentage of the indigenous population is over 80%, in Estonia - almost 70%, in Latvia - more than half (60%).

Baltic, also Baltic(German: Baltikum) - an area in Northern Europe, which includes the territories of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, as well as the former East Prussia. From the name of this territory comes the name of one of the Indo-Germanic language groups - the Balts. .

The indigenous population of the Baltic countries, as a rule, do not use the term "Baltic", considering it a relic of the Soviet era, and prefer to talk about the "Baltic countries". In Estonian there is only the word Baltimaad (Baltic countries), it is translated into Russian as Baltic, Baltic or Baltic. In Latvian and Lithuanian, the word Baltija is used in relation to the region.

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Lithuania (lit. Lietuva)

the official name of the Republic of Lithuania (lit. Lietuvos Respublika), is a state in Europe, on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. In the north it borders with Latvia, in the southeast - with Belarus, in the southwest - with Poland and the Kaliningrad region of Russia. Member of NATO (since 2004), EU (since 2004), WTO, UN. A country that has signed the Schengen Agreement. Kaunas was the capital from 1919 to 1939. The capital of modern Lithuania is Vilnius (from 1939 to the present). The state emblem - Chase or Vytis (lit. Vytis) - a white horseman (Vityaz) on a red background, the national flag - yellow-green-red.

Grand Duchy of Lithuania

In the XIII-XIV centuries, the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania grew rapidly and reached the shores of the Black Sea. At the same time, the Lithuanian princes fought hard with the Teutonic Order, which was defeated in 1410 in the Battle of Grunwald by the combined forces of the Lithuanian lands and Poland.

In 1385, the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello (Jogaila), by the Treaty of Kreva, undertook to unite Lithuania and Poland in a personal union if he was elected king of Poland. In 1386 he was crowned King of Poland. In 1387 Lithuania was baptized and adopted Western Christianity as its official religion. Since 1392, Lithuania was actually ruled by Grand Duke Vytautas (Vytautas; Vytautas), cousin and formal governor of Jogaila. During his reign (1392-1430) Lithuania reached the height of its power.

Casimir Jagiellon expanded the international influence of the Jagiellonian dynasty - he subjugated Prussia to Poland, put his son on the Czech and Hungarian thrones. In 1492-1526, there was a political system of the Jagiellonian states, covering Poland (with vassals of Prussia and Moldova), Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

In 1569, a union was concluded with Poland in Lublin (on the eve of the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were annexed to Poland). According to the act of the Union of Lublin, Lithuania and Poland were ruled by a jointly elected king, and state affairs were decided in a common Seimas. However, the legal systems, army and governments remained separate. AT XVI-XVIII centuries gentry democracy dominated in Lithuania, the polonization of the gentry and its rapprochement with the Polish gentry took place. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was losing its Lithuanian national character, Polish culture was developing in it.

As part of the Russian Empire

In the XVIII century, after the Northern War, the Polish-Lithuanian state fell into decay, falling under the protectorate of Russia. In 1772, 1793 and 1795 the entire territory of Poland and the GDL was divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Most of the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was annexed to Russia. Attempts to restore statehood caused the transition of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility to the side of Napoleon in 1812, as well as the uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864, which ended in defeat. In the second half of the 19th century, a national movement began to take shape.

Latvia, Republic of Latvia

(Latvian Latvija, Latvijas Republika) - the Baltic state, the capital is Riga (721 thousand people, 2006). Geographically belongs to Northern Europe. The country was named after the ethnonym of the people - Latvies (Latvian latvieši). Member of the EU and NATO, member of the Schengen agreements. Latvia first emerged as an independent state in 1918 (Riga Peace Treaty of 1920 between the RSFSR and Latvia). From 1940 to 1991 it was part of the USSR as the Latvian SSR.

1201 - Bishop Albert von Buxgevden founded the city of Riga on the site of Liv villages. For better organization of the incorporation of the lands of the Livs and Latgalians into the bosom of the church (and at the same time their political subjugation), he also founded the Order of the Swordsmen (after the defeat in the Battle of Saul, the Livonian Order as part of the Teutonic Order), which later became an independent political and economic force; the order and the bishop often fought with each other. [source?] In 1209, the bishop and the order agreed on the division of the occupied and not yet occupied lands. On the map of Europe, the state formation of the German crusaders appeared - Livonia (by the name of the local ethnos Livs). It included the territory of present-day Estonia and Latvia. Many Livonian cities subsequently became members of the prosperous North European trade union - the Hansa. However, later, torn apart by internecine skirmishes of the Order, the Bishopric of Riga (from 1225 - the Archbishopric of Riga) and other, more insignificant bishops, as well as their vassals, Livonia began to weaken, which drew increased attention to it from the surrounding states - the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Russia and later also Sweden and Denmark. Moreover, Livonia (especially Riga, which was the largest of the cities of the Hanseatic Trade Union), due to its geographical location, has always been an important trading region(A part of the "Road from the Varangians to the Greeks" ran through its lands in the past).

17th century

During the 17th century - the formation of the Latvian nation as a result of the consolidation individual peoples: Latgalians, villages, Semigallians, Curonians and Livs. Some of the Latgalians still retain their original language, although in Latvia and even among the Latgalians themselves there are so many dialects and dialects that many historians and linguists consider this language one of the “big” dialects of Latvian. [source?] This is the official position of the state , from this side, supported by a very strong feeling of patriotism among Latvians (three stars on the coat of arms of Latvia and in the hands of the woman-Freedom on top of the monument of the same name in the center of Riga symbolize the three regions of Latvia - Kurzeme-Zemgale, Vidzeme and Latgale)

18th century

1722 - as a result of the Northern War, part of the territory of modern Latvia departs to the Russian Empire. 1795 - under the third partition of Poland, the entire territory of present-day Latvia was united as part of Russia.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was interesting to watch how sovereign states build independent course to well-being. The Baltic countries were especially intriguing, as they left, slamming the door loudly.

Over the past 30 years, numerous claims and threats have constantly rained down on the Russian Federation. The Baltics believe that they have the right to do so, although the desire to secede was suppressed by the USSR army. As a result of the suppression of separatism in Lithuania, 15 civilians were killed.

Traditionally, the Baltic states are ranked among the countries. This is due to the fact that this alliance was formed from the liberated states after the Second World War.

Some geopoliticians do not agree with this and consider the Baltics to be an independent region, which includes:

, the capital is Tallinn.
(Riga).
(Vilnius).

All three states are washed by the Baltic Sea. Estonia has the smallest area, the number of inhabitants is about 1.3 million people. Following is Latvia, where 2 million citizens live. Lithuania closes the top three with a population of 2.9 million.

Based on a small number of inhabitants, the Baltic states have taken a niche among the small countries. The composition of the region is multinational. In addition to indigenous peoples, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles and Finns live here.

The majority of Russian speakers are concentrated in Latvia and Estonia, about 28–30% of the population. The most “conservative” is Lithuania, where 82% of native Lithuanians live.

For reference. Although the Baltic countries are experiencing a high outflow of the able-bodied population, they are in no hurry to populate the free territories with internally displaced persons from and. The leaders of the Baltic republics are trying to look for various reasons to evade obligations to the EU to resettle refugees.

Political course

Even being part of the USSR, the Baltics were significantly different from other Soviet regions for the better. There was perfect cleanliness, beautiful architectural heritage and interesting population similar to European.

Central street of Riga - Brivibas street, 1981

The desire to become part of Europe has always been in the Baltic region. An example was the rapidly developing state that defended its independence from the Soviets in 1917.

The chance to secede from the USSR appeared in the second half of the eighties, when, along with perestroika, came democracy and glasnost. This opportunity was not missed, and in the republics they began to talk openly about separatism. Estonia became a pioneer in the independence movement, and in 1987 mass actions protest.

Under pressure from the electorate, the Supreme Council of the ESSR issued a Declaration of Sovereignty. At the same time, Latvia and Lithuania followed the example of their neighbor, and in 1990 all three republics received autonomy.

In the spring of 1991, at referendums in the Baltic countries, an end was put in relations with the USSR. In the autumn of the same year, the Baltic countries joined the UN.

The Baltic republics willingly adopted the course of the West and Europe in economic and political development. The Soviet legacy was condemned. Relations with the Russian Federation finally cooled down.

Russians living in the Baltic countries were limited in their rights. After 13 years of independence, the Baltic states joined the NATO military bloc.

Economic course

After gaining sovereignty, the Baltic economy has undergone significant changes. In the place of a developed industry in the industrial sector, service industries have come. The importance of agriculture and food production has grown.

Modern industries include:

Precision engineering (electrical engineering and household equipment).
Machine tool building.
Ship repair.
Chemical industry.
perfume industry.
Timber processing (furniture and paper manufacturing).
Light and footwear industry.
Food production.

The Soviet heritage in the production of vehicles: cars and electric trains is completely lost.

Obviously, the Baltic industry is not a strong point in the post-Soviet era. The main income for these countries comes from the transit industry.

After gaining independence, all the production and transit capacities of the USSR went to the republics for nothing. The Russian side made no claims, used the services and paid about $1 billion a year for cargo turnover. Every year, the amount for transit grew, as the economy of the Russian Federation increased its pace, and freight turnover increased.

For reference. The Russian company Kuzbassrazrezugol shipped more than 4.5 million tons of coal per year to its customers through the Baltic ports.

Particular attention should be paid to the monopoly of the Baltic States on the transit of Russian oil. At one time, the forces of the USSR on the Baltic coast built the Ventspils oil terminal, the largest at that time. A pipeline was laid to it, the only one in the region. This grandiose system went to Latvia for nothing.

Thanks to the built industrial infrastructure, the Russian Federation pumped through Latvia from 30 million tons of oil annually. For every barrel, Russia paid $0.7 in logistics services. The income of the republic grew steadily as oil exports increased.

The transit country's sense of self-preservation has blunted, which will play one of the key roles in the stagnation of the economy after the 2008 crisis.

The work of the Baltic ports was provided, among other things, by the transshipment of sea containers (TEU). After the modernization of the port terminals of St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Ust-Luga, traffic through the Baltic States has decreased to 7.1% of the total Russian cargo turnover.

Nevertheless, in one year, taking into account the decline in logistics, these services continue to bring about $170 million a year to the three republics. This amount was several times higher until 2014.

On a note. Despite the poor economic situation in the Russian Federation, to date, many transport terminals have been built on its territory. This made it possible to significantly reduce the need for a transit and transport corridor in the Baltics.

The unexpected reduction in transit cargo turnover had a negative impact on the Baltic economy. As a result, the ports regularly undergo mass layoffs of workers, which number in the thousands. At the same time, railway transport, freight and passenger, went under the knife, bringing stable losses.

The policy of the transit state and openness to Western investors has led to an increase in unemployment in all industries. People leave for more developed countries to earn money and stay there to live.

Despite the deterioration, income levels in the Baltics remain significantly higher than in other post-Soviet republics.

Jurmala lost income

The scandal of 2015 in show business became a stone in the garden of the Latvian economy. Some popular singers from the Russian Federation were banned from entering the country by Latvian politicians. As a result, the New Wave festival is now held in Sochi.

In addition, the KVN program refused to hold the performance of the teams in Jurmala. As a result, the tourism industry has lost a lot of money.

After that, Russians began to buy less residential real estate in the Baltic countries. People are afraid that they can fall under political millstones.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

State educational institution

higher public education

State University of Management

Institute of Public Administration and Law

Coursework in the discipline of geopolitics

on the theme "Baltic countries"

Is done by a student:

Minasyan A.A.

Faculty: GIMU, 2nd year, 2nd group

Checked by teacher:

Loparev Anatoly Vasilievich

Moscow 2012

Introduction

1. The situation with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

1 Accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR

2 Geopolitical processes in the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

2. The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and at the present time

1 Political aspect

2 Economic aspect

3 Problems of relations between Russia and the Baltic countries

3.1 Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries

3.2 Border issues

3.3 Security in the region

3.4 Social tensions

3. Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of geopolitical relations between Russia and the Baltic countries will never be exhausted, since the Baltic Sea region will always remain in the zone of Russia's vital interests, which involve ensuring strong security there on conditions that do not infringe on Russia's security. Main task foreign policy our country in relation to the Baltic countries is to strengthen Russia's influence in the region in order to strengthen its own security, protect its economic interests and ensure the rights of national minorities through cooperation with these states.

In this course project, an attempt was made to list the main geopolitical factors in relations between Russia and the Baltic countries, their historical background, as well as the prospects for the development of the Russia-Baltic geopolitical space, taking into account existing and newly emerging factors.

The purpose of this work is to understand the relations between Russia and the Baltic countries.

To understand the essence of the problem will be considered:

)Situations with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

)The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and at the present time

)Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future.

1. The situation with the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

.1 Accession of the Baltic countries to the USSR

September and October 10, 1939 - after Germany attacked Poland, and the USSR also sent its troops to the territory of Poland and actually took part in its division - the USSR invited the Baltic states to conclude agreements on mutual assistance, including military aid, the creation of military bases and the deployment of Soviet troops on them (25 thousand people each in Latvia and Estonia and 20 thousand in Lithuania). According to the Baltic states (supported by the West), these treaties were imposed on them by the Soviet leadership, and their subsequent accession to the USSR should be regarded as an annexation. Thus, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed on August 23, 1939, actually predetermined the fate of the Baltic states.

Simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance, the USSR transferred Vilnius and the Vilna region to Lithuania, which had ceded to the USSR after the partition of Poland. Less than a year later, the entry of all three countries into the USSR as union socialist republics was formalized - after the entry of Soviet troops into the Baltic States in June 1940, pro-Soviet governments were created in all three countries and elections were held, on July 21, 1940, the Latvian Seimas proclaimed that Latvia was becoming socialist republic, on the same day on the establishment Soviet power proclaimed by the Seimas of Lithuania and the Parliament of Estonia, and 3? On August 6, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to join the USSR.

On the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the post-war borders were fixed. The United States and Great Britain essentially recognized the entry of the Baltic countries into the USSR. The leadership of the allied countries did not want at that moment to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, this did not prevent the Western states from supporting numerous public demands for independence for the Baltic republics. At the same time, the official presentation of such demands could lead to the collapse of the entire system of post-war international agreements. The problem found its solution only many years later thanks to centrifugal processes within the Soviet Union itself.

.2 Geopolitical processes in the Baltic countries before the collapse of the USSR

With the beginning of perestroika in 1987, mass anti-Soviet demonstrations began in the capitals of the Baltic states. In 1988, the first perestroika movements emerged. On June 3, 1988, the Sąjūdis independence movement was founded in Lithuania. In January 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Vilnius provoked a demonstration of up to 250,000 supporters of independence.

On March 1990, the Supreme Council of Lithuania, headed by Vytautas Landsbergis, declared independence. Thus, Lithuania became the first of the union republics to declare independence, and one of the two that did so before the events of the State Emergency Committee. The independence of Lithuania was not recognized by the central government of the USSR and by almost all other countries. The Soviet government started economic blockade Lithuania, and later troops were used.

In 1988, the Estonian Popular Front was formed, proclaiming the goal of restoring independence. In June 1988, the so-called "singing revolution" took place in Tallinn - up to one hundred thousand people took part in the traditional festival on the Singing Field, and on March 23, 1990, the Estonian Communist Party withdrew from the CPSU.

On March 1990, the Estonian Supreme Council declared the entry into the USSR in 1940 illegal, and began the process of transforming Estonia into an independent state.

On May 1990, the Supreme Council of Latvia proclaimed the transition to independence, and on March 3, 1991, this demand was reinforced by a referendum.

A feature of the secession of Latvia and Estonia is that, unlike Lithuania and Georgia, before the complete collapse of the USSR as a result of the actions of the State Emergency Committee, they did not declare independence, but a “soft” “transitional process” to it, and also that, in order to gain control on its territory in the conditions of a relatively small relative majority of the titular population, republican citizenship was granted only to persons living in these republics at the time of their accession to the USSR, and their descendants.

The central union government undertook forceful attempts to prevent the achievement of independence by the Baltic republics. On January 13, 1991, a special forces detachment and the Alpha group stormed the TV tower in Vilnius and stopped republican television broadcasting. Local population had massive opposition to this, which resulted in 14 victims killed. On March 11, 1991, the Committee of National Salvation of Lithuania was formed, troops were brought in. However, the reaction of the world community and the intensified liberal currents in Russia made further military actions impossible.

2. The situation with the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR and at the present time

2.1 Political aspect

Immediately after the restoration of independence, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia took vigorous steps towards the fastest possible integration into the main European and Atlantic institutions. The Baltics are comprehensively oriented towards the West, and, above all, towards the USA, Germany, North European countries. The main motive is the "historically justified" desire to overcome dependence on Russia, to leave the sphere of Russian influence.

In 1992-1995 for their domestic and foreign policy purposes, the Baltic countries actively used acute problems the presence of Russian troops, the status of the Russian-speaking population. Any political crisis in Russia, the Chechen conflict was used as a factor in national mobilization against an external threat.

July 1991, following a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member states, a decision is made to establish with the Baltic States diplomatic relations and expresses the readiness of the European Communities to assist economic transformation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In May 1992, agreements on trade and cooperation between the EU and these countries were signed, similar to those signed earlier between the EU and the USSR.

In 1992, the EU economic program PHARE was also extended to the Baltic States, and in June 1993, at the summit in Copenhagen, a decision was made on the fundamental possibility of admitting Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the EU along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia , Bulgaria and Romania.

In fact, the Baltic States in relations with the European Union in two years have covered a path that took the states of Central and Eastern Europe about 6 years. A year after the summit in Copenhagen, free trade agreements were signed between the Baltic countries and the EU (July 1994), which entered into force on January 1, 1995. At the same time, the EU, taking into account the economic situation in these countries, agreed to grant a delay in the abolition of import duties from Lithuania (for 6 years) and Latvia (4 years).

June 1995 in Luxembourg, the signing of the Association Agreements between the Baltic States and the European Union ("European Agreements") took place. The agreements contain obligations to establish a free trade regime between the parties, remove restrictions on the movement of capital, services and labor, bring the laws of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in line with the standards adopted in the European Union. Since the signing of the association agreements, the Baltic countries have received the same rights in relations with the EU that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania now have. This means, in particular, that representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can participate in all joint meetings of EU Member States and associated countries within the framework of the latter's "pre-accession strategy". European Union adopted at the Essen summit in December 1994.

In May 1994, the Baltic states, together with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were granted the status of "associated partners" of the WEU. "Associated Partners" may participate in meetings of the Council of the Western European Union (without the right to block decisions taken by consensus), and also with the consent of the majority full members in the military operations of the WEU.

In December 1995, at the next Assembly of the Union in Paris, an initiative was put forward to create, within the framework of developing cooperation between the WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and strengthening the role of the Union in the European security system, a "Hanseatic corps" from the naval formations of Denmark, Germany, Poland and the Baltic countries.

In general, we can say that today the EU is one of the leading political and economic partners of the Baltic States. The countries of the European Union account for 35 to 50% of the total foreign trade Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is important to note the effect of the free trade agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 1995. In Latvia, for example, in January-November 1995, exports to the EU countries increased compared to the same period of the previous year from 39.1 to 45 %, import - from 39.7 to 50%. This is happening against the background of a decrease in trade with the CIS countries - over the same time, exports decreased from 42.5 to 37.5%, imports - from 30.1 to 28%.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the "acceleration" of the pace of rapprochement between the European Union and the Baltic countries - giving them the status of "associated partners" of the WEU, the conclusion of free trade agreements, the beginning of the development of "European agreements" - fell on the period of aggravation of relations between the Baltic States and Russia (problems of the withdrawal of troops from Latvia and Estonia, the adoption of a law on citizenship in Latvia). The increased attention of the EU to the Baltic region is also evidenced by the nomination in May 1996 at the summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States of a new strategy of the European Union for the region.

The most active agents of the EU's Baltic policy are the Nordic countries - Denmark, and after joining the European Union in 1994 - Sweden and Finland. The Nordic states provided active support to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during their struggle for independence in 1990-1991. The development of their cooperation after the restoration of independence has deep foundations.

First of all, the Nordic states are interested in stability in the region immediately adjacent to their borders. Hence - and assistance to economic reforms in the Baltic countries. In addition, cooperation with the Baltic states to a certain extent contributes to the search for a new identity for the Nordic countries in a changing Europe, and allows you to feel more confident in the EU. Of particular interest to them is the market for relatively cheap and sufficiently skilled labor in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Finally, long-standing historical, cultural and even ethnic (Finland-Estonia) ties cannot be discounted.

The Nordic states are the main Western economic partners of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It is necessary to note the assistance of the Nordic countries in the creation of the national armed forces of the Baltic states. First of all, this concerns border units because the Nordic countries are concerned about the danger of illegal refugees from third countries, drugs, smuggling of weapons and other goods entering their territory through the Baltic states. At the same time, military supplies from the northern Baltic countries are still limited to equipment and outdated light equipment.

The Nordic states are patronizing the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in peacekeeping operations. In September 1994, these states, as well as Norway and Great Britain, signed a document providing for long-term cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the creation of the Baltic peacekeeping battalion, of which Denmark became the official curator. The decision to create a battalion, which will consist of military personnel from the three Baltic countries, was taken in December 1993 in Tallinn. It is expected that the cost of its preparation will be total about 27 million dollars

It is possible that cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states will also receive a serious institutional basis. There is a plan to turn Sweden into a kind of security curator in the region, creating a security zone that includes Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states. Today, Sweden is already practically the official political patron of the Baltic states; it acted as an intermediary in settling the dispute over maritime border between Latvia and Estonia, in settling the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia, etc. It is significant that the first foreign visit after the appointment of the new Prime Minister of Sweden G. Peterson made to Estonia (April 1996).

Among the EU Member States, Germany also occupies a special place in relations with the Baltic States.

Germany has long historical and cultural ties with the region - up to the 80s. 19th century German Baltic barons were the true masters of the Baltic.

Today, Germany actively contributes to the rapprochement between the EU and the Baltic states. During the visit of the presidents of the Baltic States to the United States in June 1996, B. Clinton called Germany the possible main "patron" of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in negotiations on joining the European Union. It is appropriate to recall that it was during the German presidency of the European Union that the EU free trade agreement was signed with the Baltic countries and negotiations began on concluding "European agreements" with them.

In September 1994, Germany concluded military cooperation agreements with all three Baltic countries. It provides Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in this regard, with specific financial assistance. So, the Germans handed over to Latvia two transport aircraft, 8 military boats former GDR, 150 trucks and 60 trailers, 136 tons of various military equipment and uniforms. A squadron of minesweepers from the FRG visited Latvia twice, Minister of Defense F. Ruhe and others visited the republic officials.

Germany currently plays a significant role in the economy of the Baltic countries. For Latvia, for example, it is the second trading partner in terms of turnover (about 13% of exports and 15% of imports), and ranks third in terms of foreign investment in the republic (about $60 million). Germany also plays a significant role in the Lithuanian economy, where it is the first foreign investor (about 70 million dollars).

At the same time, it should be noted that Germany is very cautious about increasing activity in the Baltic region, and its full potential in this regard has not yet been used.

In the United States, which never recognized the entry of the Baltic States into the USSR in 1940, the restoration of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is now interpreted as one of the results of the end of the Cold War, and therefore they are not classified as "newly independent states", but are considered as "nations that have restored freedom." Significant interest in the Baltic countries and their relations with Russia, which exists in the United States, is evidenced by the visits of B. Clinton to Riga on July 6, 1994, A. Gora (March 13, 1995) and H. Clinton (July 8, 1996). ) - in Tallinn.

North Atlantic Alliance considered in the Baltic States as the main guarantor of security in the region. The Baltic countries actively welcomed NATO's initiative of the "Partnership for Peace" program, seeing it as "the right step in the right direction at the right time", and were among the first countries to join the program. The intention to join NATO as a long-term goal was recorded in the "Basic Provisions of Latvia's Foreign Policy", approved by Parliament in February 1995, and Lithuania filed an official application for membership in the Alliance as early as January 1994. The Baltic States actively advocated NATO expansion, emphasizing that this process should by no means leave them on the sidelines, and declaring that it is not directed against Russia. Lithuania was especially active in the issue of NATO expansion, which in this respect was guided by Poland.

As is known, the three Baltic states were not included in the first wave of invitees to join the North Atlantic Alliance. The unwillingness of Western politicians to spoil relations with Russia and complicate the domestic political situation of President Boris N. Yeltsin played a role to no small extent. Arguments of this kind are well formulated in the 1996 report "From Collective Defense to collective security. Transformation and expansion" by the influential Dutch Council for Peace and Security: "The time for the admission of the three Baltic countries to NATO in the near future has not yet come, since this would seriously complicate relations with Russia. It is also not clear whether NATO would be willing and willing to offer countries small in size and lacking strategic depth a reliable degree of protection in the event that their entry into NATO would lead to hostility from the Russian Federation.

However, the protracted process of the entry of the Baltic countries into NATO was destined to end. In 2004, all three Baltic countries were admitted to NATO.

In an effort to avoid exacerbation of relations with Russia, the West past years pursued a policy of "squeezing" it out of the Baltic states, including the Baltic states in its sphere of influence. At the same time, the West is not interested in aggravating Russian-Baltic relations, and the West, apparently, is not ready to directly support the Baltic states in their confrontation with Russia. Russia will have to reckon with the special treatment of the Baltic countries in the West. It is necessary to realize that the defense of Russian interests in the region will face hidden, and it is possible that in key issues and open opposition from Western states.

.2 Economic aspect

Economic relations with Russia have three most important aspects for the Baltic States today:

Firstly, Russia and the CIS countries (Belarus) are the most important source of fuel and other energy carriers and minerals for the Baltic states. Imports from Russia satisfy, for example, 93% of Latvia's needs for fuel, 50% for electricity, 90% for non-ferrous metals, and 80% for raw materials for the chemical industry. In the sectors associated with the supply of Russian raw materials, Russian investments are also concentrated in the Baltic States, the participation of Russian capital in the corporatization of Baltic enterprises, which are of great importance for the latter;

secondly, the service of transit from Russia is an important source of income for the Baltic States. Today, the volume of Russian transit through the territory of Estonia is, according to some data, up to 9 million tons per year, Latvia - 36 million tons, Lithuania - 10.1 million tons. All three republics plan to increase revenues from transit. Plans for the reconstruction of ports are being developed, foreign investors are being attracted, and the reconstruction of the former Soviet naval bases in Paldiski and Liepaja is planned. Latvia pays much attention to plans to transport oil from the Timan-Pechora oil province - Ventspils would like to be one of its points in the republic. Estonia, which has a large balance of payments deficit, is also showing interest in attracting Russian cargo flows. Prime Minister T. Vähi called transit a "priority development zone" for the Estonian economy;

thirdly, the marketing of agricultural products to Russia, given its continued importance for the economy of the Baltic countries, as well as the fact that ruined farmers are the main opposition to reforms (Estonia) and the electoral base of nationalists (Latvia).

The Baltic republics were the most economically developed in the former USSR. The rupture of cooperation ties in the fields of industry and the agro-industrial complex led to a noticeable decline in production. For example, even in the most prosperous of all Estonia, the level of industrial production has decreased by one third during the years of reforms. Agricultural production, which is more eastward oriented, has experienced an even deeper decline.

During the years of reform, the economy of the Baltic states has experienced significant structural changes. If earlier Estonia specialized in mechanical engineering, metalworking, instrument making and electronics (that is, high-tech industries), now the importance and share in the economy of processing agricultural products, forestry and woodworking industries has increased. The banking and financial sector, necessary for a market economy, has also developed. At the same time, the fishing industry has come at a loss, serious problems experiencing the shale industry.

Nevertheless, the course of economic reforms in the Baltic countries is characterized by the lowest costs in the entire post-Soviet space. So, for the period 1991-1995. inflation indices in Latvia and Estonia were the lowest and did not exceed double digits (80-85 times), while in Russia growth consumer prices amounted to slightly less than 5 thousand times, while in other countries the increase in inflation reached five- and six-digit indicators. The low inflation rates in the Baltic states were the result of tight monetary and monetary policy. The state budget deficits of the countries under consideration were maintained within plus or minus 1-2% of GDP.

The economy of the Baltic countries emerged from the crisis recession in production as early as 1995. Over the past three years, there has been a steady the economic growth.

According to the EBRD forecast, GDP growth rates in 1997 will be 3.4% in Latvia, 3.8% in Lithuania, and 4.9% in Estonia. According to experts from the European Commission, Estonia's GDP will increase by 4.5% this year. The volume of the "shadow" economy, which is not included in official statistics, is 13-14% in Estonia. According to the EBRD forecast, the inflation rate in 1997 will be the lowest in Latvia - 10% per year. In Estonia they will amount to 12%, in Latvia - 13%. The Ministry of Finance of Latvia expects that the rate of annual inflation in this country will drop to 5.7% by 2002.

The macroeconomic development of Latvia in 1996 was positively assessed by the IMF. The country achieved GDP growth of 2.5%, the inflation rate fell to 13% compared to 23% in 1995. The interest rate dropped significantly, the high level of which in 1995 contributed to the development of the banking crisis in the country.

For its part, Lithuania in the spring of 1997 announced that it would like to reduce its dependence on IMF loans. On a number of issues, the Lithuanian government did not comply with the recommendations of the IMF, on the implementation of which, as a rule, the receipt of its loans depends. For example, Lithuania refused to reduce its relatively high tariff on imports of agricultural goods (by an average of 27.%).

A wave of banking crises captured Estonia in 1993, Latvia in 1994, and Lithuania in 1995. For example, in Estonia, a third of the banks went bankrupt during the crisis. The number of banks in the country decreased from 42 to 15 during the period 1993-1995. Today, Estonian banks are considered the best in the Baltics. Lithuania experienced the consequences of the banking crisis in 1996. In Latvia, in 1996, the big bank"Baltic". 2.8. most a high degree liberalization in the region distinguishes the Estonian economy. State intervention in the economy is reduced to a minimum, there are no restrictions on property rights. A tight monetary and financial policy ensures the free conversion of the national currency kroon with its stable exchange rate, as well as a balanced state budget. Since 1991, the country has attracted 800 million dollars of foreign direct investment. In terms of the number of foreign investments per inhabitant, Estonia among all CEE countries is second only to Hungary.

Important importance in macroeconomic policy is given to privatization.

By the beginning of 1996, Estonia had sold 64% of state-owned enterprises to private strategic investors. Voucher privatization affected mainly housing. In Lithuania, only 1% of state-owned enterprises were sold to outside investors. Voucher privatization covered about 70% of the country's enterprises. To attract investors in the privatization process, Estonia used the East German model. Finns and Swedes made up 2/3 of the strategic investors in Estonia. By the beginning of 1996, only 4% of enterprises (15% of the capital) remained in the hands of the state in Estonia. In terms of the share of the private sector in the economy, Estonia is ahead of all OECD countries. Beginning in 1994, Latvia began to apply the Estonian experience of international tenders in the process of privatization. In 1996, this process became widespread.

The second stage of privatization (non-voucher) began in Lithuania in 1996. controlling stakes shares of enterprises that have already passed voucher privatization. In 1996, out of 800 privatization tenders, only 30 offered controlling blocks of shares. As of 1997, 835 enterprises are being privatized in Lithuania, including 14 large ones. Among the latter: "Lithuanian Telecommunications", "Lithuanian Airlines", "Lithuanian Radio-Television Center". The Lithuanian Social Democrats opposed such large-scale privatization and demanded a referendum on the issue. In 1998, the Lithuanian government plans to start privatizing the last stronghold of the state economy - the gas and energy industries. By February 1997, only one small transport company from Klaipeda was purchased with the involvement of a foreign investor.

In 1997, Russian Gazprom, together with the German RUR-Gas, bought 16.25% of the shares of Latviyskiy Gaza, the country's national natural gas supplier.

The privatization process in the Baltics is taking place with the broad assistance of foreign investors. From the point of view of the existing economic and political risks for capital investors, until recently, Estonia was considered the most reliable in the West. According to Euromoney, in September 1996 Estonia ranked 71st out of 179 countries in terms of investor risk, ahead of Latvia (75th). However, in March 1997, Latvia moved up to 63rd place and overtook Estonia (69th). Lithuania has fallen to 72nd place in this indicator over the past period. Russia, for comparison, occupies the 91st place in the Euromoey list. In its assessments, this magazine, influential in the financial circles of the world, takes into account 9 indicators - the general economic development of the country, political risk, indicators of debt and fulfillment of payment obligations, access to the national financial market, etc.

In terms of foreign direct investment per capita, Latvia ($86 per year) overtook Estonia ($45) in 1996, leaving far behind the more populous Lithuania ($21). According to this indicator, Latvia is much inferior to Hungary and the Czech Republic, but is on a par with Poland and Croatia. Of course, in absolute terms, foreign investment flows more intensively to the neighboring countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

Along with attracting foreign investment, the Baltic countries began to practice entering foreign financial markets as investors. Recently, Lithuania has issued Eurobonds in the amount of 200 million US dollars.

The official unemployment rate remains low. As of January 1, 1997, there were 37,000 unemployed people in Estonia looking for a job. Of these, 19 thousand people had the status of unemployed, and 17 thousand people, or 2.3% of the entire working-age population, received benefits. As a result of the almost 50% decline in Estonian agricultural production, the unemployment rate there is relatively higher, which is a serious social problem. The state actually stopped supporting farm production. Estonia has increased the import of products - meat, poultry, which it used to export to neighboring republics. Previously popular in Russia, meat and dairy products from Estonia almost never appear on sale in the Russian Federation. European Commission experts strongly recommend Estonia to reduce the number of cattle.

Estonia's foreign trade deficit (14 billion kroons in 1996) is practically equal in size to the state budget of the country. Export earnings amount to only two-thirds of import costs. Russia accounts for 16% of Estonian exports (4 out of 25 billion kroons in 1996) and about 14% of imports (5.2 out of 38 billion kroons). Natural gas, oil and oil products are Russia's main exports to the Baltic countries. The share of transit in Estonian exports is 30%.

Accession to the EU may be accompanied by an increase in structural problems in the economy of the Baltic States. Especially serious will be the damage to agriculture and Food Industry.

The Baltic countries expect to improve their economic affairs by attracting foreign tourists. So far, however, these hopes have not been justified. For example, in Estonia, the number of foreign visitors in 1996 (2.5 million) decreased by 20% compared to 1995. Last year, foreign tourists spent $0.5 billion in the country, which is equal to 18% of export earnings . Estonia expects to double the number of foreign tourists over the next five years.

In the summer of 1997, Latvia's leading circles discussed the possibility of a partial withdrawal from the tough financial policy. The change of course was opposed by the Prime Minister of Latvia Andris Shkele, who had to leave his post. He noted that easing the rigidity of the government's financial policy in favor of populist political sentiments would entail new round inflation. "The political increase in salaries and pensions", he said, may turn out to be just an illusion, because "for lats you cannot buy what you bought the day before."

Attempts to change the macroeconomic course are not only the result of a political game. Despite external relative macroeconomic well-being, social tensions remain in the Baltic countries. For example, in Latvia, almost 70% of the population, according to The Baltic Times, lives below the poverty line. The average per capita income is estimated at 38 lats (65 USD) per month.

As already noted, the strategic goal of the Baltic States in the field of economics is accession to the EU. For this, in particular, a tight financial policy is being pursued in order to prepare in advance for the fulfillment of macroeconomic requirements for the European Monetary Union (EMI) coming into force in 1999 - low inflation and the size budget deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP. At the same time, in these countries, which spent so much time and effort to avoid the economic centralism of the Soviet era, they are trying to turn a blind eye to the fact that the creation of a monetary union means the formation of a single central bank in the EU, where monetary and monetary measures will be developed. policy (level interest rate, reserve requirements, regulation of operations in financial markets). From an economic point of view, accession to the EU will mean the absorption of the national sovereignty of the Baltic countries in the field of economic policy.

Accession to the EU will require an even tighter monetary policy and support firm course national currencies in relation to the euro common currency for the EU. This will be especially difficult for Lithuania, whose currency, unlike the Latvian and Estonian ones, is pegged to the US dollar, which itself constantly fluctuates against the main European currencies - the German mark, the French franc, the British pound sterling. As a result, the Lithuanian central bank will need constant foreign exchange interventions to maintain the national currency. Director of the Lithuanian Central Bank Gitanas Nauseda recently confirmed the impossibility of a quick reorientation of the litas towards European currencies. This moment, obviously, was taken into account in the EU when drawing up a schedule for admitting new members to the union.

So far, more than half of Estonians remain indifferent to the country's accession to the EU, and 10% of the population are extremely negative about this prospect. Moreover, this takes place in conditions when the real consequences of this step are not actually discussed in the country. The Euro-orientation of the Estonian population was much more pronounced in 1991. Accession to the EU at first will require the adoption of new or revision of the old 1000 laws. The cost of this legislative activity alone will be in the order of $30 million.

In recent years, there has been a clear reorientation of the foreign trade of the Baltic countries towards the EU states. At the same time, the importance of Russia as a trading partner of these states is declining. highest degree dependence on the EU markets differs Estonia (51.1% of exports and 64.8% of imports in 1996). For Latvia, the importance of the EU is also high - 44.7% and 49.3%, respectively. For Lithuania, the importance of the EU markets is approximately the same as that of the CIS markets - 33.9% and 40.6%, respectively; 44.8 and 36.0%. At the same time, among individual countries, Russia still remains the main trading partner of the Baltic countries.

To date, the Western states, primarily the EU member states, account for 40-50% of the total foreign trade turnover of the Baltic countries, while the share of Russia and the CIS countries has decreased to 20-30%. However, behind these visible changes, less noticeable facts are hidden, indicating the transition of dependence on relations with the East to a new quality.

2.3 Problems of relations between Russia and the Baltic countries

geopolitical baltic border country

2.3.1 Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries

After the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent states of the Baltic countries faced the problem of integrating a significant part of the Russian population who moved to the Baltics during the Soviet years. Many Russian citizens, who were the national majority in the Soviet Union, turned out to be completely unprepared for becoming a national minority and new living conditions in the newly independent Baltic states. The difficult process of transformation of the economy, caused by the transition from a planned socialist to a capitalist model and free market relations, is a thing of the past. Currently, the Baltic States demonstrate economic growth and stable development of the national economy, which, unfortunately, cannot be stated in relation to the sphere of political development of the new European states.

In recent years, the state of affairs with the Russian and other Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states has caused the greatest concern of the world Russian-speaking community. Perhaps all the concern of former compatriots about the situation in the Baltic countries can be reduced to two main points: the revision of history in general and the history of the 2nd World War in particular, and the problem of integration of national minorities, mainly political integration.

Political integration in general can be viewed from different points of view. In the case of the study of the political integration of national minorities, the development of language policy and political rights come to the fore. In this paper, an attempt is made to conduct a brief analysis of the conditions for the integration of national minorities after 15 years of independence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, because the problems in these states have much in common.

In Estonia, which gained independence for the first time, Estonians made up the vast majority of the population - 87.6% according to the 1922 census (Russians - 8.2%). industrialization. By the time of the 1959 census, Estonians already made up 74.6% of the total population (Russians - 20.1%, others. 5.3%). In 1989, the last Soviet census recorded the proportion of Estonians at 61.5%, Russians at 30.3% and other peoples at 8.2%. After the restoration of independence in 1991, the exodus of minorities from the republic, as well as low level fertility in their environment led to a change demographic composition population of Estonia: the 2000 census recorded a sharp decrease in the proportion of Russians (25.6%) and other non-Russians Estonian population(6.5%). The majority of the non-Estonian population is concentrated in Tallinn (46.3% of the total city population) and in the north-east of the country, where non-Estonians make up the vast majority of the population (e.g. 95.1% in Narva, 95.8% in Sillamäe, 82.2% in Kohtla-Jarve, etc.).

Demographic changes after the 2nd World War led to the emergence of a large Russian community in Estonia, which included both the historical Russian minority and the newly arrived representatives of this people. Gradually, on the basis of the Russian community, the so-called. a Russian-speaking community, which includes both already Russified representatives of other nations, and those who, after moving to Estonia, preferred Russian as the main language of communication outside the home. In 2000, 80% of the entire Estonian population had the citizenship of the country of residence (among minorities, this was only 40%). At the same time, Estonian legislation recognizes only those who have Estonian citizenship as representatives of minorities. Russians, Germans, Swedes and Jews are recognized in Estonia as traditional minorities, which corresponds to historical realities.

Problems of integration of national minorities caused by Estonian language legislation. According to Art. 6 of the Constitution of Estonia, adopted by referendum in 1992, the only official (state) language is Estonian. In 1995, the Riigikogu (Parliament) adopted a new Language Act, which established rather stringent requirements for the knowledge and use of the Estonian language in various areas public life. The Language Act establishes that “the language of a national minority is a foreign language which Estonian citizens – members of a national minority – used originally in Estonia as their mother tongue”.

However, the legislation provides some scope for the use of minority languages (in practice, Russian) for official purposes. Art. 51 of the constitution and the Law on Language establish the right of representatives of national minorities to receive answers to mother tongue from state and municipal institutions only in those regions where Estonian is not the language of the majority of the resident population. The same norm is contained in the Law on Language (Article 10). In the same regions, the constitution "in statutory volume and order" permits the conduct of internal office work in the language of the majority (Article 52). Article 11 of the Law on Language provides that permission to use a second language of office work is given by the government of the republic. positive decision no government followed. At the same time, for example, the leadership of the predominantly Russian-speaking Sillamäe filed it twice.

As for all other regions of Estonia (including Tallinn with its 43% non-Estonian population), in official contacts, Russian (like any other) can be used here only with the consent of officials. In January 2002, Section 8(4) of the Language Act was amended so that persons who do not speak Estonian have the right to communicate with an official through an interpreter, whom they themselves must pay for.

At the local (local) level, problems of political integration are also associated with language restrictions. Until recently, Estonian laws provided for the obligatory knowledge of the Estonian language by deputies of any level. There was even a precedent when a deputy from the predominantly Russian-speaking Sillamäe was deprived of his mandate only because of ignorance state language(judgment of the Administrative Board of the Supreme Court of October 30, 1998 in RT III 1998, 29, 294).

On November 2001, an amendment was made to the Internal Regulations Act of the Riigikogu establishing Estonian as the language of single language parliamentary business. A similar rule was established for all assemblies of local governments, regardless of the ethnic composition of their population (it should be noted that members of the local assemblies of Narva, Maardu, Sillamäe and some other cities spoke Russian at sessions, taking advantage of the vagueness of the previous legal provisions).

At the end of our review of the situation in Estonia, we consider it necessary to note that according to the results of the 2000 census, 20% of the Estonian population does not speak Estonian. In Tallinn, people without knowledge of the Estonian language make up 26%, in the cities of the northeast, populated mainly by Russian speakers, - 71% of the population. In such a situation, it is quite obvious that the existing language rules do not take into account the interests of this part of the population.

In Latvia, until October 1991, all residents had the same rights. On October 15, 1991, the Parliament of Latvia adopted the Decree "On the restoration of the rights of citizens of the Republic of Latvia and the main conditions for naturalization", dividing the inhabitants of Latvia into two main categories: citizens (about 2/3 of the population) and non-citizens (about 1/3). The criterion for referring to the totality of citizens is the presence of Latvian citizenship by a person or his ancestors before June 1940. According to the statistics of 1993, 876,000 people were deprived of political rights, of which 161,000 (mostly illegally) were denied even registration in the Register of Residents.

The problem of "statelessness" is almost exclusively a problem of ethnic minorities. As of January 1, 2001, they accounted for 99.4% of all non-citizens. Among ethnic Latvians there were only 0.26% non-citizens, among non-Latvians - 55.1%.

Non-citizens acquired the possibility of gradual individual restoration of political rights collectively taken away by a one-time act only from February 1995, through the naturalization procedure. In 1996, 670,478 non-citizens lived in Latvia, and as of 01.01.2006 - 418,440 non-citizens (respectively, 27.2% and 18.2% of the country's population). For 10 years, the number of non-citizens has decreased by 252,038 people. The number of naturalized non-citizens (including minor children) at the end of 2005 was 104,521 people. The number of foreigners permanently residing in Latvia (mostly former non-citizens who have acquired foreign citizenship) has increased by 25,201 people. The number of persons who have acquired Latvian citizenship by registration is 11,350 (including 4,748 minors at the request of non-citizen parents).

Accordingly, a decrease in the number of non-citizens by 141,072 people, or by 56%, can be interpreted as a change in their legal status. The remaining 110,966 are the result of emigration and the excess of deaths over births (in last case It should be noted that a child born in the marriage of a citizen and a non-citizen receives the status of a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania).

Over the same years, the population of the Republic of Lithuania decreased by 178,766 people due to emigration and natural decline. Non-citizens account for 62.1% of these losses, with a share of 22.7% in the country's population on average for the period. This 2.7 times excess is a comprehensive indicator of discrimination against non-citizens compared to Latvian citizens. The status of a non-citizen practically remains hereditary, although since February 1999 a child born after Latvia gained independence can be registered as a citizen at the request of the parents. As of March 1, 2006, only 4,748 children received Latvian citizenship in this way.

The deprivation of the majority of non-Latvians of political rights was followed by a progressive differentiation of Latvian residents in other "non-political" rights: social rights, property rights, employment, etc.

In April 1995, under pressure from European structures (mainly the OSCE mission in Latvia), the Law "On the Status of Citizens" was adopted. former USSR who do not have citizenship of Latvia or another state". This law determined legal status most of the non-citizens. Part 3. Art. 2 of the Law established (30.03.2000 it was excluded from the law) that "the bodies exercising state power and state administration are obliged to ensure observance of the rights (mentioned in the Law) and not to allow restrictions on these rights in laws, resolutions, instructions, orders and other acts issued by state and local government bodies".

Numerous restrictions for non-citizens on the right to hold positions in the public sector are only in some cases consistent with the principle of proportionality. In some cases, restrictions apply not only to heads of services, but also to ordinary employees (for example, in the state revenue service or in civil registration departments). Restrictions also apply to mass professions: policemen, firefighters, guarding places of detention.

As a rule, in addition to non-citizens, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania with limited legal capacity, who have committed criminal offenses, who collaborated with the KGB in the past, or activists of the CPSU during the period of its legal activity, cannot occupy the relevant positions. In total, there are 22 such restrictions that are offensive to non-citizens and contribute to inciting ethnic hatred (non-citizens make up about half of non-Latvians) in various areas, or more than 30% of all restrictions.

In addition, restrictions on membership in the CPSU and cooperation with the KGB are the basis for a life-long deprivation of the right to naturalization (Law "On Citizenship", Article 11.1), and hence a life-long ban on professions. It should be noted that members of the armed forces and internal troops USSR, if they were called not from Latvia. Lifetime deprivation of the right to work in state (8 restrictions) and private (3 restrictions) power structures pushes these people to join organized crime.

In Lithuania, after gaining independence, under the law of 1991, officially equal political rights were given to all its inhabitants through the acquisition of citizenship, regardless of ethnic background. This step did not allow the development of interethnic tensions, characteristic of the other two Baltic republics.

Taking into account the actual situation in the Baltic countries, we can say that the problems of political integration of national minorities are systemic. Given the significance of the consequences, it can be assumed that without reforming the legal system towards liberalization in relation to national minorities, the situation in Estonia and Latvia is fraught with serious conflicts that can lead to the polarization of society and the split of the country. In order to avoid further negative developments in the situation, it is possible to apply the European experience in resolving interethnic conflicts and harmonizing the legislation of Estonia and Latvia, affecting the position and ways of integration of national minorities, in accordance with European standards.

It must be realized that the current Russian policy is a variant of the "damage limitation" strategy, and it has its limits.

The most vulnerable is the Russian position regarding "human rights" in the Baltics. Attracting the attention of the world community to such a formulation of the issue has not had much effect so far. The last example was the removal of the issue from discussion by the UN General Assembly at the end of 1996 and the withdrawal of monitoring from Estonia by the Council of Europe, when none of the 20 amendments proposed by the Russian delegation was taken into account. Meanwhile, there are quite strong arguments in support of the Russian position on the need to promote the integration of Russians in the Baltic countries. This is, first of all, the interest of the Baltic States themselves in stability in this area in connection with their integration into the West. The West, in turn, pays attention precisely to the problems of integrating Russians, promoting and facilitating the process of naturalization.

In the longer term, especially if an economic recovery begins in Russia, such measures as limiting the development of economic relations with the Baltic countries are dead ends. These measures may turn against Russia also in case of accelerating the processes of its admission to the WTO, where the most favored nation treatment for partners is a necessary condition.

.3.2 Border issues

In 1991, the most advanced in terms of borders between the parties was the agreement on the foundations of interstate relations between Russia and Lithuania. Together with the agreement, a special Agreement on cooperation in the economic and socio-cultural development of the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR was signed, in article 1 of which the parties recognized the "inviolability existing border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania throughout its entire length.

In the agreements on interstate relations between Russia and Estonia and Latvia, it was stated that the parties respect each other's right to territorial integrity in accordance with the principles of the CSCE. It was stipulated that the regime of the state border between the parties would be determined by special bilateral agreements.

3. Differences in the provisions of the treaties are explained not only by Russia's special interest in the Kaliningrad region, but also have a historical dimension. The territory of Lithuania after becoming part of the USSR was enlarged, and part of the territory of Belarus was added to Vilnius, transferred to Lithuania in 1939. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the territories ceded to these states under the terms of the peace treaties of 1920. with Soviet Russia, after the war they were returned to the RSFSR.

Almost immediately after the restoration of independence, on September 12, 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia declared invalid the decisions of the Supreme Council of the USSR on the transfer of a number of territories of the Leningrad and Pskov regions to the Russian Federation (the total area is about 2.3 thousand km2). On January 22, 1992, a similar decision was adopted by the Supreme Council of Latvia regarding the Pytalovsky and Palkinsky districts of the Pskov region (1.6 thousand km2).

The basis for such decisions was the same proclaimed succession of the modern Baltic states and republics of 1920-1940. The Baltics argue that the peace treaties of 1920 between Moscow and Tallinn and Riga remained valid even after the entry of Estonia and Latvia into the USSR, and therefore the border of these states with Russia should pass precisely under the terms of these agreements.

Estonia went the furthest and began issuing Estonian passports to residents of these regions on the grounds that they were citizens of the pre-war republic. Estonians have also taken initiatives to engage the CSCE and individual Western countries(in particular, Finland) to mediate in resolving the conflict.

Russia has taken an unequivocally tough position on the issue of the border line. In June 1994, President B. Yeltsin issued a decree on the unilateral marking of the border between Estonia and Russia on the ground. In November of the same year, B. Yeltsin, visiting a section of the Russian-Estonian border, declared that "no one will get a single inch of Russian land."

Certain shifts in Estonia's position occurred after the resignation of the right-liberal government at the end of 1994. In May 1995, the President of the Republic, L. Meri, announced Estonia's readiness to sign a border treaty with Russia, in which this issue would be finally resolved. At the next round of Russian-Estonian negotiations in October 1995 in Pskov, an important provision was agreed on that the parties had no territorial claims against each other, and in November 1995 an agreement in principle was reached in Tallinn on the direct passage of the border line, while the initial one was the current one is taken. Finally, in February 1996, direct work began on describing the border.

At present, only formal obstacles hinder the resolution of the issue of the line of the border between Russia and Estonia, namely, the requirement of Estonia to fix a provision confirming the validity of the 1920 treaty for Russian-Estonian relations. This requirement, however, is of a fundamental nature. As M. Helme, the Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to Russia, directly stated, if the treaty of 1920 was recognized, Russia would have to recognize the fact of the occupation of Estonia in 1940 with all the ensuing consequences. The official Russian position is that with the entry of Estonia into the USSR in 1940, the treaty of 1920 lost its force and has only historical significance.

As for Latvia, in Russia's relations with this republic the issues of the border line have not become as acute as in the case of Estonia. Negotiations on the demarcation and delimitation of the Russian border with Latvia began in April 1996, while the Latvian side agreed to negotiate not on the "restoration" of the border, but on the "state border" between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation.

Concerning the issue of borders, some experts once raised the issue of convening a multilateral (with the participation of Russia and all three Baltic states) conference on settlement. Considering the situation with Lithuania, it would be possible to "bind" all three states by confirming the inviolability of borders. In this case, the principles of the CSCE "work" for Russian interests, as well as the restrained attitude of the West towards the claims of the Baltic states regarding borders.

.3.3 Security in the region

Absolutely obvious negative consequences for the geopolitical interests of Russia entail the entry of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania into NATO. After Poland became a member of NATO, the alliance came to the border with the Kaliningrad region of Russia. However, with the admission of the Baltic countries, Russian border with NATO stretched 400 miles to the northeast and is now only 100 miles from Russia's unofficial second capital, St. Petersburg. The official sphere of NATO's military responsibility rested on the western borders of our country, including part of the belt of Russian vital interests in the Baltics: the Balts, emboldened by belonging to the Western bloc, are doing their best to limit Russia's access to seaports. Moreover, the alliance's informal areas of responsibility are being formed in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. European part Russia today is beginning to resemble not a "border with NATO", but an enclave inside the official and unofficial zones of increased activity of NATO members. These zones cover Russia in a crescent from the northwest, west and southwest. From Azerbaijan and Georgia, efforts are being made to install a “half-horseshoe” of such zones in the south, while the second “half-horseshoe” is visible behind the activity of NATO countries in Central-East Asia. NATO seemed to have stepped over the European array of Russia, undertaking to develop what we used to consider Russia's deep Asian rear.

As you know, all the official bodies of NATO and its three newly minted members - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia do not tire of repeating that the approach of the North Atlantic Alliance to Russia will only benefit it: security in the region will become stronger and "democratic values" in Russia itself will be strengthened due to such a "pleasant neighborhood". But there are some not entirely clear facts that have already been repeatedly mentioned in the Russian and international media.

In particular, it is not entirely clear why all of a sudden on the territory of the Baltic republics, even before the official invitation to NATO, with the active assistance of the United States and a number of Western European countries of the bloc, the construction of the most modern BALTNET radar surveillance and control system was launched? Moreover, this system is not only fully compatible with the unified NATO radar and electronic surveillance network, but also has capabilities that go far beyond the boundaries of the Baltic region proper. "BALTNET" allows you to control not only the sky over the Baltic States, but also the aerospace of Belarus and a significant part of Russia.

The deployment of "BALTNET" actually began back in 1997, and the main elements of the system went into operation in 2000, when it was still apparently unknown whether the Balts would be accepted into NATO or not. The central object of "BALTNET" is the so-called. "Regional Center for Air Surveillance and Coordination", located in the town of Karmelava, 100 km west of the capital of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius. The center is served by international staff representing all three Baltic republics, as well as specialist advisers from the US and other NATO countries.

The Karmelavsky center coordinates the work of three national nodes of the "BALTNET" system, located respectively in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The main part of the equipment for the network was supplied by the United States, and the installation, debugging and training of personnel was carried out by Norwegian specialists with experience in operating a similar airspace control system in the Finnmark province bordering Russia. The construction of the system's facilities cost $100 million, which was clearly not allocated from the modest budgets of the Baltic countries. Thus, after the formal accession of the Baltic republics to the alliance, no problems arose with the immediate inclusion of BALTNET in the integrated air surveillance and early warning system of NATO, and through it in the US-owned global intelligence and information system Echelon, of course, did not arise.

Moreover, the newly-minted Baltic "NATOs" apparently, not without a pointer from Washington and Brussels, intend not to rest on their laurels and continue to build up "BALTNET". In particular, Latvia, as has been repeatedly reported in the media, has decided to purchase and deploy in the southeast of its territory, 70 km from the border with Russia, the powerful newest American radar complex TPS-117. At one time, I remember, the plans to deploy this radar caused very violent protests of the Russian-speaking population of the republic, who feared the negative impact of the station's radiation on the environment and people's health.

This "pleasure" will cost the Latvian budget 8 million lats, not counting the cost of operation. The complex will be assembled by specialists from the American military-industrial concern Lockheed Martin at the former Soviet military airfield in the Audrins parish of Rezekne county in Latgale (southeastern Latvia). The geographical position of the radar station will allow it, in particular, to confidently cover the entire Pskov region of Russia, including the locations of the Pskov airborne division and the airfields of the military transport aviation of the Russian Air Force.

According to open information about the performance characteristics of the TPS-117 station, its range is approximately 460 kilometers. However, according to unofficial data, radars of this type are capable of detecting high-speed, small-sized air targets, including missile warheads of various types in near-Earth space at an inclined range of up to 1000 km and at an altitude of more than 20 km, which makes it clearly an object of strategic importance. Some experts claim that the TPS-117 radar also has a number of "special features": using its "pencil beam", which is practically not affected by terrain and weather, you can track not only aircraft and missiles, but also stationary and mobile objects at sea and on land.

According to some reports, half of the staff of the "Latvian" TPS-117, at least at first, will be American specialists. Interestingly, the US plans to deploy two more stations of this type in Estonia and Lithuania in the future. As a result, a unified system of dense radar and electronic tracking of adjacent territories will be created in the Baltic States and airspace Russia and Belarus, which will allow NATO to know almost everything that is happening in the North-West of the CIS. And recently it became known that in addition to the TPS-117, three more less powerful ASR-7 medium-range airspace tracking radars will be deployed in Latvia, which, together with similar Estonian radars, will also be included in the common BALTNET network. It is assumed that these radars will be located in the Ventspils region, in Lielvarde or in Aluksne.

Against the backdrop of NATO's deployment of a powerful intelligence complex in the Baltics, the obvious miscalculation of the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in connection with the decision to completely close the intelligence complex in Cuba, which made it possible to obtain unique information from US territory, cannot but cause regret. The bet that the closure of the Cuban center will be compensated by building up the reconnaissance satellite constellation is clearly not justified. It remains only to hope that the necessary conclusions for the future will be drawn from this.

2.3.4 Social tension

Public opinion in Russia

Two-thirds of Russians consider the Baltic states unfriendly towards our country: 64% of respondents described Latvia as such, Lithuania and Estonia - 61% each. Older citizens share this opinion much more often than younger ones: Latvia, for example, is called an unfriendly state by 68% of the representatives of the older age group and 56% of the younger ones. The age differences are especially pronounced in Moscow, where 83% of the elderly and 59% of the young respondents speak of the "unfriendliness" of the same country. Many do not undertake to assess the nature of relations between Russia and the Baltic States, and only 14-15% of the respondents recognize these states as friendly. However, more than half of the respondents (56%) would prefer relations between the Baltic States and Russia to be closer than they are now.

The greatest interest in rapprochement with the Baltics was shown by elderly respondents, persons with higher education as well as citizens with relatively high incomes. Only 11% of those polled, on the contrary, would prefer that relations between Russia and the Baltic States be less close. It is not surprising that this position was taken only by respondents who consider Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia unfriendly to Russia. But even among those who assess the attitude of the Baltic countries towards us in this way, only 15-16% are supporters of distancing themselves from them.

Most of our fellow citizens believe that the Baltic countries and Russia are interested in rapprochement - only 17% of the survey participants definitely take the opposite position. But it is curious that the opinion that both sides are equally interested in rapprochement is shared by relatively few (20%), while the point of view that this rapprochement is primarily needed by Russia (30%) is much more widespread, and the opposite view is much less common: only 8 % of respondents believe that the Baltic countries are more interested in it.

By the way, only a quarter of the respondents (27%) believe that the Baltic countries were annexed to the Soviet Union against their will (a third - 34% - think that their entry into the USSR was voluntary). Even less - three times - the share of those who believe that being part of the Soviet Union brought more harm to the Baltic countries than good: only 9% of respondents think so, while 65% are convinced of the opposite.

Public opinion in the Baltic countries

In the opinion of the majority of nationalist-minded "indigenous" residents in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, signs of the restoration of Russian influence are everywhere. These are the “Kremlin-funded media”, and the Kremlin-funded local politics and economic development, and the Moscow-fuelled determination of a third of the population of the Baltic republics inherited from Russia; and the "energy club" that the Kremlin loves to use. This tactic - especially the use of Russian money - has created tensions in the Baltics that no one even thought about five years ago.

The main theses of the Baltic nationalists is that "everything that is happening today in the Baltics is the strategy of Russian President Vladimir Putin to revive Russian influence in most of Eastern Europe."

Every time someone in the Baltic opposes Russian pressure, emotions are triggered on both sides, the fault of which is the memory of a difficult common history. In the twentieth century, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania came under the rule of the Russian tsars, but after the First World War they gained independence. In 1939, when Hitler and Stalin signed a non-aggression pact, Soviet troops broke into the Baltic States. Stalin deported to the Siberian gulags, to certain death, hundreds of thousands of Balts. And when the Nazis took the place of the Soviet troops, many considered the Germans to be liberators - and many Balts agreed to cooperate with the Nazis and participate in the extermination of local Jews.

The opinion of the older Russian-speaking population is obvious - almost one hundred percent coincidence with the opinion of Russians, however, there is a tendency of the younger Russian-speaking generation to focus on European countries. Young people are studying English and German en masse for subsequent travel outside the unfriendly Baltic countries and permanent residence in the territory of Western European countries.

3. Prospects for relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the future

Despite everything, it is necessary to clearly and clearly understand that Russian-Baltic relations are the most important vector of Russian policy in the European direction and their relevance will only increase.

Opportunities exist in state (Presidential Administration, Russian Foreign Ministry, Federal Assembly, regional authorities) and economic structures (individual Russian companies, their associations, Round table business of Russia, RSPP, etc.), which can be more actively involved in improving our bilateral relations for the benefit of all participants in the process.

At present, the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the relevant departments of the Ministry, and specialists from other foreign affairs departments have done a great deal of work to rethink the problems facing our states. A significant contribution to the stabilization of relations was made by various regional initiatives, both initiated by the authorities of the northwestern regions of Russia and the Baltic states.

In the foreseeable future, Russian diplomacy will once again face the problem of a second wave of NATO expansion. It seems to us that the non-inclusion of the Baltic states into the expanding Alliance may become for Russia one of the elements of the "damage limitation" strategy in the event of a hard resolution of the expansion problem. In this case, an unequivocal firm position will not only weaken the forces that seek to disregard Russia, but will also be advantageous from an internal political point of view, since there is a consensus within Russia regarding the geopolitical affiliation of the Baltic countries.

Russia's long-term interests are met by an evolutionary strategy in the Baltic problem, which, from a Western standpoint, could be formulated as follows:

promotion of political and economic reform in the Baltic countries, the success of which is seen as a precondition for the independence of the Baltic States, its integration with the West. Particular attention is paid to the settlement of the problem of the Russian-speaking minority;

defense cooperation of the Baltic states. The defense system of the Baltic States must be established so that it can be integrated into the wider regional and international system. Ideally, one should strive for the status that Sweden and Finland currently have - countries that have modern military forces, but also have very close relations with NATO;

enlargement of the EU to include the Baltic states. It is necessary to create a precedent - to make at least one of the Baltic States a "part of the West" by joining the European Union. Informally, it is proposed to admit the first group of countries to the EU, including Cyprus and Malta in the south, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in Central and Eastern Europe and one Baltic state (Estonia) in Northern Europe;

an "open door" strategy for NATO membership. Closing the "door to NATO" would have a strong negative effect in these countries and possibly undermine the reform process. Simultaneously with the announcement that the Alliance intends to expand to include the CEE countries, it must be publicly confirmed that it remains open to the membership of the Baltic countries, and in the future - will be transformed into a pan-European security structure that includes Russia. The strategy outlined should seek to include Baltic countries into the system of bilateral, multilateral and institutional ties with the West without provoking Russian reaction which would increase the security threats to these states and seriously undermine other objectives of Western policy toward Russia.

Some shifts are outlined in the situation with the position of Russian-speaking minorities in these countries. In particular, the problem of the slow progress of the naturalization process is being actively discussed in Latvia, and talks have begun about the need to supplement or even revise the law on citizenship. Estonia has taken steps to speed up the process of issuing "foreigner's passports" and residence permits, and is discussing a bill that, if passed, will ensure that a large proportion of non-citizens will automatically exchange temporary residence permits for permanent ones. According to some reports, the number of people accepting Russian citizenship is decreasing and there are cases of exit from it.

The economic aspects of Russia's relations with the Baltic countries are a powerful factor in rapprochement. At the same time, this factor is far from fully involved. This can be largely explained by the fact that the current level of development of economic relations allows Russia to satisfy its interests without compromising political guidelines. Despite the elements of economic sanctions against the Baltic countries, which were discussed above, the volume of Russian trade with them has been continuously increasing since 1994, with a positive balance for Russia. The example of Estonia is indicative: despite the absence of the most favored nation treatment in trade with Russia, the Russian-Estonian trade turnover is increasing. Although business has not yet become a decisive force in the normalization of Russian-Baltic relations, the presence of mutual economic interest is a guarantee against the implementation of ill-conceived actions such as "sanctions". Closer and more active economic ties between Russia and the countries of the region would allow our business to participate in promising projects of a pan-European scale.

And finally, domestic entrepreneurs will play their weighty word in the Russian-Baltic rapprochement. So far, Russia is not among the countries that have large volumes of investments in the Baltics. In terms of investment in Estonia, Russia ranks third among foreign investors (10% of foreign direct investment), fifth in Lithuania, and sixth in Latvia. However, the objects of investment of Russian funds are very important for the Baltic economy.

In Estonia, Gazprom, which has a monopoly on natural gas supplies to the republic, owns a 30% stake in Esti Gaas. In 1993, Gazprom's subsidiary, Lentransgaz, won a tender to privatize a mineral fertilizer plant in Kohtla-Järve (Nitrofert) and is now the full owner of the plant. 90% of the company's products (carbamide and ammonia fertilizers) are exported, providing the republic with an annual inflow of $20-25 million. Gazprom has already announced the purchase of a large block of shares (16.25%) of the Latvian company Latvijas Gaze. Together with another foreign investor (RUR-Gaz, also 16.25% of the shares), Gazprom is expected to invest $50 million in the development of Latvijas Gaze. This is the second largest investment project in the republic after the restoration of independence. The possibility of participation of Russian enterprises in other sectors of the economy important for the Baltic States is being discussed. For example, LUKOIL may take part in the privatization of Vetspils-afta, an oil pumping company in the Latvian port of Ventspils, and will also invest in the construction of an oil terminal in Butinge (Lithuania).

Conclusion

Russia has always been an international country that respects the memory of people of different nationalities, even if we did not feel sympathy for them. And a good illustration of this, for example, are the monuments to French soldiers on the Borodino field. This is an example of a careful and correct attitude to history.

On the one hand, the residents of the Baltic states have a certain basis for indignation at the period of being part of the USSR. On the other hand, the current political elite of the Baltic states builds its own legitimacy on the denial of the entire Soviet past, in which it enjoys the support of most Western countries. The anti-Russian component is embedded in the entire education system, a whole young generation of people is being brought up who have no experience of living in the USSR, but at the same time they often and without fail visit the museums of the occupation.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's relations with the Baltic countries were not easy. The abundance of historical grievances and mutual claims prevented finding mutual understanding in the national, cultural, political, economic spheres.

Attempts to scientifically analyze the processes that took place in the Baltic region (as, indeed, in the entire post-Soviet space) were also not free from a subjective, often overly politicized approach.

The desire to shift responsibility to the opposite side, the unwillingness to admit one's own mistakes, the lack of sociological research data - all this hinders the formation of an objective view of the geopolitical processes taking place on the world stage.

Relations between the Baltic states and Russia are of particular importance in the light of NATO's eastward advance and the active desire of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to be included in the next "tranche" of invitees. Moscow's official position on this issue is well known.

At the same time in economic sphere there is an objective positive potential; historically, one should not forget about the decisive role played by the leadership of the new Russia in gaining independence for the Baltic countries.

AT this moment there are objective preconditions for the success of such efforts. The leaders of the Baltic States are increasingly aware of the fact that in order to successfully integrate into Western structures, they need a stable relationship with Russia; this is one of the mandatory conditions formulated by the West itself.

The most far-sighted Russian politicians also realize that the lack of dialogue with the Baltics will ultimately lead to its loss for Russia, just as it happened with Central and Eastern Europe.

It is necessary to overcome imaginary and real contradictions and propose new approaches.

Bibliography

Internet portal of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Russian Federation ( );

Internet portal "Compatriots" (http://www.russedina.ru);

Internet portal of the Public Opinion Foundation (http://www.fom.ru);

Internet portal of the weekly "Delo" ( );

Internet portal "InoPress" (http://inopressa.ru);

Internet portal of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (http://www.ng.ru);

Internet portal of the political expert network "Kreml.org" (http://www.kreml.org);

Article - "The results of 15 years of freedom: the situation of Russians in the Baltic countries", Ovseenko Yu.;

Article - "The geopolitical structure of the post-Soviet space: the main factors and stages of development", Lyakhovich A.G.;

Global Internet encyclopedia "Wikipedia" (http://ru.wikipedia.org);

Article - "The Estonian economy is highly dependent on Russia", Nikonov V.

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