War came to the Balkans along with the troops of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. At first, everything went very well for Greek forces, weak Italian divisions invaded Greece at the end of October, without warning Berlin, after a brief advance bogged down in the mountains. The British Expeditionary Force in the Balkans fought successfully - in a 62-day campaign, General Sir Archibald Wavel captured 133,000 Italian prisoners at the cost of his total losses in 3,000 people. There was a coup in Yugoslavia, and the new government "wanted to take the side of the Western powers." However, the Germans soon came to the aid of the Italians. On April 6, 1941, Germany attacked the Balkans, and by the middle of the month the Yugoslav resistance was defeated, the Greek front was broken through, and the British expeditionary forces, outflanked, after a series of desperate rearguard battles, were urgently evacuated.

In the Greek campaign, the British lost more than 12,000 men, "at least 8,000 vehicles", most of the equipment, 209 aircraft, 6 ships of the Royal naval forces and more than a dozen merchant ships. Another bitter defeat after such a difficult victory in the Battle of Britain. The situation was aggravated by the fact that additional expeditionary forces (Australian 6th Division, New Zealand Division, one armored brigade, as well as several other formations total strength, about 58,000 people) sent to help Athens in March 1941, the African contingent of Britain was weakened so much that Egypt was also actually lost.

After the defeat in Greece, about 27,000 soldiers were evacuated to Crete. On November 3, 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in two memorandums that Souda Bay and Crete should become "a second Scapa," a permanent military stronghold. From that moment on, we can talk about the beginning of the final stage of the Balkan campaign - the battle for Crete.

As Henson Baldwin notes: “The war came to Crete unexpectedly, by chance, rather as a result of misjudgment than a well-crafted plan. The battle for Crete is the best refutation of the popular belief that war is a planned and rational process, where logic prevails over strategy. Adolf Hitler and his young paratroopers were drawn into Crete gradually, unintentionally, even with reluctance, Mussolini's arrogance, Goering's impertinence, his commitment to the process of annihilation in general. Hitler's eyes were farther away, he had grander ambitions - an invasion of Russia; he was not interested in the Mediterranean campaign. England was also drawn to the island under the influence of inexorable circumstances, tangled destinies, partly unplanned and in best case obscurely visible. Its strategic concept was vague and its policy indecisive."

For Hitler, Crete was another annoying delay on the way to Russia. The Mediterranean theater, indeed, was of little interest to him, but he believed that control in the Balkans necessary condition further advance to the east. The mastery of the island strengthened control over the Aegean Sea and the sea straits, guaranteed security sea ​​route from Greece to Romania and Bulgaria, in addition, Hitler feared that, using Crete as a base, the British would start bombing Ploiesti - Romanian oil fields having strategic importance. The British held on to the island because it became a "matter of honor" - a symbol of their presence in the Mediterranean. It is unlikely that the British were able to seriously threaten Ploiesti or German naval caravans, there was no air base in Crete, and create it in short term was impossible. One way or another, but the Cretan knot was tightened more and more tightly, and the "soldiers of the Reich" were going to cut it. The operation developed by the Germans to capture Crete was called the "Mercury" plan.

“It was like the god of war brought together a warrior with a trident and a net and his enemy with a shield and a sword in the Cretan coliseum,” continues Baldwin. “History has weaved a network of fate in its own way, connecting the disparate parts of the world, people of different skin colors and with different heritage of fathers, alien to each other by their names, language, time, so that they gathered for a common meeting in the battle for Crete. Men and women from distant continents came to this battle in the Cretan mountains and on the Cretan seas. There lived a wild Cretan mountain people, fierce and independent, proud and courageous and, to the surprise of the Germans, sharply opposed to them. There were Maori from New Zealand, tough little people who took on a natural fraternity with a mountain people from another world. There were drunken Australians singing Dancing Matilda. There were Royal Marines and elements from some of the ancient British regiments, keeping the tradition. There were 16,000 Italian prisoners, Greek soldiers evacuated from the mainland, Palestinians and Cypriots and a full complement of units and units hastily evacuated from Greece - "artillerymen who lost their guns, sappers who lost their tools and<...>drivers who have lost their cars." And through the narrow straits in which Darius and Xerxes and the conquerors of the past so often swam, the Germans looked at them, encouraged by recent murders and confident in their victory.

The capture of the island was planned as an "invasion on wings". The entire burden of the task fell on the parachute and glider landing. The key to victory was absolute air supremacy, and the Germans accurately assessed their capabilities. The distances from Crete to the German air bases established on the mainland and the islands ranged from 120 to 240 km. and did not exceed the range of German aircraft. The distances to the British air bases in Egypt, Malta and Mersa Matruh were 700, 1000 and 500 km respectively. In addition, the Germans had significantly more aircraft in the region. This was the bet, but the risk remained, because airborne operations of this magnitude had never been carried out before.

The British did not take the threat of an airborne assault seriously. Churchill wrote that General Freiberg, who, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister himself, was appointed commander of the British troops in Crete, said on May 5: "I cannot understand the reasons for nervousness, I am not at all worried about the airborne assault." He was more concerned about the invasion of Crete from the sea, although this threat in this case partly filmed with the presence of English navy. Churchill, too, was concerned about the threat to Crete. He insisted on sending "at least a dozen more tanks" in addition to the six or seven tanks that were there.

General Wavel arrived in Crete only at the end of April, and found the troops in complete disarray. The bulk were evacuees from Greece, they were exhausted, disorganized and perceived their stay on the sunny island as a reward for the suffering they had endured. Most of the equipment, ammunition and weapons were lost during the evacuation. “People had no weapons or equipment, plates, knives, forks or spoons; they ate and drank from cans or cigarette boxes. The morale of this "mixture" was low," Davin wrote. Organizing them into combat-ready formations was not an easy task.

In fact, absolutely suitable for combat use there were only 8,700 men - all from the United Kingdom (including two regiments transferred from Egypt). The rest arrived at varying degrees readiness: 10,000 of the 27,000 of those soldiers who were evacuated from Greece turned out to be strayed from their formations and without weapons. Most of them were "Palestinian or Cypriot workers - sick, wounded or weakened in the battles." Some of them were sent by sea to Egypt even before the start of the battle. Of the 11,000 Greek military and 3,000 cadets of the Greek military and air force academies and gendarmes were formed about 11 rifle battalions without heavy weapons and with limited number ammunition (less than 30 rounds per person on average). These units, however, were reinforced by Cretan irregulars, a mountain people armed with sabers, hunting rifles and ferocious pride.

The island's defenders thus totaled over 42,000 men - over 17,000 British, 6,500 Australians, 7,700 New Zealanders, 10,000-12,000 regular Greek soldiers plus an undetermined number of irregulars and paramilitary forces. There was very little motorized transport on the island, with some units having none at all. Artillery was weak and ammunition was limited. There were only about half the necessary anti-aircraft guns. Freiburg divided his troops into four groups, which were stationed respectively at four points: Heraklion, Rethymno, Malame and Souda Bay. The first three points had airfields. However, due to the lack of transport, the groups were isolated and therefore completely unable to support each other.

The German forces intended to capture Crete were the 7th Parachute and 5th Mountain Rifle Divisions. It was planned that these formations would be dropped by parachute or delivered by gliders and transport aircraft. To cover the landing from the air, suppress the British fleet and support on the battlefield, the 8th Aviation Corps was allocated, consisting of 280 bombers, 150 dive bombers and 180 fighters.

But the Germans, like the British, had problems. The attack on Greece came too late and had to be carried out so quickly (because of the upcoming Russian campaign) that there was not enough time to plan and prepare the Mercury plan. German paratroopers were used on April 26 to capture the Corinth Canal and its crossings, parachute troops were scattered over a wide area as far as France; transport aviation units were busy in Greece and not all were properly trained for the transfer of parachute troops. Several hundred Ju-52 transport aircraft were returned to the Vienna area for inspection, new engines and repairs, and then hurriedly re-deployed to forward airfields in the Athens area. Finally, it was also necessary to create a network of airfields in the initial areas near the ports.

But one way or another, by mid-May, planning and all the main preparatory work was completed. D-Day was set for May 20.

The bombing of Crete, which began in early May, by May 20 had borne fruit: there were 13 damaged or broken ships in the Souda harbor. Burning oil filled the bay, clouds of black smoke rising from the roaring oil fires. Between 1st and 20 May "more than half of the British engineering<...>was sunk at sea or in a harbour. Civilian longshoremen were leaving the bombed-out docks; of 400 Australian and New Zealand volunteer soldiers who worked as "dock workers" during civilian life, shift brigades were formed. Ships sneaked into Suda Bay during the night hours, hastily unloaded, and before dawn again set off to seek refuge on the high seas. These stevedore soldiers provided a vital dispatch to Crete; every night, despite the bombing, a few days before the invasion, they unloaded 500-600 tons.

Starting May 14, the 8th Aviation Corps intensified its attacks on the bay, and included airfields and positions among its targets. air defense. Several Hurricanes and obsolete Gladiator biplanes flying up from Cretan airfields vigorously opposed the German bombers, but not for long. The disparity was too great. The British did not have enough fuel, not enough spare parts. To repair aircraft damaged in battle, others had to be dismantled. The pilots fell from fatigue and stress.

Royal air Force stated that until May 19 they shot down 23 enemy aircraft, but by this day there were four capable Hurricanes and three Gladiators in all of Crete. They have become a burden, not a possession. For this handful of aircraft, the defense had to provide an airfield and personnel to maintain it. On May 19, the remaining planes flew to Egypt.

The Germans won the air battle. On the day of the landing, an overwhelming advantage in the air, about 30: 1, was provided. However, the assault was still a very risky undertaking. The Luftwaffe, with virtually no naval power, set out to conquer an island located 100 miles off the Greek mainland. The defenders of Crete numbered more than 40,000 soldiers, and the invasion force, in the best scenario, only 22,750 people, 750 of which were to be delivered by gliders, 10,000 parachuted, 5,000 delivered by aircraft and 7,000 by sea. The landing force was divided into three groups with different tasks:

Mars Group: Central Group (commanded by General Süssmann), consisting of the main body air division and a small number of soldiers of the glider unit - the capture of Chania and Galatas, Rethymnon and the airstrip.

Group "Kometa": Western group (commanded by Major General Eugene Meindel), consisting of an offensive regiment, - the capture of the airfield of Malama and approaches to it.

Group "Orion": Eastern group (first under the command of Colonel Hans Brauer; later General Ringel was to take command), consisting of one parachute regiment and one mountain infantry regiment, - the capture of the city of Heraklion and its airfield.

The commander of the operation, General Ler, and the commanders subordinate to him placed their headquarters in Athens.

The invasion took place at 8:00 am on May 20, 1941. The skies filled with German planes "bomb-dropping, half-barrelling, and diving to bomb and strafing air defense positions." The heavy guns around Suda Bay, which had been fired continuously in previous weeks to protect the ships, were targeted by bombing; soon, from the bombing and machine-gun attacks, the positions were destroyed, and the anti-aircraft crews were destroyed. The main roads were attacked. “Before we knew what had happened, the sky was filled with German planes,” an eyewitness reported. - ... It seemed that there were hundreds of them, diving, buzzing and flying in different sides... Then a flock of large silver machines passed low over our heads ... They walked silently, like ghosts ... and their wings were very long and sharp.

Glider landing became the "point of the spear." 750 Germans from the glider battalion of the elite offensive regiment were dropped from the sky on Malam and Chania. They were slowly followed by Yu-52 military transport aircraft - "huge black animals with yellow noses" with a "charge" of 13-15 German paratroopers.

General Freiberg, who was watching the landing from a mountain behind Chania, was stunned: “... hundreds of planes, line by line, were approaching us ... We looked at them circling counterclockwise over the airfields of Malama, and then when they were only a few hundred feet above the ground, as if by magic, white spots suddenly appeared under them mixed with other colors; clouds of paratroopers began to slowly descend to the ground.

“The whole air trembled with the noise of engines, the howl of dive planes and bomb explosions; German strafing fighters bombarded the ground so hard that it was almost impossible to advance, except in short jerks and throws. Immediately, as a result of the bombardment, telephone communications were interrupted; Allied command lost control of the situation. "Brigadier Puttik, near Chania, knew little of what was going on, and Freiberg knew even less."

Tippelskirch recounts the landings on Crete: “Since the forces of the 8th Air Corps were not large enough to support the landing of paratroopers simultaneously in all four widely spaced places in Crete, the landings were made in two waves. First, one reinforced regiment of paratroopers was sent to the area south of Cania and to attack the airfield in Malama. At both points the Germans met with fierce resistance. In the Malame area, one battalion, dropped east of the airfield, fell into positions occupied by the enemy on the commanding heights and was almost completely destroyed during the landing. The paratroopers of another battalion, who landed to the west of the airfield, were forced, with pistols and grenades in their hands, to break through the enemy machine-gun positions to the dropped containers with weapons. Only the reserve battalion was dropped into an area where there was no enemy, was able to put itself in order and launch an offensive against the heights dominating the airfield. Further, he says: “During the fighting on the island itself, paratroopers faced enormous difficulties. They did not have special tropical equipment, and the troops suffered greatly from extreme heat. Dense vegetation made it easier for the enemy to camouflage. Since the enemy was expecting an attack from the air, he correctly positioned his forces and could not be taken by surprise. The attackers had to make do with their light weapons at first. It was assumed that they would undoubtedly meet a numerically superior enemy.

The gliders descended silently around 8:15-8:45 am. About 45-50 of them are near the Malama airfield, most in the dry bed of the Tavronitis River, others scattered further to the east. Some of them were wrecked; one, on its last landing, turned into a burning air torch; another was shot down by a Bofors anti-aircraft gun on the descent; many were riddled with machine-gun fire and became coffins for their pilots, "but most of these large birds, with box-shaped fuselages, wings with curved branches of olive trees, with ragged holes in the fuselages, threw off heavily armed people with motorcycles, flamethrowers, mortars" . The offensive regiment immediately accomplished two goals set for it: it captured the battery of Bofors anti-aircraft guns (40 mm), located at the mouth of the Tavronitis (artillerymen had rifles, but no cartridges), and a bridge across the river with some positions near the western side airfield. But the glider group, which was tasked with capturing the dominant local height - 107 (about 300 meters) - to control the runway, suffered heavy losses from the 22nd New Zealand Battalion and did not cope with the task. Already in the first hours of the battle, most of the German squad leaders were killed or wounded.

Following the gliders, Yu-52s appeared, flying below the angle of destruction of heavy anti-aircraft guns, and dropped the paratroopers. But some close groups of planes were an easy target for the Bofors anti-aircraft guns. The eastern part of the German pincers, which were to close at Malama airfield, were dropped far from their intended position, and most of its paratroopers landed among the New Zealanders or within easy reach of their guns. “Suddenly they were among us... a pair of legs appeared in the branches of a nearby olive tree. They were right above us. Rifles crackled around me. I had a machine gun, and it was all like shooting at ducks, ”said Captain Watson. "Messy Battle... series individual battles- flared up all day around Galatas. There was a "terrible panic". The commander of one New Zealand battalion killed five Germans in a few minutes; the battalion adjutant shot two without getting up from the table. "Dead Germans are everywhere - parachutes get tangled in the trees and still flutter in the wind ...".

Lieutenant Colonel von der Heidte reported: "... of my planes ... only three people landed unharmed."

All experts admit that the landing of the first wave was extremely unsuccessful, the whole operation that day was cheerful in the balance. The reasons seem to lie not only in wrong choice drop sites and pilot errors during landings. Prior to this, German paratroopers had never landed in close proximity to enemy positions, Crete showed that their equipment and armament tactics proved unsuitable for this kind of action.

During the landing, the paratroopers did not fire from the air. “In the overwhelming majority of cases, the German paratroopers landed without weapons. The fact is that the main German parachutes were the very imperfect RZ and the RZ-16 that entered the troops at the beginning of 1940. Their device did not allow them to be controlled in the air. The usual ring was missing, and the reserve parachute was not provided. The folded canopy of the parachute (in Crete the domes were painted in camouflage color) fit into a cloth bag, the top of the dome with the neck of the bag was tied with a thin sling, and the bag itself was rigidly connected to a halyard with a carabiner at the end. After jumping upside down, when 9 meters of the halyard fastened to the beam inside the aircraft were unwound, the weight of the soldier and the momentum created by the opposite movement of the aircraft sharply pulled out the contents of the satchel. The halyard with the bag remained hanging in the door of the aircraft, and the spirally coiled lines continued to unwind after the canopy was completely filled with air. All this time, the fighter continued to fly upside down, and only the fully straightened lines abruptly "pulled" him to his normal position. This method, compared to that used in the British and Soviet Airborne Forces, was quite primitive and dangerous, especially considering the force of impact when straightening the lines. Jumping upside down was not bravado, but a necessity. If the soldier was in a horizontal position at the time of opening the parachute, then the jerk would break him (head to feet) with a high probability of injury. And if he was flying like a soldier, then the same jerk would have thrown him upside down and would certainly have tangled him in the parachute lines. German parachutes did not allow speed control and landing site selection. The Germans were taught to land in the "lean forward" position, that is, in the last seconds before landing, the paratrooper had to turn into the wind, for which he had to make special "floating" movements with his arms and legs. He fell on his side and, according to the instructions, had to quickly roll forward. Therefore, the Germans wore massive shock-absorbing shields on their elbows and knees. Even with these pads, landing at a speed of 5-6 m/s (especially on the rocks and sharp stones of Crete) was associated with great risk. It was quite problematic to get rid of the parachute: for this it was necessary to quickly (until the wind filled the canopy) unfasten four uncomfortable buckles. But the problems of paratroopers did not end there. All equipment: weapons, grenades, ammunition, first aid kits, walkie-talkies - were dropped separately in special containers. This was done because of the fear of incomplete opening of the parachute, which could catch on the paratrooper's equipment. So after landing, the fighter had to find the first container that came across and arm himself. And before that, his only weapons were a 9 mm Parabellum 08 pistol and a sling cutter. Finding the container quickly was a matter of life and death. rare exception were especially experienced officers and non-commissioned officers who made jumps with weapons, but at the same time the submachine gun was unloaded, packed in a canvas case and tightly tied to the body.

By evening, after many hours of chaotic fighting, it was possible to sum up the first results. Tipelskirch writes: “The regiment dropped in the Kania region, although it entrenched itself, could not connect with the regiment that landed in Malam. By the end of the day, the airfield, on the occupation of which the landing of mountain shooters and, consequently, the success of the entire operation, depended, still remained in the hands of the British. However, two regiments managed, albeit at the cost of very heavy losses, to gain a foothold on the island. The situation has become extremely clear - if the Germans do not take the airfield in Malam, the operation can be considered a failure. Success or failure depended on whether the two battalions defending in the Maleme area, one of which had already suffered significant losses, could hold out until the next morning, when the rest of the parachute division was to land on Crete. The night from 20 to 21 gave the British real chance win the battle for Crete. A decisive attack on 2 exhausted battalions of German paratroopers would definitely save the situation.

Lieutenant Colonel L.U. Andrew, commander of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion, which held the airfield at Malama, knew that German glider soldiers were entrenched along Tavronitis and from the western part of the airfield. Throughout the night, he tried to organize an attack, but without a reliable connection, he did not get the necessary forces at his disposal. The colonel himself continued to hold a significant area. He considered quite definitely that he could count on only two of his five divisions; there was no communication with others, or he knew that the paratroopers had landed at their place of deployment and their losses were great. Most of his mortars and machine guns were out of order. An attempt to involve the nearby 23rd New Zealand Battalion in the upcoming attack was unsuccessful "the 23rd Battalion had many things to worry about." Finally, at 5 am on May 21, without waiting for reinforcements, Andrew led his men to attack. Two tanks, supported by a supply platoon of New Zealand infantry and infantry-formed anti-aircraft gunners, struck from the western edge of the Malam airport towards the bridge over the Tavronitis. Almost immediately it was discovered that in one tank two-pound shells did not enter the bolt mechanism and the turret did not rotate well. Therefore, they left him. The second tank... sat on its belly in a rocky river bed, the turret was jammed, and the crew left it. The infantry faced "withering fire in front and on the left". Eight of the nine men wounded - that's all that was left - retreated to the New Zealand line. Complete failure.

On the 21st, while the sky was still dark in the west, Ju-52s landed on the beach west of Tavronitis. Sandy coastal strip was extremely inconvenient for takeoff and landing, but several Junkers succeeded. One of them took way back wounded General Meindel. About eight in the morning the sky again blossomed with silk mushrooms of parachutes, Yu-52s dropped two more groups of paratroopers west of Tavronitis. They were to join the offensive regiment. The soldiers landed safely, out of range of the English guns, and immediately began to fight their way to the east. The offensive regiment expanded its line to the west, capturing virtually the entire landing strip and large area to the north, clearing it of the scattered remnants of the British. At 08:10, despite the fire of four 75-mm French, three 75-mm Italian and two 3.7-inch English mountain howitzers, Yu-52s began to land on the Malam strip.

When the offensive regiment attacked from the west, two more groups of paratroopers were dropped on the coast east of Malam. But again German intelligence miscalculated; paratroopers landed directly on the positions of the New Zealanders. “Everyone was there—officers,” says Captain Anderson, “cooks, dishwashers… the German fell less than ten feet away… I slapped him before he got off the ground… I barely survived the shock, how else one went down almost on my head, and I also put a bullet into him while he was unfastening. I know it's unfair, but that's how it happened." The Maori stubbornly hunted down the Germans and killed them with a gun or stabbed them with a bayonet. By dusk, most of the two groups were dead or wounded; about 80 survivors made their way to the outskirts of Pyrgos to join the Germans advancing from the west. And the offensive regiment, having captured Pyrgos and Malam, stopped, leaving after a strong attack about 200 dead Germans in front of the positions of the 23rd battalion.

Throughout 22 May, transport aircraft flew into Malam and the beaches near it and delivered two infantry battalions of the 5th Mountain Infantry Division, an engineer battalion and a parachute artillery battery. The landing strip, "littered with burning and wrecked aircraft, was cleared again and again with the help of captured tanks." All day the British attacked Malama airfield. The Maori battalion, with their "innate desire to fight," used grenades and edged weapons, paving their way with cries of "Ah! BUT!" and shooting from the hip.” But courage was not enough. On the coastal road and in the ruins of Pyrgos the bloody struggle broke out and died out again; to the north, where the height above the airfield attracted an attack, another New Zealand battalion attempted to make a flanking movement, but stopped in the middle of the morning when German hawks attacked and German machine-gun fire began; they were forced to retreat by noon on this hot May day. The deed was done, the chance was lost, the counterattack failed. "In the course of the counterattacks on Malam, it was not possible to capture a large territory."

On the 23rd of May, when it was completely daylight, the British lines east of Malam appeared to be completely pushed back. The New Zealanders, who had made such an effort the day before, were ordered to retreat to Chania in order to create a stronger defensive line. Freiberg had made the decision the previous night. He wanted to launch a counter-attack again, but before it could be carried out, Brigadier Puttik found that the coastal road - the main communication route between his two brigades - had been cut by the Germans; he feared that his first two battalions would be defeated. Therefore, before the morning of May 23, the order was given: "Withdraw to a new position, two and a half miles to the east." The German positions at Malam had strengthened: the British were now seven miles from the airfield and were building up German forces it became impossible to interfere.

The day of May 24 marked the end of a valiant defense of Castelli, a small port on the extreme western tip of the island, defended by the Greek 1st Regiment, an odd mixture of wild Cretan militias and a small New Zealand training unit. On May 20, 72 German paratroopers attempted to capture the city and thus secure the western flank. German offensive to Malam. But they were treated cruelly - they were all killed, wounded or captured. The Germans needed the city, and urgently. May 24 special forces, moving west from Malam, overcame the defenses, and Castelli fell.

On Sunday, May 25, on the sixth day of the battle, General Student, eager to fight, flew from Athens to Ringel's headquarters near Malam. It was a day of fierce fighting for the English and hopes forever shattered. German triple strike: in the direction of Alikan to cut off the retreat to the south coast; further east of Chania to cut off the coastal road between Souda and Rethymnon; from the Prison Valley and Malam in the direction of Galatas - was carried out with bitterness and full determination. Soon deserters streamed in from the British positions. It became an ominous symptom... "Suddenly the stream of deserters turned into a stream, many of them were in a panic." Colonel H.K. Kippenberger walked among them and shouted: "Stop for New Zealand!" and everything else that I have not heard, ”wrote Davin.

The matter was settled, but the British held on to withdraw, albeit beaten, badly battered, but in order. It was a day of attack, bitterness and disorderly counterattacks. Galatas fell under the onslaught of the Germans, but not for long. Scattered units of the New Zealand formations with two light tanks broke into the ruins of the city and took it in a bayonet attack, preventing the Germans from regrouping. Here is how Lieutenant Thomas wrote about it: “Those who climbed us fell on our bayonets, and bayonets with their eighteen-inch steel entered the throat or chest with the same<...>lightness ... as it was when we trained on straw dummies ... One of the guys from behind leaned heavily on me and fell near my legs, clutching his stomach. His throat rumbled for a second, he tried to restrain himself, but the wound in the stomach is very painful, and the person cannot control himself, and soon his moans blocked all the others. The German seemed to be completely stunned. But it was only brief victory. The British were defeated; that night they retreated to a distant position, and Galatas was left to the Germans, along with the bodies and ruins.

May 26 was the day when all hopes disappeared, even that thin thread that tied a person to duty. German air raids on forward positions and rear areas, on supply depots and lines of retreat were relentless, continuous and powerful; the nerves of the island's defenders were taut with endless terror as the Stukas swooped down and their bombs exploded. The front line moved further and further; dockers, logistics personnel were ordered to make their own way through the harsh mountains to Sfakion, a fishing village on the "south coast. Rumors spread; the discipline that makes a person fight to the end has weakened; some soldiers who have fallen behind their units did not try with them to reunite and, on the contrary, fled away, throwing their weapons.

General Freiberg, on orders from Egypt, was evacuated at 08:45 in the evening, along with some of his brigadiers and commanders of various units in Sunderland flying boats. He left under the command of Major General Weston of the Royal marines a heavily defeated rearguard, which still continued to try to push the enemy back from the heights of Sfakion, as well as the exhausted remnants of the troops on the beaches, in caves and in the mountains.

May 31, the twelfth day of the battle, was the last for the organized resistance of Crete. The Australians, a few light tanks, British marines and commandos held the last rear-guard positions in the passes and on the heights, but the German mountaineers began flanking movements in the direction coastlines and time was lost. In addition, RAF air cover was indispensable in the besieged Tobruk; on the night of May 31 to June 1, the last evacuation was to be carried out. Weston and his aides knew that at least another 5,500 men in Crete would have to be abandoned. The soldiers were "desperately hungry"; German patrols actually penetrated the location of the Crifors headquarters, located in caves above the coast. It was a terrible day. And the night was the final scene. The cruiser Phoebus, the mine-layer Abdiel, the destroyers Jekal, Kimberley, and Hotspur lay adrift near the dark shore. They took on board 4,000 people in 3 hours and 40 minutes and sailed to Egypt.

General Weston, in accordance with orders, was transferred that night in a flying boat, and the next day, June 1, Australian Lieutenant Colonel T.J. Walker, the battalion commander, acting in accordance with written orders, formally announced the surrender to an Austrian officer of the 100th Mountain Infantry Regiment. Everything was over.

LITERATURE:
Baldwin H. "Battles won and lost"
Liddell Hart B.G. "The Second World War"
Tippelskirch K. "History of World War II"
Utkin "Second World War"
Fuller J.F.C. "The Second World War 1939-1945: A Strategic and Tactical Review"